FM
stringclasses 43
values | page
int64 1
477
| text
stringlengths 6
8.45k
|
|---|---|---|
3-01 | 20 | Chapter 1
AGILITY
1-27. “Agility is the ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy” (ADP 3-90). Automated battle
management aids in ADA systems enable operators to execute engagements in a timely manner within the
planned defense design and its branches and sequels. Dynamic replanning to respond to unanticipated enemy
avenues of ingress, however, is less responsive primarily due to system centric architectures that do not allow
cross-leveling of resources across ADA systems.
AMD EMPLOYMENT TENETS
1-28. While commanders should always start AMD employment planning by applying the principles
described above, they should also strive to adhere to employment tenets (desirable attributes) when planning
and positioning their ADA resources. A tenet is a belief, dogma, or doctrine generally held to be true. The
AMD employment tenets are mutual support, overlapping fires and coverage, balanced fires, weighted
coverage, early engagement, defense in depth, and resilience.
1-29. The application of a specific tenet or tenets is METT-TC dependent. In some cases, the application of
one tenet may only be achieved at the expense of another, as noted below.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
1-30. Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the
adjacent weapon. For guns, this dead zone is usually small. For missiles, the dead zone may be large, and
mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover nonoperational weapons or weapons at
lower states of readiness. Mutual support, when applied to sensors has the same connotation; that is, sensors
are deployed to cover the dead zone of adjacent sensors. The application of sensor mutual support is
challenging due to the need to pair weapons and sensors by system and the scarcity of ADA systems.
OVERLAPPING FIRES AND OVERLAPPING COVERAGE
1-31. Weapons are positioned so that their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes
and ranges from which the enemy can attack or conduct surveillance operations, defense planners must apply
mutual supporting and overlapping fires vertically and horizontally. Overlapping coverage is the positioning
of sensors such that their coverage does not leave any seam in the defense that might be used by ingressing
threats. Overlapping fires and overlapping coverage should be planned during defense design. Achieving
overlapping coverage against ballistic threats is a challenge because of the need to orient primary target lines
toward ballistic launch zones and the system architectures that require system-specific sensors to support
system-specific weapons. Overlapping coverage against low altitude non-ballistic threats is challenged by
terrain impacts on ground-based sensor visibility and the aforementioned system-specific limitations.
BALANCED FIRES
1-32. Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions. This is necessary for AMD
in an area where the terrain does not canalize the threat or when the avenues of approach are unpredictable.
Against cruise missiles and other non-ballistic missile threats, balanced fires is a desired characteristic of
defense design.
WEIGHTED COVERAGE
1-33. Weapons coverage is combined and concentrated toward the most likely threat air avenues of approach
or direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander may risk leaving one direction of attack
unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage toward another direction. Weighted coverage is generally
desirable when designing defenses to defeat ballistic threats. Weighted coverage and balanced fires are not
mutually achievable, requiring the defense designer to give up most aspects of one to achieve the other. |
3-01 | 21 | Army Air and Missile Defense
EARLY ENGAGEMENT
1-34. Sensors and weapons are positioned so they can engage the threat before ordnance release or friendly
target acquisition. Early engagements enable destruction of enemy platforms over enemy forces and
unoccupied areas, thereby reducing the possibility of friendly collateral damage and fratricide. As with
weighted coverage, early engagement is achieved at the expense of balanced fires.
DEFENSE IN DEPTH
1-35. Sensors and weapons are positioned so that the threat is exposed to a continuously increasing volume
of fire as it approaches the friendly protected asset or force. Defense in depth decreases the probability that
attacking missiles, aircraft, or RAM will reach the defended asset or force.
RESILIENCE
1-36. Resilience is the quality of the defense to maintain continuity of operations regardless of changes
in or unanticipated tactics by enemy air or losses of critical air and missile defense components. ADA
planners must understand the capabilities of the system(s) that are being deployed in a defense design, and
plan for deployment and employment of components to enable these capabilities to be exploited during
mission execution. Resilience is a key determinant when considering which tenet (or tenets) to use in in
maintaining the defense.
ADA OPERATIONS
1-37. Unified action (joint) operations entail the participation of the appropriate joint forces operating as a
cohesive team. AMD is an inherent function in joint operations, requiring the interdependent capabilities of
each service’s AMD component.
1-38. The ADA force is the primary land-based contributor to AMD. It executes its role and missions within
the context of unified land operations, as discussed below.
ADA IN SUPPORT OF UNIFIED ACTION
1-39. “Threats to U.S. and allied interests throughout the world can sometimes only be countered by U.S.
forces able to respond to a wide variety of challenges along a conflict continuum that spans from peace to
war” (JP 3-0). Within the conflict continuum, the range of military operations extends from military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in times of peace, through crisis response and limited
contingency operations, to large-scale combat operations in times of war (see FM 3-0 for discussion of these
operations). Joint operations constitute the integrated actions of the U.S. armed forces in all of these.
1-40. ADA forces provide concerted defensive capabilities in the air domain and in the littoral areas of the
sea domain in support of Army operations. The following paragraphs discuss ADA actions and activities in
support of the four broad categories of Army operations: operations to shape, operations to prevent, large-
scale ground combat operations (defense and offense), and operations to consolidate gains, all of which
ultimately lead to winning.
1-41. Operations to shape. “Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security
operations and deterrence missions, and actions intended to assure friends, build partner capacity and
capability, and promote regional stability” (FM 3-0). Army shape operations, though most prevalent in
military engagement and security cooperation activities, are executed continuously throughout all of the joint
phases. ADA forces help shape operations by supporting the assurance of friends, building partner capacity
and capabilities, and promoting regional stability. Shaping actions are generally planned and coordinated at
the AAMDC or ADA brigade levels and executed by ADA battalions. AMD is a key capability our joint
forces and allies want on the ground to build partner capacity in advance of hostilities. ADA forces build
partner capacity through security cooperation activities such as joint air defense exercises, on-going training,
and leader development of multinational AMD forces. Partner capacity and capabilities are further enhanced
through their procurement of technologically advanced ADA systems and the enrollment of our partners’
AMD Soldiers in ADA schools. |
3-01 | 22 | Chapter 1
1-42. Operations to prevent. Operations to prevent “include all activities to deter an adversary’s undesirable
actions. They are typically conducted in response to activities that threaten unified action partners and require
the deployment or repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight if
deterrence fails” (FM 3-0). ADA forces are a preeminent means of deterrence in support of the U.S.’s
commitment to preserve the peace by providing assurance of protection for our forces and allies. In that
regard, ADA forces frequently serve as flexible deterrent options to demonstrate U.S. resolve. Forward
stationed ADA units, such as Patriot battalions, THAAD batteries, and AN/TPY-2 forward-based mode radar
batteries, further serve as a deterrent to our enemies by dramatically reducing their expectation of success.
The deployed ADA forces are generally tailored as task forces with the right sizes and mix of capabilities to
deter or, when required, defeat the projected air and missile threats.
1-43. Presence, profile and posture define and describe the means by which ADA units can shape the security
environment through physical and visual actions. Both profile and posture address the manner that units,
systems, and Soldiers are present. Profile is the degree of presence, both in terms of quantity and quality. In
offensive and defensive operations, ADA units can tailor their profiles in the number of forces or effects.
Military deception can play a significant role by allowing commanders to make their force appear larger or
more substantial than it is or to keep the profile to a minimum. Posture dictates how units or Soldiers appear
to others and how they act towards them and is determined by the operational environment. See FM 3-13 for
additional information.
1-44. While prevent as discussed above focuses on an overseas theater, operations to prevent for joint AMD
forces begin in the homeland. Prevent in the homeland denies an enemy’s ability to successfully attack a
geopolitical area or installation. Army ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) systems are deployed in the
United States to counter potential long-range ballistic missile threats, such as intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). ADA systems are emplaced in and around Washington D.C. to protect the National Capital
Region against air threats. Navy and Air Force elements add capabilities to protect against air and ballistic
missile threats.
1-45. Large-scale ground combat operations. “Large-scale combat operations require the execution of
multiple tasks synchronized and converged across multiple domains to create opportunities to destroy,
dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate enemy forces” (FM 3-0). Army forces conduct decisive action to seize the
initiative and dominate the enemy.
1-46. “Joint force commanders (JFC)s strive to achieve air, maritime, space, and cyberspace superiority early
to allow the joint force to conduct land operations without prohibitive enemy interference” (FM 3-0).
Conditions preceding large-scale ground combat operations vary depending on the threat. Some adversaries
possess significant capabilities to employ anti-access and area denial strategies. ADA has a critical role in
countering anti-access/area denial activities and assuring access into a given region. The joint warfighting
force’s ability to conduct force projection is reliant on ADA’s ability to provide force protection. When
deployed, ADA units will be integrated with joint and multinational AMD forces to improve and extend
surveillance and defend land, air, and sea bases that support operations in an anti-access and area-denial
environment.
1-47. ADA is a significant enhancer in the battle to achieve air superiority, or at a minimum, maintain air
parity throughout large-scale ground combat operations. Large-scale ground combat operations require the
employment of a considerable amount of ADA forces to protect the most critical theater assets, as designated
by the JFC. An AAMDC will be positioned in the theater of operations to provide overall command of
deployed ADA forces. ADA brigades and battalions may be placed in supporting roles to Army corps and
divisions in accordance with mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations (METT-TC) conditions and the JFC’s directives. In addition, ADA forces at
battery and platoon levels may be deployed with BCTs. See chapters 5 through 10 for further discussion of
the roles, capabilities, and AMD operations conducted by the ADA echelons, from the AAMDC to ADA
platoon.
1-48. Operations to consolidate gains. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary
operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition
of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains generally signifies a greater focus
on security and stability tasks than on combat operations. ADA forces support operations to consolidate gains
by maintaining protection of friendly forces and critical assets as areas are secured. ADA formations, in |
3-01 | 23 | Army Air and Missile Defense
accordance with the priorities for defense and available assets, may be positioned in corps or division
consolidation areas to defend against enemy residual air and missile capabilities. While an enemy may
possess few of these capabilities – the majority having been destroyed or disabled during the dominate phase
(large-scale ground combat) of an operation, an attack by a single missile may have a catastrophic impact on
a maneuver formation, C2 facility, or geopolitical asset.
ADA IN SUPPORT OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
1-49. Unified land operations apply “landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and
establish conditions that accomplish the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives” (ADP 3-0). Within the
context of unified land operations, an operational framework is used to describe operations by echelon in
time and space for an area of operations and areas of influence or interest. Land force commanders establish
close, deep, support, and consolidation areas within their areas of operations to describe the physical
arrangement of their forces over time and their forces’ respective roles and missions. Figure 1-1 displays
ADA organizations overlaid across the areas.
Figure 1-1. ADA echelons in support of a theater of operations
1-50. SHORAD forces are positioned with division or brigade maneuver formations in the close area, where
the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat. ADAM cell personnel in the BCT plan
and coordinate the support of SHORAD or other ADA forces and relay pertinent AMD information and early
warning of enemy air activity to maneuver formations. Patriot units may add supplementary protection of the
maneuvering forces from their designated locations in the corps or theater areas and/or may be repositioned
to sustain coverage. In support of the fight in the corps or theater deep area, the AAMDC or ADA brigade
calculate prospective launch areas for ballistic missiles and nominate said areas for subsequent targeting by
long-range artillery and aviation assets. The AAMDC and ADA brigade will also assess likely enemy air
avenues of approach and missile operating areas from the corps’ deep area into the close, support, and
consolidation areas and design defenses that are positioned to negate surveillance or attack. ADA forces in
the support and consolidation areas provide continuous defense of sustainment facilities and participate in
the requisite security and stability tasks. SHORAD forces generally protect assets in the division and brigade
areas, while Patriot and THAAD units maintain coverage of assets in the division, corps, and theater areas.
See FM 3-0 for additional discussion of the operational framework, its various considerations, and its
operational areas. |
3-01 | 24 | Chapter 1
1-51. The role of ADA forces spans the full range of operations and is a critical enabler in the Army’s ability
to execute its tasks. ADA forces support Army, joint, and multinational forces in the execution of offensive,
defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities operations. They facilitate the conduct of decisive
and sustainable land operations by Army and other land forces. As with joint operations, the tasks may vary
by type of operation and across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. However, irrespective of
type operation, ADA forces fundamentally defend friendly forces and other designated critical assets and
engage and destroy air and missile threats, ranging from ICBMs to RAM munitions.
1-52. ADA key tasks in support of the defense include:
* Providing AMD coverage of designated critical assets.
* Providing and disseminating early warning to all affected forces.
* Providing situational awareness of the airspace.
* Contributing to engagement information (classification, discrimination, and identification).
* Determining, predicting, and reporting enemy air and missile launch points and impact points.
* Proactively engaging threat air and missile platforms before they attack or surveil.
* Integrating joint and multinational capabilities into the defense design.
1-53. ADA is a key enabler to forces conducting offensive operations. ADA tasks include:
* Providing AMD coverage of maneuver forces and their critical assets, to include denying
surveillance by threat air platforms.
* Developing targeting information in support of attack operations.
* Defending forward-based infrastructure, such as lines of communications and command nodes,
from air and missile attacks.
* Determining, predicting, and reporting threat air and missile launch points and projected impact
points.
* Providing early warning and surveillance.
1-54. ADA key tasks in support of stability operations include:
* Providing forward deployed or forward stationed ADA forces to serve as flexible deterrent
options. This is a prelude to unified land operations and serves as an initial condition for shaping
operations.
* Supporting security assistance and building partnership capacity efforts through training,
education, participation in exercises, and related activities with multinational AMD forces.
* Providing AMD protection for deployed forces and civilian assets and areas from aerial threats,
such as RAM attacks.
* Providing or supporting Army-common tasks related to essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief efforts.
1-55. ADA key tasks in defense support of civilian authority operations focus on:
* Providing sensor surveillance in support of civilian law enforcement agencies – primarily to U.S.
Customs and Border Protection organizations along the U.S. borders. ADA sensors are ideally
suited to provide surveillance support to counter-drug operations. Sentinel radars can detect and
track low-flying aircraft approaching and penetrating the border.
* Deploying sensors (for example, Sentinel) in support of National security special events and
special event assessment rating events, such as the Olympics and Super Bowl.
* Planning for transition to active defense capabilities when properly directed and authorized.
1-56. Fulfilling the ADA role hinges on the ability of ADA forces to conduct effective C2 across both
engagement operations and force operations. Engagement operations are functions and activities required
to execute the air, missile, and counter-surveillance battle. Force operations are actions and functions
required to plan, coordinate, prepare for and sustain the total air and missile defense mission. See
paragraphs 2-3 (on page 2-2) through 2-24 (on page 2-6) for additional discussion of force operations and
paragraphs 2-25 (on page 2-7) through 2-38 (on page 2-10) for engagement operations. |
3-01 | 25 | Army Air and Missile Defense
TRAINING
1-57. The ADA branch requires agile and adaptive Soldiers and Leaders, who are masters of their craft and
who are comfortable operating in complex, often ambiguous, environments. Only through an outcome-based
training and education system that stresses the development of cognitive skills will this requirement be met.
1-58. The foundation for individual and collective training is the education provided by the Army’s
institutional education system. Instructors in the various institutional courses introduce, facilitate, or enhance
the knowledge of ADA systems, ADA organizations, and AMD operations to resident students. The
institutional domain is responsible for providing Soldiers and Leaders with the qualification and preparation
for entry into a unit - they teach the ADA competencies.
1-59. Operational force training focuses on collective training conducted at home station, at maneuver
combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed.
Live, virtual, and constructive methods of training are used to attain the desired realism and synchronization
of critical tasks across echelons that will facilitate the levels of readiness required to execute wartime
missions. ADA Leaders and Soldiers, as individuals and in teams, must be knowledgeable of and capable of
executing the actions associated with mission command and C2 – the principles of mission command and
the authorizations and directives of Army, joint, and multinational C2 elements, particularly with respect to
the AMD kill chain; force operations – planning, coordinating, and sustaining activities for the total AMD
mission; and engagement operations – coordinating and executing the engagements of air and missile threats.
1-60. Commanders at all echelons are responsible for ensuring that their units are capable of performing their
missions. Commanders cannot delegate this responsibility. Commanders are directly responsible and
accountable for all aspects of unit training including the certification/qualification of their individuals,
sections, platoons, batteries, and battalions. They understand and employ the principles of unit training and
leader development. Through guidance and direction, commanders drive the training management process.
They directly observe and participate in the unit's training and leader development to better assess mission
readiness and help their subordinates improve. They understand that unit training and leader development
are inextricably linked – that good training can develop good leaders, and good leaders are the key to good
unit training. They focus the unit's efforts to optimize available time, ensuring their units train the right tasks
to meet mission requirements and to support the next higher commander's intent. Each commander
determines what essential supporting collective tasks must be trained to attain the required levels of objective
training requirements for mission-essential task list proficiency. Commanders look for every opportunity to
coach and teach subordinates as they plan, prepare, execute, and assess training, employing the mission
command philosophy. They give their subordinate leaders the commander's intent and the resources–
including time–to plan, prepare, and conduct the training necessary to develop unit proficiency. Leaders are
also trained and educated in the Army Ethic, culture, and character development. They personally create and
sustain a positive command climate in their ADA units and organizations. Commander/leader involvement
makes a quantitative and qualitative difference in unit training and leader development.
1-61. The proficiencies of individual Soldiers, Leaders, and teams/crews in the operational force are gauged
through a certification program. The certification process uses gunnery tables and guidance from higher
echelons in the conduct of formal evaluations. In preparation for these periodic formal evaluations, informal
assessments are generally conducted by standardization officers at ADA battalions and Leaders at lower
echelons. Soldiers and Leaders receive their individual certifications by their units. Teams require
certification by the next higher command or a command two levels higher based on the ADA system they
use. Re-certification is conducted periodically and is also required if an individual is assigned to a new unit
or team, notified of deployment, experiences a major system change to his/her assigned equipment, or as
directed by the command. While it is optimal to certify as crews, commanders have the flexibility to retain
unit/crew certification as individual crew members rotate in/out, as long as proper evaluation protocols are
in place. |
3-01 | 27 | Chapter 2
Air and Missile Defense Operations Process
This chapter addresses the planning, preparing, executing, and assessing phases of the
Army’s operations process. These are presented in terms of force operations and
engagement operations. General aspects and applications of both follow. ADA
echelon-specific discussions of force and engagement operations are presented in
chapters 5 through 10.
AMD OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK
2-1. The Army's framework for exercising C2 is the operations process - the major C2 activities performed
during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0).
Integral to AMD C2 are force operations and engagement operations. Force operations set the conditions for
successful and sustained engagement operations. They include all actions needed to conduct parallel and
collaborative planning, coordination, and integration with Army, joint, and multinational forces. Engagement
operations constitute the process of engaging air and missile threats. Engagement operations include
establishing an air picture, determining the classification and identification of all tracks, evaluating the threat
these tracks pose to the defended assets, and exercising engagement control over subordinate units.
Categorization as force operations or engagement operations provides a framework to assist in
defining/establishing responsibilities and conducting activities. However, not all activities or tasks are clearly
distinguishable as force or engagement operations; some may span both categories depending upon the phase
of operation or METT-TC considerations.
2-2. Figure 2-1 on page 2-2 depicts the planning and execution focus of the ADA echelons; the two curves
represent the traditional activity level of the ADA echelons as they carry-out the AMD fight. Force operations
and engagement operations for each ADA echelon are described in greater detail in its respective chapter,
beginning with chapter 5. |
3-01 | 28 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-1. ADA echelons-planning versus execution
Note. With the introduction of IBCS, the force and engagement operations curves “flatten”
somewhat, though the AAMDC and ADA brigade remain primarily planning headquarters and
ADA battalion and below execution organizations. Enhanced engagement operations capabilities
are provided to the AAMDC and the ADA brigade. Each may now apply dynamic engagement
control over radars and sensors, though generally this control will continue to be exercised at the
ADA battalion and below level. The AAMDC and the ADA brigade commanders may also be
given engagement authority as METT-TC dictates. (See page 4-9, para 4-53 for more
information.) Force operations capabilities are increased at battery and below levels.
FORCE OPERATIONS
2-3. Force operations begin with detailed planning within and between the ADA echelons and
synchronization of such plans with other affected Army, joint, and multinational elements. Planning is a
continuous process that begins with the receipt of a mission and the commander’s guidance and is done as
thoroughly as time allows. Successful planning requires an appreciation of the simultaneous nature of
operations, awareness of the mission, anticipation of future events, and an understanding of the operational
framework. |
3-01 | 29 | Air and Missile Defense Operations Process
2-4. Force operations continue, as described below, with such other tasks as designing defenses, task
organizing a unit to meet mission requirements, initiating support relationships, moving the unit to the area
of operations, establishing communications networks, and sustaining the unit. Each task may be executed
before, during, or after the initiation of engagement operations.
AMD PLANNING AND DESIGN PROCESS
AMD Planning and Design Process
2-5. ADA commanders and staffs develop AMD plans based on
Military Decision Making
the guidance of their higher headquarters and in accordance with
Process.
their supporting or supported relationships. The military decision
Integrated Defense Design.
making process integrates the activities of the commander, staff,
Criticality, Vulnerability,
subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to understand
Threat.
the situation and mission, develop and compare courses of action,
Troop Leading Procedures.
decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission, and
produce an operation plan or order for execution (ADP 5-0).
2-6. Any AMD operation begins with detailed planning in collaboration with joint and multinational AMD
partners. Coordinated planning, such as war-gaming, is conducted in anticipation of future operations to
identify potential issues or concerns and plan the way ahead. Planning considers all AMD operational
elements, as appropriate, across the levels of war. Planning considerations at the operational level may be
more extensive than those at the tactical level as a primary threat could be ballistic missiles, and coordination
and integration must be conducted with joint and multinational AMD elements. Planning at the tactical level
is nevertheless necessary to develop defenses against those aerial platforms that may threaten tactical units.
At the operational level, the AAMDC directs ADA planning priorities and focus. The AAMDC identifies the
geostrategic picture and provides suitable guidance to deployed ADA forces in concert with directives from
the area air defense commander (AADC) to enable operational and tactical level planning. The result of this
planning process is an integrated defense design that leverages all available joint AMD capabilities to most
effectively defeat aerial threats from ballistic missiles and high-performance aircraft down to UASs and RAM
threats at the tactical level. At the tactical (maneuver) level, much of the planning resides with the ADAM
cell in BCTs to enable AMD where feasible and to leverage inherent non-dedicated, active AMD capabilities
(combined arms fires and maneuver force Stinger teams) for protection of the maneuver forces. The ADA
personnel in ADAM cells assist the brigade commanders and their staffs in planning support by ADA forces
or general coverage by SHORAD sensors and shooter systems, if such support is allocated.
2-7. AMD planning involves joint, multinational, and Army units including service or functional
component commands, AAMDCs, ADA brigades, and ADA battalions. Defense design tools are available
in an array of planners, ranging from Command and Control Battle Management and Communications
(C2BMC) planner at the strategic level to the air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS). The Patriot
tactical planning workstation and THAAD portable planner at the operational and tactical levels provide
automated means to develop effective plans and alternative plans and to respond to dynamically changing
tactical situations. These design tools are domain specific (C2BMC in ballistic missile defense planning) or
system specific (Patriot tactical planning workstation for Patriot AMD planning, AMDWS for general
defense planning and specific Avenger planning, and THAAD portable planner for THAAD planning.), thus
inducing a strong hierarchical planning structure.
2-8. The criticality, vulnerability, and threat methodology is used to allocate ADA forces to mission
requirements. This methodology begins with the combatant commander’s nomination of high value assets
across all deployed forces and considers political and geographic aspects as well as military assets. These
high value assets are incorporated into a critical asset list – a prioritized list of assets or areas, normally
identified by phase of the operation and approved by the joint force commander, that should be defended
against air and missile threats (JP 3-01). After receiving all nominated critical assets, the methodology
considers and ranks the importance of these assets based upon:
* Criticality − how critical is the asset to the JFC in the execution of the mission and plan for
accomplishing that mission? Criticality can change over the course of a campaign. For example,
early entry may place a higher value on a limited number of access points, but, as the theater
matures and more access points are opened, the criticality of a particular access point may diminish
significantly. |
3-01 | 30 | Chapter 2
* Vulnerability − how vulnerable is the asset? Vulnerability assesses an asset’s susceptibility and
recoverability. Susceptibility includes such factors as the asset’s or force’s hardness and its ability
to disperse or displace to another position. Recoverability includes such factors as the time it
would take to repair or recover from damage by enemy attack and if the asset can be replicated
elsewhere should it be damaged by enemy attack.
* Threat − how likely is the asset to be surveilled and/or attacked by enemy air and missile threats?
By what types of threats? In what quantities?
2-9. Missions and threats are analyzed, and forces are sized, matched, and allocated accordingly. The
resulting linkage of ADA forces to designated critical assets constitutes the defended asset list – a listing of
those assets from the critical asset list prioritized by the joint force commander to be defended with the
resources available (JP 3-01). The JFC further defines the required level of protection for each asset on the
critical asset list based on mission variables. For ballistic missile defense, for instance, the levels range from
level 0 (no active defense; accept risk) to level 4 (near leak-proof defense requiring upper and lower tier
systems operating in an integrated defense). The AADC implements the JFC-directed protection level for
each asset on the defended asset list based on METT-TC.
Note. As formally defined and used hereafter, the critical asset list and defended asset list present
formalized lists of prioritized assets at the theater level that require defense against air and missile
threats. However, commanders/leaders at all echelons and in all services identify their most critical
assets that require protection. These assets are compiled into prioritized lists, which though having
different names, are the equivalents of the critical asset and defended asset lists. For instance in
the Army corps, the protection cell and work group develop a protection prioritization list and
protected asset list. See ADP 3-37 for more information.
2-10. ADA battery commanders and subordinate leaders use troop leading procedures to translate the
integrated plan into executable actions to achieve an integrated defense. Troop leading procedures are a
dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation
(ADP 5-0). See ADP 5-0 for process details.
TASK ORGANIZATION
2-11. The METT-TC variables provide the basis for analyzing and selecting the right capabilities to be
deployed and employed. Knowing the mission, threat, and operational environment allows commanders to
identify and plan for an optimal capability package. Deployment considerations must also factor in the
availability of strategic lift – the deployment carriers – and a suitably packaged ADA force to facilitate an
operational defense as rapidly as possible. This package may consist of a complete battalion-level task force,
a task-organized battery, or sub-sets of a battery. Task organization must consider elimination of exploitable
seams in the defense coverage. Seams can be created in azimuth (for example, Patriot sectored coverage), in
altitude (ingress below or above a sensor’s coverage), and by threat capabilities (for example, use of a threat
mixed package that includes platforms with capabilities that exceed those of the sensor or shooter in a
defense).
2-12. Current capabilities to task organize enable coordinated but not integrated defenses. Coordinated
defenses are fought at the system level; for example, a system such as Patriot or Avenger is selected to engage
a threat and other systems in the defense monitor the engaging system’s engagement sequence to decide the
need for follow-on actions.
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
2-13. Support relationships define specific arrangements and responsibilities between supporting and
supported Army units. Though traditionally focused on Army missions, these relationships are also
applicable to ADA support of joint and multinational forces. There are four support relationships: direct
support, general support, general support-reinforcing, and reinforcing. Commanders specify and change
support relationships through task organization. ADP 5-0 provides expanded details on Army support
relationships. |
3-01 | 31 | Air and Missile Defense Operations Process
2-14. ADA units in a direct support role provide dedicated support to a specific element of the force.
Supporting ADA units coordinate their movement and positioning with the supported unit. A SHORAD
platoon, for example, may be placed in direct support of a mechanized task force. The platoon will provide
dedicated support to the task force, and the platoon leader will position the platoon in accordance with the
task force commander’s concept of the operation. Additionally, a Patriot battalion can be placed in a direct
support mission to the AADC.
2-15. ADA units in a general support role provide support to the force as a whole and not to any particular
subordinate echelon unit or element. ADA units in general support commonly protect theater, corps, or
division level assets. They are positioned by the ADA commander.
2-16. ADA units with general support-reinforcing missions provide support for the force as a whole and,
secondarily, augment the support provided by other ADA units. ADA units must coordinate with the
augmented ADA units to reinforce the coverage of assets in the area of operations
2-17. ADA units in reinforcing roles augment the coverage of other ADA units and strengthen AMD
capabilities of the force. Reinforcing ADA units are positioned to protect one or more of the reinforced units’
priorities as specified by supported ADA unit commanders.
MOVEMENT
2-18. Movement is executed by the most expedient means needed, in accordance with the JFC’s
requirements for AMD. Strategic lift may be designated to transport sub-sets of ADA batteries or entire ADA
units. Due to the large size of many ADA components and systems, and when time is available, transportation
by means of self-movement, rail movement, or sea vessels for overseas deployments is likely to be more
economical and efficient.
2-19. When such stationing or deployments cannot be achieved within a timely manner, the JFC will rely on
Navy AMD assets to protect early entry assets until land-based ADA capabilities can be deployed.
POSITIONING
2-20. ADA units are forward deployed to an area of operations and positioned to best protect the designated
assets against the projected air and missile threats in accordance with detailed defense designs. Sensor and
launcher placements are selected to maximize surveillance, tracking, and engagements. In designing a
defense, sensors are positioned to provide surveillance and fire control tracking capability sufficient to protect
assigned assets and prevent gaps in the coverage. Sensors are emplaced on terrain that provides the best
longest range line-of-sight in all directions. Shooters are then positioned to optimize the defense of the
defended assets, enabling lethal coverage over the assigned assets and extending firepower through as much
of the defense coverage area as possible. The AMD employment tenets and latest intelligence reports inform
the defense design. Patriot and THAAD forces may use a weighted defense to counter ballistic missile threats
from known locations or areas, or a balanced defense when there is a potential for multiple types of threats
coming from various approaches. Because of the nature of their target set, SHORAD forces may be able to
rely more heavily on the tendency of low flying threats to be canalized by terrain due to their flight level and
maneuverability. This may allow SHORAD forces to predict the air avenues of approach for enemy air threats
and position forward of the defended asset, weight coverage, and achieve early engagement before the threat
is able to reach its ordnance release line. Communications assets interconnect launchers, sensors, and C2
nodes to enable an integrated defense. Tools embedded in C2 capabilities, such as the Patriot tactical planning
workstation and AMDWS, enable automated support to defense planning and defense design to both optimize
component emplacement and to evaluate defense design alternatives. Software functionality is system
specific, requiring manual steps to develop an integrated defense design across a task force containing
multiple system capabilities. When planning, positioning, and determining how often ADA units will be
required to conduct survivability moves, units take into account the range of enemy indirect fires.
2-21. Positioning ADA units with maneuver forces (generally the case for SHORAD units) or on or near
installations (generally for Patriot and THAAD units) allows the units to take advantage of security measures
and forces on those installations. ADA units have limited self-defense capabilities and thus must rely on
others for that protection. Antiterrorism and force protection considerations are extremely important given
the ever present threat of terrorist attacks and the need to protect ADA units at all echelons from becoming |
3-01 | 32 | Chapter 2
targets of opportunity. Once in place, ADA forces should implement passive defense measures, such as
camouflage and protective works, and continuously improve them as long they remain at a location.
Deception, camouflage, and concealment should be used as much as possible to deny or limit the ability of
enemy surveillance assets to identify sensor, shooter, and C2 components and ultimately target them.
Emission control measures should be initiated to reduce the electromagnetic signatures of the sensors and
command posts (CP).
DECEPTION
2-22. Deception operations are designed to mislead enemy decision makers by distorting, concealing, and
falsifying friendly intentions, capabilities, and dispositions. The objective is to mislead the enemy
commander, inducing the enemy to conduct activities that unwittingly serve friendly purposes.
2-23. ADA units plan and conduct deception activities in conjunction with movement, cover, concealment,
and other passive defense operations to disguise friendly capabilities and counter enemy capabilities. In the
context of tactical deception, ADA units may position weapons systems in locations forward of those
typically associated with a point defense. For example, Avengers, employed with Patriot in an integrated
defense of a fixed or semi-fixed asset, are generally positioned to deny an enemy low-level access to the asset
and to defend the Patriot system. Moving Avengers forward along likely enemy air avenues of approach
provides early and unexpected (to the enemy) engagement opportunities. ADA units conduct deception in
support of operations security by emission control, “blinking” sensors, and employing counter-
countermeasure. Emission control of sensors in the defense limits sensor radiation until the last moment in
an engagement sequence, thus reducing or denying enemy targeting. Radiating multiple sensors in a defense
at different times and different locations hinders potential lock-on by anti-radiation missiles. Employing
counter-countermeasure capabilities mitigates the effects of enemy jamming or other electromagnetic
deception. See FM 3-13.4 for additional information on Army military deception operations.
2-24. A summary of the key force operations tasks, with respect to planning and preparing for aerial
engagements, is presented in table 2-1. The tasks are representative of those that are conducted across the
ADA force, though not necessarily be each of the ADA echelons. See chapters 5 through 9 for additional
discussions of force operations by each. |
3-01 | 33 | Air and Missile Defense Operations Process
Table 2-1. AMD planning and preparing tasks
AMD Planning and Preparing Tasks
22 December 2020 FM 3-01 2-7
nalP
Perform criticality, vulnerability, and threat assessment.
Support development of CAL by phase.
Provide AMD running estimates.
Develop ROE/identification matrix.
Conduct AMD IPB.
Assess availability of AMD assets by conducting a defense laydown.
Determine levels of risk and means to mitigate.
Propose DAL to commander.
Request additional AMD resources if levels of protection cannot be achieved.
Allocate AMD assets.
Establish command and support relationships for subordinate units.
Develop supporting scheme of maneuver.
Develop initial defense design.
Nominate targets for attack operations in support of offensive counter air development.
Support refinement and adjustment of CAL/DAL.
Develop sensor and communication plans.
Plan deception techniques.
Develop AMD plans/AMD appendices to OPLANs.
Plan engagement zones with joint and Army commanders.
eraperP
Implement identification and engagement authorizations, weapons control statuses, air
defense warnings, and ROE.
Coordinate with supported commander.
Position sensors and shooters and implement appropriate deception measures.
Coordinate with joint and multinational AMD forces.
Refine defense design and adjust positions as required.
Establish sensor communications and early warning network.
Conduct ROC drills with supported force.
Implement airspace control order and special instructions.
Conduct surveillance of airspace.
Implement alert states or readiness conditions.
AMD air and missile defense
CAL critical asset list
DAL defended asset list
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
OPLANs operation plans
ROC rehearsal of concept
ROE rules of engagement
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
2-25. ADA systems generally do not fight as independent AMD fire units. They are employed in integrated
defenses with other ADA systems, such as Patriot and Avenger, or with the AMD systems of other services
or multinational partners (for example, THAAD and the Navy’s Aegis). While SHORAD systems can fight
as independent fire units, their capabilities are greatly improved by fighting as integrated formations with
Patriot and THAAD forces or joint and multinational partners.
2-26. Defenses are designed to provide the greatest degree of protection of designated assets against probable
air and missile threats. Ideally, defenses have the requisite capabilities to overmatch threat capabilities and
deny an enemy’s expectation of successful air and missile operations. Integrated defenses are developed for |
3-01 | 34 | Chapter 2
protection. Integrated active AMD measures are established and executed concurrently with attack operations
and passive defenses.
EXECUTION
2-27. Ground-based or aerial sensors, or combinations of both when available, are employed to perform
surveillance of the airspace and provide focused early warning to at-risk forces. The sensors provide
engagement authorities the time to make engagement decisions that deny threat platforms the ability to see
or impact the defended assets.
2-28. These engagement authorities function as a vertically and horizontally integrated kill chain. The kill
chain is the successive linkage of commanders who can authorize engagements of air and missile
threats. Engagement decisions are made by the designated engagement authority in the kill chain, providing
operational control of and, ultimately, directions to the shooter. Integrated sensors, shooters, and C2 networks
will allow for greatly increased engagement options. As such, engagement authorization must be delegated
to the lowest level possible.
2-29. Proactive engagements are conducted in accordance with theater-level rules of engagement (ROE) and
complementary directives. Engagements are conducted by the best shooter, that weapon system that can best
deliver the appropriate effects to achieve maximum attrition at the right time and place, and as far forward as
possible, to ensure keep-out ranges and keep-out altitudes. Keep-out range is the horizontal distance from
a defended asset at which a successful engagement denies an adversary's desired weapons effects
against the defended asset. A keep-out range is a key defense design consideration for cruise missiles. It
also allows AMD systems to counter enemy aerial surveillance and reconnaissance platforms beyond the
range at which they can surveil an asset and beyond the engagement capability of a defending AMD system,
contributing to the overall ability of friendly forces to see first. Keep-out altitude is the vertical distance
above a defended asset at which a successful engagement denies an adversary's desired weapons effects
against the defended asset. A keep-out altitude is a major design consideration for ballistic missiles.
Shooters may use shoot-new target-shoot, shoot-look-shoot, salvo, or ripple methods of fire, depending upon
the type of system. The method of fire may be stipulated in operation plans, directed by the kill chain, or
influenced by the situation. Coordination is effected by the AMD C2 elements to ensure the threats are
overmatched by the AMD weapons, facilitating their destruction while simultaneously mitigating the
potential for fratricide of friendly and neutral aircraft.
2-30. Combined arms for air defense constitutes another element of Army AMD that can provide vital
protection from air threats and contribute to the freedom of maneuver for friendly forces. (See chapter 11 for
a fuller discussion of combined arms contributions to AMD). Maneuver forces can effectively engage
hovering or slow-moving helicopters within their weapon systems' ranges. Stinger teams organic to maneuver
formations further enhance this capability. The ADAM cell (see chapter 10) in the maneuver brigade links
the maneuver forces to the kill chain to implement appropriate ROEs. Intelligence enables cyber and
electronic warfare elements to electronically attack air targets. Intelligence elements can also provide or assist
in the surveillance, identification, and classification of air targets, facilitating early warning.
ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE
2-31. The engagement sequence is the successive actions taken by all of the services’ air and missile
defense systems in the engagement of aerial threats. Terms in the sequence differ by service but capture
similar actions. The ADA engagement sequence terms are surveil, detect, track/identify, threat evaluation
and weapons assignment, engage, and assess.
* Surveil. Surveil is the systematic observation of airspace by electronic, visual, or other means,
primarily for the purpose of identifying and determining the movements of friendly and enemy
aircraft and missiles in the airspace.
* Detect. Detect in tactical operations is the perception of an object of possible military interest but
unconfirmed by recognition. For ADA units, detect is the acquisition of an aerial object of possible
military interest by sensor systems.
* Track/identify. Track is the process of displaying or recording the successive positions of a moving
object. Identification is the process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an unknown |
3-01 | 35 | Air and Missile Defense Operations Process
detected contact (JP 3-01). Identify attains an accurate characterization of detected objects with
high confidence so that timely application of weapons can occur. Embedded within the overall
process of identification are distinct tasks dealing with classification and discrimination.
Classification is the process of characterizing a detected object by its type, model,
variant, nationality, and any other distinguishing feature or attribute. Classification, for
instance, would establish a track as a cruise missile.
Discrimination is the process to distinguish real objects of interest from other objects or
phenomenon and military objects from those that are not. For example, discrimination
would differentiate between an enemy air platform and a decoy.
* Threat evaluation and weapons assignment. Threat evaluation is the process of determining the
intended target of the threat, the threat’s predicted impact point upon the defended asset,
and the timing of the threat’s arrival. Weapons assignment provides the right unit, launcher, or
missile to engage the threat paired to an appropriate sensor, if needed, to support the engagement.
Weapons assignment can be based on the location of the unit or ADA system, preferred area where
an engagement should be conducted, or ADA system’s capability. Sensors may be able to support
multiple types of weapons (for example, Sentinel can support Avenger and C-RAM detection and
acquisition) or may be designed to specifically support engagements of one weapon system, such
as the Patriot. Weapons may need in-air engagement support from a sensor, such as the Patriot
radar or may be “fire and forget”, such as the Stinger missile, meaning that once the missile is
launched it uses on-board guidance and homing capabilities to close with and intercept the air and
missile threat.
* Engage. Engage is defined as “In air and missile defense, a fire control order used to direct or
authorize units and/or weapon systems to attack a designated target (JP 3-01)”. Engage
commences with the initiation of missile launch or trigger pull of a gun and concludes with the
impact of a missile or bullets (hit-to-kill) or impact of fragments from a detonating warhead
(arming and fusing of the kill mechanism, explosion of the warhead, dispersal and travel of
warhead fragments, and impact of fragments). It can also encompass the use of non-dedicated
AMD assets to commit resources to disrupt or destroy air and missile threats.
* Assess. Assess in the air and missile defense engagement sequence, the analysis of the
effectiveness of the engagement and of the potential for reengagements.
METHODS OF FIRE
2-32. The operational environment, level of protection required, and time considerations determine the
method of fire used by ADA units during engagements. Methods of fire are the firing options for air
defense artillery interceptors employed against aerial threats. There are four methods of fire: shoot-new
target-shoot, shoot-look-shoot, ripple, and salvo. The method of fire selected provides the statistical
probability of achieving the defense design goals, such as achieving less than 10-percent leakage.
* Shoot-new target-shoot. A shot (missile launched or volley of gun rounds fired) is taken against
one threat, and the shooter immediately is assigned to a different target without consideration of
the effect of the preceding shot. This method of fire primarily applies to fire-and-forget weapons
(such as Stinger) in heavy saturating attacks or when the engagement timeline does not permit a
re-engagement of the threat just engaged.
* Shoot-look-shoot. After the first shot has been fired, the operator/gunner/system evaluates the
engagement. If the target is not destroyed and the operational environment and time permits,
another shot is fired.
* Ripple. Two or more missiles or volleys of gun rounds are fired in predetermined intervals from
the same or multiple launchers or guns based upon the threat. This method of fire is used to achieve
a desired probability of engagement effectiveness or to negate threat tactics (for example, one shot
fired against a ballistic missile at relatively high altitudes before aerodynamic maneuvers are likely
and one fired at medium altitudes after aerodynamic maneuvers have likely been completed).
* Salvo. Two missiles or volleys of gun rounds are fired near-simultaneously from different
launchers or guns. This method is used if there is insufficient time for a shoot-look-shoot or ripple |
3-01 | 36 | Chapter 2
engagement and when multiple engagements are necessary to achieve the desired probability of
engagement effectiveness.
FIRING DOCTRINE
2-33. Firing doctrine is the application of the methods of fire to achieve the required level of
engagement effectiveness. It is implemented in accordance with the priority of the defended assets and the
number of available interceptors relative to the number of attackers. It may have situational variations from
the method of fire selected.
2-34. Patriot, for example, may select ripple fire against a ballistic missile that is part of a massed raid. The
first shot of the ripple will occur in accordance with the selected method of fire. The second shot may be
preempted by the need to shoot higher priority threats. THAAD may use a shoot-look-shoot, but may conduct
the first or the last shot as a ripple fire or salvo fire depending upon engagement timelines and supporting
ballistic missile defense fires.
SECTORS OF FIRE AND PRIMARY/SECONDARY TARGET LINES
2-35. A sector of fire is that area assigned to a unit, a crew-served weapon, or an individual weapon within
which it will engage targets as they appear in accordance with established engagement priorities (FM 3-90-
1). Sectors of fire are specified by left and right limits in azimuth and are normally designated at ADA
battalion level for Patriot and THAAD units and platoon level for SHORAD units. Sectors of fire are a part
of a comprehensive sensor and shooter plan that provides optimum radar coverage of the defined area and
effective use of available ADA weapons.
2-36. A primary target line is an azimuth assigned to a weapon system or unit along which the system
fire control personnel and or gunners focus their attention. Primary target lines are established along the
centerline of the assigned sector of fire to assist in the distribution of AMD fires.
2-37. A secondary target line is a pre-planned alternative target line used to shift the orientation of fires
to assure all likely threat avenues of ingress are adequately defended. Secondary target lines are
designated to supplement the effects of an ADA unit to defend adjoining areas on both sides of the primary
target line. These sectors of fire are clearly defined by right and left boundaries. The assignment of primary
and secondary target lines for Patriot, which has a sectored radar, is critical to mission success. However,
THAAD, which also has a sectored radar, does not plan for or assign secondary target lines. Other sensors,
such as Sentinel, provide 360-degree coverage; assignment of secondary target lines are less critical but do
enable operators to concentrate attention within assigned sectors based upon likely enemy air avenues of
approach.
2-38. A summary of the key engagement operations tasks is presented in table 2-2. The tasks are
representative (not inclusive) of those that are conducted by Patriot, THAAD, and SHORAD fire units. See
the echelon chapters for additional discussions of engagement operations.
Table 2-2. AMD engagement tasks
AMD Engagement Tasks
2-10 FM 3-01 22 December 2020
etucexE
Detect aerial objects.
Classify/discriminate/identify aerial objects.
Determine appropriate weapon system to conduct the engagement.
Determine impact area.
Clear the target area.
Order the engagement.
Conduct the engagement in accordance with the control measures.
ssessA
Monitor and assess the engagement.
Reengage as necessary.
Update air and missile defense tactical orders and reports as necessary. |
3-01 | 37 | Chapter 3
Threat
This chapter summarizes the operational environment, presents existing and emerging
threat aerial tactics, and identifies the air and missile threats facing the Army and joint
warfighting forces. The air and missile threats, the focus of this chapter, are addressed
in terms of generic capability descriptions. The air and missile threats to be countered
by ADA systems are ballistic missiles, large-caliber rockets, cruise missiles, air-to-
surface missiles, hypersonic weapons, UASs, manned fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft,
and rockets, artillery, and mortars. Electronic warfare and, cyber, and threats from
space are also addressed.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
3-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). The operational
environment encompasses the five domains of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace. Space and
cyberspace are relatively “new” domains that individually impact all other domains. Space technologies are
proliferating throughout the world. “Adversaries have developed their own systems, while commercially
available systems allow almost universal access to some level of space-enabled capability with military
applications. Army forces must be prepared to operate in a denied, degraded and disrupted space operational
environment” (FM 3-14). Cyberspace supports, enables, and integrates operations for Army and joint forces.
Cyberspace includes and considers friendly, enemy, adversary, and host nation networks, communications
systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media web sites, and technical infrastructures. While
cyberspace enables friendly communications capabilities, it also creates critical vulnerabilities which
adversaries and enemies can attack or exploit. “Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum will grow
increasingly congested, contested, and critical to successful operations. Army forces must be able to
effectively operate in cyberspace and the EMS [electromagnetic spectrum], while controlling the ability of
others to operate there” (FM 3-0).
3-2. Army forces must also be able to operate in degraded conditions in the other domains. The worldwide
availability of advanced military and commercial technologies and information may allow adversaries
opportunities to acquire, develop, and employ chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
weapons. Such situations could also expose U.S. forces to CBRN threats and hazards. CBRN threats and
hazards have the potential to cause personal injury, illness, or death, equipment or property damage or loss;
or mission degradation. CBRN threats include the intentional employment of, or intent to employ, weapons
or improvised devices to produce CBRN hazards (FM 3-11). CBRN hazards are those elements that could
cause an adverse effect through accidental or deliberate release, dissemination, or impacts (FM 3-11). CBRN
hazards present physical and psychological effects well beyond the immediate target area. See FM 3-11 and
JP 3-11 for more information.
3-3. As noted in FM 3-0, the operational environment is in a constant state of flux for each commander in
their respective operational area, when, at any time, friendly or enemy operations are initiated or curtailed.
What is more of a given, regardless of the turmoil inherent in these environments, is that the United States
will face a peer threat. In the past, U.S. forces have enjoyed relative advantages over their adversaries with
superior capabilities in each of the domains. However, adversaries of the past have become peer threats,
capable of challenging U.S. operations in all domains. Peer threats generate tactical, operational, and strategic
challenges that are an order of magnitude more challenging militarily than other adversaries. |
3-01 | 38 | Chapter 3
3-4. Potential adversaries are investing in anti-access strategies and area-denial capabilities to counter the
U.S. ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish
assigned missions. The concept of anti-access/area denial is to control the access into and movement within
a region. Preclusion, the combination of anti-access and area denial methods, seeks to influence the ability
of an enemy, outside the region, to introduce forces into the theater and sustain combat power. Many
countries are pursuing weapon systems, such as ballistic or cruise missiles, which enable anti-access/area
denial. To deter current and potential adversaries from achieving these objectives, the United States must
maintain its ability to project power in areas where access and freedom to operate are challenged.
3-5. From a pure ADA perspective, operational environment considerations are focused on the air domain,
while maintaining an awareness and understanding of the potential impacts of actions within the other
domains on AMD operations. The air domain challenges to Army operations include:
* Increased threats from traditional ballistic missile capabilities. The ballistic missile threat has
increased both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the
foreseeable future. Our known and potential adversaries will continue to challenge both the
proficiency and sufficiency of U.S. ballistic missile defenses due to the resulting improvement in
ballistic missile technical sophistication, increase in inventories, advancement of
countermeasures, and growing proliferation.
* Expanding spectrum of air and missile threats. Within the last decade, the air and missile arsenal
of today’s adversaries has become more robust, diverse, and complex. Not only do our adversaries
have access to the increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles, but they also have a growing array
of cruise missiles, UASs, and easily attainable and lethal RAM. All of these air and missile threats
must be addressed by Army and joint AMD forces within the context of anti-access/area denial
operations and of defeating increasingly sophisticated countermeasures, electronic attack, and
cyber efforts.
THREAT TACTICS AND OBJECTIVES
3-6. The threat will attempt to develop an overmatch in an area to mitigate the capabilities of the U.S. force.
Traditional tactics of massing fires to overwhelm a defense and surveilling or attacking from any direction
and altitude will continue to be employed. In massing fires, for instance, the threat will launch more missiles
against a defense than the defending Army or joint AMD force can engage. Cruise missiles, UASs, and fixed-
and rotary-wing aircraft have freedom of maneuver through 360 degrees in support of both attack and
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance operations. Threats will prioritize AMD forces and control
elements as high priority targets.
3-7. Advanced electronic attack, in which a threat system jams or spoofs across the electromagnetic
spectrum in an attempt to hamper an ADA system’s ability to detect or engage a threat system or missile,
will also be employed. And, as the ADA force becomes more network centric, a sophisticated cyber-attack
could potentially hamper the AMD network’s ability to support the detection, identification, or engagement
of a target.
3-8. The threat will continue to exploit the use of countermeasures tailored to the attacking platform and
the AMD capabilities being countered. Ballistic missiles may employ decoys, in-atmosphere maneuver
(which may also aid accuracy of delivery), and electronic jamming pods. Air threats may employ electronic
jamming and spoofing, flares, chaff, and other penetration aids. Penetration aids are devices carried on air
and missile objects and/or tactics used to counter AMDs. ADA forces must be knowledgeable of the various
types of countermeasures that could be employed and prepared to defeat them.
3-9. An emerging tactic is a complex integrated attack which is designed to overwhelm defense of a site by
the employment of different capabilities. Simple attacks that send one threat type at a time against a defense
are more easily defeated in detail, as a defense can concentrate its capabilities against the specific operational
characteristics of that type of threat. For example, when ballistic threats attack within a sector of the defense’s
coverage, the defense is able to concentrate surveillance and firepower into that sector. However, when out-
of-sector cruise missiles are integrated with ballistic missile attacks, the defense must counter the combined
effects of the total attacking force. A complex integrated attack is a synchronized attack of a friendly asset
by a mix of air and missile threats arriving near-simultaneously from different directions, altitudes, and |
3-01 | 39 | Threat
ranges. This mix may include any and all air and missile threats, from ballistic missiles to RAM. The
defending force’s surveillance and firepower must be capable of defending throughout the entire 360 degrees;
if focused on only one threat or sector (for example, the ballistic sector of attack), the complex integrated
attack will destroy or significantly damage the defended asset. Complex integrated attacks will likely be
supported by enemy activities in other domains, such as jamming efforts in the cyberspace domain and special
operations forces’ attacks in the land domain.
THEATER AIR AND MISSILE THREATS
3-10. The emerging air and missile threats encompass a wide range of missiles, rockets, projectiles, and air
platforms. The number of countries developing weapons of mass destruction is unconstrained, and delivery
systems with increasing range and accuracy are being sought and developed. Compounding these threats is
the potential for or initiation of electronic and cyber-attacks.
3-11. Air and missile threats encompass ballistic missiles, air threats, and rockets, artillery, and mortars. A
ballistic missile is any missile that does not rely on aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently
follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated (JP 3-01). Air threats include manned fixed- and rotary-
wing aircraft, UASs, and aerodynamic missiles. Rockets, artillery, and mortars comprise the indirect fire
threat.
BALLISTIC MISSILES
3-12. Ballistic missiles are a means to project power in regional and strategic contexts, and they provide a
capability to launch an attack from a distance. Ballistic missile proliferation continues and countries are
acquiring a greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their range, incorporating ballistic missile defense
countermeasures, and making them more complex, survivable, reliable, and accurate. Ballistic missiles can
be used as anti-access weapons by potential regional adversaries. These weapons can be used to reduce
military options for combatant commanders and threaten the survivability of regional military assets. There
is an increasing threat of the technologies falling into the hands of other countries and hostile non-state
groups.
3-13. Ballistic missiles include close-range ballistic missiles with ranges up to 300 kilometers, short-range
ballistic missiles with ranges up to 1,000 kilometers, medium-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 1,000
to 3,000 kilometers, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that range from 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers.
These are surface-launched missiles with ballistic trajectories. Ballistic missiles, often launched from highly
mobile, difficult-to-detect transporter erector launchers, can carry nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Most are single-stage missiles with an estimated circular error probable accuracy of one-tenth of one percent
of the range. State-of-the-art guidance technologies, such as the Global Positioning System, can increase this
accuracy to less than 50 meters. The most proliferated of these missiles are the close- and short-range ballistic
missiles which are available to more than 30 states and non-state actors worldwide. Ballistic missiles are
inherently difficult to defend against. Characteristics that increase their survivability include a small radar
cross section, high terminal velocity, short notification time for defending forces, a variety of difficult-to-kill
warheads, and an all-weather launch capability. With the introduction of penetrations aids such as decoys,
chaff, and maneuvering warheads, ballistic missiles have become increasingly sophisticated, accurate, and
more difficult to defeat.
3-14. Iran has steadily increased its ballistic missile force, deploying next-generation short- and medium-
range missiles with increasing accuracy and new submunition payloads. It is continuing to develop new
missiles and working to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with improvements in
accuracy and warhead designs, to include maneuvering reentry vehicles and submunition payloads.
3-15. North Korea has expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces - from close-range
to intercontinental variants - and has conducted an unprecedented level of nuclear tests and ballistic missile
launches since 2016, including its short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, long-range, and
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. In February 2016, Pyongyang launched a satellite
launch vehicle. The technology involved in a satellite launch would be applicable to North Korea's other
long-range missile programs. In 2016 and 2017, North Korea conducted an aggressive testing campaign,
launching multiple intermediate-range ballistic missiles, with a range greater than 3,000 kilometers. Today, |
3-01 | 40 | Chapter 3
North Korea fields hundreds of Scud and No Dong missiles that can reach U.S. forces forward deployed in
the Republic of Korea and Japan.
LARGE-CALIBER ROCKETS
3-16. Large-caliber rockets, classified as those of 200 millimeters and greater, are unguided, surface
launched, indirect fire rockets with ranges greater than 40 kilometers. They can be fired from single or
multiple launch platforms. In the past 20 years, large-caliber rockets have increased in range (some as much
as 300+ kilometers) and now, with enhanced guidance packages, are morphing into close- and short-range
ballistic missiles.
3-17. Rockets can deliver high rates of fire and a variety of warheads, making them ideal weapon systems
for fire support missions. The highly mobile launchers can rapidly move around the battlefield. This mobility,
coupled with the rockets’ short burn time, gives maneuver forces little warning. Their short range and salvo
capability complicate engagement by current AMD systems.
3-18. Like ballistic missiles, large-caliber rockets are found in many countries. They are inexpensive and
have been used against United States forces in Iraq and against Israel forces and its general population. North
Korea has a 300-mm multiple launch rocket systems that can easily range Seoul and many U.S. forces
stationed in South Korea, including those at Osan Air Base.
AERODYNAMIC MISSILES
3-19. Aerodynamic missiles use lateral surfaces to maintain their flight path. Aerodynamic missiles include
cruise missiles and tactical air-to-surface missiles.
3-20. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-guided vehicles that maintain sustained flight at one or more pre-
determined constant (cruise) altitudes and have ranges from 30 to 3,000 kilometers. Tactical air-to-surface
missiles are similar to air-launched cruise missiles, but are smaller, have shorter ranges, lack the wings and
aerodynamic lifts associated with cruise missiles, and are launched by tactical fighter-bomber aircraft.
Though regarded as distinctly separate threats, the application of new technologies has given cruise missiles
and tactical air to-surface missiles virtually identical capabilities.
CRUISE MISSILES
3-21. Modern cruise missiles can travel at low-to-supersonic or high subsonic speeds, are self-navigating,
and can fly non-ballistic trajectories at very low to very high atmospheric altitudes. Cruise missiles can be
found in two general categories: land attack and anti-ship. Cruise missiles are generally very expensive and
have complicated navigation devices, two considerations which minimized their proliferation; regardless,
many nations have shown an increased interest in obtaining the ability to produce these missiles after seeing
the U.S. success in employing the land attack variants. Cruise missiles are the hardest air target to detect and
intercept which makes them particularly well suited against static ADA systems.
3-22. Cruise missiles are reliable, accurate, survivable, and lethal. They can be launched from the land, air,
or sea. They are difficult to detect, can fly indirect routes at low altitudes to avoid heavily defended areas,
and can attack from any direction. Today’s cruise missile can hit a target with remarkable accuracy;
tomorrow’s smarter, maneuverable, more accurate missile will pose a far greater threat. Cruise missiles are
ideal for striking high-value targets in highly defended areas, since aircraft and aircrews are not put at risk.
3-23. The use of air-breathing turbojet and turbofan engines has given cruise missiles a longer range and the
capability to fly at high, subsonic speeds and altitudes lower than 50 meters above ground level. Their flight
paths can be programmed using sophisticated guidance systems, such as the Global Positioning System,
inertial navigation systems, and terrain contour matching. Their guidance systems contribute to overall
accuracy, optimize surprise, and help avoid air defenses. A terminal guidance seeker increases accuracy to
less than 10 meters. A wide array of conventional warheads, including individually targetable submunitions,
allows targeting of both soft and hard targets. In addition, cruise missiles may carry weapons of mass
destruction warheads. |
3-01 | 41 | Threat
3-24. Many countries have cruise missiles in their arsenal. Some countries have nuclear-capable cruise
missiles.
3-25. Technological advances are now making hypersonic glide vehicles and missiles flying non-ballistic
trajectories practicable. Hypersonic glide vehicles are a new class of weapon propelled to hypersonic velocity
by ballistic missile boosters. After launch, they are essentially unpowered cruise missiles.
TACTICAL AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
3-26. These missiles are air-launched, precision-guided munitions designed to strike ground targets. They
are ideal against targets such as bridges that are difficult to destroy with conventional dumb bombs. Tactical
air-to-surface missiles are an extremely lethal threat because of their versatility and pinpoint accuracy.
3-27. Most variants employ radio-command, laser, anti-radiation homing, or electro-optical guidance
systems. Missiles that employ anti-radiation homing systems are referred to as anti-radiation missiles; they
represent the greatest threat to radars such as those employed by ADA forces. An aircraft firing an anti-
radiation missile will usually launch from outside the lethal envelope of the ADA system defending the asset.
Laser-guided systems provide the least standoff range, generally less than 10 kilometers. Electro-optical or
video-guided systems and anti-radiation missiles offer the greatest standoff range and aircraft survivability.
Some electro-optical systems have ranges of approximately 100 kilometers.
HYPERSONIC WEAPONS
3-28. Technological advances are now making hypersonic weapons practicable. There are two main types
of hypersonic weapons: hypersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. Hypersonic cruise missiles,
which are powered by scramjet, are restricted below 100,000 feet; hypersonic glide vehicles can travel higher.
Hypersonic weapons, by definition, travel five or more times the speed of sound.
3-29. Some weapon systems have characteristics of both ballistic and cruise missiles. For example, ballistic
missile-launched hypersonic glide vehicles are essentially unpowered cruise missiles. Future
supersonic/hypersonic powered cruise missiles may be launched by large rocket boosters that have
traditionally been associated with ballistic missiles.
3-30. Hypersonic glide vehicles are being developed as a new type of ballistic missile payload. They are
maneuverable vehicles that travel at hypersonic (greater than Mach 5) speed and spend most of their flight at
much lower altitudes than a typical ballistic missile. The combination of high speed, maneuverability, and
relatively low altitude makes them challenging targets for missile defense systems.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
3-31. An unmanned aircraft system is that system whose components include the necessary equipment,
network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft (JP 3-30). Threat UASs are categorized in groups
(see table 3-1 on page 3-6), typically based on weight, operating altitude, and speed. Groups 1 through 3 are
further categorized as low, slow, small systems. |
3-01 | 42 | Chapter 3
Table 3-1. UAS Groups
Speed / Altitude Characteristics
Group 1 Normally operates below 1,200 Generally hand-launched. Operates within LOS of
Micro / Mini feet AGL at speeds less than 100 Real time video and user (limited range).
UAS knots control.
Small payloads; focus on
reconnaissance,
surveillance, and
intelligence gathering.
Group 2 Normally operates below 3,500 Launched in unimproved areas by a small number of
feet AGL at speeds less than 250 personnel.
Small Tactical
knots
Medium range and endurance.
Payload focus: reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence
gathering; may add weapons.
Requires LOS to ground control station.
Group 3 Normally operates below 18,000 Launched in unimproved areas by a small number of
Tactical feet MSL at speeds less than 250 personnel.
knots
Range and endurance vary significantly.
Payload focus: reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence
gathering; may add weapons.
Requires larger logistics footprint than Groups 1 and 2.
Group 4 Normally operates below 18,000 Can be used both strategically and tactically.
Persistent feet MSL at any speed Requires a runway for launch and recovery.
Extended range and endurance.
Payloads: reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence,
gathering, and ASM weapons.
Operates at medium-to-high altitudes.
Group 5 Normally operates higher than Strategic-level asset.
18,000 feet MSL at any speed
Penetrating Requires an improved runway for launch and recovery.
Greatest range, endurance, and airspeed.
Payloads: suite of optics for targeting and weaponry for
engagements.
Operates at medium-to-high altitudes.
Logistical footprint similar to that of a manned aircraft.
AGL above ground level MSL mean sea level
ASM air-to-surface munition UAS unmanned aircraft system
LOS line-of-sight
3-32. UASs include drones, characterized by preprogrammed flight paths and patterns, and remotely piloted
vehicles controlled by ground-based operators. Some UASs may implement both drone and remotely piloted
flight control types. Each can perform a variety of missions, ranging from reconnaissance and battlefield
surveillance to attack and electronic warfare. UASs have extensive commercial applications and, as a result,
are readily available and arguably the most developed system in many armies around the world. Due to the
prolific use of unmanned systems, commercial off-the-shelf UASs are readily available and can be
weaponized with relative ease. There are over 1,000 current and developing UAS programs worldwide. UASs
are typically comprised of a control element, communication systems, support elements, an unmanned
aircraft, a payload or pod, and a human element.
* The control element typically consists of UAS operators and leaders providing aircraft control,
payload control, weapons control, and communications supporting the commander’s and staff’s
planning/execution requirements. It also includes the control station itself from which the
unmanned aircraft receives its commands. The control station can be mounted on tactical vehicles,
in stationary and static structures, on civilian vehicles such as vans or trucks, and on ships; it could
even be placed in orbit around the Earth.
* Communication within an UAS is normally conducted via line-of-sight communications or
satellite control; it is often encrypted to increase information protection and survivability. UASs |
3-01 | 43 | Threat
also make effective platforms for communications relay stations due to their potentially high
mission endurance and ability to avoid (over-fly) terrain that ground-based vehicles with relay
components would be unable to navigate.
* The support element includes all logistical systems required to deploy, transport, recover, enable,
and generally sustain the UAS.
* The unmanned aircraft can manifest itself in a variety of types to include fixed-wing, rotary-wing,
aerospace, and even balloons. Typically, the larger the aircraft the higher its endurance and the
higher the altitude in which it can operate. Low, slow, and small UAS are particularly dangerous
due to the challenges which they present to friendly sensor systems for detection and identification
and for weapon systems to consistently defeat them given their low/slow kinematic profile. UASs
are also easily obtained commercially and inexpensive, making them even more of a threat.
3-33. UASs serve as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms for target detection,
identification, and location; weapon targeting; target designation; and battle damage assessment. UASs can
assist commanders with early warning to develop friendly courses of actions. State-of-the-art sensors and
data links provide real-time targeting for fire support systems, maneuver forces, and aircraft. UASs equipped
with laser designators provide immediate targeting assistance and terminal guidance of munitions. UAS
platforms also can serve as a means for weapons delivery or may themselves serve as the weapon, and have
been used extensively to attack high payoff targets without endangering pilots. Threat actors consider UASs
expendable.
3-34. UASs have relatively low radar cross sections, low speed, and low thermal signatures, thus making
them difficult to detect, track, and engage. Mission-dictated flight profiles take full advantage of terrain,
increasing system survivability and optimizing coverage. Flight altitudes for UASs vary by their size and
mission and can range from meters to thousands of kilometers. UASs conducting intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance missions operate at altitudes consistent with their sensor systems. They normally fly at
altitudes safe from small arms fire and can stand off and detect from up to 25 kilometers.
3-35. UAS optical payloads consist of daylight television, infrared video, and recording cameras (for
reconnaissance missions). Other major payload categories include electronic warfare (jammers), electronic
intelligence, radar, communications relay and attack warheads. Several nations are developing and fielding
anti-radiation homing UAS capabilities with the primary mission of attacking battlefield radio frequency
emitters (radars and communications). These platforms have a variety of launch options and are usually fire-
and-forget systems.
MANNED ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT
3-36. Most countries maintain helicopter fleets to support military operations. While the majority of
helicopters can be armed to perform a variety of roles, the attack helicopter poses the greatest threat to
maneuver forces. The versatility of helicopters make them ideal for use in most combat areas.
3-37. Threat ground force commanders rely primarily on helicopters to fulfill direct air support requirements.
Helicopters can perform a variety of missions. Hovering and low-flying helicopters, taking full advantage of
terrain masking, are difficult to acquire and target. An especially challenging ingress technique is nap-of-the-
earth flying, in which a helicopter hovers at a masked point, dashes to the next mask point, and hovers again.
This technique is challenging because of short exposure times and varying between near-zero Doppler and
moderate Doppler velocities. Improvements in fire control and weapon capabilities enable helicopters to
search, acquire, and fire at ground targets from longer standoff ranges, thus increasing their survivability and
effectiveness.
MANNED FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
3-38. Manned fixed-wing aircraft remain essential to virtually every type of military operation and despite
the emergence of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, it will continue to play a role in future conflicts. There
are more than 40,000 operational military aircraft today; of these, some 10,000, many produced during the
Cold War era, are in third world inventories. Over 50 countries have an aviation industry of some kind, and
over 20 countries design their own aircraft. |
3-01 | 44 | Chapter 3
3-39. Manned fixed-wing combat aircraft are highly flexible and can perform a variety of missions in
offensive and defensive operations: air interdiction, strategic attack, suppression of enemy air defense, and
close air support. Fixed-wing aircraft can employ a variety of munitions, including bombs, guns, rockets,
cruise missiles, and tactical air-to-surface missiles. Integrated navigation/bombing computers and related
mission equipment provide new combat aircraft with a precision-strike capability, day or night and in bad
weather.
3-40. New aircraft incorporate such features as radar warning receivers, on-board jammers, chaff, flares, and
a lower radar cross section to improve survivability and mission success rate. In addition, the proliferation of
fixed-wing aircraft throughout the world increases the probability that opposing forces may employ the same
type of aircraft in a conflict; this exacerbates the already challenging problem of identification.
ROCKETS, ARTILLERY, AND MORTARS
3-41. RAM are traditional indirect fire threats to ground forces. These systems vary in size and effect.
Rockets and artillery are usually fired from towed or self-propelled platforms while mortars are frequently
transported by dismounted crews.
3-42. Rockets are unguided projectiles with a short boost phase and unpowered flight, and fly ballistic
trajectories. The most common type of warhead is high explosive with a point detonating fuse. Rockets are
commonly fired from self-propelled platforms known as multiple rocket launchers. Multiple rocket launchers
may fire large volleys of rockets (20 to 40) with multiple launchers being used in a volley. Rockets come in
many calibers such as 57-millimeter, 68-millimeter, 80-millimeter, 81-millimeter, 107-millimeter, 120-
millimeter, 122-millimeter, and 127-millimeter. Their high rate of fire and volume of fire make them a
stressing threat. Hybrid and irregular forces have used rockets as harassing fire, with improvised firing
methods and delays to limit counterfire effects. Large caliber rockets, 200-millimeter and greater, were
addressed earlier.
3-43. Artillery and mortar rounds are also unpowered and traditionally fly ballistic trajectories. All armies
throughout the world have some form of artillery. The most common artillery calibers are 122-millimeter,
152-millimeter, and 155-millimeter. Unless using rocket assisted projectiles, artillery systems are generally
limited to 20 to 30 kilometers. The most common mortar calibers range are 60 to 120-millimeter, but include
many variants, such as 81-millimeter, 82-millimeter, 100-millimeter, and 160-millimeter.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND CYBER
3-44. Electronic warfare and cyber threats are continuously present throughout the tactical, operational, and
strategic realms. Electronic warfare involves the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the
electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare includes electronic attack, electronic
protection, and electronic warfare support. A threat will attempt to deny, degrade, disrupt, or destroy friendly
emitters (radar and communications) and other electromagnetic spectrum dependent devices. Sensors to
locate emitters or to listen for information and/or intelligence can be mounted on ground or air platforms.
Cyberspace attacks will target technical networks, systems, and data. For more information see FM 3-12.
3-45. The most common form of tactical electronic attack is electromagnetic jamming. Jamming consists of
an emitter radiating electromagnetic energy to prevent a radar receiver from discerning the expected return
from the background noise or a radio from receiving voice or data. Advanced jamming techniques allow the
threat to project false location, speed, and altitude, creating confusion for radar operators.
3-46. The use of an electromagnetic pulse, normally envisioned as produced by a high altitude nuclear
explosion, is a threat to friendly electronic systems. Our increasing dependence on advanced electronics
systems results in the potential for an increased electromagnetic pulse vulnerability of our forces, and if
unaddressed makes electromagnetic pulse employment by an adversary an attractive asymmetric option
(Electromagnetic Pulse Commission Report). In addition, several countries are experimenting with
generating an electromagnetic pulse from non-nuclear explosives.
3-47. ADA organizations, from the tactical to the strategic level, face multiple types of sophisticated cyber
threats, whether in garrison or operating in the field. Regional powers, peer states, and transnational terrorist
organizations have personnel with capabilities to conduct cyber-attacks on installations and sites. Cyber- |
3-01 | 45 | Threat
attacks are expected against C2 nodes; theater and tactical data and voice networks, information systems,
radars and their tracking and targeting systems, and missile guidance packages. The threat is expected to use
cyber attacks in conjunction with physical attacks as part of a larger campaign. Cyber threats can prevent
target detection, tracking, and engagement of threat munitions and platforms. The threat is likely to also
expand attempts to penetrate networks for data collection and exploitation with a growing sophistication to
conduct cyber attacks. Strategic organizations, with “on-line” missions, face multiple types of cyber threats
on a continual basis.
STRATEGIC MISSILE THREATS THAT MAY IMPACT THE
THEATER
3-48. Despite the end of the Cold War, the threat of accidental, unauthorized, or limited strategic strikes
against the United States continues to exist. ICBMs and SLBMs are a threat to the United States. They carry
nuclear warheads and employ a variety of penetration aids.
3-49. ICBMs and SLBMs pose significant challenges to active defense and attack operations forces. Some
ICBMs are road mobile, reducing the time that they can be targeted, while others are designed with
countermeasures to ballistic missile defense systems. Some SLBMs may be launched from surfaced and
submerged submarines from various launch locations.
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
3-50. An ICBM is a ballistic missile with a range greater than 5,500 kilometers and typically designed to
deliver one or more nuclear warheads. Most modern designs support multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles, allowing a single missile to carry several warheads, each of which can strike a different
target.
3-51. Although current ICBM-producing countries are limited, several countries are developing production
capabilities. Thus, the threat to the United States continues to grow. Other countries developing ballistic
missiles are also likely to build various responses to U.S. defenses. Developing countries would probably
rely on available countermeasure technologies such as separating reentry vehicles, spin stabilizing reentry
vehicles, radar absorbing material, low-power jammers, and simple decoys such as balloons.
3-52. Rudimentary technologies from earlier versions of missiles are more readily available and are adequate
for use by nations not overly concerned with missile accuracy, reliability, or safety. The increased availability
of technical assistance from other nations and of classified information related to ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction will short-cut development programs. Once launched, ICBMs are difficult to
defeat. Their targets may be strategic or political, civilian or military. ICBMs will most likely use nuclear
warheads, and many will carry multiple reentry vehicles. Projected ICBM improvements include mobile
basing, improved reliability, increased accuracy, and improved penetration aids.
3-53. Iran's progress on space launch vehicles - along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies
- provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including ICBMs. In
April 2016 Iran launched a space launch vehicle, which could be capable of ICBM ranges if configured as
such. Iran may be able to deploy an operational ICBM by 2020 if the regime chooses to do so.
3-54. North Korea is developing and has paraded two road-mobile ICBMs which, if successfully developed,
would likely be capable of reaching much of the continental United States. North Korea launched several
ICBMs in 2017 and claims to be capable of ranging most of the continental United States with its ICBMs.
SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES
3-55. Submarine mobility provides launch location options unavailable to ICBM forces and makes detection
difficult. SLBMs provide ICBM capabilities with the added advantages of better hiding, shorter flight times,
and depressed reentry angles. Targets will generally be identical to those of ICBMs. Projected improvements
include more sophisticated payloads and guidance systems, improved reliability, increased range, and
improved penetration aids. |
3-01 | 46 | Chapter 3
3-56. North Korea conducted multiple flight tests of a developmental SLBM. North Korea tested a new
SLBM capability in 2015 and again in 2016. In February 2017, North Korea publicized the launch of a new
solid-propellant missile that appeared to be a land-based variant of its SLBM. The missile was launched from
a canister carried on a previously unseen tracked launcher.
SPACE
3-57. Space is the new high ground for operations. It is becoming an increasingly congested, competitive,
and contested environment. Space systems are critical to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of
warfighting. The quantity and quality of foreign satellites on orbit is rapidly increasing, and foreign countries
are developing counters to the U.S. space advantage, including methods to disrupt or deny access to
communications; position, navigation, and timing; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
satellites. Employment of these threat space-based capabilities can have a significant impact on U.S. systems
and their ability to execute missions.
3-58. Peer competitors are pursuing space efforts for military, economic, and political objectives. They
recognize the strategic value of space and view U.S. dependency on space for projection of military power
as a vulnerability. They operate satellites for communications, navigation, earth resources, weather,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes, in addition to conducting manned space and space
exploration missions.
3-59. Over the next 10 years, hundreds of commercial or government-sponsored imaging satellites are
projected to be launched. The sheer number of these new satellites, and the fact that most are foreign or
consortia owned, diminishes the ability of the United States to impose political constraints on the use of
satellite imagery products. These new commercial imaging capabilities will allow an adversary to challenge
the U.S. force’s ability to achieve strategic and tactical surprise and to gain and sustain information
superiority.
SUMMARY
3-60. Ballistic, cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons are and will continue to be offensive weapons of
choice for many nations. These threats, as standalone systems or complemented with UAS, electronic warfare
and cyber, and other capabilities described above, create formidable challenges for Army, joint, and
multinational AMD forces. Table 3-2 provides a summary of the air and missile threats, their primary targets,
and their capabilities and trends. |
3-01 | 47 | Threat
Table 3-2. Air, missile, and electronic warfare/cyber threats to surface targets
System Targets Capabilities Trends
Category
Geopolitical/population To 5,500 kilometers Increased range – solid
centers. range. fuel, multi-stage.
Ballistic
Missiles Airports and seaports. Low radar signature. Improved accuracy –
terminal guidance, global
Logistical areas. Warheads –
positioning system.
conventional, weapons
Troop concentrations.
of mass destruction, Increased survivability –
submunitions. decoys, signature
reductions.
Launch from mobile
platforms.
Penetration aids,
decoys, chaff,
maneuvering warheads.
Assembly areas. High rates of fire, rapid Course corrected
reload and highly munitions.
Large Caliber ADA/field artillery locations.
mobile.
Rockets Increased ranges blurring
Defensive positions.
Extended Range–300+ line with close- and short-
Chokepoints/routes of kilometers. range ballistic missiles.
advance.
Low signature and flat Increased accuracies with
trajectory. global positioning system
guidance.
Warheads –
conventional, weapons
of mass destruction,
submunitions.
High-value military/industrial 30-3,000 kilometer Increased number of land
complexes. range. attack variants.
Cruise Missiles
Airports and seaports. 360-degree threat; very Reduced radar signatures.
low radar signature.
Logistical areas. Improved accuracy and
Air, sea, or ground increased range.
C2 centers.
launched.
Maneuver force
Warheads –
concentrations.
conventional, weapons
of mass destruction,
submunitions.
Armored vehicles. >100 kilometer range. Improved accuracy and
lethality.
Tactical Air-to- Radars. Supersonic speeds
Surface (Mach 3). Lock-on-after-launch or
Bridges or other point
Missiles loitering.
targets. Extremely accurate.
Dual/tri mode seekers –
ADA sites. Radio-command, laser,
increased reliability and all
anti-radiation, or electro-
weather capability.
optical guidance.
Assembly areas, logistical Multi-mission – More missions – decoy,
areas, C2 centers reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air
Unmanned
(seeing). surveillance, and target defenses, and electronic
Aircraft
acquisition; electronic attack.
Systems Troop movements (seeing).
warfare; attack.
Standoff range in excess
C2 centers (jamming).
Range to 1,900 of 25 kilometers.
Maneuver kilometers; altitude near-
Detection to 40 kilometers;
formations/systems ground to 17+
all weather, day/night.
(attacking). kilometers.
Perch and stare ability.
Standoff/detection to 25
kilometers. Low radar signature.
Payloads – daylight Low thermal signature.
television, cameras,
missiles, laser
designators,
retransmitters. |
3-01 | 48 | Chapter 3
Table 3-2. Air, missile, and electronic warfare/cyber threats to surface targets (continued)
System Targets Capabilities Trends
Category
Assembly areas, logistical Multi-mission – More missions – decoy,
areas, C2 centers reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air
Unmanned
(seeing). surveillance, and target defenses, and electronic
Aircraft
acquisition; electronic attack.
Systems Troop movements (seeing).
warfare; attack.
Standoff range in excess of
C2 centers (jamming).
Range to 1,900 25 kilometers.
Maneuver kilometers; altitude near-
Detection to 40 kilometers;
formations/systems ground to 17+
all weather, day/night.
(attacking). kilometers.
Perch and stare ability.
Standoff/detection to 25
kilometers. Low radar signature.
Payloads – daylight Low thermal signature.
television, cameras,
missiles, laser
designators,
retransmitters.
Troops/armored vehicles. Multi-role – attack; Modular upgrades to
reconnaissance, airframes.
Rotary-Wing Convoys.
surveillance, and target
Aircraft Expanded night/adverse
C2 centers. acquisition; electronic
weather capability.
warfare.
Improved fire control
Combat diameters out to
systems/engagement
460 kilometers; terrain
capability – at greater
masking/hovering.
ranges.
Payloads – daylight TV,
Improved countermeasures.
cameras, missiles, laser
designators,
retransmitters.
Ports. Multi-role – close air Multi- versus single- mission
support; aircraft.
Fixed-Wing Assembly/logistical areas.
reconnaissance,
Aircraft
C2 centers. surveillance, and target
Greater use of standoff and
precision.
Geo-political/ population acquisition; electronic
centers. attack; interdiction; Reduced radar and infrared
strategic attack; signatures.
Maneuver force vehicles/
suppression of enemy Integrated electronic attack.
formations.
air defenses.
Proliferation increases
Precision strike. identification challenges.
Equipment – missiles,
rockets, bombs,
submunitions, guns.
Rockets, Troops/armored vehicles. Variable payload. Extended ranges.
Artillery, and Fixed/semi-fixed sites. Saturation of airspace. Improved accuracy.
Mortars
Mass fires. Greater lethality.
Easily moved/relocated. |
3-01 | 49 | Threat
Table 3-2. Air, missile, and electronic warfare/cyber threats to surface targets (continued)
System Targets Capabilities Trends
Category
C2 nodes. Disrupt data and voice Cyber-attacks in
communications. conjunction with
Electronic Tactical data and voice
physical attacks.
Warfare information, networks, Locate C2 nodes for targeting.
and Cyber and systems. Expanded attempts to
Disrupt targeting and guidance
penetrate networks for
Theater data and voice systems.
data collection and
information, networks,
Electronic warfare techniques, such exploitation.
and systems.
as interception and spoofing, to gain
Growing sophistication
ADA radars. information on planning and
of threats.
operations.
ADA tracking and
Increased exposure of
targeting systems. Radar jamming.
tactical systems to
Missile and UAS Electromagnetic pulse to cyber threats as office
guidance systems. incapacitate electronic systems. systems are combined
with tactical systems.
Large fixed military Mobile launchers. Mobile basing.
installations.
Inter- Multiple warheads – nuclear. Improved reliability and
continental Capitals and other accuracy.
Penetration aids.
Ballistic population centers.
Improved penetration
Missiles
Major industrial aids.
sites/regions.
Intercontinental
ballistic missile sites.
Large fixed military Mobile. More sophisticated
installations. payloads and guidance
Submarine- Hide/wait/launch from anywhere.
systems.
launched Capitals and other
Worldwide targeting.
Ballistic population centers. Increased range and
Missile Multiple warheads – nuclear. accuracy.
Major Industrial
areas/sites. Penetration aids. Improved reliability and
penetration aids.
Intercontinental
ballistic missile sites.
Lodgment areas. Functions: communications/ Easy access to
navigation support, weather improved commercial
Space Massed troops.
prediction, surveillance, sources.
Systems
Ships. reconnaissance, intelligence
Remote sensing
Missile launch sites. collection, and counter-space resolution to one meter.
operations.
Advanced data
Payloads: synthetic aperture radar,
processing/ storage.
electro-optical, imaging infrared.
Disrupting communications.
ADA air defense artillery C2 command and control UAS unmanned aircraft system |
3-01 | 51 | Chapter 4
Command and Control of ADA Forces
This chapter describes the elements of mission command, the elements of command
and of control, and the authorities exercised through C2. It discusses how ADA forces
execute AMD C2 and the C2 relationships exercised across joint elements and ADA
echelons in a theater of operations.
MISSION COMMAND
4-1. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate
decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). To effectively exercise
authority and provide direction, a commander must fully understand the problem, envision the desired end
state, and grasp the nature and design of operations that will lead to it. The criticality of understanding cannot
be overstated. It is vital to making effective decisions, managing associated risks, and considering subsequent
effects.
4-2. A fundamental aspect of Army AMD operations is that AMD fires are defensive in nature. The enemy
chooses when to initiate offensive action by air surveillance and attack, and, thus, the enemy commander
holds the initiative as friendly ADA forces react to the method, tempo, and volume of air attack. However,
ADA commanders, who are skilled in translating mission command into executable plans and effective AMD
fires, render enemy air attacks and surveillance ineffective. In so doing, they wrestle the initiative from the
enemy commander and translate it into operational and strategic advantages for the Army and JFC. Further,
successful countering of enemy air attacks sets the conditions for joint and Army commanders to seize or
retake the initiative through offensive action, forcing the enemy commander to react to our actions.
4-3. C2 systems provide the ability to receive and disseminate orders, immediately view friendly activity
and supply movement, plan operations, receive situation and intelligence reports, view the airspace, and
receive automatically disseminated weather observations, forecasts, and analysis. C2 capabilities ensure
commonality across Army operations and standardize planning and execution functions across all echelons.
A unique aspect of the ADA force is the degree of integration that exists between the art of command and
the science of control. ADA C2 systems, as well as a comprehensive understanding of mission command,
are critical enablers for ADA commanders as they determine how, when, and at what level they should impact
the tactical engagement sequence.
4-4. AMD operations are complex and require commanders who, through mastery and application of
mission command,
* Understand the air and missile threat,
* Know how to design air and missile defenses,
* Can develop cohesive teams,
* Can employ ADA forces to maximize weapon systems capabilities with joint and multinational
AMD partners.
4-5. The Army’s principles of mission command enable ADA commanders at all echelons to effectively
conduct operations. These principles ̶ competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent,
mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance ̶ allow commanders to cut through the “fog of
war” and make timely and effective decisions despite operating in an environment that is both uncertain and
often ambiguous.
4-6. Competence. ADA leaders and Soldiers at all echelons must be tactically and technically competent in
executing AMD operations – masters of their craft – as individuals and in teams. Competence is achieved |
3-01 | 52 | Chapter 4
through institutional training and education focusing on the individual, operational force training
emphasizing team building, and self-development enhancing knowledge. Competence is reinforced through
a continuous series of focused and progressively stressing drills and exercises and challenging certifications.
4-7. Mutual trust. Central to creating a functional mission command climate is the need to build cohesive
teams. Demonstrated competencies, dedicated leadership, and commitment to mission accomplishment are
the cornerstones to building mutual trust. ADA commanders have a unique opportunity to build cohesive
teams with joint and multinational partners. Commanders must have a fundamental understanding and
appreciation for the unique community cultures of these partners to build cohesive multicultural AMD teams.
4-8. Shared understanding. AMD C2 capabilities at the operational and tactical levels (Patriot C2, Air and
Missiles Defense Planning and Control Systems (AMDPCS), forward area air defense (FAAD) C2/C-RAM
C2, THAAD C2, AMDWS, and air defense systems integrator) provide information exchanges, automated
processing aids, and warfighter/machine interfaces to achieve awareness. Lack of commonality and unique
system interfaces complicate the achievement of this objective across all echelons of the ADA force. As such,
a greater premium is placed on human cognition when it comes to transforming awareness and sometimes
conflicting or ambiguous information into understanding.
4-9. Commander’s intent. The ADA commander regularly synchronizes several warfighting functions
across multiple joint, multinational, and Army organizations. It is impossible for the commander to specify
the task, purpose, and end state for every possible contingency. It is with this backdrop that the commander
must issue a clear intent that provides the necessary framework for subordinate and adjacent leaders to
execute their short notice warfighting tasks and mission – maximum attrition as far forward as possible.
4-10. Disciplined initiative. AMD functions, by their very nature, are complex. A thinking enemy with a
wide range of capabilities, combined with a saturated joint or multinational operating environment, creates
the conditions for demonstrated disciplined initiative. The key to operating in this environment is for
subordinates to demonstrate understanding of the mission, the commander’s intent and end state, the AMD
concept of operations (to include ROE), and the tasks and purposes of each subordinate unit within that
concept of operations. This understanding arms subordinates with the ability to exercise disciplined initiative.
4-11. Mission orders. The AMD environment is fast paced and always evolving. Effective use of mission
orders to provide direction and guidance enables commanders to achieve mission accomplishment over a
wide ranging, rapidly evolving, and three-dimensional operational environment. Properly constructed and
disciplined orders allow commanders to direct change to the concept of the operation, when necessary.
4-12. Risk acceptance. ADA commanders must know where they are facing risk and ensure these risks are
understood at all echelons. Commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders use the risk management process in
developing plans and preparing for operations (see ATP 5-19 for more information). The risk management
process allows commanders to determine the level of risk, supports their decisions as to how much risk to
accept (prudent risk), and facilitates the identification of means to minimize the effects of the risk. It is most
important to provide leadership with accurate risk information and for all to understand at what level the
responsibility to accept risk resides.
COMMAND OF ADA FORCES
4-13. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates
by virtue of rank or assignment (JP 1). Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively
using available resources and for planning the employment, organization, coordination, and control of forces
for the accomplishment of missions. Direct leadership within a command decreases as the level of command
increases.
4-14. Command is more art than science. The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority
through timely decision making and leadership. As an art, command requires exercising judgment. |
3-01 | 53 | Command and Control of ADA Forces
COMMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
4-15. Army command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders
and identify the degree of control of the gaining commander. There are five types of command relationship:
organic, assigned, attached, operational control, and tactical control (ADP 5-0).
Note. The joint community identifies four command relationships: combatant command,
operational control, tactical control, and support. Operational and tactical control are discussed
below. Support Relationships is discussed on page 2-4, paragraphs 2-13 through 2-17. Combatant
command (COCOM) is the nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a
combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving
organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and
giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics
necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command (JP 1).
4-16. Organic are those assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in the
table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the operating forces for
the Navy (JP 1). An ADA battalion, for instance, is organized with a specified number of ADA batteries
based on its table of organization and equipment. Organic ADA forces have command relationships with all
other organic forces organized with the headquarters. Organic ADA forces are positioned by its organic
headquarters and have their priorities established by that headquarters.
4-17. Assign is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent
and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or
greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (JP 3-0). Assigned ADA forces have command
relationships with the gaining unit, are assigned positions by that unit’s commander, and have priorities
established by that commander or by a subordinate commander if so delegated.
4-18. Attach is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
temporary (JP 3-0). Attached ADA forces have command relationships with the gaining ADA unit and are
assigned positions and have priorities established by that unit’s commander.
4-19. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces
involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and
giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1). Command relationships, positions,
and priorities are established by the gaining ADA unit. See paragraph 4-51, on page 4-8 for additional
discussion.
4-20. Tactical control is the command authority over assigned or attached forces, or military capability of
forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned (JP 1). Command
relationships, positions, and priorities are established by the gaining ADA unit. See paragraphs 4-58 and 4-
59 on page 4-10 for additional discussion.
ELEMENTS OF COMMAND
4-21. The elements of command are authority, responsibility, decision making, and leadership. Commanders
exercise their authority by making decisions and leading their command in the implementation of those
decisions (ADP 6-0).
4-22. Command requires providing leadership. Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing
purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22).
Collaboration and dialogue are essential to this process, and effective commanders employ their C2 systems
to promote these in order to support decision making. |
3-01 | 54 | Chapter 4
AUTHORITY
4-23. Authority is the right and power to judge, act, or command. Commanders exercise authority by virtue
of their positions; they sustain authority, in many cases, by their competence and leadership abilities and by
the trust and respect with which they are held by superiors and subordinates. Command authority permeates
all force and engagement operations. This authority may be, and often is, delegated to subordinates.
Commanders must determine how much authority is delegated and when. These determinations are made
based on the commander’s confidence and trust in subordinates and METT-TC. For example, when
significant air threats are imminent or an air battle intensifies, engagement authority for air threats may be
delegated to Avenger team leaders. Authority with respect to command and to control is more fully discussed
in Authorities: Command and Control, beginning on page 4-6.
RESPONSIBILITY
4-24. With authority comes responsibility. Though commanders may delegate authority, they cannot
delegate responsibility. Commanders are legally and ethically responsible and accountable for their own
actions and decisions and for those of their subordinates. Responsibility entails fulfilling the assigned task;
accountability is about “answerability.” Commanders are responsible and accountable for mission
accomplishment; the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of Soldiers; and the use and maintenance of
resources. Commanders are always accountable to their superiors for what happens or fails to happen in their
command. AMD command responsibility and accountability are inherent in all force and engagement
operations irrespective of phase of operation, time, allocation of ADA resources, or aerial threats.
DECISION MAKING
4-25. Given the nature of the AMD operational environment (compressed detection-to-engagement
timelines, congested airspace, and ambiguous air pictures), ADA commanders and their staffs must be
equipped and trained to make decisions that are both timely and effective. While our AMD capabilities
include a variety of automated decision aids, the volume and variety of information presented to commanders
and operators require those making decisions to process and understand it quickly enough to allow for the
most appropriate response/action. To facilitate this, ADA commanders must train subordinates to realistic
standards, organize available assets, establish procedures, and demand focus in order to streamline the
information flow and expedite the decision-making process.
LEADERSHIP
4-26. A key ingredient to successful command is the exercise of effective leadership in the inherently
stressful, ambiguous, and often chaotic conditions of combat operations. Leadership is the activity of
influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve
the organization (ADP 6-22). Collaboration and dialogue are essential to this process, and effective
commanders employ their C2 system to promote these in order to support decision making.
4-27. Effective leadership requires commanders to establish their presence at the critical place and time in
battle. Commanders’ presence at subordinate elements allows them to personally check for an understanding
of plans and intent. Their presence also allows them to better understand the operational concerns and
challenges of their subordinate commanders and factor those into their decision making. Finally, their
presence allows them to assess the overall unit climate, readiness, and morale.
4-28. Commanders at all echelons must exploit opportunities for greater leadership presence and use those
opportunities to instill confidence in their Soldiers and cultivate a positive leadership climate. The typically
wide dispersion of subordinate units in an AMD defense design makes this extremely challenging. As such,
commanders must be deliberate about prioritizing the time spent “on the ground” with their staffs and
subordinate units. The face-to-face interaction with subordinate leaders and Soldiers helps to improve the
flow of information, both up and down, contributing to a common and shared situational understanding across
echelons. Ultimately, this time spent “on the ground” is time well spent; it facilitates building and maintaining
trust and confidence, which will result in significant operational dividends during those times when command
presence is not possible. |
3-01 | 55 | Command and Control of ADA Forces
CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF ADA FORCES
4-29. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance
with the commander’s intent (ADP 6-0). Control extends over the entire force and is executed in the different
domains by various authorities. In the air domain, the JFC designates the AADC to execute AMD operations
and the airspace control authority to coordinate the use of the airspace. See paragraph 4-51 on page 4-8 for
more information.
4-30. Limited AMD resources, the potentially catastrophic consequences of failed engagements, and the ever
present risk of fratricide make effective control of AMD fires a top priority of all personnel involved in
engagement operations. The structure and degree of this control varies based upon situational factors, which
include span of control, degree of airspace traffic density, operational context (phase of operations), and geo-
political considerations and sensitivities.
ELEMENTS OF CONTROL
4-31. Commanders use control to direct and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces. However, control
is not a one-way process – it entails the reciprocal flow of information from subordinate elements as well as
from higher and lateral sources. There are four elements of control: direction, feedback, information, and
communications.
DIRECTION
4-32. Directions are generally transmitted through plans and orders. These may contain amplifying control
and coordination measures. AMD documents, such as the area air defense plan, airspace control plan, and
airspace control order, may, for instance, identify air routes through the area of operations, specify who is
delegated engagement and/or identification authority, activate/deactivate missile engagement zones, and
establish the weapons control status.
4-33. Automated C2 tools can enhance the ADA commander’s ability to exercise control to account for
changing circumstances and direct adjustments within the defense design and ROE to address the new
situation. These tools facilitate shortened response times to achieve and implement critical C2 decisions and
directives.
FEEDBACK
4-34. Feedback may come from higher headquarters or adjacent, subordinate, or supporting forces, and it
may occur before, during, or after operations. Feedback conveys concurrence/approval of existing plans or
activities, or it may recommend/direct changes. Feedback promotes common situational understanding.
INFORMATION
4-35. The ability to gather and process information from multiple sources (for example, sensor data, situation
reports, and unit movement reports) allows commanders and their staffs to see and understand the air battle.
While this holds true for all phases of the fight, it is particularly critical as maneuver forces look to seize the
initiative and execute decisive action against the enemy. Given the pace of these operations, this information
must be timely and unambiguous. While this has proven to be a challenge across all domains, the ability to
gather and process this information as it pertains to the airspace has been particularly daunting. The lack of
a real-time air picture at BCTs and functional brigades forces these commanders to accept what amounts to
incalculable risk when factoring in the enemy’s ability to influence (interdict, delay, or disrupt) their schemes
of maneuver to achieve decisive action. ADAM cells must establish communications and information
exchange procedures with ADA units and other AMD assets, within their assigned brigades’ areas of
operations, in order to leverage the capabilities those assets provide. Even if they do not have all the assets
to defeat the potential air threat, identifying and understanding it allows brigade commanders to assess the
risk and implement measures to mitigate it. |
3-01 | 56 | Chapter 4
COMMUNICATION
4-36. Effective communication is essential when operating in the complex and ever evolving AMD
operational environment. The information being transmitted must be timely, relevant, and, most importantly,
must equal the information being received. Due to these requirements, every effort must be made to ensure
voice and data communication networks are established and maintained through all phases of operations.
Outages to networks must be addressed immediately. When outages do occur, established degraded
communication procedures must be followed to ensure safe and effective continuity of operations until
networks are restored.
4-37. One way to deal with degraded communications is through primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency (also known as PACE) communication planning. PACE plan establishes the methods of
communications, typically from higher echelons to lower echelons. A good plan establishes redundancy so
that communications are always available, while ensuring that an alternate or contingency method of
communications does not rely on the primary.
COORDINATION
4-38. Inherent in command and control relationships is coordination of efforts. Coordination is a continuous
process extending from initial planning for AMD operations through their execution. Coordination of
functions and actions is effected by ADA officers in organizations and elements at the various Army, joint,
and multinational levels. The primary AMD coordinators are the AAMDC commander; AAMDC and ADA
brigade air defense artillery fire control officer (ADAFCO); AMD section chiefs in the theater, corps, and
division headquarters; and the ADAM cell ADA officers in BCTs and other specified brigades. However, all
ADA officers down to platoon level execute coordination tasks with their supported and supporting
commanders.
4-39. AMD coordinators ensure that ADA plans and operations are synchronized with and integrated into
the plans and operations across the land, sea, and air domains. Key coordination tasks (echelon dependent)
include:
* Advise commanders and their staffs of the AMD capabilities, unit locations and statuses.
* Assess air and missile threats and supported commanders’ priorities in order to optimize defense
planning.
* Inform protection cells in corps and below of current operations and future AMD plans.
* Assist the fire support coordinator in integrating attack operations priorities into the forces
targeting process.
* Request and disseminate AMD information to include airspace control measures or restrictions.
* Develop the AMD appendix in the operations plan.
* Assist in facilitating force protection and sustainment support for ADA units.
4-40. Additional discussion of the specific responsibilities of individual AMD coordinators are contained in
section IV, below, and in chapters 4 through 9.
AUTHORITIES: COMMAND AND CONTROL
4-41. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). Command of AMD forces
and the control of AMD fires are derived from separate authorities. Army commanders exercise legal
authority and responsibility for the ADA formations assigned to them or otherwise placed under their
operational control. However, because AMD fires occur in the airspace, they are controlled by the AADC.
The area air defense commander is the component commander with the preponderance of air defense
capability and the required command, control, and communications capabilities who is assigned by the joint
force commander to plan and execute integrated air defense operations (JP 3-01). The AADC establishes the
AMD ROE for the theater of operations. The separation of command responsibility from the authority to
control AMD fires presents unique challenges for ADA commanders. They must command their ADA forces
in the planning, preparation, and execution of the AMD mission, but at the same time, they engage air threats |
3-01 | 57 | Command and Control of ADA Forces
according to specified authorities and controls promulgated by the AADC. This complex environment results
in the following set of conditions, which characterize nearly all AMD operations:
* AMD operations are inherently joint and interdependent.
* Army AMD operations require an integrated and networked C2 system.
* Command of ADA forces is exercised by Army commanders.
* Control of Army AMD fires is exercised in accordance with JFC directives and by delegated
authorities.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS ARE INHERENTLY
JOINT AND INTERDEPENDENT
4-42. The JFC counters air and missile threats to ensure freedom of action, provide protection, and deny
enemy freedom of action (JP 3-01). The service component commands of the joint force normally are tasked
to conduct operations in support of the counterair mission to maximize the complementary and reinforcing
capabilities that each service brings to joint warfighting while minimizing relative vulnerabilities.
4-43. The U.S. Army provides the primary land-based AMD to the joint force. The JFC depends on the Army
to execute AMD of critical assets from the land within the context of a larger joint counterair mission, which
includes offensive and defensive operations. As the land AMD force to the larger joint defensive counterair
effort, ADA forces depend on other service capabilities to provide space-, air-, and land-based intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance to detect, track, provide early warning of air and missile threats, and cue
ADA weapon systems to effectively counter these threats. The combination of Army AMD capabilities
brought to the joint counterair effort, coupled with the support required of other services, make AMD
operations inherently joint and interdependent.
4-44. ADA commanders must build a cohesive Army team that understands joint doctrine, tactics, techniques
and procedures, and that is trusted by other members of the joint force. Further, through joint training and
exercises, collaboration, and regular interaction, ADA commanders and those of other service components
foster shared understanding that is critical to the execution of the joint counterair mission.
ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS REQUIRE AN
INTEGRATED AND NETWORKED COMMAND AND CONTROL
SYSTEM
4-45. ADA forces dependence on other service capabilities, as well as on each other, requires that all
contributing systems (or sensor and shooter components) be networked and integrated to the greatest extent
possible to facilitate a shared understanding of the operational environment for the air domain. Current
capabilities are somewhat limited in the extent to which they are able to network and integrate due to their
unique system interfaces. These capabilities rely on joint tactical data links to share track data and coordinate
engagements. The Army has established an interface control officer position in the AAMDC, ADA brigades,
corps, and divisions to focus on the planning and integration of the many Army and joint systems, networks,
and information exchange capabilities. The Army interface control officer works with the designated joint
interface control officer who is normally located at the joint air operations center (JAOC). The joint interface
control officer is responsible for planning and managing the links over which critical force operations and
engagement operations data is passed between joint AMD capabilities. See chapter 12 for more information
on the networks and the Army’s interface control officer.
4-46. To overcome the inherent system-centric limitations to integration, the Army is developing the
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command (IBCS) system, a comprehensive and common
networked C2 capability package that will leverage all relevant external data links for full joint integration;
integrate all Army AMD sensor, shooter, and C2 platforms; employ an integrated defense design planning
capability; provide a robust tool set to manage both force and engagement operations; and, allow for dynamic
task organization of previously stove-piped ADA systems and major components into tailored force
packages. By employing these capabilities, ADA forces will be able to overcome many of the inherent |
3-01 | 58 | Chapter 4
challenges associated with the complexities and ambiguities that characterize the wide range of air and
missile threats they must defeat.
COMMAND OF AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY FORCES IS EXERCISED
BY ARMY COMMANDERS
4-47. Although AMD operations are inherently joint and interdependent, the command of ADA forces is
always retained by Army commanders and cannot be delegated. Similarly, while the control of AMD fires is
usually retained by the designated AADC, that control does not lessen the fundamental responsibility of ADA
commanders for mission accomplishment and leading their formations.
4-48. Army command policy and mission command/C2 doctrine apply to all commanders regardless of unit
type. Command of ADA forces includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available
resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces for
the accomplishment of assigned missions. The ADA commander issues the commander’s intent which
expresses the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state, provides focus to the staff, and helps
subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results.
4-49. Operational control is inherent in command authority and may be delegated within the command.
Operational control, as previously defined in paragraph 4-19 on page 4-3, includes the authoritative direction
over all aspects of military operations and joint training. Operational control normally provides full authority
to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary. However, operational
control does not give the commander in operational control the implied authority to direct logistics or
administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These authorities reside with the commander
pursuant to service directives. ADA forces may receive operational control of subordinate organizations, and
may also be placed under the operational control of higher level Army organizations or another service
component in support of a joint force or component commander.
4-50. The Army’s overarching framework for exercising C2 is the operations process. The operations process
drives AMD mission planning and the execution of AMD operations in accordance with a unit’s command
structure (for example, ADA brigade to battalion) and collaboration with joint and multinational partners.
Within the operations process, the analysis process continuously collects and evaluates all available
information on friendly and enemy forces to support decisions made by the commander. Throughout the
operations process, ADA commanders apply leadership to translate decisions into actions and operations.
This process culminates when operations orders are published, thereby initiating the execution activity.
4-51. ADA commanders make decisions and direct assigned ADA forces or those placed under their
operational control. The planning, preparation, execution, and sustainment of the total AMD mission (force
operations) is conducted before, during, and after commencement of combat operations. Guided by the
principles of mission command, ADA commanders, assisted by their staffs, direct the operations of
subordinate forces. The net results of force operations are units ready to perform the AMD mission and ADA
capabilities integrated with, and under the control of, the designated engagement authority to execute AMD
engagement operations.
CONTROL OF ARMY AMD FIRES IS EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH JOINT FORCE COMMANDER DIRECTIVES AND BY
DELEGATED AUTHORITIES
4-52. Control of Army AMD fires is exercised according to JFC directives and delegated authorities. The
separation of command responsibility from the control of AMD fires can appear problematic given that ADA
commanders can only direct the engagement of air threats under their command authority in compliance with
the promulgated ROE and designated engagement authority; yet, they possess the mission to defend critical
assets. This challenge is overcome by the joint common operating precept of unity of effort in the
accomplishment of the JFC’s objectives.
4-53. Control of AMD engagements is executed through various personnel and agencies that collectively
constitute the engagement authorities in the kill chain (see figure 4-1). An engagement authority is an |
3-01 | 59 | Command and Control of ADA Forces
authority vested with a joint force commander that may be delegated to a subordinate commander that permits
an engagement decision (JP 3-01). Figure 4-1 depicts both positions (for example, regional air defense
commander [RADC]) and organizations (for example, Army corps), and thus does not necessarily imply the
physical locations of ADA organizations nor parallelism between ADA organizations in the center of the
figure and the Army maneuver echelons shown on the right.
Figure 4-1. Theater AMD control relationships
4-54. The JFC appoints a joint force air component commander − The commander within a unified
command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for
recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces;
planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
(JP 3-0). The joint force air component commander (JFACC) normally has operational control of their
Service’s component forces and tactical control or direct support of the other forces made available for
tasking. The JFACC, or the joint force maritime component commander in some circumstances, also typically
serves as the airspace control authority and AADC, though these functions may be assigned to different
individuals. As the airspace control authority, the JFACC coordinates use of the airspace through the airspace
control plan and synchronizes/deconflicts all airspace user requirements through the airspace control order
(see JP 3-52 for more information). As the AADC, the JFACC plans, coordinates, and integrates the joint
force’s defensive counterair operations. The AADC’s responsibilities include developing and implementing
identification procedures and authorities, developing and implementing engagement procedures, developing
and executing plans for joint AMD operations, developing and transmitting AMD weapon control procedures
and measures, and establishing air defense regions or sectors to enhance decentralized execution of defensive
counterair missions. RADCs and subordinate sector air defense commanders (SADC)s may be appointed
within large theaters of operations and are delegated responsibilities and decision-making authority for
defensive counterair operations within their region or sector (JP 3-01). The AAMDC commander, as
discussed in chapter 4, has responsibilities at the AADC level (for example, deputy AADC for AMD) and
frequently is collocated with the AADC. The AAMDC headquarters may be collocated with the AADC at |
3-01 | 60 | Chapter 4
the JAOC, with the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) headquarters, or as shown in figure 4-
1 on page 4-9, separately in accordance with METT-TC.
4-55. The ADAFCO coordinates/integrates Army AMD fires within the joint AMD architecture. An
ADAFCO team consists of a fire control officer, a control assistant, and an operations assistant. ADAFCO
personnel must have proper clearances for the specified operation and duty location. They conduct continuous
24-hour operations and ensure effective control of AMD fires. Typically, ADAFCO requirements are
identified by the responsible ADA headquarters staff during the mission analysis step of the military decision
making process with consideration for the joint air operations plan, the area air defense plan, and the
supported commander’s requirements. The ADAFCO must be collocated with the commander possessing
engagement authorization for air and missile threats. As depicted in figure 4-1 on page 4-9, the AAMDC
ADAFCO is positioned with the JFAAC/AADC and the ADA brigade ADAFCO with the RADC/SADC.
Once embedded within that commander’s organization, the ADAFCO provides for the rapid engagement of
airborne targets/platforms, coordinates and controls AMD engagements, and assists the controlling authority
with friendly protect functions and fratricide prevention. When AAMDC and brigade ADAFCOs are
deployed, it is essential that they have access to a display of the integrated air picture at the hosting unit (for
example, JAOC, Aegis, or Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS]), voice and data
communications with subordinate ADA battalions and separate batteries, and access to the senior weapons
officer at the hosting unit, such as the senior air defense officer at the joint AOC or senior director on
AWACS.
4-56. Under the precept of unity of effort, both ADA commanders and the AADC are unified in their efforts
to execute joint AMD operations in support of the JFC’s objectives. The practical application of unity of
effort is the delineation of operational control authorities, described above, and the tactical control of ADA
fires.
4-57. In the context of joint AMD operations, the designated component commander, usually the
JFACC/AADC, is supported by ADA forces. The designated component commander is granted the necessary
authority (in this case tactical control) for controlling and directing ADA fires. Because ADA forces are not
typically assigned or attached to a commander of a different service, tactical control provides sufficient
authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of ADA assets within the
assigned mission or task.
4-58. Tactical control and the near-real-time exercise of the kill chain, as depicted and described above,
generally do not apply to Army Avenger and C-RAM units. Avenger and C-RAM engagements of threats,
such as low, slow, small tactical UASs (groups 2 and 3) and rockets, are very time sensitive and cannot wait
for authorizations through the various elements comprising the kill chain. Their engagements are delegated
to the lowest level as established by the ROE, fire control orders, and weapons control status (see procedural
control discussion in paragraphs 4-59 through 4-60, on pages 4-10 through 4-11). The employment of
Avenger and C-RAM must fully exploit the capabilities of early warning systems in conjunction with a
functional airspace control plan to reduce risk to friendly aircraft while facilitating successful engagements.
To ensure success, units must conduct in-depth planning and integration of the area air defense plan nested
with the standing airspace control plan at the appropriate echelon. The airspace control plan is the document
approved by the joint force commander that provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the
airspace control system for the joint force operational area (JP 3-52).
POSITIVE AND PROCEDURAL MEASURES OF CONTROL
4-59. AMD fires may be controlled through positive and procedural means and measures. Positive control
is a method of airspace control that relies on positive identification, tracking, and detection of aircraft within
an airspace, conducted with electronic means, by an agency having the authority and responsibility therein
(JP 3-52). Positive control is enabled by a common air picture that synthesizes data from multi-service
intelligence and AMD sensors, correlates air tracks, and identifies them based on an integrated airspace
control plan and established identification criteria. Positive control is exercised through fire control orders.
Procedural control is a method of airspace control which relies on a combination of previously agreed and
promulgated orders and procedures (JP 3-52). Procedural controls include air defense warnings, ROE,
published identification criteria, and weapons control status. |
3-01 | 61 | Command and Control of ADA Forces
4-60. Regardless of the echelon, positive and procedural control are exercised through the fire control
element (FCE), which is a subset of the current operations section in ADA units; it is responsible for air battle
management, airspace C2, and engagement operations. The composition of an FCE is echelon and METT-
TC dependent. The FCE manning crew accomplishes five functions. A single manned position may execute
more than one function when the pace of combat operations permits. Conversely, some functions may require
distribution across more than a single manning position or possibly across multiple C2 nodes. The five FCE
functions are:
* Fire control function encompasses the overall management of the air battle and engagement
decisions.
* Surveillance function provides for clarity in the air picture.
* Identification function focuses on proper combat identification. The identification and fire control
functional positions may be combined into a single manned position during light to moderate
levels of combat operations.
* Weapons control function addresses actions from receipt of an engagement decision from the fire
control officer to execution of that engagement. Depending upon span of control and pace of
combat operations, more than a single weapons control functional position may need to be
manned. Allocation between multiple weapons control positions may be based on threat type (for
example, one position for the ballistic missile fight and one for the air fight), a geographical
division (for example, one controlling all engagements occurring in the northern sector of the
defense and one controlling those occurring in the southern sector), or along system type lines (for
example, one controlling Patriot fires and one controlling Avenger fires).
* Information control function addresses the maintenance of networks and information flow across
the task force and with higher, adjacent, and supported units.
Note. The term “fire control element (FCE)” is used generically throughout the ensuing chapters
to address those elements, sections, and centers (such as fire direction centers in Patriot battalions,
air battle management operations centers in Avenger battalions, and fire control elements in
THAAD batteries) that manage or control AMD engagements.
ALERT STATES
4-61. An alert state is a condition that prescribes the amount of resources required to achieve ready to
fire and desired radar emissions, and which specifies manning requirements and equipment
configurations. Alert states are METT-TC dependent and are determined by the senior ADA commander,
in coordination with the AADC and RADC/SADC.
4-62. The AAMDC governs subordinate units’ readiness levels through the use of alert states. In addition,
alert states provide maintenance and training opportunities for subordinate units.
AIR DEFENSE WARNING CONDITIONS
4-63. An air defense warning condition is an air defense warning given in the form of a color code
corresponding to the degree of air raid probability with yellow standing for when an attack by hostile aircraft
or missiles is probable; red for when an attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is imminent or is in progress;
and white for when an attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is improbable (JP 3-01).
4-64. Warnings conditions are a procedural control used to “posture” units based on the assessed threat. The
AADC will establish the baseline air defense warning condition for the joint force during the planning stage.
A condition may be different for an air threat and a missile threat. Subordinate air defense commanders may
issue higher, but not lower, conditions for their region or sector. Air defense warning conditions are
disseminated though C2 channels to all AMD elements, ADA fire units, and supported assets. |
3-01 | 62 | Chapter 4
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
4-65. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered (JP 3-84). The JFC approves the theater rules. These established
rules enable the AADC to retain control of the air battle by prescribing the exact conditions under which
engagements may take place. ROE apply to all warfare participants in the theater and are disseminated to all
echelons of air, land, and sea forces. There are six AMD ROE categories: right of self-defense, identification
criteria, fire control orders, weapons control status, levels of control, and modes of control.
4-66. Right of self-defense. Commanders at all echelons must take whatever action is necessary to protect
their forces and equipment against air or missile attack. When under attack, the right of self-defense is
inherent to all ROE and weapons control procedures (JP 3-01).
4-67. Identification criteria. The employment of ADA weapon systems requires early identification of
friendly, neutral, or hostile aircraft and missiles to maximize extended-range engagement and avoid
fratricide. The problem of distinguishing friendly, neutral, and hostile air objects, while employing various
weapon systems against the enemy, is a highly complex task; the same type of aircraft may be flown by
friendly and enemy countries. However, since ballistic missiles have a distinct flight profile, ROE for this
threat should be based on the trajectory profile. The AADC and the airspace control authority establish
measures and procedures within the airspace control system to positively identify all airborne assets and
permit the execution of AMD operations. These measures and procedures reduce delays in operations and
prevent fratricide. Positive identification of tracks is normally the preferred method of operation. Positive
identification is an identification derived from observation and an analysis of target characteristics including
visual recognition, electronic support systems, non-cooperative target recognition techniques, identification
friend or foe systems, or other physics-based identification techniques (JP 3-01). In the absence of positive
identification, procedural identification is used; procedural identification employs previously established and
promulgated airspace coordinating measures and rules. Procedural identification separates airspace users by
geography, altitude, heading, time, and/or maneuver. Generally, some combination of positive and procedural
identification is used.
* Hostile criteria are a description of conditions under which aerial platforms or missiles may be
identified as hostile for engagement purposes. For AMD units, they are basic rules that assist in
distinguishing between friendly and enemy aerial objects. For example, air platforms such as
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft may be declared hostile if they begin to attack an asset, appear
to be in an attack posture, or are not providing an appropriate friendly identification code; UASs
may be declared hostile if they are surveilling a friendly asset or force; and ballistic missiles and
large-caliber rockets are generally considered hostile, allowing for engagement based on the
current ROE.
* Commanders having identification authority use hostile criteria to determine the identification of
detected air targets. Identification authority is the authority to assign an identity classification to
an unknown contact, if possible (JP 3-01). The highest echelon capable of managing engagement
operations normally retains identification authority. Upon target detection, fire units with near-
real-time data transmission capability assist the engagement authority by forwarding target
information. The engagement authority makes final targeting decisions based on identification (for
example, classification and kinematic evaluation) and may delegate the authority to engage.
Delegation of engagement and identification authorization to lower echelons is normal for
SHORAD units.
4-68. Fire control orders. Fire control orders are commands that are used to exercise positive control over
engagements on a case-by-case basis and can be transmitted electronically or verbally. They are given to
direct or inhibit firing by surface-to-air weapons units based on the ROE and rapidly changing tactical
situation (JP 3-01). However, not all of the fire control orders, presented below, can or will be used by every
type of ADA unit.
* Engage is a fire control order used to direct or authorize units and/or weapon systems to attack a
designated target (JP 3-01). |
3-01 | 63 | Command and Control of ADA Forces
* Hold fire is an emergency fire control order used to stop firing. If technically possible, missiles
already in flight must be prevented from intercepting (JP 3-01). Hold fire is primarily used to
effect friendly protection or avoid intercepts on neutral tracks.
* Cease engagement or cease fire directs units to stop the firing sequence against a designated target;
however, units may continue to track, and missiles already in flight are permitted to continue to
intercept (JP 3-01). Cease fire is normally issued to preclude engagement of the same track by two
or more weapon systems.
* Engage hold is a fire control order which prevents automatic engagement of the specified
target by the system when the system is operating in the automatic mode. Missiles in flight
are allowed to continue to intercept. This order is applicable to Patriot and THAAD systems only.
Engage hold is primarily used to prevent initiation of a redundant engagement during the time
period when an engagement has been initiated until its completion.
* Cover is, in air and missile defense, a fire control order that instructs a unit to assume a
posture that will allow engagement of a target. This order can be used for targets that are
presently being engaged by another fire unit or for targets that have yet to become significant
threats; to execute this command, the unit must report tracking and ready to fire to higher echelons.
4-69. Weapons control status. A weapon control status is an air and missile defense control measure declared
for a particular area and time by an area air defense commander, or delegated subordinate commander, based
on the ROE, that establish conditions under which fighters and surface air defense weapons are permitted to
engage threats (JP 3-01). Weapon control statuses (weapons hold, weapons tight, and weapons free) may be
applied to weapon systems, volumes of airspace, or types of air platforms. They prescribe the relative control
of AMD fires. The degree or extent of control varies depending on the tactical situation (JP 3-01).
* Weapons hold: the most restrictive status. Units may only fire in self-defense or when ordered by
proper higher authority (JP 3-01).
* Weapons tight: the normal status. Units may only fire on targets identified as hostile in accordance
with current ROE (JP 3-01).
* Weapons free: the least restrictive status: used to indicate when any target not positively identified
as friendly in accordance with current ROE may be engaged (JP 3-01).
4-70. Levels of control. Levels of control describe the AMD commander/echelon permitted to authorize
engagement of an air or missile threat (JP 3-01). This can be the AADC, RADC, SADC, ADA battalion,
ADA battery, ADA platoon, or ADA team. Different levels of control may be established for ballistic
missiles, UASs, fixed-wing aircraft, and rotary-wing aircraft.
4-71. Modes of control. There are three modes of control: centralized, decentralized, and autonomous. The
mode of control selected will depend upon the capabilities of the C2 system and weapons employed and both
the friendly and enemy air situations.
* Centralized control mode. In this mode, a higher echelon must authorize target engagements by
fire units. The executing element seeks permission to engage targets by requesting authorization
from that higher authority. Centralized control is used to minimize the likelihood of engaging
friendly aircraft while permitting engagements of hostile aircraft and missiles only when specific
orders are issued to initiate those engagements.
* Decentralized control mode. In this mode, a higher echelon monitors unit actions, making direct
target assignments on a management by exception basis, to ensure proper fire distribution, prevent
engagement of friendly air platforms, and prevent simultaneous engagements of hostile air targets.
Decentralized control is used to increase the likelihood that a hostile aircraft or missile is engaged
as soon as it comes within range of an ADA weapon system.
* Autonomous operations. Autonomous operations are initiated when a firing unit has lost all
communications (voice, data link, and tactical chat) to higher tactical headquarters. The fire unit
commander assumes full responsibility for control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets
in accordance with existing ROE, weapons control status, and previously received directives. In
this mode, the unit commander bears the full weight and responsibility of the unit’s actions or
inactions with regard to fire control. |
3-01 | 64 | Chapter 4
4-72. ADA units will normally be governed by a mix of positive and procedural controls that will vary by
weapon system. For example, aircraft engagements by Patriot are typically positively controlled by
engagement orders passed through voice and data links from the engagement authority, while those by
Avenger may be positively controlled, but are, more commonly, procedurally controlled – initiated at the fire
unit based on established identification criteria (visual identification) and weapons control status. |
3-01 | 65 | Chapter 5
Army Air and Missile Defense Command
This chapter describes AAMDC operations and how this level of command deploys,
employs, and supports ADA organizations. The guidance in this chapter is applicable
to the role of an AAMDC in all areas of AMD operations and ADA fires supporting
the preservation of land and air combat power.
ROLES AND CAPABILITIES
5-1. The role of the AAMDC is to perform AMD planning, coordination, integration, and execution in
support of the JFC priorities. One AAMDC is normally assigned to a theater. If not already forward stationed
or deployed, an early entry element of the AAMDC initially deploys followed by the remainder of the
headquarters. The AAMDC can operate either with the entire force in theater or using split operations. The
AAMDC is the primary ADA command organization and lead for Army Theater AMD. The AAMDC
strategically deploys combat ready ADA forces. In performing this role, the AAMDC ensures the Army’s
contribution to the joint AMD fight is architecturally and seamlessly integrated, coordinated, and
synchronized with other Army, joint, and multinational units, and supports the JFC’s intent.
5-2. In wartime, the AAMDC operates in theater in support of the Army force commander or, if designated,
the JFLCC and JFACC. Normally the AAMDC is under the operational control of the JFLCC and in direct
support of the area air defense commander (AADC) (JP 3-01).
5-3. The AAMDC commanding general has three primary roles: senior AMD commander, theater Army
AMD coordinator, and, if appointed, deputy AADC for AMD. The AAMDC commander is the Army
proponent for the AMD combat function and has total responsibility for active AMD planning within Army
forces and, when assigned, for the entire land force. As the theater Army AMD coordinator, the commander
ensures organic, assigned, and supporting ADA units’ contributions to accomplish AMD objectives in
support of the Army force commander’s, JFLCC’s (if appointed), and JFC’s concept of operations are
properly planned, coordinated, and synchronized. These responsibilities include recommending AMD
missions for the other members of the joint combined arms team. The AAMDC commander, as the deputy
AADC for AMD, ensures that Army AMD operations are properly coordinated and integrated with those of
joint and multinational forces. In addition, as the deputy AADC, the commander may chair the theater AMD
coordination board which recommends changes to AMD priorities on the defended asset list, adjustments to
planned defense designs, and actions across all the operational elements based on threat activities and/or
friendly operations.
5-4. While the capabilities of the AAMDC and the ADA brigade have significant overlap, their roles and
responsibilities are distinct, as highlighted in table 5-1 on page 5-2. Discussions of each of these roles and
responsibilities are provided in subsequent sections addressing command and control, force operations,
engagement operations, and sustainment. Additional details are provided in ATP 3-01.94. |
3-01 | 66 | Chapter 5
Table 5-1. Distinctive responsibilities of the AAMDC and ADA brigade
Responsibility AAMDC ADA Brigade
Planning Plans future operations and adjusts existing Plans current operations and
plans as dictated by METT-TC. makes required plan
adjustments and modifications.
Current Operations Supports joint air operations center. Supports regional/sector air
defense center.
Provides administrative,
operational, and sustainment
support of deployed forces.
Joint/Multinational Air Plans for and coordinates integrated Executes integrated operations.
and Missile Defense operations.
Integration
Sustainment Plans and coordinates joint, Army, and Executes AMD requirements.
multinational requirements.
Force Provision Develops requirements for forces needed. Provides forces to achieve
needs.
Certifies brigades for deployment.
Certifies battalions/batteries/
Ensures brigades are trained.
force packages for deployment.
Ensures battalions and
batteries are trained.
Air Battle Management Primarily performs upper tier ballistic missile, Highest organizational echelon
defense coordination and execution. equipped, trained and staffed to
operationally integrate
Can link subordinate task forces to the kill
multinational land-based AMD
chain via the ADAFCO.
forces.
Primary organization linking
subordinate task forces to the
kill chain via the ADAFCO.
Force Protection Coordinates support for protection from the Coordinates for support for
ground threat with the joint force land protection from the ground
component commander. threat with the local supported
commander.
AAMDC Army Air and Missile Defense Command
ADA air defense artillery
ADAFCO air defense artillery fire control officer
AMD air and missile defense
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations
AAMDC COMPOSITION
5-5. The AAMDC is staffed for its primary role to plan for U.S. and multinational land-based AMD forces
and integrate these forces and their defenses into the AADC’s overall AMD plan. The AAMDC is an
organization of either wholly active or reserve component ADA, fire support, aviation, intelligence, CBRN,
signal, and sustainment personnel melded into an effective AMD team. All AAMDCs are constructed based
on a core table of organization and equipment but are staffed somewhat differently to meet unique regional
challenges in performing their missions. The organizational structure of the AAMDC consists of a command
section and twelve subordinate sections: the chief of staff, G-1 (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3
(Operations), G-4 (Logistics), G-6 (Communications/Electronics), inspector general, public affairs, staff
judge advocate, unit ministry team, battery headquarters, and motor maintenance. Strategic planning and
resource management functions (G-5/G-8) are performed by designated personnel from within the existing
staff structure. An example of a typical AAMDC organizational structure is shown in figure 5-1. |
3-01 | 67 | Army Air and Missile Defense Command
Figure 5-1. AAMDC organization
5-6. AAMDCs are regionally aligned, mission tailored organizations. ADA formations are typically task
organized to the AAMDC to conduct AMD operations.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
5-7. The AAMDC serves as an operational command supporting the Army force commander, or JFLCC,
and JFACC. In exercising C2, the AAMDC is guided by the seven principles of mission command in training,
equipping, supporting, deploying, and fighting relevant ADA formations from brigade (in most operations)
to crew level (generally in early entry or small scale deployment operations). See the discussion of the
mission command principles in paragraphs 4-5 through 4-12 on pages 4-1 through 4-2.
5-8. Nominal AAMDC control relationships are depicted in figure 5-2 on page 5-4. As noted in paragraph
4-55 on page 4-9, the positions depicted for the ADA organizations do not necessarily imply their physical
locations nor parallelism between ADA organizations and the Army maneuver echelons. |
3-01 | 68 | Chapter 5
Figure 5-2. AAMDC AMD control relationships
5-9. The AAMDC C2 node links active defense, passive defense, and attack operations functions and
provides timely assessment of the threat. It enables rapid dissemination of data fusion, tactical warning,
mission assignment, cueing, targeting data, and post-strike assessment to the appropriate AMD element.
AAMDCs are equipped with AMDPCS and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) portable
planner. The AMDPCS is capable of exercising C2 functionality for force and engagement operations. The
portable planner enables the AAMDC to plan and evaluate THAAD defenses. The AAMDC focuses on force
operations across the theater for deployed ADA forces. The AAMDC participates in engagement operations
through its ADAFCO. As noted in chapter 4, the ADAFCO team is collocated with the designated
engagement authority for air and missile threats.
5-10. The AAMDC assists in coordinating upper and lower tier engagements across the theater and region.
This involves coordination between the Navy’s Aegis, Patriot, and THAAD weapon systems, all of which
may be employed in the homeland defense mission as well as in theaters. This responsibility is primarily
executed through the ADAFCO who serves as the Army’s upper and lower tier coordination officer. The
ADAFCO is deployed at the joint air operations center (JAOC) or other appropriate joint controlling
headquarters, in conjunction with the naval ballistic missile defense liaison officer; the ADAFCO uses
equipment provided by the joint controlling headquarters and organic voice communications.
FORCE OPERATIONS
5-11. The AAMDC projects its ADA forces to theater to support the JFC priorities based on METT-TC. This
includes all aspects of mobilization and pre-deployment operations, deployment and entry operations,
employment and sustainment, and redeployment, as well as the responsibility for training and certifying its
task organized forces. |
3-01 | 69 | Army Air and Missile Defense Command
5-12. Historically, the AAMDC conducts strategic and operational level efforts, coordinating the
administrative, operational, logistical, and special staff requirements for subordinate units, typically brigades.
The AAMDC plans future operations and supports current operations by monitoring the execution of its
subordinate ADA brigades and conducting appropriate replanning to maintain viability of land-based air and
missile defenses as the tactical and operational situations change.
5-13. AAMDC operations focus on coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the operational elements,
C2 nodes, sensors, attack systems, and active/passive defense to effectively counter the air and missile threat
and weapons of mass destruction. AAMDC force operations include the following core tasks:
* AMD planning and coordination with and between supported and supporting headquarters.
* Coordination of AMD related tasks and liaison with multinational forces.
* AMD resource allocation.
* Support of critical and defended asset list development and management.
* Airspace control measures planning and coordination.
* AMD aspects of the IPB – referred to as AMD IPB in further discussions.
* AMD reporting.
* Coordination of force protection requirements.
* Dissemination of early warning.
* Support offensive counterair (attack operations) during target development and time sensitive
targeting.
* Sustainment operations.
5-14. The AAMDC performs AMD planning and coordination with and between supported and supporting
headquarters. The AAMDC functions as a theater Army AMD coordinator, coordinating and planning
centralized air battle management of tactical through strategic levels of command, as part of the supported
commanders’ objectives and concepts of operations. The AAMDC coordinates with the JFLCC to define the
critical assets requiring defense and further coordinates the ground locations where ADA units will be
positioned to execute that defense. The AAMDC also coordinates and integrates AMD plans and operations
to enable synchronized efforts within designated areas of operation. It supports theater-strategic current
operations by providing the AADC up-to-date information on the operational and sustainment status of land-
based AMD forces. It supports future operations by participating in air operations planning, gathering
intelligence data to predict future threat air activities, and evaluating the JFC’s schemes of operations and
maneuver. Operation plans and requirements are coordinated with the AAMDC by ADA officers in the
corps/division functional cells, air defense airspace management (ADAM) elements within the BCTs, and
subordinate ADA brigades. The coordination of plans allows for the assessment, prioritization, and
apportionment of resources and further dissemination of orders.
5-15. The supported Army or joint headquarters develops and issues a base plan or order. From the base
order, all supporting or subordinate Army echelons prepare estimates and begin planning; this may generate
requirements to update the base plan due to modifications received. Based on the final order, AAMDC or
ADA brigade representatives assist the corps/division AMD elements in developing the AMD appendix of
the fires annex to the operations order. The AMD section coordinates with all supporting echelons, including
the AAMDC and supporting ADA brigades and subordinate units, allowing force tailoring of AMD
capabilities to satisfy mission requirements. The AMD appendix directs task organization, coordination,
integration, and synchronization tasks; informs subordinate units of their specific missions; and allocates
resources required to sustain operations.
5-16. The AAMDC coordinates AMD related tasks with joint, interorganizational, and multinational
organizations. Additionally, planning and integration requires coordination to economize forces and
capabilities and create unity of effort. Optimizing the AMD capabilities of regional partners to contribute to
plans also requires synchronization with the overarching theater engagement plans.
5-17. The AAMDC performs AMD resource allocation. As a theater level command supporting the
combatant commander’s AMD requirements, the AAMDC allocates AMD forces in a manner consistent with
priorities established by area air defense plans and commensurate with unified command protection plans in
support of national objectives. The AAMDC staff participates in all stages of joint planning while developing |
3-01 | 70 | Chapter 5
the AAMDC commander’s recommended AMD force allocation to the JFC, JFACC/AADC, and JFLCC.
The AAMDC also recommends the allocation of elements to strengthen/establish passive defenses for assets,
facilitating the economy of ADA forces.
5-18. The AAMDC supports the development of the critical and defended asset lists. The AAMDC staff
works with the JFACC/AADC and JFLCC staffs in developing and managing the critical asset list and
defended asset list within a joint operations area. The AAMDC staff receives the nominated critical assets
from subordinate Army, joint, and multinational elements, consolidates them into a list, and contributes to
the prioritization of this critical asset list. The joint and AAMDC staffs then identify the most critical assets
that must be defended, given the amount and availability of AMD forces. Defended assets change throughout
an operation, as METT-TC changes. This ongoing integrated process – nomination and prioritization of
critical assets, AMD force resourcing, and identification of defended assets – facilitates the efficient
allocation or reallocation of AMD forces to provide the degree of protection desired or risk accepted by the
JFC for the most critical assets in theater.
5-19. The AAMDC performs airspace control measure planning and coordination. Airspace control spans
joint and multinational activities and can include intergovernmental aspects as well. The AAMDC identifies
the most suitable airspace control measures for AMD ground forces and advises the AADC of these. AAMDC
personnel then coordinate the measures with the AADC staff, or the joint force maritime component
commander’s staff as appropriate, to ensure the most effective measures are in place in the area of operations.
Coordination is continuous as the requirements for and use of various control measures may change
throughout an operation depending on METT-TC.
5-20. The AAMDC performs an AMD IPB. The AMD IPB is an analysis process to continuously assess air
and missile threats to the area of operations. AAMDC intelligence personnel and other staff members
systematically evaluate the effects of significant characteristics of the operational environment and the
anticipated threat characteristics and project the quantities and capabilities of the air and missile forces that
may be used against friendly assets. These projections allow the AAMDC commander and staff to identify
the degree of protection for designated critical assets and to allocate AMD elements accordingly, facilitating
designs of the most capable defenses for the assets. AAMDC intelligence personnel also provide or assist
their joint or Army force counterparts in the development of theater-specific threat information. This
information assists ADA officers and staff planners, in supported corps or division headquarters, in the
development of AMD plans and orders. For additional information on the AMD IPB, see ATP 3-01.16.
5-21. The AAMDC performs AMD reporting. The reporting requirements begin as soon as deployment alerts
are received. The reports comprise all aspects of force operations, to include preparation, readiness,
certifications, personnel, training, deployments, planning, headquarters and unit locations, communications,
weapons statuses, and future planning. Some reporting is formal, and some is more coordination oriented to
assure synchronization with supported forces. Some reports are AMD specific and reflect the posture of ADA
forces and their capability to defend designated assets in the joint operations area.
5-22. The AAMDC coordinates force protection requirements for ADA forces. ADA forces are not
sufficiently manned to provide 24-hour protection from air and missile threats and concurrently force
protection against ground threats. The AAMDC coordinates with the JFLCC or other commanders, as
appropriate, for forces to provide protection against the ground threat.
5-23. The AAMDC disseminates early warning. The AAMDC, as well as other members of the joint force,
develop early warning architectures to detect air and missile threats and warn supported Army, joint, and
multinational units, and, when requested, civilian authorities in the operations area. The AAMDC plans,
coordinates, and integrates AMD and other external sensor capabilities to maintain situational awareness of
the airspace. It generates and disseminates timely early warning and alert of impending attacks for units or
areas at risk.
5-24. The AAMDC attack operations section supports the JFLCC and JFACC in the development of targets
specifically against the air and missile threat. The section integrates with JFLCC and JFACC targeting teams
to address AMD objectives in the JFC targeting strategy, and coordinates through JFLCC or JFACC targeting
personnel to implement a coherent joint theater AMD attack plan. The section enables the deputy AADC to
support the JFACC by helping to synchronize the targeting efforts against the air and missile threat, and
providing AMD focus to Army deep operations and within the JFLCC’s operating environment. |
3-01 | 71 | Army Air and Missile Defense Command
5-25. The AAMDC performs sustainment operations. The AAMDC plans and coordinates sustainment
operations as described in paragraph 5-31 on page 5-7.
5-26. Based on METT-TC, AAMDC elements are forward deployed into an area of operations prior to
hostilities. During contingency missions and wartime, the AAMDCs plan/recommend force requirements
and task organize the forces again based on METT-TC. The AAMDC may mobilize along with some or all
of its subordinate ADA organizations or as a separate AMD C2 capability. Dedicated AAMDC liaison
sections or teams deploy to selected major joint operational areas and with Army forces/JFLCC elements to
assist in the execution of the mission.
5-27. The AAMDC has the flexibility to organize and employ itself in a variety of ways to successfully
support and execute higher headquarters’ AMD guidance, intent, and concept of operations. Locations of the
CPs, as well as the AAMDC commander, are based on METT-TC. The AAMDC may collocate its entire CP
or an operations and intelligence-heavy main CP with the JAOC. It may also collocate an
administrative/logistics heavy CP or element in the proximity of the Army force/JFLCC headquarters. The
AAMDC commander has the flexibility with its modular CP to tailor it to meet mission unique requirements.
The placement of headquarters elements requires extensive coordination and determination of force
protection support available in that location. Force protection can usually be attained by collocating with
supported elements; this must be deliberately addressed during the planning process. Coordination with the
supported unit must include a complete understanding of the specific ADA assets that require force
protection.
5-28. To plan operations, the AAMDC uses the embedded planning tools within the AMDPCS. The primary
planning tool is the air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS), which allows the staff to develop defense
design options using algorithms based upon broad system capabilities. To assist in force operations planning,
it retrieves situational awareness information from joint headquarters, the Army Battle Command System
network, subordinate ADA units, national intelligence assets, all source centers, and tactical and strategic
sensors. The AAMDC also uses the THAAD portable planner to plan and evaluate THAAD defenses.
Additionally, the AAMDC uses the C2BMC system (see Appendix A) as a means of integrating its assigned
theater AMD assets with the United States Strategic Command’s global missile defense plan/architecture.
C2BMC assists the AAMDC as it works to deconflict competing priorities across the operational and strategic
levels, enabling the most effective allocation of AMD resources.
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
5-29. The AAMDC provides a joint air picture and connectivity with the controlling identification and
engagement authorities in accordance with the area air defense plan, special instructions, and AAMDC
tactical supplement. This connectivity is conducted through the ADAFCO.
5-30. The ADAFCO serves as the Army point of contact between the ADA FCEs and the controlling
authority. The AAMDC ADAFCO provides Army AMD operational expertise and monitors, coordinates,
and synchronizes surveillance and engagement activities of ADA assets with joint and multinational AMD
units. The ADAFCO is also responsible for the coordination and deconfliction of upper-tier engagements by
joint and multinational systems in conjunction with the naval liaison officer. The ADAFCO maintains
communications with the ADA brigade ADAFCOs at other controlling authorities, sharing tactical air
pictures and situational awareness and coordinating for the engagement of upper-tier leakers. The ADAFCO
additionally serves as the conduit for the issuing of fire control or engagement orders from the controlling
authority to ADA units.
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
5-31. The AAMDC plans and coordinates joint, Army, and multinational sustainment for land-based air and
missile defenses and supervises execution of sustainment through its subordinate ADA brigades. Often ADA
units or elements are located with supported forces and require sustainment support from them. Required
support includes religious, health, financial management, and personnel services, as well as maintenance
support by the support maintenance company and signal support by the expeditionary signal battalion.
Sustainment support must be coordinated in detail and in advance as much as possible. The AAMDC |
3-01 | 72 | Chapter 5
examines sustainment needs to position land-based air and missile defenses in sufficient time and quantities
to meet the JFC’s needs in seizing and maintaining the initiative to defeat the enemy.
5-32. The AAMDC must provide a sustainable force that enables supported commanders to optimize their
operations while minimizing adverse impacts from possible air and missile attack. The AAMDC’s organic
primary and special staffs provide specialized operational, administrative, and logistical support for its task-
organized ADA forces. This includes all types of support unique to the theater, from force protection to
supply chain management, communications and network operations, and diplomatic and host nation
coordination.
5-33. The AAMDC analyzes the operational environment to account for ground and air threats that may
impact friendly infrastructure and the availability of resources, ensuring that adequate support is planned and
available for sustainment, resupply, and reconstitution activities throughout all phases of an operation.
5-34. Sustainment activities focus on how, when, and where to accomplish the functions of manning, arming,
fueling, fixing, and moving. Ensuring the adequacy of personnel services, health services, field services,
quality of life, and general supply support is also a priority of sustainment activities.
5-35. The AAMDC commander may establish priority supporting efforts by phase of the operation or change
priorities during operations to ensure that operational and force sustainment is provided in accordance with
their relative importance to accomplishing the mission. Changes by phase to the defended asset list, or
reprioritization of critical assets on the list, will normally affect support priorities and require continual
assessment by the staff.
5-36. Reconstitution activities, including regeneration and reorganization, are conducted to restore the
AAMDC and/or its supporting forces to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission
requirements and available resources. They are implemented when combat effectiveness has been degraded
as a result of enemy activity, battlefield damage, or other environmental factors and hazards. Regeneration
involves rebuilding the unit through large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies, including
the reestablishment or replacement of essential C2 personnel and equipment and the conduct of mission-
essential training. Reorganization involves the shifting of internal resources within the unit to increase its
level of combat effectiveness. |
3-01 | 73 | Chapter 6
ADA Brigade
This chapter discusses the ADA brigade headquarters and the AMD capabilities it
provides in support of the joint force commander (JFC) and unified land operations.
Like all ADA headquarters units, the brigade headquarters is task organized to support
the mission based on METT-TC.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
6-1. The role of ADA brigades is to command and coordinate the operations of subordinate ADA battalions
and other assigned and attached units in the theater army. Normally one brigade is assigned per theater. If
not already forward stationed or deployed, an early entry element of the ADA brigade initially deploys as a
part of an AAMDC, followed by the remainder of the headquarters. ADA brigades are structured to perform
several functions supporting the AAMDCs and those designated geographic command organizations which
support AMD integration and operations. ADA brigade functions include C2, integration, planning, and
liaison with joint and higher echelon units and subordinate battalions. See table 5-1 on page 5-2 for the
brigade responsibilities as compared with the AAMDC responsibilities. The brigade responsibilities are
further defined in this chapter. ADA brigades provide forces for the AAMDCs to meet the commanders’
AMD objectives. ADA brigades, in both the active and reserve components, can integrate a mix of active,
reserve and multinational forces. The ADA brigades are aligned under the AAMDCs and exercise C2 of
subordinate units in support of unified land operations.
6-2. The ADA brigade focuses on the execution of current operations, while supporting planning through
collaboration with the AAMDC. The ADA brigade executes C2 functions in support of force and engagement
operations. Consistent with the AAMDC, the ADA brigade’s level of effort remains more heavily focused
on planning and force operations than on engagement operations.
6-3. The ADA brigade provides ground-based AMD command across a large area of operations. It
generally commands several ADA battalions/task forces and reports directly to the AAMDC. Like the other
ADA echelons, the ADA brigade is normally under the operational control of the AAMDC and in direct
support of the AADC for the execution of operational and geostrategic missions. The ADA brigade generally
exercises this direct support role through an AADC’s subordinate commander, such as a RADC or sector air
defense commander (SADC). METT-TC considerations may allow for them to be placed under operational
or tactical control of a corps, as has been the case in past conflicts. Support relationships, such as direct and
general support, may also be used to provide AMD fires in support of maneuver echelons.
6-4. The ADA brigade commander can serve as the senior AMD commander for land forces in the absence
of the AAMDC. In these situations, the brigade may be augmented with capabilities organic to the AAMDC.
6-5. The ADA brigade integrates into the kill chain by attaching the brigade’s ADAFCO to the designated
AADC engagement authority. This authority is usually the RADC or SADC.
6-6. The ADA brigade assists the AAMDC in providing the requisite C2 to specific organizations or
geographical areas where multiple joint and multinational AMD forces operate. The brigade is the highest
echelon that is properly resourced with the skills, equipment, and staff to integrate multiple ground-based
ADA capabilities into the joint and multinational AMD fight and in support of Army maneuver forces.
6-7. Generally, the integration of U.S. and multinational land-based AMD forces occurs with the oversight
of the ADA brigade headquarters. The operational, tactical and support relationships in these situations are
METT-TC dependent and often support specific bi-lateral agreements between nations. |
3-01 | 74 | Chapter 6
BRIGADE COMPOSITION
6-8. Each brigade consists of a headquarters, a brigade staff, and its subordinate battalions and batteries. A
brigade headquarters can effectively provide C2 of several subordinate units. ADA brigades differ in their
composition, which are driven by METT-TC, and the manner in which their battalions are task organized.
The typical brigade can expect to have between two and seven battalions.
6-9. The brigade is comprised of active and/or reserve component personnel. The range of personnel
working in the brigade includes intelligence, chemical, air defense, signal, logistic, and special staff
personnel.
6-10. The brigade staff consists of a command section and multiple subordinate sections: S-1 (personnel), S-
2 (intelligence), S-3 (plans, operations, training, and fire control), S-4 (motor maintenance, and support
operations), S-6 (information technology and voice/data communications), public affairs, surgeon, chaplain,
and brigade judge advocate.
* The brigade staff is led by the brigade deputy commander. The deputy commander is responsible
for all coordination within the brigade staff and with higher, adjacent, and subordinate staffs.
* The S-1section provides personnel and administrative support and limited postal services to the
battalions and separate batteries. The S-1 manages personnel strengths and actions for all
subordinate units, including personnel readiness. The S-1 also performs adjutant duties, including
protocol.
* The S-2 section processes battlefield information and coordinates intelligence requirements within
the battalions and separate batteries and with the supported units, higher headquarters, and military
intelligence assets. The S-2 section leads the staff in the IPB process, identifies threat
characteristics, and coordinates with adjacent intelligence assets to provide the commander with a
full spectrum threat assessment. The brigade S-2 also performs other functions such as support to
Army information and personnel security programs.
* The S-3 section is the focal point for task organization, planning, operations, fire control, and
training. The S-3 section conducts current and future planning, operations, and ADA-specific
training certifications. As in all headquarters staffs, the S-3 is the central staff that drives the
requirements and is supported by the other staff sections. Specific staff sections under the S-3
include the current and future operations cells, CBRN cell, brigade FCE, and ADAFCO element.
The current operations cell executes force operations and maintains an accurate awareness of the
current situation for the commander. The future operations cell plans and coordinates future
brigade operations. The CBRN cell monitors the CBRN environment and integrates passive
defensive measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerability to, and effects of, CBRN attacks.
The FCE and ADAFCO elements are addressed in paragraph 6-15 on page 6-4 and paragraphs 6-
21 and 6-22 on page 6-5 and 6-6. The S-3, in coordination with the deputy commander, oversees
the brigade’s controlled substitution plan to ensure it remains deliberately managed and supports
the AAMDC commander’s specific guidance.
* The S-4 section provides supervision and coordination of logistics; coordination of food services
field feeding, and sanitation; coordination of supply and resupply; and coordination of
transportation and maintenance support. It operates the admin/log network control station and
transports S-1 and S-4 personnel and equipment. The S-4 section provides the full range of
logistics support from property accountability, maintenance and readiness, to budget management.
The S-4 oversees the brigade’s property book and the brigade’s equipment readiness to include
coordinating with external logistics support agencies for repairs, upgrades, and modifications.
Specific staff sections under the control of the S-4 include the support operations section and the
motor maintenance section.
* The S-6 section provides staff planning and supervision of communications for the brigade. It
provides for the installation, operation, and maintenance of internal signal communications and
electronic equipment in the brigade headquarters. It coordinates frequency allocation and
assignments. The section performs field maintenance, internal and external planning, and 24 hour
communications and courier services. It conducts network operations to establish, operate,
manage, protect, and defend communications networks and information services. The S-6 section
manages organic communications capabilities and computers, and coordinates for the use of |
3-01 | 75 | ADA Brigade
external communications capabilities based on METT-TC. The S-6 oversees the brigade’s
communications security accounts and equipment.
* The special staff section provides the command with the necessary subject matter expertise to
ensure medical, legal, public affairs, and spiritual unit readiness. The brigade surgeon provides
medical treatment for the brigade. The brigade judge advocate section provides legal expertise
pertaining to military, domestic, and international law. It provides advice on laws of armed
conflict, interprets ROE, determines the legality of targets and plans, supervises the administration
of military justice, and monitors treatment of captured and detained persons and refugees. The
public affairs office section assists in conducting briefings for the media on brigade operations
and ground rules for media coverage of those operations, reviews material scheduled for release
to the media for operational security limitations or requirements, and provides guidance to new
media personnel concerning field censorship procedures and guidelines. The unit ministry team
provides religious support to all assigned, attached, or authorized personnel, to include ministry
for mass casualties and hospitalized members. The team advises the commander on religious,
ethical, morals, morale, and soldier welfare issues, and liaises with higher and adjacent unit
ministry teams.
* The battery headquarters, while not a staff section, provides C2, administrative, and logistical
support for headquarters battery personnel.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
6-11. ADA brigades have the primary mission of linking subordinate ADA echelons to the kill chain. The
brigade ADAFCO deploys to the appropriate joint C2 facility at which the RADC or SADC operates, and
provides voice connectivity with subordinate ADA echelons for engagement operations. The brigade
maintains operational control of its organic subordinate ADA units and any attached forces. It also maintains
constant communications and coordination with the AMD element at corps and, when required by METT-
TC, with the AMD element at division. The brigade C2 capabilities are provided by the AMDPCS, Patriot
tactical planner, and THAAD portable planner. The AMDPCS gives the ADA brigade a limited capability to
operate a FCE to direct subordinate C2 nodes. The AMDPCS provides the means to select and direct a
subordinate C2 node to conduct an engagement, but cannot directly execute the engagement. The Patriot
tactical planner provides a capability to create and test defense designs of Patriot forces. The THAAD
portable planner provides the capability to design and evaluate THAAD defenses.
6-12. Figure 6-1 on page 6-4 presents the nominal brigade control relationships. See ATP 3-01.7 for
additional discussions of brigade C2. |
3-01 | 76 | Chapter 6
Figure 6-1. ADA brigade AMD control relationships
6-13. As a part of exercising C2 over subordinate ADA organizations, the ADA brigade also focuses on
building, and potentially controlling, cohesive joint and multinational teams responsible for executing the
AMD mission in a given area of operations. The ability of the ADA brigade to operate in the joint and
multinational environment, with ever changing METT-TC factors that influence this environment, is
critically important. In situations where an AAMDC is not present, the brigade can expect to coordinate with
and support multiple joint, multinational and Army headquarters, including the joint air operations center
(JAOC), regional and sector air defense command centers, multinational AMD headquarters, Army division,
corps, or numbered Army headquarters, and, in some circumstances, host nation airspace control elements.
6-14. The ADA brigade, through its AMDPCS and via tactical data links, provides the necessary situational
awareness to joint and multinational partners which enhances the timely and required decision making to
support unified land operations. The AMDPCS provides the ADA brigade with some flexible capability:
support to current operations and sustainment, and support to future operations or a capability to support
forward operations − a jump capability.
6-15. An ADA brigade can provide C2 of subordinate units, to include a multinational task force.
Engagement operations are controlled through the ADA brigade ADAFCO deployed with the SADC, for
instance. Control of subordinate forces is exercised through tactical data links and voice communications.
The brigade may operate an FCE to battle manage engagement operations of subordinate battalions, generally
in a management by exception role. The normal mode of operations is for the ADAFCO supporting the
SADC to provide engagement authority directly to the battalion/separate battery capable of executing the
engagement.
FORCE OPERATIONS
6-16. Historically, the brigade focuses on training and certifying subordinate units to execute their AMD
mission while providing and/or coordinating all the administrative, operational, logistical, and special staff |
3-01 | 77 | ADA Brigade
requirements for subordinate units. The ADA brigade focuses on dynamic adjustments to current plans during
execution to maintain the viability of the defense. It also conducts hierarchical planning with the AAMDC
and with subordinate ADA echelons. Brigade force operations mirror those of the AAMDC and consist of
the following core tasks: AMD planning and coordination with and between supported and supporting
headquarters, AMD resource allocation, critical and defended asset list development and management
support, airspace control measures planning and coordination, AMD reporting, AMD IPB, force protection,
early warning dissemination, sustainment, and multinational AMD related tasks. Generally, the brigade
focuses more on C2 capabilities that enhance force operations and planning than those associated with
engagement operations. An exception to this general rule may occur if there is an unacceptable risk to
engagement operations within the brigade footprint.
6-17. The ADA brigade assists the AAMDC in projecting its AMD forces to theater to support the JFC’s
priorities. This includes all aspects of mobilization and pre-deployment operations, deployment and entry
operations, employment and sustainment, and redeployment. The brigade oversees subordinate units’ rear
detachment operations, including the effective execution of family readiness groups. Forward ADA brigades
participate in portions of the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process in theater.
Following the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration principle of unity of command, a theater
sustainment command typically controls the first three stages. The gaining ADA brigades can influence the
onward movement stage by recommending tactical assembly areas. Integration is complete when the gaining
ADA brigade establishes positive command over the arriving unit, and determines that the unit is combat
ready and capable of performing its assigned mission.
6-18. The ADA brigade headquarters can mobilize along with some or all of its subordinate ADA
organizations or as a separate AMD capability. Brigade headquarters generally deploy in theater to areas that
facilitate joint/multinational coordination and provide the best geographical opportunities to execute C2 of
current and future AMD capabilities. It is common, but not necessary, for ADA brigades to collocate with a
subordinate unit to benefit from mutually supporting force operations considerations like logistics and force
protection. Key to employing an ADA brigade headquarters is a comprehensive understanding of the AMD
operation across all phases. Special consideration is given when a brigade’s C2 responsibilities will
significantly change in scope or magnitude while transitioning from one phase of the operation to the next.
In this scenario, the brigade should employ in a way that minimizes disruptions to the AMD operation while
transitioning across phases.
6-19. ADA forces lack a sufficient physical security capability to protect themselves, so deployment
considerations for the ADA brigade includes the support relationships, sustainment operations, and physical
security needs. It is frequently advisable for the ADA brigade to collocate with the supported unit, such as
the regional or sector air defense command, or with other Army organizations that can supplement the ADA
brigade’s capabilities.
6-20. The ADA brigade is under the operational control of the AAMDC. Additionally, the brigade regularly
conducts direct coordination with supporting joint and multinational base commands for mission and Soldier
support.
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
6-21. Brigades exercise engagement operations through the C2 systems of subordinate units. ADA brigades
also assist in integrating and controlling joint fires by positioning an ADAFCO team with the kill chain
controlling headquarters. A brigade ADAFCO normally deploys to a control and reporting center, AWACS,
Aegis combat system, JAOC, or combined air operations center, per the regional and/or sector layout.
6-22. ADA brigade ADAFCO functions include:
* Controlling ADA engagements and providing assistance for rapid engagement of airborne targets
or platforms by maintaining a continuous communications link with the AAMDC ADAFCO,
engagement authority, subordinate FCEs, and THAAD fire control officers, as appropriate.
* Tracking deconflictions between AMD and other joint sensors via the regional/sector air defense
command’s mission crew to assist in resolving identification and correlation issues.
* Disseminating and complying with air defense warnings, airspace control orders, special
instructions, early warning data, real-time intelligence, and air tasking orders. |
3-01 | 78 | Chapter 6
* Issuing surface-to-air missile tactical orders which direct ADA fire unit readiness based on the
Army headquarters or AAMDC, and AADC, RADC, or SADC guidance.
* Monitoring ADA unit information such as status and engagement reports, to include C-RAM.
6-23. Brigade-level control of sensors generally revolves around coordinated emission control procedures
and alert states. The procedures and alert states provide subordinate units predictable maintenance
opportunities, emission authorization to achieve the directed alert state, and the opportunity to train with
sensors outside of a full radiation condition.
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
6-24. As discussed in the unit composition section, the ADA brigade is resourced to provide all staff
functions, including the special staff sections of the chaplain, judge advocate, and surgeon. However, the
brigade is dependent upon appropriate elements of the theater for financial management support, force health
protection, personnel and administrative services, and supplemental transportation; the expeditionary signal
battalion for signal support; support maintenance company for maintenance support beyond organic means;
and field feeding company for field feeding support.
6-25. The ADA brigade headquarters generally oversees two sustainment related responsibilities. First, the
brigade assesses all the sustainment requirements across subordinate units and direct specific sustainment
responsibilities to subordinate headquarters based on METT-TC. It is quite possible that a subordinate
battalion will be directed to assume sustainment responsibilities such as logistics support and force protection,
for non-organic subordinate batteries. Second, the ADA brigade coordinates sustainment support for
joint/multinational AMD forces within the brigade’s area of operations. The combination of these two
responsibilities ensure that all sustainment functions are properly provided for subordinate AMD units. In
cases where a particular sustainment function is inadequate for a subordinate unit, the brigade will seek the
assistance of the AAMDC to secure the appropriate resources. |
3-01 | 79 | Chapter 7
ADA Battalion
This chapter describes the ADA battalion, task organized to form an ADA task force,
and its capabilities, firepower, and tactics. The guidance in this chapter is applicable to
the role of an ADA battalion in all phases of operations and to ADA fires supporting
the preservation of land and air combat power. This chapter is written to a METT-TC
tailored task force consisting of multiple sensor and shooter types, providing a
coordinated capability to defend against enemy forces employing complex integrated
attack tactics. This chapter is also applicable if the task force consists of a single type
of sensor and shooter.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
7-1. The role of the ADA task force is to protect forces and selected geopolitical assets within a specified
geographical area from air attack, missile attack, and surveillance. The ADA task force consists of a mix of
sensors and shooters to provide low-to-high altitude, short- to long-range AMD protection of combat land
forces and other critical assets. The ADA task force components can defeat the following threats, after launch,
in accordance with the METT-TC considerations in which it is being deployed:
* Ballistic missiles.
* Cruise missiles.
* UASs.
* Tactical air-to-surface missiles, to include anti-radiation missiles.
* Large-caliber rockets.
* Hypersonic weapons.
* Fixed-wing aircraft.
* Rotary-wing aircraft.
* RAM.
7-2. An ADA task force is frequently used as a flexible deterrent option, showing U.S. resolve and
commitment to our partner nations. It is often forward deployed or stationed. For example, currently more
than 45 percent of the Patriot force is deployed in overseas locations.
7-3. An ADA task force provides the terminal defense for multi-tier joint AMD systems supporting the
combatant commander’s needs. Its missile defense capabilities (Patriot and/or the THAAD) comprise an
element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). When THAAD and Patriot are combined in a task
force, a layered (upper and lower tier) ballistic missile defense is achieved. While able to operate as an
independent entity consisting of a single system’s capabilities, such as Patriot, the task force is optimized
when organized with multiple ADA sensors and shooters, such as those organic to Patriot and Avenger units.
ADA task forces help to defend the lodgment during entry operations. The ADA task force provides robust
defense against ballistic missiles and air threats, and can be augmented with C-RAM capabilities to defeat
RAM threats after launch. As the theater develops and entering forces expand into forward positions, ADA
task forces support shaping activities and enable decisive action. ADA task forces provide AMD for
maneuver forces, their sustainment assets, and resupply routes using overlapping movement and positioning
schemes to maintain supportive coverage. This protection provides maneuver force commanders the ability
to conduct aggressive, as well as sustained, offensive and defensive tasks.
7-4. ADA task force resources may remain in theater to continue providing AMD of critical assets as a
conflict is resolved, preventing residual enemy forces from successfully affecting assets or friendly forces |
3-01 | 80 | Chapter 7
that are redeploying. ADA units also promote stability within a country or region by protecting civilians and
geopolitical assets from state and non-state actors who may seek to exploit periods of transition.
7-5. ADA task force capabilities can be tailored to counter diverse or specific air and missile threats based
on JFC requirements and METT-TC. The nominal task force is generally deployed to counter both air threats
and lower tier missile threats.
SUPPORT TO JOINT AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
7-6. An ADA task force provides defense of designated joint force command assets at the strategic and
operational levels. These include senior CPs, logistic facilities, operating bases, aerial and sea ports of
debarkation, and geopolitical assets. The maneuver commander’s key assets are also addressed during the
planning process. These assets are recommended by the commander’s organic AMD section or ADAM cells
for inclusion in the critical asset listing from which defended assets are derived.
7-7. The task force’s persistent presence facilitates long-term protection of assets against all-altitude air and
missile threats. Augmentation with C-RAM sensors and shooters is required for the task force to defend
against RAM threats.
7-8. The task force also contributes to aerial surveillance and situational awareness. Its nominal
configuration includes sensors capable of detecting low-flying air threats to ballistic missile threats, and
publishing track data across Army and joint links to alert the force to impending attacks. Augmented with C-
RAM sensors, the task force can also provide detection, alerting, and focused warning of RAM threats.
SUPPORT TO UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
7-9. The ADA task force counters a wide variety of potential air and missile threats that target assets
identified by the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and selected for the JFC’s defended asset
list. The main threats that the ADA task force must be prepared to counter are:
* Ballistic missiles.
* Cruise missiles and anti-radiation missiles.
* UASs, both attack and surveillance.
* Hypersonic weapons.
* Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, jammers and aerial surveillance platforms that penetrate defensive
counterair into the task force’s defended area (commonly called leakers).
7-10. The ADA task force’s support of ground-based elements varies in accordance with the type of
operation, projected threats, amount of deployed maneuver and ADA forces, and other METT-TC
considerations. Most ADA task forces are deployed to defend strategic and operational high value assets.
ADA task forces may be assigned general support missions or, in rare occasions, placed in direct support of
maneuver elements. In a direct support role, the task force commander coordinates with the supported unit
commander and the ADAM cell to select the asset(s) to be defended. Direct support assignments are more
typically made at the ADA battery or platoon echelons than at ADA task force levels.
7-11. The ADA task force in a general support role within a corps or, more likely, a division is assigned to
defend such key Army assets as corps or division headquarters, fuel and ammunition points, counterfire
radars, and forward arming and refueling points. The points to be defended are designated by the supported
commander. Offensive tasks and defensive tasks requiring rapid mobility are supported by bounding
overwatch, as ADA elements, other than Avenger, lack shoot-on-the-move capability. Bounding overwatch
to support offensive tasks places ADA elements behind the maneuver force, as the terrain must be secured
prior to its occupation by ADA elements. In retrogrades, ADA elements precede the withdrawal of maneuver
units to vacate terrain being surrendered by the retrograde.
7-12. An ADA task force provides warning of impending air and missile attacks. Detections by Patriot and
Sentinel radars or other sensors are broadcast to affected units or installations. UAS detections, particularly
of low, slow, and small variants, can trigger self-defense actions taken by non-ADA units. |
3-01 | 81 | ADA Battalion
7-13. When providing support to maneuver forces, commanders should bear in mind that even though ADA
task forces are mobile, they are extremely vulnerable. They require a security contingent and are unable to
provide AMD coverage while on the move.
ADA TASK FORCE COMPOSITION
7-14. In peacetime, there are multiple types of ADA battalions, organized according to system types. A
peacetime battalion serves as the baseline for an ADA task force, providing the resources from which ADA
task forces are tailored and deployed in wartime. A peacetime battalion without further tailoring, once
deployed, may be designated as a task force if METT-TC indicates that it is the right size capability to
accomplish the mission. However, the battalion will more likely be tailored, adding or deleting similar type
capabilities, or adding capabilities from two or more peacetime organizations to deny threats a preferred
attack strategy. There are four types of peacetime ADA battalions:
* Patriot battalions are fielded in the active component. A Patriot battalion consists of a headquarters
and headquarters battery, four Patriot firing batteries, and a field maintenance company.
* Composite Patriot/Avenger battalions, also in the active component, have the same Patriot force
as a Patriot battalion and one organic Avenger battery. The maintenance company is adjusted to
include system-peculiar maintenance for the Avenger component of the battalion. This battalion
composition constitutes an integrated battalion consisting of Patriot and Sentinel radars, the Patriot
family of missiles, and Stinger missiles.
* Composite Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)/Avenger battalions are fielded in the active
component. They consist of a headquarters and headquarters battery, one battery of Avenger
missioned primarily to defeat the cruise missile and UAS threats (groups 2 and 3), two batteries
of C-RAM with their Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS) missioned primarily to defeat
the RAM threat, and a maintenance company.
* Avenger battalions are fielded in the Army National Guard and in the active component force.
Avenger battalions consist of a headquarters and headquarters battery, three firing batteries with
two firing platoons each, and a maintenance detachment.
Note. A fifth type of peacetime battalion, a composite Patriot/THAAD battalion, is being explored.
7-15. Task force composition can be varied. Three factors impact the size of an ADA task force: mission
requirements (METT-TC), human span of control, and geographical span of control.
* Mission requirements, based on METT-TC, determine the desirable size of the task force. These
requirements may indicate that a force smaller than an equivalent peacetime battalion is adequate.
If the requirement is fewer than the equivalent of two peacetime ADA batteries, the task organized
element is called an ADA task-organized battery (see chapter 8). Mission requirements greater
than the equivalent of six peacetime ADA firing batteries is equivalent to an ADA brigade (-)
operation, which is covered in chapter 6.
* Human span of control encompasses both the command and the control functions. While human
span of control varies based on the abilities and experiences of the leaders involved, effectiveness
diminishes as the number of elements and dispersion of these elements increases. For example,
Patriot commanders, commanding the original battalion configuration of six firing batteries, were
somewhat overwhelmed by the human span required to cover these six batteries (mainly impacting
command functions) and the technical challenges of adequately controlling the AMD operations
of the batteries. The Patriot battalion configuration was ultimately reduced to four firing batteries
per battalion based on organizational studies and other factors. While human span of control must
be considered, it should not dictate task force sizing. If METT-TC requires a greater human span
of control, the risks associated with it should be addressed and mitigated by augmenting elements
within the task force that facilitate C2.
* Geographic span of control is a combination of two factors: firepower reach and communications
and networking. The firepower reach of the task force determines the span in which effective
defense can be achieved. Communications and networking design features of ADA systems
impact physical separation distances between elements of the defense in order to achieve time |
3-01 | 82 | Chapter 7
crucial air battle information exchange. AMD networks are sized to provide assured delivery
across a set geographic span of control, within latency constraints, that enable full defense
effectiveness. Patriot multi-routes critical ADA data by sending the information across multiple
point-to-point links, thus requiring each node to have multiple paired nodes. Each node uses a
terrestrial line-of-sight radio, limiting the distance between them. Large geographic spans of
control would result in one or more points of failure, thus reducing the probability of successful
message transfer between the task force C2 node and the executing firing battery. Avenger fire
units have more limited data and communications ranges. Therefore, an Avenger platoon is limited
in its geographical dispersal of fire units in order to maintain effective mission control. Patriot and
Avenger share information to achieve a coordinated defense across joint air defense linkages, with
each system then distributing the shared information to its firing components via their own data
interfaces. The terrestrial reach of the radios within each system are a limiting factor in task force
composition without significant augmentation from unique ADA communications resources.
Standard Army communications can augment non-critical air battle data distribution, but lack
compatible interfaces to effect battle management.
7-16. Task force sensors may be of one type, such as the Patriot radar, but normally have at least two types
(for example, Patriot and Sentinel radars). Likewise, shooters may be of one type (for example, Patriot), but
normally have at least two types (for example, Patriot and Avenger). In addition, the task force has a field
maintenance company or detachment.
7-17. Avenger and C-RAM share a C2 framework that allows for full integration across sensors and
weapons. C-RAM C2 is a modification of forward area air defense (FAAD) C2 that maintains full backward
compatibility across the systems. An ADA task force, composed of Avenger and C-RAM weapons and
Sentinel radars, can provide short-range, low-altitude defense against air threats (fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft, UASs, cruise missiles) and incoming RAM. Avenger provides defense against the air threat while
C-RAM counters the RAM threat. FAAD C2/C-RAM C2 integrates the defense across the weapons. In such
a task force, human and geographic spans of control are the primary limiting factors in ADA task force
composition.
7-18. ADA task forces using Patriot as the base capability with augmentation from Avenger or C-RAM
forces present greater integration challenges. Each system has a unique C2 capability that does not provide
air battle control over the other system. Patriot C2 effects air battle management over Patriot forces and
integrates with higher echelons via joint data linkages. Patriot shares air battle management decisions and
data with Avenger or C-RAM via these joint linkages, but cannot direct engagements over these linkages.
Likewise, FAAD C2/C-RAM C2 cannot plan or execute Patriot engagements. Thus, this type of ADA task
force fights a coordinated but not fully integrated air battle. Primary considerations in ADA task force sizing
for this type of ADA task force are human and geographic spans of control. This has two implications to task
force composition:
* Maximum task force composition is always limited by human span of control, that is, task force
size should not exceed six firing batteries. For example, two Avenger batteries, or one Avenger
battery and one C-RAM battery, may be attached to a Patriot battalion to form a six firing battery
task force.
* Avenger and C-RAM components are directly controlled by their organic FAAD C2/C-RAM C2
node and fight a coordinated, but not holistic, fight through C2-to-C2 interfaces.
* The dual communications architectures require separate network planning, one for Patriot's
interconnectivity and one for Avenger's/C-RAM's interconnectivity. Patriot fire units may disperse
over a wider area than that which can be spanned by FAAD/C-RAM C2 in connecting firing
elements. The Patriot battery communications architecture is incapable of transmitting into joint
data linkages; these interconnectivities come directly from the Patriot battalion. Network planning
for Avenger units may require that each Avenger platoon individually enter into the joint data
networks rather than relying upon the battery to be the point of interface, distributing the data
down to the platoon level.
7-19. THAAD batteries may be independently deployed, commanded by their parent ADA brigade and
controlled by the AAMDC ADAFCO collocated with the AADC controlling headquarters, such as the JAOC.
THAAD interoperates with the ADA task force through its tactical fire control and communications |
3-01 | 83 | ADA Battalion
equipment. Interface to the ADA task force is achieved through link 16. A THAAD battery may also be
attached to an ADA task force. THAAD operates, whether independently deployed or attached to an ADA
task force, as a part of BMDS, and it interfaces with other Army ADA forces via joint linkages. Patriot has
the capability to exchange information, to include engagement orders, with the THAAD battery. Neither the
Avenger nor C-RAM C2 node has the necessary software to direct THAAD fires. When THAAD is attached
to a non-Patriot based ADA task force, tactical control of THAAD fires remains under the authority of the
AAMDC ADAFCO, with the ADA task force commander exercising operational control.
7-20. Ten types of ADA task forces may be formed by METT-TC tailoring of peacetime organizations:
* Patriot ADA task forces may consist of two to six Patriot firing batteries capable of providing
short-to-medium range lower tier ballistic missile defense and low-to-high altitude air defense
against air threats. Additionally, Patriot can provide defense against large caliber rockets, but not
other elements of the RAM threat.
* Patriot/THAAD ADA task forces may be composed of two to five Patriot batteries and one
THAAD battery. THAAD provides upper tier missile defense and Patriot provides lower tier
missile defense and air defense.
* Patriot/THAAD/Avenger/C-RAM ADA task forces may be composed with up to four Patriot
batteries, a THAAD battery, and an Avenger or C-RAM battery. This composition enables the
defeat of the broadest spectrum of air and missile threats.
* Patriot/Avenger or Patriot/Avenger/C-RAM ADA task forces composed from elements of
peacetime composite Patriot/Avenger battalion(s) may consist of up to five Patriot batteries and
one Avenger battery, four Patriot batteries and two Avenger batteries, or four Patriot batteries, one
Avenger battery, and one C-RAM battery. Patriot provides the ballistic missile defense capability
and the most robust air defense capability, with Avenger supplementing Patriot with very low-
altitude, short-range air defense. Composite battalions are equipped with an AMDPCS subset
called the air battle management operations center with specific modifications to hardwire to the
Patriot C2 node, thus enabling a composite FCE with both Patriot and Avenger (but not C-RAM)
weapons control capability. The air battle management operations center can provide higher
echelon integration of C-RAM into the ADA task force, but direct control of C-RAM fires is
through the C-RAM C2 node.
* Patriot/Avenger or Patriot/Avenger/C-RAM ADA task forces composed from elements of
peacetime Patriot battalions and peacetime Avenger or C-RAM battalions or batteries. As above,
the ADA task force may consist of up to five Patriot batteries and one Avenger battery, four Patriot
batteries and two Avenger batteries, or four Patriot batteries, one Avenger battery, and one C-
RAM battery. The primary difference in these two forms of ADA task forces is that the hardwired
air battle management operations center is not available in non-composite battalions. Thus, the
Avenger or C-RAM battery C2 node interfaces via joint linkages to the Patriot C2 node, enabling
a coordinated but not integrated fight.
* Patriot/C-RAM ADA task forces may consist of up to five Patriot batteries and one C-RAM
battery or up to four Patriot batteries and two C-RAM batteries. Patriot provides ballistic missile
and air defense capabilities, and C-RAM provides capabilities to defeat the RAM threats.
* Avenger ADA task forces may consist of up to six Avenger batteries. This task force has only
very low- to low-altitude, short-range air defense capabilities.
* Avenger/C-RAM ADA task forces may consist of any combination of Avenger batteries and C-
RAM batteries up to a maximum of six. This type of task force can defend against low-altitude,
short-range air and RAM threats.
* Avenger/THAAD ADA task forces may consist of up to five batteries of Avenger and one
THAAD battery. THAAD provides ballistic missile defense and Avenger provides short range air
defense.
* Avenger/C-RAM/THAAD task forces may consist of up to four batteries of Avenger, one C-RAM
battery, and one THAAD battery. THAAD provides ballistic missile defense, Avenger short range
air defense, and C-RAM defeats the RAM threat within the task force.
7-21. Sensing functions, such as detection, acquisition, and tracking, are provided by networked sensors.
These sensors include Patriot, Sentinel, or AN/TPY-2 (operating in the THAAD or forward-based mode). |
3-01 | 84 | Chapter 7
Patriot has a robust capability for developing an internal air picture in which the ADA task force C2 node
receives and processes data from all Patriot radars in the task force tracking the object. Other sensors in the
ADA task force use a track reporting schema that has rules for selecting the best sensor track for reporting
across the network. Additional sensors, such as the Army’s Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar (LCMR) and
Firefinder, Navy’s Aegis SPY radar, and the Air Force’s AWACS radar, may supplement networked sensors
by reporting tracks across standard Army or joint linkages. Track reports are received at the ADA task force
C2 node, which further distributes the data to subordinate fire units. The THAAD radar reports tracks across
joint linkages through the THAAD fire control and communications equipment.
7-22. Engagements are conducted by mixes of missiles carried on Patriot and Avenger launchers or by C-
RAM guns. Patriot employs three missile variants: PAC-3, missile segment enhancement, and guidance
enhanced missile. PAC-3 and missile segment enhancement missiles use inertial midcourse with ground-
based target vector updates and radar terminal homing to defeat air and ballistic missile threats from low-to-
high altitudes. Missile segment enhancement missiles are an upgraded version of PAC-3 missiles with greater
kinematics to achieve higher altitude and longer range intercepts. Both of these missiles are optimized against
ballistic threats but have significant capability against air threats. Guidance enhanced missiles are retrofitted
older versions of Patriot missiles that retain midcourse command guidance and track-via-missile terminal
homing. Guidance enhanced missiles are optimized against air threats, especially cruise missiles, while
retaining good capability against close-range ballistic missiles. Patriot missiles require the support of a
“local” Patriot radar (a radar located in a geometric missile capture and guidance relationship with the
launcher) for the entire engagement sequence. The shooting function may be augmented by the attachment
of Avenger with Stinger missiles and .50 caliber machinegun or LPWS guns. THAAD launchers carrying
THAAD missiles may also augment the task force.
7-23. Voice and data communications capabilities enable task force integration with external data and
targeting networks supporting Army and joint advanced warning and engagement operations. ADA task force
communications operate within the tactical data link networks (for example, link 16 and LandWarNet) for
battlefield integration. The ADA task force can operate independent of other U.S. AMD forces, but will
normally be employed as a part of a larger joint AMD capability.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
7-24. ADA task forces are normally employed with other ADA assets and organized under the ADA brigade
and the AAMDC to support JFC priorities. On rare occasions, an ADA task force may be employed with
minimal or no supporting ADA resources and be required to directly integrate with the AADC for control.
An ADA task force may also be required to integrate with the JFLCC for command. ADA task forces perform
AMD functions as specified by the JFC. The deployed ADA task force performs lower-tier missile defense
and air defense in support of joint unified action and Army unified land operations. Figure 7-1 depicts the
nominal control relationships for a deployed ADA task force. The figure omits echelons above the ADA
brigade level to focus on the ADA task force. Engagement authority is exercised through an ADA brigade
ADAFCO, deployed with a joint higher echelon commander, presented as a regional air defense commander
(RADC)/SADC in the figure. Engagement authority may be delegated in accordance with METT-TC and
promulgated through a surface-to-air missile tactical order or a short-range air defense tactical order; the
engagement authority may change dynamically as the battle proceeds. Patriot engagements are planned and
managed by the task force C2 node, unless engagement authority is decentralized and executed at the battery,
which has direct control of its assigned Patriot radar and launchers. Avenger and C-RAM normally deploy
and fight at the platoon level, which has direct control of assigned weapons. Avenger sensors are under the
control of the battery C2 node, but may be attached to a platoon and controlled by the platoon C2 node. C-
RAM sensors are controlled by the platoon. Supported units may vary in accordance with METT-TC. The
ADA task force coordinates with the supported unit to pass high quality air picture information and to
collaborate on defense design to protect the maneuver element’s high value assets. |
3-01 | 85 | ADA Battalion
Figure 7-1. ADA task force AMD control relationships
7-25. Each firing echelon in the ADA task force operates a FCE during combat operations. Manning for each
echelon varies according to the allocation of C2 functions across the ADA task force and METT-TC. The
ADA task force FCE generally mans all five functional positions: fire control, surveillance, identification,
weapons control, and information control, with one operator for each position. Under heavy loads, more than
one person per function may be required. For example, two or more weapons control operators may be needed
when control is decentralized to the ADA task force and the air threat is heavy.
7-26. FCEs in Patriot and THAAD batteries within the ADA task force require a minimum manning of three
Soldiers: fire control officer (who also executes identification functions), weapons control operator (who also
does surveillance functions), and information control officer. Medium to heavy air threats may require
manning the weapons control/surveillance functions with two Soldiers. These positions allow for continuity
of operations upon loss of linkage through the higher echelon FCE, while also assuring that communications
within the FCE continue to provide requisite performance to maintain data linkages.
7-27. The ADA task force C2 node plans, deploys, operates, manages air battle operations, and sustains
combat operations across the task force. When a single type of system is deployed in an ADA task force, C2
components of that type are sufficient. However, when the ADA task force consists of multiple types of
systems, its C2 node must contain components of each type to effect coordinated battle management. The
following discussion considers an ADA task force consisting of Patriot batteries augmented by an Avenger
battery. The same principles hold if the ADA task force is a Patriot battalion augmented by a C-RAM battery:
* Patriot C2 provides for battlefield integration with the joint AMD authority and with the supported
land combat component. Planning is coordinated using the combined capabilities of Patriot C2
and FAAD C2/C-RAM C2.
* Each C2 node plans its engagements in accordance with higher echelon control and ROE. The
nodes share air picture data and engagement decisions via link 16. Engagement decisions of one
capability, such as Patriot, place an engagement hold on the companion capability, such as |
3-01 | 86 | Chapter 7
Avenger, until the planned engagement has been completed. This frees the companion system to
use resources to engage another threatening track.
7-28. The dismounted Patriot information and coordination central (DPICC) affords Patriot-based ADA task
forces flexibility in deployment while retaining full employment functionality. Potential usages of the
dismounted capability include:
* Initial deployment. Early entry operations typically see initial ADA task force deployments by
batteries. A Patriot battery, with joint data network receive only capability, has no means to
directly inject data into the kill chain, necessitating early deployment of the Patriot battalion’s
information and coordination central (ICC). This requires the dedication of precious strategic
transport to deploy the large truck-mounted ICC van. However, the fly-away DPICC can be
deployed with the battery within the battery’s strategic transport requirements, thus enabling a
greater tooth-to-tail ratio in the critical early entry periods.
* Sustained operations in a location. The DPICC can be located inside permanent or semi-permanent
facilities, enabling greater efficiency and troop protection in operations of the ADA battalion task
force FCE along with better coordination across the headquarters staff.
* Mobile operations. The ICC provides functionality not available in a battery engagement control
system. When the ADA battalion task force is conducting mobile operations, the DPICC can serve
as a base or jump capability while the ICC is relocating, thus retaining full C2 functionality during
times of movement.
* Independent battery deployment. A Patriot battery can receive data across link 16, but can only
transmit its air picture across the Patriot digital information link (PADIL) network. Thus, when
deployed outside the communications range of the ICC, the battery is unable to uplink its internal
air picture across the kill chain. By deploying the independent battery with an attached DPICC,
full data connectivity with the kill chain is realized. This topic is more fully explored in chapter 7.
FORCE OPERATIONS
7-29. ADA forces are deployable via air, rail, and sea. Due to the size and weight of ADA equipment, the
most economical means of transporting into a theater of operations is via sea; however, this requires long
lead times. If an AMD capability is required as part of a rapid deployment package, an ADA task force can
be deployed via C-17 and C-5 to support the mission or a strategic response.
7-30. An ADA task force’s standard to prepare all equipment for movement is a minimum of one hour and
another hour once on site to emplace and initialize the unit for tactical operations, except for C-RAM and
THAAD. (C-RAM is transportable, but not mobile. C-RAM emplacement is generally into sites that may
take weeks to prepare, and actual emplacement requires days. THAAD standards are two hours to prepare
for movement and four hours to emplace and initialize.) This standard will vary based upon conditions (for
example, day, night, weather conditions, and mission oriented protective posture) and composition of the
ADA task force (for example, Patriot timelines are longer than Avenger timelines). Although the ADA task
force is fully mobile with all tactical equipment mounted on wheeled trailers or vehicles, much of ADA
equipment is both oversized and heavy. When deploying systems in theater, planners must consider route
and site suitability. Road surfaces, bridges, and terrain to be negotiated may limit the route taken. Thus, route
and site (if possible) reconnaissance are essential prior to movement. Once the initial emplacement is
completed, adjustments to the defense can be obtained by moving individual pieces of equipment with
minimal disruption of combat operations.
7-31. At the operational level, the AAMDC or ADA brigade determines force allocation, task organization
when needed, and ADA areas of operations in defending the JFCs’ critical assets. At the tactical level, the
ADA task force plans and executes defense designs to maximize inherent capabilities against the threat.
Planning includes initial and follow-on positions, determining primary and secondary target lines, allocating
resources to the designated critical assets, and planning the necessary communications networking. For more
information on Patriot technical and system details of defense design refer to ATP 3-01.85 and ATP 3-01.87.
7-32. The ADA task force staff utilizes the tools embedded in its C2 node to assist in the planning process.
These tools include the Patriot tactical planning workstation and the AMDWS in the FAAD C2 and C-RAM
C2 systems. |
3-01 | 87 | ADA Battalion
7-33. The ADA task force commander must translate a defense plan into a defense design. The plan provides
information on the mission, critical assets to be defended and their priority, resources allocated to the ADA
task force, and other critical METT-TC considerations. Defense design begins by determining optimal sensor
positions. Locations for the most capable sensors are selected first; less capable sensors are then positioned
to complement the coverage of the more capable sensors. In most ADA task forces, Patriot radars are the
most capable sensors and the only sensors currently able to provide fire control quality data against ballistic
missile threats (assuming no AN/TPY-2). Fire control quality data is usable guidance updates to a weapon
in flight that allows a seeker to acquire the target. Patriot radars available to the ADA task force are
allocated to provide for ballistic missile defense as the first priority in accordance with mission orders and
the presence of a creditable ballistic missile threat. Secondarily, Patriot radars are sited to provide as much
low-altitude coverage as is feasible within the limitations of achieving necessary ballistic missile defense
coverage. Once the Patriot radars are sited and their coverage determined, Sentinel radars are positioned to
complement Patriot coverage, with a concentration primarily on low-altitude avenues of ingress and,
secondarily, on weighted coverage or early engagement.
7-34. Patriot is most effective when it fights as an ADA task force, but it deploys by batteries because of
strong system site configuration requirements. The battery fire control section, consisting of the battery
engagement control station, battery command post, radar set, electric power plant, and antenna mast group,
are physically cabled together and require approximately 500 square meters of moderately level ground. All
equipment, other than the antenna mast group, can be emplaced on up to a 10-percent slope. The antenna
mast group cannot be emplaced on greater than a 0.5-degree slope. Patriot launchers have limitations on
where they can be placed with respect to the radar in order to be available for the air battle. Launchers can
be dispersed within these limitations to best provide for effective fires over the defended assets. Patriot
missiles must be captured by a Patriot radar. Missile capture is highly dependent upon physical separation
distance between the capturing radar and the launcher. The launcher must be in the capturing radar’s field of
view, and that field of view varies between a “local” capture (separation distance less than one kilometer)
and remote launch phases 1 and 3.
7-35. Avenger typically fights as a platoon within an ADA task force. The Sentinel radar is positioned to
best complement Patriot radars in the task force, as discussed above, while also providing track data to
support Avenger fires. Avenger platforms can deploy independently, with no site configuration requirements.
The primary factor impacting Avenger platform dispersal is communications connectivity to the controlling
FAAD C2 node. An Avenger platform is capable of completing an engagement using visual detection and
identification, but is more effective and efficient when alerting data and higher echelon identification data
are fed to it through its controlling FAAD C2 node.
7-36. C-RAM typically fights as a platoon within an ADA task force. C-RAM requires extensive site
preparation for deployment of its guns. Its effectiveness is optimal when pairs of guns have mutual support
and each pair of guns have overlapping fires with an adjacent pair. As a minimum, overlapping fires between
guns must be achieved. Site surveys are normally done to optimize C-RAM fires against RAM well in
advance of actual deployment. The C-RAM system includes two LCMRs per platoon. These sensors provide
C-RAM with detection and alerting of RAM threats. They are positioned to best achieve the C-RAM mission,
irrespective of where other sensors in the ADA task force are positioned.
7-37. When an ADA task force includes a THAAD battery, the THAAD radar forms the base piece for sensor
emplacement planning, followed by Patriot radars and then Sentinel radars. The THAAD radar provides
extended range surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles. Patriot may have to augment THAAD assets
to provide sufficient firepower to counter ballistic missile threats as well as sufficient protection against
threats not in THAAD’s capabilities set. This is a consideration in selecting locations and primary target lines
for Patriot radars when THAAD coverage is available to support the task force.
7-38. During the planning of the radar locations and primary target lines, planners must take into account
threat air avenues of approach and named areas of interest (formerly called, in AMD applications, ballistic
missile operating areas). Many technical aspects are involved with the positioning of the Patriot radar and
launchers to ensure the radar can control missiles in flight. The sensor’s primary target lines are determined
based on mission requirements, number of defended assets, and the Patriot unit’s location in relation to the
assets. Because Patriot is a sectored system, radar orientation is critical. Sentinel radars rotate to provide 360- |
3-01 | 88 | Chapter 7
degree surveillance and track-while-scan capabilities; they may be stopped to stare at fixed sectors. THAAD
also provides sectored radar coverage against ballistic threats.
7-39. Patriot radars may be assigned secondary target lines to counter alternate air avenues of approach or
to provide mutual support/overlapping coverage for an adjacent radar. Secondary target lines must be planned
in advance to allow the proper siting of launchers to accommodate both primary and secondary target line
requirements.
7-40. Patriot launchers can be rotated in azimuth via tabular inputs from the engagement control station, but
such rotation is done prior to the conduct of an engagement. During the engagement process, Patriot launchers
fire at a fixed elevation and azimuth. Patriot missiles must be acquired by a Patriot radar so that in-flight
updates can be provided to enable target intercept. Thus, launcher locations must be carefully selected to
meet technical requirements and to ensure proper lethality at intercept. Patriot launchers are emplaced within
the Patriot radar coverage, or, if secondary target lines are assigned, in such a position as to support fires in
this secondary sector. Launchers emplaced to support secondary sectors may not be available in the primary
sector, and launchers available in the primary sector may not be available to support secondary sectors.
Algorithms in the engagement control station automatically calculate which launchers can support a sector
and command appropriate slew actions to enable that support. The first principle in emplacing launchers is
that of mass to ensure proper lethality against the anticipated attacks on defended assets. Patriot launchers
are emplaced, dependent upon missile load, with sufficient mass to defeat the anticipated ballistic missile
threat and support wider area cruise missile defense. Missile load-out is task force tailorable as is the
composition of the task force itself. In consideration of defeating the ballistic missile threat, preference is
given at emplacement to launchers carrying missile segment enhancement missiles first and then to PAC-3
missiles second, as the hit-to-kill characteristics of these missiles provides greater lethality against ballistic
threats. Launchers carrying guidance enhanced missiles should be placed in positions primarily to optimize
cruise missile defense and secondarily to support the ballistic missile fight. While other factors are considered
in the engagement, decision, and assignment process, missile selection is critical.
7-41. Patriot launchers can be distributed across the area of operations, subject to constraints on the technical
requirements of missile capture and uplinks and the need to achieve sufficient mass. Patriot launchers are
connected to the network via data link terminals, which are embedded in engagement control stations and
communication relay groups. Launchers are directly connected to their controlling engagement control
station by data link terminals (local and phase 1 remote) or by launcher data link terminal to a data link
terminal in a communications relay group (phase 3 remote), which then connects the launcher to its
controlling engagement control station. (When providing control of remote launchers, a communications
group is also called a launcher control station.) Fiber optic cable connections can replace the data link terminal
connections when time permits site improvements. Since only four communication relay groups are available
in a nominal task force, launchers should be grouped either locally with the radar or in distributed remote
launch farms such that the demand for relay terminals to place launchers on the net is minimized consistent
with achieving desired lethality to protect assets. Patriot launchers located in the vicinity of a defended asset
provide for better lethality and shorter time of flight. However, sustainment and security of remote launch
farms must be considered when selecting locations for the deployment of launchers.
7-42. Avengers, with a nominal load of eight Stinger missiles, are emplaced to support engagements of the
anticipated cruise missile threat through 360 degrees, though Stinger’s operational range is limited. Avengers
rotate in azimuth to point Stinger missiles in the optimal direction. Since Patriot radars, and thus Patriot
engagements, are sectored, the emplacement of Avenger considers the out-of-sector attack potential of air
threats in a complex integrated attack scenario; Avengers are positioned to deny any ingress routes not
already covered by Patriot. Once these routes are defended, any additional Avengers can be positioned to
thicken the defense and provide for earlier engagement of very low altitude threats.
7-43. C-RAM deploys and fights as a platoon. When C-RAM is attached to an ADA task force, C-RAM
deployment and employment continues to be in accordance with C-RAM doctrine.
7-44. ADA units are high value assets with limited organic security capabilities. ADA task force equipment
is vulnerable to both direct and indirect fire and enemy special operations forces. When the mission permits,
ADA forces are typically emplaced as part of larger operations bases; however, when a mission requires that
ADA components deploy outside of these installations, additional force protection assets, such as engineers
and infantry, are required to prepare and secure the new site. |
3-01 | 89 | ADA Battalion
7-45. Force protection is an important planning function for distributed elements of the ADA task force.
Selection of sites for distributed components, such as communications relay groups and remote launch farms,
must consider the availability of other military organizations in the vicinity of the dispersed element to
provide force protection and site security.
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
7-46. The ADA task force does not fight the AMD battle alone. Fires are typically controlled by joint C2
authorities, such as the RADC or the SADC, as part of the kill chain. These commanders have a more
complete understanding of the air domain as they execute the airspace control plan and offensive/defensive
counterair operations on behalf of the JFACC/AADC. While the ADA task force possesses significant
functionality to perform active and passive identification of air tracks, these capabilities often fall short of
achieving true combat identification for the full spectrum of airspace users. Operating under the centralized
control of the kill chain via joint tactical data links ensures that the ADA task force receives a joint air picture
and achieves connectivity with the controlling identification authority and engagement authority. ADA task
force engagement operations are governed by several documents specific to each theater, such as the area air
defense plan, special instructions, and AAMDC tactical supplement.
7-47. Identification authority and engagement authority reside with the AADC; however, these authorities
may be delegated to the echelon level that has the greatest amount of situational understanding and the
resources to make decisions timely enough to affect an action. For ADA task force aerial engagements, less
ballistic missiles and RAM, this authority typically remains with the RADC or SADC. For certain types of
threats, such as ballistic missiles and small UASs, identification authority and engagement authorization are
commonly delegated to ADA task force level (or below). Against RAM threats, engagement authorization
typically resides at the base defense operations center, if operating on an installation, or at firing platoon level
if operating in off-base locations. Decentralizing identification and engagement authorization to the task force
commander enables more responsive land-based AMD fires; it also allows for greater defense effectiveness
as the threat volume increases. However, this decentralization may increase the risk of fratricide to friendly
air platforms.
7-48. ADA task force mission readiness is governed through the use of alert states. Alert states, as mentioned
previously, prescribe the amount of resources directed to achieve battle stations (ready to fire) and specify
manning requirements and equipment configuration. Alert states are METT-TC dependent. Alert states are
generally promulgated by the ADAFCOs via the surface-to-air missile tactical order. Utilizing alert states
allows for maximum flexibility to conduct training or maintenance while meeting mission requirements.
7-49. The ADA task force fights from stationary locations; therefore, tactics are a matter of the proper
positioning, orientation and system configuration of subordinate components with respect to the defended
assets and threat, rather than a function of maneuver. Tactics for threat engagements will vary based on the
specific threat platforms, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or fixed-wing aircraft.
7-50. At the ADA task force level, Patriot C2 node is capable of controlling engagements against ballistic
missiles within the Patriot and THAAD system. Ballistic missile engagement planning and execution are
accomplished at the battery C2 node in both Patriot and THAAD. The ADA task force C2 node performs a
threat assessment to the defended assets which are threatened by an in-flight missile and assigns the best
battery to conduct the engagement. The engaging battery (Patriot or THAAD) C2 nodes then determines
when, where, and how (launcher, missile type) to execute the engagement. Missile engagements are
conducted manually or automatically; even in the automatic mode, an operator must validate engagements
and may prevent the engagement or, if required, destroy the missile after launch. If a designated defended
asset is threatened and the threat is engageable, the system will initiate an engagement when in the automatic
mode; however, an operator must initiate engagement in the manual mode.
7-51. When a THAAD battery is attached to a non-Patriot ADA task force, the THAAD battery C2 node
provides the capability of planning and executing engagements against ballistic missiles in its threat set.
While operational control resides in the ADA task force C2 node, tactical control is exercised through the
AAMDC AADFCO, as neither FAAD C2 nor C-RAM C2 has the requisite software to provide adequate fire
control orders to THAAD. See ATP 3-01.91 for further discussions of THAAD battery operations. |
3-01 | 90 | Chapter 7
7-52. Anti-radiation missiles present an urgent self-defense threat to task force sensors. Depending on the
type and launch point, anti-radiation missile trajectories may emulate those of a ballistic missile or a fixed-
wing aircraft. Patriot’s C2 node employs special logic to classify a track as an anti-radiation missile. Other
system C2 nodes lack the software to specifically declare a threat as an anti-radiation missile. In Patriot, some
classification parameters are operator defined and should be a product of the planning process. Like ballistic
missiles, anti-radiation missiles may be engaged automatically or manually. System configuration will be
METT-TC dependent. For further information see ATP 3-01.85.
7-53. Cruise missiles, UASs, and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft are capable of flying similar trajectories.
Because of the inherent difficulties in distinguishing between these types of platforms, identification and
engagement authorities are typically held at the RADC/SADC and will always be engaged manually.
* Patriot battalion-level C2 node conducts a threat evaluation, assesses engagement options, and
assigns an appropriate battery C2 node to execute engagements. In heavy threat scenarios, the
battalion-level node may decentralize to allow each battery to plan and execute engagements.
* Avenger fights primarily at the platoon level, with higher echelon C2 nodes providing battlefield
coordination, linkage to the joint air picture, and authorization to engage. Avenger engagements
occur at the Avenger platform level. See ATP 3-01.64 for further discussion of Avenger battalion
and battery techniques.
7-54. ADA task forces integrate with other Army, joint and multinational network systems at ADA task
force headquarters level. ADA task force communications capabilities allow for exchange of track messaging
over tactical data links via radio frequency transmissions, secure local area networks, or commercial
telephone, to include secure and non-secure internet protocol-based applications and C2 networks to send
and receive voice, video, and data-related items. The ADA task force’s communication capability allows for
critical track data to be exchanged among a wide variety of service platforms, such as AWACS, Aegis ships,
control and reporting center, and JTAGS.
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
7-55. A maintenance company or detachment is organic to each ADA battalion. The company or detachment
has repair personnel for the types of equipment within the battalion and, thus, has a different composition for
each type of ADA formation.
7-56. ADA task force tailoring must include pulling the appropriate level of sustainment support from the
peacetime organizations of battalions for the composition of the ADA task force. This support includes
system-specific maintenance parts and maintainers, as appropriate, for the mix of ADA sensors and weapons
in the task force.
7-57. Planning for sustainment of dispersed elements of the ADA task force considers the availability of
support from the supported unit. Most supported units can provide some level of common Army support, but
do not have the capability of providing system-specific support. For example, a supported unit, with proper
planning, coordination and collaboration, can provide fuel support to a distributed Patriot launch farm. |
3-01 | 91 | Chapter 8
ADA Battery
This chapter discusses the capabilities, linkages, and tactics and procedures of a generic
ADA battery employed as a task-organized battery. An ADA battery is a subordinate
element in every ADA battalion; an ADA task-organized battery is a tailored
organization based on METT-TC that fights subordinate to an ADA task force or as an
independent entity. An ADA task-organized battery consists of sensors, shooters, and
command and control (C2) elements; sensors and shooters may be of one type or of
multiple types. The guidance in this chapter is applicable to the role of an ADA task-
organized battery in all areas of operations and in support of unified land operations.
ROLES AND CAPABILITIES
8-1. An ADA task-organized battery defends forces and selected assets against air and missile attacks and
from the effects of enemy surveillance. To accomplish this, the battery employs sensors and shooters to
provide AMD protection within the altitude and range capabilities of its organic and attached weapon
systems.
8-2. An ADA task-organized battery may be comprised of a peacetime battery organization with an
additional platoon of the same system for instance, but is more effective against complex integrated attacks
when augmented with complementary sensors and shooters from another type of organization. For example,
a task-organized battery, consisting of a Patriot battery augmented with an Avenger platoon, provides
sectored ballistic missile defense and 360-degree defense against air threats such as cruise missiles and UASs.
A task-organized battery may initially deploy a minimum element consisting of at least two launchers with
ready missiles, a sensor, a C2 node, and a tailored set of support equipment.
8-3. The ADA task-organized battery’s roles and responsibilities generally remain the same irrespective of
type of operational tasks – offensive, defensive, or stability. It may be deployed in tactical to strategic roles,
depending on the capability of the team, priority of its defended assets, and commander’s intent.
8-4. ADA task-organized batteries promote stability within a country or region by protecting civilians and
geopolitical assets. Their presence discourages enemy factions and supports the resident government in
essential services and humanitarian efforts. ADA task-organized batteries may remain in theater to continue
providing AMD of critical assets as a conflict is resolved, preventing residual enemy forces from successfully
affecting assets or friendly forces that are redeploying and supporting the transition to civil authorities.
SUPPORT TO JOINT AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
8-5. An ADA task-organized battery provides defense of designated JFACC and joint force land component
commander (JFLCC) assets at strategic, operational and tactical levels. These assets include aerial and sea
ports of debarkation, senior CPs, logistical facilities, assembly areas, forward operating bases, and
geopolitical assets. The battery affords continuous protection of assets against threats within its METT-TC
tailored capabilities.
8-6. Defense of these assets requires capabilities, such as those provided by a Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) or Patriot battery, to defeat the most likely threats – longer range, lethal ballistic and
cruise missiles. THAAD, as part of the BMDS, may be tasked to engage ballistic missiles within or across
the boundaries of a combatant commander’s area of responsibility. An Avenger platoon, added to either
battery, supports engagements of other threats, such as fixed-wing aircraft. Engagements are generally
controlled and directed by the designated engagement authority. |
3-01 | 92 | Chapter 8
SUPPORT TO UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
8-7. The ADA task-organized battery is integral to the execution of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks
by maneuver formations and other Army elements. Battery participation in each of these facets of unified
land operations is METT-TC dependent. Deployment and employment considerations are similar in each.
8-8. An ADA task-organized battery can also be placed in support of a maneuver element or other
designated critical asset. The battery may be employed as part of an ADA task force and placed in a general
support role within a corps or division, or it may be employed independently, attached to a maneuver unit
(most likely no higher than a brigade) and placed in a direct support role. Support relationships are METT-
TC dependent. In its general support role, it may be assigned to defend such key Army assets as a corps
headquarters, major sustainment points, assembly areas, and forward operating bases. When in a direct
support role, the battery commander coordinates with the supported unit commander and the air defense
airspace management (ADAM) cell to optimize defense of the asset(s) selected to be defended. There may
also be circumstances where a reinforcing or general support-reinforcing role may be most suitable.
BATTERY COMPOSITION
8-9. The peacetime ADA battery structure is consistent with that of a traditional Army company-size unit.
The battery generally contains some 70-90 Soldiers and is equipped with interceptors, launchers, sensors, C2
elements, and such general Army materiel as vehicles and generators. Peacetime battery organizations vary
by type of system:
* The THAAD system is organized in the active component and deployed as a battery. Major
organic components of the battery are the AN/TPY-2 radar, six launchers with up to eight missiles
per launcher, C2 elements, communications, and a battery support center. THAAD C2 is achieved
by the THAAD tactical fire control and communications equipment for engagement operations
and components of the Air and Missile Planning and Control System (AMDPCS) for force
operations. The THAAD tactical fire control and communications equipment and THAAD
portable planner also perform defense design and evaluation.
* Patriot batteries are in the active component and organized as part of Patriot battalions. They
generally deploy as part of the battalion or in an ADA task force; when deploying as separate
batteries, Patriot C2 assets from the parent battalion are normally attached to the battery to enhance
integration with higher echelon units, joint and multinational forces, and the host nation. Organic
components of a battery include C2 elements, a radar, six launching stations containing from 4 to
16 missiles per launcher (dependent on the type of Patriot missile), and support equipment.
* Avenger batteries are organized as part of active component and National Guard Avenger
battalions or separate batteries in active component composite battalions; they generally deploy
with the battalion or as separate batteries and are employed as batteries or platoons. An Avenger
battery has two Avenger platoons and appropriate support equipment. The battery in the active
component and National Guard battalions contains 12 Avengers and two Sentinel radars; the
battery in the active component composite battalions has 24 Avengers and four Sentinels. Each
Avenger has eight uploaded Stinger missiles, M3P .50-caliber machine gun, and sensor package,
and identification, friend or foe capability. C2 is provided by the FAAD C2 system.
* C-RAM batteries are organized in the active component in IFPC/Avenger battalions, deployed as
batteries and employed as platoons. A C-RAM battery has three C-RAM platoons and appropriate
support equipment. The battery contains 12 Land-Based Phalanx Weapon Systems (LPWS) – 20-
millimeter gun systems, three Sentinel radars, six LCMR, and three platoon engagement
operations sections. C2 is provided by the C-RAM C2 System.
8-10. Peacetime organizations are METT-TC tailored to wartime configurations by attaching or detaching
launchers, sensors, and C2 systems. Task-organized Patriot batteries require a Patriot radar, and a task-
organized THAAD battery requires an AN/TPY-2 radar. The Patriot radar can provide sectored alert and
cueing support to other weapon systems, but 360-degree coverage against air threats requires the addition of
a Sentinel. The AN/TPY-2 radar can provide extended surveillance against ballistic threats and can cue other
systems and sensors to the threat. Defense against rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) threats requires a
Sentinel radar, modified to detect, acquire, and track RAM threats, or a LCMR. |
3-01 | 93 | ADA Battery
8-11. The maximum composition of an ADA task-organized battery is a “base” battery plus up to two
platoons. Anything larger is, by definition, an ADA battalion task force (see chapter 7). Patriot and THAAD
forces have no mission organizational structure smaller than a battery. Possible compositions of task-
organized batteries are driven by the C2 capabilities available in the formation.
* THAAD and Patriot have unique C2 capabilities. When either is used as the base battery,
engagement coordination with the supporting platoon(s) is achieved through link 16. Neither
THAAD nor Patriot C2 nodes can issue engagement orders to dissimilar systems over link 16, so
each system makes its engagement decisions and informs the other to prevent redundant
engagements. Planning and force operations is accomplished through Army standard voice and
data communications (LandWarNet). THAAD provides ballistic missile defense and the
supporting platoon(s) provide Avenger/C-RAM fires. Patriot provides ballistic and cruise missile
defense and the supporting platoons augment with Avenger/C-RAM fires. Note that a
THAAD/Patriot combination requires the equivalent of two batteries, and is thus by definition an
ADA task force.
* FAAD/C-RAM C2 allows task force tailoring of Avenger and C-RAM components, but FAAD/
C-RAM C2 cannot control THAAD or Patriot components. Thus, a base Avenger battery could
be augmented with up to two platoons of any combination of Avenger and C-RAM. Although
possible to form a task-organized battery with a base battery of C-RAM and additional C-RAM
or Avenger platoons, doing so is unlikely since C-RAM fights as a platoon in most operational
scenarios.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
8-12. An ADA task-organized battery is under the command of its parent ADA battalion and generally
placed under the operational or tactical control of an ADA task force. The ADA task-organized battery
exercises traditional command responsibilities, to include planning, resource allocation, and sustainment.
Operational linkages for engagement and sustainment operations are established and maintained with the
ADA task force, supported unit or asset, and the ADAFCO in the kill chain, as required. The battery
commander is responsible for coordinating the support relationship, engagement considerations, and
sustainment plans with the supported asset. The battery’s data and voice capabilities vary in accordance with
its C2 elements.
* Patriot interconnects battery components via its internal communications architecture, a
combination of hardwire and radio frequency devices, using voice and the PADIL for data. The
battery can receive link 16 but is not authorized to transmit on link 16. Thus, it requires a PADIL
connection to its parent battalion or an attached dismounted Patriot information and coordination
central (DPICC) to uplink engagement operations data. The parent battalion ICC or DPICC then
inserts battery engagement operations data into link 16 in accordance with approved protocols.
The battery communications architecture is supplemented by LandWarNet, primarily for
communications external to the battery. FAAD/C-RAM C2 data and voice services include FAAD
data link and LandWarNet. Sensor networks use the radar enabling subsystem, and weapons use
the analog weapons enabling subsystem over the FAAD data link.
* The DPICC may interconnect in one of two ways as illustrated in figure 8-1 on page 8-4. A direct
linkage via a copper cable is used when the DPICC is collocated with the Patriot battery. The
DPICC can also connect to the Patriot battery across Army communication services or host nation
infrastructure through a point of presence package deployed with the Patriot battery. The latter
option enables a single DPICC to interconnect up to three independently deployed Patriot task-
organized batteries into the kill chain.
* THAAD interconnects battery components via its internal communications architecture, a link 16
derivative, and uses link 16 to report to other AMD elements. LandWarNet provides additional
critical data and voice services. |
3-01 | 94 | Chapter 8
Figure 8-1. DPICC at the task-organized battery
8-13. Figure 8-2 focuses on lines of engagement and planning and coordination for the ADA task-organized
battery in the joint and Army C2 architectures, when the battery is deployed as a part of a larger ADA task
force or is independently deployed. Accordingly, connectivity lines to all higher echelons that are resident in
these architectures (for example, JFACC and AAMDC), but not directly connected to the battery, have been
omitted. While engagement authorization for most of the air threat is likely initially centralized above the
ADA task force, the engagement control in the figure begins with the ADA task force. When the battery
operates within an ADA task force, it takes direction from the ADA task force, irrespective of the centralized
level of control in effect. When the battery is independently deployed, it enters a link 16 net or connects to a
higher echelon network that provides C2 data. When engagement authority is centralized above an
independently deployed battery, the ADAFCO provides control orders to the battery. When engagement
authority is decentralized to the battery, the base battery C2 node is responsible for target identification (using
joint data links and internal battery capabilities) and engagement decisions in accordance with promulgated
ROE. Since neither THAAD nor Patriot C2 nodes can issue engagement orders via link 16 to dissimilar
systems, voice communications are used to provide engagement control over fires of the supporting
platoon(s).
8-14. Sensors and shooters are hierarchically controlled. Patriot and THAAD C2 nodes directly control
Patriot and THAAD sensors and shooters. When Avenger deploys as the base battery of an ADA task-
organized battery, the battery C2 node controls Sentinel radars and platoon C2 nodes; the platoon C2 node
controls the Avenger platforms. When THAAD or Patriot provides the base battery, the battery C2 node, in
addition to directly controlling its organic radar and shooters, controls the attached platoon C2 node. While
METT-TC may enable the augmentation of an Avenger platoon to a THAAD or Patriot battery without a
Sentinel radar, most situations are likely to see the Avenger platoon augmented with a Sentinel radar from
its parent battery. The C-RAM platoon C2 node directly controls its organic and attached sensors and
shooters. |
3-01 | 95 | ADA Battery
Figure 8-2. ADA task-organized battery AMD control relationships
8-15. Engagement and identification authority in a low intensity air threat environment is generally
centralized at the AADC designated level, with the RADC or SADC, and engagement orders are transmitted
to ADA units through the ADAFCO. The ADAFCO transmits the engagement orders directly to the ADA
task force or ADA task-organized battery, if deployed independently of its parent battalion or task force.
8-16. In a high intensity air threat environment, with significant, simultaneous, and coordinated manned air,
cruise missile, and ballistic missile attacks, the AADC may, for instance, decentralize engagement/
identification authority for cruise missiles and manned aircraft in a specified area to an ADA task force or
independent ADA task-organized battery.
8-17. The task-organized ADA battery is at the end of the kill chain. The battery executes engagement
operations under positive controls – positive identification and tracking of airborne objects and control of
fires by a designated engagement authority.
FORCE OPERATIONS
8-18. Operation plans are usually prepared by the parent battalion prior to mission initiation. If deployed
independently of the parent battalion, the battery commander develops the plan and subsequent changes, as
required, in accordance with METT-TC. If operating as part of an ADA task force, the battery commander
builds the plan in synchronization with that of the task force. If operating in support of a maneuver unit or
other critical asset, the battery commander coordinates the plan with the supported commander.
8-19. An ADA task-organized battery normally defends one primary asset. It may have secondary assets
within its area of operations, dependent upon METT-TC factors, such as the criticality of the asset, anticipated
threat types and quantities, and available ADA forces. The battery commander uses the Patriot tactical
planner workstation, THAAD portable planner, and/or the AMDWS to develop positional options for the |
3-01 | 96 | Chapter 8
defense. These planning tools are system specific, so the battery commander must coordinate with dissimilar
system platoon leaders and exercise manual integration of options to develop a desired defense design. Patriot
and THAAD planning tools provide automated capabilities for determining the “best” defense design, and
information can be directly linked into the initiation of these systems. AMDWS provides for the transfer of
planning factors and acceptance or rejection of higher echelon mission orders, but requires a manual
determination of “better” defense design options. The commander synchronizes the detailed positioning plans
with the overall defense design being developed by the parent battalion and supported force’s air defense
element/ADAM cell, if assigned a direct or other support mission to a maneuver element.
8-20. Once the initial emplacement is completed for ADA task-organized batteries, adjustments to the
defense can be executed by moving individual pieces of equipment. Patriot and THAAD C2 tools provide
automated assistance in the adjustment of defense designs and can adjust parameters of the design that do
not require physical relocation of equipment, with only minor disruptions in combat operations. This includes
adjustment of primary target lines, rotation to secondary target lines (for Patriot), and a change in radar search
parameters. Patriot, THAAD, and FAAD/C-RAM C2 require manual processes to adjust the defense as
components depart and enter the network. Task-organized Patriot and THAAD batteries, with Patriot or
THAAD unique C2 equipment, must deploy and redeploy as a battery, with the exception that individual
launchers can be redeployed within the defense. Complementary Avenger or C-RAM platoons, forming a
part of a task-organized Patriot or THAAD battery, can deploy and redeploy independently of the base battery
by individual element.
8-21. ADA task-organized batteries are high value assets with limited organic security capabilities. When
the mission permits, they are emplaced on large operating bases, similar to ADA task forces. When a mission
requires that they deploy outside of these installations, additional force protection assets may be required to
prepare and secure the new sites. IPB and analysis of METT-TC factors determine the force protection
requirements. However, batteries must be prepared to implement their own site defenses regardless of other
force protection assets.
8-22. The ADA task-organized battery’s deployment of its sensors and weapons varies based on the threat
and the defended asset. When integrated with its parent battalion, sensor and weapon positioning are
determined as a part of the integrated ADA task force defense design. When deployed independent of its
parent battalion, a greater responsibility rests upon the battery commander to select the positions. Sensor
positioning is generally the first consideration in establishing a defense. The most capable sensor (for
example, THAAD or Patriot) is deployed first. Other sensors are then deployed to complement the coverage
of the base sensor. Sensors are distributed in the ADA task-organized battery’s area of operations to best take
advantage of their sensing function. Patriot and THAAD radars are site-configured such that the radar has
direct linkage to its controlling C2 node. Sentinel radars have a sensor C2 node that links them into the FAAD
C2 data network, allowing greater freedom in their deployment. Identification metrics are supplied by AMD
sensors and can be supplemented by data from networked sensors accessed via the battery C2 node. The node
correlates track data from multiple air defense sensors into a composite air picture. Sensor data is reported
via the standard joint reporting responsibility schema on link 16 to form a common air picture.
8-23. The battery commander uses the ADA employment tenets to position launchers in accordance with
METT-TC. THAAD and Patriot launchers are weighted towards ballistic missile defense. A secondary
consideration for Patriot launchers is early coverage along potential cruise missile avenues of ingress within
the Patriot radar’s sectored coverage. Avenger and C-RAM weapons are positioned to achieve mutual support
and/or overlapping fires (see paragraph 9-34 on page 9-5).
8-24. Sensors and launchers are assigned primary and secondary target lines. When integrated into an ADA
task force defense, these lines are established as a part of the task force defense design. When operating
independently, the battery commander selects them based on mission requirements and defended assets.
Patriot should have secondary target lines to enable rapid reaction to attacks from other than the primary
sector. Secondary target lines require careful planning. They must be sufficiently broad to cover all likely
avenues of attack. However, launchers must be positioned to support them. Launchers positioned to protect
in secondary sectors may not be available to support the primary sector, depending upon system limitations
on missile capture by the guiding radar after launch. Avenger and Sentinel use primary and secondary target
lines as a means of prioritizing operations in mass attack scenarios. |
3-01 | 97 | ADA Battery
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
8-25. When operating as a part of an integrated ADA task force, the ADA task-organized battery C2 node
operates under the direct supervision of the ADA task force C2 node. The ADA task-organized battery C2
node directly controls weapons and sensors (THAAD, Patriot, and in some cases Sentinel radars). It
supervises the operations of the Avenger and C-RAM platoon C2 nodes which directly control their sensors
(unless under battery control) and shooters.
8-26. When operating as a part of an ADA task force, the fire control element (FCE) of the task-organized
battery requires accomplishment of four functions: fire control, which has overall responsibility for battery
engagement operations, to include identification; surveillance, which is maintenance of the air picture;
weapons control, which monitors or controls battery component operations; and information control, which
assures continuous information flow between battery components and the task force C2 node. Manning to
accomplish these four functions is operational load and operator skill set dependent. Medium to heavy
operational loads require four Soldiers. Minimum manning is three Soldiers, with one Soldier executing the
surveillance and weapons control functions.
8-27. When operating independent of the task force, the battery executes full C2 through its C2 node. Patriot
batteries, with Patriot-unique C2 nodes, cannot transmit to the kill chain (receive only), unless augmented
with a DPICC, thus limiting operations to procedural implementation of the ROE and increasing risk of
fratricide. All other batteries, pure or task-organized, must establish digital and voice connectivity with the
kill chain and fully integrate operations with joint AMD units.
* The ADA task-organized battery C2 node either directly controls sensors and shooters or
supervises platoon C2 nodes, as noted in paragraph 8-13 on page 8-4.
* The ADA task-organized battery operates a full FCE which requires five functions to be manned:
fire control, surveillance, identification, weapons control, and information control. Multiple
functions may be accomplished by a single crew member if the operational load permits. Minimum
crew size is three Soldiers, combining fire control and identification into a single position, and
surveillance and weapons control into a single position. Medium to heavy operational loads
require one Soldier per function. An ADA task-organized battery is not resourced to man a fully
staffed FCE in which each of the functions is accomplished by a single Soldier. Thus, when heavy
operational loads are expected, the ADA task-organized battery may require augmentation from
its parent battalion to operate independent of the ADA task force.
8-28. Battery engagement operations may be conducted in the manual or automatic mode. The manual mode
requires the operator to confirm engagement recommendations provided by the automated battle management
aids or to manually select targets for engagement. Air threats, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, UASs,
and cruise missiles, can only be engaged in manual mode to reduce the risk of fratricide. For ballistic missiles
and anti-radiation missiles, the operator has a choice of engaging in the automatic or manual mode. The
automatic mode uses automated battle management aids to evaluate the missile threat, determine engagement
eligibility, prioritize the engagement, optimize the engagement timeline, and conduct and monitor execution
of the engagement (subject to operator override). Due to the shortened engagement timeline and necessity to
optimize the engagement for increased probability of kill, ballistic missile and anti-radiation missile
engagements are typically conducted in the automatic mode.
8-29. When a THAAD battery is the base for an ADA task-organized battery, tactical control of fires is more
complex. THAAD C2 lacks the software to manage non-ballistic missile components of the air battle; an
attached platoon(s) lacks ballistic missile defense software. The THAAD battery assumes operational control
of the attached platoon or platoons. THAAD fires are controlled through the AAMDC ADAFCO and
managed internal to the THAAD battery. The attached platoon, or platoons, is placed under the tactical
control of the SADC or RADC through linkages to the kill chain.
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
8-30. The sustainment concept for an ADA task-organized battery embodies the principles of
responsiveness, flexibility, and initiative. Force-projection operations require that the task-organized battery
anticipates needs and not wait to react. This is accomplished through constant coordination and detailed
planning between the battery and organizations from which it will draw support. |
3-01 | 98 | Chapter 8
8-31. An ADA task-organized battery deploys with the ability to sustain itself for 72 hours; after that, it
requires external support from higher headquarters or other support systems in general. The ADA task-
organized battery employs the Army’s two-level maintenance system, consisting of field maintenance and
sustainment maintenance. Field maintenance is characterized by on-system maintenance − repair and return
to user − while sustainment maintenance is off-system maintenance – repair and return to supply.
8-32. The ADA task-organized battery commander should be familiar with the diagnostic mandatory parts
list, as the Department of the Army’s approved supply support method for ADA systems. Its purpose is to
maintain the highest possible state of readiness through diagnosis and repair of faults in non-mission capable
equipment and to ensure availability of combat/mission essential assets at or near the firing battery to
preclude extended downtime for lack of repair parts. The basic objective is to authorize stock of essential
diagnostic and repair/replacement parts that may not otherwise be authorized based on demands. If the end
item is found to be non-mission capable, the diagnostic mandatory parts list item will be used to repair the
piece of equipment and a replacement part for the list will be put on order. Parts carried on the list will be
used as required in peacetime operations. Replenishment will be on an as-used basis. Some ADA repair parts
are classified and require the appropriate level of security for transport and storage.
8-33. The ADA task-organized battery commander is responsible for all administrative and logistical
functions within the ADA task-organized battery, supported by the executive officer, supply NCOs, system
and conventional technicians, and, in most cases, system-specific or conventional maintenance warrant
officers. The executive officer is responsible for supply, maintenance, services, and transportation of unit
personnel and equipment and should organize and take advantage of all assets available. The executive officer
is typically charged with bridging unit sustainment and logistics with the commander’s intent. Some materiel
readiness functions that the executive officer must coordinate are:
* Apprising the commander of materiel readiness.
* Providing assistance to the platoon leaders on materiel readiness problems.
* Providing liaison with higher headquarters and outside agencies regarding materiel readiness.
* Forecasting logistical requirements and support requests during combat. The executive officer
concentrates on seven classes of supply: classes I, II, III, IV, V, VII, and IX. The executive officer
and supply NCO coordinate the requisition, receipt, preparation, and delivery of classes I, III, and
V.
8-34. The executive officer works with the system warrant officer, NCOs, and Soldiers to ensure unit
sustainment supports the unit mission. In a typical ADA battery, the warrant officer is responsible for
ensuring system sustainment requirements for the unit are met. The warrant officer accomplishes this through
expertise in Army logistics and sustainment, through assigned NCOs and Soldiers, and by ensuring that
officers in the unit are fully advised of the employment capability of the weapon system. The warrant officer
and maintenance NCOs also coordinate with other units and higher headquarters to ensure ADA unique parts
and supplies are available to maintain the best possible mission-capable posture.
8-35. The ADA task-organized battery commander is responsible for the operator/crew maintenance
functions in the unit. The commander leverages the senior maintainers’ technical expertise on all aspects of
the maintenance mission, including diagnostics and troubleshooting to isolate faults and expedite the repair
and return of systems to operation.
8-36. The battery commander can ensure flexibility by tailoring methods of sustainment and should not allow
the organization to be bound by traditional support methods. The commander must know the logistical
requirements of the battery and the details of operation plans, and devise innovative ways to support the plans
and reduce risks. The ADA task-organized battery must be flexible enough to obtain support from any base
arrangement and accomplish its mission. |
3-01 | 99 | Chapter 9
ADA Platoon
This chapter discusses the capabilities, linkages, and tactics and procedures of a generic
ADA platoon. While the platoon is a subordinate element in every ADA system
organization (for example, Patriot battalion/battery and C-RAM battery), the focus of
this chapter is an ADA platoon that has traditionally been referred to as SHORAD and
currently encompasses Avenger and C-RAM capabilities. Neither THAAD nor Patriot
platoons are deployable and employable at the platoon level; they fight as part of the
larger battery. The generic ADA platoon, henceforth referred to as a SHORAD platoon,
embraces the common capabilities of these systems. When required, the unique
capabilities of Avenger or C-RAM are identified.
ROLES AND CAPABILITIES
9-1. Within the context of the overarching ADA role, a SHORAD platoon detects, engages, and defeats
short-range, low-altitude air threats to defend designated forces and other critical assets. Low-altitude air
threats consist of UASs, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles, and RAM.
9-2. Detection is provided by the Sentinel radar in Avenger and C-RAM units, LCMR in C-RAM units,
and other Army sensors whose data is available through the FAAD C2 or C-RAM C2 nodes. Engagements
of the different threats are dependent upon the platoon’s unique weapons. An Avenger platoon, with Stinger
missiles, predominantly engages fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UASs (groups 2 and 3); a C-RAM
platoon, with 20-millimeter guns, engages RAM targets.
9-3. SHORAD platoon sensors also provide supported or affiliated units (for example, a task force)
situational awareness of the airspace and timely, localized warning of impending attacks. The sensors can
classify and aid in the identification of air objects, facilitating situational awareness in proximity to a
defended area and reducing the potential of fratricide incidents. In addition, the LCMR, supplemented with
data extracted from other Army sensors, determines predicted points of impact for RAM munitions, enabling
in-time warnings to at-risk forces and areas through the RAM warn system.
9-4. Though normally employed as an organic element of an Avenger battery, an Avenger platoon may also
be employed as an independent organization, as METT-TC dictates. C-RAM normally deploys as a battery
and is employed as a platoon. The platoon’s roles and responsibilities generally remain the same, irrespective
of the operational tasks – offensive, defensive, or stability.
9-5. SHORAD platoon roles and capabilities are improved in the near term with the fielding of the
Maneuver-SHORAD capability and IFPC. The Maneuver-SHORAD capability, mounting a mix of selectable
weapons (guns and missiles), will provide protection of Stryker and Armor BCT maneuvering forces against
rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft and group 3 UASs. The IFPC system will provide enhanced firepower and
extended range protection of critical, more stationary fixed assets (for example, an air base) and semi-fixed
assets (transient structures or locations, such as assembly areas) against cruise missiles and UASs, with a
residual capability against fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
SUPPORT TO JOINT AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
9-6. A SHORAD platoon, as either a subordinate element of an ADA task force/task-organized battery or
an independent organization, provides defense of designated JFACC and JFLCC assets at strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. These may include such key AMD equipment as U.S. Air Force and Marine
Corps long-range surveillance radars and THAAD systems – low density, operationally critical equipment |
3-01 | 100 | Chapter 9
for the AMD fight. The platoon’s presence facilitates long-term protection of assets against low-altitude
threats.
9-7. The SHORAD platoon also provides warning of impending air attacks. Its sensors can detect low-
flying threats, such as RAM and “pop-up” rotary-wing aircraft, which may be below the coverage of other
AMD sensors, and report their locations. This information can then be furnished via applicable data links for
situational awareness and broadcast to at-risk forces, facilities, or populations for appropriate passive defense
actions.
SUPPORT TO UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
9-8. ADA forces, to platoon level, support Army maneuver forces and their subordinate elements in the
conduct of unified land operations. The SHORAD platoon’s support varies in accordance with the type of
operation, projected threats, amount of deployed maneuver and ADA forces, and other METT-TC variables.
9-9. The SHORAD platoon may be employed as part of an ADA task force/task-organized battery, or as an
independent platoon placed in support of a maneuver unit (most likely no higher than a brigade), for defense
of assets designated by the supported commander. Support relationships are dependent upon the operational
environment and METT-TC. Avenger platoons are preferred in offensive operations and those defensive
operations that require some movement, against UASs and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft threats. C-RAM
platoons are preferred when there is a preponderance of RAM threats, and defenses are limited to static sites,
with no movement required.
9-10. The SHORAD platoon leader, when placed in direct support of a maneuver unit, coordinates with the
supported unit commander and the resident ADAM cell to select the asset(s) to be defended. Defense of
maneuvering forces against UASs is particularly critical during movements to contact and other offensive
operations in the close area. Surveillance by unmanned aircraft system (UAS) platforms may be followed by
volleys of RAM or air-to-surface munitions, potentially rendering a maneuver force incapable of fulfilling
mission requirements. Avenger platoons may be positioned along routes of march, pre-positioned at potential
geographical choke points, or otherwise move with the support elements of maneuver formations.
9-11. Similar to its role in joint AMD operations, a SHORAD platoon supports unified land operations by
providing warning of threat actions, most notably RAM attacks and UAS surveillance, to Army elements.
Detections by Sentinel radars or other sensors are broadcast to affected units or installations. Passive defense
measures can be executed to mitigate RAM attacks. UAS detections, particularly of small variants (group 2),
can trigger self-defense actions by non-ADA elements in Army units (combined arms for air defense).
PLATOON COMPOSITION
9-12. A platoon is the smallest echelon that can execute an independent operation for a limited period of
time. It requires sustainment support from its parent organization or the supported unit or asset during
operations.
9-13. The SHORAD platoon structure replicates that of a “traditional” Army platoon. It contains some 20-
30 Soldiers and is equipped, in general, with multiple shooters (launchers or gun platforms), one or more
sensors, a C2 node, and ancillary mission support equipment.
9-14. The Avenger platoon has six Avengers and FAAD C2, which is embedded in the platoon headquarters.
The platoon receives sensor support from the Sentinel radars in the battery headquarters. Each Avenger has
eight ready-to-fire Stinger missiles in two turret-mounted standard vehicle missile launchers, an M3P .50-
caliber machine gun, a sensor package with forward-looking infrared sensor, a laser range finder, and an
identification, friend or foe capability. Avenger crews have the additional ability to remove Stinger missiles
from the Avenger and attach a gripstock to form a man-portable air defense system. (See ATP 3-01.64 for
additional discussion of Avenger capabilities.) The C-RAM platoon has four Land-Based Phalanx Weapon
Systems (LPWSs), each with a 20-millimeter, multi-barrel gun and an on-board fire control radar; C-RAM
C2 in the platoon headquarters; two LCMRs; RAM Warn; and one Sentinel radar. The LPWS automatically
executes search, detection, threat evaluation, tracking, engagement, and kill assessment functions. (See ATP
3-01.60 for additional discussion of C-RAM operations.) |
3-01 | 101 | ADA Platoon
9-15. SHORAD platoons are deployed and employed as pure units, containing only one type of weapon
system. A limited number of launchers and sensors may be added or removed from the platoon, while still
maintaining the platoon’s integrity and ability to exercise C2.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
9-16. A SHORAD platoon is under the command of its parent ADA battery and may be placed under the
operational or tactical control of an ADA task force or pure/task-organized battery and further employed with
a maneuver brigade or battalion. The battery exercises traditional command responsibilities, to include
planning, resource allocation, and sustainment. When placed under the operational or tactical control of an
ADA task force or task-organized battery, the platoon is attached to that unit; when employed with a
maneuver brigade or battalion, the platoon is generally placed in direct support of that formation.
9-17. The platoon headquarters establishes and maintains operational links for engagement and sustainment
purposes with its parent battery or task-organized battery, and with the supported unit/asset generally through
the ADAM cell, supported unit CP, or base defense operations center. The platoon leader is responsible for
coordinating the support relationship, engagement conditions, and sustainment plans with the supported
asset.
9-18. Planning and coordination is continuous between ADA echelons and with the supported maneuver
force and/or defended installation. When employed in defense of an installation, a SHORAD platoon is
generally linked to the installation’s base defense operations center. The base defense operations center
participates in planning Avenger or C-RAM positions on the installation, identifying installation-unique ROE
and establishing sustainment relationships.
9-19. The platoon’s data and voice capabilities include Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (also
known as EPLRS), Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), LandWarNet, and
the FAAD/C-RAM C2 data link. Connectivity between the platoon headquarters and its organic sensors and
weapons and with higher echelon units is achieved through the FAAD/C-RAM C2 data link.
9-20. Figure 9-1 on page 9-4 focuses on lines of engagement and planning and coordination for the SHORAD
platoon in the joint and Army C2 architectures. Connectivity lines to all higher echelons that are resident in
these architectures (for example, JAOC and AAMDC), but not directly connected to the platoon, have been
omitted. The engagement authority lines in the figure begin with a higher echelon unit commander, the
RADC or SADC, who controls engagements per direction of the area air defense commander (AADC). The
ADAFCO, collocated with the RADC or SADC, transmits engagement commands to the ADA battalion/task
force and ADA battery. An Avenger platoon is generally not a participant in this kill chain; Avenger fire
units conduct engagements in accordance with established procedural control rules vice the positive control
exerted by the kill chain. However, the Avenger platoon is connected to and receives AMD operational
information from its parent battery/task-organized battery, an ADA task force, or the ADAM cell if operating
in support of a maneuver force. The C-RAM platoon is also not a part of the kill chain; it receives its
engagement commands from the base defense operations center. |
3-01 | 102 | Chapter 9
Figure 9-1. Platoon AMD control relationships
9-21. Engagement and identification authority, except for rotary-wing aircraft, smaller class UAS, and RAM
threats, is normally maintained by the AADC’s designated commander (for example, the RADC or SADC).
Avenger team leaders serve as engagement and identification authorities for rotary-wing aircraft and the
smaller class of UASs. The ground commander is generally given the responsibility to execute C-RAM
operations (JP 3-01). Authority for RAM engagements is decentralized to and exercised by the commander
of an installation or base on which C-RAM assets are employed. The C-RAM platoon leader conducts the
tactical engagements for the installation/base commander in compliance with the ROE and other AMD
control measures forwarded by an ADAFCO, ADAM cell, or another ADA unit.
9-22. In a low intensity air threat environment that may exist prior to or after ground combat operations,
engagement/identification authority for fixed-wing aircraft is generally centralized at the RADC/SADC level.
Engagement orders are transmitted by the ADAFCO to ADA task force level, or, in some cases, to battery
level.
9-23. When there are projections of high intensity air and missile threats with significant simultaneous and
coordinated ballistic missile attacks (the expected norm in large-scale combat operations), the AADC may
decentralize engagement/identification authority for all air threats. Authority may initially be delegated to an
ADA task force, or, if no task force is present in the vicinity and some centralized control above weapon
level is required, to an ADA pure/task-organized battery. Once attacks are imminent, authority will likely be
decentralized directly to the Avenger team leaders. All Avenger leaders must be cognizant of and prepared
to assume requisite authority when so delegated.
9-24. Equipment status reports are provided by the platoon to the ADA task force or task-organized battery,
when operating in these formations, or to an ADAM cell when directly supporting a BCT or its subordinate |
3-01 | 103 | ADA Platoon
forces. These reports identify the operational status and availability of the platoon’s major items of
equipment, with a focus on those items required to conduct engagements.
FORCE OPERATIONS
9-25. Operation plans are usually prepared by the parent battery prior to mission initiation. Once employed,
the platoon leader may be responsible for developing changes, METT-TC dependent (for example, an
Avenger platoon assigned a new mission of defending a river crossing site).
9-26. One platoon is generally allocated in defense of an asset. More may be allocated dependent upon
METT-TC factors, such as the size, dispersion, and criticality of the asset; anticipated threat types and
quantities; and available ADA forces.
9-27. The SHORAD platoon deploys as part of an ADA task force or with its parent battery. The platoon
fights as part of an ADA task force/task-organized battery or as a separate organization.
9-28. When placed in support of a maneuver unit, the Avenger platoon leader coordinates the operation plan
with the supported unit commander. If assigned to an ADA task force or ADA task-organized battery, the
platoon leader builds the plan in synchronization with that of the task force or battery.
9-29. When deployed to a base or semi-fixed location, the SHORAD platoon is integrated into that location’s
overall security plan. The platoon provides its own defense with augmentation by security elements to protect
against ground assaults. When supporting a maneuver element, the platoon must rely on that force for security
while moving and in static positions.
9-30. Since C-RAM units are most likely positioned on a fixed base or installation due to the limited mobility
of the LPWS, C-RAM platoon operation plans and orders are developed by its parent battery and controlling
AMD element on that asset in coordination with the base or installation commander. The C-RAM platoon
leader advises the AMD element and the base/installation commander of the best positions for the guns given
the projected threat.
9-31. The method of employment for a SHORAD platoon varies based on the threat and the defended asset.
Placement of the sensors and launchers must maximize coverage of the designated asset. The AMDWSs in
Avenger and C-RAM units, with automated battle management aids, provide platoon leaders the best
positional options for the defense.
9-32. Sensors must be carefully placed to ensure optimal surveillance of the area. Their positioning is
generally the first consideration in establishing a defense. Sentinels have a 360-degree capability to detect
and classify aerial threats. LCMRs provide 360-degree detection of RAM threats. They aid in the
identification of targets with small radar cross sections and small electronic signatures, traveling at low
speeds and altitudes. Identification can be supplemented by data from networked sensors accessed via
FAAD/C-RAM C2. The FAAD/C-RAM C2 architecture allows fire control operators to correlate track data
from multiple AMD sensors into a composite air picture provided by the track report correlation technique.
The supplementary data provided by other AMD sensors is especially useful to SHORAD platoons during
potential rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft engagements as it serves to further mitigate the risk of fratricide.
9-33. Sentinel may be employed as a separate component in the area of operations, providing low-altitude
coverage of areas that may be masked to other AMD sensors. When so employed, it requires site protection.
When developing the sensor plan, leaders must take into account the threat’s ability to detect radar emissions
and build survivability moves and emplacement locations beyond artillery engagement ranges when possible.
Security of these assets must be balanced with the ability to provide early warning to the force.
9-34. In defense of static assets, the SHORAD platoon leader uses the ADA employment tenets to position
launchers in accordance with METT-TC. The Avenger platoon leader stresses mutual support, or overlapping
coverage when possible, to enhance engagement opportunities. If fixed-wing aircraft are considered to be a
major threat, the platoon may weight coverage to the most likely air avenue(s) of approach. The C-RAM
platoon leader positions the LPWS launchers in pairs with mutual support if possible, or overlapping fires
between pairs as a minimum, for RAM engagements given the relatively short range of the LPWS.
9-35. During deployments with maneuver units, Avenger platoons are generally positioned forward and to
the flanks. Avenger can launch a missile or fire its .50-caliber machine gun on the move. Defenses are |
3-01 | 104 | Chapter 9
optimized at static locations (for example, refuel points or bridge crossings)—where missiles and sensors are
in place and positioned along the most likely directions of attack (again using the employment tenets)—and
minimized when units are on the move. The platoons employ an overwatch technique to ensure continuous
coverage of units on the move. For example, a team of two Avengers, with the associated C2 node and
sensors, is positioned in a static location to provide defense over the maneuvering forces. As the supported
force moves, a second team maneuvers into position to provide the follow-on defense. Once the second team
is in place, it assumes the defense while the first team maneuvers. Overwatch may require additional sensors
and launchers. While platoon assets may be positioned at critical points along a route of advance, there is no
intent for the platoon weapons or sensors to maintain pace with the maneuvering elements.
9-36. Avenger and C-RAM launchers are assigned primary and secondary target lines. Primary target lines
are determined based on mission requirements and defended assets. They assist in the distribution of fires
when defending against multiple targets that are attacking from different directions. Secondary target lines
allow mutual support and overlapping coverage. Secondary target lines are planned in advance to allow the
proper positioning of equipment to accommodate both primary and secondary target line requirements.
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
9-37. The platoon conducts engagement operations from its C2 node. Each platoon’s C2 node includes a
FCE. The platoon leader serves as the fire control officer and ADA Soldiers fulfill surveillance and
identification functions. Engagement operations can be conducted 24 hours per day, requiring constant
manning. Battle management aids, embedded in FAAD/C-RAM C2, assist operators in executing their
missions.
9-38. Virtually all rotary-wing, smaller class UAS, and RAM engagement authorizations are decentralized
to platoon level, without further direction or guidance from higher engagement authorities. Engagements of
these threats are time sensitive; there is insufficient time for higher echelons to exert positive control.
However, a higher echelon – a task force C2 node for Avenger or base defense operations center for C-RAM,
for example – may impose control prior to an engagement when a SHORAD weapons system will fire into a
no-fire or controlled airspace zone.
9-39. SHORAD platoon leaders, in their capacity as fire control officers, must consider the “where” of
engagements, identifying those locations that allow for minimum collateral damage to friendly forces and
defended assets. However, when defended assets are in urban areas and there is significant potential for
civilian casualties, ROE and the platoon leader’s judgment may result in non-engagements, except for those
engagements required for self-defense.
9-40. UAS and RAM engagements are conducted by Avenger and C-RAM systems using procedural
controls and are guided by fire direction orders, as required, from the platoon headquarters. The common air
picture, facilitated by FAAD/C-RAM C2, enhances the platoon’s ability to identify and engage the right
target. See ATP 3-01.81 and ATP 3-01.60, respectively, for further discussions of counter-UAS techniques
and C-RAM operations.
9-41. SHORAD weapons are placed in the manual or automatic engagement mode. The manual mode is the
preferred mode for the Avenger; in this mode, the Avenger gunner conducts the engagement. The automated
mode is preferred for C-RAM weapons; in this mode, the gunner conducts the engagement while sitting in a
unique LPWS control station and connected to the C-RAM C2 system.
9-42. C-RAM units “clear” airspace before engagements through dynamic “do-not-engage sectors”. The
sector puts an “uncertainty bubble” around aircraft based on local radar track quality and sends that
information to the LPWS. The LPWS then does not initiate an engagement of a RAM threat – or continue an
engagement if one has been initiated – if its rounds will pass through this uncertainty volume. The system
continues to track the threat and, once clear of the do-not-engage sector, continues the engagement if possible.
9-43. While FAAD/C-RAM C2 facilitates more permissive engagement controls, given the ability to support
and display a common air picture with positive identification, Avenger platoons may still be required to
visually identify targets as hostile before engaging.
9-44. Engagement, sustainment, and other operational reports are forwarded to parent battery/task-organized
battery, ADA task force, and/or ADAM cell. The platoon advises these echelons, for example, of its |
3-01 | 105 | ADA Platoon
engagement results, equipment status (to include battle damage to major components and the need for
additional missiles/ammunition), and future maneuver force plans.
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
9-45. The SHORAD platoon is not self-sustaining. It requires administrative and logistical support from its
parent unit, the ADA task force or task-organized battery to which it is assigned, or the supported force.
When operating independently, the platoon may require an attached maintenance element consisting of select
system maintainers and repair parts. Unique items, especially Class V, require careful planning as they cannot
be resourced from supported units in many cases, and the parent organization may not have the distribution
capability to transport bulky loads across the width and depth of the area of operations. The distributed nature
of SHORAD operations also requires consideration of medical support, as medical personnel assigned to a
platoon’s parent unit will have difficulty covering the area as well.
9-46. Maintenance relies on the Army’s two-level maintenance concept: field maintenance and sustainment
maintenance. Class IX repair parts are ordered through the Global Combat Support System-Army. A robust
prescribed load list will be established to maximize the operational status of sensors and shooters to meet
mission requirements and limit maintenance downtime. |
3-01 | 107 | Chapter 10
ADAM Cell
This chapter describes the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the air defense
airspace management (ADAM) cell in the corps, division, and brigade. ADAM cells
in the corps and division, per the tables of organization and equipment, are titled AMD
sections; however, they perform many of the functions of the brigade-level ADAM
cell. Therefore, for purposes of simplicity, they are referred to as ADAM cells
throughout this chapter. While the following addresses tactics and procedures of the
ADAM cell in the corps, division, and brigade, emphasis is placed on ADAM cells in
brigade combat team (BCT).
ROLES AND CAPABILITIES
10-1. ADAM cells plan, coordinate, and distribute tactical information necessary to execute AMD operations
and to support airspace management at all required Army echelons. They also provide a near-real-time,
common operational air picture to facilitate situational awareness. ADAM cells at corps, division, and brigade
levels primarily perform planning and liaison functions for force operations, though they also provide some
engagement operations support. ADAM cells also ensure that AMD and aviation plans are considered in
corps, division, and brigade planning and preparations for operations.
10-2. The ADAM/brigade aviation element cell at brigade level, under the direction of the S-3, is the
executive agent for integrating the use of airspace for the brigade commander. The cell resolves immediate
airspace conflicts affecting targeting missions and contributes to the air-ground integration process.
10-3. The ADAM cell in the BCT is linked to and coordinates operations with the division ADAM cell,
ADAFCO positioned at a regional or sector air defense center, and any supporting ADA units. Through
constant coordination, the ADAM cell facilitates the BCT’s awareness of the air environment and current
and projected AMD operations within and around the BCT’s area of operations.
10-4. Major functions and capabilities of the ADAM cell include:
* Coordinate the airspace with aviation, field artillery, and other prime airspace user representatives.
* Advise the commander and staff of air and missile threats and supporting or in-vicinity ADA force
capabilities, locations, and activities.
* Plan and coordinate AMD operations with supporting ADA units.
* Receive, stage, and integrate supporting ADA forces/positions into the brigade’s area of
operations.
* Coordinate early warning of air activity and complementary defense coverage with other Army,
joint, and multinational AMD units.
* Clear the airspace, with airspace authorities and other users, for AMD engagements.
* Relay early warning of enemy air and missile attacks to maneuver and supporting forces.
* Broadcast air defense warnings, ROE, and other pertinent AMD information to maneuver
elements to support their AMD actions.
* Write the AMD appendix in accordance with the commander’s guidance.
* Continuously assess requirements for AMD augmentation. |
3-01 | 108 | Chapter 10
SUPPORT TO JOINT AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
10-5. ADAM cell personnel in BCTs serve as the conduit for AMD information transmitted by the AAMDC
ADAFCO or, more likely, the ADA brigade ADAFCO. ADAM cell personnel support the conduct of AMD
operations in the brigade’s area of operations, primarily with respect to UASs (groups 2 and 3) and rotary-
wing aircraft.
10-6. ADAM cell personnel monitor engagements and advise the ADAFCO of air activity in the BCT’s area.
They also report the locations and actions of a supporting ADA unit as required. In addition, the ADAFCO
relies on the ADAM cell for information on the BCT’s operating environment when the BCT area of
operations encompasses the ADAFCO’s region or sector, or portions thereof.
SUPPORT TO UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
10-7. ADAM cell personnel at division and corps levels coordinate and assist in the planning of AMD
operations when ADA forces are placed in support of, or operate within, the areas of operations of those
organizations. The ADA officer is the resident AMD coordinator at each echelon.
* ADAM cell personnel at the corps, or division when a corps headquarters is not present, are linked
to the AAMDC in theater and ADAFCO at the JAOC or regional/sector centers for planning and
coordination. The AAMDC advises ADAM cell personnel of the overall AMD plan for the area
of operations, the projected locations of ADA units within the corps’ or division’s area of
operations, and the allocation of ADA units to support land forces. ADAM cell personnel advise
the AAMDC of their commander’s intent, the designated critical assets, and the proposed positions
of the supporting ADA units.
* ADAM cell personnel ensure that AMD operations are supportive of the corps/division
commander’s intent, while simultaneously synchronized with the overall AMD plan.
* ADAM cell personnel also coordinate with the supporting ADA brigade, task force, or task-
organized battery to ensure common understanding of AMD capabilities and mission
requirements.
10-8. ADA personnel in the BCT ADAM cells advise the brigade commander of RAM and UAS
engagements, coordinate with a supporting ADA task force or task-organized battery for defense of critical
assets, and assist in the coordination of the airspace to facilitate rapid, unimpeded engagements.
* ADA personnel synchronize AMD operations with the commander’s scheme of maneuver.
* They contribute to the commander’s aerial situational awareness by connecting to appropriate joint
and multinational elements and providing a common air picture at the unit level.
* They transmit airspace data to maneuver elements at the tactical edge of the close area to enable
awareness of the air picture, initiation of passive defense measures, and execution of appropriate
self-defense actions.
10-9. Planning and coordination between the corps-, division-, and brigade-level ADAM cells, and with
supporting ADA forces, are continuous. Plans and operations are reviewed and adjusted in accordance with
changes to commanders’ priorities, increases or decreases in threat activity, and friendly force situations.
ADAM CELL COMPOSITION
10-10. ADAM cells are organic to corps, divisions, BCTs, field artillery brigades, maneuver enhancement
brigades, and theater/combat aviation brigades. They provide resident AMD expertise, coordination, and
integration with other Army airspace and joint AMD and airspace authorities.
10-11. In corps and divisions, the cells consist of ADA Soldiers who provide AMD planning expertise to
the commander and staff. At brigade level, the cells contain ADA and aviation Soldiers, in a combined
ADAM/brigade aviation element, whose duties focus on airspace management. While the aviation personnel
are integral to ADAM cell operations, they will only be discussed minimally in this chapter, primarily with
respect to airspace management. Refer to ATP 3-01.50 for a more detailed discussion. |
3-01 | 109 | ADAM Cell
10-12. ADAM cells have 4 to 12 ADA Soldiers, depending upon echelon. A headquarters battery in a
maneuver enhancement brigade, for instance, contains 4 ADA Soldiers, while the corps, with ADAM cells
in the main CP and tactical CP, requires 12 ADA Soldiers.
10-13. As staff elements, ADAM cells do not have assigned sensors or shooters. Their major items of
equipment are C2 related. Current ADAM cells contain FAAD C2 and AMDWS hardware and software as
well as communications equipment to enable integration with the supported force and into the joint data net.
ADAM cells contain a suite of communications equipment, to include the Multifunction Information
Distribution System, Joint Tactical Terminal, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (also known as
EPLRS), and SINCGARS. This equipment collectively provides access to the joint community via link 16,
affording the ability to transmit and receive near-real-time tactical intelligence, targeting, position location,
and identification information.
10-14. Equipment is mounted on two HMMWVs and powered by a 10-kilowatt generator. In the future, the
high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles are projected to be replaced by medium tactical vehicles.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
10-15. C2 is facilitated through FAAD C2 and AMDWS. ADAM cells use LandWarNet and tactical data
links to transport data to effect C2. LandWarNet is leveraged to provide planning and sustainment support
and to distribute airspace management and control data to corps, division, and brigade elements. The tactical
network enables AMD force operations and engagement operations at the maneuver element.
10-16. Figure 10-1 on page 10-4 reflects the ADAM cell’s C2 relationships at the joint regional/sector and
Army division and below levels. As depicted in the figure and described in previous chapters, engagement
authority lines emanate from the RADC or SADC and engagement control from the ADA battalion/task
force, ADA battery, or SHORAD platoon. The ADAM cell participates in the planning and coordination of
AMD operations with joint and Army elements; it is not involved in the engagement authorization or
engagement control chains.
* A BCT ADAM cell is most likely linked to the ADAFCO in a sector air defense command center
and generally monitors engagements by a supporting ADA unit.
* Planning and coordination is conducted between the ADAM cells at the corps, division, and
brigade levels; ADAM cells and ADA units, from the AAMDC to platoon level; ADAM cell and
non-ADA elements in a BCT conducting air defense operations (combined arms for air defense);
and an ADAM cell and base defense operations center when the ADAM cell is deployed on an
installation.
* An ADAM cell forwards air defense data to the non-ADA elements in the BCT to allow them to
conduct air engagements in self-defense per the ROE. |
3-01 | 110 | Chapter 10
Figure 10-1. ADAM cell AMD relationships
10-17. The ADAM cell assists in the coordination of defenses when shooters are attached to or placed in
support of the BCT. The ADAM cell becomes the singular point of contact within the brigade for the
augmenting ADA force. ADAM cell personnel maintain constant, complete, and timely pictures of
supporting ADA force engagements, equipment status, and positional moves in the BCT area. However,
coordination and execution of AMD operations remains a primary function of the commander of the
augmenting force.
10-18. ADAM cell personnel transmit brigade-unique ROE to the supporting ADA force. The ADAM cell
ensures that the supporting ADA force understands if, where, and when more restrictive rules are imposed in
the brigade area.
FORCE OPERATIONS
10-19. An ADAM cell is deployed and employed with its parent headquarters. ADAM personnel are
positioned in the fires cell in a BCT, in the protection cells at corps and division, and in the current operations
staffs or as stand-alone cells in the field artillery, maneuver enhancement and theater/combat aviation
brigades.
DEFENSE PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
10-20. ADAM cell personnel at the corps, division, and brigade levels develop the AMD appendix for their
respective echelons. The appendix includes the AMD IPB, priorities for defense, and recommended
allocation of ADA forces. The recommended allocation is vetted with other land and air component |
3-01 | 111 | ADAM Cell
commander priorities, and a force allocation decision is made. The ADA personnel assist the BCT
commander and staff in planning for support by ADA forces or general coverage by AMD sensors and missile
systems, when support is allocated. They also recommend how to integrate designated AMD capabilities into
the maneuver plan.
10-21. Current ADAM cells achieve visibility of and input to AMD planning through their embedded
AMDWS capability. ADAM cells leverage ADA capabilities through AMDWS functionality, allowing their
commanders to shape the defended asset plans. Data is transported across LandWarNet.
10-22. ADAM cells plan and coordinate the emplacement of low-level sensors (for example, Sentinel
radars), as applicable, to support AMD operations. They may coordinate with the target acquisition platoon,
within the brigade’s organic field artillery battalion, for Sentinel placement. Adjustments in position locations
and trade-offs in allocation of resources may be required as the field artillery battalion may desire Sentinels
for support of RAM Warn and counterfires, while the ADAM cell may need Sentinels to support the counter-
UAS fight.
10-23. ADAM cell personnel monitor and advise the fires cells of the operational status of the ADA
shooters and their available munitions. They assist in the coordination of adjustments to launcher position
when shooters are out of action and advise when missile and ammunition resupplies are required.
10-24. ADAM cell personnel coordinate force protection requirements for ADA forces supporting the
brigade or operating within its area. ADA echelons do not have organic personnel that can provide adequate
protection against ground threats. Some force protection requirements may be met by locating the ADA force
with other brigade assets at a base; however, this is only suitable if the ADA force can execute its mission
from that base. When positioned at a separate location and METT-TC dependent, the ADA force may need
an attachment of Soldiers from the brigade for protection.
10-25. ADAM cell personnel also assist in AMD planning in maneuver battalions and companies. They
advise battalion and company commanders of the supporting ADA assets or units, their capabilities and
limitations, and their employment considerations. In addition, they plan for and monitor active and passive
AMD measures to be executed by BCT elements. They coordinate force protection of supporting ADA
elements with supported battalion and company commanders.
AIRSPACE COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT
10-26. The ADAM cell is part of an airspace coordination team, consisting of ADA, field artillery, aviation,
and other service representatives at corps, division, and brigade levels that facilitate airspace deconfliction
and clearance of fires. The ADAM cell responsibilities for airspace management vary dependent upon
echelon. The corps ADAM cell, for instance, is more involved with planning airspace usage and coordinating
that usage with joint air planners. The BCT ADAM cell is focused on the execution of airspace usage, such
as deconfliction and clearance of fires.
Note. At the division level, the ADAM cell’s ADA officer is a participant in the joint air ground
integration center. The joint air ground integration center is designed to fully support and enable
division-level current operations through the rapid execution and clearance of fires and airspace.
It is a modular and scalable center designed to integrate and synchronize fires and airspace control
in the division’s area of operations. See ATP 3-91.1 for additional details.
10-27. Planning considers the identification of potential airspace users and the airspace needs of these users.
The ADAM cell personnel determine the most appropriate airspace control measures that provide the least
restrictions to airspace users while maximizing their use and combat effectiveness. The ADAM cell may
establish restricted operations zones within the brigade’s airspace to support management and deconfliction
of airspace users. A restricted operations zone is an airspace reserved for specific activities in which
operations of one or more airspace users is restricted (JP 3-52). ADAM cell personnel also monitor the
restricted zones that are created by other airspace management and control authorities.
10-28. The ADAM cell manages the airspace over the BCT’s area of operations. The brigade aviation
officer coordinates the actions of the ADAM cell and ensures that airspace management activities are |
3-01 | 112 | Chapter 10
integrated with the brigade staff sections and higher echelons. The ADAM cell maintains a relationship with
higher airspace control elements and with supporting air traffic services elements.
10-29. The ADAM cell provides oversight of brigade UAS operations. ADAM/brigade aviation element
personnel may assist in mission planning, though planning is generally conducted at maneuver battalion or
UAS platoon level. ADAM cell personnel must maintain continuous awareness of UAS operations as UASs
at division and brigade levels tend to be used for multiple missions and need to be able to maneuver over the
battlefield with relatively few restrictions.
10-30. Airspace deconfliction is conducted by ADA, field artillery, and aviation Soldiers to mitigate
potential fratricide of aircraft and other friendly air users and minimize the interruption of ongoing operations.
Such operations include aircraft transiting the area, ADA forces conducting engagements of air or missile
threats, or field artillery units executing fire support missions. The ADA, field artillery, and aviation Soldiers,
enabled by the common air picture, maintain situational awareness. They are cognizant of the locations,
plans, and activities of other users to enable the greatest use of the airspace with minimal conflicts. Where
potential conflicts might exist, the ADAM cell facilitates the commander’s priority efforts.
10-31. Airspace must be cleared to allow uncontested operations by the multitude of airspace users,
avoiding time and space conflicts. ADAM cell personnel contact various airspace control agencies for
clearance. These agencies include the Air Force control and reporting center, radar approach control, and air
traffic control agencies. Responsibilities of these agencies are generally defined by the established
coordinating altitude; a coordinating altitude is an airspace coordinating measure that uses altitude to separate
users and as the transition between different airspace control elements (JP 3-52). The majority of all fires
exceeds the coordinating altitude and therefore must be cleared by the control and reporting center and radar
approach control. Clearance must be obtained from the control and reporting center because it controls
tactical military aircraft, and from the radar approach control because it has control of commercial and non-
tactical military aircraft. Air traffic control agencies control their defined airspace below the coordinating
altitude. Once each agency clears its airspace, the ADAM cell can acknowledge that the airspace is cleared
for the designated operation.
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
10-32. The ADAM cell has limited engagement operations responsibilities, as it is not in the kill chain and
does not exercise battle management of ADA units or combined arms for air defense elements. Its primary
functions in engagement operations are to disseminate AMD data to maneuver forces, transmit early warning
and general air threat information provided by supporting sensors, and to inform the ADAFCO and higher
Army echelons of air threats operating in the BCT’s area and subsequent engagement results, as appropriate.
10-33. ADAM cell personnel interface with the ADAFCO at a regional and/or sector air defense command
center for the positional information on projected air threats and to provide the status of engagements. The
ADAM cell may also link to an ADA task force or task-organized battery if one is located in or near the
BCT’s area of operations for positional information.
10-34. ADAM cell personnel provide the linkage between the AMD authorities and maneuver forces
conducting AMD engagements, generally in self-defense. ADAM cell personnel transmit air defense
warnings, ROE, weapons control status, and other air defense procedural control measures to aviation
elements and fire support officers at battalion and company levels for further transmission to Soldiers at those
levels. These procedural controls allow Soldiers, to include maneuver Stinger teams, to conduct engagements
of air threats without further authorization.
10-35. ADAM cells at the BCT and higher levels are involved in the deliberate targeting process through
participation in the targeting working groups, targeting board, and assessment working groups. The ADAM
cell supports the collection of information to confirm or deny potential named areas of interest through the
use of ADA sensors and to nominate targets for attack operations. The ADAM cell may also support attack
operations (counterfire) in the brigade area by transmitting sensor back plot information (information that
identifies the point of origin of incoming fires). Sensor data is forwarded to fire support officers for execution
of immediate fires. |
3-01 | 113 | ADAM Cell
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
10-36. ADAM cell personnel plan for and coordinate sustainment requirements for ADA elements
supporting the brigade or one of its subordinate units. ADAM personnel work with the brigade S-4 to identify
and program the resupply of required rations, ammunition (less ADA unique), and petroleum products;
maintenance of common Army equipment (ADA-specific maintenance needs are furnished by the ADA
unit’s next higher headquarters); and, as available, supplementary transportation. Coordination may entail
the delivery of rations, ammunition, and petroleum products to an ADA site, instead of the ADA element
picking up such items at a brigade logistical location. If some or all sustainment needs cannot be met, ADAM
personnel may contact and request support from an ADA force operating in the brigade’s area, or, with the
supporting ADA element’s commander, contact the next higher ADA headquarters for assistance.
Sustainment planning continues throughout an operation and is modified, as appropriate, in accordance with
METT-TC.
10-37. ADAM cell personnel perform operator-level maintenance on their equipment. Additional
maintenance requirements for common Army equipment can be met by the corps, division, or brigade
maintenance unit. Maintenance of ADA equipment beyond the scope and capabilities of the ADAM cell
ADA Soldiers is coordinated with the supporting ADA force.
10-38. ADAM cell sustainment needs are provided by the echelon headquarters to which the ADAM cell
is assigned. Administrative support is provided by its parent unit. |
3-01 | 115 | Chapter 11
Combined Arms for Air Defense
This chapter addresses the contributions that Army non-AMD forces provide in the
execution of AMD operations, commonly referred to as combined arms for air defense.
All forces may be involved in AMD operations, either through direct engagement or
indirect support actions. The capabilities and considerations presented throughout this
chapter are of those non-AMD forces that complement the capabilities of dedicated
Army, joint, and multinational AMD forces. The capabilities may include small arms,
crew-served weapons, or missiles. In most cases, the discussion addresses situations
where there are no ADA forces present. The focus of this chapter, unless otherwise
indicated, is the BCT and low-flying threats.
GENERAL
11-1. Since the advent of air power, Army forces have been observed, challenged, threatened, and attacked
by enemy air and have had to learn, train, and execute their missions under the premise of air attack. To help
counter this air threat the Army developed AMD capabilities, ranging from missile defense to C-RAM
systems. The AMD capabilities are prioritized and allocated to protect the most critical force assets
throughout an operation. However, the amount of dedicated ADA resources available within the Army has
always been insufficient to protect all of the force components. Therefore, non-ADA forces must contribute
to defense against air threats, relying on their own protection capabilities to supplement any dedicated ADA
forces allocated to them.
11-2. The primary air threats to the maneuver force are RAM, UASs (groups 1 and 2), fixed- and rotary-
wing aircraft, and cruise missiles. It is likely all of these threats, in various quantities and with various
capabilities, are present in a BCT’s area of operations and can threaten the commander’s ability to maneuver
freely and execute mission requirements. The most prevalent air threat generally varies by theater and by
time during an operation. RAM and surveillance UASs, capable of cueing fires against friendly assets, are
likely always present. The low, slow, and small l UASs (groups 1 and 2) are prominent threats, given their
small size and signature and ability to report friendly force locations in near-real time. UASs may also be
employed in coordinated groups and, in the future, swarms, further complicating engagements by friendly
forces. And, as discussed in previous chapters, the threat has added the capability to execute complex
integrated attacks, using a combination of different platforms with different capabilities to conduct a
synchronized attack in near-real time.
11-3. Actions taken by Army forces in support of AMD may be either active or passive.
* Active measures are offensive and defensive actions taken to defeat the air threat before, during,
and after they attack friendly assets. These actions can be taken by Army systems that have not
been optimized or adapted with a capability against the air threats or by Army systems with
enhanced AMD capabilities. The non-optimized systems engage an air threat, without making
changes to the system’s primary mission, role, or capabilities. For instance, crew-served weapons
shoot at an air target using manual super elevation and lead angle (Kentucky windage).
Enhancements may add such capabilities as air track targeting information in C2 systems, airborne
platform attack mode in electronic attack systems, and new software in BCT sensors to enable
detection, tracking, and reporting of airborne platforms. Active measures may be taken against all
air threats cited above in the air or on the ground, with the exception of RAM. Only ADA units
and some self-protection systems have the capability to actively engage RAM threats in the air.
* Passive measures are actions taken to reduce the enemy’s ability to detect, locate, target the force,
and minimize the effects of the attack. Passive measures include camouflage, cover, concealment, |
3-01 | 116 | Chapter 11
air guards, convoy procedures, signals intelligence, and operational security. These measures help
mitigate the enemy’s ability to use air power to affect Army operations. Passive measures may be
taken against all threats.
11-4. As previously mentioned, all Army forces participate in and support AMD operations. Sustainment
forces in general, for instance, provide the standard Army class I-IX support, maintenance, and transportation
support. Maneuver support forces, such as chemical sections, military police forces, and engineer
components may advise ADA elements on CBRN, support the security requirements of ADA units, and
enhance the survivability of ADA systems with protective works, respectively. The forces most actively and
directly engaged in AMD operations are maneuver, aviation, special operations, field artillery, and
intelligence.
* Maneuver. Maneuver forces support both surveillance and attack operations against threat air
capabilities. Maneuver forces can conduct and support the engagement of UASs (groups 1 and 2).
The addition of Stinger teams in maneuver formations provides an enhanced capability to engage
enemy UASs, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and some low-altitude cruise missiles.
* Aviation. Aviation forces may attack an enemy’s ground-based theater launch assets in the deep
area. Army aviation forces are not equipped for air-to-air combat. However, they may attempt to
engage air threats as targets of opportunity or in self-defense.
* Special operations. Special operations forces are adept at deep strikes on C2 facilities and launch
sites, as part of attack operations.
* Field artillery. Field artillery is one of the Army’s primary means for attack operations. Field
artillery forces provide scalable capabilities, a range of nonlethal to lethal actions, against enemy
C2 stations and launch sites (suppression of enemy air defenses), as well as in the counterfire fight.
These capabilities provide the required effects, while considering collateral damage. Artillery
sensors also provide data inputs to the air picture. When C-RAM is deployed in the maneuver
area, artillery sensors are directly linked to it to provide cueing against RAM threats in the air.
* Intelligence. Intelligence elements perform the analysis of enemy aerial capabilities, the
foundation of the IPB for ADA units. They assist in collecting and analyzing such data as threat
air activity, technical characteristics, ingress tactics, and potential warheads and/or payloads. In
addition, they provide strategic early and accurate warning and targeting information for attack
operations.
11-5. Maneuver, special operations, and field artillery forces generally contribute to AMD operations before
and after launch. Aviation and intelligence forces contribute before, during, and after launch.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
11-6. AMD operations are further enhanced by electronic warfare actions, specifically electronic attack and
electronic protection. Electronic attacks, for instance, can deceive or confuse operators in C2 nodes at the
tactical through strategic levels; they can also adversely impact an enemy’s ability to surveil using UASs (see
paragraphs 11-16 on page 11-3 and 11-21 on page 11-4). Electronic protect involves actions taken to protect
personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic
spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. This may include limiting the
electromagnetic signatures of radars to reduce an enemy’s ability to locate these systems. For further
information on cyberspace and electronic warfare operations, see FM 3-12.
11-7. Engagements of air threats are executed in accordance with AMD directives issued by the AADC.
Directives such as ROE, weapons control status, and air defense warnings establish the conditions for what
can be engaged and, to a degree, when an engagement can be conducted (for example, in self-defense). AMD
information is initially incorporated into the BCT’s operation plan.
11-8. ADAM cells transmit the AMD directives to BCT forces through LandWarNet. The information
constitutes the initial air defense conditions and changes as they are enacted. Information can be transmitted
by voice or data. LandWarNet is also used to provide sensor detections, situational awareness of the BCT’s
airspace and airspace in the immediate vicinity of the BCT, and early warning. |
3-01 | 117 | Combined Arms for Air Defense
PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
11-9. ADAM cell personnel develop the AMD appendix for the BCT. The appendix addresses the organic
capabilities of the BCT, for both active and passive defense, and capabilities of an ADA unit placed in support
of the BCT or of ADA units operating in its vicinity. It identifies AMD missions for the BCT’s organic and
supporting units. Intelligence units, for instance, may assist in identifying the air threat to be countered and
analyze potential enemy courses of action.
11-10. The brigade commander establishes the priority of assets to be defended and influences the
positioning of any supporting ADA unit. The ADAM cell facilitates the commander’s understanding of the
airspace and the capabilities, locations, and missions of ADA units in or near the BCT area.
11-11. The BCT’s battalion-size elements can get assistance from the ADAM cell or supporting ADA unit,
if one is assigned, in incorporating AMD into their plans. The ADAM cell or ADA unit can provide the
current data on projected air threats, special guidance on ROE, UAS and aviation locations and transit routes
through the brigade’s area, and any engagement directives from the designated engagement authority. This
enables aerial situational understanding for BCT units and mitigates fratricide.
11-12. Defenses for virtually all Army elements are focused on the potential or projected ground threat.
Units and their weapons are positioned to deny or mitigate this threat. However, with the increasing
proliferation of UASs and potential for complex integrated attacks of any friendly concentration of forces,
commanders must be cognizant of, plan, and allocate resources to defend against air threats. Thus, defenses
of installations, such as operating bases, or areas where brigade elements may concentrate should consider
the most likely air ingress routes, surveillance orbits, and suspected areas from which UASs and rotary- and
fixed-wing aircraft can be launched.
11-13. BCT units must incorporate passive defense measures into their AMD planning. In addition to
camouflage and movement control, units can plan for and institute electromagnetic hardening, electronic
masking, and emission control by such measures as shielding sensitive equipment components, controlling
signatures to protect against threat signal intelligence operations, and selecting and controlling the use of
sensors and C2 emitters, respectively (FM 3-12). Units on installations should continually harden their
locations and incorporate all means to lessen the potential for threat observation and mitigate the effects of
air attacks. For more information on passive AMD measures, see ATP 3-01.8.
11-14. ADAM cells are cognizant of friendly UAS launch times and projected operating areas. ADAM
Soldiers, in coordination with brigade S-3 and the maneuver force UAS units, may establish restricted
operations zones that encompass UAS operating areas and affect the AMD actions initiated by maneuver
force Soldiers.
ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
11-15. Engagements can be lethal or non-lethal, and they can be executed against air and missile threats on
the ground or those that are airborne. Engagements are conducted by the best available system or systems
positioned and capable of negating an enemy’s capabilities. All of the maneuver forces’ organic weapons can
be used in self-defense. Key to the engagements is the detection of the threat in sufficient time and with
sufficient accuracy to allow friendly forces to execute necessary responses. For more information on active
AMD measures, see ATP 3-01.8.
11-16. The best defense against air and missile threats is to destroy them on the ground before launch or
disrupt/destroy their control stations. Intelligence analysis and collection efforts are continuous and support
preplanned and dynamic targeting. Using potential launch site and C2 location information identified by
intelligence elements, field artillery, aviation, and special operating forces employ lethal means to target
these threat assets at extended ranges. Electromagnetic jamming directed against a UAS control station can
disrupt its electronic signals, thus reducing the controlled UAS’s ability to surveil the right area and transmit
targeting data.
11-17. Once the threat is airborne and enters the brigade’s defended areas, brigade units use all means to
destroy these threats. Engagements are procedurally controlled. A different weapons control status (weapons
hold, weapons tight, and weapons free) may be applied simultaneously to different weapon systems, different |
3-01 | 118 | Chapter 11
threat types, and in different airspace areas (JP 3-01). The more restrictive status (weapons hold) is generally
in effect in low threat environments or when there are numerous friendly aircraft operating in the brigade
airspace. A more liberal status (weapons tight or free) may potentially be declared in a high threat
environment or when there is certainty that no friendly or neutral air platforms are in the area. The right of
and rules for self-defense are also established; the right of self-defense is never denied.
11-18. Engagement authority for most air threats in the brigade area flying below the coordinating altitude
is likely vested with the BCT commander. The sole exception may be fixed-wing aircraft; the AADC or his
designated representative (for example, the RADC) may retain engagement authority for these threats,
irrespective of whether they are flying above or below the coordinating altitude.
11-19. Maneuver forces on the tactical edge of the battlefield use their organic weapons to engage
surveilling or attacking rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft and UASs. All such efforts are considered self-defense
actions. Crew-served weapons are more capable against fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, while small arms
are generally better against the group 1 UASs. Threat systems that transit a unit’s location, but are not
attacking that unit, may also be engaged; however, they are more likely allowed to continue transiting given
the relative short ranges and limited AMD effectiveness of maneuver force weapons.
11-20. The reintroduction of Stinger to the maneuver force provides an additional capability for the defense
of critical assets in BCTs and their subordinate units. Brigade or battalion commanders may task organize
Stinger teams at their respective locations for protection of CPs or logistical elements, or each team may
remain with its parent company (one Stinger team is currently projected per maneuver company). Regardless
of organization, a team is generally positioned in proximity to the defended asset. The team weights its
coverage to the most likely air avenue of approach. The team receives positional information of friendly,
hostile, or neutral air activity in its vicinity from the ADAM cell, or a supporting ADA unit, through its unit’s
communications nets. Early warning cues the Stinger Soldier as to where to look for the aerial object. Once
the object has been detected, the team uses the ROE, weapons control status, and identification criteria to
determine whether to engage or not. Primary targets are rotary-wing aircraft and UASs, especially the low,
slow, and small ones. As noted previously, different weapon control statuses may be in effect for different
air types. It is likely that weapons tight may be directed for rotary-wing aircraft and weapons free for the low,
slow, and small UASs. See ATP 3-01.18 for additional discussion of Stinger team techniques.
11-21. Army forces can use electronic attack measures against airborne UASs to disrupt signals.
Electromagnetic deception and intrusion devices and activities are designed to mislead or deceive the threat
(FM 3-12). These devices can deny, defeat, or exploit the link between the UAS and its ground control station.
Deny activities are executed through jamming with little to no operator interaction; defeat is the deliberate
measure to render the link ineffective and requires man-in-the-loop interaction; and exploit is the deliberate
effort to employ deception measures and is exercised by an operator. See FM 3-12 for additional discussion
of cyberspace capabilities.
11-22. Aviation forces do not have a dedicated air-to-air weapon system. Army helicopters and UASs may
engage enemy air threats as targets of opportunity or in self-defense. Air crews must give careful
consideration to collateral damage. No current aviation weapon system has a self-destruct capability, and
firing air-to-ground systems at enemy aircraft creates a significant collateral damage hazard in the sector of
fire.
11-23. Offensive actions by the aviation, field artillery, and special operating forces continue during the air
battles and after the threat platforms have exited the brigade area. Combined fires continue to target enemy
air capabilities − platforms on the ground and control stations – to reduce further air activities.
11-24. A summary of the actions which the different forces, cited in paragraph 11-4 on page 11-2, can take
against air threats is presented in table 11-1. Engagement actions are typically conducted in self-defense. For
more information, see ATP 3-01.8. |
3-01 | 119 | Combined Arms for Air Defense
Table 11-1. Summary of actions against air and missile threats
Threat Actions Initiated By:
to be Maneuver Aviation Special Field Artillery Intelligence
Countered Forces Forces Operating Forces Forces
Forces
Unmanned Passive Passive Passive Passive Passive
Aircraft defense. defense. defense. defense. defense.
System Engage in Engage as Attack Target C2 Collect and
the air with targets of ground C2 stations analyze
organic opportunity station. and launch data re
small arms or in self- sites. threat
Attack
and crew- defense. capabilities.
launch Support the
served.
Attack sites. air picture Provide
Weapons.
launch/ with data early
Engage in airfield from warning.
the air with facilities and artillery
Provide
Stinger. ground C2 sensors.
targeting
station.
Engage in data for
the air with attack
small arms operations.
and crew-
served
weapons.
Rotary-Wing Passive Passive Passive Passive Passive
Aircraft defense. defense. defense. defense. defense.
Engage Engage as Attack C2 Engage in Collect and
with small targets of facilities. the air with analyze
arms and opportunity all organic data re
Engage
crew- or in self- weapons. threat
with
served defense. capabilities.
organic Support the
weapons.
Attack weapons, air picture Provide
Engage in launch sites, to include with data early
the air with C2 stations, Stinger. from warning.
Stinger. and forward artillery
Attack
arming and sensors.
launch
refueling
sites, C2
points.
stations,
and forward
arming and
refueling
points.
Fixed-Wing Passive Passive Passive Passive Passive
Aircraft defense. defense. defense. defense. defense.
Engage Engage as Attack Engage in Collect and
with small targets of ground C2 the air with analyze
arms and opportunity station. all organic data re
crew- or in self- weapons. threat
Attack
served defense. capabilities.
operating
weapons.
bases. Provide
Engage in early
Engage in
the air with warning.
the air with
Stinger.
organic
weapons,
to include
Stinger. |
3-01 | 120 | Chapter 11
Table 11-1. Summary of actions against air and missile threats (continued)
Threat Actions Initiated By:
to be Maneuver Aviation Special Field Artillery Intelligence
Countered Forces Forces Operating Forces Forces
Forces
Passive Passive Passive Passive Passive
defense. defense. defense. defense. defense.
Rocket, artillery,
and mortar Attack Attack Counter- Collect and
launch site. launch site. battery. analyze
data re
Attack
threat
launch site.
capabilities.
Provide
early
warning.
Passive Passive Passive Passive Passive
defense. defense. defense. defense. defense.
Cruise Missile
Attack Attack Target C2 Collect and
ground C2 ground C2 stations. analyze
station. station. data re
Target
threat
Attack Attack launch
capabilities.
launch launch sites.
sites. sites. Provide
early
warning.
C2 command and control |
3-01 | 121 | Chapter 12
ADA Data and Communications Architecture
This chapter discusses the ADA data and communications architecture and how it
connects with the joint AMD organizations. It includes information on connectivity
specified for the joint, interorganizational, multinational AMD elements, and ADA
organizations, echelons, and systems capable of connecting directly to the major AMD
networks. The intent is to show the connectivity that supports the doctrinal linkages
discussed in the previous chapters.
MAJOR NETWORKS
12-1. The major networks addressed are the AMD supporting networks for the joint, interorganizational, and
multinational elements, link 16, and LandWarNet. LandWarNet is discussed in terms of its radio frequency
connections and internet protocol connections.
12-2. Networks that span ADA echelons and joint, interorganizational, and multinational links using
multiple types of interfaces require special skills to plan, coordinate, install, operate, and maintain. Personnel
who perform this mission have extensive experience and detailed technical training. To support the AMD
operational networks, an interface control officer is positioned at the corps, division, AAMDC, and ADA
brigade levels. The interface control officer is responsible for planning data links for early warning
dissemination within the area of operations. The Army interface control officer, in the G-6 staff, coordinates
with ADA units, the Army AMD network design facility, and the joint interface control officer to plan the
network design with the information exchange requirements that have been provided by subordinate units
and the command. The interface control officer manages and coordinates the entire multi-link interface for
supporting units and works with the joint interface control officer for connectivity into the larger joint,
interorganizational, and multinational networks. The G6, normally from the AAMDC, deploys an interface
control officer, as necessary, to the joint interface control officer’s location to integrate Army AMD assets
into the tactical data link architecture.
AMD SUPPORTING NETWORKS
12-3. The AMD supporting networks includes the many tactical data links and unique connections
throughout the joint, interorganizational, and multinational community. Link 16, though not included below,
is also an AMD supporting networks; it is discussed and shown separately due to its significance. The AMD
networks support development of the air picture with situational understanding, intelligence activities,
planning, operations, and engagement operations with threat position information and firing guidance. Some
of the networks are legacy networks for U.S. joint forces but are still in use with multinational forces.
However, some joint forces currently retain the capability to enter or monitor the legacy networks to maintain
connectivity with joint, interorganizational, and multinational organizations and elements.
12-4. Examples of legacy AMD supporting networks still in use on some platforms are link 11 (also known
as tactical data link-A), link 11B (also known as tactical data link-B), PADIL, forward area air defense data
link (FDL), and the Army tactical data link 1. The Command and Control Battle Management and
Communications (C2BMC) network is used to integrate the BMDS. The cooperative engagement capability
(CEC) network is a newer network used by the U.S. Navy. These networks are discussed briefly below.
12-5. Link 11 is a secure, half-duplex, netted digital link that provides a network for exchanging tactical data
between subscribers at either 1,364 or 2,250 bits per second. It is normally operated in a roll call or polling
mode, using either high frequency or ultra-high frequency communications. It is controlled by a net control |
3-01 | 122 | Chapter 12
station to exchange information between airborne, land-based, and shipboard systems. The system uses the
M-series messages.
12-6. Link 11B is a secure, full duplex, point-to-point digital data link using serial transmission frame
characteristics and standard message formats at either 600, 1,200, or 2,400 bits per second. The system uses
M-series messages, which can be exchanged using ultra-high frequency or landline communications.
12-7. PADIL is a Patriot system internal data link. It has a high capacity, full-duplex, and line-of-sight/point-
to-point radio system. Its normal routing is between fire units and the ICC, although it can also link to another
battalion’s ICC. The radio system interfaces up to 11 bit rates up to almost 9000 kilobits per second. Digital
traffic includes high quality digital voice equipment with a data service channel. Analog voice for circuit
installation and maintenance is available for additional communications between operators using a handset
directly attached to the radio set.
12-8. FDL is used with the FAAD C2 system and passes information, including targeting information,
between the Sentinel radar C2 node, Avenger battery and platoons, Avenger platforms (squads), and C-RAM
battery and platoon. FAAD C2 includes an AMDWS and an air defense system integrator (also known as
ADSI). A variant of FAAD C2, C-RAM C2, is used to support C-RAM systems.
12-9. ATDL-1 is a legacy secure, full duplex, point-to-point digital data link using serial transmission frame
characteristics and standard message formats at a basic speed of 1200 bits per second. It is used to
interconnect tactical air control systems and Army or Marine Corps tactical AMD systems. ATDL-1 can be
exchanged using ultra-high frequency, very high frequency, or landline communications. The capability to
link with ATDL-1 systems provides a means to exchange air and missile data with some multinational
partners using this data link.
12-10. C2BMC is a vital operational system that provides the U.S. President and Secretary of Defense a
common operating picture. It also enables combatant commanders at strategic, regional, and operational
levels to systematically plan missile defense operations, collectively see the battle develop, and dynamically
direct designated networked sensors and weapons systems to achieve global and regional mission objectives.
The worldwide distributed and regional combatant command C2BMC architecture provides operational
flexibility to engage both strategic- and theater-level ballistic missile threats and affords each command the
flexibility to tailor system behavior and data sharing to satisfy unique mission objectives.
12-11. CEC is a real-time, sensor-netting system that enables high-quality situational awareness and an
integrated fire control capability. It is used on selected Aegis cruisers and destroyers, amphibious ships,
aircraft carriers, and selected Hawkeye aircraft. Its two major hardware pieces are the cooperative
engagement processor, which collects and fuses sensor data, and the data distribution system, which
exchanges data between participating CEC units. CEC increases Naval AMD capabilities by integrating
sensors and weapon assets into a single real-time network that enhances situational awareness, increases
depth-of-fire, enables longer intercept ranges, and improves decision and reaction times. Targeting data from
CEC can be passed onto link 16.
LINK 16
12-12. Link 16, also known as tactical data link-J, is the Department of Defense’s primary tactical data link
for command, control, and intelligence, providing critical joint interoperability and situational understanding
information and supporting AMD engagements. It is used by the joint services, some nations of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Japan.
12-13. Link 16 is a relatively high-speed link. It has a capability to transfer data of over 50 kilobits per
second. It uses an L-band transceiver and has its own frequency hopping algorithm and internal encryption.
It provides technical and operational improvements to older capabilities, including spread spectrum
frequency hopping over 51 discrete frequencies, increased data rate, data volume and granularity, hardware
size and weight reduction, digital secure voice capability, relative navigation, improved security, jam-
resistance, seamless network entry and exit, precise position and location information, and increased numbers
of participants.
12-14. Link 16 uses the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System radio or the Multifunctional
Information Distribution System radio. Both radios operate in a line-of-sight frequency band. Other radios |
3-01 | 123 | ADA Data and Communications Architecture
are available that can interface with the link 16 waveform. It is a time division multiple access link where
time slots are allocated to users by the network controller. Link 16 has its own protocol and uses the J-Series
messages. It requires network preplanning.
12-15. Link 16 has an enhancement to increase its range. The Joint Range Extension addresses the
requirement to pass secure/anti-jam data and voice via common means in a timely manner, beyond line-of-
sight, without the use of a dedicated airborne relay. Joint Range Extension is a gateway between existing link
16-capable systems and satellite terminals, and can be used with other beyond line-of-sight media, such as
landline-based networks. There are two major employment applications of the gateway: in-theater reachback
and inter-zone connectivity. In-theater reachback is used to transmit the air surveillance and ballistic missile
information from a forward area of a theater to a remote command center located beyond-line-of-sight of the
forward link 16 elements. Inter-zone connectivity is used to transfer air surveillance and ballistic missile
information between localized areas of a theater operation.
LANDWARNET
12-16. LandWarNet is the Army’s contribution to the global information grid. It consists of all globally
interconnected, end-to-end Army information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting,
processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand supporting warfighters, policy
makers, and support personnel. It includes all U.S. Army owned and leased and leveraged Department of
Defense/joint communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data
security services, and other associated services. LandWarNet exists to enable the war fight through C2. As
the Army’s enterprise system of systems, LandWarNet moves information through a seamless network that
facilitates information-enabled joint warfighting and supporting operations from the operational base to the
individual Soldier. LandWarNet provides the Army’s enterprise networking capabilities that enable Soldiers,
leaders, and units today and in the future to operate anytime, anywhere, and at every echelon as part of the
joint force. However, the LandWarNet is in a state of continual improvement with capabilities being refined
yearly.
12-17. LandWarNet provides the construct for the Army’s transition to the future. LandWarNet enables
voice, data, and video to the edge of tactical formations, ultimately pushing these capabilities to the Army’s
modular brigades, battalions, and Soldiers. LandWarNet is the means to provide linkages between sensors,
shooters, and leaders; seamless and secure interoperability; network services; and end-to-end connectivity
throughout the enterprise.
12-18. ADA units rely on supported organizations or Expeditionary Signal Brigades to provide connectivity
to the Army backbone network for establishment and maintenance of common user networks, Department of
Defense information network services, and integration of network transport and cyberspace support activities.
In this chapter LandWarNet is addressed through two modes, radio frequency and internet protocol:
* The radio frequency system most used in the tactical forces is SINCGARS. Almost every vehicle
whose senior occupant is involved in engagement operations or directly supporting engagement
operations has a SINCGARS radio. In many cases in the SHORAD mission, SINCGARS is the
primary means of voice communications and also a means of data communications. SINCGARS
operates in the very high frequency spectrum. Other radios used in ADA include the AN/PRC-
117, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (also known as EPLRS), the high frequency
AN/VRC-104, as well as radios capable of linking through satellites.
* LandWarNet supports an internet protocol-based system and, therefore, is able to send messages
from anyone on the internet protocol network to anyone else on that network using routing
conventions like those on the internet. The tactical implementation of this concept is more difficult
than in the civilian world with its permanent supportive infrastructure. Internet protocol
connectivity “to the edge” is a stated goal of LandWarNet.
COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA ARCHITECTURE
CONNECTIVITIES
12-19. Figures 12-1 (on page 12-4) and 12-2 (on page 12-5) present the data and communications networks
supporting ADA forces. Figure 12-1 primarily depicts joint and multinational elements, while figure 12-2 is |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.