FM
stringclasses 43
values | page
int64 1
477
| text
stringlengths 6
8.45k
|
|---|---|---|
6-02 | 90 | Chapter 3
Figure 3-1. Shaping activities within an environment of cooperation and competition
3-4. Shaping activities help assure operational access for crisis response and contingency operations. Army
signal forces support the geographic combatant commander’s shaping operations to promote favorable
access. Signal activities that support shaping operations include—
* Key leader engagements.
* Bilateral and multinational exercises to improve multinational communications interoperability.
* Negotiations to develop bilateral and multinational information sharing agreements.
* The use of grants and contracts to improve interoperability and the communications capabilities
of partner nations.
* Designing interoperability into acquisition programs.
* Agreements for shared use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
* Mapping of adversary capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum. |
6-02 | 91 | Signal Support to Operations to Shape and Prevent
Signal Support to Security Force Assistance and Long-Term
Consolidation of Gains—Colombia
U.S. communications capabilities supported the government of Colombia as it
confronted the destabilizing challenges of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia. Through various long-term programs, the United States aided Colombian
forces in their struggle against a protracted, bloody insurgency that at times controlled
significant areas of the country.
One of the programs was the development of bilateral information sharing agreements
and the provisioning of a coalition network. The coalition network was a secure, secret-
releasable communications network that linked more than 25 key Colombian command
and control nodes, support elements from the United States Southern Command, and
other U.S. Government agencies.
The coalition network enabled the Army to provide technical, planning, and operational
assistance to Colombian National Police and military forces, and fully integrate the
military approach into interagency efforts. Improved, secure information sharing during
police and military operations strengthened capabilities. The ability to share
information reduced operational friction between friendly forces, increased the
effectiveness of Colombian security forces, and bolstered their capacity.
These capacity-building activities weakened transnational drug cartels and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, while fostering a culture of cooperation and
information sharing in rising generations of Colombian military and government
personnel. Ultimately, that made them more effective in current and future operations.
SIGNAL OPERATIONS ASSESSMENTS
3-5. Signal operations assessments are integral to planning and executing communications support.
Operations assessments identify and analyze changes in the operational environment and determine the
success of signal elements supporting the campaign or operation. Signal operations assessments help the
theater army G-6 develop, adapt, and refine the theater communications support plan.
3-6. Collecting information to develop an understanding of the operational variables provides the basis for
signal operations assessments. A complete understanding of the operational environment, the theater
campaign plan, and the commander’s priorities is critical to developing an accurate assessment.
RISKS TO SIGNAL SUPPORT
3-7. Enemies and adversaries will attempt to further their interests and achieve their goals without fighting.
Threat actors will focus on disrupting and degrading networks and intercepting or manipulating information
to undermine unified action partner relationships, raise political stakes, shape public opinion, and challenge
U.S. resolve. The goal of threat activities during shaping operations is limiting allied action and freedom of
maneuver.
3-8. Cyberspace attacks may allow an enemy or adversary to extract sensitive information, contingency
plans, or other data to degrade relationships or mitigate planned friendly operations. Adversaries may conduct
reconnaissance in cyberspace to identify vulnerabilities in friendly networks, so they can plan cyberspace
attacks to disrupt friendly forces’ ability to respond during crisis. Signal forces maintain cybersecurity
compliance to prevent intrusions into the DODIN-A. |
6-02 | 92 | Chapter 3
SIGNAL SUPPORT
3-9. Shaping activities take place continuously within a theater. The geographic combatant commander
uses shaping activities to improve partner nations’ internal security, enhance international legitimacy, gain
multinational cooperation, and influence adversary decision making. Shaping activities tie directly to
authorities provided in the United States Code and approved programs. The geographic combatant
commander integrates and synchronizes shaping activities with the Department of State, other government
agencies, country teams, and ambassadors’ plans and objectives. Mission partners develop and synchronize
shaping activities in the country plan, the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy, and the theater
campaign plan.
3-10. Signal forces supporting shaping operations provide communications capabilities to the geographic
combatant commander and Army forces in theater. Signal support to shaping operations may also include
signal-focused security cooperation activities with partner agencies and countries.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
3-11. Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the
United States Armed Forces and those of another nation’s armed forces or civilian authorities to build trust
and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0). Geographic
combatant commanders seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover areas of common
interest and tension. Such military engagements can reduce tensions and may prevent conflict or build
coalitions.
3-12. The theater army G-6 provides communications capabilities to support military engagements by
allocating mobile communications capabilities or providing information technology support to key leader
engagements. The G-6 may also conduct key leader engagements with partner nations to establish
relationships and develop plans for further assistance or cooperation.
SECURITY COOPERATION
3-13. Commanders and staffs conduct security cooperation to develop allied and friendly military
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. Security cooperation activities improve
information exchange and intelligence sharing, provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access,
and mitigate conditions that could lead to crisis. Commanders execute various security cooperation activities
such as the transfer of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments, training and education
of foreign military personnel, the sale of construction services to develop a host nation’s internal defense,
and developing programs to build partner capabilities and capacity for self-sufficiency. Security cooperation
activities include:
* Security assistance.
* Security force assistance.
* Foreign internal defense.
* Security reform.
3-14. Although each security cooperation activity is unique, signal support for each activity is similar. The
signal support plan depends on the desired outcome of the theater campaign plan.
3-15. Signal subject matter expert exchanges, training, and education are investments in the future of the
host nation’s military institutions. These security cooperation activities foster future cooperation and build
partner-nation capacity. Sharing information on tactics, techniques and procedures, interoperability, and
doctrine provides a path to self-sufficiency and builds relationships between U.S. and partner nation
militaries. Multinational signal-themed symposiums enable sharing of information and ideas between foreign
countries and often result in better tailored, peer-nation solutions. Refer to FM 3-22 for a more detailed
discussion of Army support to security cooperation. |
6-02 | 93 | Signal Support to Operations to Shape and Prevent
INTEROPERABILITY
3-16. Single-channel very high frequency (VHF), high frequency (HF), and tactical satellite radios provided
through grants, loans, or foreign military sales build partner-nation military communications capabilities,
capacity, and command and control interoperability. Secure radios for loan or sale to partner nations are
unique for foreign release, but are interoperable with, and share most of the same features of, those used by
U.S. forces. Country teams maintain accountability of loaned radios and facilitate the transfer of COMSEC
keying material for the systems. Some radios, such as single-channel ground and airborne radio system, are
not approved for foreign release and cannot be loaned to foreign governments or militaries. When the United
States provides radios as part of a grant, loan, or sale, planning for ongoing logistics support is critical to
maintaining the operational capability of the system.
3-17. Working closely with allies and partners is a key and enduring element of U.S. national strategy. The
United States frequently needs support from its partners and allies to prevail in contemporary conflicts.
Likewise, U.S. partners and allies often need extensive U.S. support during regional and internal conflicts
(ATP 3-94.1). Establishing among military headquarters allows commanders to integrate with joint,
inter-organizational, and multinational mission partners by providing staff interface, mentoring, support, and
communication required for U.S. partners to accomplish their missions.
MULTINATIONAL NETWORKS
3-18. The development of regional or theater classified information sharing arrangements and command and
control networks fosters cooperation between the United States and partner nations. U.S. forces and allies
employ both sustained and ad hoc bilateral and multinational networks to practice command and control of
multinational operations during exercises, and support to day-to-day operations across the Army’s strategic
roles of shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.
3-19. As the DOD executive agent for theater communications infrastructure, the Army is often the lead for
installing, operating, maintaining, and securing bilateral and multinational information sharing networks.
Coalition networks connect partner nation-owned networks to the core of the DODIN. If partners do not have
the capacity, the geographic combatant commander may loan the necessary equipment.
3-20. The Defense Information Systems Agency establishes technical and operational standards for mission
partner environment. Sharing common configurations and operating procedures among multinational mission
partners removes the barriers to information sharing.
3-21. Although there are U.S. encryption devices available for release to foreign nations, some constraints
apply to which countries may possess, control, and operate the equipment. Providing COMSEC materials
and equipment to a foreign nation requires a formal COMSEC sharing agreement and a bilateral command
and control interoperability board. The command and control interoperability board guides the partner nation
through the process of establishing a U.S. COMSEC account with adequate secure storage facilities, and
provides a venue to develop further interoperability programs. The National Security Agency-approved
commercial solution for classified may serve as an alternative to U.S. COMSEC equipment and materials.
The commercial solution for classified is an end-to-end commercial encryption solution that is releasable to
friendly foreign nations and approved to transmit sensitive information.
CYBERSECURITY
3-22. The security of a multinational network is only as strong as the partner nations operating on it. Most
partner nations are in the early development of cybersecurity programs. Army cybersecurity professionals
can share lessons learned with partner nations as they develop their programs. Sharing cybersecurity tactics,
techniques, procedures, and insights from U.S. Army experience can help partner nations establish or
improve their cybersecurity programs and capabilities.
3-23. All nations must share a common system baseline and conduct disciplined cybersecurity programs to
prevent unnecessary vulnerabilities to the network and the data it carries. Cybersecurity processes to preserve
information and information systems include—
* The risk management framework.
* Integration and interoperability. |
6-02 | 94 | Chapter 3
* Protecting DOD information.
* Identity and access management.
3-24. Sharing cybersecurity program information and threat warnings builds trust and confidence between
the Army and unified action partners. Timely and deliberate information sharing maximizes the security of
critical network infrastructure. Cybersecurity and network defense personnel must share vulnerability
information to the maximum extent allowed by law, regulation, and government-wide policy. The geographic
combatant command J-6 and theater army G-6 develop guidance and programs for sharing cybersecurity
information. The theater army is the cybersecurity lead for any coalition network provided by the Army.
SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
3-25. The DODIN-A faces continuous risk from threat actors. Signal planners collaborate with the CEMA
section to help identify key terrain in cyberspace during operations to shape. The CEMA section plans for
defensive cyberspace operations support. Cyberspace capabilities must be coordinated, built, moved, and
provided access to various nodes across cyberspace. These systems require constant maintenance and defense
throughout operations to shape.
3-26. Defensive cyberspace operations require access to the theater network. DODIN operations personnel
collaborate with defensive and offensive cyberspace operations personnel throughout the planning process,
since their activities are interdependent.
ADDITIONAL SHAPING ACTIVITIES
3-27. As part of operations to shape, Army signal forces conduct numerous other activities supporting the
geographic combatant command and theater army. These include signal support to intelligence operations,
support to countering weapons of mass destruction, support to humanitarian efforts, and organizing and
participating in combined training and exercises.
SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING SHAPING ACTIVITIES
3-28. The theater military intelligence brigade-theater provides regionally-focused collection and analysis to
support the geographic combatant commander, theater army commander, and Army forces conducting
operations to shape. The theater military intelligence brigade has S-6 staff support and dedicated satellite
transport systems for sensitive compartmented information networks. With transport convergence (see
paragraph 2-267), tactical signal systems replace the dedicated intelligence transport systems for sensitive
compartmented information networks.
3-29. Units at home station access sensitive compartmented information networks, SIPRNET, NIPRNET,
and coalition networks through the DODIN-A fixed infrastructure. In a deployed environment, Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical provides satellite transport for top secret/sensitive compartmented information
networks to the brigade level. If the military intelligence brigade identifies network requirements beyond the
capability or capacity of organic signal assets, they request additional signal support through the theater army
and geographic combatant command. Signal support comes from theater-available assets or elements of an
expeditionary signal battalion. See appendix E for more information about requests for signal support.
SUPPORT TO COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
3-30. Shaping activities work toward strategic deterrence of weapons of mass destruction. Army forces shape
an operational environment to dissuade or deter adversaries from developing, acquiring, proliferating, or
using weapons of mass destruction.
3-31. The DODIN-A fixed infrastructure supports the countering weapons of mass destruction mission.
Units conducting countering weapons of mass destruction missions use their organic signal capabilities.
When organic capabilities cannot meet mission requirements, these units request additional support through
the theater army and geographic combatant command. |
6-02 | 95 | Signal Support to Operations to Shape and Prevent
SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
3-32. The United States Agency for International Development collaborates with Army forces for
humanitarian relief missions. Security cooperation efforts include exercises in preparation for theater
humanitarian missions.
3-33. Communications support ranges widely from secure and nonsecure cellular phones to wideband,
deployable network nodes. Signal support to humanitarian relief depends on the size and scope of the
operation. Signal elements supporting humanitarian efforts may need to directly support U.S. Government
interagency partners, non-governmental organizations, host-nation government agencies, and media outlets
when no other communications capabilities exist.
Humanitarian Assistance: Hurricane Matthew, U.S. Military
Support to Haiti
On October 4, 2016, Haiti was hit by 140 mile per hour winds from category 4 Hurricane
Matthew, leaving a swath of destroyed homes, stripped trees, raging rivers, and
flooded streets. The storm dumped over two feet of rainwater on the island within 24
hours.
Commander, United States Southern Command, along with numerous governmental
and non-governmental agencies, was poised to provide emergency humanitarian
support.
Within hours of the storm’s passing, the Joint Task Force (JTF) Matthew commander
arrived to assess damage and develop the plan for emergency assistance. The initial
joint task force communications capability consisted of nonsecure cellular telephones,
secure satellite telephone service, and single-channel tactical satellite. The first
commander’s update brief to the United States Southern Command staff took place by
conference call over the secure satellite phone.
Concurrently with the JTF-Matthew commander’s assessment, Army and Marine
Corps helicopters self-deployed from JTF-Bravo in Honduras. As the helicopters
deployed, the JTF-Bravo commander maintained en route communications with the
JTF-Matthew commander and the United States Southern Command staff using
single-channel tactical satellite and secure satellite telephones.
As the end-strength of JTF-Matthew grew to roughly 400 Soldiers and sailors, the 1st
Joint Communications Squadron of the Joint Communications Support Element
deployed a satellite communications terminal to support the JTF headquarters with
secure video teleconferencing, telephone, chat, and data services. In the end, the
mission lasted 14 days and distributed 253 metric tons of relief supplies to areas of the
country unreachable by land routes.
SUPPORT TO COMBINED TRAINING AND EXERCISES
3-34. Combined training and multinational exercises play a key role in shaping an operational environment
and setting the conditions for the geographic combatant commander to initiate rapid crisis action. Signal
support to combined training and exercises varies from information technology support, to exercise
simulations, to fully-deployed communications networks supporting large troop formations.
3-35. It is important to exercise the full communications capabilities anticipated for use in a crisis. Training
events that use the full network validate tactics, techniques, and procedures, battle drills, and policies for
employing and operating the network. Realistic exercises help identify what services are required to support |
6-02 | 96 | Chapter 3
the geographic combatant command and theater army. Using mission partner environment during combined
exercises ensures multinational mission partners can share information with these systems during operations.
CONSOLIDATING GAINS
3-36. Security cooperation helps set the theater for future geographic combatant command and theater army
actions. Security cooperation activities address interoperability, validate standard operating procedures, and
exercise communications systems to prepare the multinational force to rapidly respond to crises or transition
to operations to prevent. Signal forces and staffs consolidate gains in signal support during operations to
shape by adjusting the scheme of signal support in operation plans to address changing communications
requirements.
SECTION II – OPERATIONS TO PREVENT
3-37. The purpose of operations to prevent is to deter adversary actions contrary to U.S. interests. They are
typically conducted in response to activities that threaten unified action partners and require the deployment
or repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight if deterrence fails (FM
3-0).
OVERVIEW OF ARMY OPERATIONS TO PREVENT
3-38. Prevent activities enable the joint force to gain positions of relative advantage prior to future combat
operations. Operations to prevent are characterized by actions to protect friendly forces and indicate the intent
to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation (FM 3-0). Army forces perform the following major
activities during operations to prevent:
* Execute flexible deterrent options and flexible response options.
* Set the theater.
* Tailor Army forces.
* Project the force.
3-39. Signal support in operations to prevent requires signal leaders and organizations to quickly plan
support, engineer network solutions, and deploy personnel and equipment in support of expeditionary Army
forces. Signal planners and units tailor communications packages to minimize the communications footprint
while providing robust communications capabilities to the deploying force. Signal capabilities support en
route services, echeloned command posts, and ad hoc requirements.
3-40. During operations to prevent, the theater army G-6, the SC(T) commander, and theater tactical signal
brigade commander contribute to joint command and control by establishing, maintaining, and securing the
network architecture to support joint and Army forces operating in theater.
3-41. The theater portion of the DODIN-A provides network and information system availability,
information protection, and information delivery across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Signal
units provide the theater army with trained and ready signal Soldiers to support Army operations to prevent
and rapidly transition to combat operations, if required.
RISKS TO SIGNAL SUPPORT
3-42. During operations to prevent, peer threats shift resources to information warfare and preclusion. Threat
supporting efforts include systems warfare and sanctuary. Threat forces will consider four key areas when
designing operations to mitigate U.S. deterrence efforts. They include—
* Attempts to reduce the perceived risk to threat forces.
* Limited attacks to expose friendly vulnerabilities.
* Deception operations to conceal the threat’s true intentions.
* Attempts to slow and disrupt deployment to limit U.S. force buildup. |
6-02 | 97 | Signal Support to Operations to Shape and Prevent
3-43. Peer threats can focus these methods against U.S. forces’ ability to establish communications networks
and critical command and control nodes. Preventing effective communications between command and
control nodes through limited cyberspace or electronic attacks will disrupt synchronization of operations and
logistic support, disrupt deployment, and damage credibility among multinational mission partners.
SIGNAL SUPPORT
3-44. In support of Army activities to prevent, signal units execute technical response options and establish
communications capabilities at key command and control and logistics nodes. Technical response options
defend critical communications networks and nodes. Technical response options include establishing backup
circuits for key nodes, strengthening cybersecurity measures, and shifting network resources for emergency
circuit restoral. Planners tailor communications packages to mission requirements and prepare or execute
communications support plans for deploying Army forces.
3-45. As the Army executes flexible deterrent options and flexible response options, supporting signal
elements employ strategic and expeditionary communications capabilities to meet emerging requirements.
The joint force J-6 and Army component G-6 coordinate to shift resources, activate pre-planned circuit
requirements, reengineer satellite capabilities, allocate electromagnetic spectrum access, and prepare to
provide contract resources to support the force.
3-46. The theater army plans and coordinates Army capabilities to meet the geographic combatant
commander’s intent to set the theater. Given the expected time to deploy additional capabilities, the theater
army G-6 coordinates with the commander and staff to identify strategic and tactical signal capabilities for
forward-deployment to support immediate communications requirements as deploying units arrive in the
theater. Support requirements include—
* Joint command and control requirements.
* Port and terminal operations.
* Intermediate staging base support.
* Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration support.
* Noncombatant evacuation operation requirements.
* Emergency circuit restoral.
* Logistics node support.
TAILORING SIGNAL CAPABILITIES
3-47. Tailoring signal capabilities is selecting the right capability and deploying in the optimal sequence.
The theater army G-6 staff maintains operational focus in determining signal support requirements. Tailored
capabilities match the size, capacity, flexibility, and capability of signal force packages to support the
requirements of the operation plan.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO FORCE PROJECTION
3-48. Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United
States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). Speed and combat
readiness are essential to achieving the desired position of advantage over an adversary.
SIGNAL DEPLOYMENT
3-49. Understanding the geographic combatant commander’s intent and operation plan is the foundation of
signal deployment planning. Signal deployment plans establish what capabilities are needed, by location and
time, for successful deployment outcomes. The theater army G-6 should consider—
* Geographic combatant command and theater army operation plans.
* Geography and the effects of terrain and distance on terrestrial-based communications.
* Threat capabilities to disrupt, degrade, or destroy communications capabilities.
* Tactical dispersion of signal capabilities. |
6-02 | 98 | Chapter 3
* Separation of signal sites from the supported command post (remoting) to reduce command post
vulnerabilities.
* Available signal capabilities—type, size, and numbers:
Strategic.
Host-nation.
Multinational partners.
* PACE plan.
* Capability gaps by requirement and system.
* Size and location of command and control nodes, including the number of network users at each
node.
* Other key headquarters requiring communications support—size and locations.
* Data threads—understanding what systems or command posts must communicate where.
* Satellite, electromagnetic spectrum, and communications capacity and availability to support the
operation, including single-channel availability.
* Services required—data, voice, and video, by location.
* Quality of service—prioritization of key leaders, command posts, and types of data on the
network.
* Protection of critical nodes—the communications capabilities most critical to the success of the
joint force and the Army component, and plans to protect those capabilities and nodes.
* DODIN operations—define responsibilities for managing and controlling portions of the network
and determine availability of DODIN operations tools.
* Cybersecurity—the theater cybersecurity program and management plan.
* Coordination for defensive and offensive cyberspace operations support—
Organization, planning, and execution.
Support requirements.
* Transition plan to shift from tactical signal to fixed infrastructure, including resources available
or needed.
* Capabilities available for the commander at key locations and times throughout the operation.
* Authorizing official who approves devices and software on the network.
* Mission command information systems—
Locations.
Paths to servers.
Software versions.
Configurations.
Effects of network latency.
* Maintenance management and tracking.
* Key battle rhythm events—
Systems used.
Times.
Locations.
Requirements.
* COMSEC requirements—plan for distribution, accounting, and security of cryptographic keying
material.
NETWORK AND DATA PROTECTION WHILE THE FORCE IS IN TRANSIT
3-50. As the Army force is in transit, the risk to operations increases. Units operate with limited
communications capabilities and redundancy, and have minimal defensive capabilities while en route to an
operational area. The peer threat will use this to their advantage. Threat actors may conduct cyberspace or
electronic attacks to disrupt the flow of information in an attempt to impede or prevent unit deployments. |
6-02 | 99 | Signal Support to Operations to Shape and Prevent
Disrupting the ability of Army forces to track the identity, status, and location of units, personnel, and cargo
may cause delays in deployment, desynchronize force deployment plans, and disrupt U.S. forces’ ability to
quickly build combat power.
3-51. The theater army G-6 coordinates technical response options to implement cybersecurity in the theater
portion of the DODIN-A. Enforcing encryption standards, minimizing non-essential use of the commercial
Internet, validating connected devices, and enforcing strict network authentication are some of the technical
response options the G-6 can implement to improve the network’s cybersecurity posture. The joint force J-6
coordinates with the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) and the joint cyberspace center to deploy
cyberspace defense forces and to conduct threat-based analysis, monitoring, and vulnerability mitigation on
key terrain in cyberspace.
RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION
3-52. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration delivers combat power to the joint force
commander in a theater of operations or a joint operations area (FM 3-0). Signal elements supporting
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration provide the theater army and arriving units the
communications capabilities necessary to enable command and control and track personnel and equipment
as they transit ports of debarkation and staging areas to enable rapid onward movement.
3-53. During reception and staging, signal units provide fixed infrastructure or tactical signal support at ports
of debarkation and staging bases to enable the unit’s reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.
Tactical communications systems not configured to operate in the theater before deployment do so during
staging. Deploying units test and validate their radios and network systems, as time permits.
3-54. Theater army, corps, and division G-6s plan signal support for emergency road and route
communications, casualty evacuation, route control, and other specialized communications requirements
during onward movement. Units should limit nonsecure cellphone use because of the vulnerability it brings
to operations. The theater tactical signal brigade deploys to exercise command and control of expeditionary
signal battalions and augments the corps network operations and security center or joint network operations
control center to provide DODIN operations oversight for tactical networks.
3-55. During integration, signal elements continue to support unit arrivals, begin integrating their network
systems into the theater network, and establish network situational awareness so they can monitor and track
the installation, operation, maintenance, and security of the network. The theater tactical signal brigade works
directly with the Army component G-6 or the joint force J-6 as the central focal point for all network
activities.
CONSOLIDATING GAINS
3-56. The primary signal tasks in consolidating gains during operations to prevent are planning efforts to
migrate to fixed infrastructure when and where possible and planning support for follow-on forces
specifically tasked to consolidate gains. Thorough signal planning and preparation for support to offensive,
defensive, and stability tasks enable positive future security and stability outcomes.
3-57. Signal commanders and staffs plan for the eventual expansion of consolidation areas, as well as
supporting the command structure responsible for those areas as large-scale combat operations continue.
Tactical signal capabilities support communications requirements while fixed communications infrastructure
is being built out in consolidation areas. Planning for rapid network expansion is a critical part of signal
support in operations to prevent. |
6-02 | 101 | Chapter 4
Large-Scale Combat Operations
This chapter discusses signal support to large-scale combat operations. The chapter is
divided into 4 sections. Section I provides an overview of signal support to joint and
Army large-scale combat operations. Section II discusses signal support in large-scale
defense operations. Section III discusses signal support in large-scale offensive
operations. Section IV discusses signal support to the consolidation of gains in large-
scale combat operations.
SECTION I – SIGNAL SUPPORT TO LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
OVERVIEW OF LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
4-1. The nature and scope of some missions may require joint forces to conduct large-scale combat
operations to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests. Such combat typically occurs
within the framework of a major operation or a campaign (FM 3-0). When large-scale combat operations
commence, the joint force commander immediately exploits friendly capabilities across multiple domains
and the information environment to gain the initiative.
4-2. The geographic combatant commander may direct a field army, corps, or division to establish a joint
task force. In most cases, standing up a joint task force headquarters requires augmentation. Establishment
of a joint network operations control center supporting the joint task force requires augmentation, either from
other Services or elements of the theater tactical signal brigade. The joint task force J-6 determines
communications requirements for the joint task force headquarters and lower echelon units directly
supporting the commander, joint task force. Requests for support route through the geographic combatant
command J-3 to the Joint Staff.
4-3. Establishing a joint task force to conduct large-scale combat operations requires speed, detailed
planning, and coordination. The joint task force may use the facilities and assigned signal Soldiers of the
theater or field army to support the joint task force headquarters until adequate facilities become available.
The geographic combatant commander may attach elements of the theater tactical signal brigade to meet joint
task force communications requirements until further augmentation or rotational units arrive.
RISKS TO SIGNAL SUPPORT
4-4. The enemy will seek to render U.S. combat power ineffective by systemic and continual attacks across
multiple domains and the information environment, both before and during combat operations. These attacks
include lethal attacks, cyberspace attacks, and electronic attacks targeting command and control nodes and
networks. The isolation or destruction of a key command and control node offers the enemy a marked tactical
advantage.
4-5. Commanders should assume the enemy considers the network and the ability to communicate to be
key targets for destruction or degradation. Disrupting a unit’s ability to communicate reduces its effectiveness
and combat capability. The enemy can conduct electronic attacks to jam satellite positioning, navigation, and
timing systems and degrade the effectiveness of precision munitions, sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation.
The enemy may also use lethal fires, electronic attack, or cyberspace attack to destroy, degrade, disrupt, or
isolate individual units and capabilities.
4-6. Peer threats may use EW capabilities before and during large-scale combat to locate and identify
friendly command and control and other key nodes. Spectrum managers and EW personnel develop electronic |
6-02 | 102 | Chapter 4
protection plans to reduce or mask the electromagnetic signature of the unit’s command posts. Refer to FM
3-12, ATP 6-02.53, and ATP 6-02.70 for more information about electronic protection tasks.
SIGNAL SUPPORT
4-7. Army communications capabilities can support any joint or multinational combined arms team. Signal
elements provide a wide variety of fixed and tactical communications capabilities to support a theater of
operations.
4-8. Large-scale combat operations are lethal and complex. The full range of strategic to tactical signal
capabilities support the combination of offense, defense, and stability tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative, consolidate gains, win, and return to shaping operations. Large-scale combat operations require
adaptable and agile communications support able to meet the specific mission requirements. Commanders
can tailor employment of their communications capabilities to support their mission requirements,
considering terrain, electromagnetic spectrum and satellite availability, and speed of displacement.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO STABILITY TASKS
4-9. Stability tasks during large-scale combat operations include restoring essential services and population
control in areas controlled by friendly forces. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the needs of the
civilian population rests with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and
organizations. Army forces perform the minimal essential stability tasks to provide security, food, water,
shelter, and medical treatment when there is no legitimate civil authority or capability present. Army signal
support may include emergency communications restoral to support stability tasks until host-nation civilian
capabilities can be restored.
4-10. Functional support brigades, such as military police, engineers, and medical brigades, require
communications augmentation when they support large-scale combat operations. Divisions also require
network support for company- and platoon-level units performing stability missions. Elements of the
expeditionary signal battalion support these requirements.
SIGNAL SUPPORT IN THE CORPS AND DIVISION SUPPORT AND CONSOLIDATION AREAS
4-11. A maneuver enhancement brigade typically controls and defends the corps or division support area. A
brigade combat team controls and defends the consolidation area. Elements of the expeditionary signal
battalion augment the maneuver enhancement brigade and brigade combat team’s organic communications
capabilities to establish the base communications network.
4-12. Perimeter defense forces, quick reaction forces, and roving guards primarily use single-channel radios
for communications support. Units’ organic and augmenting network capabilities support command posts for
base security and defense. If base camps become enduring requirements, the base network migrates to a more
permanent or fixed infrastructure. Fixed infrastructure frees tactical signal elements to support maneuver
tasks.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO TACTICAL ENABLING TASKS
4-13. Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the performance of all offensive, defensive, and
stability tasks. Commanders usually employ tactical enabling tasks as part of shaping operations or
supporting efforts. The tactical enabling tasks are—
* Reconnaissance.
* Security.
* Troop movement.
* Relief in place.
* Passage of lines.
* Encirclement operations.
* Mobility and counter-mobility operations. |
6-02 | 103 | Large-Scale Combat Operations
4-14. Large command post communications systems lack the mobility required during tactical enabling
tasks. When executing tactical enabling tasks beyond the range of VHF single-channel radios, or when terrain
prevents line of sight communications, units can employ retransmission capabilities, single-channel HF
radios, narrowband (single-channel) tactical satellite radios, tactical messaging, or secure satellite telephones
for communications between units and command posts.
4-15. Employing a retransmission site requires deliberate mission planning before deploying the team.
Planning factors for retransmission include—
* Units supported.
* Planned retransmission locations throughout the mission, including alternates, with line of sight
analysis.
* Triggers for displacement to alternate locations.
* Primary and alternate frequencies.
* Frequencies for emergency contact—
Medical evacuation.
Command.
Nearest units.
* Time required to be on station and retransmitting for supported units.
* Route and site security requirements.
* Infiltration and exfiltration routes.
* Whether unmanned aircraft systems or other aerial retransmission capabilities can meet the
requirement.
* Plan to communicate with the parent unit (for example, contact the higher unit every two hours
with update).
* Resupply plan.
* Concealment of the site.
* Plans to mask or reduce the electromagnetic signature of the site.
4-16. Passage of lines is generally considered a higher-risk operation. The division may establish a command
and control node such as a tactical command post at the passage point to enable communications between
passing units and their higher headquarters.
4-17. Relief in place operations require greater access to networked DODIN-A services than other maneuver
tasks. Relief in place involves detailed planning and coordination between the current unit and the relief unit.
The handover plan identify which communications systems rotate out with the departing unit and how to
migrate services to the gaining unit’s systems. The gaining unit generally retains the frequency allocations
of the relieved unit, but deploys with its own allocated Internet protocol address range for its network and
automated information systems.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS
4-18. Army signal forces must be capable of providing communications support from the point of departure,
in transit, during landing, and throughout the fight to gain access to the geographic area controlled by hostile
forces. Commanders and staffs must understand what communications capabilities and services will be
available during each phase of the operation. Plans include the transition to more robust communications
capabilities as they arrive in the area of operations. For example, during an airborne operation to seize an
airfield, the aircraft may be fitted with wideband satellite communications capabilities to access video,
imagery, databases, and e-mail while en route. During the airborne assault, communications are limited to
single-channel radios. As the unit begins to consolidate gains, a small communications node may provide the
commander, S-3, and S-2 with wideband satellite access to the DODIN-A. Once aircraft can land, the
command receives and establishes its organic signal capabilities to support command post operations with
wide-area network access. |
6-02 | 104 | Chapter 4
SIGNAL SUPPORT IN THE TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATE GAINS
4-19. Army forces provide the joint force commander the ability to capitalize on operational success by
consolidating gains. Consolidation of gains is integral to winning armed conflict and achieving success across
the range of military operations. Army forces consolidate gains in support of a host nation and its civilian
population, or as part of the pacification of a hostile state.
4-20. During the consolidation of gains, signal units will see a rapid expansion in communications
requirements. As the division establishes and expands the consolidation area, the division requires support
from elements of the expeditionary signal battalion to support those augmenting units without organic signal
capabilities. Requirements may include downward support to company and platoon echelons as the division
establishes camps and bases to support operations to consolidate gains.
4-21. Depending on the enduring nature of camps and bases, the theater tactical signal brigade assists the
corps and divisions by installing and transitioning to fixed strategic network infrastructure. Establishing fixed
signal systems frees units’ organic signal systems for follow-on operations while providing greater DODIN-
A capacity and throughput.
SECTION II – LARGE-SCALE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
OVERVIEW OF LARGE-SCALE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4-22. Army forces conduct defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. There are three primary types of defensive
operations:
* Area defense.
* Mobile defense.
* Retrograde.
4-23. The defense provides time for a commander to build combat power and establish conditions to
transition to the offense. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defender’s occupation of positions
before an attack and the use of available time to prepare defenses. A defender maneuvers to place an enemy
in a position of disadvantage and attacks the enemy at every opportunity using lethal fires, electronic attack,
aviation, information-related capabilities, cyberspace operations, and obstacles, as well a joint assets.
SIGNAL SUPPORT
4-24. Signal support in large-scale defensive operations depends on the situation, terrain, and the primary
defensive operation the Army force is executing. Signal leaders provide the communications capabilities
required to support the mission. During planning for large-scale defensive operations, the Signal staff must
ensure the commander understands what communications capabilities will be available at each critical point
of the operation.
4-25. Signal support in large-scale defensive operations is critical to the Army winning. An accurate common
operational picture helps commanders develop and share situational understanding to enable effective
command and control. If forward observers cannot communicate with supporting fires elements, an enemy
could penetrate the Army force’s defense. In the mobile defense, the success of the strike force attacking at
the decisive point and time relies on the timely and accurate flow of information. Signal soldiers must be
operationally-focused and able to rapidly adapt to the constantly changing situation on the battlefield.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO AREA DEFENSE
4-26. During the area defense, Army forces have the full array of their organic and augmenting
communications systems to support the mission. Single-channel radio systems support mobile forces with
retransmission sites positioned behind the main battle area, but capable of supporting primary and alternate
defensive positions. Narrowband (single-channel) satellite or HF radios can be employed where terrain or |
6-02 | 105 | Large-Scale Combat Operations
distance degrades or disrupts single-channel VHF communications. Units should rehearse the single-channel
communications plan for the area defense and mitigate any challenges before the enemy attacks.
4-27. Signal nodes support each command post location and provide on-the-move wideband satellite
communications to enable command and control on-the-move. Key command and control nodes should
remain behind the main battle area, outside the range of cannon artillery. Units rehearse plans for battle
handover and dislocation of command posts to mitigate the risk of the enemy locating and targeting friendly
command and control nodes. Signal soldiers supporting command posts on the defense must train and
rehearse command post displacement to reestablish communications as quickly as possible. The
communications staff should work closely with the G-3 (S-3) when planning future command post locations
to mitigate adverse effects of terrain and structures on the unit’s communications capabilities.
4-28. If friendly communications nodes face imminent risk of being overrun, operators must evacuate
COMSEC material and encryption devices or destroy them in place. Allowing COMSEC materials to fall
into enemy hands compromises secure communications. COMSEC compromise disrupts all radio and data
networks until operators and net control stations can conduct emergency cryptographic key supersession.
Leaders must ensure all personnel train and rehearse these procedures as battle drills to prevent and mitigate
COMSEC compromise.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO MOBILE DEFENSE
4-29. A mobile defense is typically conducted when the terrain favors the attacker and there is sufficient
depth to employ a striking force forward of the no penetration line (FM 3-0). The mobile defense consists of
a fixing force, a striking force, and a reserve force.
4-30. Signal support to an Army force conducting a mobile defense is similar to that for an area defense.
However, command posts forward of the no penetration line will likely rely on mobile communications
capabilities such as single-channel radios and wideband on-the-move capabilities. Command and control
nodes behind the no penetration line have full DISN services, but must be prepared to displace to mitigate
the risk of being located and attacked.
4-31. Retransmission sites supporting the mobile defense should colocate with other Army elements if
possible. If the retransmission site operates remotely, the site requires security augmentation. For
retransmission planning considerations, see paragraph 4-15.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO RETROGRADE TASKS
4-32. The retrograde is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy
(ADP 3-90). Army units do not conduct the retrograde in isolation. Retrograde is part of a larger scheme of
maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy. The three forms of retrograde are delay,
withdrawal, and retirement.
4-33. Retrograde operations are some of the most demanding ground combat operations and rely heavily on
mobile communications support. Similar to the support during mobile defense, single-channel VHF radios
are the primary communications capabilities to support a delaying, withdrawing, or retiring force. HF and
narrowband (single-channel) satellite radios are alternate means of communications when terrain or distance
challenge line of sight radio capabilities. Retransmission systems extend the range of single-channel radio
networks to support command and control in retrograde operations. For retransmission planning
considerations, see paragraph 4-15. The constant movement of the retrograde force requires multiple planned
retransmission site locations with routes that support quick dislocation and reestablishment to support the
maneuvering force. Retransmission teams must track the progress of the operation to maintain awareness of
supported force locations and when the operation meets a trigger to move to the next location. Units
conducting retrograde operations usually deploy command and control nodes to the support area to establish
the main command post ahead of the retrograde force and a tactical command post maneuvering with the
main body. |
6-02 | 106 | Chapter 4
RISKS TO SIGNAL SUPPORT
4-34. Peer threats will use EW capabilities to identify and locate friendly command and control nodes.
Defending units should limit their electromagnetic emissions to protect networked systems and the integrity
of data on those systems. Defenders can use terrain to mask emitters and reduce the probability of enemy
signals intelligence and EW detection. Operating emitters remotely from command posts can increase
command post survivability in case of detection and targeting. Refer to ATP 3-12.3 for techniques to reduce
command post electromagnetic signature.
SECTION III – LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4-35. Against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining,
and exploiting the initiative to gain physical, temporal, and cognitive advantages and achieve definitive
results (FM 3-0). Characteristics of the offense include audacity, concentration, surprise, and tempo.
OVERVIEW OF LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4-36. Army forces conduct offensive operations to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain,
resources, and population centers. Effective performance of offensive operations capitalizes on accurate and
timely communication of intelligence and other relevant information regarding enemy forces, weather, and
terrain. There are four primary types of offensive operations:
* Movement to contact.
* Attack.
* Exploitation.
* Pursuit.
4-37. The overall concept for signal support is similar among all offensive operations. The specific tasks
influence planning for signal support to each of these tasks in large-scale offensive operations.
SIGNAL SUPPORT
4-38. Corps and division commanders must be able to communicate with adjacent units, subordinates,
supporting joint forces, and host-nation and multinational forces. Signal support allows command post
personnel to access the full range of DODIN-A services and capabilities. Signal support is critical to transmit
plans, develop common situational understanding, and to direct action to break the will of or destroy the
enemy. |
6-02 | 107 | Large-Scale Combat Operations
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
On 19 March 2003, 3ID began its attack on Baghdad as the geographic combatant
commander’s main effort of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Because of the Army’s
lack of multi-channel tactical satellite ground systems and the time required to establish
terrestrial based, line of sight networks, there were only two complete 24-hour periods
when the network was available for the command. 3ID fought most of the war with the
division command net on single-channel satellite radios and all other command
communications on single-channel VHF radios. The United States declared victory on
14 April 2003 with the fall of Baghdad.
Since the conclusion of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, the Army has transitioned its
tactical communications capabilities to a primarily satellite-based, at-the-halt network
with wideband line of sight radios to make the network more robust. Divisions and
brigade combat teams have organic on-the-move network capabilities to quickly
establish an agile network. This provides maneuver forces voice, data, and video
capabilities on-the-move, and greater network throughput at-the-quick-halt.
4-39. Large-scale offensive operations are inherently mobile. Maneuver elements will perform tactical
enabling tasks away from the command posts using highly mobile means of communications. The brigade
combat team command posts maintain upper tier tactical internet connectivity for communications to
division, but communication with subordinate echelons relies heavily on vehicle-mounted, man-pack, and
handheld communications devices. When satellite transport is available, on-the-move networking provides
improved situational awareness and increases the communications capabilities available at the battalion.
4-40. During planning and mission rehearsals, the S-6 staff must ensure the commander and staff understand
the communications plan, specifically what communications capabilities will be available by phase of the
operation or critical points of the battle. Command post personnel and their signal support must plan and
rehearse rapid displacement to enhance command post survivability and support the rapid advance of
maneuver forces.
4-41. Single-channel radio retransmission is a critical command and control enabler. Because U.S. ground
forces move rapidly in offensive operations and the battlefield situation is fluid, retransmission teams must
track the progress of the maneuver operation and anticipate emerging communications requirements. This
awareness helps them maintain fully operational networks to support the commander’s mission requirements.
For retransmission planning considerations, see paragraph 4-15.
4-42. Signal elements support command and control as commanders maneuver their forces to positions of
relative advantage before contact. Redundant systems and diversity in the network architecture allow for
communications throughout the corps and division areas of operations. Although commanders require
communications capabilities, effective command and control does not necessarily rely on continuous access
to the DODIN-A. The commander’s intent is the basis for all offensive operations. PACE plans, organic unit
liaison teams, and digital liaison detachments provide commanders options to enhance coordination and
interoperability. Units must train and rehearse to operate by redundant means and exercise disciplined
initiative within the commander’s intent when disconnected from the network.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO SUSTAINMENT
4-43. Sustainment is critical to offensive operations. Sustainment units require reliable communications to
control their teams operating from dispersed locations. Supply points, maintenance collection points,
ambulance exchange points, and long-haul convoys are essential to mission success and operate throughout
the corps and division areas of operations.
4-44. Long lines of communications may expand support area communications requirements beyond the
organic signal capabilities of sustainment units. Dispersed sustainment nodes require expeditionary signal |
6-02 | 108 | Chapter 4
battalion augmentation down to company level and some platoons to support the higher data throughput
requirements for logistics support to offensive operations.
SIGNAL SUPPORT TO ENABLING UNITS
4-45. The theater tactical signal brigade and expeditionary signal battalions support corps and division
enabling units that have no organic signal capabilities. Battalion and below units primarily communicate
using single-channel radios in the offense. This results in fewer augmentation requirements at these echelons.
Expeditionary signal battalions provide communications support to enabling units’ command posts as they
consolidate gains or transition to stability tasks. Expeditionary signal battalions also deploy teams and signal
systems to replace battlefield losses, when directed.
RISKS TO SIGNAL SUPPORT
4-46. While Army forces conduct large-scale offensive operations, peer threats will use EW systems to
identify and locate friendly command and control nodes. Units in the offense must limit electromagnetic
emissions to protect mission command information systems and the integrity of data on those systems. Units
use terrain to mask electromagnetic emissions and reduce the likelihood an enemy can locate and exploit
command and control nodes. Locating antennas away from the command post enhances the survivability of
the command post in case of detection. The cyber electronic warfare officer can develop plans to mask or
reduce the radio frequency signature of signal systems. Refer to FM 3-12 and ATP 3-12.3 for more
information on electronic protection techniques.
4-47. Satellite communications systems provide vital command post support and command and control on-
the-move capabilities. However, when facing a peer threat with satellite denial capability, commanders must
be prepared to fight and win with single-channel radio communications.
CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS
4-48. As the corps and divisions begin to transition from large-scale offense to area security and stability
tasks, communications support must rapidly adapt from supporting maneuver operations to area support.
Transition to consolidation of gains requires prior planning. Equipment and personnel must rapidly flow
forward to establish fixed network infrastructure to support bases. Fixed infrastructure frees units’ organic
tactical communications systems for follow-on operations. |
6-02 | 109 | Chapter 5
Operations to Consolidate Gains
This chapter discusses signal support to Army operations to consolidate gains.
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS TO CONSOLIDATE GAINS
5-1. Commanders and staffs continuously consider activities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the
desired end state. Army units must consolidate gains to achieve enduring success. Consolidation of gains
occurs in portions of an area of operations where large-scale combat operations are no longer occurring.
Consolidation of gains consists of security and stability tasks and will likely involve combat operations
against bypassed enemy forces and remnants of defeated units (FM 3-0). Army forces conduct consolidation
of gains across the range of military operations. Consolidation of gains makes military objectives enduring.
5-2. During large-scale combat operations, the size of consolidation areas generally increases as the
operation progresses and units achieve combat successes. Eventually, most Army units can expect to conduct
some consolidate gains activities during large-scale combat operations.
5-3. During operations to consolidate gains, Army and joint commanders must be able to—
* Employ joint fires.
* Manage airspace.
* Conduct sustainment tasks.
* Conduct security tasks.
* Begin reconstruction.
* Coordinate humanitarian relief.
SIGNAL SUPPORT
5-4. Operations to consolidate gains change the focus of signal support. The corps and division G-6 staffs
and the theater tactical signal brigade refine plans to transition available signal capabilities to support
consolidation areas.
5-5. During operations to consolidate gains, communications requirements will quickly surpass the
capabilities of single-channel radio communications. The expeditionary signal battalion’s downward support
requirements increase significantly as company- and platoon-sized units conduct area security and other
consolidate gains tasks.
5-6. Tactical signal units may support communications requirements for local and area security, civil
security and control, restoration of essential services, and security cooperation. Expeditionary signal units
provide this support only until civilian, local government or other agencies can establish communications.
The transfer of an area of operations to legitimate civil authorities relieves the land force of area security and
stability tasks and represents a transition from operations to consolidate gains to operations to shape or
prevent. Regardless of the tasks required in a specific area of operations, signal units support the Army’s
strategic roles of shape, prevent, win, and consolidate gains.
5-7. During operations to consolidate gains, expeditionary signal capabilities return to their parent
commands as soon as fixed communications infrastructure is available to support enduring base
requirements. Strategic satellite and terrestrial network transport capabilities provide high-throughput
connections to the DODIN-A. DODIN operations and cybersecurity tasks transition from the brigade combat
team and division to the corps, theater army, theater tactical signal brigade, and SC(T). |
6-02 | 110 | Chapter 5
RISKS TO SIGNAL SUPPORT
5-8. An enemy may continue to direct information warfare activities, including cyberspace and EW attacks,
to disrupt U.S. communications and prevent consolidation of gains. Enemy forces will likely continue to fight
even after friendly forces attain their initial military objectives in the close area.
5-9. Some enemy formations may be intentionally or unintentionally bypassed during close operations as
friendly forces focus on the decisive effort. As U.S. forces attempt to consolidate gains, command posts and
signal sites are vulnerable to physical attack from bypassed conventional and irregular forces. |
6-02 | 111 | Appendix A
Operating in a Contested Environment
This appendix addresses the means to recognize and overcome threat activities
affecting signal support in a contested environment. It includes an overview of peer
threat tactics, techniques, and procedures and methods to counter threat EW and
cyberspace attacks.
THREAT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
A-1. Information and its management, dissemination, and control have always been critical to the successful
conduct of tactical missions. Given today’s advancements in information and information systems
technology, this importance is growing in scope, impact, and sophistication. The opposing force recognizes
the unique opportunities that information warfare gives tactical commanders, and it continuously strives to
incorporate information warfare activities in all tactical missions and battles (TC 7-100.2).
A-2. A peer threat’s information warfare activities will integrate electronic attack, military deception, lethal
fires, perception management, information attack, and computer warfare to deny U.S. and allied forces access
to the electromagnetic spectrum in a contested environment.
A-3. Understanding threat capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum is key to sound signal support plans.
Enemy attacks on friendly command nodes may combine electronic attacks, other information warfare
effects, and lethal fires to deny friendly forces the use of spectrum-dependent systems. To accomplish this
goal, threat forces gather technical and combat information about their enemies. As enemy forces locate and
identify friendly units, enemy information warfare elements establish priorities to—
* Jam communications assets.
* Deceptively enter radio networks.
* Interfere with the normal flow of U.S. and allies’ communications.
A-4. Commanders, their staffs, and equipment operators must train to recognize and react to peer threat
information warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures if they are to continue communicating in a contested
environment.
U.S. MEASURES TO PREVENT THREAT EFFECTS
A-5. There are operational tactics, techniques, and procedures signal planners and operators can take to
mitigate peer threat capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum. If an enemy cannot detect friendly signals,
they cannot geolocate or jam those signals.
LIMITING ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNATURE
A-6. To protect against a peer threat’s ability to locate and target radio signals, the G-6 (S-6) must plan
signal support in a way that limits the electromagnetic signature of the command post. Measures to reduce
the electromagnetic signature of command posts and communications sites include—
* Careful site selection for communications equipment.
* Employment of directional antennas.
* Operations using the lowest power required.
* Limiting radio transmissions.
* Using burst transmission to minimize transmission time.
* Using a random battle rhythm schedule. |
6-02 | 112 | Appendix A
A-7. Electronic protection techniques can also help mask the electromagnetic signature of command posts
and communications sites. The cyber electronic warfare officer assists the G-6 (S-6) in planning electronic
protection measures to reduce the command post signature.
Terrain Masking
A-8. Terrain masking can effectively block radio signals from reaching enemy direction finding capabilities.
Positioning communications systems with large terrain features or manmade structures between the
communications system and the forward line of own troops effectively blocks an enemy from detecting the
signal.
Camouflage Net Masking
A-9. Radar reflective camouflage netting is an effective means of blocking unintended electromagnetic
radiation from the rear and sides of directional antennas. Camouflage netting to the sides and back of a line
of sight or satellite communications antenna ensures only the main beam of the antenna radiates. This main
beam is highly directional; it is much harder to detect since the enemy would need to be directly in the
transmission path.
Line of Sight
A-10. High-throughput line of sight radios can carry high bandwidth data over distances up to 25 miles, but
the links need to be engineered to minimize the chance of detection, targeting, and jamming. If the line of
sight path is parallel to the forward line of troops, an enemy is less likely to detect the signal, and enemy
jammers will be unable to reach the antenna with a signal strong enough to jam the radio.
REMOTE ANTENNAS
A-11. Large command posts and their high-throughput communications systems emit a significant amount
of electromagnetic energy. While planners and operators can mask some of this energy with careful siting,
terrain masking, and directional antennas, some electromagnetic energy remains. Because peer threats target
friendly command and control capabilities, anything near the communications system is at risk of destruction
from lethal fires.
A-12. Commanders and signal planners should consider locating major communications assemblages as far
from the supported command post as practical. Placing terrain features, man-made structures, or distance
between communications systems and command posts provides the command post protection from lethal
fires. Commanders and planners must consider the additional physical security and site defense requirements
for a remote site during planning.
FREQUENT COMMAND POST DISLOCATION
A-13. Despite all efforts to reduce and mask the electromagnetic signature of a command post, a peer threat
is likely to locate it eventually. Moving a command post frequently reduces the chances of destruction.
Frequent moves are especially important when operating within the range of enemy artillery.
A-14. Maintaining continuity during displacement of a command post or catastrophic loss requires
designating alternate command posts and passing control between command posts (FM 3-0). During training
exercises, units must practice frequent command post dislocation and handoff between the main and tactical
command posts.
INTEGRATION WITH OTHER STAFF ELEMENTS
A-15. The G-6 (S-6) cannot plan signal support alone. Other staff sections’ functions and capabilities help
inform sound, survivable signal support plans. Staff sections activities during the military decision-making
process reinforce each other’s planning efforts.
A-16. The cyber electronic warfare officer, signal planners, spectrum managers, and the G-2 (S-2) assess
threats to friendly communications during the military decision-making process. Integrated planning counters |
6-02 | 113 | Operating in a Contested Environment
enemy attempts to exploit vulnerabilities of friendly communications systems. When creating electronic
protection plan, the cyber electronic warfare officer and signal planners consider deployment, employment,
replacement, and concealment of communications systems.
Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities Section
A-17. The CEMA section of the G-3 (S-3) from brigade to corps coordinates and synchronizes cyberspace
and EW operations for effective collaboration across staff elements. This section includes the cyber electronic
warfare officer, the spectrum manager, the EW technician, and EW noncommissioned officers. The CEMA
section is key to the collaboration of cyberspace and EW operations. The cyber electronic warfare officer is
the cyberspace planner and understands the operations and missions of the unit and the commander’s intent.
The CEMA section participates in the planning and targeting process, and leads the CEMA working group
to support the military decision-making process. The cyberspace planner submits requests for effects
provided by non-organic resources. Other key staff members who assist in CEMA include the G-2 (S-2), G-
3 (S-3), G-6 (S-6), supported by the network operations and service center and signal company). CEMA
Section activities include—
* Plans, requests, and synchronizes effects in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to
support freedom of maneuver.
* Coordinates with higher headquarters staff to integrate and synchronize information collection
efforts to support cyberspace and EW operations.
* Synchronizes cyberspace and EW effects requests with organic targeting capabilities.
* Prepares and submits effect requests using the cyber effects request format or electronic attack
request format.
* Develops, maintains, and disseminates cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum input for the
common operational picture.
* Plans, coordinates, integrates, prepares for, and conducts EW operations.
* Conducts spectrum management coordination for EW capabilities within the unit’s area of
operations.
* Prepares and submits effect requests using the cyber effects request format, as required.
* Provide recommendations on commander’s critical information requirements.
The G-6 (S-6)
A-18. The G-6 (S-6) section prepares annex H (Signal) to the operation plan or order, with appropriate cross-
references to the EW portions of annex C (Operations), operations security portion of annex E (Protection),
the military deception plan, and the signal operating instructions. The G-6 (S-6) integrates and coordinates
DODIN operations and spectrum management operations through close collaboration with the CEMA section
during planning and operations. The G-6 (S-6) also—
* Plans alternate means of communications for those systems most vulnerable to enemy jamming.
* Provides COMSEC to protect systems most vulnerable to enemy information gathering activities.
* Plans measures to protect critical friendly frequencies from intentional and unintentional
electromagnetic interference.
* Enforces proper use of radio, electronic protection, and transmission security procedures on
communications channels.
* Performs spectrum management, including designating alternate frequencies for radio networks
and modeling the electromagnetic environment.
* Publishes and updates signal operating instructions.
* Prepares and maintains the restricted frequency list—taboo, protected, and guarded frequencies,
in collaboration with the G-2 (S-2).
* Implements cybersecurity on the network and automated information systems. |
6-02 | 114 | Appendix A
The G-3 (S-3)
A-19. The G-3 (S-3) is the staff lead in planning and the conduct of Army operations. During the planning
and execution of EW and signal support, the G-3 (S-3)—
* Exercises staff responsibility for electronic protection.
* Includes electronic warfare support and electronic attack scenarios in all command post and field
training exercises.
* Evaluates electronic protection techniques employed.
* Includes electronic protection in the unit training program.
Cyber Electronic Warfare Officer
A-20. The cyber electronic warfare officer plans, coordinates, and directs the execution of EW activities. The
cyber electronic warfare officer is also the lead for the CEMA section. The cyber electronic warfare officer—
* Serves as subject matter expert on enemy EW capabilities and EW rules of engagement.
* Leads the EW working group.
* Submits information requirements to the G-2 (S-2) to support EW planning and assessment.
* Supports the G-2 (S-2) during intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
* Coordinates with the G-6 (S-6) to plan, implement, and assess friendly electronic protection
measures.
* Coordinates with the G-6 (S-6) spectrum manager to ensure planned EW activities do not interfere
with friendly communications.
* Deconflicts EW operations with the spectrum manager in the CEMA section.
* Collaborates with the G-2 (S-2) to synchronize and deconflict EW operations with intelligence
activities.
G-2 (S-2)
A-21. The G-2 (S-2) provides current intelligence estimates during the military decision-making process, and
updated estimates during operations. The intelligence estimate includes—
* Current enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.
* Enemy locations in relation to friendly forces.
* The enemy’s electronic technical data—enemy capabilities that could be used to deny friendly use
of the electromagnetic spectrum.
* Known cyberspace threats to inform cybersecurity and defensive cyberspace operations efforts.
RECOGNIZING AND RESPONDING TO THREAT EFFECTS
A-22. Because peer threats consider friendly command and control capabilities to be high priority targets,
they have developed capabilities to deny their enemies the effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum for
communications. Signal personnel and leaders must learn to identify and respond to threat effects in
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM (JAMMING)
A-23. Electromagnetic jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic
energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum,
and with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability (JP 3-13.1). Jamming is an
effective way for the enemy to disrupt friendly communications. An enemy only needs a transmitter tuned to
a U.S. frequency with enough power to overpower friendly signals can effectively jam U.S. systems.
A-24. Jammers operate against receivers, not transmitters. The two modes of jamming are spot and barrage
jamming. Spot jamming concentrates power on one channel or frequency. Barrage jamming is power spread
over several frequencies or channels at the same time. It is important to recognize jamming, but it can be
difficult to detect. |
6-02 | 115 | Operating in a Contested Environment
Communications Jamming
A-25. Radio operators must learn to recognize and react to electromagnetic jamming. This is not always an
easy task, since electromagnetic interference can be either internal or external. Other sources having nothing
to do with enemy jamming may cause electromagnetic interference. Unintentional electromagnetic
interference may be caused by one or more of—
* Other radios (friendly and enemy).
* Other electronic, electrical, or electromechanical equipment.
* Atmospheric conditions.
* Equipment malfunction.
A-26. Radio operators must train to quickly differentiate between internal and external interference. Refer
to ATP 6-02.53 for more information about isolating and eliminating internal sources of interference.
A-27. Electromagnetic jamming most commonly affects single-channel radio systems. These radios
include HF, VHF, and UHF radios. Jamming effects may be obvious or subtle. Obvious jamming is normally
simple to detect. When experiencing jamming, it is more important to recognize and overcome the incident
than to identify it formally.
A-28. Subtle jamming is less obvious because subtle jamming signals produce no sound from the receivers.
Although everything may appear normal to the radio operator, the receiver cannot receive an incoming
friendly signal. Often, users assume their radios are malfunctioning, instead of recognizing subtle jamming.
Table A-1 on page A-6 lists some common jamming signals. |
6-02 | 116 | Appendix A
Table A-1. Common jamming signals
Signal Description
Random Synthetic radio noise. It is indiscriminate in amplitude and frequency. It is similar to normal
Noise background noise and can degrade all types of signals. Operators often mistake random noise
jamming for receiver or atmospheric noise and fail to take appropriate electronic protection
actions.
Stepped Tones transmitted in increasing and decreasing pitch. They resemble the sound of bagpipes.
Tones Stepped tones are effective against single-channel amplitude modulation or frequency
modulation voice circuits.
Spark Bursts are of short duration and high intensity; they are repeated at a rapid rate. This signal is
effective in disrupting all types of radio communications. Spark jamming is easy to produce and
one of the most effective jamming signals.
Gulls Quickly rising and slowly falling variable radio frequency. The effect produced is similar to the cry
of a seagull. Gulls produce a nuisance effect and are very effective against voice radio
communications.
Random Pulses of varying amplitude, duration, and rate. Pulses disrupt teletypewriter, radar, and various
Pulse data transmission systems.
Wobbler A single frequency, modulated by a low and slowly varying tone. The result is a howling sound
that causes a nuisance effect on voice radio communications.
Recorded Any audible sound, especially of a variable nature. Recorded sounds can distract radio
Sounds operators and disrupt communications. Music, screams, applause, whistles, machinery noise,
and laughter are examples.
Preamble A tone resembling the synchronization preamble of the speech security equipment, broadcast
Jamming over the operating frequency of secure radio sets. Results in all radios being locked in the
receive mode. Preamble jamming is especially effective when employed against radio networks
that use speech security devices.
Preventive Measures
A-29. Measures operators and planners can use to reduce susceptibility to enemy jamming include—
* Minimize radio transmissions. Try to keep radio transmissions to six seconds or less.
* Use electronic counter-countermeasures, such as frequency hopping.
* Train using radio silence.
* Use low power setting on radios for normal operations to reduce the probability of detection.
* Use terrain masking to reduce the probability of detection and block potential sources of enemy
jamming.
Indicators
A-30. The enemy strives to perfect and use new and more confusing forms of jamming, which requires radio
operators to be increasingly alert to the possibility of jamming. Training and experience allow operators to
determine whether a particular signal is a jamming signal. During operations, radio operators should remain
alert to possible jamming indicators. Observable indications of jamming include—
* Apparently random noise or static over voice channels.
* Recorded sounds—messages or music—over voice channels.
* No answer to a radio transmission.
Reaction
A-31. Communications jamming requires prompt corrective action to restore critical communications
capabilities. Possible reactions to jamming include— |
6-02 | 117 | Operating in a Contested Environment
* Continuing to operate. Enemy jamming usually involves a period of jamming followed by a brief
listening period. Operator activity during this short period indicates to enemies whether their
jamming efforts were successful. Continuing to operate normally gives the enemy no indication
of success for failure. If the enemy hears discussion of the problem on the air, or radio operation
terminates, the enemy may assume their jamming is effective. Operators should never terminate
operation of a radio network unless they are ordered to do so. Operators should be careful not to
disclose to the enemy that the radio has been adversely affected. This means normal operations
should continue even when degraded by jamming.
* Increasing transmitter power output. Low power is used for normal operations to minimize
detection. Once the enemy begins jamming the radios, the risk of detection becomes secondary to
the radio delivering required communications. Higher radio power may overcome the enemy’s
jamming signal, but increases the risk of detection by enemy direction finding capabilities.
* Improving the Signal-to-Jamming Ratio. The signal-to-jamming ratio is the relative strength of
the desired signal to the jamming signal at the receiver. If the desired signal is much stronger than
the jamming signal, the jamming does not significantly degrade communications. To improve the
signal-to-jamming ratio operators and signal leaders can consider the following—
Adjusting or changing the antenna. When jamming occurs, the radio operator should adjust
the antenna to receive the maximum incoming signal strength. Depending on the antenna,
some methods include reorienting the antenna, changing antenna polarization at all stations,
or installing an antenna with a greater range.
Establishing a retransmission site. A retransmission site can increase the effective range
and power of a signal between radio stations without increasing transmit power.
Relocating the antenna. Operators may use terrain masking to block the incoming jamming
signal. This may require moving the antenna and associated radio set anywhere from a few
meters to several hundred meters.
* Changing frequencies. If a communications network cannot overcome enemy jamming, the
commander may direct using an alternate or spare frequency. Preplanned and well-coordinated
actions are required in order for practical dummy stations to continue to operate on the jammed
frequency, to mask the change to an alternate frequency. During a jamming incident, it may be
difficult to coordinate a frequency change. All radio operators require knowledge of when, and
under what circumstances, they should switch to a backup frequency. If the frequency change is
not smooth, the enemy may discover what is happening, and try to degrade communications on
the new frequency.
* Executing the PACE plan. Quickly changing to the alternate or contingency means of
communications reduces communications disruption.
* Using signals intelligence or EW capabilities to locate the jamming signal. Leveraging signals
intelligence or EW capabilities requires coordination and collaboration with the G-2 (S-2) or the
cyber electronic warfare officer.
A-32. If any of the corrective actions taken mitigate the enemy jamming, operators should continue operation
of the network and submit a joint spectrum interference resolution report to higher headquarters. Joint
spectrum interference reports document a history of problems and help identify possible causes for
subsequent interference. Maintaining a historical record of interference helps develop countermeasures to
future jamming incidents. Refer to ATP 6-02.70 for more information about joint spectrum interference
resolution reporting.
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Jamming
A-33. Peer threats have capabilities to contest the space domain and attack the on-orbit, link, and terrestrial
segments of U.S. positioning, navigation, and timing satellites. These attacks may have significant impacts
across all warfighting functions and many weapon platforms.
A-34. Electromagnetic jamming of positioning, navigation, and timing satellite capabilities affects not only
communications, but also many other capabilities in tactical formations. Systems affected include— |
6-02 | 118 | Appendix A
* Communications systems.
* Friendly force tracking.
* Navigation.
* Reconnaissance.
* Radar systems.
* Precision guided munitions.
Preventive Measures
A-35. Measures to reduce susceptibility to, and mitigate the effects of, enemy jamming of positioning,
navigation, and timing include—
* Using only encrypted positioning, navigation, and timing systems.
* Antenna masking.
* Terrain masking.
* Training and maintaining the ability to navigate using a map and compass.
Indicators
A-36. User indications that an enemy may be jamming positioning, navigation, and timing satellites
include—
* Loss of satellite signal.
* Red Global Positioning System icon on the network management system.
* Loss of timing or incorrect time displayed on equipment.
* Wrong location displayed on the map.
* Jamming environment warning message.
Reaction
A-37. Because of the diverse and widespread effects of enemy positioning, navigation, and timing jamming,
a prompt, coordinated response is necessary. Operators of all affected systems should—
* Navigate using map and compass. While this does not restore system timing and situational
awareness displays, navigation using a map and compass cannot be jammed.
* Increase distance between affected systems and jammer. If the jammer location is known,
increased distance or terrain masking may mitigate interference.
* Use signals intelligence or EW capabilities to locate the jamming signal. Leveraging signals
intelligence or EW capabilities requires coordination and collaboration with the G-2 (S-2) or the
cyber electronic warfare officer.
* Report jamming to higher headquarters. Submitting a joint spectrum interference resolution
report to higher headquarters documents a history of problems and helps identify possible causes
for subsequent interference.
Satellite Communications Jamming
A-38. Expeditionary forces rely heavily on satellite communications capabilities for beyond line of sight
network transport. Systems and capabilities affected by satellite communications jamming include—
* Friendly force tracking.
* Upper tier tactical internet.
* Tactical satellite radios.
* Intelligence reporting systems.
Preventive Measures
A-39. Operational and employment measures to prevent satellite communications jamming include— |
6-02 | 119 | Operating in a Contested Environment
* Minimizing transmissions on single-channel tactical satellite radios. Try to keep radio
transmissions to six seconds or less.
* Terrain masking.
* Camouflage net masking.
Indicators
A-40. Possible operator indications of satellite jamming include—
* Seemingly random noise or static on single-channel tactical satellite radios.
* Recorded sounds, such as messages or music, over single-channel tactical satellite radios.
* No answer to transmission.
* Red satellite icon on network management system display.
* Loss of data from the satellite.
* Low signal-to-noise indicated on wideband satellite terminal.
Reaction
A-41. The reactive measures here apply mostly to narrowband (single-channel) satellite communications
systems. When a single-channel tactical satellite radio operator recognizes a jamming attempt, they may—
* Increase radio transmit power. Only increase power on wideband satellite communications
terminals if directed by the satellite controller.
* Change to a preapproved alternate frequency.
* Execute the PACE plan. Quickly changing to the alternate or contingency means of
communications reduces communications disruption.
* Use signals intelligence or EW capabilities to locate the jamming signal. Leveraging signals
intelligence or EW capabilities requires coordination and collaboration with the G-2 (S-2) or the
cyber electronic warfare officer.
* Report jamming to higher headquarters. The higher headquarters’ frequency manager and
cyber electronic warfare officer can correlate reports from units across the area of operations to
isolate enemy jammers and plan countermeasures, including nominating targets for lethal fires.
* Use line of sight systems for network transport. Units will be unable to communicate beyond
line of sight, or through significant physical obstacles.
A-42. Satellite network controllers at the wideband satellite communications operations center coordinate all
interference resolution and reporting on DOD wideband satellite networks. Refer to ATP 6-02.54 for more
information about wideband satellite communications operations.
JOINT SPECTRUM INTERFERENCE RESOLUTION
A-43. Joint spectrum interference resolution reporting addresses electromagnetic interference and jamming
incidents affecting the DOD. The objective of joint spectrum interference resolution is to document and assist
in resolving electronic attack and recurring electromagnetic interference.
Incident Resolution
A-44. Frequency managers and EW personnel attempt to resolve incidents at the lowest possible level using
organic assets. If the spectrum manager and the cyber electronic warfare officer cannot resolve an incident
locally, they submit a joint spectrum interference resolution report through the chain of command. Each
successive level attempts to resolve the incident before forwarding the report.
A-45. Corps and division spectrum managers coordinate regional and local interference resolution. The
impact of each interference incident is unique, so no standard procedure establishes or guarantees resolution
in every case. A systematic approach reduces the time and cost required to resolve interference situations.
Refer to ATP 6-02.70 for more information about joint spectrum interference resolution reporting. |
6-02 | 120 | Appendix A
Reporting Procedure
A-46. Joint spectrum interference resolution reporting takes place through secure channels. Spectrum
managers should not delay reports due to a lack of complete information. They can submit an initial report
while attempting to resolve the incident, and follow-up reports to provide additional information, as it
becomes available.
A-47. The submitter of a joint spectrum interference resolution report determines the appropriate security
classification by evaluating the sensitivity of the electromagnetic interference on the affected system and
considering the classification of the text comments.
A-48. Army units report through their chain of command up to the geographic combatant command, and to
the U.S. Army Communications-Electronic Services Office. Message precedence of a joint spectrum
interference resolution report depends on the urgency of the reported situation. Normally reports are routine
or priority precedence, unless the originating unit believes the incident is hazardous to military operations.
In this case, the unit reports using immediate precedence.
CYBERSPACE ATTACKS
A-49. U.S. networks face continuous risk of cyberspace attacks. Cyberspace risk increases substantially when
operating against a peer threat in a contested environment. DODIN operations personnel implementing
cybersecurity measures can prevent many attacks. If an enemy cyberspace attack breaches cybersecurity
measures, it may require defensive cyberspace operations support to mitigate. Refer to FM 3-12 for more
information about defensive cyberspace operations support.
Denial of Service
A-50. A denial-of-service attack seeks to make a computer or network resource unavailable to its intended
users by disrupting services of a host connected to the Internet. An attacker floods the target computer or
network resource with more requests than it can handle to overload the system and prevent it from fulfilling
legitimate requests.
A-51. Denial of service attacks can affect any internet protocol network system, including—
* Mission command information systems.
* Logistics systems.
* Administrative systems.
* End user devices.
Preventive Measures
A-52. Good cybersecurity practices can prevent or lessen the effects of a denial of service attack.
Cybersecurity personnel should—
* Maintain current anti-virus software and virus definition files.
* Maintain properly configured network firewalls.
Indicators
A-53. Operator indications of a denial of service attack may include—
* Unusually slow network performance when opening files or accessing websites.
* Request timeouts.
* Widespread unavailability of a website or network system.
Reaction
A-54. When faced with the symptoms of a denial of service attack, DODIN operations personnel should— |
6-02 | 121 | Operating in a Contested Environment
* Report to the next higher echelon G-6 (S-6) or joint force J-6 to determine whether the system
slowdown is due to known activity on the network.
* Report suspected attacks to the G-2 (S-2) and G-3 (S-3).
* Continue operations using alternate or contingency communications means.
Malware
A-55. Malware is malicious software intentionally designed to damage a computer, server, or computer
network. Malware attacks can affect any automated information system, including—
* Mission command information systems.
* Logistics systems.
* Administrative systems.
* End user devices.
Preventive Measures
A-56. Cybersecurity personnel attempt to prevent malware attacks by—
* Using and maintaining up to date anti-virus software and virus definition files.
* Creating and changing passwords according to the standards in Army Information Assurance Best
Business Practices Document 04-IA-O-0001.
* Keeping system software updated and patched.
* Ensuring compliance with the most recent security technical implementation guidance.
* Maintaining properly configured network firewalls.
Indicators
A-57. Possible indicators of a malware attack include—
* Destruction or unexplained changes to files.
* Spontaneous restart of computers.
* Erratic, delayed, or unexpected computer or network activity.
* Anti-virus software warnings.
Reaction
A-58. If operators or DODIN operations personnel observe indications of a possible malware attack, they
should—
* Report to the next higher echelon G-6 (S-6) or joint staff J-6.
* Continue operations using alternate or contingency communications means.
* Report to G-2 (S-2) and G-3 (S-3).
A-59. DODIN operations personnel should not reconfigure computers or network systems in response to an
attack unless directed by their next higher echelon.
Data Exfiltration and Collection
A-60. Data exfiltration may be either electronic—removing files through the network, or physical—
removing paper or electronic copies from sensitive areas. Either method may disclose sensitive operational
information and plans. This compromise may place operations at risk.
A-61. All automated information system are potential targets of data exfiltration and collection. Affected
systems include—
* Mission command information systems.
* Logistics systems.
* Administrative systems.
* End user devices. |
6-02 | 122 | Appendix A
Preventive Measures
A-62. Cybersecurity measures and physical security combine to prevent data exfiltration and collection by—
* Implementing strict identity and access management controls for network systems.
* Enforcing strict physical security controls.
* Implementing access control restrictions.
* Employing data loss prevention software.
* Encrypting data-at-rest.
* Maintaining strong passwords for network access.
Indicators
A-63. Indicators of enemy data exfiltration and collection efforts include—
* Attempted or successful unauthorized physical access to sensitive areas.
* Unusually high volume of outgoing network traffic.
Reaction
A-64. The effects of data exfiltration can be catastrophic. If an enemy can steal enough documents, they can
develop a complete assessment of U.S. capabilities, troop strength, logistics, and even operation plans. If any
member of the unit suspects an enemy data exfiltration attempt, they—
* Report to G-2 (S-2) and G-3 (S-3).
* Report to next higher echelon.
* Consider changing the maneuver course of action if operation or support plans become
compromised.
Malware Attacks Against Combat Platforms
A-65. Many modern combat platforms rely heavily on embedded computer systems. Any computerized
system is susceptible to malware injection in the logistics chain, during maintenance, or through corrupted
or unauthorized software updates.
Preventive Measures
A-66. Strict physical security and cybersecurity controls can prevent most potential sources of malware
injection. Maintainers prevent malware injection by—
* Verifying the source of all software updates.
* Checking the software hash to verify software has not been manipulated.
* Maintaining strict physical control of data storage devices and maintenance computer systems.
* Avoiding the unauthorized use of removable storage media, such as thumb drives.
Indicators
A-67. Possible indications of a malware attack against combat platforms include—
* Similar faults on multiple systems, either simultaneously or within a short period.
* Faults related to subcomponents that rely on embedded computers for operation.
Reaction
A-68. If equipment maintainers suspect compromised operating software on a combat platform, they
should—
* Review maintenance records of software updates.
* Report incidents to G-2 (S-2) and G-3 (S-3).
* Report incidents to the next higher echelon.
* Roll back software updates to the last known good configuration, if possible. |
6-02 | 123 | Operating in a Contested Environment
Social Engineering
A-69. Social engineering uses techniques that rely on weakness in human nature rather than hardware or
software. The goal is to deceive people into revealing passwords and other information that compromise the
security of automated information systems and networks. Adversaries may also use social engineering
techniques to identify and develop potential targets for phishing and spear phishing.
A-70. The target of a social engineering attack is an individual. A successful social engineering attack may
compromise any system to which the affected individual has access.
Preventive Measures
A-71. All individuals should maintain operations security and cybersecurity awareness to avoid falling victim
to a social engineering attack. They should—
* Confirm the identity of persons asking for personal information or access credentials.
* Pay close attention to website addresses.
A-72. As a rule, individuals should avoid disclosing any information to unknown or unverified persons.
Disclosing even seemingly innocuous information could make subsequent social engineering or spear
phishing attempts against other targeted individuals seem much more legitimate.
Indicators
A-73. Indicators of social engineering attempts include—
* Unexpected phone calls from unknown callers requesting sensitive information.
* Websites that do not look normal, have several broken links, or mismatching Internet address.
* Unauthorized personnel shoulder surfing.
Reaction
A-74. If personnel suspect a social engineering attempt, they should—
* Confirm the requestor’s identity before disclosing information.
* Report the attempt to supervisors, network managers, and G-2 (S-2).
* Report social engineering attempts to next higher echelon.
A-75. Promptly reporting attempts at social engineering can raise awareness and prevent others from falling
victim to the same techniques.
Phishing and Spear Phishing
A-76. Phishing is a fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and
credit card details, often for malicious reasons, by disguising as a trustworthy entity in electronic
communications. Spear phishing is a targeted phishing attempt, usually against key individuals or personnel
with elevated or special access.
A-77. Any individual may fall victim to a phishing attack. Key leaders and network administrators are also
subject to spear phishing.
Preventive Measures
A-78. All personnel should protect themselves from phishing attacks by following best practices outlined in
annual cybersecurity refresher training. Depending on the information operations condition level, the
command may—
* Maintain awareness of the personal use of commercial e-mail.
* Restrict the use of personal e-mail, as required.
* Block access to commercial e-mail providers. |
6-02 | 124 | Appendix A
Indicators
A-79. Most common phishing techniques share certain traits, including—
* E-mails with generic greetings. Note that spear phishing attempts are more sophisticated and
address targeted individuals by name.
* E-mails requesting personal information or login credentials.
* E-mails requesting or demanding an urgent response.
* E-mails with spoofed links—where the text displayed does not match the internet address shown
when hovering over the link.
Reaction
A-80. If an individual suspects a phishing or spear phishing attempt, they should—
* Report the attempt to the chain of command, automation support section, and G-2 (S-2).
* Confirm the identity of the sender before taking any action.
A-81. Individuals can further protect themselves from fraudulent links by never accessing their personal
accounts through links in e-mails. For instance, if an e-mail purports to be from the individual’s bank or
credit card company, they should access their account only through the legitimate secure website, not through
a hyperlink provided in an e-mail.
A-82. Commands should not threaten punishment against personnel who inadvertently fall victim to phishing
attempts. Fear of punishment could prevent individuals from reporting attacks.
Social Media Attacks
A-83. Adversaries may conduct social media attacks in support of their information collection and
information operations goals. All individuals using any form of social media are potential targets.
Preventive Measures
A-84. Individuals should strictly limit personal information posted to their social media accounts. The
compromise of this information could be damaging in itself or could strengthen an adversary’s subsequent
social engineering or spear phishing attacks.
A-85. Individuals should restrict who can view their social media profile and activities using the privacy
settings on the social media platform.
A-86. Individuals and public affairs personnel must carefully weigh operations security considerations when
they engage on social media platforms.
A-87. Individuals and group administrators should not accept friend or group membership requests from
unknown or unverifiable persons.
A-88. Commands should consider limiting or restricting access to social media platforms as mission or
operations security concerns dictate.
Indicators
A-89. Indicators of potential social media attacks include—
* Friend requests from unknown persons, or duplicate friend requests that mimic a known person.
* Unknown persons commenting on social media posts.
Reaction
A-90. If a social media attack is known or suspected, personnel should—
* Report the suspected compromise to the G-2 (S-2).
* Immediately change any passwords that might have become compromised.
* Watch for indicators of identity theft. |
6-02 | 125 | Operating in a Contested Environment
Attacks Against Personal Electronic Devices
A-91. Widespread use of personal electronic devices creates significant vulnerabilities when operating
against a peer threat. Peer threats have demonstrated advanced capabilities to exploit personal electronic
devices, seize control of cellular communications networks, and locate personal cell phones with precision.
This gives them the ability to collect information, conduct information warfare activities, and direct accurate
lethal fires. Any personal electronic device capable of connecting to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or cellular
communications systems is vulnerable to attack.
Preventive Measures
A-92. Measures to protect against personal electronic device attacks include—
* Maintaining strict control and accountability of personal electronic devices.
* Downloading only trusted apps from approved sources.
* Maintaining current security updates on devices and apps.
* Disabling Bluetooth and Wi-Fi features when they are not in use.
* Encrypting sensitive files and personal information.
* Allowing only government-provided personal electronic devices to connect to the DOD network.
A-93. Commanders should consider restricting or banning the use of personal electronic devices, based on
the tactical situation.
Indicators
A-94. Some possible indicators of attacks against personal electronic devices are—
* Enemy attacks that seem to correlate with personal electronic device usage.
* Incoming lethal attacks that occur with unexplained precision.
* Receiving a barrage of text messages—up to several per second—preventing the intended use of
the device.
* Incoming propaganda or psychological warfare messages from unknown numbers.
Reaction
A-95. If a unit suspects it has come under attack, they should—
* Quickly displace the element under attack and direct all personnel to immediately turn off personal
electronic devices.
* Disable personal electronic devices and confiscate them, if necessary.
* Report to the next higher echelon. |
6-02 | 127 | Appendix B
Signal Planning
The G-6 (S-6) advises the commander and conducts planning and coordination for
DODIN operations, network transport and information services, spectrum
management, and COMSEC. Signal planners are subject matter experts in these areas,
so they can formulate signal plans and evaluate the signal supportability of various
courses of action during the military decision-making process.
MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
B-1. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation
and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). In simple terms,
the military decision-making process is a systematic method to solve a specific military problem. During the
planning and orders production process, G-6 (S-6) staff maintains the running signal staff estimate and plans
the scheme of signal support to support the unit’s operation.
SIGNAL STAFF ESTIMATE
B-2. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable
(ADP 5-0). Commanders and staffs use running estimates throughout the operations process. In their running
estimates, the commander and each staff member continuously consider the effect of new information and
update—
* Facts.
* Assumptions.
* Friendly force status.
* Enemy activities and capabilities.
* Civil considerations.
* Conclusions and recommendations.
B-3. The signal staff estimate outlines the G-6 (S-6) and assigned or supporting signal elements’ ability to
support various friendly courses of action. Signal planners evaluate the communications and network
requirements for each proposed course of action and against the available signal support. Evaluating the
available signal support includes considering the capabilities and limitations of supporting signal systems.
An accurate running estimate is invaluable throughout the military decision-making process. If signal
elements cannot support a proposed course of action, the running estimate should identify the shortfall. The
signal staff estimate includes all relevant signal information, including a signal mission analysis chart, which
outlines—
* Signal equipment on-hand.
* Equipment in-use, non-mission capable, and available.
* Capabilities of available communications systems.
* Projected retransmission sites.
* Combat net radio coverage.
* Status of communications and automated information systems.
* Projected communications node locations. |
6-02 | 128 | Appendix B
B-4. The staff derives the running estimate from facts, assumptions, and situational analysis (terrain,
friendly situation, enemy situation, and support requirements). Signal planners use the running estimate
through each step of the military decision-making process. Planners update the running estimate when—
* The commander and staff recognize new facts.
* The staff can replace assumptions with facts or find previous assumptions invalid.
* The mission changes.
* Planners receive updated information from other staff sections.
B-5. The staff adjusts the running estimate based on the course of action development and war-gaming.
After course of action approval, the signal running estimate forms the basis for annex H (Signal) of the
operation plan or order.
PRIMARY, ALTERNATE, CONTINGENCY, AND EMERGENCY PLAN
B-6. Building an effective PACE plan may be simultaneously the most useful and challenging practice for
communications planners. The key to a good PACE plan is to establish redundancy, so some means of
communication is always available. Signal leaders and planners must understand their organization’s
authorized and available communications capabilities and limitations, as well as the personnel and logistic
requirements to employ and sustain the capabilities. During the military decision making process, G-6 (S-6)
planners ensure proposed PACE plans are feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete.
* Feasible. The unit and subordinates must have enough working systems to implement each step
of the PACE plan.
* Acceptable. Time needed to set up a redundant capability must not interfere with the unit’s
operation or command post displacement.
* Suitable. Redundant capabilities must have the capacity to meet the commander’s requirements.
* Distinguishable. Redundant communications means cannot rely on a denied method. For
example, if network data is not available, voice over Internet protocol would be a poor backup
method. If VHF radio communications are degraded or denied, the next step in the PACE plan
should use a different transmission medium.
* Complete. The scheme of signal support should outline each means of communication, along with
triggers for execution.
B-7. The PACE plan should be as simple as possible to support reliable communications during dynamic
operations. If possible, PACE plans should revolve around warfighting functions. The principal warfighting
functions for the purposes of PACE planning are movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, and
sustainment. The G-6 (S-6) does not dictate PACE plans for these warfighting functions, but does educate
the warfighting function leads on available capabilities during operations and assists the warfighting function
staff in formulating a PACE plan.
B-8. Planners should identify appropriate PACE systems for each phase—for example, defense, offense, or
consolidating gains—and publish them in annex H (Signal) of the operation order. An emergency means of
communications does not necessarily have to be equipment; it may be a procedure such as moving back to
the last known effective communications point or rallying at a specified grid coordinate. The PACE plan
helps ensure communications availability if the primary means of communication fails. Units should rehearse
and validate the PACE plan during mission and communication rehearsals to ensure all personnel can execute
the plan as necessary. Refer to ATP 6-0.5 for information about communication rehearsals. Table B-1 shows
an example of a simple PACE plan for one phase of an operation, aligned with warfighting functions. |
6-02 | 129 | Signal Planning
Table B-1. Example primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications plan by
warfighting function
Movement and Intelligence Fires Sustainment
Maneuver
Primary VHF (CMD net) VHF (O&I) AFATDS VHF (A&L)
Alternate SC TACSAT JBCP VHF (voice) JBCP
Contingency JBCP SC TACSAT VHF (digital) SC TACSAT
(voice) (voice)
Emergency HF (chat) TIGR JBCP BCS3
Legend:
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data HF high frequency
System JBCP Joint Battle Command Platform
A&L administrative and logistics O&I operations and intelligence
BCS3 Battle Command Sustainment and Support SC single-channel
System TACSAT tactical satellite
CMD command TIGR tactical ground reporting
FM frequency modulation VHF very high frequency
RECEIPT OF MISSION (STEP 1)
B-9. Commanders initiate the military decision-making process upon receipt, or in anticipation of, a
mission. The signal staff coordinates with higher and adjacent headquarters staff counterparts to collect
information on current and future signal support, running estimates, and other signal planning products.
Planners collect—
* Paper and digital maps for the area of operations.
* Signal plans and annexes from higher headquarters.
* List of available signal equipment and personnel assets.
* Resource allocation—frequencies, satellite access, bandwidth, information services.
* Tactical standard operating procedure of the unit and higher headquarters.
* Reporting requirements.
* Cybersecurity procedures.
* COMSEC procedures.
* Applicable field and technical manuals.
B-10. On receiving a mission, G-6 (S-6) planners begin collaborating with higher, adjacent, and subordinate
signal elements.
* Higher.
Confirm higher headquarters communications assets and requirements.
Higher headquarters network architecture, COMSEC, and spectrum management.
Retransmission locations for possible collocation.
Systems under operational management.
* Adjacent.
Retransmission locations for possible collocation.
Operational management of equipment, as directed.
Possibility of sharing signal assets.
* Subordinate.
Tasks required of subordinate elements.
Resources available to augment subordinate units’ capabilities.
Assistance requesting outside augmentation, such as pooled theater resources.
B-11. During the receipt of mission step, planners prepare the initial signal estimate. Table B-2 on page B-4
identifies the key inputs, planning process, and key outputs for step 1. |
6-02 | 130 | Appendix B
Table B-2. The military decision-making process, step 1: receipt of mission
Higher headquarters plan or Begin updating the signal Initial signal running estimate.
order. running estimate.
Planning products from higher Gather tools to prepare for
headquarters, including the mission analysis specific to
signal annex (annex H) signal support.
Provide signal input for
formulation of the
commander’s initial guidance
and warning order.
MISSION ANALYSIS (STEP 2)
B-12. Mission analysis is the method for clearly identifying a problem and the tools available to solve it.
Commanders and their staffs conduct mission analysis to develop their understanding of the situation and
problem, identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and why. The signal
staff gathers, analyzes, and synthesizes information on the current conditions of the operational environment
with an emphasis on signal support, spectrum management operations, and the information environment. At
this point, planners identify any restraints imposed by signal systems in the intended operational environment.
B-13. Planning using the Army design methodology may occur before the military decision-making process,
take place concurrently with the military decision-making process, or might not be conducted at all. The
commander and staff should review Army design products, if available, to enhance situational understanding
and integrate them into the military decision-making process.
B-14. Intelligence support to signal begins with intelligence preparation of the battlefield and continues
throughout the operations process. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of
analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to
determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3). The signal staff and CEMA section coordinate with the
G-2 (S-2) staff to identify enemy and adversary capabilities and help develop models, situation templates,
event templates, high-value targets, named areas of interest, and other outputs from the intelligence process,
including enemy and adversary cyberspace, EW, and communications information.
B-15. The signal staff identifies—
* Facts and assumptions (what planners know and what they assume to be true about the operation,
operational area, and enemy).
* Tasks.
Specified.
Implied.
Essential.
* Planning constraints—what the unit must do.
* Planning restraints—what the unit cannot do.
* Risks.
B-16. Some information from the higher headquarters order, if it is available, establishes the basis for
developing the signal plan. The G-6 (S-6) should extract—
* Task organization.
* Reporting requirements.
* Higher headquarters communications support and architecture.
* Enemy command and control capabilities and threat. |
6-02 | 131 | Signal Planning
* Higher headquarters’ execution timeline.
* COMSEC key, period change, and compromise procedures.
* Cybersecurity requirements.
* Scheduled network outages.
* Signal tasks—
Specified.
Implied.
Essential.
B-17. The G-6 (S-6) considers these facts and assumptions:
* Maintenance status of communications equipment and systems.
* Technical limitations of equipment—range, weather, and bandwidth.
* Areas of limited communications coverage.
* Higher headquarters support—
Services.
Bandwidth.
Frequencies.
* Personnel status.
* Effects of the operational environment on communications.
* Threat intelligence and EW capabilities.
* COMSEC changes.
* Command post locations.
* Security of isolated or moving communications nodes.
* Communications requirements of attached units.
B-18. The G-6 (S-6) nominates commander’s critical information requirements and essential elements of
friendly information related to signal support. During mission analysis, the G-6 (S-6) conducts signal site
analysis (see paragraph A-51) to identify the most effective operating locations and updates the running
estimate. The G-6 (S-6) begins collaboration with the G-3 (S-3), G-2 (S-2), and sustainment staff sections.
This collaboration continues throughout the planning process. Table B-3 on page B-6 identifies the key
inputs, planning process, and key outputs for step 2. |
6-02 | 132 | Appendix B
Table B-3. The military decision-making process, step 2: mission analysis
Commander’s initial guidance. Analyze inputs and develop List of signal information
information requirements. requirements.
Army design methodology
product. Participate in intelligence Overlays from intelligence
preparation of the battlefield. preparation of the battlefield
Higher headquarters plan or
process to support signal
order. Determine signal specified
operation.
and implied tasks.
List of signal specified and
Determine signal limitations
implied tasks.
and constraints.
List of signal limitations and
Identify critical facts and
constraints.
assumptions.
List of signal facts and
Identify and nominate signal-
assumptions.
related commander’s critical
information requirements. Updated signal running
estimate.
Identify and nominate signal
essential elements of friendly
information.
Provide signal input to the
combined information overlay.
Provide signal input for
development of mission
analysis brief and warning
order.
Participate in mission analysis
brief.
COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT (STEP 3)
B-19. Course of action development is the method to determine the best employment of the tools available
to solve the problem identified in mission analysis. Course of action development generates options for
subsequent analysis and comparison to satisfy the commander’s intent and planning guidance. The G-3
(S-3) staff usually drives course of action development, aided by the subject matter expertise of the other
staff sections. The signal staff applies the knowledge gained from the mission analysis step to help develop
proposed courses of action. During course of action development, the signal staff develops a draft scheme of
signal support. The scheme of signal support describes how the commander intends to use organic and
augmenting signal assets to support the concept of operations, with an emphasis on the scheme of maneuver.
B-20. The G-6 (S-6) understanding of the operating characteristics and limitations of the unit’s
communications systems helps the G-3 (S-3) develop feasible courses of action. Lack of reliable
communications could render an otherwise promising course of action unsupportable.
B-21. The staff typically develops two to three proposed courses of action for comparison. Each course of
action must be—
* Complete. The proposed course of action can accomplish the mission within available time, space,
and resources. |
6-02 | 133 | Signal Planning
* Feasible. The unit has the capacity to accomplish the mission within available time, space, and
resources.
* Acceptable. The tactical or operational advantage gained by executing the course of action
justifies its resource cost, especially in casualties.
* Distinguishable. The proposed course of action differs identifiably from the others.
* Suitable. The proposed course of action can accomplish the mission and comply with the
commander’s guidance.
Note. While each course of action must meet all five criteria, the communications plan does not
necessarily have to be distinguishable. One communications plan may support multiple courses of
action.
B-22. For each proposed course of action, the signal staff identifies the PACE plan for each phase of the
operation. Planners establish the communications plan to support each phase. The communications plan
includes—
* Long-haul communications.
* Combat net radios and retransmission.
* Network transport.
* Line of sight analysis.
* Triggers for movement of command and control nodes and systems, include primary and alternate
routes and locations, and time and space required for movement.
B-23. The staff bases signal support priorities on the commander’s guidance for priority of effort:
* Weighting the main effort.
* Sufficient redundancy for key command and control nodes—the tactical command post and
command group—at critical times.
B-24. The G-6 (S-6) recommends command post locations based on communications requirements,
equipment operating characteristics, and the tactical situation. Through course of action development,
planners formulate a clear concept of signal support for each proposed course of action with an understanding
of which command post is controlling the fight by phase of the operation. The concept of signal support
includes necessary support tasks performed by non-signal personnel, such as quick reaction force, security,
and casualty evacuation.
B-25. On completion of course of action development, many outputs from the mission analysis may require
updates, such as signal-related input for the commander’s critical information requirements and essential
elements of friendly information. The signal staff updates their portions of the draft operation order, including
annex H appendixes with signal support information. Table B-4 on page B-8 identifies the key inputs,
planning process, and key outputs for step 3. |
6-02 | 134 | Appendix B
Table B-4. The military decision-making process, step 3: course of action development
Commander’s initial guidance. Identify signal vulnerabilities Updated list of signal
of friendly and neutral actors. information requirements.
Initial commander’s critical
information requirements. Provide signal input for the Draft scheme of signal
combined information overlay. support.
Updated intelligence
preparation of the battlefield Determine the initial scheme Updated signal running
products. of signal support. estimate.
List of specified and implied Provide signal input for the
signal tasks. course of action development
brief.
List of signal limitations and
constraints. Begin development of annex
H (Signal) to the operation
List of signal facts and
order.
assumptions.
Updated signal running
estimate.
COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (STEP 4)
B-26. Course of action analysis enables commanders and staffs to identify difficulties, coordination
problems, and the probable consequences of each course of action considered. As the staff war-games
proposed courses of action, the G-6 (S-6) assesses DODIN operations, spectrum management operations,
cybersecurity, and information protection feasibility. The G-6 (S-6) defines communications systems
requirements, compares them to available assets (organic and attached), identifies potential shortfalls, and
recommends actions to eliminate or reduce their effects.
B-27. When determining feasibility and supportability of proposed courses of action, the G-6 (S-6) evaluates
potential signal sites. The signal site must be defensible, and the location must not interfere with the operation
of signal equipment. For example, structures or terrain do not block line of sight between a satellite
communications terminal and the orbiting satellite.
B-28. As the staff war-games proposed courses of action, the G-6 (S-6) provides signal input, including—
* Movement of command and control nodes.
* Emplacement of network architecture, network transport, and retransmission nodes.
* Command and control synchronization and execution matrix.
B-29. The G-6 (S-6) evaluates the feasibility of the communications plan for each proposed course of action,
including the communications advantages, disadvantages, and recommended solutions for communications
disadvantages. Upon completion of course of action analysis, operational planning continues with updating
the commander’s critical information requirements and signal running estimate. The signal staff refines their
scheme of signal support, ensuring that it nests with and supports the scheme of maneuver. Table B-5 on
page B-9 identifies the key inputs, planning process, and key outputs for step 4. |
6-02 | 135 | Signal Planning
Table B-5. The military decision-making process, step 4: course of action analysis
Revised commander’s Provide signal input and Refined signal input to the
planning guidance. participate in the war-game commander’s critical
briefing, as required. information requirements.
Draft scheme of signal
support. Integrate and synchronize Refined scheme of signal
signal support into the support.
Updated signal running
scheme of maneuver and
estimate. Updated signal running
concept of operations.
estimate.
Continue developing scheme
of signal support.
Provide signal input for the
development of the decision
support matrix and decision
support template.
Provide refined signal support
input to the combined
information overlay.
COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON (STEP 5)
B-30. Course of action comparison is a process to evaluate proposed courses of action against objective
evaluation criteria approved by the commander and staff. During course of action comparison, all staff
sections analyze and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action from their
perspective. The G-6 (S-6) section may not directly participate in this process. The G-3 (S-3) usually conducts
course of action comparison based on principles of warfare, doctrinal fundamentals, or the commander’s
guidance and intent. The G-6 (S-6) should ensure the available signal assets are adequate to support each
course of action, and there is adequate security and defense for the number of signal sites required. During
course of action comparison, the G-6 (S-6) recommends a concept of signal support for each course of action
and provides supporting criteria:
* Simplicity of the communications plan.
* Coverage of combat net radio networks.
* Number of command and control node movements required.
* Timeline of information services availability.
B-31. After course of action comparison, output products and the base operation order enter final draft. Table
B-6 on page B-10 identifies the key inputs, planning process, and key outputs for step 5. |
6-02 | 136 | Appendix B
Table B-6. The military decision-making process, step 5: course of action comparison
War-game results. Analyze advantages and Recommended concept of
disadvantages of each signal support.
Refined scheme of signal
proposed course of action.
support. Updated signal running
Provide signal input to the estimate.
Updated signal running
decision matrix tool, as
estimate.
required.
Provide signal input for the
risk assessment.
Develop recommendation for
the most supportable course
of action from a signal support
perspective.
Provide signal input for
development of the course of
action comparison briefing, as
required.
COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL (STEP 6)
B-32. During course of action approval, the commander selects the most advantageous course of action to
accomplish the mission. The selected course of action must first be ethical, and then the most effective and
efficient possible. During the course of action approval briefing, the G-6 (S-6) briefs the commander on the
signal support plan for each course of action, including the advantages or disadvantages of each. The G-6
(S-6) should be able to articulate whether and why the recommended course of action is more supportable
than the alternatives. The commander issues final planning guidance, including a refined commander’s intent,
the commander’s critical information requirements, and any additional guidance on warfighting function
priorities. Table B-7 on page B-11 identifies the key inputs, planning process, and key outputs for step 6. |
6-02 | 137 | Signal Planning
Table B-7. The military decision-making process, step 6: course of action approval
Updated signal running Receive and respond to final Commander-approved course
estimate, including refined planning guidance from of action.
products for each proposed commander.
Final draft for relevant
course of action.
Assess implications and portions of paragraph 5,
Evaluated courses of action. revise relevant portions of the command and signal, to the
operation order. operation order.
Recommended course of
action. Finalize scheme of signal Final draft annex H (Signal) to
support. the operation order.
Final draft signal input to
appendix 1 (Defensive
Cyberspace Operations) to
annex H (Signal).
Final draft appendix 2
(Network Operations) to
annex H (Signal).
Final draft appendix 3
(Network Diagrams) to annex
H (Signal)
Final draft appendix 4
(Satellite Communications) to
annex H (Signal).
Final draft appendix 5
(Foreign Data Exchanges) to
annex H (Signal).
Final draft appendix 6
(Spectrum Management) to
annex H (Signal).
Final draft appendix 7
(Information Services) to
annex H (Signal).
Final draft signal input to
annex B (Intelligence).
ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION (STEP 7)
B-33. The final step of the military decision-making process is orders production, dissemination, and
transition. The staff prepares the operation order by turning the selected course of action into a clear, concise
concept of operations with supporting information, as required. The signal staff finalizes all planning
products, including the signal running estimate and annex H of the operation order (with appendixes). If time
allows, the staff can conduct a more thorough war game of the approved course of action. The staff internally
reconciles planning outputs for approval by the commander. |
6-02 | 138 | Appendix B
B-34. The G-6 (S-6) staff prepares annex H (Signal) and its appendixes. The G-6 (S-6) staff also collaborates
with the G-3 (S-3) to prepare appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to annex C (Operations),
with input from the G-2 (S-2) staff.
B-35. The phases in the scheme of signal support match the phases of the base plan or order. The scheme of
signal support outlines the priorities of support for each phase of the operation.
B-36. Because there is often little time between course of action approval, the operation order brief, and
orders production, it is useful for the signal staff to maintain a signal annex template. Using a template speeds
up order production, since most recurring information pre-populates the appropriate paragraphs. The higher
headquarters plan or order can also provide a useful framework. Table B-8 identifies the key inputs, planning
process, and key outputs for step 7.
Table B-8. The military decision-making process, step 7: orders production, dissemination,
and transition
Commander-approved course Participate in staff plans and Relevant portions of
of action and any orders reconciliation, as paragraph 5, command and
modifications. required. signal, to the operation order.
Final draft operation order Participate in staff plans and Final annex H (Signal) to the
products. orders crosswalk, as required. operation order.
Provide final input to the risk Final appendix 2 (Network
assessment specific to signal Operations) to annex H
support. (Signal).
Produce operation order Final appendix 3 (Network
products. Diagrams) to annex H (Signal)
Participate in the operation Final appendix 4 (Satellite
order briefing and Communications) to annex H
confirmation briefing, as (Signal).
required.
Final appendix 5 (Foreign
Data Exchanges) to annex H
(Signal).
Final appendix 6 (Spectrum
Management) to annex H
(Signal).
Final appendix 7 (Information
Services) to annex H (Signal).
Paragraph 5 (Command and Signal) of Operation Plans and Orders
B-37. The G-6 (S-6) usually writes paragraph 5 (Command and Signal) of the base plan or order. The G-6
(S-6) lists task-organized units in the appropriate annexes. Figure B-1 on page B-13 shows a sample
paragraph 5 for an operation order. |
6-02 | 139 | Signal Planning
Figure B-1. Operation plan or order paragraph 5
Annex H (Signal) to Operation Plans and Orders
B-38. Commanders and staffs use annex H (Signal) to describe how signal supports the concept of operations
described in the base plan or order. The G-6 (S-6) develops annex H (Signal) using the five-paragraph
attachment format from FM 6-0. (See figure B-2 on pages B-14 through B-17). |
6-02 | 140 | Appendix B
Figure B-2. Operation plan or order annex H (Signal) |
6-02 | 141 | Signal Planning
Figure B-2. Operation plan or order annex H (Signal) (continued) |
6-02 | 142 | Appendix B
Figure B-2. Operation plan or order annex H (Signal) (continued) |
6-02 | 143 | Signal Planning
Figure B-2. Operation plan or order annex H (Signal) (continued) |
6-02 | 144 | Appendix B
Attachments to Annex H
B-39. Appendixes and their associated tabs provide additional information required to implement the scheme
of signal support detailed in annex H. The format and content for appendixes and tabs follow unit standard
operating procedures. Appendixes and suggested tabs include—
* Appendix 1—Defensive cyberspace operations.
Tab A—Scheme of network protection.
Tab B—Defensive cyberspace operations incident battle drill.
Tab C—Cybersecurity compliance report.
Tab D—Vulnerability and patch reports.
Tab E—Defensive cyberspace operations incident report.
* Appendix 2—Department of Defense information network operations.
Tab A—Network node allocation and organization.
Tab B—Network outage procedures and report.
Tab C—Scheme of network monitoring.
Tab D—Scheme of COMSEC distribution.
Tab E—Scheme of COMSEC compromise procedures.
Tab F—COMSEC compromise procedures.
* Appendix 3—Voice, video, and data network diagrams.
Tab A—Voice (wide-area network and local area network) logical network diagram.
Tab B—Data (wide-area network and local area network) logical network diagram.
Tab C—Scheme of tactical radio allocation and employment.
Tab D—Voice over Internet protocol phone book.
* Appendix 4—Satellite communications.
Tab A—Warfighter Information Network-Tactical satellite transmission diagram.
Tab B—Scheme of Tactical Satellite Communications Employment.
* Appendix 5—Foreign data exchanges.
Tab A—Coalition forces network diagram.
Tab B—Scheme of foreign liaison employment.
* Appendix 6—Spectrum management operations.
Tab A—Signal operating instructions (tactical radios).
Tab B—Signal operating instructions (Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below; Blue
Force Tracking; Joint Capabilities Release; or Joint Battle Command-Platform role name
directory).
Tab C—VHF and UHF line of sight analysis (single-channel ground and airborne radio
system, advanced networking wideband waveform, soldier radio waveform, and highband
networking waveform).
Tab D—High frequency analysis charts.
* Appendix 7—Information services.
Tab A—Scheme of information and knowledge management.
Tab B—Scheme of Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below; Blue Force Tracking;
Joint Capabilities Release; and Joint Battle Command-Platform allocation and employment.
Tab C—Scheme of mission command information system employment (reference annex Q,
appendix 3—mission command information system integration matrix).
RAPID DECISION-MAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS
B-40. Operational and mission variables continually change during mission execution. This often invalidates
or weakens the chosen course of action. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process allows |
6-02 | 145 | Signal Planning
commanders and staffs to adjust the operation order to the current situation. When using this technique, the
following considerations apply—
* Rapid is often more important than process.
* Much of the process may be mental, rather than written.
* Rapid decision making should be part of the battle drills for current operations integration cells,
future operations cells, or both.
B-41. While the military decision-making process seeks the optimal solution, the rapid decision-making and
synchronization process seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent, mission, and
the concept of operations. Using the rapid decision-making and synchronization process lets leaders avoid
the time-consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing courses of action. Under the
rapid decision-making and synchronization process, leaders combine their experience and intuition to quickly
reach situational understanding. Based on this, they develop and refine workable courses of action.
B-42. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process is based on an existing order and the
commander’s priorities as expressed in the order. The most important of these control measures are the
commander’s intent, the concept of operations, and the commander’s critical information requirements. The
rapid decision-making and synchronization process includes five steps—
* Compare the current situation to the order.
* Determine that a decision, and what type, is required.
* Develop a course of action.
* Refine and validate the course of action.
* Implement the course of action.
B-43. The first two steps may be performed in any order or concurrently. The last three are performed
iteratively until commanders identify an acceptable course of action. Refer to FM 6-0 for more information
about the rapid decision-making and synchronization process.
ADDITIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
B-44. The military decision-making process might not address the full scope of planning for signal support.
Army forces plan, prepare, execute, and assess signal support in collaboration with joint, interorganizational,
and multinational mission partners, as required. Whether signal support is organic to the unit or provided
from pooled theater assets, commander involvement and comprehensive situational awareness of cyberspace
and the electromagnetic spectrum are critical to mission success.
B-45. Army units need to coordinate or interact with joint forces in the conduct of operations. Commanders
and staffs must be familiar with joint planning systems and processes, including the joint planning process
and Adaptive Planning and Execution. Refer to JP 5-0 for more information about joint planning.
B-46. The G-6 (S-6) staff assists the protection cell’s personnel recovery coordination section when preparing
appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery) to annex E (Protection). Refer to FM 3-50 for details about the G-6 (S-6)
section’s responsibilities in personnel recovery planning.
Note. For more details about the signal staff’s role during each step of the military decision-
making process, see the S-6 disk resources on the Cyber Lessons and Best Practices Website.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN A DEGRADED ENVIRONMENT
B-47. Communications planners must understand the commander’s concept of operations and intent.
Because there might not be sufficient communications capacity for all requirements in a degraded
environment, planners need a clear understanding of the overall communications architecture and how it can
support the commander’s priority effort. The G-6 (S-6) coordinates with other staff sections during the
military decision-making process and considers—
* Communications requirements for each warfighting function.
* Capabilities and limitations of available communications systems. |
6-02 | 146 | Appendix B
* Requirements for joint, interorganizational, and multinational interoperability.
* Detailed line of sight analysis.
* HF analysis.
* Redundancy in means to communicate—PACE plan.
* Integration of all available signal assets.
* Method of deployment—sequence assets to coincide with the arrival of forces.
* Command post locations.
* The use of retransmission, digital network links, and node placement.
* Satellite communications requirements.
* Priorities of support to manage available communications bandwidth.
* Spectrum requirements for emitters, sensors, radars, and any other assets that rely on a frequency.
* COMSEC distribution plans.
* Initial task organization and expected changes.
* Signal and COMSEC procedures.
* Conduct of communications rehearsals.
TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
B-48. Troop leading procedures extend the military decision-making process to the small-unit level. The
military decision-making process and troop leading procedures are similar but not identical. They are both
linked by the basic Army problem-solving process. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the military
decision-making process as their primary planning process. Company-level and smaller units lack formal
staffs and use troop leading procedures to plan and prepare for operations. This places the responsibility for
planning primarily on the commander or small-unit leader (FM 6-0).
B-49. Troop leading procedures are an eight-step process:
* Step 1—receive the mission.
* Step 2—issue a warning order
* Step 3—make a tentative plan.
* Step 4—initiate movement.
* Step 5—conduct reconnaissance.
* Step 6—complete the plan.
* Step 7—issue the order.
* Step 8—supervise and refine.
B-50. The first three steps of troop leading procedures normally occur in order. The order of the remaining
steps depends on the tactical situation. Depending on the situation, some steps may require repeating. The
final step, supervise and refine, takes place throughout the process.
B-51. The steps of troop leading procedures largely parallel the higher headquarters military decision-making
process. A higher headquarters warning order or operation order generally triggers company and below
planning using troop leading procedures. Figure B-3 on page B-21 illustrates the parallels between the
military decision-making process and troop leading procedures. Refer to FM 6-0 for more detailed
information about troop leading procedures. |
6-02 | 147 | Signal Planning
Figure B-3. Parallel sequences of the military decision-making process and troop leading
procedures.
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
B-52. The spectrum manager uses automated spectrum management tools to assist in electromagnetic
spectrum planning and to define support requirements. Planners coordinate frequency use before activating
any emitter to mitigate or eliminate electromagnetic interference with friendly systems. The spectrum
manager considers—
* Transmitter and receiver locations.
* Antenna technical parameters and characteristics.
* Number of frequencies desired and separation requirements.
* Alternate frequencies for key radio networks.
* Nature of the operation (fixed, mobile land, mobile aeronautical, and over water or maritime).
* Physical effects of the operational environment (ground and soil type, humidity, and topology).
* All spectrum-dependent equipment to be employed, including emitters, sensors, and unmanned
aerial sensors.
* Start and end dates for use.
* Restricted and taboo frequencies.
Note. Refer to ATP 6-02.70 for more information about spectrum management. |
6-02 | 148 | Appendix B
SIGNAL SITE ANALYSIS AND SELECTION
B-53. The operating characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of various communications systems create
specific requirements for acceptable operating locations. Signal sites must be able to accomplish their
assigned missions while remaining supportable and defensible.
SITE ANALYSIS
B-54. The G-6 (S-6) should conduct a signal site analysis of the entire area of operations, if possible. Signal
site analysis and selection is a collaborative effort between the G-6 (S-6) and the G-3 (S-3). A thorough site
analysis enables a meaningful course of action comparison during planning and provides flexibility when
executing operations. The G-6 (S-6) analysis focuses on the ability of communications systems to provide
coverage from the proposed site. The G-3 (S-3) analysis focuses on mobility, survivability, and sustainability.
If the mission changes and operations move to another area, planners should already know which areas they
can support with effective communications.
B-55. Signal planners consider the operating characteristics, limitations, and effective planning distance for
each available communications asset. As planners define communications requirements, the number of
retransmission sites needed to cover the operational area may help determine supportability of proposed
courses of action during the military decision-making process.
B-56. The G-6 (S-6) coordinates with the G-2 (S-2) for terrain analysis and the current threat estimate. Signal
planners evaluate the terrain (including man-made features) in the operational area to visualize how they can
support the mission. Terrain and structures can render some communications systems ineffective. Planners
consider the current threat estimate to prevent placing communications sites near known or anticipated enemy
positions.
Link Geometry
B-57. The G-6 (S-6) analyzes the terrain to determine how to make the geometry of the operations work in
favor of friendly forces. Improper link geometry makes it easier for the enemy to use direction finding
jamming capabilities.
B-58. When possible, terrestrial line of sight communications links should parallel the forward line of own
troops. This keeps the primary signal strength of U.S. transmissions in friendly terrain. Deploying units and
communications systems perpendicular to the forward line of own troops aims transmissions toward the
enemy and makes it easier for the enemy to jam communications.
Terrain Masking
B-59. When possible, command post locations should place terrain features and manmade structures between
friendly communications systems and enemy positions. This may require moving senior headquarters farther
forward and using more jump or tactical command posts to ensure commanders can continue to direct their
units effectively.
Antenna Placement
B-60. Command post locations generally determine antenna locations. The proper installation and
positioning of antennas around command posts is critical. G-6 (S-6) planners and system operators should
position antennas and radio frequency emitters as far as practical from the command post to spread out the
electromagnetic signature.
SITE SELECTION
B-61. Based on the signal site analysis, the G-6 (S-6) recommends a signal site for each proposed course of
action during the military decision-making process. The final site selected must be—
* Able to support the selected course of action.
* Logistically supportable. |
6-02 | 149 | Signal Planning
* Defensible—
Defensive plan
Escape routes.
Cover.
Concealment.
B-62. Operating against a peer threat may require locating the signal site away from the supported command
post. This way, if an enemy locates and destroys communications systems, they do not destroy the entire
command post capability. Operating signal systems away from the supported command post creates
additional physical security and site defense requirements.
RECONNAISSANCE
B-63. Before occupying a signal site, leaders should reconnoiter the designated area. The site reconnaissance
might find unanticipated conditions that make the selected site unacceptable. This would require adjusting
the operation plan or order to select a new signal site. The reconnaissance team should consist of the company
leader, the transmission supervisor (if applicable), node supervisor (if applicable), and a security team. The
makeup of the reconnaissance team depends on the type of unit. The reconnaissance team maintains single-
channel radio communications with their parent headquarters. The reconnaissance team should—
* Ensure the selected site can support the unit’s communications requirements.
* Ensure the site is large enough to accommodate and tactically disperse all communications
assemblages on the site.
* Determine whether the selected site is securable and defensible. The reconnaissance team
considers—
The size of the site.
The number of personnel available to defend the site.
Entrances and avenues of approach.
Concealment from major roads or other vantage points. This may involve traveling around
the entire site from a distance to visualize what the enemy would see.
* Verify the site is close enough to the supported unit command post to connect with the signal
systems. Increasing distance between signal assemblages and subscribers complicates
troubleshooting.
* Verify line of sight between stations for multichannel radio links. Line of sight planning range is
about 40 kilometers, or 28 miles.
* Ensure terrain and man-made structures will not interfere with communications equipment and
links.
SIGNAL SITE SECURITY AND DEFENSE
B-64. Site defense plans depend on the size and type of signal site and whether it is colocated with the
supported unit. Planners coordinate with the G-2 (S-2) staff for the current threat estimate and the G-3 (S-3)
staff for security force requirements when planning site defense.
Colocated Sites
B-65. Usually, these are larger signal elements, up to platoon size, supporting a unit command post. The
signal personnel assist in perimeter defense. The supported unit headquarters conducts the overall defense of
the command post. The signal element coordinates closely with the supported unit.
Remote Sites
B-66. Planners must coordinate for security and sustainment services when deploying signal sites remotely
from the supported unit. When a signal site does not colocate with the supported headquarters, the signal
element conducts site defense. They must also be prepared to survive enemy air, artillery, and chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear attack with little outside assistance. Because of their size and limited |
6-02 | 150 | Appendix B
defensive capabilities, signal elements need assistance from the supported unit to defend against a large-scale
assault.
Node Sites
B-67. Platoon-sized signal elements may or may not colocate with the command post or other elements of
the supported unit. Based on the threat level, the signal site commander plans site defense and coordinates
with nearby units for mutual support.
Small Teams
B-68. Small teams often operate from isolated positions, usually for retransmission or wireless network
extension. Teams should try to remain concealed and report enemy activity to higher headquarters. The teams
conduct risk assessments at remote sites to determine the likelihood of mission success. Supported unit
leaders must carefully track threats and move teams quickly when in danger. |
6-02 | 151 | Appendix C
Visual Information
Visual information and COMCAM provide vital information to support decision
making. Because the available support is limited, the operational chain of command
validates and approves support requests before committing COMCAM assets.
Archived visual information products are available from a centralized repository.
PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING COMBAT CAMERA SUPPORT
C-1. Planners develop COMCAM requirements and submit them to Joint Chiefs of Staff through the
combatant command personnel directorate and operations directorate (J-3) by entering the requirement into
the Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager. The chain of command validates and resources rotational and
contingency COMCAM requirements supporting joint operations through the global force management
process. When the supporting Service sources the requirement, they enter the personnel and logistics
information into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System for assignment of unit line numbers.
C-2. Any Service’s COMCAM unit or activity can fulfill a COMCAM requirement. COMCAM assets
belong to their parent Service until placed under the operational or tactical control of a supported unit.
C-3. Before sending a tasking message, the requesting unit should contact the COMCAM unit to discuss
the type of support and timeframe required. This coordination should take place as early as possible. The
COMCAM unit evaluates the feasibility and supportability of the requirement. If the COMCAM unit cannot
support the requirement, the unit helps identify other support resources. Figure C-1 on page C-2 shows the
format for an official COMCAM support request.
Note. Verbal contact is not a commitment or an agreement to provide support. |
6-02 | 152 | Appendix C
Figure C-1. Combat camera support request format
PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING VISUAL INFORMATION
PRODUCTS
C-4. Units prepare requests for visual information products on official letterhead signed by a branch or unit
head. They may submit requests to the Defense Imagery Management Operations Center by facsimile, postal
mail, or e-mail.
C-5. The following information is required when requesting imagery—
* Subject and/or image identification number.
* Unit, location, event, or operation name.
* Date or date range.
* Equipment or equipment type to represent, if any.
* Action requester wants to see.
* Media format, size, and quantity.
* Date needed.
* Requester’s name, rank, and position title.
* Requester’s Defense Switched Network and commercial telephone numbers.
* Complete official mailing address, including building and room or suite number.
* How media is to be used (briefing, training).
* For motion media requests, the approximate total number of minutes needed for each subject. |
6-02 | 153 | Visual Information
C-6. The Defense Imagery Management Operations Center provides high-resolution photograph archive
files for download through the defense imagery Website. Requesters bear expenses for hard copy production
and duplication. Official government customers can also obtain visual information products from the Defense
Imagery Website. |
6-02 | 155 | Appendix D
Signal Systems Maintenance
This appendix outlines two-level maintenance at brigade and below. It discusses
communications-electronics maintenance and the logistics support provided to build
and preserve operational readiness. Early detection by the operator, crew, or
maintainer, correction of failures as far forward as possible, and prompt replenishment
of repair parts are essential to readiness.
MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT
D-1. Army organizations are required to establish standard operating procedures and maintenance
management processes to sustain, repair, evacuate, and report maintenance readiness status of critical
communication systems. The Cyber Lessons and Best Practices Website contains sample maintenance
standard operating procedures. Refer to FM 4-30 and ATP 4-33 for detailed information on maintenance
support.
TWO-LEVEL MAINTENANCE
D-2. The Army utilizes a tiered, two-level maintenance system comprised of field and sustainment
maintenance. Command teams, maintenance personnel, and planners must have a complete understanding of
two-level maintenance fundamentals to plan and execute their mission. See table D-1 for the alignment of
units to the type of maintenance performed.
* Field maintenance takes place as close to the point of use as possible. The owning unit retains
the equipment or receives it back from the maintenance support facility. Equipment operators,
operator-maintainers, and ordnance-trained maintainers perform field maintenance. Army
maintenance units also provide field maintenance support.
* Sustainment maintenance restores equipment to a national standard, after which the equipment
is returned into the supply system. Sustainment maintenance requires evacuating the equipment to
a support facility. When a unit sends equipment to a sustainment maintenance organization, the
owning unit usually removes the equipment from its property book. Only in rare instances, such
as unit reset, does the equipment return to the owning unit.
Table D-1. Alignment of units to type of maintenance performed
Field Maintenance Sustainment Maintenance
Operator/crew Army field support brigade (management)
Forward support company Army field support battalion
Field maintenance company United States Army Materiel Command support
formations
Support maintenance company Army depots
Other units with assigned Ordnance Logistics readiness center (installation)
School-trained maintainers
D-3. The goal of the maintenance system is to reduce repair times by repairing or replacing components,
modules, and assemblies as far forward as possible by maximizing reliance on rapid repair parts distribution. |
6-02 | 156 | Appendix D
FIELD MAINTENANCE
D-4. Field maintenance consists of two subcategories, operator or crew and Ordnance Corps trained
maintainer. Field maintenance restores unserviceable equipment, communications systems, or weapon
systems using line replaceable units or modules and component replacement or repair. The owning unit
normally performs field maintenance using organic tools and test equipment. The unit should retain and repair
the item until it is ready to return to service. Field maintenance is not limited to simply remove and replace
actions. If the operator, crew, or maintainer have the skills, special tools, repair parts, references, and adequate
time to repair an item, the unit should not evacuate equipment for sustainment maintenance.
D-5. The brigade support battalion has low-density specialty maintainers to maintain specialized equipment
in the brigade combat team. These personnel perform maintenance the forward support companies are not
structured to accomplish including missiles, fire control systems, and signal systems.
D-6. Field maintenance includes actions performed by crew members, operators, and maintenance
personnel, such as—
* Adjustment.
* Alignment.
* Service.
* Applying field-level modification work orders.
* Fault or failure diagnosis.
* Battle damage assessment and repair.
* Recovery.
D-7. Field maintenance is always repair and return to the user. Maintenance personnel at echelons below
brigade level reside in the owning unit, forward support company, and field maintenance company.
Operator and Crew Maintenance
D-8. Operators and crews perform field maintenance on their assigned equipment as outlined in the
equipment operator’s manual. The operator or crew is typically the first to observe a fault or failure. In many
instances, operators or crews can repair the fault or minimize its impact, enabling mission completion.
Operators and crews may also initiate maintenance tasks in response to fault or failure indicators or
instrumentation. Typical tasks consist of inspecting, servicing, lubricating, adjusting, and replacing minor
components or assemblies, as authorized in the maintenance allocation chart. Operator and crew tasks in a
maintenance allocation chart refer to the applicable technical manual and use basic issue items and onboard
spares.
D-9. Operators and crews are specialists on their systems. They receive formal military occupational
specialty or functional training on diagnosing system faults. Operators and crews troubleshoot their systems
using the operator’s manual and simplified or embedded diagnostic equipment to identify, isolate, and trace
problems. Operators and crews include signal or military intelligence military occupational specialties, or a
maneuver unit’s master gunner, who receive advanced individual training, specialized courses, and in some
instances, specialized tools. Their primary focus is the system’s performance and integrity. After operators
and crews exhaust their maintenance capabilities, they rely on maintenance personnel to conduct field
maintenance on their equipment. Most maneuver units receive this maintenance support from the forward
support company.
Maintainer Maintenance
D-10. Maintainer maintenance is performed by Ordnance School-trained maintenance personnel.
Maintainers repair a component, accessory, assembly, subassembly, plug-in unit, shop replaceable unit, line
replaceable unit, or other portion of the equipment, either on the system or after removal by a trained
maintainer.
D-11. Depending on the system and military occupational specialty involved, the definition of a line
replaceable unit or shop replaceable unit is flexible. The characterization of line or shop replaceable units for
wheeled and tracked vehicles, radar, or communications systems shifts as the field maintenance |
6-02 | 157 | Signal Systems Maintenance
troubleshooting increases in complexity. Operator-maintainers working with communications systems and
communications-electronics equipment, armament routinely perform tasks other maintainers would consider
sustainment-level maintenance.
SUSTAINMENT MAINTENANCE
D-12. Since it is closer to the point of use, field maintenance is the preferred method of repair. However,
operators, crews, and unit maintenance personnel sometimes lack the skills, special tools, repair parts, or
references to complete repairs. This may require evacuating equipment for sustainment maintenance. Based
on the extent of damage or failure, leaders use their professional judgment to determine the best course of
action, based on operational and mission variables.
D-13. The intent of sustainment maintenance is to perform commodity-oriented repairs to return items to a
national standard, providing a consistent and measurable level of reliability. Sustainment maintenance
supports both operational forces and the Army supply system. Sustainment maintenance is comprised of two
subcategories—below depot-level sustainment maintenance and depot-level sustainment maintenance.
Depot Maintenance
D-14. Tobyhanna Army Depot provides depot-level sustainment maintenance for communications-
electronics systems, including joint satellite communications and joint command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Besides depot repairs and spares
management, Tobyhanna Army Depot can provide on-site depot-level technical assistance.
D-15. Tobyhanna’s forward repair activities provide depot-level sustainment presence at locations inside and
outside the continental United States. Tobyhanna field service representatives provide depot-level technical
assistance visits for on-site troubleshooting, repair, and configuration assistance worldwide.
Below Depot Maintenance
D-16. The United States Army Communications-Electronics Command Field Sustainment Support Division
has seven regional support centers aligned with the Army field support brigades. Regional support centers
provide forward logistical support, including care of supplies in storage, warehousing, below depot
sustainment maintenance, and return maintenance authorizations for warranty items. The regional support
centers can react rapidly to warfighter requirements and support surge requirements, if necessary. Regional
support centers mainly support commercial off-the-shelf and non-standard equipment.
D-17. United States Army Communications-Electronics Command provides below depot sustainment
maintenance for United States Army Training and Doctrine Command training base tactical equipment at
Fort Huachuca, Arizona and Fort Gordon, Georgia. This includes associated support items of equipment for
the systems.
D-18. United States Army Communications-Electronics Command’s logistics assistance representatives
provide commanders the technical guidance necessary to resolve problems with weapon systems, equipment,
and logistics. Logistics assistance representatives help solve readiness issues at unit level, and assist with
logistics problems beyond the unit’s resources or capabilities to resolve through—
* Technical guidance to resolve equipment and systemic logistics issues.
* Analysis of readiness issues.
* Identification of systemic issues with command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence equipment.
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE
D-19. The unique maintenance requirements of signal equipment and the need to maintain the DODIN-A
with minimal downtime requires more responsive maintenance procedures. Some signal military
occupational specialties are operator-maintainers who can perform more extensive field maintenance on their
assigned equipment at the point of use. These operator-maintainers perform equipment replacement tasks to
restore or maintain the viability of the network. |
6-02 | 158 | Appendix D
NETWORK SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE
D-20. Maintaining the DODIN-A requires continual coordination between signal leaders and staffs. The
G-6 (S-6) and the division and brigade signal leaders work across organizational boundaries to sustain their
portions of the DODIN-A.
Communications-Electronics Maintenance in the Maneuver Battalion
D-21. The S-6 works in conjunction with the logistics staff, support operations, communications-electronics
maintenance shop, and the forward support company commander to develop a comprehensive maintenance
plan. The maintenance plan includes coordination for contractor field service representative support. The
maintenance plan becomes part of the unit’s maintenance standard operating procedure. This ensures there
are clearly understood procedures to preserve the battalion’s maintenance readiness. The signal support
systems specialist in the brigade and battalion S-6—
* Replaces defective line replaceable units or modules in communications-electronics systems,
COMSEC devices, remote control systems, intercoms, and automated information systems.
* Replaces line replaceable units or modules or evacuates equipment to the forward support
company for repair or replacement of faulty communications-electronics equipment and
automated information systems.
* Repairs and installs the unit’s communications-electronics systems wiring and cabling.
* Installs and removes vehicular and base station communications systems, and automated
information systems. This includes installation kits, antennas, and cables on all platforms.
* Performs communications-electronics systems testing.
* Maintains test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment calibration records.
* Manages and maintains battery inventory and charging systems.
* Orders and maintains bench stock.
* Applies modifications and directions, such as technical bulletin guidance.
D-22. Maneuver battalions typically receive field maintenance support from the brigade support battalion’s
forward support company. The forward support company has a maintenance platoon to repair automotive,
armament, ground support, electronics, and missile equipment. The forward support company focuses on line
replaceable units using combat spares from prescribed load list and shop stock. The forward support company
has a service and recovery section to perform battle damage assessment and repair.
D-23. The forward support company’s maintenance control section uses logistics automated information
systems to order and track repair parts. The forward support company commander establishes maintenance
collection points in coordination with the maneuver battalion’s logistics staff.
Communications-Electronics Maintenance in the Brigade
D-24. The brigade S-6 maintains and monitors the status of the brigade’s portion of the DODIN-A. The S-6
works closely with the brigade signal company commander, brigade engineer battalion staff, and the
executive officer to ensure critical network maintenance and parts are available to maintain operations.
D-25. Each maneuver brigade has an assigned brigade support battalion with a forward support company and
a field maintenance company. In the other brigades, the forward support company supports the maneuver
battalions. The field maintenance company supports the brigade headquarters and other non-maneuver units
in the brigade.
D-26. The field maintenance company has a base support platoon to provide electronics equipment
maintenance support and conduct float management of communications-electronics equipment to a forward
support company. The forward support company focuses on line replaceable units using combat spares from
shop stock. The forward support company has a service and recovery section to perform battle damage
assessment and repair. The forward support company’s maintenance control section uses logistics automated
information systems to order and track repair parts. The forward support company commander establishes
maintenance collection points in coordination with the brigade logistics staff. |
6-02 | 159 | Signal Systems Maintenance
Brigade S-6
D-27. The brigade S-6 closely tracks the maintenance status and availability of the brigade’s communications
equipment and systems. The brigade S-6 works closely with the brigade signal commander, executive officer,
and electronic systems maintenance warrant officer to ensure critical network maintenance, services, repair
parts, and spares are available to preserve operational readiness.
Brigade Signal Company
D-28. The brigade signal company coordinates network performance and maintenance issues with the brigade
S-6. The brigade signal company has operator-maintainers who perform field maintenance on organic signal
equipment. The signal company executive officer coordinates maintenance support for organic equipment
and maintains logistical and maintenance oversight for the company.
UNITS WITH NO ORGANIC MAINTENANCE CAPABILITIES
D-29. Some units in the brigade have limited or no organic field maintenance capability or capacity. These
units normally receive field maintenance support or augmentation from a supporting maintenance
organization. Maneuver battalions are examples of units without organic field maintenance capabilities.
These units receive field maintenance support from the brigade support battalion’s forward support
companies. Functional brigades without organic maintenance capabilities for any equipment or commodity
area normally coordinate for support from a sustainment brigade or combat sustainment support battalion.
The sustainment brigade or combat sustainment support battalion’s support maintenance company provides
field maintenance to division and above units with no organic maintenance capabilities. |
6-02 | 161 | Appendix E
Requests for Signal Support
Units with no organic signal assets, or units tasked to perform a mission beyond their
organic signal capabilities, request signal support through the request for forces
process. The signal requirements may be fulfilled in-theater using regionally-aligned
forces, or may require resources from the global force pool.
IDENTIFYING SIGNAL REQUIREMENTS
E-1. Units that require signal augmentation do not request a unit, such as an expeditionary signal company,
or a communications assemblage, but the operational capability required to accomplish their mission. The
requesting unit G-6 (S-6) identifies the signal requirements. Accurately defining requirements simplifies the
process of validation as the request routes through successive levels of the chain of command. The G-6
(S-6) determines—
* Services required by type and quantity—
NIPRNET.
SIPRNET.
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System.
Secure and nonsecure voice.
Video teleconferencing.
Coalition—mission partner environment.
Commercial services.
* Mission and purpose for each service.
* Period of services—
Starting date-time group.
Ending date-time group, if known.
* Location of services.
REQUEST FOR FORCES
E-2. Once the G-6 (S-6) identifies the signal requirements, the G-3 (S-3) initiates a request for forces and
forwards it to their higher headquarters for validation. For the request for forces to be validated, it must make
operational sense. The request for forces identifies—
* The unit requesting support.
* The capability required. Requestors describe the capability clearly enough to identify in lieu of
sourcing, if applicable.
* Time needed.
Earliest arrival date.
Latest arrival date.
* Deployment duration, and whether or not service rotations are authorized.
* Mission justification.
Why the capability is required.
Operational risk, if not sourced.
Mitigation measures available to reduce that risk. |
6-02 | 162 | Appendix E
* Similar capabilities in the area of responsibility.
Number.
Justification why they cannot be used.
* Identify whether the request is for additional or replacement forces.
Detailed justification.
If additional, what change in the operational environment created the requirement?
* Special training requirements.
* Command and control relationships.
* Urgency.
Non-urgent—120 days prior to earliest arrival date.
Urgent or emergent—within 120 days.
Immediate—within 30 days.
REQUIREMENT VALIDATION
E-3. As the request for forces routes through the chain of command to the geographic combatant
commander, each successive level reviews the request to determine—
* Whether the requirements are valid.
* Whether the requested forces are operationally necessary.
* Whether the requirement can be satisfied internally with organic or attached signal elements.
* A sourcing recommendation to fulfill the requirement.
SOURCING
E-4. If the theater army or geographic combatant command can fulfill the requirement with forces already
in theater, the geographic combatant command sources the capability internally. The tasking order defines
operational, tactical, and administrative control relationships for the supporting and supported units.
E-5. If the geographic combatant cannot fulfill the requirement, the combatant command J-3 forwards the
request to the Joint Staff J-3 force management office. The J-3 force management office—
* Validates the unit request.
* Assigns a force tracking number.
* Forwards the request to United States Army Forces command for sourcing.
E-6. United States Army Forces Command G-3—
* Identifies a unit to fulfill the requirement.
* Forwards to the Joint Staff J-3 force management office for allocation.
E-7. The Joint Staff J-3 force management office—
* Approves the source.
* Allocates the requirement in the Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager system.
* Forwards the allocated requirement to U.S. Army Forces Command.
E-8. United States Army Forces Command issues a deployment order to the identified unit. The deployment
order identifies the operational, tactical, and administrative control relationships for the supporting and
supported units. Figure E-1 on page E-3 outlines the request for forces process. |
6-02 | 163 | Requests for Signal Support
Figure E-1. Request for forces process |
6-02 | 165 | Source Notes
This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it
lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number.
1-2. “There is no better example…”: General Martin E. Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Joint Information Environment White Paper, 22 January 2013.
2-40. “A strong case can be made…”: A History of U.S. Communications Security (U): The David G.
Boak Lectures, Vol. II, National Security Agency, July 1981. |
6-02 | 167 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 6-02 is the
proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms
is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ARCYBER United States Army Cyber Command
CEMA cyberspace electromagnetic activities
CIO chief information officer
COMCAM combat camera
COMSEC communications security
DISN Defense Information Systems Network
DODIN Department of Defense information network
DODIN-A Department of Defense information network-Army
EW electronic warfare
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-6 assistant chief of staff, signal
HF high frequency
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
JTF joint task force
NETCOM United States Army Network Enterprise Technology Command
NIPRNET Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network
PACE primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-6 battalion or brigade signal staff officer
SC(T) signal command (theater)
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
VHF very high frequency
SECTION II – TERMS
adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may
be envisaged. (JP 3-0) |
6-02 | 168 | Glossary
combat camera
Specially-trained expeditionary forces from Service-designated units capable of providing high-quality
directed visual information during military operations. Also called COMCAM. (JP 3-61)
command and control
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. (JP 1)
command and control system
The arrangement of personnel, processes and procedures, networks, and command posts that enable
commanders to conduct operations. (ADP 6-0)
command and control warfighting function
The related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of
combat power. (ADP 6-0)
communications security
The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value
that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead
unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also called
COMSEC. (JP 6-0)
cybersecurity
Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications
systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication,
including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication,
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. (DODI 8500.01)
cyberspace
A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of
information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (JP 3-12)
cyberspace electromagnetic activities
The process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations
in support of unified land operations. Also called CEMA. (ADP 3-0)
cyberspace operations
The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or
through cyberspace. (JP 3-0)
defense-in-depth
An information security strategy integrating people, technology, and operations capabilities to
establish variable barriers across multiple layers and missions of the organization. (CNSSI 4009)
defensive cyberspace operations
Missions to preserve the ability to utilize blue cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks,
cyberspace-enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent
malicious cyberspace activity. (JP 3-12)
defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures
Operations in which authorized defense actions occur within the defended portion of cyberspace.
(JP 3-12)
defensive cyberspace operations-response actions
Operations that are part of a defensive cyberspace operations mission that are taken external to the
defended network or portion of cyberspace without the permission of the owner of the affected
system. (JP 3-12) |
6-02 | 169 | Glossary
Department of Defense information network
The set of information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing,
disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support
personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone, including owned and leased communications and
computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other
associated services, and national security systems. Also called DODIN. (JP 6-0)
Department of Defense information network-Army
An Army-operated enclave of the Department of Defense information network that encompasses all
Army information capabilities that collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information
worldwide. Also called DODIN-A. (ATP 6-02.71)
Department of Defense information network operations
Operations to secure, configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain Department of Defense
cyberspace to create and preserve the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the Department of
Defense information network. Also called DODIN operations. (JP 3-12)
electromagnetic jamming
The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of
preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and with the intent
of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. (JP 3-13.1)
electromagnetic spectrum
The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26
alphabetically designated bands. (JP 3-13.1)
electronic warfare
Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. (JP 3-13.1)
emission control
The selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command
and control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security: a. detection by enemy sensors; b.
mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or c. enemy interference with the ability to execute a
military deception plan. (JP 3-13.1)
enclave
A set of system resources that operate in the same security domain and that share the protection of a
single, common, continuous security perimeter. (CNSSI 4009)
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADP 3-0)
field maintenance
On-system maintenance, repair and return to the user including maintenance actions performed by
operators .(FM 4-30)
force projection
The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another
theater, in response to requirements for military operations. (JP 3-0)
forcible entry
Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or forcing access into a
denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-18)
hybrid threat
The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists, or criminal
elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. (ADP 3-0) |
6-02 | 170 | Glossary
information environment
The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on
information. (JP 3-13)
information management
The science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display,
disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products. (ADP 6-0)
information operations
The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert
with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries
and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)
insider threat
A person with placement and access who intentionally causes loss or degradation of resources or
capabilities or compromises the ability of an organization to accomplish its mission through espionage,
providing support to international terrorism, or the unauthorized release or disclosure of information
about the plans and intentions of United States military forces. (AR 381-12)
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (ATP 2-01.3)
knowledge management
The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision
making. (ADP 6-0)
local area network
A data communications system that (a) lies within a limited spatial area, (b) has a specific user group,
(c)has a specific topology, and (d) is not a public switched telecommunications network, but may be
connected to one. Note 1: Local area networks are usually restricted to relatively small areas, such as
rooms, buildings, ships, and aircraft. Note 2: An interconnection of local area networks within a
limited geographical area, such as a military base, is commonly referred to as a campus area network.
An interconnection of local area networks over a city-wide geographical area is commonly called a
metropolitan area network. An interconnection of local area networks over large geographical areas,
such as nationwide, is commonly called a wide-area network. Note 3: Local area networks are not
subject to public telecommunications regulations. (American National Standard T1.523.2011)
military decision-making process
An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action,
and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)
military engagement
The routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the United States Armed Forces
and those of another nation’s armed forces or civilian authorities to build trust and confidence, share
information, coordinate mutual activities and maintain influence. (JP 3-0)
mission command
The Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and
decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.. (ADP 6-0)
network enterprise center
The facility that provides and acquires telecommunications and information management services on
Army installations. (ATP 6-02.71)
*network transport
The processes, equipment, and transmission media that provide connectivity and move data between
networking devices and facilities. |
6-02 | 171 | Glossary
offensive cyberspace operations
Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.
(JP 3-12)
operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that effect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operational reach
The distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)
retrograde
A defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (ADP 3-90)
running estimate
The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is
proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.
(ADP 5-0)
* spectrum management operations
The interrelated functions of spectrum management, frequency assignment, host nation coordination,
and policy that together enable the planning, management, and execution of operations within the
electromagnetic operational environment during all phases of military operations.
spillage
A security incident that results in the transfer of classified information onto an information system not
authorized to store or process that information. (CNSSI 4009)
synchronization
The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat
power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)
technical channels
The chain of authority for ensuring the execution of clearly delineated technical tasks, functions, and
capabilities to meet the dynamic requirements of Department of Defense information network
operations. (ATP 6-02.71)
threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and into to harm United States
forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADP 3-0)
unified land operations
The simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities
across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale
ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action. (ADP 3-0)
visual information
Various visual media with or without sound that generally includes still and motion photography,
audio video recording, graphic arts, and visual presentations. (JP 3-61)
wide-area network
A physical or logical network that provides data communications to a larger number of independent
users than are usually served by a local area network and is usually spread over a larger geographic
area than that of a local area network. Note 1: Wide-area networks may include physical networks,
such as Integrated Services Digital Networks, X.25 networks, and T1 networks. Note 2: A
metropolitan area network is a wide-area network that serves all the users in a metropolitan area. Wide-
area networks may be nationwide or worldwide. (American National Standard T1.523.2011) |
6-02 | 173 | References
All URLs accessed on 26 August 2019.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. July 2019.
ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: https://www.jcs.mil/doctrine.
DODD 8140.01. Cybersecurity Workforce Management. 11 August 2015.
DODI 5040.02. Visual Information. 27 October 2011.
DODI 8500.01. Cybersecurity. 14 March 2014.
DODI 8510.01. Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DOD Information Technology (IT).
12 March 2014.
JP 1. Joint Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.
JP 3-12. Cyberspace Operations. 8 June 2018.
JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-13.1. Electronic Warfare. 8 February 2012.
JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 11 May 2017.
JP 3-27. Homeland Defense. 10 April 2018.
JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 31 January 2018.
JP 3-61. Public Affairs. 17 November 2015.
JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 16 June 2017.
JP 6-0. Joint Communications System. 10 June 2015.
JP 6-01. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations. 20 March 2012.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil.
ADP 1. The Army. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31. July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019.
ADP 7-0. Training. 31 July 2019. |
6-02 | 174 | References
AR 5-22. The Army Force Modernization Proponent System. 28 October 2015.
AR 25-6. Military Auxiliary Radio System and Amateur Radio Program. 3 January 2014.
AR 381-12. Threat Awareness and Reporting Program. 1 June 2016.
ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 1 March 2019.
ATP 3-05.60. Special Operations Communications System. 30 November 2015.
ATP 3-12.3. Electronic Warfare Techniques. 16 July 2019.
ATP 3-37.10. Base Camps. 27 January 2017.
ATP 3-93. Theater Army Operations. 26 November 2014.
ATP 3-94.1. Digital Liaison Detachment. 28 December 2017.
ATP 3-96.1. Security Force Assistance Brigade. 2 May 2018.
ATP 4-15. Army Watercraft Operations. 3 April 2015.
ATP 4-33. Maintenance Operations. 9 July 2019.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.
ATP 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations. 1 March 2017.
ATP 6-01.1. Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management. 6 March 2015.
ATP 6-02.40. Techniques for Visual Information Operations. 14 January 2019.
ATP 6-02.53. Techniques for Tactical Radio Operations. 7 January 2016.
ATP 6-02.54. Techniques for Satellite Communications. 5 June 2017.
ATP 6-02.60. Tactical Networking Techniques for Corps and Below. 9 August 2019.
ATP 6-02.70. Techniques for Spectrum Management Operations. 31 December 2015.
ATP 6-02.71. Techniques for Department of Defense Information Network Operations. 30 April 2019.
ATP 6-02.75. Techniques for Communications Security Operations. 17 August 2015.
FM 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.
FM 3-12. Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. 11 April 2017.
FM 3-14. Army Space Operations. 19 August 2014.
FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.
FM 3-50. Army Personnel Recovery. 2 September 2014.
FM 3-53. Military Information Support Operations. 4 January 2013.
FM 3-94. Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations. 21 April 2014.
FM 3-96. Brigade Combat Team. 8 October 2015.
FM 4-30. Ordnance Operations. 1 April 2014.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 6-27. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 7 August 2019.
TB 380-40. Security: Army Controlling Authority and Command Authority Procedures.
10 September 2012.
TC 7-100. Hybrid Threat. 26 November 2010.
TC 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. 9 December 2011.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
A History of U.S. Communications Security (U): The David G. Boak Lectures, Vol. II. National
Security Agency, July 1981. https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-
documents/cryptologic-histories/assets/files/history_comsec_ii.pdf.
American National Standard T1.523.2011. Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions
Telecom Glossary 2011. https://glossary.atis.org/. |
6-02 | 175 | References
Army Information Assurance Best Business Practices Document 04-IA-O-0001. Army Password
Standards. 1 May 2008. https://www.milsuite.mil/book/servlet/JiveServlet/download/22894-
1-114498/04-IA-O-0001_Army_Password_Standards.pdf. (Requires DOD-approved
certificate login).
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Information Environment White Paper. 22 January 2013.
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/environmentalwhitepaper.pdf.
CNSSI 4009. Committee on National Security Systems Glossary. 6 April 2015.
https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm.
Defense Information Service Agency. Enabling the Joint Information Environment: Shaping the
Enterprise for the Conflicts of Tomorrow. 5 May 2014.
https://www.disa.mil/~/media/Files/DISA/About/JIE101_000.pdf.
Memorandum, DOD CIO. 15 December 2014. Subject: Updated Guidance on the Acquisition and Use
of Commercial Cloud Computing Services.
https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Cloud/DoD%20CIO%20-
%20Updated%20Guidance%20-
%20Acquisition%20and%20Use%20of%20Commercial%20Cloud%20Serviices_20141215.pdf.
UNITED STATES LAW
Most acts and public laws are available at https://uscode.house.gov/.
Clinger-Cohen Act
Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces.
Title 32, United States Code. National Guard.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019.
ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2019.
AR 25-1. Army Information Technology. 15 July 2019.
AR 25-2. Army Cybersecurity. 4 April 2019.
CJCSI 3205.01D. Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM). 20 October 2014.
CJCSM 6510.01B. Cyber Incident Handling Program. 10 July 2012.
DODI 8530.01. Cybersecurity Activities Support to DOD Information Network Operations.
7 March 2016.
TB 380-41. Security: Procedures for Safeguarding Accounting and Supply Control of COMSEC
Material. 15 August 2013.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Website:
https://armypubs.army.mil.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
WEBSITES
Approved Products List Integrated Tracking System Website (Requires DOD-approved certificate
login) https://aplits.disa.mil. |
6-02 | 176 | References
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information Management Services List Website
(Requires DOD-approved certificate login) https://www.itmetrics.hua.army.mil. (Choose
e-mail certificate.)
Cyber Lessons and Best Practices Website (Requires DOD-approved certificate login)
https://lwn.army.mil/web/cll/home.
Defense Imagery Website https://www.dimoc.mil. |
6-02 | 177 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
COMSEC. See
A C
communications security
ACOIC. See Army Cyber camouflage net masking, A-9
congested environment, 1-31
Operations and Integration capability, expeditionary, 1-157
Center consolidation area, 4-11
capacity, 1-100
agility, 1-99 consolidation of gains, 4-19,
CATS. See combined arms
5-1
antenna placement, B-60 training strategy
large-scale offense, 4-48
ARCYBER, 2-138 CECOM, 2-157 operations to prevent, 3-56
area defense, 4-5 CEMA. See cyberspace shaping, 3-36
Army Cyber Operations and electromagnetic activities contested environment, 1-35
Integration Center, 2-139 CEWO. See electronic warfare continuity of operations, 1-48
army, theater, 2-47 officer
convergence, transport, 2-267
G-6, 2-50 CIO/G-6, 2-136
COOP. See continuity of
signal support, 2-51
cloud computing, 2-231 operations
attacks, cyberspace, A-49
colorless core, 2-266 core competencies, 1-120, 2-
aviation operations, support to,
combat camera, 2-198 166
2-119
requests for support, C-1 corps, 2-4
B combined arms training G-6, 2-6
battalion strategy, 2-223 signal company, 2-12
maneuver, 2-29 COMCAM. See combat countering weapons of mass
capabilities, 2-31 camera destruction, 3-30
S-6, 2-29, 2-39, 2-45 command and control, support cyber electronic warfare officer,
security force assistance, 2- to, 1-137 A-20
45
signal command posts, dislocation, A- cybersecurity, 3-22
expeditionary, 2-60, 2-155 13 cyberspace electromagnetic
satellite control, 2-163 communications in depth, 2- activities, 2-103
special operations, 2-87 265 cyberspace operations
strategic, 2-153 communications security, 2- defensive, 2-96, 2-101
support, 2-39 202 offensive, 2-100
battle drills, 2-222 communications, base camp, cyberspace operations, support
BCT. See brigade combat 2-122 to, 2-91, 3-25
team company cyberspace workforce, 2-110
brigade maneuver, 2-32
D
S-6, 2-34, 2-43 signal
security force assistance, 2- brigade, 2-27, 2-37, 2-44 data exfiltration, A-60
42 combat camera, 2-65 Defense Information Systems
signal corps, 2-12 Network, 2-233
strategic, 2-151 division, 2-20 defense support of civil
tactical, 2-59 expeditionary, 2-62 authorities, 2-127
support joint/area, 2-63
defense-in-depth, 2-262
functional, 2-52 Ranger, 2-89
multifunctional, 2-33 tactical installation and degraded environment, 1-41
brigade combat team, 2-22 networking, 2-66 planning, B-47
S-6, 2-23 compatibility, 1-97 denial of service, A-50
signal company, 2-27 |
6-02 | 178 | Index
denied environment, 1-46 geographic combatant joint spectrum interference
command resolution, A-43
deployment, signal, 3-49
J-6, 2-254 joint task force, 2-54, 2-256
digital master gunner, 2-224
DISN. See Defense H JRSS. See regional top level
architecture
Information Systems home station mission
Network command, 2-276 JSIR. See joint spectrum
interference resolution
division, 2-14 homeland defense, 2-26
G-6, 2-15 JTF. See joint task force
HSMCC. See home station
signal company, 2-20
mission command K
DOD Gateway, 2-237
humanitarian relief, 3-32 knowledge management,
DODIN, 2-226
2-115
architecture, 2-230
I
command and control, IAADS. See installation as a L
2-229 docking station
large-scale combat operations,
DODIN operations, 2-95, 2-166 information advantage, 1-119 4-1
in Army networks, 2-173
information environment, 1-9 large-scale defensive
joint, 2-52
information management, operations, 4-22
tasks, 2-169
2-114 large-scale offense, 4-36
DODIN-A, 2-257
information operations, support line of sight radios, A-10
architecture, 2-260
to, 2-117
operating environments, link geometry, B-57
2-70 information services, 2-183 local infrastructure, 2-249
DSCA. See defense support of information warfare, 1-70
M
civil authorities installation as a docking
maintenance
station, 2-273
E
below depot, D-16
intelligence operations, support
echelons corps and below, 2-1 communications-
to, 2-76
electronics, D-19
electromagnetic signature,
intelligence, support to, 3-28 COMSEC, 2-159
limiting, A-6
interoperability, 1-96, 3-16 depot, D-14
electronic warfare, support to,
multinational, 1-150, 3-18 field, D-4
2-73
maintainer, D-10
isolation, 1-59
en route, 3-50 network systems, D-20
enabling units J operator and crew, D-8
support to, 4-45 J-6 sustainment, 2-158, D-12
two-level, D-2
enterprise operations center geographic combatant
global, 2-247 command, 2-254 maintenance management,
regional, 2-248 jamming, A-23 D-1
entry operations, 1-160 communications, A-25 maintenance support, D-29
early and initial, 1-162 positioning, navigation, and malware, A-55
forcible, 1-163, 4-18 timing, A-33
MDMP. See military decision-
satellite communications,
EOC. See enterprise making process
A-38
operations center, regional step 1–receipt of mission,
JCC. See joint cyberspace B-9
F
center step 2–mission analysis,
flexibility, 1-101 JIE. See joint information B-12
force projection, 1-159 environment step 3–course of action
support to, 3-48 JNCC. See joint network development, B-19
step 4–course of action
operations control center
G analysis, B-26
G-6, A-18 joint cyberspace center, 2-253 step 5–course of action
corps, 2-6 joint information environment, comparison, B-30
Department of the Army, 2-243 step 6–course of action
2-136 joint network operations control approval, B-32
division, 2-15 center, 2-255 step 7–orders production,
theater army, 2-50 dissemination, and
joint operations, support to,
transition, B-33
GEOC. See enterprise 1-122
operations center, global |
6-02 | 179 | Index
METL. See mission essential primary, alternate, contingency, network situational
tasks and emergency plan, 1-50, awareness, 1-113
B-6 operational focus, 1-94
military decision-making
process, B-1 protection, 1-109 shared networks, 1-112
trusted systems, 1-108
military engagement, 3-11
R large-scale combat
mission essential tasks, 2-216 rapid decision making, B-40 operations, 4-7
mobile defense, 4-29 large-scale defense, 4-24
RCC. See regional satellite
large-scale offense, 4-38
mobility, 1-102 communications support
objectives
movement and maneuver, center, See regional cyber information advantage,
operational, 1-155 center 1-119
multi-domain battle, 1-21 reach, strategic and strategic responsiveness,
operational, 1-152 1-117
N
redundancy, 1-103, 2-265 support to command and
NEC. See network enterprise control, 1-116
regional cyber center, 2-146
center objectives, 1-115
regional satellite operations to consolidate
NETCOM, 2-141
communications support gains, 5-4
network enterprise center, 2- center, 2-161 operations to prevent, 3-44
156, 2-272
regional top level architecture, operations to shape, 3-9
network transport, 2-180 2-250 requests, 2-68
satellite, 2-235 risks, 3-7, 3-42, 4-4, 4-34,
reliability, 1-104
4-46, 5-8
O remote antennas, A-11
site analysis, B-54
operation order request for forces, E-2
annex H, B-38 sourcing, E-4 site defense, B-64
attachments, B-39 site reconnaissance, B-63
requirements, identification,
paragraph 5, B-37
E-1 site selection, B-61
operational concept, Army, 1-
requirements, validation, E-3 situational awareness, 1-113
135
retrograde, 4-32 social engineering, A-69
operational environment, 1-1
RFF. See request for forces social media attacks, A-83
anticipated, 1-6
trends, 1-15 RSOI, 3-52 space capabilities, 1-24
operational focus, 1-94 running estimate, B-2 space operations, support to,
2-78
operations assessment, 3-5 S
special forces, 2-81
operations to prevent, 3-38 S-6, A-18
special operations, support to,
battalion, 2-45
P 2-79
brigade, 2-34, 2-43
PACE. See primary, alternate, brigade combat team, 2-23 spectrum management, 2-186
contingency, and emergency maneuver battalion, 2-29 planning, B-52
plan
special forces group, 2-83 stability tasks, 4-9
personal electronic devices, A- support battalion, 2-39
staff integration, A-15
91
sanctuary, 1-61
standardization, 1-98
personally identifiable
SC(T). See signal command
information, 2-240 strategic roles, 1-127
(theater)
consolidate gains, 1-134
phishing, A-76
scalability, 1-105 large-scale ground combat,
PII. See personally identifiable security cooperation, 3-13 1-132
information prevent conflict, 1-130
shape, 3-2
planning shape, 1-128
shared networks, 1-112
degraded environment, survivability, 1-110
B-47 signal command (theater),
sustainability, 1-111
2-57, 2-145
planning considerations, B-44
sustainment, support to, 4-43
signal staff estimate, B-2
port operations, support to, 2-
systems warfare, 1-63
121 signal support
preclusion, 1-57 fundamental principles, T
1-92
TAC. See tactical actions
agility, 1-99
center
interoperability, 1-96 |
6-02 | 180 | Index
tactical actions center, 2-150 threat effects, recognizing, trusted systems, 1-108
tactical enabling tasks, 4-13 A-22
U
tailoring capabilities, 3-47 threat tactics, techniques, and
unified capabilities, 2-238
procedures, A-1
terrain masking, A-8, B-59
USASMDC/ARSTRAT, 2-160
timeliness, 1-106
theater network operations
control center, 2-255 TNCC. See theater network V
operations control center
threat visual information, 2-192
activities in cyberspace, training requests, C-4
1-77 collective, 2-213, 2-217
hybrid, 1-65
individual, 2-209
W
insider, 1-89 resident, 2-210 warfighting functions, support
peer, 1-54 sustainment, 2-212 to, 1-146
threat effects, 1-53 troop leading procedures, B-48 |
6-02 | 181 | FM 6-02
13 September 2019
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
1925303
DISTRIBUTION: |
6-27 | 1 | FM 6-27
MCTP 11-10C
THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
AUGUST 2019
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 27-10/MCTP 11-10C,
dated 18 July 1956.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY |
6-27 | 2 | Foreword
Thlee sospfo rnost rcaocntflceiodcn tfit rhamad th ertetonh lceaeo w fa r mceodn fl(iLcOtAb Cyt) h lea fonrdc es,
boitnih n ternaatnnidoo nn-ailn taerrnmacetodin oflmniuacssltte , ra vste hs et antdhawarettd r atioan na dp ply
acrtohseesn triarnoegfm e i liotpareyr aAtdihoentrsLoi.O n AgeC n hatnhcleee sg itoifom uoarpc eyr aatnido ns
supptohrmeto srfr aalm ewoofor ukar r mfoerdc Weesh .a vlee arntehwdae td evifraotmte h ensoert moos u r
detrainmrdei nustnk d ercbuodttothmi enasgnt idin ct ernastuipopfonoroar uoltrp eraLtOiAohCna sbs.e eann d
remaavi ingtsua ilfod rae lm li liotpaerryac toinodnubscyt t hUee.d GS o.v ernmeTnhtfii.es ml adn uparlo vai des
genedreaslc roiftp hlteai owofl n a wnadr faforrSe o ldainMedar rsi dneelsi,na essa ttaetdeo mfde oncttansrd i ne
practtgoiu citedh,lee a fonrdc iecnso ndudcitsicnimgpi lliiontpearedyr aitanic ocnosrw diattnhhrce ue ol fel aw.
ThDee paroft mDeefenntsL ea wo fW aMra nu(aJlu2 n0e1 u5p,d aDteecde m2b0e1ir6s t) h aeu thoritative
statoenmt ehlneat ow fw aforr t hDee parotfDm eefenntIs nte h.ee v eonfatc onfloirdc its crreepganacryd ing
thlee gsatla naddarddrsei stnsh peiudsb liancdat thDieOo DLn a owf W aMra nutahllea, t ttaekprer se cedence.
Thfiiesml adn uhaabsle eonv2 e0ry earistn h mea kiannogdw emsu cthto h jeu dagdev ocSaotledMsiar,ei rnse,s ,
andc ivielmipanl owyhehoea sve en deatvuoop rdeTadht Leea owfL anWda rfsairniectp esu bliacsFa iteilodn ,
Manua(lF MF)M2 7-10/CMoarrTpiasnc etP iucballi (cMaCtTi1Po1)n- l(OcBh.anlig n2e 0d1 t7oM CT1P1 -
lOCi)1n,9 5a6nt,dh ceh apnrgoem ulig1na9 t7e6d.
CHARLNE.PS E DE
LIEUTENGAENNTE RUA.LAS,R. M Y
THEJ UDGAED VOCAGTEEN ERAL
W.F M.U LLEINI I
MAJOGRE NERUA.LMS,A. RI NEC ORPS
COMMANDIGNENGE RAL
TRAINAINNDGE DUCATCIOOMNM AND
Thpiusb liicavsaa tiiloaanttb h lAeer mPyu bliDsihriencgst iotrea te
(https://arm)ya pnutdbh Csee. natArrrmamyRly.e mgiilss/ittrey |
6-27 | 3 | (cid:41)(cid:48)(cid:3)6-27/MCTP 11-10C(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:38)(cid:20)(cid:3)
(cid:38)(cid:75)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:49)(cid:82)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:20)
Field Manual (cid:43)(cid:72)(cid:68)(cid:71)(cid:84)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:86)(cid:3)
No. 6-27 (cid:39)(cid:72)(cid:83)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:87)(cid:80)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)
Washington, DC
Marine Corps Tactical Publication (cid:43)(cid:72)(cid:68)(cid:71)(cid:84)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:86)
No. 11-10C United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command
(cid:3) Quantico, VA, 20 September 2019
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Land Warfare
(cid:20)(cid:17) (cid:36)(cid:3)(cid:83)(cid:79)(cid:88)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:86)(cid:76)(cid:74)(cid:81)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:12)(cid:3)(cid:80)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:78)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:90)(cid:3)(cid:80)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:76)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:17)
(cid:21)(cid:17) (cid:41)(cid:48)(cid:3)6-27/MCTP 11-10C(cid:15) 7 August(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)9(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:70)(cid:75)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:73)(cid:82)(cid:79)(cid:79)(cid:82)(cid:90)(cid:86)(cid:29)
(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:80)(cid:82)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:79)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:74)(cid:72)(cid:86) (cid:44)(cid:81)(cid:86)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:49)(cid:72)(cid:90)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:74)(cid:72)(cid:86)
(cid:83)(cid:68)(cid:74)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)1-5 (cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:85)(cid:82)(cid:88)(cid:74)(cid:75)(cid:3)1-6 (cid:83)(cid:68)(cid:74)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)1-5 through 1-6
3. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes. |
6-27 | 4 | FM 6-27, C1
20 September 2019
(cid:37)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:29)(cid:3)
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE(cid:3)
(cid:42)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)
(cid:38)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:72)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:73)(cid:73)(cid:3)
(cid:50)(cid:73)(cid:73)(cid:76)(cid:70)(cid:76)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:29)(cid:3)
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
1925302
(cid:37)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)Marine Corps(cid:29)(cid:3)
W.F. MULLEN III
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding General,
Training and Education Command
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: (cid:55)(cid:82)(cid:3) (cid:69)(cid:72)(cid:3) (cid:71)istributed in |
6-27 | 5 | *FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 6-27 Department of the Army
Washington, DC
Marine Corps Tactical Publication Headquarters
No. 11-10C United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command
Quantico, VA, 07 August 2019
The Commander s Handbook on the Law of
'
Land Warfare
Contents
Page
PREFACE..................................................................................................................... v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1 GENERAL BACKGROUND AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF .................
ARMED CONFLICT .................................................................................................. 1-1
International Law and Use of Force in International Relations .................................. 1-1
Lex Specialis–The Law of Armed Conflict ................................................................. 1-1
Purposes of the Law of Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 1-2
When the Law of Armed Conflict Applies .................................................................. 1-2
Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 1-5
Classes of Persons .................................................................................................. 1-11
Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 1-20
Protecting Powers and Humanitarian Organizations .............................................. 1-24
End of Hostilities and LOAC Rules .......................................................................... 1-25
Human Rights Law .................................................................................................. 1-26
Training the Law of Armed Conflict ......................................................................... 1-26
Chapter 2 CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES ................................................................................... 2-1
Practical Guidance for Adhering to LOAC ................................................................. 2-1
Distinction Between Means and Methods of Warfare ............................................... 2-1
Protection of Civilians ................................................................................................ 2-1
Protection of Civilians: A Shared Responsibility........................................................ 2-2
Civilians Taking a Direct Part in Hostilities ................................................................ 2-2
Targeting and Military Objectives .............................................................................. 2-5
Combatants ............................................................................................................. 2-10
Proportionality in Conducting Attacks – Excessive Incidental Harm and Feasible
Precautions .............................................................................................................. 2-12
Lawfulness of Certain Methods of Waging Warfare ................................................ 2-15
Good Faith, Perfidy, and Other Unlawful Acts, and Lawful Deception and Ruses of
War .......................................................................................................................... 2-24
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This publication is approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited. This publication supersedes FM 27-10/MCTP 11-10C (dated 18 July 1956). |
6-27 | 6 | Contents
Prohibition Against Compelling Enemy Nationals to Take Part in Military Operations
Directed Against Their Own Forces or State .......................................................... 2-28
Treatment of Enemy Property ................................................................................. 2-30
Ensuring Legality of Weapons and Weapon Systems ............................................ 2-32
Chapter 3 PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER DETAINEES ................................................. 3-1
Practical Guidance on POWS and Detainee Operations.......................................... 3-1
Basic Protections and Humane Treatment for All Detainees ................................... 3-1
GPW and POW Protections ...................................................................................... 3-3
Persons Entitled to Prisoner of War Status .............................................................. 3-3
Other Persons to be Given Prisoner of War Treatment ............................................ 3-5
Commencement and Duration of Status ................................................................... 3-5
Retained Personnel................................................................................................... 3-5
Persons Not Entitled to Prisoner of War Status ........................................................ 3-6
Basic Protections and Humane Treatment for POWS .............................................. 3-7
Beginning of Captivity ............................................................................................... 3-8
Internment in Prisoner of War Camps ..................................................................... 3-10
Communications, Shipments, and Related Entities ................................................ 3-13
Labor ....................................................................................................................... 3-16
Financial Resources of Prisoners of War................................................................ 3-17
Camp Administration and Discipline ....................................................................... 3-17
Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions ............................................................................ 3-18
Transfer of Prisoners of War ................................................................................... 3-22
Death of Prisoners of War ....................................................................................... 3-23
Termination of Captivity .......................................................................................... 3-23
Chapter 4 THE WOUNDED AND SICK .................................................................................... 4-1
Basic Principles ......................................................................................................... 4-1
Protection and Care of the Wounded and Sick ......................................................... 4-3
Medical Units, Facilities, Personnel, and Ground Transports ................................... 4-4
The Distinctive Emblems .......................................................................................... 4-7
Medical Care Provided by Impartial Humanitarian Organizations ............................ 4-9
Chapter 5 CIVILIANS ................................................................................................................ 5-1
Practical Guidance on the Protection of Civilians ..................................................... 5-1
General Provisions .................................................................................................... 5-2
Provisions Common to the Territories of the Parties to the Conflict and to Occupied
Territories ................................................................................................................ 5-12
Aliens in the Territory of a Party to the Conflict ...................................................... 5-13
Treatment of Internees ............................................................................................ 5-15
Chapter 6 OCCUPATION .......................................................................................................... 6-1
Overview and Practical Guidance ............................................................................. 6-1
Humane Treatment and Other Basic Protections for Protected Persons in Ooccupied
Territory ..................................................................................................................... 6-5
Administration of the Occupied Territory................................................................... 6-5
Protection of the Population of the Occupied Territory ............................................. 6-8
Relief Societies and Protected Persons ................................................................. 6-13
Treatment of Enemy Property ................................................................................. 6-13
Services of Inhabitants and Officials ....................................................................... 6-17
Public Finance ......................................................................................................... 6-19
Obedience, Security Measures, and Penal Legislation and Procedure ................. 6-23
Chapter 7 NON-HOSTILE RELATIONS BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS ................................... 7-1
General Background ................................................................................................. 7-1
Practical Guidance for Commanders ........................................................................ 7-2
Communication Between Belligerents ...................................................................... 7-2
Parlementaires .......................................................................................................... 7-3 |
6-27 | 7 | Contents
Significance of the White Flag ................................................................................... 7-5
Military Passports, Safe-Conducts, Safeguards, Cartels, and Other Special
Agreements ............................................................................................................... 7-6
Armistice .................................................................................................................... 7-8
Capitulations ............................................................................................................ 7-14
Chapter 8 WAR CRIMES AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ...... 8-1
Practical Guidance for Commanders and Soldiers or Marines ................................. 8-1
Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 8-2
War Crimes ................................................................................................................ 8-2
Prosecution of War Crimes........................................................................................ 8-7
Remedies for Violation of LOAC ............................................................................. 8-14
Appendix A MAJOR LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT TREATIES AND THEIR STATUS ............. A-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ................................................................................................................ Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Common Article 3 ........................................................................................................ 1-5
Figure 1-2. Martens Clause ............................................................................................................ 1-6
Figure 2-1. Special AP I sign for works and installations containing dangerous forces............... 2-20
Figure 4-1. The distinctive emblems .............................................................................................. 4-7
Figure 5-1. The distinctive emblem for the protection of cultural property ..................................... 5-7
Figure 5-2. The distinctive sign of civil defense ........................................................................... 5-11
Tables
Table Preface-1. Treaty name abbreviations .................................................................................... vi
Introductory table-1. New Army terms ............................................................................................. viii
Table 1-1. Application of basic LOAC principles ............................................................................ 1-6
Table 1-2. Treaties ....................................................................................................................... 1-20 |
6-27 | 9 | Preface
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates must ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable
U.S., international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels will ensure
that their Soldiers or Marines operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and applicable
rules of engagement.
This publication provides guidance to Soldiers and Marines on the doctrine and practice related to customary
and treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land and to relationships between opposing
belligerents, in order to train and prepare for combat operations. Although some of the legal principles set
forth herein also apply to warfare at sea and in the air, this publication otherwise concerns itself with the rules
peculiar to naval and aerial warfare only to the extent that such rules have some direct bearing on the activities
of Soldiers and Marines operating on land.
This is an official publication of the U.S. Army and a referenced publication for the U.S. Marine Corps. It
does not necessarily reflect the views of other Department of Defense (DOD) components or the DOD as a
whole. This publication is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or in equity against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its
officers or employees, or any other person.
The principal audience for this publication is Army and Marine Corps commanders as well as Army and
Marine Corps judge advocates. Commanders and staffs of Army and Marine Corps headquarters serving as
joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine.
Trainers and educators throughout the Army and Marine Corps will also use this publication where
appropriate. This publication often describes legal concepts in general terms for non-lawyers rather than
exhaustively.
As stated in DOD Directive 2311.01E, the Department of Defense Law of War Manual (June 2015, updated
December 2016) is the authoritative statement on the law of war for the Department of Defense. The DOD
Law of War Manual provides more detail on and discussion of the legal rules and concepts discussed in this
manual and addresses other law of war topics. Soldiers and Marines may find it useful to consult Air Force
and Navy publications on the law of war when addressing issues related to the air and sea domains.
This publication uses joint or DOD terms where applicable. Selected joint, DOD, and Army terms and
definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. When terms are defined by this publication as the
proponent for the Department of the Army and the Marine Corps, the terms and definitions are boldfaced and
italicized in the text and marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. For other definitions shown in the text,
the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
This publication uses some joint approved and some nonstandard abbreviations for treaty names to enhance
readability. The table preface-1 on page vi provides a list of the treaty name abbreviations used in this
publication. Readers should consult the Appendix to obtain the full citation for these and other major treaties
concerning the law of land warfare. |
6-27 | 10 | Preface
Table Preface-1. Treaty name abbreviations
Abbreviation Treaty Name
Hague IV; HR Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (“The Hague
Regulations”) (The Hague, October 18, 1907)
GWS Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
In Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949
GWS Sea Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949
GPW Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949
GC Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of August 12, 1949
AP I Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (“Additional Protocol I”) (June 8,
1977)
AP II Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (“Additional Protocol II”)
(June 8, 1977)
CCW Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects (Geneva, October 10, 1980)
This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and the U.S. Marine
Corps total force unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of this publication is the Future Concepts Directorate, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal
Center and School, U.S. Army. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028
(Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, The Judge Advocate
General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, ATTN: CTR-FC, 600 Massie Road, Charlottesville, VA
22903-1781. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to usarmy.pentagon.hqda-
[email protected]. Follow the DA Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form
2028. |
6-27 | 11 | Introduction
DOD policy requires “[m]embers of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed
conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations” (Department of
Defense Directive [DODD] 2311.01E).
This publication addresses topics that are also addressed in the DOD Law of War Manual. In the event of a
conflict or discrepancy regarding the legal standards addressed in this publication and the DOD Law of War
Manual, the latter takes precedence. In many cases, any apparent conflict or discrepancy may be due to this
publication’s efforts to provide guidance to Commanders by describing legal concepts more generally rather
than exhaustively as found the DOD Law of War Manual. In certain instances, this publication will set out a
current policy or practice for Army and Marine forces rather than a legal requirement.
The terms “law of war” and “law of armed conflict” are used interchangeably in practice, but this publication
uses the term LOAC. Although the term international humanitarian law (IHL) is favored by academics and
some others in the international community, it is the Army and Marine Corps’ practice not to use this term
as it could confuse practitioners as to the body of law to apply. LOAC is that part of international law that
regulates the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims.
This publication summarizes the law and practice under LOAC for legal and operational practitioners of the
Army and Marine Corps. It draws from treaties to which the United States is a party, customary international
law, the DOD Law of War Manual, and other references describing long-standing U.S. military practice. It
has precedent in the first comprehensive publication of the U.S. military regulation of LOAC, prepared by
Professor Francis Lieber, and approved by President Lincoln in April 1863 in General Orders Number 100.
The basic LOAC rules and principles applicable to Soldiers and Marines can be summarized by the following
basic Soldier’s Rules (see AR 350-1)/Marine Corps Basic Principles (see MCO 3300.4A), developed by
Army and Marine judge advocates to train Soldiers and Marines to conform to LOAC standards applicable
in all military operations:
* Fight only enemy combatants.
* Do not harm enemies who surrender. Disarm the enemy and turn them over to your superiors.
* Do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war or other detainees.
* Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
* Do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
* Destroy no more than the mission requires.
* Treat all civilians humanely.
* Do not steal. Respect private property and possessions.
* Do your best to prevent violations of the law of war.
* Report all violations of the law of war to your superiors.
Just as the Soldier’s Rules/Basic Principles provide general and sometimes more narrow guidelines than
might be allowed for as a matter of law in specific situations, this publication summarizes the law and practice
under LOAC for legal and operational practitioners of the Army and Marine Corps. It provides more detailed
guidance than what is provided for in the Soldier’s Rules/Basic Principles, but it does not go into the
extensive detail of the DOD Law of War Manual. This publication is not a definitive explanation of all LOAC
issues, but it should assist in developing other doctrine, tactical practices and training that will be understood
by individual Soldiers and Marines and units and lead to increased compliance with LOAC.
As a statement of Army and Marine Corps doctrine, this publication should not be interpreted as a source of
United States’ government views on customary international law, and, unless explicitly noted, the practices
described in the publication should not be understood to have been undertaken out of a sense of legal
obligation for the purposes of assessing customary international law. |
6-27 | 12 | Introduction
This publication also discusses the relevant and applicable policies, regulations, and other issuances that the
Army and Marine Corps have followed in military operations. In discussing such issuances, this publication
does not create any policy for Army and Marine Corps forces as the cited document remains the source of
any such policy. Such policies, regulations, or other issuance should be reviewed for currency and
applicability because they are frequently updated.
Whenever possible, this publication should be used in conjunction with the appropriate treaties, as provided,
for example, in documents published by the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School,
which contain the text of those various treaties. The Appendix references major LOAC treaties, separately
referencing those treaties to which the United States is not a party (for example, Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions).
This publication cites applicable authorities within parenthetical references to facilitate quick reference. In
certain cases, this publication summarizes or paraphrases treaty provisions. In the event of a conflict or
discrepancy between this publication and a binding treaty provision, the treaty provision takes precedence.
This publication includes references to Additional Protocol I (AP I), which has not been ratified by the United
States and contains some provisions that the United States categorically rejects. These references to API are
intended to provide additional content to consider where its provisions are consistent with long-standing
practice or principles the United States has generally accepted or where the provision is based on a principle
that the United States supports, but is not necessarily militarily acceptable in all respects (API references are
noted with consider cites; see DOD Law of War Manual 19.20.1). Unless explicitly stated otherwise,
reference in this publication to any provision of a treaty to which the United States is not a party is not
intended to affirm the status of those provisions as customary international law or as otherwise binding on
the United States. The intent is to compare U.S. practice to provisions of those treaties, and to facilitate
understanding of likely positions of potential multinational partners who are parties to those treaties.
Based on recent doctrinal changes, certain terms are added for which the DOD Law of War Manual or
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C is a proponent. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. See introductory
table-1 for specific changes.
Introductory table-1. New Army terms
Term Remarks
distinction New definition.
environmental modification technique New definition.
general license New definition.
honor New definition.
humanity New definition.
international armed conflict New definition.
jus ad bellum New definition.
jus in bello New definition.
levée en masse New definition.
military necessity New definition.
military objective New definition.
military passport New definition
non-international armed conflict New definition.
opinio juris New definition.
parlementaire New definition.
proportionality New definition.
protecting power New definition.
reprisal New definition. |
6-27 | 13 | Introduction
Introductory table-1. New Army terms (continued)
Term Remarks
safe-conduct pass New definition.
special license New definition.
suspension of arms New definition.
unprivileged belligerent New definition. |
6-27 | 15 | Chapter 1
General Background and Basic Principles of the Law of
Armed Conflict
Certain basic principles are foundational to a full understanding of LOAC, rules of
engagement, and Army and Marine Corps doctrine. This chapter examines the law
governing the resort to the use of armed force (jus ad bellum), the purpose and
applicability of LOAC in armed conflict and its relationship with other law. After
examining the basic LOAC principles, this chapter discusses the classes of persons
distinguished within LOAC along with their basic rights, responsibilities, and
liabilities. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the tools for implementation of
LOAC, such as the role of protecting powers and humanitarian organizations within
LOAC, when LOAC no longer applies, and the relationship with human rights law.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
1-1. International law principally governs the relations between States both in peacetime and during armed
conflict. Jus ad bellum is that part of international law that regulates the circumstances in which States
may resort to the use of force in international relations. Jus in bello is that part of international law
relating to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims, from combatants who are
wounded and out of combat, to prisoners of war and civilians.
1-2. Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter provides that States are required to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any State. There are circumstances in which the resort to force will not violate this prohibition, which
include when the use of force is authorized by the UN Security Council, when it is undertaken with the
consent of the territorial State, and when it is undertaken in the lawful exercise of the inherent right of self-
defense (See DOD Law of War Manual, 1.11.4). For example, the United States has used armed force
pursuant to an authorization in a UN Security Council Resolution and pursuant to its inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack.
1-3. The decision to resort to the use of force in international relations is one that is decided at the national
level. Because this publication is intended for Soldiers and Marines operating at lower echelons, it will focus
on the jus in bello principle, that is, the international law relating to the conduct of hostilities and the
protection of war victims, which as discussed in paragraph 1-4 below, is known as LOAC.
LEX SPECIALIS–THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
1-4. LOAC, also referred to as the law of war, is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of
hostilities and the protection of war victims both in international and non-international armed conflict;
belligerent occupation; and the relationship between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent States (see DOD
Law of War Manual, 1.3; JP 3-84). The legal maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali, also known as the
principle of specialty, provides that as a rule, the special law overrides the general law. This means if an
action is regulated by both a general provision and a specific one, the latter applies, as it is more specifically
directed toward the action. LOAC is the lex specialis of armed conflict; it is the controlling body of law and
provides the legal standards that apply to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims. |
6-27 | 16 | Chapter 1
1-5. Although LOAC is part of international law, it is important to understand that different States may
have different LOAC obligations. Understanding where these differences may arise is often important in
dealing with an enemy; it becomes critical when working with allies and other foreign partners. Partner States
are often bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party (for example, Additional Protocol I).
Partner States may also have different interpretations of LOAC obligations even where the same treaty
provision is at issue. Consequently, those partners often adopt conditions or “caveats” during multinational
operations that express those States’ interpretations or their differences on issues of national policy.
1-6. DOD policy is that “[m]embers of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed
conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.” (DODD 2311.01E,
para. 4.1). Soldiers and Marines must comply with LOAC in all military operations (as well as with any
further restrictions imposed by the rules of engagement). Although reciprocity may play an important role in
encouraging LOAC compliance, DOD policy is to comply with LOAC even when enemy forces are engaged
in violations of their LOAC obligations (see DOD Law of War Manual, 3.6).
PURPOSES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Purposes of the Law of Armed Conflict
There are two reasons . . . for the preservation and enforcement, as even-handedly as
possible, of the laws of war. The first is strictly pragmatic: They work. Violated or ignored
as they often are, enough of the rules are observed enough of the time so that mankind is
very much better off with them than without them. . . .
Another and, to my mind, even more important basis of the laws of war is that they are
necessary to diminish the corrosive effect of mortal combat on the participants. War does
not confer a license to kill for personal reasons – to gratify perverse impulses, or to put
out of the way anyone who appears obnoxious, or to whose welfare the Soldier is
indifferent. War is not a license at all, but an obligation to kill for reasons of state; it does
not countenance the infliction of suffering for its own sake or for revenge.
Unless troops are trained and required to draw the distinction between military and non-
military killings, and to retain such respect for the value of life that unnecessary death and
destruction will continue to repel them, they may lose the sense of that distinction for the
rest of their lives. . . .
As Francis Lieber put the matter in his 1863 Army regulations: “Men who take up arms
against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings,
responsible to one another and to God.” [Lieber Code, art. 15]
Telford Taylor
Nuremberg Prosecutor
1-7. The main purposes of LOAC are:
* Protecting combatants, noncombatants, and civilians from unnecessary suffering;
* Providing certain fundamental protections for persons who fall into the hands of the enemy,
particularly prisoners of war, military wounded and sick, and civilians;
* Facilitating the restoration of peace;
* Assisting the commander in ensuring the disciplined, ethical, and effective use of military force;
* Preserving the professionalism and humanity of combatants; and
* Preventing the degeneration of warfare into savagery or brutality.
WHEN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT APPLIES
1-8. Commanders must be prepared to comply with LOAC whenever there is the possibility of military
operations or hostile actions. Different LOAC rules can apply to an armed conflict against another State
versus an armed conflict against a non-State armed group, such as a terrorist or insurgent group. Guidance |
6-27 | 17 | General Background and Basic Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict
will come from higher authority regarding which rule set may apply; but, if no such guidance is forthcoming,
commanders must adhere to the LOAC rules for State-on-State conflict described in paragraph 1-14 below.
1-9. War may be described as the existence of armed hostility between States, between States and non-State
armed groups, or between non-State armed groups, although the specific legal definition of “war” may
depend on the legal purpose at issue (see DOD Law of War Manual, 1.5). For example, under the U.S.
Constitution, Congress has the power to declare war, which it last did formally in World War II. Of course,
the United States has often engaged in armed conflict or “war,” under international law, since that time, often
with congressional support or authorization. Even if parties involved in hostilities do not refer to such actions
as “war” or “armed conflict,” LOAC applies to the hostilities at issue. For this reason, and because the terms
“war” and “armed conflict” often are used interchangeably, this manual uses them as synonyms.
1-10. Whether a LOAC rule applies may depend on whether a war exists. Jus in bello treaties often provide
that they apply to cases of “declared war or of any other armed conflict,” even if a state of war is not
recognized by the parties (see Common Article 2, the Geneva Conventions of 1949). This standard has also
been understood to result in the application of the customary law of war. A case of “declared war or any other
armed conflict” for the purpose of determining whether parties must comply with jus in bello rules may be
understood as arising in two ways: (1) when a party intends to conduct hostilities; or (2) when parties are
actually conducting hostilities. What specific parts of LOAC apply as a matter of law to a given war may
depend on whether the war is characterized as an international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-international
armed conflict (NIAC).
EXISTENCE OF A WAR FOR PURPOSES OF APPLYING THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
1-11. Whether an armed conflict exists for the purpose of applying LOAC may be an intent-based analysis.
If States or non-State armed groups seek to engage in armed conflict, they are bound by LOAC with respect
to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims (see DOD Law of War Manual, 3.4.1). As such,
LOAC obligations must be taken into account even before the fighting actually begins, such as in the planning
of military operations.
1-12. Whether an armed conflict exists may also be a conduct-based analysis. Armed conflict may exist
absent a declaration of war or without the participating States acknowledging they are engaged in armed
conflict. The factual existence of an armed conflict is sufficient to trigger LOAC obligations for the conduct
of hostilities and the protection of war victims.
1-13. A helpful rule of thumb may be that where parties are, in fact, engaged in activities that LOAC
contemplates (including detention of enemy military personnel without criminal charge, or bombardment of
military objectives), those activities are subject to LOAC.
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
1-14. An international armed conflict (IAC) refers to any declared war between States, or to any other
armed conflict between States, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Geneva
Conventions apply to all cases of international armed conflict and all cases of partial or total occupation of a
territory, even if the occupation meets no armed resistance (Common Article 2 to Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field [GWS], Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea [GWS Sea], Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War [GPW], and
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [GC]). Other law of war
treaties also generally apply to international armed conflict and occupation (such as Hague Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land [Hague IV], and its Annex: Regulation Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, October 18, 1907) [HR]). The United States has interpreted
“armed conflict” in Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to include any situation in which
there is hostile action between the armed forces of two parties, regardless of the duration, intensity, or scope
of the fighting (see DOD Law of War Manual, 3.4.2). |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.