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1-06 | 185 | Glossary
Builds on the budget estimates centered on actual execution of the operational plan based on data
provided by the respective component commands. |
1-06 | 187 | References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 08 November 2010.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
UNITED STATES LEGAL DOCUMENTS
United States Code
U.S. Constitution, Art. I § 8 and § 9.
A searchable version of the U.S. Code is found online at http://uscode.house.gov. Accessed on: 10
December 2013]
10 USC 127; 166a; 401; 402; 404; 2011; 2342; 2396; 2551; 2557; 2803; 2804; 2805; 2808; 3013.
22 USC 287d-1; 2318; 2321j; 2346-2348; 2357; 2388; 2390; 2751, Ch 39, "Arms Export Control Act";
2761.
31 USC 902, Ch 9, "Agency Chief Financial Officers"; 1341; 1342; 1344; 1511-1517 "The Anti-
Deficiency Act"; 1501; 1535; 1552; 1553; 1554; 1555; 1557; 3324.
41 USC 11, "Feed and Forage Act".
42 USC 5121, “The Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act”.
50 USC 1621, National Emergencies Act.
Public Laws
Executive Order 10206, Providing for Support of United Nations’ Activities Directed to the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes.
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.
Public Law 79-264, United Nations Participation Act of 1945.
Public Law 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA) (sections 506, 531, 541-545,
551, 552, 607, 628, 632).
Public Law 87-510, The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.
Public Law 90-629, Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
[Note: Public Law 90-629, "The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968," was amended by Public Law 94-329, "The
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976," and they are commonly referred to as
the "Arms Export Control Act".]
Public Law 97-255, Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982, as amended.
Public Law 97-258, The Economy Act.
Public Law 100-707, The Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
Public Law 101-576, Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990.
Public Law 103-337, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995.
Public Law 103-356, Federal Financial Management Act of 1994.
[Note: The Federal Financial Management Act of 1994 is the same as the Government Management
and Reform Act of 1994. Both titles are used to refer to this particular Act.] |
1-06 | 188 | References
2013 National Defense Authorization Act §1221
2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act §9005.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET PUBLICATIONS
OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 4. Instructions on Budget Execution. July 2013 (Sections 120, 123, 130,
and Appendix F revised November 2013).
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
DODI 1000.11. Financial Institutions on DOD Installations. 16 January 2009.
DOD Directive 5101.1. DOD Executive Agent.
DOD 7000.14-R. Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations. June 2008. Including the
following volumes:
[Note: These volumes are available online at http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/.]
Volume 2A. Budget Formulation and Presentation (parts A and B).
Volume 3. Budget Execution—Availability and Use of Budgetary Resources.
Volume 4. Accounting Policy and Procedures.
Volume 5. Disbursing Policy.
Volume 7a. Military Pay Policy—Active Duty and Reserve Pay.
Volume 10. Contract Payment Policy.
Volume 11a. Reimbursable Operations, Policy and Procedures.
Volume 12. Special Accounts, Funds and Programs.
Volume 14. Administrative Control of Funds and Anti Deficiency Act Violations.
DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE PUBLICATIONS
[Note: The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) publications are available online at
http://www.asafm.army.mil/]
DFAS-IN Regulation 37-1. Finance and Accounting Policy Implementation. January 2000.
DOD DIRECTIVES
DOD Directive 5530.3. International Agreements. 11 June 1987. Change 1, 18 February 1991.
DOD Directive 7200.1. Administrative Control of Appropriations. 4 May 1995.
JOINT AND MULTISERVICE PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 1-06. Financial Management Support in Joint Operations. 2 March 2012.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.
JP 3-29. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 3 January 2014.
JP 3-31. Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 29 June 2010.
JP 3-68. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 22 January 2007.
JP 4-10. Operational Contract Support, 17 October 2008. |
1-06 | 189 | References
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <http://www.apd.army.mil/>
ADP 1. The Army. 17 September 2012.
ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.
ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 4-0. Sustainment. July 2012.
AR 11-2. Managers’ Internal Control Program. 4 January 2010.
AR 15-6. Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. 2 October 2006.
AR 25-2. Information Assurance. 24 October 2007.
AR 27-20. Claims. 8 February 2008.
AR 37-47. Official Representation Funds of the Secretary of the Army. 18 September 2012.
AR 37-104-4. Military Pay and Allowances Policy. 8 June 2005.
AR 215-1. Military Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Programs and Nonappropiated Fund
Instrumentalities. 24 September 2010.
AR 700-137. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. 28 December 2012.
ATP 4-93. Sustainment Brigade. 9 August 2013.
ATTP 4-10. Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 20 June 2011
FM 3-35. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 21 April 2010.
FM 4-92. Contracting Support Brigade. 12 February 2010.
FM 5-19. Composite Risk Management. 21 August 2006.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
The World Fact Book. 16 January 2014, Central Intelligence Agency.
[Note: An online version of this document is available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html. The online Factbook is updated regularly—generally weekly—throughout the year.]
Army CBA Guide. 24 April 2013
DASA-CE Cost Management Handbook. August 2012
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976)
Secretary of Interior, B-120676, 34 Comp. Gen. 195 (1954)
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 7401.01F, Combatant Commander Initiative
Fund. 30 November 2012
The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
AMC PAM 700-30. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).
AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees. 1
October 1997.
AR 350-28. Army Exercises. 9 December 1997.
AR 715-9. Operational Contract Support Planning and Management. 20 June 2011.
AR 735-5. Property Accountability Policies. 2 August 2013. |
1-06 | 190 | References
ATP 4-91. Army Field Support Brigade. 15 December 2011.
FM 3-92. Corps Operation. 26 November 2010.
FM 3-93. Theater Army Operations. 12 October 2011.
Federal Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1, 1993.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Cost and Economics) Cost Management Handbook. May
2009
DOD Decision-Type Memorandum 13-004. 22 March 2013, subject: Operation of the DOD
Financial Management Certification Program
DSCA (P) 1239 (Formerly DD ISA (P) 1226). Roster of Key Security Assistance Personnel
Worldwide. Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
Public Law 81-351, Career Compensation Act of 1949.
Public Law 85-804, Indemnification.
Public Law 97-177, The Prompt Payment Act, as amended.
AIMD-00-21.3.1. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. November 1999.
[Note: This document can be found online at http://www.gao.gov/.]
Joint Federal Travel Regulations, Volume 1—Uniformed Service Members.
Joint Federal Travel Regulations, Volume 2—Department of Defense Civilian Personnel.
DOD 7000.14-R. Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations. June 2008. Including the
following volumes:
[Note: These volumes are available online at http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr.]
Volume 7b. Military Pay Policy and Procedures—Retired Pay.
Volume 7c. Special Military Pay/Personnel Program and Operating Procedures.
Volume 9. Travel Policy.
Volume 11b. Reimbursable Operations—Working Capital Funds (WCF).
Volume 15. Security Cooperation Policy.
DFAS-IN Manual 37-100-FY. The Army Management Structure, Fiscal Year 20XX.
DFARS Part 204, Subpart 204.70—Uniform Procurement Instrument Identification Numbers. Revised
29 July 2009.
[Note: This document can be found online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/index.htm. Accessed on:
10 December 2013.]
CJCSM 3500.04C. Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). 1 June 2011.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
None.
REFERENCED FORMS
Most Army Forms are available online: www.apd.army.mil.
DA Form 11-2. Internal Control Evaluation Certification.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 3953. Purchase Request and Commitment.
DD Form 448. Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request.
DD Form 1081. Statement of Agent Officer’s Account.
DD Form 2406. Miscellaneous Obligation Document.
DD Form 2657. Daily Statement of Accountability.
DD Form 2663. Foreign Currency Control Record.
DD Form 2665. Daily Agent Accountability Summary. |
1-06 | 191 | References
SF 44. Purchase Order–Invoice–Voucher.
SF 215. Deposit Ticket.
SF 1080. Voucher for Transfers Between Appropriations and/or Funds.
SF 1219. Statement of Accountability.
SF 5515. Debit Voucher.
WEBSITES
Army Audit Readiness. https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/auditready. Accessed on: 10 December
2013
Defense Travel Management Office. http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil. Accessed on: 10 December
2013
The White House, Office of Management and Budget. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars.
Accessed one: 10 December 2013
U.S. Government Accountability Office. http://www.gao.gov/. Accessed on: 10 December 2013
United States Code, Office of the Law Revision Counsel. http://uscode.house.gov. Accessed on: 10
December 2013
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/.
Accessed on: 10 December 2013
Army Financial Management, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management &
Comptroller. http://www.asafm.army.mil. Accessed on: 10 December 2013
ACQWeb, Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
http://www.acq.osd.mil/. Accessed on: 10 December 2013
Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook
The World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org. Accessed on: 10 December 2013
Cost and Performance Portal, Assistant Secretary of the Army Financial Management & Comptroller.
https://cpp.army.mil/portal/page/portal/Cost_Performance_Portal/CPP_Home_Page.
Accessed on: 10 December 2013
Multimedia content distribution system, FMTP.
https://mcds.army.mil/CTM/Play/437fa0ec0385418f8b619a1b084cd7b51d?catalog=135a1acf
-ae5d-489f-82ff-69b33c120fc4. Accessed on: 10 December 2013 |
1-06 | 193 | Index
6-10, 6-14, 6-16, 6-18, 6-19,
GFEBS, 1-22, 1-30, 2-4, 5-3, 5-
A
7-3, 7-7
9
accounting support, 1-16, 1-23,
direct cost, 1-9
2-13, 2-17, 5-1, 5-2, 5-6, 5-7, H
Disbursing
5-8
host nation support, 1-7, 1-22,
Deployable Disbursing
Anti-deficiency Act (ADA), 2-3, 2-35, 2-38, 6-8
System (DDS), 8-9
2-4, 2-10, 2-18, 5-4, 6-5
Disbursing Officer (DO), 1- I
Army Audit Agency (AAA), 1- 28, 3-1, 3-4, 3-8, 3-10, 3-
instrument of economic power,
12, 1-15, 2-15, 7-7 12, 3-13, 3-14
vii, 3-2
Army Budget Office (ABO), 1- disbursing operations, 3-2,
24, 2-18, 2-19, 2-23 3-4, 5-4 L
disbursing roles, 3-14
ASCC, 1-7, 1-8, 1-14, 1-17, 1- limited depositary account, 3-7
disbursing section, 1-26, 1-
23, 2-4, 2-23, 3-13, 5-2, 5-7,
6-9, 6-12, 6-18, 6-19, 7-7
27, 1-28 M
disbursing support, 1-4, 1-5,
Assistant Secretary of the 1-8, 3-2, 3-12, 6-15 MICP, 1-6, 1-29, 2-29, 6-16, 7-
Army (Financial 4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7
Management & Comptroller) E
O
(ASA [FM&C]), 1-12, 1-13, E-commerce, 1-22, 1-25, 1-26,
1-14, 1-21, 2-16, 2-18, 2-19, 1-27, 1-28, 3-1, 3-2, 3-14, 6- obligation management, 5-4
5-6, 5-7, 7-8 10, 6-15, 6-16, 6-19, 6-20, 8- Operation Plan (OPLAN), 1-10,
15 1-14, 6-1, 6-7, 6-14
B
Banking F P
Army's Banking Program, 1- Financial Management Support Pay Agent (PA), 1-29, 3-9, 3-
1 Center (FMSC), 1-14, 1-17, 10, 3-11, 3-12, 5-4
banking and disbursing 1-21, 1-22, 1-25, 1-26, 1-27, pay support, 4-1
support, 1-8, 3-2 3-2, 3-13, 3-14, 5-8, 6-1, 6-7,
pre-deployment cost estimate,
banking and host nation 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 7-5, 7-7, 8-5,
5-19
support, 3-2 8-14
Banking Officer, 1-22 procurement process, 1-3, 1-6,
Fiscal Triad, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 3-1,
banking section, 1-22, 1-25, 3-8, 3-15, 6-10, 6-15
3-8, 3-11, 3-15, 6-13
3-2
FM SPO, 1-19, 1-26, 1-27, 6-1, R
banking support, 1-4, 3-1,
6-16 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-17, 6- responsibility segment, 5-16
18, 6-19, 8-6, 8-8, 8-10
Military Banking Facility
S
(MBF), 3-2 FMSD, 1-28, 1-29, 3-14, 4-1, 4-
budget execution, 1-16, 1-20, 2, 4-4, 6-7, 7-7 Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), 1-
6, 2-6, 2-14, 2-21, 3-6, 3-15,
1-24 FMSU, 1-7, 1-22, 1-23, 1-25, 1-
6-11, 6-18, 6-19, 6-20, 7-7
26, 1-27, 1-28, 3-4, 3-14, 4-
C
1, 4-2, 5-2, 5-8, 5-9, 6-1, 6-7, stewardship, 1-2
cost benefit analysis, 5-11 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-19, 7-
T
cost center, 5-16 5, 7-7, 8-1, 8-6, 8-15
technical oversight, 1-21
cost culture, 5-10 fund the force, 1-4
Treasury, 1-1, 1-8, 1-10, 1-21,
cost management, 1-5, 5-1 G 1-22, 1-25, 2-1, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8,
D G-8, 1-7, 1-11, 1-13, 1-14, 1- 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7,
16, 1-18, 1-19, 1-20, 1-21, 1- 3-8, 3-12, 3-13, 5-5, 5-8, 6-
DFAS, 1-1, 1-4, 1-10, 1-12, 1-
22, 1-23, 1-24, 1-25, 1-26, 2- 10, 8-5
13, 1-14, 1-21, 1-22, 1-26, 2-
14, 2-19, 2-20, 2-21, 3-2, 3-
8, 2-11, 2-30, 2-36, 2-38, 3- W
13, 3-15, 5-2, 5-3, 5-7, 5-8,
2, 3-7, 3-12, 4-4, 4-5, 5-1, 5-
6-1, 6-2, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6- working estimate, 5-20
2, 5-3, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9,
17, 6-18, 7-7, 8-6 |
1-06 | 195 | FM 1-06(FM 1-06)
15 April 2014
By Order of the Secretary of the Army
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1408008
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic |
2-22.3 | 1 | FM 2-22.3
(FM 34-52)
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
September 2006
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
NOTE: All previous versions of this manual are obsolete. This document is identical in content
to the version dated 6 September 2006. All previous versions of this manual should be |
2-22.3 | 2 | This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine |
2-22.3 | 3 | *FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52)
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 2-22.3 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 6 September 2006
Human Intelligence Collector Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE...............................................................................................................vi
PART ONE HUMINT SUPPORT, PLANNING, AND MANAGEMENT
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................1-1
Intelligence Battlefield Operating System.............................................................1-1
Intelligence Process..............................................................................................1-1
Human Intelligence...............................................................................................1-4
HUMINT Source....................................................................................................1-4
HUMINT Collection and Related Activities...........................................................1-7
Traits of a HUMINT Collector..............................................................................1-10
Required Areas of Knowledge............................................................................1-12
Capabilities and Limitations................................................................................1-13
Chapter 2 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE..............................................................2-1
Organization and Structure...................................................................................2-1
HUMINT Control Organizations............................................................................2-2
HUMINT Analysis and Production Organizations.................................................2-6
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
NOTE: All previous versions of this manual are obsolete. This document is identical in content to the version
dated 6 September 2006. All previous versions of this manual should be destroyed in accordance with
appropriate Army policies and regulations.
*This publication supersedes FM 34-52, 28 September 1992, and ST 2-22.7, Tactical Human Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Operations, April 2002. |
2-22.3 | 4 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 3 HUMINT IN SUPPORT OF ARMY OPERATIONS..............................................3-1
Offensive Operations............................................................................................3-1
Defensive Operations ........................................................................................... 3-2
Stability and Reconstruction Operations ............................................................. 3-3
Civil Support Operations....................................................................................... 3-7
Military Operations in Urban Environment............................................................ 3-8
HUMINT Collection Environments........................................................................ 3-8
EAC HUMINT ....................................................................................................... 3-9
Joint, Combined, and DOD HUMINT Organizations..........................................3-10
Chapter 4 HUMINT OPERATIONS PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT...............................4-1
HUMINT and the Operations Process..................................................................4-1
HUMINT Command and Control .......................................................................... 4-3
Technical Control.................................................................................................. 4-4
Command and Support Relationships.................................................................. 4-4
HUMINT Requirements Management..................................................................4-5
HUMINT Mission Planning ................................................................................. 4-15
Task Organization .............................................................................................. 4-18
Operational Considerations................................................................................4-19
Operations Plans, Operations Orders, and Annexes.........................................4-21
Operational Coordination.................................................................................... 4-22
PART TWO HUMINT COLLECTION IN MILITARY SOURCE OPERATIONS
Chapter 5 HUMINT COLLECTION .......................................................................................5-1
HUMINT Collection Operations ............................................................................ 5-1
Human Source Contact Operations ..................................................................... 5-2
Debriefing Operations........................................................................................... 5-7
Liaison Operations.............................................................................................. 5-12
Interrogation Operations.....................................................................................5-13
Types of Interrogation Operations......................................................................5-27
PART THREE THE HUMINT COLLECTION PROCESS
Chapter 6 SCREENING .......................................................................................................6-1
Human Source Screening .................................................................................... 6-1
Screening Operations...........................................................................................6-2
Screening Process ............................................................................................... 6-9
Screening Methodologies...................................................................................6-11
Screening Requirements....................................................................................6-12 |
2-22.3 | 5 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Initial Data and Observations..............................................................................6-13
Source Assessment ............................................................................................6-14
Other Types of Screening Operations ................................................................6-15
Chapter 7 PLANNING AND PREPARATION .......................................................................7-1
Collection Objectives.............................................................................................7-1
Research...............................................................................................................7-1
HUMINT Collection Plan .......................................................................................7-8
Final Preparations...............................................................................................7-13
Chapter 8 APPROACH TECHNIQUES AND TERMINATION STRATEGIES......................8-1
Approach Phase....................................................................................................8-1
Developing Rapport ..............................................................................................8-3
Approach Techniques ...........................................................................................8-6
Approach Strategies for Interrogation.................................................................8-20
Approach Strategies for Debriefing.....................................................................8-21
Approach Strategies for Elicitation......................................................................8-22
Termination Phase..............................................................................................8-23
Chapter 9 QUESTIONING .....................................................................................................9-1
General Questioning Principles ............................................................................9-1
Direct Questions....................................................................................................9-1
Elicitation...............................................................................................................9-5
Leads.....................................................................................................................9-5
Detecting Deceit....................................................................................................9-6
HUMINT Collection Aids .......................................................................................9-9
Recording Techniques ..........................................................................................9-9
Questioning With an Analyst or a Technical Expert............................................9-11
Third-Party Official and Hearsay Information......................................................9-12
Conducting Map Tracking ...................................................................................9-13
Special Source Categories .................................................................................9-16
Chapter 10 REPORTING.......................................................................................................10-1
Reporting Principles............................................................................................10-1
Report Types.......................................................................................................10-1
Reporting Architecture ........................................................................................10-5 |
2-22.3 | 6 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 11 HUMINT COLLECTION WITH AN INTERPRETER ..........................................11-1
Advantages and Disadvantages of Interpreter Use ........................................... 11-1
Methods of Interpreter Use.................................................................................11-2
Sources of Interpreters.......................................................................................11-4
Interpretation Techniques...................................................................................11-5
Training and Briefing the Interpreter...................................................................11-5
Placement of the Interpreter...............................................................................11-6
Interactions With and Correction of the Interpreter ............................................ 11-7
Interpreter Support in Report Writing ................................................................. 11-8
Evaluating the Interpreter ................................................................................... 11-8
Managing an Interpreter Program......................................................................11-9
PART FOUR ANALYSIS AND TOOLS
Chapter 12 HUMINT ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION ........................................................12-1
Analytical Support to Operational Planning........................................................12-1
Operational Analysis and Assessment...............................................................12-3
Source Analysis..................................................................................................12-4
Single-Discipline HUMINT Analysis and Production..........................................12-4
HUMINT Source Selection ............................................................................... 12-19
Chapter 13 AUTOMATION AND COMMUNICATION..........................................................13-1
Automation..........................................................................................................13-1
Collection Support Automation Requirements ................................................... 13-2
Analytical Automation Requirements ................................................................. 13-3
Automation Systems........................................................................................... 13-7
Communications.................................................................................................13-8
APPENDIX A GENEVA CONVENTIONS ...................................................................................A-1
Section I. Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) .................................A-1
Section II. Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) ........A-47
APPENDIX B SOURCE AND INFORMATION RELIABILITY MATRIX.....................................B-1
APPENDIX C PRE-DEPLOYMENT PLANNING ....................................................................... C-1
APPENDIX D S2 GUIDE FOR HANDLING DETAINEES, CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS,
AND CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT............................................................ D-1 |
2-22.3 | 7 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX E EXTRACTS FROM ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION (AJP)-2.5..........................E-1
APPENDIX F NATO SYSTEM OF ALLOCATING INTERROGATION SERIAL NUMBERS ... F-1
APPENDIX G QUESTIONING QUICK REFERENCE ................................................................G-1
APPENDIX H SALUTE REPORTING ........................................................................................H-1
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION AND HANDLING..................................................I-1
APPENDIX J REFERENCES......................................................................................................J-1
APPENDIX K CONTRACT INTERROGATORS ........................................................................K-1
APPENDIX L SAMPLE EQUIPMENT FOR HCT OPERATIONS...............................................L-1
APPENDIX M RESTRICTED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE - SEPARATION .....................M-1
GLOSSARY .............................................................................................Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................Bibliography-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................Index-1 |
2-22.3 | 8 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Preface
This manual provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing the
employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analytical assets in
support of the commander’s intelligence needs. It outlines⎯
• HUMINT operations.
• The HUMINT collector’s role within the intelligence operating system.
• The roles and responsibilities of the HUMINT collectors and the roles of those
providing the command, control, and technical support of HUMINT collection
operations.
This manual expands upon the information contained in FM 2-0. It
supersedes FM 34-52 and rescinds ST 2-22.7. It is consistent with doctrine
in FM 3-0, FM 5-0, FM 6-0, and JP 2-0. In accordance with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, the only interrogation approaches and techniques
that are authorized for use against any detainee, regardless of status or
characterization, are those authorized and listed in this Field Manual.
Some of the approaches and techniques authorized and listed in this Field
Manual also require additional specified approval before implementation.
This manual will be reviewed annually and may be amended or updated from time to
time to account for changes in doctrine, policy, or law, and to address lessons learned.
This manual provides the doctrinal guidance for HUMINT collectors and
commanders and staffs of the MI organizations responsible for planning and
executing HUMINT operations. This manual also serves as a reference for personnel
developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); materiel and force
structure; institutional and unit training; and standing operating procedures (SOPs),
for HUMINT operations at all army echelons. In accordance with TRADOC
Regulation 25-36, the doctrine in this field manual is not policy (in and of itself), but
is “…a body of thought on how Army forces operate….[It] provides an authoritative
guide for leaders and soldiers, while allowing freedom to adapt to circumstances.”
This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National
Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise
stated. This manual also applies to DOD civilian employees and contractors with
responsibility to engage in HUMINT collection activities. It is also intended
for commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands, and Service Component
Commands (SCC). Although this is Army doctrine, adaptations will have to be made
by other Military Departments, based on each of their organizations and specific
doctrine.
Material in this manual applies to the full range of military operations. Principles
outlined also are valid under conditions involving use of electronic warfare (EW) or
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.
This manual is intended for use by military, civilian, and civilian contractor
HUMINT collectors, as well as commanders, staff officers, and military intelligence
(MI) personnel charged with the responsibility of the HUMINT collection effort.
HUMINT operations vary depending on the source of the information. It is essential
that all HUMINT collectors understand that, whereas operations and sources may |
2-22.3 | 9 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
differ, the handling and treatment of sources must be accomplished in accordance
with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of
war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”;
DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
Interrogation, the HUMINT subdiscipline responsible for MI exploitation of enemy
personnel and their documents to answer the supported specific information
requirements (SIRs), requires the HUMINT collector to be fully familiar with both
the classification of the source and applicable law. The principles and techniques of
HUMINT collection are to be used within the constraints established by US law
including the following:
• The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (including Common Article III), August 12,
1949; hereinafter referred to as GWS.
• Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (including
Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GPW.
• Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as
GC.
• Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.
HUMINT collectors must understand specific terms used to identify categories of
personnel when referring to the principles and techniques of interrogation.
Determination of a detainee’s status may take a significant time and may not be
completed until well after the time of capture. Therefore, there will be no difference
in the treatment of a detainee of any status from the moment of capture until such a
determination is made. The following terms are presented here and in the glossary.
• Civilian Internee: A person detained or interned in the United States or in
occupied territory for security reasons, or for protection, or because he or she has
committed an offense against the detaining power, and who is entitled to
“protected person” status under the GC.
• Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW): A detained person, as defined in Articles 4 and
5 of the GPW. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of
his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such,
he or she is entitled to the combatant’s privilege of immunity from the municipal
law of the capturing state for warlike acts that do not amount to breaches of the
law of armed conflict. For example, an EPW may be, but is not limited to, any
person belonging to one of the following categories of personnel who have fallen
into the power of the enemy; a member of the armed forces, organized militia or
volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces, without actually
being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft
crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the
approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces.
• Other Detainees: Persons in the custody of the US Armed Forces who have not
been classified as an EPW (Article 4, GPW), retained personnel
(Article 33, GPW), and Civilian Internee (Articles 27, 41, 48, and 78, GC) shall
be treated as EPWs until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority;
for example, by Article 5 Tribunal.
• Retained Personnel: (See Articles 24 and 26, GWS.) |
2-22.3 | 10 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
– Official medical personnel of the armed forces exclusively engaged in the
search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in
the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in the administration
of medical units and facilities.
– Chaplains attached to the armed forces.
– Staff of National Red Cross Societies and that of other Volunteer Aid
Societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist
Medical Service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are
exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment
of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided that the
staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations.
• Protected Persons: Include civilians entitled to protection under the GC,
including those we retain in the course of a conflict, no matter what the reason.
• Enemy Combatant: In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term
“enemy combatant” includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful
enemy combatants.” All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status,
shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, “Department of Defense Detainee
Program”, and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD, regardless
of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US
law.
– Lawful Enemy Combatant: Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to
protections under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular
armed forces of a State Party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and
organized resistance movements belonging to a State Party to the conflict,
which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of
war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.
– Unlawful Enemy Combatant: Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not
entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United
States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war
during an armed conflict. For the purposes of the war on terrorism, the term
“unlawful enemy combatant” is defined to include, but is not limited to, an
individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the
proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the US Army Intelligence
Center and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, AZ. Send written comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms) directly to Commander, ATZS-CDI-D (FM 2-22.3), U.S. Army
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ
85613-7017. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to ATZS-FDT-
[email protected]. Follow the DA Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form
2028.
Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to
men. Use of the terms “he” and “him” in this manual should be read as referring to
both males and females unless otherwise expressly noted. |
2-22.3 | 11 | FM 2-22.3
PART ONE
HUMINT Support, Planning, and Management
HUMINT collection activities include three general categories: screening,
interrogation, and debriefing. In some cases these may be distinguished by legal
distinctions between source categories such as between interrogation and
debriefing. In others, the distinction is in the purpose of the questioning. Regardless
of the type of activity, or goal of the collection effort, HUMINT collection operations
must be characterized by effective support, planning, and management.
_________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 1
Introduction
INTELLIGENCE BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM
1-1. The Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) is one of seven
operating systems⎯Intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense,
mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support (CSS), and
command and control⎯that enable commanders to build, employ, direct, and
sustain combat power. The Intelligence BOS is a flexible force of Intelligence
personnel, organizations, and equipment. Individually and collectively, these
assets generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and the
environmental features required by a command planning, preparing,
executing, and assessing operations. Inherent within the Intelligence BOS is
the capability to plan, direct, and synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) operations; collect and process information; produce
relevant intelligence; and disseminate intelligence and critical information in
an understandable and presentable form to those who need it, when they
need it. As one of the seven disciplines of the Intelligence BOS, HUMINT
provides a capability to the supported commander in achieving information
superiority on the battlefield.
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
1-2. Intelligence operations consist of the functions that constitute the
intelligence process: plan, prepare, collect, process, produce, and the
common tasks of analyze, disseminate, and assess that occur throughout
the intelligence process. Just as the activities of the operations process
overlap and recur as circumstances demand, so do the functions of the
intelligence process. Additionally, the analyze, disseminate, and assess tasks |
2-22.3 | 12 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
of the intelligence process occur continuously throughout the intelligence
process. (See Figure 1-1.)
• Plan. This step of the intelligence process consists of activities that
include assessing the situation, envisioning a desired outcome (also
known as setting the vision), identifying pertinent information and
intelligence requirements, developing a strategy for ISR operations to
satisfy those requirements, directing intelligence operations, and
synchronizing the ISR effort. The commander’s intent, planning
guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)
(priority information requirements [PIRs] and friendly force
information requirements [FFIRs]) drive the planning of intelligence
operations. Commanders must involve their supporting staff judge
advocate (SJA) when planning intelligence operations (especially
HUMINT operations). Planning, managing, and coordinating these
operations are continuous activities necessary to obtain information
and produce intelligence essential to decisionmaking.
• Prepare. This step includes those staff and leader activities that take
place upon receiving the operations plan (OPLAN), operations order
(OPORD), warning order (WARNO), or commander’s intent to improve
the unit’s ability to execute tasks or missions and survive on the
battlefield.
• Collect. Recent ISR doctrine necessitates that the entire staff,
especially the G3/S3 and G2/S2, must change their reconnaissance and
surveillance (R&S) mindset to conducting ISR. The staff must carefully
focus ISR on the CCIR but also enable the quick re-tasking of units
and assets as the situation changes. This doctrinal requirement
ensures that the enemy situation, not just our OPLAN, “drives” ISR
operations. Well-developed procedures and carefully planned flexibility
to support emerging targets, changing requirements, and the need to
support combat assessment are critical. The G3/S3 and G2/S2 play a
critical role in this challenging task that is sometimes referred to as
“fighting ISR” because it is so staff intensive during planning and
execution (it is an operation within the operation). Elements of all
units on the battlefield obtain information and data about enemy
forces, activities, facilities, and resources as well as information
concerning the environmental and geographical characteristics of a
particular area.
• Process. This step converts relevant information into a form suitable
for analysis, production, or immediate use by the commander.
Processing also includes sorting through large amounts of collected
information and intelligence (multidiscipline reports from the unit’s
ISR assets, lateral and higher echelon units and organizations, and
non-MI elements in the battlespace). Processing identifies and exploits
that information which is pertinent to the commander’s intelligence
requirements and facilitates situational understanding. Examples of
processing include developing film, enhancing imagery, translating a
document from a foreign language, converting electronic data into a
standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator, and |
2-22.3 | 13 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
correlating dissimilar or jumbled information by assembling like
elements before the information is forwarded for analysis.
• Produce. In this step, the G2/S2 integrates evaluated, analyzed, and
interpreted information from single or multiple sources and disciplines
into finished intelligence products. Like collection operations, the
G2/S2 must ensure the unit’s information processing and intelligence
production are prioritized and synchronized to support answering the
collection requirements.
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1-3. For more information on the Intelligence process, see FM 2-0. |
2-22.3 | 14 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
1-4. HUMINT is the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector
(military occupational specialties [MOSs] 97E, 351Y [formerly 351C], 351M
[formerly 351E], 35E, and 35F), from people and their associated documents
and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength,
dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human
sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and
actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence
requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines.
1-5. HUMINT tasks include but are not limited to—
• Conducting source operations.
• Liaising with host nation (HN) officials and allied counterparts.
• Eliciting information from select sources.
• Debriefing US and allied forces and civilian personnel including
refugees, displaced persons (DPs), third-country nationals, and local
inhabitants.
• Interrogating EPWs and other detainees.
• Initially exploiting documents, media, and materiel.
Note. In accordance with Army regulatory and policy guidance, a select set of intelligence
personnel may be trained and certified to conduct certain HUMINT tasks outside of those
which are standard for their primary MOS. Such selection and training will qualify these
personnel to conduct only those specific additional tasks, and will not constitute
qualifications as a HUMINT collector.
HUMINT SOURCE
1-6. A HUMINT source is a person from whom information can be obtained.
The source may either possess first- or second-hand knowledge normally
obtained through sight or hearing. Potential HUMINT sources include
threat, neutral, and friendly military and civilian personnel. Categories of
HUMINT sources include but are not limited to detainees, refugees, DPs,
local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
HUMINT COLLECTOR
1-7. For the purpose of this manual, a HUMINT collector is a person who is
specifically trained and certified for, tasked with, and engages in the
collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the purpose
of answering intelligence information requirements. HUMINT collectors
specifically include enlisted personnel in MOS 97E, Warrant Officers (WOs)
in MOS 351M (351E) and MOS 351Y (351C), commissioned officers in MOS
35E and MOS 35F, select other specially trained MOSs, and their Federal
civilian employee and civilian contractor counterparts. These specially
trained and certified individuals are the only personnel authorized to
conduct HUMINT collection operations, although CI agents also use
HUMINT collection techniques in the conduct of CI operations. HUMINT |
2-22.3 | 15 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
collection operations must be conducted in accordance with applicable law
and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
Additional policies and regulations apply to management of contractors
engaged in HUMINT collection. (See Bibliography for additional references
on contractor management.) HUMINT collectors are not to be confused with
CI agents, MOS 97B and WO MOS 351L (351B). CI agents are trained and
certified for, tasked with, and carry out the mission of denying the enemy the
ability to collect information on the activities and intentions of friendly
forces. Although personnel in 97E and 97B MOSs may use similar methods
to carry out their missions, commanders should not use them
interchangeably. See Figure 1-2 for HUMINT and CI functions.
PHASES OF HUMINT COLLECTION
1-8. Every HUMINT questioning session, regardless of the methodology
used or the type of operation, consists of five phases. The five phases of
HUMINT collection are planning and preparation, approach, questioning,
termination, and reporting. They are generally sequential; however,
reporting may occur at any point within the process when critical
information is obtained and the approach techniques used will be reinforced
as required through the questioning and termination phases.
Planning and Preparation
1-9. During this phase, the HUMINT collector conducts the necessary research
and operational planning in preparation for a specific collection effort with a
specific source. Chapter 7 discusses this phase in detail.
Approach
1-10. During the approach phase, the HUMINT collector establishes the
conditions of control and rapport to gain the cooperation of the source and to
facilitate information collection. Chapter 8 discusses approach and
termination strategies in detail.
Questioning
1-11. During the questioning phase, the HUMINT collector uses an
interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation methodology to ask a source questions
systematically on relevant topics, collect information in response to the
intelligence tasking, and ascertain source veracity. Chapter 9 discusses
questioning techniques in detail. (See Appendix B for a source and reliability
matrix.) |
2-22.3 | 16 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
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Termination
1-12. During the termination phase, the HUMINT collector completes a
questioning session and establishes the necessary conditions for future
collection from the same source by himself or another HUMINT collector.
(See Chapter 8.)
Reporting
1-13. During the reporting phase, the HUMINT collector writes, edits, and
submits written, and possibly oral, reports on information collected in the
course of a HUMINT collection effort. These reports will be reviewed, edited,
and analyzed as they are forwarded through the appropriate channels.
Chapter 10 discusses reporting in detail. |
2-22.3 | 17 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT COLLECTION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
1-14. HUMINT collection activities include these categories: tactical
questioning, screening, interrogation, debriefing, liaison, human source
contact operations (SCOs), document exploitation (DOCEX), and captured
enemy equipment (CEE) operations. DOCEX and CEE operations are
activities supported by HUMINT collection but usually are only conducted by
HUMINT collectors when the CEE or captured enemy document (CED) is
associated with a source being questioned. In some cases, these
determinations may depend on legal distinctions between collection methods
such as interrogation and debriefing. In others, the distinction is in the
purpose of the questioning. For example, screening is used to identify the
knowledgeability and cooperation of a source, as opposed to the other
activities that are used to collect information for intelligence purposes.
1-15. The activities may be conducted interactively. For example, a HUMINT
collector may be screening a potential source. During the course of the
screening, the HUMINT collector identifies that the individual has
information that can answer requirements. He might at that point debrief or
interrogate the source on that specific area. He will then return to screening
the source to identify other potential areas of interest.
1-16. HUMINT collection activities vary depending on the source of the
information. Once the type of activity has been determined, leaders use the
process of plan, prepare, execute, and assess to conduct the activity. The
following are the different types of HUMINT collection activities.
TACTICAL QUESTIONING
1-17. Tactical questioning is expedient initial questioning for information of
immediate tactical value. Tactical questioning is generally performed by
members of patrols, but can be done by any DOD personnel. (See ST 2-91.6.)
SCREENING
1-18. Screening is the process of identifying and assessing the areas of
knowledge, cooperation, and possible approach techniques for an individual
who has information of intelligence value. Indicators and discriminators used
in screening can range from general appearance, possessions, and attitude to
specific questions to assess areas of knowledge and degree of cooperation to
establish if an individual matches a predetermined source profile. Screening
is not in itself an intelligence collection technique but a timesaving measure
that identifies those individuals most likely to have information of value.
1-19. Screening operations are conducted to identify the level of knowledge,
level of cooperation, and the placement and access of a given source.
Screening operations can also assist in the determination of which discipline
or agency can best conduct the exploitation. Chapter 6 discusses screening in
detail. Screening operations include but are not limited to—
(cid:131) Mobile and static checkpoint screening, including screening of
refugees and DPs.
(cid:131) Locally employed personnel screening. |
2-22.3 | 18 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
(cid:131) Screening as part of a cordon and search operation.
(cid:131) EPW and detainee screening.
INTERROGATION
1-20. Interrogation is the systematic effort to procure information to answer
specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques
of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning.
Some examples of interrogation sources include EPWs and other detainees.
Interrogation sources range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic.
Interrogations may be conducted at all echelons in all operational
environments. Detainee interrogation operations conducted at a Military
Police (MP) facility, coalition-operated facility, or other agency-operated
collection facility are more robust and require greater planning, but have
greater logistical support. Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel
trained and certified in the interrogation methodology, including personnel
in MOSs 97E, 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by DOD
policy. Interrogations are always to be conducted in accordance with the Law
of War, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the
HUMINT collector is operating.
DEBRIEFING
1-21. Debriefing is the process of questioning cooperating human sources to
satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. The source
usually is not in custody and usually is willing to cooperate. Debriefing may
be conducted at all echelons and in all operational environments. The
primary categories of sources for debriefing are refugees, émigrés, DPs, and
local civilians; and friendly forces.
• Refugees, Émigrés, DPs, and Local Civilians Debriefing
Operations. Refugee, émigré, and DP debriefing operations are the
process of questioning cooperating refugees and émigrés to satisfy
intelligence requirements. The refugee may or may not be in custody,
and a refugee or émigré’s willingness to cooperate need not be
immediate or constant. Refugee debriefings are usually conducted at
refugee collection points or checkpoints and may be conducted in
coordination with civil affairs (CA) or MP operations. Local civilian
debriefing operations are the process of questioning cooperating local
civilians to satisfy intelligence requirements. As with refugees and
émigrés, the local civilians being debriefed may or may not be in
custody and the civilian’s willingness to cooperate may not be
immediate or constant. Debriefing operations must be conducted
consistent with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy
include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”;
DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
• Friendly Force Debriefing Operations. Friendly force debriefing
operations are the systematic debriefing of US forces to answer |
2-22.3 | 19 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
collection requirements. These operations must be coordinated with US
units. (See Chapter 6.)
LIAISON OPERATIONS
1-22. Liaison operations are programs to coordinate activities and exchange
information with host country and allied military and civilian agencies and
NGOs.
HUMAN SOURCE CONTACT OPERATIONS
1-23. Human SCO are operations directed toward the establishment of
human sources who have agreed to meet and cooperate with HUMINT
collectors for the purpose of providing information. Within the Army, SCO
are conducted by trained personnel under the direction of military
commanders. The entire range of HUMINT collection operations can be
employed. SCO sources include one-time contacts, continuous contacts, and
formal contacts from debriefings, liaison, and contact operations. SCO
consist of collection activities that utilize human sources to identify attitude,
intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, target
development, personnel, and capabilities of those elements that pose a
potential or actual threat to US and coalition forces. SCO are also employed
to develop local source or informant networks that provide early warning of
imminent danger to US and coalition forces and contribute to the Military
Decision-Making Process (MDMP). See Chapter 5 for discussion of approval,
coordination, and review for each type of activity.
DOCEX OPERATIONS
1-24. DOCEX operations are the systematic extraction of information from
open, closed, published, and electronic source documents. These documents
may include documents or data inside electronic communications equipment,
including computers, telephones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and
Global Positioning System (GPS) terminals. This operation is not solely a
HUMINT function, but may be conducted by any intelligence personnel with
appropriate language support.
1-25. Many CEDs are associated with EPWs and other human sources.
Consequently, a HUMINT collector is often the first person to screen them.
HUMINT collectors will screen the documents associated with human
sources and will extract information of use to them in their immediate
collection operation. Any information discovered during this initial screening
that might cross-cue another collection effort will be forwarded to the
appropriate unit.
1-26. A captured document is usually something that the enemy has written
for his own use. For this reason, captured documents are usually truthful and
accurate. There are cases in which falsified documents have been permitted
to fall into enemy hands as a means of deception but these cases are not the
norm. Normal policy of not relying on single-source information should help
prevent deceptions of this type from being effective. Documents also do not
forget or misinterpret information although it must be remembered that
their authors may have. Usually, each document provides a portion of a |
2-22.3 | 20 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
larger body of information. Each captured document, much like a single piece
of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to tactical intelligence,
technical data and political indicators that are important to strategic and
national level agencies can sometimes be extracted from captured documents.
Captured documents, while not affected by memory loss, are often time
sensitive; therefore, they are to be quickly screened for possible exploitation.
CEE OPERATIONS
1-27. CEE includes all types of foreign and non-foreign materiel found on a
detainee or on the battlefield that may have a military application or answer
a collection requirement. The capturing unit must––
• Recognize certain CEE as having immediate intelligence value, and
immediately forward such CEE to the unit’s S2. Such items include—
(cid:131) All electronic communications equipment with a memory card,
including computers, telephones, PDAs, and GPS terminals.
(cid:131) All video or photographic equipment.
• Recognize certain CEE as having technical intelligence (TECHINT)
value. Such items include––
(cid:131) New weapons.
(cid:131) All communications equipment not immediately exploitable for
HUMINT value.
(cid:131) Track vehicles.
(cid:131) Equipment manuals.
(cid:131) All CEE known or believed to be of TECHINT interest.
• Evacuate the equipment with the detainee.
• Confiscate, tag, and evacuate weapons and other equipment found on
the detainee the same as CEDs. (See Appendix D.)
• Secure and report the capture of TECHINT items to the unit’s S2 for
disposition instructions.
TRAITS OF A HUMINT COLLECTOR
1-28. HUMINT collection is a science and an art. Although many HUMINT
collection skills may be taught, the development of a skilled HUMINT
collector requires experience in dealing with people in all conditions and
under all circumstances. Although there are many intangibles in the
definition of a “good” HUMINT collector, certain character traits are
invaluable:
• Alertness. The HUMINT collector must be alert on several levels
while conducting HUMINT collection. He must concentrate on the
information being provided by the source and be constantly evaluating
the information for both value and veracity based on collection
requirements, current intelligence, and other information obtained
from the source. Simultaneously, he must be alert not only to what the
source says but also to how it is said and the accompanying body
language to assess the source’s truthfulness, degree of cooperation, and
current mood. He needs to know when to give the source a break and |
2-22.3 | 21 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
when to press the source harder. In addition, the HUMINT collector
constantly must be alert to his environment to ensure his personal
security and that of his source.
• Patience and Tact. The HUMINT collector must have patience and
tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the
source, thereby enhancing the success of the questioning. Displaying
impatience may—
(cid:131) Encourage a difficult source to think that if he remains unresponsive
for a little longer, the HUMINT collector will stop questioning.
(cid:131) Cause the source to lose respect for the HUMINT collector, thereby
reducing the HUMINT collector’s effectiveness.
• Credibility. The HUMINT collector must provide a clear, accurate,
and professional product and an accurate assessment of his
capabilities. He must be able to clearly articulate complex situations
and concepts. The HUMINT collector must also maintain credibility
with his source. He must present himself in a believable and consistent
manner, and follow through on any promises made as well as never to
promise what cannot be delivered.
• Objectivity and Self-control. The HUMINT collector must also be
totally objective in evaluating the information obtained. The HUMINT
collector must maintain an objective and dispassionate attitude
regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience or
simulate during a questioning session. Without objectivity, he may
unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable
to vary his questioning and approach techniques effectively. He must
have exceptional self-control to avoid displays of genuine anger,
irritation, sympathy, or weariness that may cause him to lose the
initiative during questioning but be able to fake any of these emotions
as necessary. He must not become emotionally involved with the
source.
• Adaptability. A HUMINT collector must adapt to the many and
varied personalities which he will encounter. He must also adapt to all
types of locations, operational tempos, and operational environments.
He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being
adaptable, he can smoothly shift his questioning and approach
techniques according to the operational environment and the
personality of the source.
• Perseverance. A tenacity of purpose can be the difference between a
HUMINT collector who is merely good and one who is superior. A
HUMINT collector who becomes easily discouraged by opposition, non-
cooperation, or other difficulties will not aggressively pursue the
objective to a successful conclusion or exploit leads to other valuable
information.
• Appearance and Demeanor. The HUMINT collector's personal
appearance may greatly influence the conduct of any HUMINT
collection operation and attitude of the source toward the HUMINT
collector. Usually an organized and professional appearance will
favorably influence the source. If the HUMINT collector's manner |
2-22.3 | 22 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove more
cooperative and more receptive to questioning.
• Initiative. Achieving and maintaining the initiative are essential to a
successful questioning session just as the offensive is the key to success
in combat operations. The HUMINT collector must grasp the initiative
and maintain it throughout all questioning phases. This does not mean
he has to dominate the source physically; rather, it means that the
HUMINT collector knows his requirements and continues to direct the
collection toward those requirements.
REQUIRED AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE
1-29. The HUMINT collector must be knowledgeable in a variety of areas in
order to question sources effectively. The collector must prepare himself for
operations in a particular theater or area of intelligence responsibility
(AOIR) by conducting research. The G2 can be a valuable source of
information for this preparatory research. The HUMINT collector should
consult with order of battle (OB) technicians and analysts and collect
information from open sources and from the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) to enhance his knowledge of the AOIR. Some of these
areas of required knowledge are—
• The area of operations (AO) including the social, political, and
economic institutions; geography; history; language; and culture of the
target area. Collectors must be aware of all ethnic, social, religious,
political, criminal, tribal, and economic groups and the
interrelationships between these groups.
• All current and potential threat forces within the AOIR and their
organization, equipment, motivation, capabilities, limitations, and
normal operational methodology.
• Applicable law and policy that might affect HUMINT collection
activities. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of
war; relevant international law; relevant directives including
DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations,
Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. HUMINT collectors are subject to applicable law,
which includes US law, the law of war (including the Geneva
Conventions as applicable), and relevant international law.
Additionally, local agreements with HNs or allies and the applicable
execute orders and rules of engagement (ROE) may further restrict
HUMINT collection activities. However, these documents cannot
permit interrogation actions that would be illegal under applicable US
or international law.
• The collection requirements, including all specific information
requirements (SIRs) and indicators that will lead to the answering of
the intelligence requirements. |
2-22.3 | 23 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
• Cultural awareness in the various AOs will have different social and
regional considerations that affect communications and can affect the
conduct of operations. These may include social taboos, desired
behaviors, customs, and courtesies. The staff must include this
information in pre-deployment training at all levels to ensure that
personnel are properly equipped to interact with the local populace.
1-30. There are other areas of knowledge that help to develop more effective
questioning:
• Proficiency in the target language. The HUMINT collector can
normally use an interpreter (see Chapter 11) and machine translation
as they are developed to conduct questioning. Language proficiency is a
benefit to the HUMINT collector in a number of ways: He can save
time in questioning, be more aware of nuances in the language that
might verify or deny truthfulness, and better control and evaluate
interpreters.
• Understanding basic human behavior. A HUMINT collector can
best adapt himself to the source’s personality and control of the
source’s reactions when he understands basic behavioral factors, traits,
attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions. He must not only
understand basic behavioral principles but also know how these
principles are manifested in the area and culture in which he is
operating.
• Neurolinguistics. Neurolinguistics is a behavioral communication
model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The
HUMINT collector should read and react to nonverbal
communications. He must be aware of the specific neurolinguistic clues
of the cultural framework in which he is operating.
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
CAPABILITIES
1-31. HUMINT collection capabilities include the ability to⎯
• Collect information and cross-cue from an almost endless variety of
potential sources including friendly forces, civilians, detainees, and
source-related documents.
• Focus on the collection of detailed information not available by other
means. This includes information on threat intentions and local
civilian and threat force attitudes and morale. It also includes building
interiors and facilities that cannot be collected on by other means due
to restrictive terrain.
• Corroborate or refute information collected from other R&S assets.
• Operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational
environments in support of offensive, defensive, stability and
reconstruction operations, or civil support operations. Based on solid
planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely
information if deployed forward in support of maneuver elements. |
2-22.3 | 24 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
LIMITATIONS
1-32. HUMINT collection limitations include⎯
• Interpersonal abilities. HUMINT is dependent on the subjective
interpersonal capabilities of the individual rather than on the abilities
to operate collection equipment. HUMINT collection capability is based
on experience within a specific AO that can only be developed over
time.
• Identification of knowledgeable sources. There is often a multitude of
potential HUMINT sources. Information in response to specific
requirements can only be collected if sources are available and
identified that have that information.
• Limited numbers. There are never enough HUMINT collectors to meet
all requirements. Limited assets must be prioritized in support of units
and operations based on their criticality.
• Time limitations. HUMINT collection, particularly source operations,
takes time to develop. Collection requirements must be developed with
sufficient lead-time for collection.
• Language limitations. Although HUMINT collectors can normally use
an interpreter, a lack of language proficiency by the collector can
significantly slow collection efforts. Such language proficiency takes
time to develop.
• Misunderstanding of the HUMINT mission. HUMINT collectors are
frequently used incorrectly and assigned missions that belong to CA,
MP, interpreter or translators, CI, or other operational specialties.
• Commanders’ risk management. Maneuver commanders, in weighing
the risks associated with employing HUMINT collection teams (HCTs),
should seriously consider the potential loss of a wealth of information
such as enemy activities, locations of high-value personnel, and threats
to the force that they will incur if they restrict HCT collection
activities. J/G2Xs, operational management teams (OMTs), and HCT
leaders must educate maneuver commanders on the benefits of
providing security for HCTs and employing them in accordance with
their capabilities.
• Legal obligations. Applicable law and policy govern HUMINT
collection operations. Applicable law and policy include US law; the
law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including
DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee
Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The
Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and
military execute orders including FRAGOs. HUMINT operations may
be further restricted by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and
other agreements, execute orders and ROE, local laws, and an
operational umbrella concept. Such documents, however, cannot
permit interrogation actions that are illegal under applicable law.
• Connectivity and bandwidth requirements. With the exception of the
size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE) report, most
HUMINT reporting requires considerable bandwidth. Deployed |
2-22.3 | 25 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT teams must be able to travel to, and report from, all areas of
the battlefield. Digital communication equipment must be able to
provide reliable connectivity with teams’ reporting channels and
sufficient bandwidth for transmission of reports, including digital
imagery.
• Timely reporting and immediate access to sources. Except in tactical
situations when HUMINT collectors are in immediate support of
maneuver units, HUMINT collection and reporting takes time. In
stability and reconstruction operations, sources need to be assessed
and developed. Once they are developed, they need to be contacted
which often takes time and coordination. In offensive and defensive
operations, HUMINT collection at detainee holding areas sometimes
may still be timely enough to meet tactical and operational
requirements. See paragraphs 3-2 and 3-7 for more information on
offensive and defensive operations. |
2-22.3 | 27 | FM 2-22.3
Chapter 2
Human Intelligence Structure
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
2-1. The success of the HUMINT collection effort depends on a complex
interrelationship between command and control (C2) elements,
requirements, technical control and support, and collection assets. Each
echelon of command has its supporting HUMINT elements although no MI
organization in the Army is robust enough to conduct sustained HUMINT
operations under all operational environments using only its organic
HUMINT assets. HUMINT units have specific support requirements to the
commander. HUMINT units must be flexible, versatile, and prepared to
conduct HUMINT collection and analysis operations in support of any
echelon of command. A coherent C2 structure within these HUMINT
organizations is necessary in order to ensure successful, disciplined, and
legal HUMINT operations. This structure must include experienced
commissioned officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs conscientiously
discharging their responsibilities and providing HUMINT collectors with
guidance from higher headquarters.
2-2. Regardless of the echelon, there are four basic elements that work
together to provide the deployed commander with well-focused, thoroughly
planned HUMINT support. The four elements are staff support, analysis, C2,
and collection. Each piece of the infrastructure builds on the next and is
based on the size, complexity, and type of operation as shown in Figure 2-1.
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TTTTeeeeaaaammmm((((ssss)))) TTTTeeeeaaaammmm((((ssss))))
Figure 2-1. Tactical HUMINT Organization. |
2-22.3 | 28 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
HUMINT CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS
2-3. HUMINT control organizations are the means by which a commander
exercises command of a unit’s operations. HUMINT control organizations are
vital to the effective use of HUMINT collection assets. HUMINT control
organizations consist of the C/J/G/S2X and the HUMINT operations cell
(HOC) at the brigade and above level and the OMTs at the battalion and
below level.
C/J/G/S2X
2-4. The C/J/G/S2X is a staff element subordinate to the C/J/G/S2, is the
primary advisor on HUMINT and CI, and is the focal point for all HUMINT
and CI activities within a joint task force (JTF) (J2X), an Army component
task force (G2X) or a brigade combat team (BCT) (S2X). The 2X can be
organic to the unit staff or can be attached or under operational control
(OPCON) to the staff from another organization such as the theater MI
brigade. The C/J/G/S2X is part of a coherent architecture that includes
organic HUMINT assets and HUMINT resources from national, theater, and
non-DOD HUMINT organizations.
2-5. The C/J2X is responsible for controlling Joint Force HUMINT assets,
coordinating all HUMINT and CI collection activities, and keeping the joint
force C/J/2 informed on all HUMINT and CI activities conducted in the joint
force area of responsibility (AOR). The C/J2X is also part of the review and
recommendation process concerned with the retention or release of detainees.
HUMINT reports maintained at the C/J2X are considered during the review
for release process. The C/J2X consists of the 2X Officer, a HOC, a
Counterintelligence Coordination Authority (CICA), a HUMINT Analysis
Cell (HAC), and a CI Analysis Cell (CIAC). At all echelons, the 2X should
also include an Operational Support Cell (OSC) staffed to operate 24 hours a
day. The authority and operational responsibilities of a C/J2X in combined or
joint contingency operations (CONOP) takes precedence over service-specific
CI and HUMINT technical control agencies. Specifically, the C/J/G/S2X⎯
• Accomplishes technical control and support, and deconfliction of all
HUMINT and CI assets through the Army component G2X, the
HUMINT and CI operations sections, or the OMTs.
• Participates in planning for deployment of HUMINT and CI assets in
support of operations.
• Coordinates, through the HOC and the CICA, all HUMINT and CI
activities to support intelligence collection and the intelligence aspects
of force protection for the deployed commander.
• Coordinates and deconflicts all HUMINT and CI operations within the
operational area.
• Coordinates with the senior US national intelligence representative for
specific operational approval when required by standing agreements.
• Is the release authority for HUMINT reporting at his echelon and only
releases reports to the all-source system after ensuring all technical
control measures for reporting have been met. |
2-22.3 | 29 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
• Coordinates with other HUMINT collection agencies not under the
control of the command, such as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
• Does not exercise OPCON over HUMINT and CI assets assigned,
attached, or reinforcing the unit; however, he is the staff support
responsible for creating a cohesive HUMINT and CI effort.
• Coordinates with non-DOD agencies conducting HUMINT collection
operations in the joint area of operations (JAO) to ensure deconfliction
of sources, informants, or contacts and the HUMINT reporting that is
generated by these collection operations.
2-6. The J2X will maintain technical control (see para 4-10) of all CI
investigative actions within its AOIR; however, all investigative matters will
be in accordance with DOD policies, joint or Military Department doctrine,
applicable US law and policy, SOFAs, or other International Standardization
Agreements (ISAs). The J2X will advise the responsible Theater CICA
(TCICA) of any Army CI element conducting investigative activities that fall
under the purview of AR 381-20.
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CELL (OSC)
2-7. The OSC in the C/J/G/S2X staff will maintain the consolidated source
registry for all HUMINT and CI activities in the unit’s designated AOIR. The
OSC will provide management of intelligence property book operations,
source incentive programs, and intelligence contingency funds (ICFs) for
subordinate HUMINT and CI elements. The OSC responsibilities also
include requests for information (RFIs) and/or source-directed requirements
(SDRs) management and the release of intelligence information reports
(IIRs).
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AUTHORITY
2-8. The CICA is assigned under the J/G2X and coordinates all CI activities
within its designated AOIR. (See FM 34-60 for a detailed explanation of the
CI mission.) The CICA⎯
• Provides technical support to all CI assets and coordinates and
deconflicts CI activities in the deployed AOIR.
• Coordinates and supervises CI investigations and collection activities
conducted by all services and components in the AOIR.
• Establishes and maintains the theater CI source database.
• Coordinates with the HOC for CI support to detention, interrogation,
refugee, and other facilities.
• Manages requirements and taskings for CI collectors in the AO in
coordination with the HOC.
• Expedites preparation of CI reports and their distribution to
consumers at all levels.
• Coordinates CI activities with senior CI officers from all CI
organizations on the battlefield. |
2-22.3 | 30 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
• Performs liaison with HN and US national level CI organizations.
• Informs the appropriate TCICA when Army CI elements are
conducting CI investigative activities within the purview of AR 381-20.
HUMINT OPERATIONS CELL
2-9. The HOC is assigned under the J/G2X to track all HUMINT activities in
the AOIR. The J/G2X uses this information to advise the senior intelligence
officer (SIO) on all HUMINT activities conducted within the AOIR. The
HOC—
• Provides technical support to all HUMINT collection operations and
deconflicts HUMINT collection operations in the designated AOIR.
• Establishes and maintains a consolidated HUMINT source database in
coordination with the CICA.
• Coordinates with collection managers and the HAC to identify
collection requirements and to ensure requirements are met.
• Coordinates the activities of HUMINT collectors assigned or attached
to interrogation, debriefing, refugee, DOCEX, and other facilities.
• Manages requirements and taskings for HUMINT collectors in the
AOIR, in coordination with the CICA.
• Expedites preparation of intelligence reports and their distribution to
consumers at all levels.
• Performs liaison with HN and US national HUMINT organizations.
OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT TEAM
2-10. A HUMINT OMT consists of senior individuals in MOS 351M (351E)
and MOS 97E. Each OMT can control 2 to 4 HCTs depending upon assigned
mission and operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The OMT performs a necessary
function when two or more HCTs deploy by assisting the HUMINT element
commander in tasking and providing technical support to assigned or
attached HCTs. The OMT is optimally collocated with the command post
(CP) of the supported unit. However, it must be located where it can provide
oversight of team operations and best support the dissemination of tasking,
reports, and technical data between the unit and the deployed collection
assets. When a higher echelon augments subordinate elements with
collection teams, it should include proportional OMT augmentation. When a
single collection team is attached in direct support (DS) of a subordinate
element, the senior team member exerts mission and technical control over
the team. The OMT⎯
• Provides operational and technical control and guidance to deployed
HCTs.
• Normally consists of a WO and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
whose experience and knowledge provide the necessary guidance for
effective team collection operations.
• Manages the use of ICFs and incentives for the HCTs.
• Provides the collection focus for HCTs. |
2-22.3 | 31 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
• Provides quality control and dissemination of reports for subordinate
HCTs.
• Directs the activities of subordinate HCTs and controls their
operations.
• Conducts limited single-discipline HUMINT analysis and mission
analysis for the supported commander.
• Acts as a conduit between subordinate HCTs, the HOC, and the
C/J/G/S2X.
• Reports the HCT mission and equipment status to the HOC and the
command element.
HUMINT COLLECTION TEAM
2-11. HCTs are the elements that collect information from human sources.
The HUMINT collectors deploy in teams of approximately four personnel in
MOS 97E (HUMINT Collector) and MOS 351M (351E) (HUMINT
Technician).
2-12. The HCT may be augmented based on factors of mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC). Interpreters from the RC or civilian contractors
with appropriate security clearances are added when necessary. TECHINT
personnel or other specific subject-matter experts (SMEs) may augment the
team to meet technical collection requirements. Another example would be
pairing HUMINT collectors with dedicated analysts to provide sharper focus
to the interrogation effort. In fixed detention facilities, these HUMINT
collector or analyst relationships may become more enduring. Commanders
are not encouraged to mix HUMINT collectors and CI agents on a single
team. Doing so seriously undermines the ability to conduct both the
HUMINT collection and CI missions simultaneously. However, commanders
may find times when METT-TC factors make it reasonable to augment a CI
team with HUMINT support for a mission, or vice versa.
COMMAND DEBRIEFING TEAM
2-13. A command debriefing team is normally not a table of organization and
equipment (TOE) organization but may be task organized to meet mission
requirements. This task-organized team is normally OPCON to the HOC.
Although more prevalent during stability and reconstruction operations,
senior personnel will often acquire information of intelligence interest during
the normal course of their duties. The HUMINT collection assets,
particularly at division echelon or higher, will normally task organize a team
of more senior, experienced individuals to debrief these senior unit personnel.
In offensive and defensive operations, this same team is prepared to
interrogate high-value detainees (including EPWs) or debrief senior civilians.
The command debriefing team should not be confused with the G2/S2
debriefing program, which also is critical and is an important conduit of
information.
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION TEAM |
2-22.3 | 32 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
2-14. DOCEX teams are normally found at theater and national level
organizations. Lower echelon HCTs may also be designated to perform the
DOCEX mission based upon mission parameters and linguist availability.
However, if organic assets are used, there will be a mission tradeoff.
Dependent on the priority of exploitation and volume of documents, HCTs
assigned the DOCEX mission may be augmented by military, civilian, or
contractor personnel to accomplish their assigned mission. During
operations, the DOCEX team will normally screen documents, extract
information, and expedite the evacuation of documents to the Joint or
Theater Document Exploitation Facility.
HUMINT ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONS
2-15. HUMINT analysis and production organizations analyze information
collected from HUMINT sources, support the requirements management
(RM) system, and produce single-discipline intelligence products. HUMINT
analysis and production are conducted at all echelons, separate brigades, and
higher. (See Chapter 12 for a description of the HUMINT analysis system
and methodologies.)
HUMINT ANALYSIS CELL
2-16. The HAC is part of the J/G2X; however, it may be collocated with an
analysis and control element (ACE) or Joint Intelligence Support Element
(JISE) single-source enclave depending on facilities and operational
environment considerations. The HAC works closely with the all-source
intelligence elements and the CIAC to ensure that HUMINT reporting is
incorporated into the all-source analysis and common operational picture
(COP). The HAC is the “fusion point” for all HUMINT reporting and
operational analysis in the JISE and ACE. It determines gaps in reporting
and coordinates with the RM to cross-cue other intelligence sensor systems.
The HAC⎯
• Produces and disseminates HUMINT products and provides input to
intelligence summaries (INTSUMs).
• Uses analytical tools found at the ACE or JISE to develop long-term
analyses and provides reporting feedback that supports the HOC,
OMTs, and HCTs.
• Provides analytical expertise to the C/J/G/S2X, HOC, and OMTs.
• Produces country and regional studies tailored to HUMINT collection.
• Compiles target folders to assist C/J/G/S2X assets in focusing collection
efforts.
• Analyzes and reports on trends and patterns found in HUMINT
reporting.
• Analyzes source reliability and credibility as reflected in reporting and
communicates that analysis to the collector.
• Develops and maintains databases specific to HUMINT collection
activities.
• Produces HUMINT requirements. |
2-22.3 | 33 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
• Answers HUMINT-related RFIs.
• Identifies collection gaps and provides context for better collection at
their echelon.
JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER ANALYSIS SECTION
2-17. This section ensures that all members of the Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) (see para 5-102) are aware of the current situation
through the distribution of INTSUMs and products from external agencies.
The Analysis Section also supports the JIDC by––
• Providing situation update briefings to all facility personnel every 12
hours.
• Preparing research and background packets and briefings for
interrogations and debriefings.
• Developing indicators for each intelligence requirement to support
screening operations.
• Conducting single-discipline HUMINT analysis based on collected
information to support further collection efforts.
• Correlating reports produced by the JIDC to facilitate analysis at
higher levels.
• Answering RFIs from interrogators and formulating RFIs that cannot
be answered by the analytical section on behalf of the interrogators.
• Reviewing IIRs and extracting information into analysis tools tailored
to support the interrogation process.
• Pursuing products and resources to support the interrogation effort.
HUMINT ANALYSIS TEAM
2-18. The HUMINT analysis team (HAT) is subordinate to the G2 ACE. The
HAT supports the G2 in the development of IPB products and in developing
and tailoring SIRs to match HUMINT collection capabilities. |
2-22.3 | 35 | FM 2-22.3
Chapter 3
HUMINT in Support of Army Operations
3-1. Army doctrine for full spectrum operations recognizes four types of
military operations: offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, and
civil support. Missions in any environment require the Army to conduct or be
prepared to conduct any combination of these operations. HUMINT assets
will be called on to provide information in support of all four operations.
Simultaneous operations, for example elements of a force conducting
offensive operations while other elements are engaged in stability and
reconstruction operations, will cause a similar division of the limited
HUMINT assets based on METT-TC.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-2. Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating the enemy. Rapid
maneuver, constantly changing situations, and a vital need for intelligence
support at the point of contact influence HUMINT missions during offensive
operations. The guiding principle to the use of HUMINT in support of
offensive operations is to minimize the time between when friendly forces
encounter potential sources (detainees, refugees, and local civilians) and
when a HUMINT collector screens them.
3-3. During offensive operations, at echelons corps and below, HCTs
normally operate in the engaged maneuver brigades’ AOs and are further
deployed in support of maneuver battalions based on advice from the OMTs.
These collection assets may be in general support (GS) of the parent brigade
or in DS of the maneuver battalions, reconnaissance squadrons, and other
forward-deployed maneuver assets. The HCTs and their supporting control
structure are deployed in accordance with METT-TC based on three
principles:
• The relative importance of that subordinate element’s operations to the
overall parent unit’s scheme of maneuver and the overall ISR plan.
• The potential for that subordinate element to capture detainees, media
and materiel, or to encounter civilians on the battlefield.
• The criticality of information that could be obtained from those sources
to the success of the parent unit’s overall OPLANs.
3-4. HUMINT missions in support of offensive operations include screening
and interrogating EPWs and other detainees, questioning and debriefing
civilians in the supported unit’s AO, and conducting DOCEX, limited to
extracting information of immediate tactical value. EAC assets normally
support offensive operations through theater interrogation and debriefing
facility operations and mobile interrogation teams. These facilities are better
equipped to conduct in-depth interrogations and DOCEX, so it is imperative |
2-22.3 | 36 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
that EPWs and other detainees who will be evacuated to theater facilities be
transported there as soon as possible.
HUMINT IN SUPPORT OF FORCED ENTRY OPERATIONS
3-5. Forced entry operations (FEOs) are offensive operations conducted to
establish an initial military presence in a target area in the face of expected
enemy opposition. HUMINT collection assets may be able to provide vital
information to tactical commanders in the critical early stages of the entry
operation. Key considerations for HUMINT support to FEOs include:
• HUMINT collectors attached or under OPCON of the initial force
package to provide HUMINT collection support for the entry force.
Collection teams will normally operate in support of battalion-sized or
smaller elements. HUMINT collection assets should be integrated
early and should participate in all aspects of planning and training,
including rehearsals, to smoothly integrate and execute operations.
• HUMINT assets supporting the entry force must include proportional
OMT elements. For example, if 2 to 4 teams are attached to a
maneuver brigade, an OMT also needs to be attached. Even if the
teams are further attached to maneuver battalions, there must be an
OMT at the brigade level to coordinate and control HUMINT collection
activities.
• HCTs and OMTs must be as mobile and as survivable as the entry
forces. Team leaders should ensure that the supported unit will be able
to provide maintenance support to the team vehicles, as appropriate, in
accordance with the support relationship.
• Attached or OPCON HUMINT teams must have robust
communications connectivity with the supported unit and must have
reach connectivity through their OMT.
• HCTs must contain organic or attached language capability in order to
conduct HUMINT collection effectively during FEO. It is unlikely that
the teams can be augmented with attached civilian interpreters during
this type of operation.
HUMINT IN SUPPORT OF EARLY ENTRY OPERATIONS
3-6. Early entry operations differ from FEOs in that early entry operations
do not anticipate large-scale armed opposition. Early entry operations
establish or enhance US presence, stabilize the situation, and shape the
environment for follow-on forces. HUMINT collection provides critical
support to defining the operational environment and assessing the threat to
US forces. The considerations listed above for FEOs apply equally to early
entry operations.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-7. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize
forces, hold the enemy in one area while attacking in another, or develop
conditions favorable for offensive operations. Forces conducting defensive |
2-22.3 | 37 | ________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
operations must be able to identify rapidly the enemy’s main effort and
rapidly assess the operational conditions to determine the timing of counter-
offensive or other operations. HUMINT support to defensive operations
centers on the ability to provide the forward-deployed maneuver commander
with information and intelligence of immediate tactical value. HUMINT
assets should be placed in the AO of the forward elements to minimize the
time between when friendly forces encounter potential sources (detainees,
refugees, local civilians) and when a HUMINT collector screens them.
HUMINT collectors are placed where the potential for HUMINT collection
and the criticality of the information are greatest.
3-8. In defensive operations, it may be necessary to divide the HUMINT
assets equally among the subordinate elements to provide area coverage
until the primary enemy threat is identified. The HUMINT C2 elements
(team leader, OMTs, and unit C2) must be prepared to task organize rapidly
and shift resources as the situation dictates, based on the changing situation
and higher headquarters FRAGO. HUMINT missions in defensive operations
normally include interrogation of detainees, refugee debriefings, and
assisting in friendly force patrol debriefings.
STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
3-9. Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and
control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military and
civilian capabilities to help establish order that advances US interests and
values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with
security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-
term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential
services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and
robust civil society. Stability and reconstruction operations involve both
coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after
offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately,
usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. The primary
focus of the HCTs during stability and reconstruction operations is to answer
the commander's information requirements (IRs) and provide support to force
protection. In stability and reconstruction operations, the HUMINT collectors
must be able to maintain daily contact with the local population. The nature
of the threat in stability operations can range from conventional forces to
terrorists and organized crime and civil disturbances. Consequently,
intelligence requirements can vary greatly. Examples of HUMINT collection
requirements include TECHINT to support arms control; extensive political
information and demographic data; order of battle (OB) regarding several
different former warring factions during peace operations; or extremely
detailed target data. HUMINT collectors also help to ascertain the feelings,
attitudes, and activities of the local populace. Stability and reconstruction
operations may be conducted in coordination with other US departments and
agencies, and in conjunction with other countries and international
organizations.
3-10. Centralized management and databasing are key to successful
HUMINT operations. The HUMINT assets may operate in GS to the parent
unit or operate in the AO of subordinate elements of the parent unit. For |
2-22.3 | 38 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
example, in a division AO, the HCTs would normally operate in DS to the
division but each team would normally have an AOIR that corresponds to the
AO of the division’s brigades or battalion task forces. There is close
coordination between the HUMINT staff officer (C/J/G/S2X) and the OMTs to
synchronize HUMINT operations properly, to develop the overall threat
awareness, and to deconflict sources. The HCTs screen and debrief contacts
to increase the security posture of US forces, to provide information in
response to command collection requirements, and to provide early warning
of threats to US forces. They may also interrogate detainees if permitted to
do so by the mission-specific orders and in accordance with applicable law
and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
3-11. Many stability and reconstruction operations are initiated with the
establishment of a lodgment or base area. There is a subsequent expansion of
operations to encompass the entire AO. The general concept of an HCT’s
operation is that of a two-phased effort. In the initial phase, the HCT
establishes concentric rings of operations around the US forces starting from
the supported unit’s base of operations and working outward. Each ring is
based on the threat environment and the commander’s need to develop his
knowledge of the tactical situation. The second, or continuation phase, begins
once the initial information collection ring is established. The initial ring is
not abandoned but rather is added to as the HCT shifts its focus to expand
and establish the second and successive rings. The amount of time spent
establishing each ring is situationally dependent.
INITIAL PHASE
3-12. The initial phase of stability and reconstruction operations is used to
lay the foundation for future team operations. In general, the priority of
effort is focused inward on security. The HCT conducts initial and follow-up
screenings of locally employed personnel, to establish base data for
subsequent source operations. The supported unit S2, with the assistance of
the HUMINT team leader, establishes procedures to debrief reconnaissance
and surveillance assets operating in the supported unit AO, as well as
regular combat patrols or logistics convoys. The HCT lays the groundwork for
future collection efforts by establishing liaison with local authorities, as well
as developing plans and profiles for HUMINT collection. While establishing
the initial and subsequent rings, the HCT actively seeks to collect PIR
information, whether it pertains to the current ring or any other geographic
location.
CONTINUATION PHASE
3-13. Following the initial phase, the HCT’s focus shifts outward. While the
HCT continues performing HUMINT collection and analysis functions within
the base camp, it also expands its collection effort to outside the base camp to
answer the supported unit’s requirements. During the continuation phase,
the HCT conducts contact operations with local personnel who may be able to |
2-22.3 | 39 | ________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
provide information of interest to the local commander or to satisfy the
requirements of the tasking or request. The HCT also conducts liaison with
local authorities, coalition forces (if present), NGOs, and others whose
knowledge or activities may affect the success of the US mission. Any time
the HCT is outside the base camp, it must be careful to observe the local
population and report what it sees. The activities and attitudes of the general
population will often have an effect on the commander’s decisions on how to
conduct US missions in the area.
LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT
3-14. HCTs may be employed with varying degrees of contact with the local
population. As the degree of contact with the population increases, the
quantity and diversity of HUMINT collection increases. In many instances,
however, there is a risk to the HCT inherent with increased exposure to the
local population. The ability of the HCT members to fit in with the local
populace can become very important to their safety. Consequently, the
commander should consider exceptions to the ROE, as well as relaxed
grooming and uniform standards, to help HCT members blend in and provide
additional security. Commanders must consider the culture in which the
HCT members will be operating. In some cultures, bearded men are more
highly respected than clean-shaven men. Relaxing grooming standards for
HCTs in these situations will support the team’s ability to collect
information. The decision regarding what level to employ an HCT is METT-
TC dependent. The risk to the collection assets must be balanced with the
need to collect information and to protect the force as a whole. The
deployment and use of HUMINT collection assets may be limited by legal
restrictions, mission-specific orders, directions from higher headquarters,
and the overall threat level. The four basic levels of employment for the HCT
are discussed below. Figure 3-1 shows these levels as well as their collection
potential versus team security.
Base Camp
• Restricting the HCT to operations within the base camp minimizes the
risk to the team. This action, however, minimizes the collection
potential and maximizes the risk to the force as a whole. While
restricted to a base camp, the HCT can maintain an extremely limited
level of information collection by⎯
(cid:131) Interviewing walk-in sources and locally employed personnel.
(cid:131) Debriefing combat and ISR patrols.
(cid:131) Conducting limited local open-source information collection.
• This mode of deployment should be used only when dictated by
operational restrictions. These would be at the initial stages of stability
and reconstruction operations when the operational environment is
being assessed, or as a temporary expedient when the force protection
level exceeds the ability to provide reasonable protection for the
collectors. A supported unit commander is often tempted to keep the
HCT “inside the wire” when the force protection level or threat |
2-22.3 | 40 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
condition (THREATCON) level increases. The supported unit and
parent commanders must compare the gains of the HCT collection
effort with the risks posed. This is necessary especially during high
THREATCON levels when the supported unit commander needs as
complete a picture as possible of the threat arrayed against US or
multinational forces.
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Figure 3-1. Team Level of Employment.
Integrated with Other Operations
• Under some circumstances, when it is not expedient to deploy the HCT
independently due to threat levels or other restrictions, it can be
integrated into other ongoing operations. The HCT may be employed
as part of a combat patrol, ISR patrol, or in support of an MP patrol or
stationed at a checkpoint or roadblock. It can also be used to support
CA, psychological operations (PSYOP), engineer, or other operations.
This method reduces the risk to the team while greatly increasing its
collection potential over the confined-to-base-camp method. It has the
advantage of placing the team in contact with the local population and
allowing it to spot, assess, and interact with potential sources of
information.
• The integration into other operations can also facilitate the elicitation
of information. However, this deployment method restricts collection
by subordinating the team’s efforts to the requirements, locations, and
timetables of the unit or operation into which it is integrated.
Integration can be done at the team or individual collector level.
HUMINT collectors should be used only in situations with an |
2-22.3 | 41 | ________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
intelligence collection potential. It is a waste of a valuable asset to use
them in a function that could be performed by a civilian translator.
As an Independent Patrol
• Defensive. One of the key elements of the HCT success is the
opportunity to spot, assess, and develop relationships with potential
sources of information. Operating as independent patrols, without
being tied to ISR or combat assets, enables the HCTs maximum
interaction with the local population, thereby maximizing the pool of
potential sources of information. The HCT must be integrated into the
supported unit’s ISR plan and be provided with other command
elements as needed to support the collection mission. The team leader
will advise the supported unit on the specific capabilities and
requirements of the team to maximize mission success. This method
also increases the risk to the team. HCT members must carry the
necessary firepower for self-protection. They must also have adequate
communications equipment to call for help if needed. The team’s
posture, equipment, and appearance will be dictated by overall force
restrictions and posture. When operating as an independent patrol, the
HCT should not stand out from overall US forces operations. If US
forces are in battle-dress uniforms and operating out of military
vehicles, so should the HUMINT collectors.
• Soft. If the threat situation is such that soldiers are authorized to
wear civilian clothes when outside base areas, the HUMINT collectors
should also move among the civilian population in civilian clothes, so
that they do not stand out from others in the area.
CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS
3-15. Army support supplements the efforts and resources of state and local
governments and organizations. If a presidential declaration initiates civil
support for a major disaster or emergency, involvement of DOD intelligence
components would be by exception. Civil support requires extensive
coordination and liaison among many organizations—interagency, joint, AC,
and RC—as well as with state and local governments, and in any case will
require compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C., § 1385, when
US forces are employed to assist Federal, state, or local law enforcement
agencies (LEAs). The National Response Plan provides a national level
architecture to coordinate the actions of all supporting agencies.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENT
3-16. Units are often task organized with additional ISR units and assets to
meet the detailed collection requirements in the urban operations. The
complexities of urban terrain cause degradation in the capabilities of many of
the sensor systems. HUMINT collectors may have to be placed in DS of lower
echelon combat maneuver forces (battalion and lower) to support operations.
HUMINT and combat reporting by units in direct contact with threat forces
and local inhabitants becomes the means of collection. For successful ISR |
2-22.3 | 42 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
planning, the S2 must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the
various organic and attached collection systems as they apply to urban
operations. As in all environments, commanders must assess the risk
involved in the forward deployment of HUMINT assets.
3-17. In urban operations, people (for example, detainees and civilians) are
the preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection provides
information not otherwise available through signals intelligence (SIGINT)
and imagery intelligence (IMINT) such as threat and local population
intentions. They collect information on, for example, floor plans, defensive
plans, locations of combatants and noncombatants, including civilians in the
buildings and surrounding neighborhoods, and other information. The
collected information is passed directly to the individuals conducting the
combat operation.
3-18. In small-scale contingencies (SSCs) and in peacetime military
engagements (PMEs), contact with local officials and populace by the
HUMINT collectors can be a prime source of information about the local
environment and is a vital component of intelligence support to force
protection. During routine patrolling of urban areas it is often expedient to
place a HUMINT collector with individual patrols. The key difference
between urban and other operations, from major theater war (MTW) to PME,
is the number of HUMINT collectors required. The need for HUMINT
collectors is a function of population density. Whereas in a rural
environment, a HUMINT team may be able to cover an area in excess of
1,200 square kilometers; the same team in a dense urban environment may
be able to cover only 10 square blocks or less.
HUMINT COLLECTION ENVIRONMENTS
HUMINT COLLECTION IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT
3-19. In a permissive environment, HCTs normally travel throughout their
specific AOR as separate teams or as part of a larger reconnaissance team.
HUMINT collectors may frequently make direct contact with the individual,
view the activity, or visit the area that is the subject of the ISR effort. They
normally use debriefing and elicitation to obtain first-hand information from
local civilians and officials as their primary collection techniques. Additional
information can be obtained from exploitation of open-source material such
as newspapers, television, and other media. The priority requirements in this
environment are normally linked to force protection. HCTs should establish
liaison and casual source contacts throughout their AOIR. Reporting is
normally via IIRs, although SALUTE reports are used for critical time-
sensitive reporting. Even in a permissive environment, the HUMINT
collector conducts the majority of his collection through the debriefing of
individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the information they are
reporting. |
2-22.3 | 43 | ________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
HUMINT COLLECTION IN A SEMI-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT
3-20. In a semi-permissive environment, security considerations increase,
but the risk to the collector still must be weighed against the potential
intelligence gain. HCTs should still be used throughout their AOIR but will
normally be integrated into other ground reconnaissance operations or other
planned operations. For example, a HUMINT collector may accompany a CA
team or PSYOP team visiting a village. Security for the team and their
sources is a prime consideration. The HCTs are careful not to establish a
fixed pattern of activity and arrange contacts in a manner that could
compromise the source or the collector. Debriefing and elicitation are still the
primary collection techniques. Teams are frequently deployed to conduct
collection at roadblocks, refugee collection points, and detainee collection
points. They may conduct interrogations of EPWs and other detainees within
the limits of the mission-specific orders, and applicable law and policy.
Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
DOCEX is also used to accomplish exploitation of threat documents.
Reporting is normally via SALUTE report and IIR.
HUMINT COLLECTION IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
3-21. In a hostile environment, the three concerns for HUMINT collection
are access to the sources of information, timeliness of reporting, and security
for the HUMINT collectors. Prior to the entry of a force into a hostile AO,
HUMINT collectors are used to debrief civilians, particularly refugees, and to
interrogate EPWs and other detainees who have been in the AO. HCTs are
normally located with the friendly units on the peripheries of the AO to
facilitate timely collection and reporting. If a refugee or EPW/detainee
population exists prior to this mission, they are screened to determine
knowledgability of the AO and are debriefed or interrogated as appropriate.
HUMINT collectors accompany the friendly ground reconnaissance elements
as they enter the AO. As part of the ground reconnaissance force, they
interrogate EPWs and other detainees and debrief refugees, displaced
persons, and friendly force patrols. Reporting is normally via oral or written
SALUTE reports with more detailed information reported via IIRs. They may
also support the S2 through the systematic debriefing of friendly ground
reconnaissance assets and the translation of any documents collected by
them.
EAC HUMINT
MI BRIGADES AND MI GROUPS SUPPORTING COMPONENT COMMANDS
3-22. Each SCC with an outside continental United States (OCONUS)
responsibility has an US Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM) MI brigade or group to provide operational HUMINT support to
that command. These MI elements provide peacetime support to the unified |
2-22.3 | 44 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
command and add a consistent, forward-deployed presence in a particular
theater of operations. Theater MI brigade and group assets provide HUMINT
support during contingency operations. These HCTs can support a JTF, an
army combatant command, or any deployed element that requires
augmentation.
JOINT, COMBINED, AND DOD HUMINT ORGANIZATIONS
3-23. The Departments of the Air Force and the Navy have limited HUMINT
collection capability. They will normally provide strategic debriefing trained
and certified personnel to joint interrogation and debriefing facilities
primarily to collect information on areas of particular interest to that
Military Department. Within the Department of the Navy, however, the US
Marine Corps has a robust tactical HUMINT collection capability that
operates primarily in support of engaged Marine Corps forces. Marine
expeditionary elements deploy with human exploitation teams (HETs) that
provide organic HUMINT and CI support to the deployed Marine force.
Marine HETs are rapidly deployable and fully equipped to conduct the full
range of tactical HUMINT and CI functions. They can provide support to
either the deployed Marine force or as part of JTF HUMINT or CI teams.
Each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has organic HETs. HETs can also
be attached to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) for a particular
operation.
SUPPORT AGENCIES
3-24. HUMINT agencies from DOD, national level intelligence agencies, and
LEAs can support the battlefield commander. In a JTF, a national
intelligence support team (NIST) works with the J2X to coordinate national
level activities with JTF and component HUMINT and analytical assets.
Sometimes liaison officers (LNOs) are assigned directly to the C/J/2X to
facilitate collection activities.
• Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA is a DOD combat
support (CS) agency and an important member of the United States
Intelligence Community. With more than 7,000 military and civilian
employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign
military intelligence. DIA provides military intelligence to warfighters,
defense policymakers and force planners in DOD and the Intelligence
Community in support of US military planning and operations and
weapon systems acquisition.
(cid:131) Defense HUMINT (DH) Service. The DH Service, a branch of the
DIA, is the force provider for strategic HUMINT forces and
capabilities. During operations, elements from DH form a
partnership within the supported JTF headquarters J2X element for
the coordination and deconfliction of HUMINT source-related
collection activities. DH support to a joint force is outlined in the
classified DIAM 58-11 and DIAM 58-12.
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA supports US national
security policy by providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive,
and timely foreign intelligence related to national security. The CIA |
2-22.3 | 45 | ________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
conducts CI activities, HUMINT collection, special activities, and other
functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as
directed by the President. Joint Pub 2-01.2 (S//NF) contains details of
CIA contributions to the deployed force.
• Department of State. The State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic
Security provides CI support to diplomatic missions worldwide and
gathers extensive information on intelligence capabilities of
adversaries within that diplomatic mission’s area of concern. The
Bureau of Intelligence and Research is the State Department's primary
source for interpretive analysis of global developments. It is also the
focal point in the State Department for all policy issues and activities
involving the Intelligence Community.
• National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA is a DOD agency that
coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to
protect US information systems and produce foreign intelligence
information. It is also one of the most important centers of foreign
language analysis and research within the Government.
• Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS). The DCIS is the
criminal investigative arm of the Inspector General (IG) of DOD. The
DCIS’s mission is to protect America’s warfighters by initiating,
conducting, and supervising investigations in support of crucial
National Defense priorities.
• Department of Justice:
(cid:131) Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI may provide the deployed
commander with national level expertise on criminal and CI issues if
currently operating in a task force (TF) AO and liaison is established
early.
(cid:131) Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The DEA provides counterdrug
operational expertise to a deployed TF and coordinates its operations
with those of a deployed TF.
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS mission is to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, protect the homeland,
its citizens, and critical infrastructure and key resources against
terrorist attack. DHS provides a lead for Federal incident response,
management, and recovery in the event of terrorist attack and natural
disasters. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal
official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating
Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. DHS operates the Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC) and the DHS-led Interagency Incident Management Group
(IIMG). The DHS AOR is the US and its territories. DHS secures and
protects the entry points to the nation, the areas between the entry
points, land and water, for people, and cargo or conveyances. DHS
enforces immigration, customs, and transportation security laws and |
2-22.3 | 46 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
regulations, counter-narcotics, counterfeiting, financial crimes, and
threats to the President. As legislated in the Homeland Security Act of
2002, DHS is chartered as the primary outreach Federal activity for
state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector. Although
DHS has no direct role in support of a “battlefield commander” outside
the United States, DHS component organizations have representatives
deployed in support of US Government missions in the US Central
Command (USCENTCOM) AOR.
• Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE can assist with the—
(cid:131) Exploitation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
(cid:131) Protection or elimination of weapons and weapons-useable (dual-
use) nuclear material or infrastructure.
(cid:131) Redirection of excess foreign weapons expertise to civilian
enterprises.
(cid:131) Prevention and reversal of the proliferation of WMD.
(cid:131) Reduction of the risk of accidents in nuclear fuel cycle facilities
worldwide.
(cid:131) The capability enhancement of WMD detection including nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC).
• National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NGA is a
member of the US Intelligence Community and a DOD Combat
Support Agency. NGA provides timely, relevant, and accurate
geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives.
Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and
geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical
features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.
• Counterintelligence Field Agency (CIFA). The mission of CIFA is
to develop and manage DOD CI programs and functions that support
the protection of the Department. These programs and functions
include CI support to protect DOD personnel, resources, critical
information, research and development programs, technology, critical
infrastructure, economic security, and US interests against foreign
influence and manipulation, as well as to detect and neutralize
espionage against the Department.
3-25. Most potential coalition partners have some type of HUMINT
capability. Less developed nations may use HUMINT as their primary
collection system and may be quite skilled in HUMINT operations. These
assets will be present on the battlefield, and US assets are likely to work
with them. HCTs should perform regular liaison with coalition HUMINT
personnel. It is likely that some coalition partners will be more
knowledgeable of the culture in the AO and be able to share insights with US
HCTs. |
2-22.3 | 47 | FM 2-22.3
Chapter 4
HUMINT Operations Planning and Management
4-1. HUMINT operations planning and management are supported by a
robust structure that includes staff elements such as the C2X when working
with non-US forces at the Joint intelligence staff level, G2X at the Division,
Corps intelligence staff, the HUMINT operations section in the MI Battalion,
and HAT in the Division and Corps ACE. It also includes C2 elements at the
MI battalion, company, platoon, and team levels. The OMT provides the first
level of staff and C2 functions when two or more HCTs deploy in support of
an operation. (See Table 4-1.)
Table 4-1. HUMINT Operations.
TTEECCHHNNIICCAALL
IISSRR MMIISSSSIIOONN
EECCHHEELLOONN SSUUPPPPOORRTT AANNDD
PPLLAANNNNIINNGG EEXXEECCUUTTIIOONN
DDEECCOONNFFLLIICCTTIIOONN
CCOOMMBBIINNEEDD CC22//AACCEE CC22XX//OOMMTT MMII CCDDRR
MMII CCDDRR
JJOOIINNTT JJ22//AACCEE JJ22XX//OOMMTT
((AAMMIIBB oorrMMII BBaattttaalliioonn))
CCOORRPPSS//DDIIVVIISSIIOONN GG22//AACCEE GG22XX//OOMMTT MMII CCDDRR//OOMMTT
BBRRIIGGAADDEE SS22 MMII CCDDRR//OOMMTT MMII CCDDRR//OOMMTT
HUMINT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
4-2. Following the operations process defined in FM 3-0, Chapter 6, there are
four components within HUMINT operations: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and
Assess.
PLAN
4-3. HUMINT planning defines collection objectives, when to collect it, and
which resources will be tasked to do the collection. Commanders with
HUMINT collection assets in their units receive collection tasking based on
requirements developed during ISR planning. The commander and staff, in
concert with their supporting OMTs, assess the requirements and task the
team or teams best capable of answering the requirement based on contact
placement and access.
4-4. Another aspect to consider carefully during the Plan phase of the
operational cycle is technical control. Technical control is ensuring adherence
to existing policies and regulations, providing information and guidance of a
technical nature, and supervising the MOS-specific TTP required in |
2-22.3 | 48 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
conducting collection missions. Planning must take into account that
technical control does not interfere with or supersede any C2 that a
commander has over an asset or unit nor does it interfere with collection of
the commander's requirements. For HUMINT collectors, the technical control
network includes the C/J/G/S2X, the HOC, and OMTs. Technical control
includes the management of source and other sensitive data and databases,
the management of intelligence contingency and incentive funds, the liaison
with other HUMINT organizations, and the deconfliction of operations.
Technical control provides HCTs with specific requirements and data that
they need to conduct operations and, in certain circumstances, specific
instructions on how to execute missions.
PREPARE
4-5. During this phase, commanders and staff, including HUMINT
management sections, review HUMINT mission plans. This review is to
ensure all areas of the mission are considered and addressed in the plan and
included in rehearsals. Items to cover include but are not limited to⎯
• Route (primary and alternate).
• Communications.
• Security plan.
• Convoy procedures including actions on contact and rally points.
• Initial requirements to be covered.
• Mission duration.
4-6. The HUMINT collector then researches the topic area addressing the
requirement and prepares a questioning plan. The HCTs and OMTs must
coordinate all mission requirements. It is important that HUMINT elements
are included in all rehearsals conducted by their supported unit. These
rehearsals will enable HCTs to carry out essential coordination with other
units and ensure that they are included in and familiar with procedures such
as resupply, communications, casualty evacuation, fire support, and
fratricide avoidance. Rehearsals and briefbacks will allow the supported
command to see and correct problems with their support to the HUMINT
elements prior to deployment.
EXECUTE
4-7. Mission execution consists of the collection of information in accordance
with the integrated ISR plan. The requirements manager validates the
requirements based on command guidance. The G3 tasks the requirements to
the units and the individual asset managers (that is, OMT) to identify the
assets best capable to answer the requirement. When requirements are
levied against a specific HCT, the HCT leader decides which of his team’s
contacts can best answer the requirements. He then turns the requirement
into specific team tasks.
ASSESS
4-8. Assessment is the continuous monitoring––throughout planning,
preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an |
2-22.3 | 49 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make
decisions and adjustments. Assessment plays an integral role in all aspects of
the intelligence process (see FM 2-0).
HUMINT COMMAND AND CONTROL
4-9. Commanders of organizations that conduct HUMINT operations are
responsible for task organization, mission tasking, execution, mission
accomplishment, and designation of subordinate AOs (within the guidelines
of the OPORD or OPLAN). MI unit commanders who exercise direct control
of HUMINT operations, including interrogation operations, at all levels are
responsible for and stand accountable to ensure HUMINT collection activities
comply with this manual and applicable law and policy. Applicable law and
policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The MI unit
commanders must ensure mission accomplishment by properly allocating
resources and logistics in support of all HUMINT collection assets assigned
to their units. Commanders must ensure that their HUMINT collection
personnel are trained and ready for the mission. There is a need for a
partnership between the J/G2X, who exercises technical direction and
oversight responsibility and the MI commander, who exercises direct
command authority and responsibility. The MI unit commander analyzes the
higher headquarters mission, concept of operations, and the specified and
implied tasks given to his unit. He restates the unit mission, designs the
concept of operations, task organizes his assets, and provides support to
subordinate units. Specifically, the MI unit commander⎯
• Issues mission orders with sufficient details and time for subordinate
commanders and leaders to plan and lead their units.
• Must know the threat, his organization, ISR systems, counter-ISR
systems, operations, and terrain over which his units will operate and
how that terrain enhances or limits HUMINT collection operations.
• Must be aware of the operational and technical limitations of his unit
and ensures that all assets are task organized, properly positioned, and
fully synchronized to accomplish the mission.
• Oversees the collective and individual training within his unit.
• Coordinates continuously with the higher headquarters staff, the
supported maneuver unit staff, and other commanders to ensure
integrated R&S operations and support.
• Establishes clear, consistent standards and guidance for current and
future operations in order to adhere to policy and the higher
headquarters commander’s intent without his constant personal
supervision.
• Continually assesses his unit’s ability to sustain its internal operations
and its ability to support assigned missions and keeps the higher
headquarters staff informed of unit, equipment, and personnel status
that affect collection operations. |
2-22.3 | 50 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• Advises his higher headquarters commander and staff on the
capabilities, limitations, and most effective employment of his assets.
• Remains flexible during operations to adjust or execute missions upon
receipt of new orders and when the situation changes.
• Ensures personnel are working within legal, regulatory, and policy
guidelines.
TECHNICAL CONTROL
4-10. Technical control refers to supervision of the TTP of HUMINT
collection. Technical control ensures adherence to existing policies or
regulations and provides technical guidance for HUMINT operations. The
elements that provide technical control also assist teams in translating
collection requirements into executable tasks. Commanders rely on the
expertise of intelligence personnel organic to their unit and within higher
echelons to plan, execute, and assess the HUMINT collection effort. The
OMTs, HATs, and the HOC of the C/J/G/S2X provide technical control.
They––
• Define and manage operational coverage and direction.
• Identify critical collection criteria such as indicators associated with
targeting.
• Prioritize collection missions in accordance with collection
requirements.
• Advise teams on collection techniques and procedures in accordance
with policy, regulations, and law.
• Register and deconflict sources.
• Conduct operational reviews.
• Advise commanders.
• Conduct operational coordination with staff elements and other
intelligence agencies.
• Manage ICF and incentive usage.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
4-11. The activities of HUMINT assets are governed by their command or
support relationship. There are subtle differences in the Joint versus the
Army description of some of the command and support relationships.
Tables 4-2 through 4-4 show these relationships.
4-12. During interrogation operations, close coordination must occur between
intelligence personnel and personnel responsible for detainee operations
including MP security forces, Master at Arms, and other individuals
providing security for detainees. The facility commander is responsible for
all actions involving the humane treatment, custody, evacuation, and
administration of detainees, and force protection. Whereas, the intelligence
commander is responsible for the conduct of interrogation operations. |
2-22.3 | 51 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS FOR HUMINT OPERATIONS
4-13. Clear command and support relationships are fundamental in
organizing for all operations. These relationships identify responsibilities
and authorities among subordinate and supporting units. The commander
designates command and support relationships within his authority to
weight the decisive operation and support his scheme of maneuver. Some
forces available to a commander are given command or support relationships
that limit his authority to prescribe additional relationships. Command and
support relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to the
subordinate unit by parent and gaining units. By knowing the inherent
responsibilities, a commander may organize his forces to establish clear
relationships.
4-14. Command relationships establish the degree of control and
responsibility commanders have for forces operating under their tactical
control (TACON). When commanders establish command relationships, they
determine if the command relationship includes administrative control
(ADCON). Table 4-2 shows Army command and support relationships and
Table 4-3 shows joint command relationships chart from FM 3-0 (derived
from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0).
4-15. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired
when one capability supports another. Support relationships establish
specific responsibilities between supporting and supported units. Table 4-2
shows Army command and support relationships and Table 4-4 shows joint
support relationships from FM 3-0 (derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0).
HUMINT REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT
4-16. The G2/S2 is responsible for RM. He uses the requirements
management (RM) process to orchestrate the actions of the unit’s organic and
supporting ISR capabilities into a unified effort to gain situational
understanding and answer the commander’s PIRs. Through centralized
planning and decentralized execution, RM optimizes the integration of ISR
operations into the commander’s scheme of maneuver and fire and into the
unit’s long- and short-range planning. Control mechanisms within the RM
structure facilitate the identification of information shortfalls and the
redirection of ISR assets to new intelligence production, reconnaissance, or
surveillance missions. |
2-22.3 | 52 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-2. Army Command and Support Relationships.
INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:
IF Establishes/ Gaining Unit
RELATIONSHIP Has May Be Receives Assigned Provides Maintains Has Priorities Can Impose
IS: Command Task CSS Position or Liaison Communica- Established Further Com-
Relation- Organized mand or Sup-
from: AO By: To: tions by:
ship with: by: port
with:
Relationship of:
As re- Attached;
Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining quired by Unit to which OPCON;
Attached Gaining unit
unit unit unit unit gaining attached TACON; GS;
unit GSR; R; DS
Parent unit
and gaining
unit; gain- As re- As required by
OPCON;
Gaining ing unit Parent Gaining quired by gaining unit
OPCON Gaining unit TACON; GS;
unit may pass unit unit gaining and parent
GSR; R; DS
OPCON to unit unit
lower HQ.
Note 1
As re- As required by
Gaining Parent Gaining quired by gaining unit
TACON Parent unit Gaining unit GS; GSR; R; DS
unit unit unit gaining and parent
unit unit
DNAMMOC
As re-
Parent Gaining quired by As required by Not
Assigned Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit
unit unit parent parent unit Applicable
unit
Direct Sup-
Parent Supported Parent unit;
Support Parent unit Parent unit ported Supported unit Note 2
unit unit Supported unit
(DS) unit
Reinforc- Rein- Reinforced
Parent Reinforced Parent unit; Not
ing Parent unit Parent unit forced unit: then
unit unit reinforced unit Applicable
(R ) unit parent unit
Rein-
forced
General Reinforced
unit and Parent unit;
Support Parent unit and as Not
Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit as re- then
Reinforc- unit required by Applicable
quired by reinforced unit
ing (GSR) parent unit
parent
unit
TROPPUS
As re-
General
Parent quired by As required by Not
Support Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit
unit parent parent unit Applicable
(GS)
unit
NOTE 1. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational unit (see TACON).
NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements
of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander. |
2-22.3 | 53 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Table 4-3. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities.
(from FM 3-0, derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0)
Inherent If relationship is:
Responsibilities
Are: COCOM OPCON TACON
Has command Gaining combatant Gaining Command Gaining Command
Relationship with: commander; gaining
service component
commander
May be task organized Gaining combatant Gaining Command Parent Unit
by: commander; gaining
service component
commander
Receives logistic Gaining service Service component Parent Unit
support from: component command; parent unit
commander
Assigned position or Gaining component Gaining Command Gaining Command
AO by: commander
Provides liaison to: As required by gaining As required by gaining As required by gaining
component command command
commander
Establishes and As required by gaining As required by gaining As required by gaining
maintains component command command and parent
communications with: commander units
Has priorities Gaining component Gaining Command Gaining Command
established by: commander
Gaining unit can OPCON; TACON; OPCON; TACON; Direct support; mutual
impose further direct support; mutual direct support; mutual support; general
command support ; general support; general support; close support
relationship/authority support; close support support; close support
of: |
2-22.3 | 54 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-4. Joint Support Categories.
(from FM 3-0, derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0)
CCCAAATTTEEEGGGOOORRRYYY DDDEEEFFFIIINNNIIITTTIIIOOONNN
TTTThhhheeee aaaaccccttttiiiioooonnnn ggggiiiivvvveeeennnn ttttoooo tttthhhheeee ssssuuuuppppppppoooorrrrtttteeeeddddffffoooorrrrcccceeee aaaassss aaaa wwwwhhhhoooolllleeee rrrraaaatttthhhheeeerrrr
GGGGeeeennnneeeerrrraaaallll SSSSuuuuppppppppoooorrrrtttt
tttthhhhaaaannnn ttttoooo aaaa ppppaaaarrrrttttiiiiccccuuuullllaaaarrrr ssssuuuubbbbddddiiiivvvviiiissssiiiioooonnnn tttthhhheeeerrrreeeeooooffff....
TTTThhhheeee aaaaccccttttiiiioooonnnn tttthhhhaaaatttt uuuunnnniiiittttssss rrrreeeennnnddddeeeerrrr eeeeaaaacccchhhh ooootttthhhheeeerrrr aaaaggggaaaaiiiinnnnsssstttt aaaannnn eeeennnneeeemmmmyyyy
MMMMuuuuttttuuuuaaaallll SSSSuuuuppppppppoooorrrrtttt bbbbeeeeccccaaaauuuusssseeee ooooffff tttthhhheeeeiiiirrrr aaaassssssssiiiiggggnnnneeeedddd ttttaaaasssskkkkssss,,,,tttthhhheeeeiiiirrrr ppppoooossssiiiittttiiiioooonnnn rrrreeeellllaaaattttiiiivvvveeee ttttoooo
eeeeaaaacccchhhh ooootttthhhheeeerrrr aaaannnndddd ttttoooo tttthhhheeee eeeennnneeeemmmmyyyy,,,, aaaannnndddd tttthhhheeeeiiiirrrr iiiinnnnhhhheeeerrrreeeennnntttt ccccaaaappppaaaabbbbiiiilllliiiittttiiiieeeessss....
AAAA mmmmiiiissssssssiiiioooonnnn rrrreeeeqqqquuuuiiiirrrriiiinnnngggg aaaa ffffoooorrrrcccceeee ttttoooo ssssuuuuppppppppoooorrrrttttaaaannnnooootttthhhheeeerrrr ssssppppeeeecccciiiiffffiiiiccccffffoooorrrrcccceeee
DDDDiiiirrrreeeecccctttt SSSSuuuuppppppppoooorrrrtttt aaaannnndddd aaaauuuutttthhhhoooorrrriiiizzzziiiinnnngggg iiiitttt ttttoooo aaaannnnsssswwwweeeerrrr ddddiiiirrrreeeeccccttttllllyyyy tttthhhheeee ssssuuuuppppppppoooorrrrtttteeeedddd ffffoooorrrrcccceeee’’’’ssss
rrrreeeeqqqquuuueeeesssstttt ffffoooorrrraaaassssssssiiiissssttttaaaannnncccceeee....
TTTThhhheeee aaaaccccttttiiiioooonnnn ooooffff tttthhhheeee ssssuuuuppppppppoooorrrrttttiiiinnnngggg ffffoooorrrrcccceeee aaaaggggaaaaiiiinnnnsssstttt ttttaaaarrrrggggeeeettttssssoooorrrr oooobbbbjjjjeeeeccccttttiiiivvvveeeessss
tttthhhhaaaatttt aaaarrrreeee ssssuuuuffffffffiiiicccciiiieeeennnnttttllllyyyy nnnneeeeaaaarrrr tttthhhheeee ssssuuuuppppppppoooorrrrtttteeeedddd ffffoooorrrrcccceeee aaaassss ttttoooo rrrreeeeqqqquuuuiiiirrrreeee
CCCClllloooosssseeee SSSSuuuuppppppppoooorrrrtttt
ddddeeeettttaaaaiiiilllleeeedddd iiiinnnntttteeeeggggrrrraaaattttiiiioooonnnn oooorrrr ccccoooooooorrrrddddiiiinnnnaaaattttiiiioooonnnn ooooffff tttthhhheeee ssssuuuuppppppppoooorrrrttttiiiinnnngggg aaaaccccttttiiiioooonnnn
wwwwiiiitttthhhh ffffiiiirrrreeee,,,, mmmmoooovvvveeeemmmmeeeennnntttt,,,,oooorrrr ooootttthhhheeeerrrr aaaaccccttttiiiioooonnnnssss ooooffff tttthhhheeee ssssuuuuppppppppoooorrrrtttteeeedddd ffffoooorrrrcccceeee....
DEVELOP HUMINT REQUIREMENTS
4-17. The first step in the RM process is to develop intelligence requirements
that accurately identify and prioritize the commander’s concerns about the
threat and the battlefield environment that must be resolved to accomplish
the mission. The G2/S2X, or his representative, normally supports the G2/S2
by identifying HUMINT collection requirements and opportunities and
advises the command and staff on HUMINT capabilities. The HUMINT
representative must be able to discuss any delays or risks involved in using
HUMINT assets. Through participation in the requirements development
process, the HUMINT representative has a thorough understanding of the
commander’s intent and concept of operations and is better able to support
the overall ISR effort.
4-18. The analysis of HUMINT requirements is normally a coordinated effort
between the HUMINT and CI staff officer (C/J/G/S2X) and the HAT of the
supporting analysis element. The C/J/G/S2X team––
• Records all HUMINT requirements whether generated internally
(Specific Orders) or received from other echelons or units (Requests).
• Tracks each requirement from receipt to final satisfaction.
• Reviews each requirement for its––
Feasibility. Feasibility is a determination if a requirement can be
answered given available time and resources.
Completeness. Does the requirement contain all the specifics
needed for collection, such as: What the collection requirement is?
When the latest time information is of value (LTIOV)? Why it needs
to be collected? Who needs the results of the collection?
Necessity. The C/J/G/S2X team, with the assistance of the HAT,
checks available intelligence databases to determine if the required |
2-22.3 | 55 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
information has already been collected or is included in an
intelligence product.
4-19. The RM team, with the assistance of the C/J/G/S2X team and the HAT,
breaks the HUMINT-related PIR into SIRs. Each SIR describes the indicator
of threat activity linked to an area or specific location and time. The HOC
evaluates––
• Reportable criteria that are linked to the threat activity. The HOC
associates these characteristics with a SIR, and compares the
characteristics to a particular HUMINT asset’s capability to collect.
• Range, which is the distance from the current location of the HUMINT
asset or resource to the source. In other words, are there sources
available that had or have access to relevant information on the area
or activity in question, and can the HUMINT team contact them in a
timely manner?
• Timeliness, which is when the information must reach the commander
to be of value; that is, the LTIOV.
4-20. The RM team, supported by the C/J/G/S2X and the HAT, attempts to
answer the SIRs with intelligence products developed from information
available within the existing intelligence databases or pulled from other
organizations within the intelligence architecture. If the requirement can be
answered in this manner, the intelligence is immediately disseminated.
When the required information is neither available nor extractable from
archived information or from lower, lateral, or higher echelons, the
C/J/G/S2X team develops it into an RFI to higher or an ISR tasking for
organic or attached HUMINT assets. The compilation of unanswered
requirements and how to answer them form the basis of the ISR plan. The
tasking may be in the form of an SDR. An SDR is a specific request or
tasking for a collector to question a source on a particular collection
requirement. This request involves analysis that results in the conclusion
that a specific source possibly has the placement and access to answer a SIR.
SDRs are specific; whereas, HUMINT collection requirements (HCRs) are
general.
DEVELOP THE HUMINT PORTION OF THE INTEGRATED ISR PLAN
4-21. The HOC within the C/J/G/S2X section assists the G3/G2 in developing
the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan in coordination with the HAT and the
RM team. The HOC ensures that the HUMINT capabilities and taskings are
included in the plan although the plan often will not contain the specifics of
HUMINT operations due to the sensitivity of the sources and techniques. The
HOC will coordinate with the Office of the SJA to ensure the HUMINT
portion of the integrated ISR plan complies with applicable law and policy
prior to its implementation. Applicable law and policy include US law; the
law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD
Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings,
and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. The HOC coordinates with C/J/G/S2X for mission
deconfliction at that echelon to specify the collection capability and current |
2-22.3 | 56 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
status of the various HUMINT organizations to better enable him to select
the "best" organization to collect on various SIRs. HUMINT collection
generally requires time to develop the environment and access sources.
4-22. The HUMINT collection environment during an SSC is different from
an MTW. During an MTW where the force is moving, a division normally
plans 48 hours out; a corps plans 72 hours out. In contrast, the planning
focus for units supporting an SSC may be 3 to 6 months out. The longer
HCTs are in an area, the better the collector is able to develop leads to
answer collection requirements. Requirements may be continuous or may be
concerned with specific upcoming events such as national elections. HUMINT
is a key asset to determine adversary intentions; however, it is highly
dependent on the ability to cultivate or locate sources with the desired
information. HUMINT in support of stability and reconstruction operations is
not a short-term undertaking. [Example: National level elections are taking
place in the AO in 3 months. As a part of integrated ISR planning, an
assessment must be conducted to determine the capability to answer post
election collection requirements based upon current contacts and HUMINT
leads. If there are no leads or contacts that could answer election-related
collection requirements, it is necessary to spot, assess, and contact sources to
meet requirements.]
4-23. A second part of the HUMINT portion of the integrated ISR plan is the
HUMINT collection focus, which⎯
• Designates which collection requirements comprise the emphasis for
collectors’ missions.
• Prioritizes collection requirements based upon the operational
environment in the AO and future missions in the AO.
• Includes future operational collection tasks which aid in causing a gap
or pause in collection as the unit transitions to the next operational
phase or the next operation.
4-24. In addition to specific requirements, a statement of intelligence
interest (SII) at the joint level or a collection emphasis message at division or
corps is issued to identify the overall collection goals for a time period. As the
collection request or requirement is passed down, each echelon performs
additional planning for its own specific requirements.
Evaluate HUMINT Resources
4-25. After identifying the SIRs, the HOC and the C/J/G/S2X determine the
availability and capability of HUMINT assets and resources that might
contribute to requirement satisfaction and which are most suited to collect
against each SIR. This does not necessarily imply that the C/J/G/S2X assigns
a tasking to a specific team; rather, it develops the requirements or requests
for an organization that then executes the mission. The HOC and C/J/G/S2X
should also consult the HAT for its analysis of additional potential HUMINT
assets and resources which might be available, both on and off the
battlefield, to contribute to requirement satisfaction. For example, the HAT
may be aware of a group of émigrés now living elsewhere who previously
lived near a target site, and who might be able to provide answers to
collection requirements if debriefed. |
2-22.3 | 57 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Determine Asset or Resource Capabilities
4-26. The HOC translates the capabilities and limitations of the available
HUMINT assets into a set of factors that they can compare to the SIR
characteristics. Asset capability factors are technical or performance
characteristics, location, and source access. Each HUMINT asset is evaluated
for its—
• Availability. The HOC reviews the list of viable HUMINT assets for
current availability and the addition or deletion of capabilities. This
includes considerations such as maintenance time and previous
taskings. Coordination with adjacent and higher headquarters and
national level agencies by the C/J/G/S2X will determine the
availability of higher echelon resources.
• Survivability. Survivability must be commensurate with the threats
to which the HUMINT assets will be exposed during the course of
operations. These assets must be as survivable as, or in certain
circumstances more survivable than, the forces they support. The HOC
and the commander must weigh the risk versus the gain in using
HUMINT assets.
• Reliability. Reliability is the ability of the asset to overcome threat
deception measures such as misinformation or false information. In
HUMINT there are two areas of reliability: source and collector. Source
reliability is the determination on the part of the collector if the source
is providing accurate information. Collector reliability is a
determination on the part of the HOC that the HUMINT collectors
within a particular organization have the level of training and
experience to collect against a given requirement.
• Suitability. Tasking must be based on an asset’s capability and on its
suitability within the context of the overall plan. For example,
HUMINT assets may be capable of collecting against a single target
but have unique capabilities against a second target. Intelligence
requirements may necessitate tasking these HUMINT assets against
the second target if other assets can maintain adequate coverage of the
first target.
• Connectivity. Connectivity is a critical aspect of any R&S operation.
Interoperability, reliability, and robustness of sensors,
communications, and supporting automated data processing (ADP) are
crucial to the responsiveness, survivability, and overall combat
effectiveness of a HUMINT asset. If the automation and
communications systems of a HUMINT asset are dissimilar to those of
other units in the AO, or if connectivity among assets, supporting
systems, and supported systems and elements is too fragile to
withstand the stress of operations, commanders will be deprived of
important information essential to conducting tactical operations. The
HUMINT asset must be able to transmit accurate and timely
information to those who must receive it when they need it. Report
formats should adhere to established standards in order to ensure that
information is easily retrieval at the user desktop through automated
queries (push/pull). Planners must look carefully at systems
compatibility and the degree of interoperability among the components |
2-22.3 | 58 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
of the communications architecture. The better the interoperability of
assets and the more robust and redundant the communications links,
the better the cross-cueing and analytical exchange.
Develop the Scheme of Support
4-27. The scheme of support is the orchestration of HUMINT assets,
resources, and requirements to facilitate the collection of information most
effectively. It includes all assets that the G3/S3 can task (organic, attached,
and DS) and the G2 can request (from higher or adjacent units). By
reviewing available HUMINT assets and higher echelon resources, the HOC
and the G/S2X determine whether unit assets or higher echelon resources are
best able to answer the requirements. If another echelon can answer an SIR,
then the J/G/S2, normally through the C/J/G/S2X, requests them to collect
the information and deliver the intelligence product. When planning the
HUMINT portion of the ISR plan, the HOC should consider the following:
• Cueing is using one asset to tip off another to a possible target. The
HOC should look for opportunities for HUMINT assets to cue other
collection assets and vice versa.
• Asset redundancy uses a combination of the same type of assets
against a high-priority collection target. This is vital in HUMINT
collection since, in dealing with human sources, the information
collected is often part of the overall picture or is influenced by the
perception and prejudice of the source. The collection on the same
target from a number of different assets gives a more accurate
intelligence picture and is a method to validate source reporting.
• Asset mix uses a combination of different types of assets against a
high-priority collection target. When the probability of success of one
asset to satisfy the requirement completely is lower than acceptable,
the use of multiple capabilities of different assets increases the
likelihood of success; for example, using SIGINT assets to intercept
voice communications while HUMINT assets observe activities.
Neither can collect all the available information, but the information
collected by both can be fused into a more complete picture. Like asset
redundancy, asset mix places greater demands on the limited assets
available, both collection and analysis, and has to be clearly justified
by the potential intelligence gain.
• Integration of new requirements into ongoing missions may make
it possible to reduce timelines, make collection more responsive to the
request, and decrease cost and risk. This is critical in HUMINT due to
the long time that it takes to develop sources. The use of an existing
source to answer new requirements often facilitates collection.
Develop and Prioritize Taskings and Requests for Information
4-28. After the G2/S2X and the G2/S2 approve the HUMINT portion of the
ISR plan, the HOC develops specific orders to task assets, develop additional
assets, and/or requests to seek higher and lateral support and production.
Specific taskings or RFIs are tailored to that specific ISR asset’s capabilities
and limitations. The G2/S2X supports the requirements manager and the
G2/S2 in developing and prioritizing HUMINT taskings. The HOC works |
2-22.3 | 59 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
with the unit requirements manager to incorporate the HUMINT plan into
the overall unit ISR plan and works with the G3/S3 as necessary to help
develop OPORDs or FRAGOs to organic or attached ISR units. HUMINT
taskings will often include technical data that cannot be passed through
normal tasking channels. The HOC will pass that information directly to the
applicable HUMINT OMT or unit operations section.
4-29. The HOC and G2/S2X cannot provide operational taskings to a unit for
collection. Collection is a stated mission that the commander executes.
However, the technical control the HOC can provide as the HUMINT
manager affords the J2/G2X the ability to steer and direct collection assets
and operations. The MI commander and OMT determine specifically which
teams will collect on a given requirement and are responsible for the TTP
used. They report on the status and availability of their collection assets. On
the HCT level, the team chief determines which sources will be contacted and
the details of how the information will be collected from a given source. A
specific plan is developed for each source. This plan should—
• Identify the requirement.
• Identify the proposed source.
• Identify questions to be asked during the source meeting.
• Contain an outline of how the meeting should proceed.
• Identify which collector will conduct the source meeting.
4-30. At the HCT level, the senior team member reviews each plan to ensure
the proper planning for the collection mission. The plan is a minimum goal
for the collection. The collector must be fully aware of the overall collection
priorities and be prepared to take advantage of any additional leads.
DIRECT PRODUCTION
4-31. The G2 coordinates intelligence production to provide non-duplicative
all-source intelligence products to the commander, staff, and subordinate
forces. Some type of production occurs in the intelligence staff or separate
analysis element at every echelon from national to battalion level. The HCT
of the ACE at echelon’s division and higher will support the intelligence
production process through the analysis of HUMINT information and the
development of single-discipline HUMINT products.
DISSEMINATE INFORMATION
4-32. The 2X element at each level is normally the release authority for
HUMINT reporting and products, ensuring that reporting, products, and
data are disseminated to the lowest appropriate level. The G/S2X should
preplan criteria for the immediate release of combat information on high-
value targets, impending attacks, or other time-sensitive requirements. This
preplanning will ensure that commanders and other users quickly receive the
information in a format that supports situational understanding, strategic
responsiveness, and ISR and provides support to effects. Special effort is also
made to ensure that information obtained from detainees is passed back
down to the unit that detained them. This measure will support the efforts of
the commander as well as building trust in the intelligence process. |
2-22.3 | 60 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
EVALUATE REPORTING
4-33. The HAT and the HOC provide the requirements manager and the
G2/S2 with expertise to support report evaluation. An important part of the
evaluation process is providing feedback to the collectors. Feedback is
important in HUMINT operations since the same source may be contacted
again for additional information. The collector needs feedback on the
accuracy, reliability, and appropriateness of the information reported. The
G/S2X team tracks reporting to determine how well the HUMINT collection
and production efforts are satisfying the PIRs. The G/S2X team supports the
RM team’s requirements to⎯
• Monitor and Maintain Synchronization. Through coordination
with the G2/S2, the G/S2X, and the HAT, the HOC knows when and
what critical pieces of information are missing from the commander's
estimate of the situation. The HOC uses the HUMINT portion of the
ISR plan to ensure synchronization with the overall operation and
scheme of maneuver. The other critical tool for the HOC is the decision
support template (DST). The HOC must have a complete copy of this
document, ensuring the HUMINT assets do not miss a collection
requirement.
• Correlate Reports to Requirements. The HOC tracks which
specific order or group of specific orders originates from which PIR to
ensure that the collected information was provided to the original
requester. This also allows the HOC to rapidly determine which asset
is available for retasking.
• Screen Reports. Each report received is screened for accuracy,
timeliness, and applicability to the original tasking or request. If the
HOC determines that it completely fulfills the tasking or request, the
HOC informs the G/S2X and G2/S2 so that the tasking or request can
be closed and the information provided to the original requesting unit.
• Provide Feedback to Collectors and Analysts. The HOC provides
feedback to all the HUMINT R&S assets. This is normally provided
through the C2 element of that unit. By doing so, the HOC quickly
reinforces if the reporting is answering the original order or request, or
the HOC can provide guidance if it is not. This feedback is essential.
The RM team may provide additional information on its collection or
analysis if the HOC tells the team exactly what is needed or has been
missed in the original report.
UPDATE ISR PLAN
4-34. This step aids the G2/G3 in updating the ISR plan by eliminating
satisfied collection requirements, redirecting assets to cover non-satisfied
requirements, cross-cueing requirements, and adding new collection
requirements to the ISR. This process is accomplished by adjusting the
HUMINT portion of the overall integrated ISR plan. It maintains intelligence
synchronization and optimizes the exploitation of information in response to
situation changes in the AO. The updated HUMINT plan is distributed to the
G/S2X requirements manager to ensure its incorporation into the overall unit
ISR plan. Continuously updating the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan is
vital due to the time involved in redirecting HUMINT assets. |
2-22.3 | 61 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT MISSION PLANNING
4-35. HUMINT mission planning begins when a unit receives a tasking to
conduct HUMINT collection in support of a specific mission, operation, or
collection plan. The mission analysis portion of the MDMP is explained in
FM 5-0. Special factors must be considered when applying the MDMP to
HUMINT operations as discussed below.
RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ORDER
4-36. Attention must be paid to the support relationship (GS or DS) that
exists between HUMINT assets and the unit. The operational environment,
including applicable law and policy under which the units are operating must
be understood, as this affects the ability of the units to perform certain
missions. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
Because of frequently overlapping AOIRs in HUMINT operations, other unit
missions and potential areas of conflict must be identified. Missions of other
non-HUMINT units must be understood for coordination and possible
integration of HUMINT assets. The availability of assets from higher
echelons, requirements to provide support to lower echelons, and the
existence of technical control from higher echelons must be identified.
Tasking, reporting, and communications channels must be clearly
understood.
ISSUE A WARNING ORDER
4-37. After the commander has analyzed his orders and worked out the
mission and related tasks, he must quickly pass on this information to his
team. This is accomplished through the WARNO. As a minimum, the
WARNO must include to whom the order applies, time and nature of the
operation, the earliest time of movement, and the time and place where the
OPORD will be issued. Unit members should prepare for movement while the
leader is performing the remaining preparatory tasks.
MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN
4-38. When determining how the mission will be carried out, the commander
works with the factors of METT-TC. When planning for HUMINT collection
missions, focus must be placed on the human beings (threat, friendly, and
neutral) as well as the key terrain on the battlefield, including information
on—
• The demographics of both the AO and AOI.
• The organization and structure of all opposition in the AO and AOI.
• The history of the AO and AOI pertinent to the current situation.
• The economic and social data of all groups in the AO and AOI. |
2-22.3 | 62 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• All key leaders (political, military, social, religious, tribal), opinion
leaders, and other influences on public opinion.
• The media and its influence on the population of both the AO and AOI.
• The primary and secondary languages and dialects spoken in all parts
of the AO.
4-39. A target folder, if one is used, provides valuable up-to-date intelligence
information about the AO for mission analysis and planning. Once
intelligence products identify the contentious areas, trends, capabilities, and
latest issues concerning the AO, the commander may request a target folder
prepared on specific items, such as a hostile organization with the inclination
and potential to cause harm to friendly forces. Target folders may include—
• Imagery of the AO and personalities.
• Terrain models of the AO.
• Latest information reports from the AO.
• Biographical data on key leaders in the AO.
Review Available Assets
4-40. The commander and staff, including the OMTs or HUMINT operations
section, must look at organic assets and consider factors such as language
capability, experience in various aspects of collection, analysis, and
management. If organic assets are inadequate, the commander and staff
should consider additional available assets within the organization and
resources from higher echelons. The commander and staff must consider the
analysis and management structure of a HUMINT operations section in
addition to the OMT and HCTs. During this step the mission analysis and
planning group should determine, among other things—
• The number of HUMINT collectors available.
• The number of collectors who are qualified linguists.
• The number of linguists available to support the collectors.
• Force protection considerations.
• The optimal number of HCTs, OMTs, and HUMINT operations
sections that can be configured from the available assets.
• Whether additional assets such as CI agents, TECHINT personnel,
analysts, additional linguists, or other experts need to be added to
some or all the HCTs to meet mission requirements.
Determine Constraints
4-41. This is a critical step in HUMINT mission analysis. HUMINT collection
operations are affected by applicable law and policy. Applicable law and
policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The degree of
restriction may depend on the type of operation being conducted. Constraints
are normally found in the scheme of maneuver, the concept of operations, and
coordinating instructions. Specific to intelligence interrogation operations, in |
2-22.3 | 63 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, “all captured or detained personnel
shall be treated humanely, and all intelligence interrogations or debriefings
to gain intelligence from captured or detained personnel shall be conducted
humanely, in accordance with applicable law and policy. Acts of physical or
mental torture are prohibited.”
Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions
4-42. The human factor is preeminent in this step. Assumptions and facts
include—
• How HUMINT collectors can interact with the local population.
• What types of sources are available.
• What types of adversary intelligence and unconventional threats are
present.
Conduct Risk Assessment
4-43. There are inherent risks involved in HUMINT collection. HUMINT
collectors need access to the local population to perform their mission. Rules
that restrict all forces to base areas to protect the force may be prudent;
however, these restrictions can severely degrade HUMINT collection
capabilities, particularly in support of force protection requirements. This
measure deprives the collectors of sources needed to anticipate and prevent
violent incidents. HUMINT collectors receive cultural training as well as
security training to allow them to minimize the dangers of interacting with
the local population. Commanders must weigh the risk to collectors against
the risk to the force as a whole, and determine whether to provide additional
security to the HCT in order to allow the team to perform missions outside
the base area to gain needed intelligence. DA Pam 385-1 provides guidance
for risk assessment.
Select Courses of Action (COAs)
4-44. During COA development the staff, under the commander’s guidance,
analyzes various options for deploying and implementing HUMINT assets.
Input from HUMINT senior NCOs and WOs is vital to COA development and
analysis. Items to consider during COA development include—
• The distribution of the HCTs and OMTs within the AO.
• The support relationship (GS and DS) that exists for the deployed
teams.
• The command relationship in effect for the HCTs and OMTs (assigned,
attached, or OPCON).
• The manner in which the HUMINT assets are phased into the theater.
• The tactical configuration (personnel and equipment) of the HCT.
• The actual number of the HCTs and OMTs and the size of the
supporting HUMINT operations section (if any) deployed.
• The priority of the OMT’s efforts.
• The priority of linguist support. |
2-22.3 | 64 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
COLLECTION PRIORITY
4-45. During the MDMP, the MI commander advises his higher headquarters
on the most efficient use of the HUMINT collectors to meet collection
requirements. Depending on the particular higher echelon mission and the
capabilities of the specific personnel under his command, the supported S2
must decide whether to concentrate collection efforts on source, debriefing,
interrogation, tactical questioning, liaison, or DOCEX operations to answer
collection requirements. (See Chapter 5 for a description of these operations.)
The MI commander may be required by his operational tasking to support
any or all of these operations. He must decide how to task organize his assets
to meet these requirements. When faced with limited assets, prioritization of
collection is paramount.
4-46. A commander normally must prioritize HUMINT collections and
DOCEX. Although the decision is primarily dependent on which type of
source (human or document) is most likely to give the priority information,
other factors such as phase of operation, ROE, source availability, and
collection resource capabilities may influence his decision. At the tactical
level, both human sources and documents are screened and the senior
HUMINT soldier establishes the priorities. If documents and human sources
are determined to be equally likely of containing priority information, human
sources are normally exploited first due to—
• The ability of the HUMINT collector to get a human source to
elaborate and explain his information, which cannot be done with a
document.
• The rate at which people forget detailed information.
• The fact that an individual's resistance is easier to bypass immediately
after undergoing a significant traumatic experience (capture). Capture
thrusts them into an unfamiliar environment over which they have no
control and are vulnerable to various approach techniques. This initial
vulnerability passes quickly. An individual's established values begin
to assert themselves again within a day or two, and the individual's
willingness to cooperate might also decrease.
TASK ORGANIZATION
4-47. Because of the need to place HUMINT collectors in contact with the
local population and the need in many cases to integrate the HUMINT
collection process into other operations, the planning and analysis staff for
HUMINT missions is somewhat expanded from the norm. They should
include the C/J/G/S2X, SJA, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, other staff officers, as
necessary, Provost Marshal, MP, and US Army Criminal Investigation
Command, CA, unit HUMINT commanders, and senior HUMINT technicians
of the deploying unit. If the unit’s mission is to replace a currently deployed
HUMINT unit, a representative of that unit should be included.
4-48. The challenge to the MI commander is the proper training during
operations, task organization, placement, and coordination of movement of
HUMINT elements to meet collection requirements. The unit modified table
of organization and equipment (MTOE) organization, which is designed for
an MTW, may have to be modified to meet the specific requirements of |
2-22.3 | 65 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
operations in PMEs and SSCs. Augmentation is often needed and must be
requested. Task organization must be flexible to adjust to the dynamic
mission objectives. Commanders must allow for the augmentation of HCT
with other MI specialties and non-MI personnel as mission analysis and
planning indicate the need. Mission analysis and planning identify the
specific requirements for the HUMINT operations section, HAT, OMTs, and
HCTs.
4-49. The composition of the HUMINT elements must be based on METT-TC
factors. The number of HCTs and OMTs in the theater depends on the
intensity of the collection effort and the geographical coverage of the AO.
HCT members should be prepared to support any HUMINT missions they
may receive through command channels. They must have the skills to shift
easily from one set of functions to another based on the dynamic mission
requirements. The number of OMTs in a designated theater will depend on
the type and nature of the mission. A single OMT is capable of managing and
controlling 2 to 4 HCTs. The size and staffing of the OMT will depend on a
number of factors:
• Whether a HUMINT operations section is deployed and how many
HCTs are subordinate to it.
• If a single HCT deploys to support a small contingency, there may be
no need for an OMT. In this case the team leader must serve as the
OMT.
• If three or more OMTs deploy, then a tactical HUMINT operations
section should be deployed.
• For every 3 to 4 HCTs and their designated OMT, there should be one
headquarters element composed of a platoon leader and a platoon
sergeant to handle all administrative and logistical matters.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
RESERVE COMPONENT INTEGRATION
4-50. Given the Army’s OPTEMPO and force structure, the integration of
RC forces into the AC is highly likely for future operational deployments.
Commanders must identify their requirements early and establish proactive
coordination (both in garrison and while deployed) with their RC
counterparts to fully integrate them during all phases of training and
operations. During operations that include significant RC participation, an
RC liaison officer normally will be assigned, either temporarily or
permanently (at higher echelons), at the appropriate level of command. The
commander and staff must ensure that the RC LNO is involved in all aspects
of operational planning and execution.
4-51. There are three general categories of RC augmentation:
• Category 1: Formation of specialized units that include a fully
integrated AC and RC TOE. The activation of the RC of these units is
required for their full operational capability.
• Category 2: Augmentation of active duty units by RC units to fill out
unit strength levels or to provide additional functionality. For example,
an AC division might require additional HUMINT teams to support it |
2-22.3 | 66 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
during a stability operation. If a division required one additional team,
it should request a team and not request four HUMINT collectors. If
the requirement is for three additional teams, it should request a
HUMINT platoon with its organic C2 and OMTs.
• Category 3: The requirement for individual augmentees. This usually
occurs when a unit has the C2 structure but needs either additional
personnel or additional capability within the command structure. For
example, a unit may have a HUMINT platoon but the platoon is at 50
percent strength. Individual augmentation is the easiest method of
integration since the individual is integrated in the same manner as
any replacement. The augmented unit normally is required to provide
all equipment other than initial issue-type equipment.
4-52. There are several items to consider in unit augmentation:
• Accurate Identification of Requirements: During the MDMP, units
need to identify those mission-essential capabilities not already
present in the unit. The G3/S3, working in conjunction with the G1/S1,
considers options that may include RC augmentation of organic units
although the final decision to employ RC units is usually determined at
Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA). The requirement for
augmentation is forwarded through appropriate personnel channels to
US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and HQDA, which will
identify the appropriate units or personnel. If approved, they will work
with the appropriate agencies to establish the timeline in which the
units can respond on the Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data List
(TPFDDL). When developing requirements, the requesting unit must
be sure to articulate its needs accurately, specifying required skills,
numbers, and any additional skill identifiers (ASI). [Example: Request
augmentation by a HUMINT platoon consisting of at least a platoon
headquarters, three HCTs, one OMT, two linguists, and one
CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS) proficient operator. The
augmenting element will be operating in support of the commander’s
force protection program in the gaining unit’s AOR.]
• Activation Timeline: Units need time to mobilize and conduct any
additional collective and individual training that may be specific to the
unit’s mission or operational environment. The requesting unit needs
to be aware of the time required to activate the requested RC and that
there may be differences in levels of training or equipment. Timelines
should be established by FORSCOM to allow resolution of these
problems and should be reflected in the commander’s operational
planning sequence. Timelines will vary from unit to unit and mission
to mission.
• Training: USAR and ARNG units usually cannot train their units or
individuals to the same proficiency as the AC. Normally, this is due to
the limited amount of training time. Because of this limitation, a
certain degree of train-up prior to deployment may be necessary.
Commanders should identify available training opportunities and
request the participation of personnel identified for augmentation. For
an ongoing mission, you should also plan for an extended “right seat |
2-22.3 | 67 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
ride” mission handover period once the individuals or unit arrives in
the theater of operations.
• Command and Control: If the RC augmentation requires activation of
an entire unit, it should include their C2 element. If the augmentation
is by individuals, then they will fall under the command and control of
the gaining units.
• Time on Active Status: USAR and ARNG soldiers are restricted as to
the amount of time they can remain on active status. This timeline
begins on the date of mobilization and ends on the day the soldier
leaves active duty status. Deployed units must take this into account
when conducting continuous operations and must identify the
requirement to replace RC forces early enough to allow for the required
training and handoff procedures.
• Experience: While RC personnel normally lack current military
experience, they often perform jobs in the civilian sector that either
mitigate this lack of experience or they are able to bring a new and
useful capability with them. Care should be taken that reservists who
have civilian jobs which are similar to their HUMINT MOS (such as
police officers or investigators) recognize the different constraints
under which they operate in the military environment. For example,
police officers who might normally task informants with minimal
oversight cannot do that in their position as a HUMINT collector.
Commanders should try to capitalize on these skills, but ensure proper
training and understanding of the policies and regulations that govern
HUMINT collection operations.
OPERATIONS PLANS, OPERATIONS ORDERS, AND ANNEXES
4-53. An OPLAN is any plan for the conduct of military operations. When a
commander issues a directive for the coordinated execution of a military
operation, it becomes an OPORD. Although plans are based on specific
conditions or assumptions, they are not static. Plans are changed, refined,
and updated as a result of continuous estimates and studies. It is critical to
include HUMINT plans in the Intelligence Annex to the OPLAN.
4-54. The OPORD gives the HUMINT element approval to execute its
mission. OPORDs define the mission, set the parameters of operations,
identify who is responsible for what, and how it is to be supported. Additions
that are necessary to amplify an OPLAN or OPORD are contained in
annexes, appendices, tabs, and enclosures. Tasking for units to conduct
HUMINT collection operations is listed in the main body of the OPORD
under Tasks to Subordinate Units. The HUMINT appendix to Annex B
provides the technical guidance for HUMINT collection including the
umbrella concept for HUMINT operations.
4-55. The HUMINT appendices provide details on planning, coordinating,
approving, and managing HUMINT operations as they relate to the unit’s
overall mission. These appendices serve as the basic document authorizing
most HUMINT operations and programs. They must be reviewed and
approved by the appropriate office or commander. The HUMINT appendix to
the ISR Annex is necessary to ensure that augmentation of HUMINT assets |
2-22.3 | 68 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
from other components and agencies are integrated throughout the TF as
required to facilitate their specialized collection requirements. Specific tabs
may include joint debriefing and interrogation facility operations, source
operations, DOCEX, or open-source information.
OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
4-56. HUMINT collection is not conducted in a vacuum. Coordination with
MI organizations and non-MI agencies, units, and staff organizations is often
critical to expedite and complete HUMINT collection operations. (See
Appendix C for predeployment planning.)
MI ORGANIZATIONS
4-57. Elements involved in HUMINT planning, execution, and analysis need
to maintain close coordination with their counterparts in the other
intelligence disciplines. Coordination includes but is not limited to the
disciplines shown below.
Imagery Intelligence:
• Support imagery analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or
confirm the identification of items in imagery. This includes, for
example, using human sources to identify the functions of buildings
that have been tentatively identified through external imagery.
• Coordinate for current military or civilian imagery to use in the
questioning of sources.
• Cue requirements managers and others involved in imagery tasking on
locations or activities for imagery collection.
• Coordinate for IMINT information to verify information obtained
through HUMINT collection.
• Provide imagery for analysis (through still and video photography and
captured imagery).
• Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on subjects related to imagery.
• Obtain imagery-related collection requirements that can be answered
by human sources.
Signals Intelligence:
• Support signals analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or
confirm the information obtained through SIGINT collection.
• Coordinate for current SIGINT information to use in the questioning of
sources.
• Cue requirements managers and others involved in SIGINT tasking on
locations or activities (including communications types and
frequencies) for SIGINT collection.
• Coordinate for information to verify information obtained through
HUMINT collection.
• Provide SIGINT-related CEDs for SIGINT analysis. |
2-22.3 | 69 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
• Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on SIGINT-related topics.
• Obtain SIGINT-related collection requirements that can be answered
by human sources.
Measurement and Signature Intelligence:
• Support measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) analysis
by using HUMINT sources to identify or confirm the information
obtained through MASINT collection.
• Cue requirements managers and others involved in MASINT tasking
on locations or activities for the location of MASINT sensors.
• Coordinate for information to verify information obtained through
HUMINT collection.
• Provide MASINT-related CEDs for MASINT analysis.
• Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on MASINT-related topics.
• Obtain MASINT-related collection requirements that can be answered
by human sources.
Technical Intelligence:
• Support TECHINT analysis by using HUMINT sources and documents
to provide information concerning threat equipment and to support
TECHINT materiel analysis. This includes, for example, the
interrogation or debriefing of equipment operators of the translation of
operators manuals for a piece of equipment being investigated.
• Coordinate for current information on equipment capabilities to use in
the questioning of sources.
• Cue requirements managers and others involved in TECHINT tasking
on locations or activities for TECHINT collection. This includes
forwarding the identification and location of equipment of TECHINT
interest obtained during HUMINT collection operations.
• Coordinate for TECHINT information to verify information obtained
through HUMINT collection.
• Provide information from CEDs in support of TECHINT.
• Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on subjects related to areas of TECHINT interest.
• Obtain TECHINT-related collection requirements that can be
answered by human sources.
Counterintelligence:
• Support CI analysis by using HUMINT sources to provide information
concerning adversary intelligence collection capabilities and
operations.
• Identify human and document sources that have information of CI
interest. |
2-22.3 | 70 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• Cue requirements managers and others involved in CI tasking
individuals or activities of CI interest.
• Coordinate for CI information to verify information obtained through
HUMINT collection.
• Provide information from CEDs in support of CI.
• Coordinate for CI support as required when questioning personnel on
topics related to areas of CI interest.
• Obtain CI-related collection requirements that can be answered by
human sources.
• Integrate CI elements into HUMINT collection operations as
applicable.
Open-Source Intelligence:
• Support open-source intelligence (OSINT).
• Provide open source maps, charts, phone directories, business
directories, newspapers, video and audio media (including tapes and
compact discs) to the appropriate J/G/S2X and Intelligence Community
agencies and liaison officers.
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
4-58. In addition to MI units, HUMINT collection organizations frequently
conduct coordination with other military organizations.
• Military Police Units: Close coordination between HUMINT
collectors and MPs is mutually beneficial. The MPs are responsible for
maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment and
resettlement, law and order, and police intelligence operations. Both
activities (HUMINT collection and MP operations) require close
contact with the local civilian, refugee, and detainee populations.
HUMINT collection at checkpoints and at EPW and other detainee
collection points must be coordinated with the MPs, who are normally
responsible for internment and resettlement operations. In return, the
HUMINT collectors, because of their screening and questioning of
these population groups, can help facilitate the MP’s population control
missions by providing information about the population’s activities and
intentions that may be of MP concern. At EPW/detainee collection
points, HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP leadership to
be allowed to debrief MPs since MPs are in regular contact with the
detainees. This does not constitute tasking. Information collected in
this manner may provide valuable insight, which can aid the collector
in formulating approach strategies. MPs should be debriefed in such a
way so as not to interfere with their mission. Liaison with the MP
chain of command is vital to gain their support and assure them that
HUMINT collection will not interfere with MP operations. Joint patrols
containing MPs and HUMINT collectors can also be mutually
beneficial in many situations.
• Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and Provost Marshal
Office (PMO): The goals of HUMINT collection and those of the MPs
(particularly CID) are different. CID and PMO are concerned with |
2-22.3 | 71 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
identification and apprehension of criminal elements. The goal of
HUMINT collection is the collection of information in response to PIRs
that in many situations are centered on force protection. In the
situation where the threat includes a criminal element, the HCTs
might collect OB type information on the criminal element to ascertain
their activities and threat to friendly forces. HUMINT collectors are
not trained to conduct criminal investigations and must not be used for
this purpose. Criminal investigators and HUMINT collectors must
carefully coordinate their activities as necessary. HUMINT collectors
are required to report to the proper agency information collected on
criminal activities that the HUMINT collectors uncover in the normal
course of their activities.
• Psychological Operations Units: As with the MP force, HUMINT
collectors and PSYOP units are often interested in the same target
audience but for different reasons. PSYOP units are interested in
modifying the target audience beliefs and actions to be more supportive
of US goals. Normally, HUMINT collection elements coordinate with
PSYOP elements to obtain information concerning the motivational
factors and cultural value systems of the individuals to be questioned.
PSYOP units, as a part of their normal operations, develop detailed
analysis concerning psychological and cultural factors of friendly and
hostile elements in the AO. Such information will help HUMINT
collection personnel to understand the source's attitude, value system,
and perception; it will also help to obtain information more rapidly. At
the same time, PSYOP units often will develop collection requirements
to determine local attitudes and for information on the effectiveness of
PSYOP campaigns. HUMINT collectors can be tasked to collect on
these requirements if they are included as PIRs.
• Civil Affairs Units: The CA mission often places CA units in contact
with the HUMINT collection target audience. If possible, HUMINT
collection missions can be established in coordination with CA
missions. If the HUMINT collection mission is viewed as having the
potential of interfering with the CA mission and coordinated
operations are not possible, CA personnel can still be sensitized to
intelligence collection requirements and debriefed by HUMINT
collectors as part of a friendly force debriefing operation.
• Drug and Law Enforcement Agency Operations: Personnel who
are employees of DOD intelligence components may be assigned to
assist Federal law enforcement authorities and, when lives are
endangered, state and local law enforcement authorities; provided such
use is consistent with, and has been approved by an official authorized
pursuant to DOD Directive 5525.5, Enclosure 4 (reference (i)). Such
official shall ensure that the General Counsel of the providing DOD
component concurs in such use. Assistance may be rendered to LEAs
and security services of foreign governments or international
organizations in accordance with established policy and applicable
SOFAs, provided that DOD intelligence components may not request
or participate in activities of such agencies undertaken against US
persons that would not be permitted activities of such components
under the procedures of AR 381-10. HUMINT collectors may assist |
2-22.3 | 72 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
foreign law enforcement authorities, with prior approval of the J2X.
Under no circumstances will HUMINT collectors assist any US or
foreign law enforcement authorities in any manner without prior
approval by competent authority after a legal review of the proposal.
• Maneuver Units: HCTs may be utilized in GS for coverage of an
AOIR or in DS to support a specific maneuver unit. The type of
coordination needed with maneuver units will vary depending on the
type of support relationship the HCT has. HCTs operating in GS
should coordinate with maneuver unit commanders when the HCT will
be operating in that unit’s AO. At a minimum, the HCTs should
announce their presence and request information on any conditions or
ongoing situations that may affect on the conduct of their mission. An
HCT operating in DS of a specific unit will coordinate with the unit for
force augmentation to HUMINT patrols as needed in accordance with
force protection requirements. The HCT leader should also coordinate
with the supported unit’s S2 for involvement in debriefings of
returning patrol members, checkpoint personnel, convoy leaders and
others. HCT leaders may also coordinate to be included in the unit’s
reconnaissance patrols, as appropriate.
• Combat Service Support Units: Current and future combat
operations will be conducted in a noncontiguous battlespace. CSS
formations and units may be an excellent source for HUMINT
collectors. In many situations, DPs and refugees will perceive CSS
activities as non-threatening and an activity which can provide them
with aid and comfort. CSS operations will naturally draw DPs and
refugees hoping to receive support. This could provide opportunities for
HUMINT collectors to access this sector of the population. CSS unit
S2s should conduct patrol debriefings of returning convoy personnel to
capture observations made during convoys, with the goal of cross-
cueing the supporting HCT, CI team, or law enforcement element as
appropriate.
STAFF COORDINATION
4-59. Successful HUMINT collection operations require support from the
staff elements of the supported unit. These elements are collectively
responsible for the planning that results in HUMINT tasking. Below is a
partial list of the staff responsibilities that affect HUMINT collection:
• G1/S1 HUMINT-related responsibilities include but are not limited
to—
Supervising the medical support furnished to EPW/detainees.
Maintaining a list (by language and proficiency) of qualified
linguists within their command.
Coordinating with the G4 or G5 for procurement and payment of
other interpreters and translators needed to perform intelligence
and non-intelligence duties.
Ensuring the echelon's OPLAN contains complete provisions for
handling and evacuating detainees, refugees, DPs, and local civilians |
2-22.3 | 73 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
as required. This plan must satisfy the interests of all other staff
officers and provide for—
− Ensuring humane treatment of all personnel.
− Promptly evacuating personnel from the combat zone.
− Integrating procedures for the evacuation, control, and
administration of personnel with other combat service (CS) and
CSS operations.
− Ensuring delivery of mail to EPWs and other detainees.
− Maintaining detainee (including EPW) statistics.
− Providing administration and control of detainee currency and
pay records, including coordinating with appropriate intelligence
authorities about investigating large sums of money.
• G2/S2 is responsible for developing intelligence in support of unit
operations. The G2/S2 at division and higher and in the interim BCT is
supported by a G/S2X and normally a HAT in the performance of his
HUMINT-related functions. His HUMINT-related responsibilities
include but are not limited to––
Obtaining intelligence through intelligence reach to support
HUMINT collection.
Incorporating HUMINT into the ISR plan.
Developing the HUMINT annex to the OPORD and OPLAN.
Coordinating to provide technical support for all HUMINT collection
operations.
Ensuring deconfliction and synchronization for all HUMINT
collection assets within the unit’s AO. A particular effort must be
made to coordinate with all DOD military source operations (MSO),
and DOD and other government agencies (OGAs) that may be
operating in the AO; with the theater J2X, as part of deconfliction.
Failure to deconflict with DOD MSO and OGAs may result in
compromise of assets and interruption of collection operations and
potentially unintended casualties.
− Obtaining documents and materials of intelligence interest,
including visual and audio media and electronic equipment
(such as computers, phones, PDAs) taken from detainees, or
seized or loaned, in coordination with the Provost Marshal and
other elements.
− Recording, evaluating, and analyzing collected information and
providing feedback to HUMINT collectors.
− Ensuring adequate HUMINT collection and reporting nets and
systems are available.
− Coordinating with the G3 to ensure plans for HUMINT collection
operations are included in unit OPLANs.
− Coordinating with the G3 to ensure that HUMINT collectors are
included in unit training plans, rehearsals, and briefbacks.
− Drafting instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting
captured enemy personnel and CEDs. (They coordinate with the
G3 to ensure draft instructions are included in the command
standing operating procedures (SOPs), OPLANs, and OPORDs.)
− Projecting capture rates as well as refugee and DP rates. |
2-22.3 | 74 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
− Determining the number of interpreters and translators needed
to perform intelligence duties.
− Coordinating with other agencies and HUMINT collectors for
intelligence sharing.
− Controlling the procedures used to process and grant clearances
to the interpreters and translators as required.
− Coordinating with the civil-military operations (CMO) officer for
intelligence screening of local nationals, refugees, and DPs.
− Coordinating with SJA for legal review of proposed operations.
• G3/S3 is responsible for operations, plans, organization, and training.
His HUMINT collection-related responsibilities include but are not
limited to––
Ensuring the inclusion of HUMINT collection units in the main body
of OPLANs and OPORDs under Tasks to Subordinate Units and
Task Organization.
Ensuring instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting
captured enemy personnel and CEDs in all unit command SOPs,
OPLANs, and OPORDs.
Incorporating HUMINT collection operations into future plans and
operations.
Ensuring subordinate units are trained in proper handling and
evacuation of captured enemy personnel, materiel, and CEDs.
Ensuring that the subordinate elements are trained in OPORDs
including ROE and the proper handling of local civilians, foreign
nationals, refugees, and DPs.
Obtaining, organizing, and supervising employment of additional
personnel as guards for EPWs and other detainees where MP assets
are not available or insufficient.
Tasking the Division/Brigade Engineer Officer in conjunction with
the G2/S2 to conduct a site survey for possible EPW/detainee holding
area facilities within the operational area. Priority should go to
existing facilities needing little or no renovation to meet operational
requirements. If suitable facilities cannot be found, the engineer
officer should provide detailed facilities design specifications to the
G4/S4 for coordination and development of contracted resources.
• G4/S4 responsibilities related to HUMINT collection include but are
not limited to––
Developing command policy for evacuation and internment of
captured enemy personnel, and evacuation and safekeeping of CEE
and CEDs.
Coordinating contracts for real estate and construction of source-
holding facilities if local capabilities are not available. Ideally,
existing facilities will be occupied and renovated whenever possible.
Collecting and distributing captured enemy supplies. (This is
coordinated with the intelligence and operations staffs.)
Procuring and distributing rations to personnel holding areas.
Transporting EPWs and other detainees in a timely, safe manner to
the appropriate facility for processing. |
2-22.3 | 75 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Determining requirements for use of source labor for the logistical
support needed in source-handling operations.
Providing logistical support to interpreter personnel.
• G5/S5 responsibilities related to HUMINT collection include but are
not limited to––
Coordinating with local US government, personnel staff
representatives, and HN armed forces for procuring native linguists
for interpreter support.
Coordinating military support of populous.
Providing technical advice and assistance in reorientation of sources
and enemy defectors.
Coordinating MI aspects of CMO activities with the G2.
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
4-60. In addition to the major staff elements, a HUMINT collection element
requires support from several other elements in order to conduct operations.
These elements are discussed below.
• The US Army Criminal Investigation Command is the organization
with primary responsibility for investigating allegations of criminal
acts or reportable incidents committed by or against detainees.
• The SJA can provide legal support and advice on the interpretation
and application of applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy
include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD
Directive 2310.E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”;
DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOS. The
SJA is also a channel for reporting known or suspected reportable
incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.
• The Inspector General is a channel for reporting known or suspected
reportable incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.
• The PMO is the channel for reporting criminal activity other than
reportable incidents, but also can be used for reporting known or
suspected reportable incidents.
• The Chaplain can also receive reports of reportable incidents.
• The G7 provides information on Information Operations and conducts
liaison with PSYOP, the Electronic Warfare Officer, the Military
Deception Officer, and Operations Security personnel. |
2-22.3 | 77 | FM 2-22.3
PART TWO
HUMINT Collection In Military Source Operations
Part Two discusses HUMINT collection as it pertains to MSO. The Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) has established a DOD-wide HUMINT Enterprise consisting of
the following executors: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the Military Departments, the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). All Defense HUMINT Enterprise executors support and
satisfy Defense requirements by employing their available resources and
capabilities.
MSO refer to the collection of foreign military and military-related intelligence by
humans from humans. MSO are conducted under SECDEF authorities, to satisfy
DOD needs in compliance with DOD policy. Within the Army, MSO are conducted
by trained personnel under the direction of military commanders. These specially
trained personnel may employ the entire range of HUMINT collection operations.
MSO sources include one-time, continuous, and formal contacts, from contact
operations; and sources from interrogations, debriefings, and liaison activities.
Each type of MSO activity has specific operational requirements, specific legal
restrictions, and operational guidelines. HUMINT collection activities in each of
these categories require specific approval, coordination, and review. MSO include
human source contact operations, debriefing, liaison, and interrogations. This
chapter introduces each of these collection operations.
_________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 5
HUMINT Collection
HUMINT COLLECTION OPERATIONS
5-1. Full spectrum operations require focused MSO with strong capabilities
dispersed across the battlefield. In offensive and defensive operations, the
HCTs need to be placed in support of the engaged maneuver battalions. In
stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations, the
HUMINT teams need to be located in battalion AOs throughout the AOIR.
5-2. The rapid pace of operations, the need to provide near-real time (NRT)
support of command decisions and the inherent time delays in moving
detainees, including EPWs and civilian refugees to centralized locations,
necessitate the dispersion of HUMINT collection assets to forward areas in |
2-22.3 | 78 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
support of critical operations rather than their retention at detainee and
refugee holding facilities at echelons corps and below. This forward
deployment gives HUMINT collectors earlier access to sources and is
facilitated by enhanced communication and automation capabilities down to
the collection team level.
5-3. All operations are different, and deployment of HUMINT assets is
METT-TC dependent. Brigades need the capability to provide 24-hour
HUMINT collection capability to each battalion AO. The command
relationship of the HUMINT collection capability is also METT-TC
dependent. The OMT should be located at the echelon that is best able to
manage and support the HCTs and to provide the best capability to answer
the commander’s PIRs.
5-4. The Division and Corps elements should cover their respective areas not
covered by their subordinate commands. They also, as needed, reinforce those
target areas that are most effective in answering their respective command
PIRs already covered by subordinate command capability. EAC HUMINT
units normally are responsible for supporting theater or national
requirements and providing HUMINT support at theater level facilities such
as the JIDC. The EAC units will also augment the echelon below corps units
and conduct source operations in the Corps area as required. Operations,
particularly in challenging terrain and in stability and reconstruction
environments, may require additional HUMINT assets normally obtained
from the RC.
HUMAN SOURCE CONTACT OPERATIONS
5-5. HUMINT collection requires the contact between the HUMINT collector,
who attempts to gather information through a variety of HUMINT collection
techniques, and a human contact, who hopefully has the information that the
HUMINT collector wants and who can be convinced to divulge the
information. Operations with formal contacts are only conducted by
HUMINT collectors and CI agents who are specifically trained and
authorized to do so. There are three levels of contacts:
• One-time contact.
• Continuous contact.
• Formal contact.
5-6. The basic goal of all levels of contact is to collect information in response
to collection tasking; however, only under certain conditions can HUMINT
collectors task contacts to get information for them (see para 5-28).
Understanding the types of contacts is key to understanding each type of
human source contact operation. The following levels are not all-inclusive nor
are the listed categories exclusive. For example, a contact who was initially a
one-time contact (such as a walk-in) may later be developed into a continuous
contact. A continuous contact may be developed into a formal contact, who
can then be tasked, trained, and paid. There is no limit on the number of
times a team can meet contacts without recruiting them and making them
into a formal contact. |
2-22.3 | 79 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
ONE-TIME CONTACT
5-7. The one-time contact is a source of information of value that was, and
will be, encountered only once. In all operational environments the HUMINT
collector will frequently encounter a source only once, particularly at lower
echelons. This may be a local civilian encountered during a patrol, a detainee
who is quickly questioned and then evacuated, or a refugee at a checkpoint.
5-8. In addition to the information obtained from a one-time contact, the
HUMINT collector must make a reasonable effort to obtain as much basic
data as possible about the one-time contact. Complete name, occupation,
address, and other basic data of this source are crucial for a thorough
analysis of the information provided. The one-time contact and the
information he provides cannot be assessed and evaluated independently;
however, the information provided by a one-time contact must be reported
and corroborated through other HUMINT sources and even other intelligence
disciplines.
5-9. Contact reports must be filed with the OMT and source registries
maintained in accordance with FM 34-5 (S//NF), AR 381-100 (S//NF), and
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) in order to support analysis of information obtained. If a
one-time contact is encountered for a second time and again provides
information of value, then the contact may be thereafter treated as a
continuous contact.
5-10. A walk-in is a one-time contact who volunteers information of value to
US forces on his own initiative. The walk-in source may volunteer
information by approaching an HCT, other ISR elements, or US forces or
civilian personnel anywhere in the AO. Each unit must have in place a
program to identify, safeguard, and direct the walk-in to the appropriate
collection asset, to be screened and debriefed as required. For example, a
walk-in who wanted to report a crime would be directed to the PMO rather
than to a HUMINT collector.
5-11. The collection asset will screen the walk-in to determine the type of
information the source has and to determine and evaluate the reliability of
the individual. After identifying the type of information, the collector
determines if he has the jurisdiction to collect that information. If, for
example, the walk-in wishes to report a crime, the collector refers that
individual to the proper criminal investigative agency.
5-12. Systematic questioning, deception detection techniques, and cross
checking of information are used extensively in the evaluation process.
Concurrently, there are national level directives, DOD directives, and Army
regulations that direct specific actions to be taken with a walk-in. When
dealing with a walk-in source, HUMINT collectors must guard against
adversary intelligence collection. They must also protect legitimate sources of
information. The walk-in is thoroughly debriefed on all areas of information
relevant to collection requirements, and any information of value is reported.
5-13. On occasion, the HUMINT collector may determine that a one-time
contact has the potential to become a continuous contact or a formal contact.
This is referred to as a developmental lead. A developmental lead is an |
2-22.3 | 80 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
individual identified through social and professional status, leads, source
profiling, or other techniques, who has knowledge required by the
commander. A developmental lead is any person the HUMINT collector
expects to see or would like to see again, or a person who indicates that they
intend to return in the future.
5-14. When a HUMINT collector identifies a developmental lead, he reports
his interest in elevating the source to continuous or formal contact status as
soon as possible to the OMT. Although not every developmental lead becomes
a source of information, the HUMINT collector should see each
developmental lead as a potential source of information and apply the
appropriate security measures. The developmental lead is continuously
assessed to verify his placement and access to the type of information the
HCT is seeking. Additionally, the HUMINT collector continuously assesses
the motivation and characteristics of the developmental lead.
5-15. A one-time source cannot be tasked to collect information, but can be
sensitized to information in which the HUMINT collector is interested. For
example, if a walk-in source provides information on activity in a house in his
neighborhood, he might ask if the collector would be interested in more of the
same type information in the future. The HUMINT collector cannot tell him
to go get more information, but can indicate that he would listen if the walk-
in returned with more information on the topic. If the walk-in returns a
second time, he must be handled as a continuous contact.
CONTINUOUS CONTACTS
5-16. Continuous contacts are individuals who have been identified as
having more information than could be obtained through a one-time contact,
and have been met again by HUMINT collection personnel for the purpose of
collecting additional information. HUMINT collectors do not task continuous
contacts, but they can be sensitized in the same way as one-time contacts.
Continuous contacts provide their knowledge through informal debriefings
and elicitation.
5-17. All contacts who are seen more than once by HUMINT collectors must
be tracked by registering them in the Source Registry and reporting the
contacts to the OMT. As an example, a one-time contact who reported
information to a HCT contacts them again with follow-up information. That
person will now be registered as a continuous contact and tracked by the
OMT. This registration process helps to prevent the same information from
being collected by multiple collectors from the same contact without realizing
it. See AR 381-172 (S//NF) and FM 34-5 (S//NF) for further information on
source registration and for the required forms. Types of continuous contacts
are discussed below.
Local National and Third-Country National Employees
5-18. Local national and third-country national employees are non-US
personnel from either the country in which the US forces are operating or a
third country who are either employed by US forces directly or through a
contractor to provide logistical support and services. One of the purposes of
locally employed personnel screening is to assess these individuals as |
2-22.3 | 81 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
potential sources of information. Local national and third-country national
employees can be a prolific source of information about local attitudes and
events, particularly in a restrictive environment where US contact with the
local population is curtailed. Their information can also be significant in a
force protection role. The HUMINT collector must register these individuals
with the J/G2X. While the HUMINT collector is assessing the local national
employee as an intelligence source, CI agents are assessing the same source
pool as potential security risks.
5-19. Coordination between HUMINT collectors and CI elements is essential
for deconfliction and to avoid duplication of effort. If the HUMINT collector
identifies an employee that may be of CI interest, he should immediately
notify the appropriate CI unit.
Displaced Personnel and Refugees
5-20. DPs and refugees are excellent sources of information about denied
areas and can be used to help identify threat agents and infiltrators. The
degree of access HUMINT collectors have to DPs is dependent on the
OPORDs, ROE, and SOFAs in effect. HUMINT collectors can work with CA
or other programs dealing with DPs or refugees.
5-21. DPs and refugees are normally considered one-time sources but may be
incorporated into other long-term collection programs if their degree of
knowledge warrants this. In this case, adherence to the restrictions involving
source operations is necessary. Those restrictions can be found in AR 380-10,
AR 381-100 (S//NF), DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), DIAM 58-12 (S//NF), and other
publications as well as existing ROE and SOFAs.
US Forces
5-22. US forces have many opportunities to interact with the local population
in the normal course of their duties in operations. This source perhaps is the
most under-utilized HUMINT collection resource. Some US forces, such as
combat and reconnaissance patrols, are routinely tasked and debriefed by the
appropriate level G2/S2. Others, such as medical teams or engineers who
have extensive contact with the local population, should also be debriefed.
5-23. Commanders and staff members who serve as liaison with the local
population and local government officials can be fruitful sources of
information. CA, PSYOP, MP, and other elements also have legitimate
reasons to conduct liaison with local authorities and should be debriefed as
appropriate. The friendly force debriefing effort can succeed only with
command emphasis.
5-24. HUMINT collection elements need to coordinate with local units to
identify those individuals who would be most profitable to debrief and to
further coordinate with them for time to conduct the debriefing. Although the
S2 and S3 can and should task their soldiers to conduct collection tasks
during the course of their normal duties, HUMINT collectors must ensure
that their friendly force debriefing effort does not interfere with the primary
mission accomplishment of the soldiers being debriefed. HCTs should ensure
that the necessary staff S2s and S3s are aware of the HUMINT collection |
2-22.3 | 82 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
requirements and request that the staffs incorporate these into their
respective collection taskings. The results of debriefings by units should also
be disseminated to the HCTs for source development, collection targeting,
and analysis.
Official Liaison
5-25. Liaison with local military, government, or civilian agency officials
provides an opportunity to collect information required by the commander.
The HUMINT collector meets with these officials to conduct liaison,
coordinate certain operations, collect information, and obtain leads to
potential sources of information. Elicitation is the primary technique used
with liaison contacts, although in many cases there is a more formal
exchange of information. Information obtained by these elements through
liaison normally tends to reflect the official positions of their superiors and
may not be entirely accurate or complete.
Detainees
5-26. A detainee is any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed
force. An EPW is a detainee who meets the criteria of Articles 4 and 5 of the
GPW. (See Appendix A.) Detainees may be interrogated. They are frequently
excellent sources of information but in many instances the access of the
HUMINT collector to the detainees may be curtailed.
5-27. For example, when supporting a counterinsurgency, the supported
government may consider all captured insurgents to be criminals and not
allow US forces access to them. In these instances, US HUMINT collectors
should attempt to sit in during local questioning; they could submit questions
or, at a minimum, coordinate to receive the reports from local authority
questioning. US HUMINT collectors must remember that regardless of the
legal status of the detainees they must be treated in a manner consistent
with the Geneva Conventions. (See Appendix A.)
FORMAL CONTACT
5-28. Formal contacts are individuals who have agreed to meet and cooperate
with HUMINT collectors for the purpose of providing information. HUMINT
collectors who have met with a particular continuous contact three or more
times should consider assessing him for use as a formal contact. Formal
contacts meet repeatedly with HUMINT collectors, and their operation and
tasking must be carried out in accordance with AR 381-172 (S//NF),
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
5-29. Formal contacts are generally local nationals or third-country national
employees. Knowledge of their meeting with HUMINT collectors is restricted.
This can be accomplished by either disguising the fact that the HUMINT
collection personnel are indeed HUMINT personnel, or by concealing the
purpose of overt meetings with HUMINT personnel. HCTs take
extraordinary measures to protect their relationship with these contacts.
Depending on METT-TC factors, meetings with formal contacts may range
from overt meetings, which are conducted discreetly in order to protect the |
2-22.3 | 83 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
relationship between the source and HUMINT collectors, to meetings
whereby only the collector and the source know the meeting has occurred.
When contact operations are conducted using this methodology, the operation
must be coordinated in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) policy cited in Appendix J. Specific direction regarding
documentation required for recruitment, and the designation of approval
authority (usually the J/G2X) for recruitment of a formal contact, will be
specified in Appendix 5 (HUMINT) of Annex B (Intelligence) to the governing
OPLAN or OPORD.
DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS
5-30. Debriefing operations refer to the systematic questioning of individuals
not in the custody of the US, to procure information to answer collection
tasks by direct and indirect questioning techniques. The primary categories
of sources for debriefings are friendly forces and civilians including refugees,
DPs, and local inhabitants.
5-31. Debriefing operations are those operations directed towards collecting
information from a segment of the target population using primarily
debriefing techniques. These debriefing operations are separate from the
G2/S2 debriefing program to debrief personnel returning from missions.
Debriefing operations often include the debriefing of personnel who may not
usually be debriefed as part of their assigned duties.
5-32. Normally Army debriefing operations will be directly related to
collection tasks at the operational and tactical levels. Strategic debriefing of
high-level personnel in response to theater and national level requirements
is often under the purview of the DIA/DH. Army HUMINT collectors
frequently participate in this type of collection, which is under the control,
rules, regulations, and operational guidance of DH.
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
5-33. Debriefing operations are conducted under the guidelines of
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF). They are further subject to
applicable execute orders and the specific ROE and classified “umbrella
concept” that apply to the specific AO.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
5-34. Debriefing requires relatively unconstrained access to the target
audience. Debriefing operations are frequently constrained by the umbrella
concept, overt operational proposal (OVOP), and OPORDs. Debriefing is a
time- and resource-demanding operation that often shows limited immediate
results. Since the potential target audience is so large, debriefing operations
require careful planning and careful screening and selection of specific
targets. |
2-22.3 | 84 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
5-35. Debriefing operations at the tactical level include the debriefing of
elements of the local and transient civilian population in support of ongoing
tactical operations. This is different from but often supportive of tactical
SCOs as described in Chapter 1. Although tactical SCOs use specific
identified sources to obtain and report information, tactical debriefing
operations use one-time and continuous contacts to answer requirements.
Tactical debriefing operations are frequently combined with tactical
interrogation operations and may identify potential sources for tactical SCOs.
REFUGEE FACILITY AND CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS
5-36. Refugee facility and checkpoint operations involve placing HCTs at
points where US forces expect to encounter large numbers of refugees.
Deployment of HUMINT collectors at checkpoints is normally preferred due
to their ability to collect and report more timely information. As in the
questioning of detainees, the debriefing of refugees should not delay their
movement out of the danger area.
5-37. Checkpoint debriefing is normally done in coordination with MP or
combat forces that are manning the checkpoint. Debriefing at refugee camps
is used to obtain longer term and less immediate information. HUMINT
collection units established at refugee camps coordinate their activities with
the CA, MP, NGO, or other organizations that has responsibility for
operating the refugee camp.
5-38. In internment facilities operated by the MPs, HUMINT collectors
coordinate with MPs for access to the detainees and for guard support. In
facilities operated by NGOs, HUMINT collectors coordinate with NGOs for
permission to speak to the refugees. NGOs are civilian agencies and may
decide not to permit HUMINT collectors to have access to refugees.
FRIENDLY FORCE DEBRIEFING
5-39. Every member of the friendly force is a potential source for HUMINT
collection. Friendly force personnel frequently have contact with the threat,
civilian population, or the environment. Although many individuals report
their information in the form of combat information, many do not report the
information, do not realize its significance, or do not know how to report key
information. Frequently a systematic questioning by a trained HUMINT
collector will identify key information that can contribute to the intelligence
picture and help an individual recall details. It also helps to place his
information into a systematic format for the analyst to use.
5-40. HUMINT collectors debrief selected friendly force personnel including
combat patrols, aircraft pilots and crew, long-range surveillance teams, deep
insert special forces teams, and other high-risk mission personnel. Often the
personnel assigned to a sector of responsibility are the first to notice changes
in the attitude of the local populace or differences in the mission
environment.
5-41. They are also able to provide indicators concerning the mission
environment. HUMINT collectors also conduct debriefings of returned |
2-22.3 | 85 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
prisoners of war (POWs), freed hostages, returned US defectors, and soldiers
reported as missing in action. These debriefings help to determine enemy
methods of operations, enemy intentions, POW handling and interrogations,
enemy weaknesses, information concerning other POWs not returned, and
battle damage assessment (BDA).
5-42. HUMINT assets lose access to valuable information if they are not
regularly coordinating with the following elements:
• Cavalry Troops, Unit Patrols, and Scouts. Unit patrols and scouts
have a unique view of the battle area that sensors cannot detect.
During operations, units and scouts often patrol villages or populated
areas that are contentious and therefore of interest. The unit will gain
valuable information on the current status of the AO, potentially
answering intelligence requirements, through mission reporting and
debriefing by their unit S2 or HUMINT collector.
• Military Police. HUMINT collection assets work with the MPs who
gain area knowledge through their extensive foot patrols and vehicular
convoys. MPs also staff checkpoints and traffic control points (TCPs)
where they interact with large numbers of the civilian populace and
encounter people and situations that often answer intelligence
requirements. MP guards at any internment facility are a valuable
source of information on the attitude and behavior of detainees.
HUMINT collectors should coordinate with the MP detainee facility
commander in order to obtain information on detainees obtained
through custodial observation and conversations.
• Civil Affairs. CA units have daily interaction with the civilian
populace including key members of the civilian community such as
politicians, technical personnel, and military leadership.
• Psychological Operations. PSYOP teams often interview civilians
on the battlefield to determine the effectiveness of friendly and threat
PSYOP campaigns. PSYOP elements also gather information on
political, social, and other PSYOP requirements. PSYOP elements
produce and disseminate intelligence products based partially on their
interaction with the civilian populace.
• Special Operations Forces. The Special Operations Forces (SOF)
team often has greater access to humans and areas on a battlefield
than any other collection asset. Their observation of and interaction
with the local population provides them access to information that
often answers collection requirements. The following are examples of
these types of collection missions:
(cid:131) Special reconnaissance missions into denied territory to satisfy
intelligence gaps or to confirm information from another source.
(cid:131) Unconventional warfare (UW) missions normally of a long duration.
SOF are inserted into hostile territory to conduct sensitive
operations that support US tactical and national objectives. During
these missions, SOF units often come in contact with the local
population and gather information that meets intelligence
requirements.
• Long-Range Surveillance. Direct observation and reporting on
targets such as activities and facilities may provide timely and |
2-22.3 | 86 | FM 2-22.3_________________________________________________________________________________
accurate intelligence to support a decision or cross-cue other collection
capabilities. Long-range surveillance (LRS) is often employed when
discreet observation of an activity is necessary over a long period of
time or when a collection system that can respond to redirection is
necessary.
• Criminal Intelligence Operations. CID personnel, in cooperation
with MP soldiers, play a key role by linking criminal intelligence to
specific groups and events. The criminal intelligence collection effort
specifically targets weapons, drugs, organized crime, and identities of
smuggling routes. The identification of smuggling routes results in a
significant increase in numbers of weapons being confiscated. The
timely transfer of criminal intelligence products to tactical units
enables a rapid response to serious confrontations, increased
confiscation of arms and ammunition, and improved stability in a TF
and AO. The Fusion Cell within the ACE develops intelligence
products from national, theater, and operational sources. Due to the
significant threat that criminal elements pose, CID military agents
and CID civilian analysts may be attached to the Fusion Cell to
facilitate the police intelligence function.
STRATEGIC DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS
5-43. Strategic debriefing is debriefing activity conducted to collect
information or to verify previously collected information in response to
national or theater level collection priorities. This avoids surprises of a
strategic nature and is used to support long-range strategic planning.
Strategic debriefing is conducted in peacetime as well as in wartime. It often
fills intelligence gaps on extremely sensitive topics or areas. The sources for
strategic debriefing include but are not limited to émigrés, refugees,
displaced persons, defectors, and selected US personnel.
Strategic debriefing guidance is provided in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF),
DIAM 58-12 (S//NF), and DODD 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence, Interrogations,
Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning."
5-44. Strategic debriefing is conducted in a non-hostile, business-like
manner. The rapport posture is usually amicable as the source is usually
willingly answering national level intelligence needs. Although voluntary
sources may not be motivated by a desire for money or other material
incentives, it is necessary to ensure that any promised incentives are
delivered. The time used in a strategic debriefing can range from days to
years. Sources typically have high-level backgrounds in scientific, industrial,
political, or military areas.
5-45. Information gathered as strategic intelligence is categorized into eight
components. Each of these components can be divided into subcomponents.
These components and subcomponents are neither all-encompassing nor
mutually exclusive. This approach enhances familiarization with the types of
information included in strategic intelligence. An easy way to remember
these components is the acronym "BEST MAPS": |
2-22.3 | 87 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Biographic Intelligence
Economic Intelligence
Sociological Intelligence
Transportation and Telecommunications Intelligence
Military Geographic Intelligence
Armed Forces Intelligence
Political Intelligence
Science and Technological Intelligence
• Biographic intelligence is the study of individuals of actual or
potential importance through knowledge of their personalities and
backgrounds. For further guidance on collecting and reporting
biographic intelligence, see DIAM 58-12 (S//NF). The subcomponents
are—
Educational and occupational history—civilian and military
backgrounds of individuals.
Individual accomplishment—notable accomplishments of an
individual's professional or private life.
Idiosyncrasies and habits—mannerisms and unusual lifestyles.
Position, influence, and potential—present and/or future positions of
power or influence.
Attitudes and hobbies—significant interests that may affect an
individual's accessibility.
• Economic intelligence studies economic strengths and weaknesses
of a country. The subcomponents are—
Economic warfare—information on the diplomatic or financial steps
a country may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with
its enemies.
Economic vulnerabilities—the degree to which a country's military
would be hampered by the loss of materials or facilities.
Manufacturing—information on processes, facilities, logistics, and
raw materials.
Source of economic capability—any means a country has to sustain
its economy (for example, black market trade, legitimate business or
trades, and imports and exports).
• Sociological intelligence deals with people, customs, behaviors, and
institutions. The subcomponents are—
Population—rates of increase, decrease, or migrations.
Social characteristics—customs, morals, and values.
Manpower—divisions and distribution within the workforce.
Welfare—health and education.
Public information—information services within the country.
• Transportation and telecommunications intelligence studies
systems dedicated to and used during military emergencies and
peacetime. |
2-22.3 | 88 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
• Military geographic intelligence studies all geographic factors
(physical and cultural) that may affect military operations. Physical
geography is concerned with natural or manmade geophysical features.
Cultural geography provides demographics information.
• Armed forces intelligence is the integrated study of the ground, sea,
and air forces of the country. The subcomponents are––
Strategy—military alternatives in terms of position, terrain,
economics, and politics.
Tactics—military deployments and operations doctrine.
OB—location, organization, weapons, strengths.
Equipment—analysis of all military materiel.
Logistics—procurement, storage, and distribution.
Training—as carried out at all echelons to support doctrine.
Organization—detailed analysis of command structures.
Manpower—available resources and their conditioning.
• Political intelligence studies all political aspects which may affect
military operations. The subcomponents are—
Government structure—organization of departments and ministries.
National policies—government actions and decisions.
Political dynamics—government views and reactions to events.
Propaganda—information and disinformation programs.
Policy and intelligence services—organization and functions.
Subversion—subversive acts sponsored by the government.
• Science and technological intelligence studies the country's
potential and capability to support objectives through development of
new processes, equipment, and weapons systems. The subcomponents
are—
Weapons and weapon systems.
Missile and space programs.
Nuclear energy and weapons technology.
NBC developments.
Basic applied science.
Research and development systems.
LIAISON OPERATIONS
5-46. Liaison is conducted to obtain information and assistance, to coordinate
or procure material, and to develop views necessary to understand
counterparts. Liaison contacts are normally members of the government,
military, law enforcement, or other member of the local or coalition
infrastructure. The basic tenet of liaison is quid pro quo. An exchange of
information, services, material, or other assistance is usually a part of the
transaction. The nature of this exchange varies widely depending upon the
culture, location, and personalities involved.
5-47. Because the nature of liaison tasks varies widely, the general goals of
the liaison operation and the objective of each liaison contact should be |
2-22.3 | 89 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
clearly defined. The objective should include the type of information to be
collected, methods of operations unique to the area, and the command
objectives. Additionally, the collector should know limitations on liaison
activities. These limitations include––
• Prohibitions against collecting certain types of information or
contacting certain types of individuals or organizations.
• Memorandums of understanding with other echelons which delineate
each echelon’s AOR and AORs for subordinate units.
• Coordination requirements per DCID 5/1 dated 19 December 1984,
which are required for selected types of liaison activities.
5-48. Administrative considerations include––
• Type, method, and channels of reporting information obtained from
liaison activities.
• Project and contingency fund site numbers to be used.
• Funding and incentive acquisition procedures.
• Limitations on the use of ICFs or incentives.
• Reporting system used.
• Authority under which the specific liaison program is conducted and
guidelines for joint and combined operations are set.
5-49. Benefits of liaison include––
• Establishing working relations with various commands, agencies, or
governments.
• Arranging for and coordinating joint and combined operations.
• Exchanging operational information and intelligence within legal
limits.
• Facilitating access to records and personnel of other agencies not
otherwise accessible.
• Acquiring information to satisfy US requirements.
• Accessing a larger pool of information.
INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-50. HUMINT interrogation is the systematic process of using approved
interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain
reliable information to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with
applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law
of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD
Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings,
and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. Interrogation is to be conducted by personnel trained
and certified to use legal, approved methods of convincing EPWs/detainees to
give their cooperation. Interrogation sources are detainees, including EPWs.
5-51. Definitions of EPWs and rules for their treatment are contained in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).
The definition and rules for the treatment of civilians are contained in the |
2-22.3 | 90 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (GC). (See Appendix A.) For persons covered by those Conventions,
applicable GPW and GC provisions must be adhered to at all times.
(Regarding treatment of detained personnel, see also paragraph 5-74.)
5-52. There is an additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions called
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, which also contains
definitions of who is a civilian and who is an EPW (Articles 50 and 44). The
US has not ratified Protocol I nor does it accept the expanded definition of
EPWs that it contains. Requirements managers, J/G/S2X personnel, and
HUMINT collectors should understand, however, that coalition military
personnel with whom they may work may be bound by Protocol I, and those
coalition personnel may be required to treat additional personnel as EPWs.
Any questions concerning the GPW and Protocol I must be directed to the
SJA office for clarification.
5-53. Interrogation operations are specific operations normally conducted at
detainee collection facilities directed at the wide-scale collection of
information from detainees using interrogation techniques. Although field
interrogations are conducted at all echelons and during all operations in
which there are detainees, detention facilities where interrogation operations
occur are normally located only at theater or JTF level.
5-54. Compliance with laws and regulations, including proper treatment of
detainees, is a matter of command responsibility. Commanders have an
affirmative duty to ensure their subordinates are not mistreating detainees
or their property. HCT leaders must effectively supervise their subordinate
collectors during all interrogation operations. Supervisors must ensure that
each HUMINT collector has properly completed an interrogation plan and
sound collection strategy, and fully understands the intelligence
requirements he is seeking to satisfy prior to beginning an interrogation.
NCOs and WOs should regularly participate in interrogations with their
subordinates to ensure that the highest standards of conduct are maintained.
Interrogation supervisors should also monitor interrogations by video, where
video monitoring is available. The production, use, and dissemination of
interrogation videos must be tightly controlled by HCT leaders. Such videos
must not be released for dissemination outside the Intelligence Community
without the express permission of the SECDEF or his delegate.
NON-DOD AGENCIES
5-55. Non-DOD agencies may on occasion request permission to conduct
interrogations in Army facilities. These requests must be approved by the
JTF commander or, if there is no JTF commander, the theater commander or
appropriate higher level official. The interrogation activity commander will
assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort non-DOD interrogators to
observe their interrogation operations. The non-DOD personnel will sign for
any detainee they want to question from the MPs, following the same
established procedures that DOD personnel must follow. In all instances,
interrogations or debriefings conducted by non-DOD agencies will be
observed by DOD personnel. In all instances, non-DOD agencies must
observe the same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and |
2-22.3 | 91 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
treatment of detainees as do Army personnel. All personnel who observe or
become aware of violations of Army interrogation operation standards will
report the infractions immediately to the commander. The personnel who
become aware of mistreatment of detainees will report the infractions
immediately and suspend the access of non-DOD personnel to the facility
until the matter has been referred to higher headquarters. Non-DOD
personnel conducting interrogation operations in an Army facility must sign
a statement acknowledging receipt of these rules, and agree to follow them
prior to conducting any interrogation operations. Non-DOD personnel
working in DOD interrogation facilities have no authority over Army
interrogators. Army interrogators (active duty, civilian, or contractor
employees) will only use DOD-approved interrogation approaches and
techniques.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INTERROGATORS
5-56. Foreign governments may request to participate, or may be invited to
participate in interrogations in Army facilities. Requests for foreign
government access to detainees will be forwarded through the operational
chain of command for appropriate action pursuant to DOD policy. Foreign
government personnel must comply with US DOD policies and observe the
same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of
detainees as do Army personnel. The interrogation activity commander will
assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort foreign government
interrogators to observe their interrogation operations. The foreign
government personnel will sign for any detainee they want to question from
the MPs, following the same established procedures that US DOD personnel
must follow. In all instances, interrogations or debriefings conducted by
foreign government interrogators will be observed by US DOD personnel. In
all instances, foreign government interrogators must observe the same
standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of
detainees as do US Army personnel.
MP FUNCTIONS IN ASSOCIATION WITH INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-57. MP and MI personnel both have responsibilities with regard to
EPW/detainees, but with different goals and responsibilities. (See DOD
Directive 3115.09.) Therefore, close coordination must occur between MP and
MI personnel in order to facilitate the effective accomplishment of the MP
and MI missions. Both MP and MI personnel must ensure that they treat
detainees in accordance with the baseline standards of humane treatment.
5-58. MPs are responsible for the humane treatment, evacuation, custody
and control (reception, processing, administration, internment, and safety) of
detainees; force protection; and the operation of the internment facility,
under the supervision of the provost marshal. The MPs do not conduct
intelligence interrogations. Intelligence interrogation is strictly a HUMINT
function. DOD policy requires that all detainees in its control, whether or not
interrogation has commenced, are assigned an internment serial number as
soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture. (See AR 190-8.) |
2-22.3 | 92 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
5-59. The standard MP security and internment functions are the only
involvement the MPs have in the interrogation process. MPs will not take
any actions to set conditions for interrogations (for example, “softening up” a
detainee). For purposes of interrogation, military working dogs will not be
used.
5-60. MPs may support interrogators as requested for detainee custody,
control, escort, and/or additional security (for example, for combative
detainees). When interrogators promise an incentive to a detainee, the
interrogators must coordinate with the MPs to ensure that the detainee
receives the incentive and is allowed to retain it. MPs may provide
incentives in support of interrogation operations under the following
conditions:
• Using incentives is coordinated with and approved by the MP facility
commander.
• Providing and withdrawing incentives does not affect the baseline
standards of humane treatment. This means that MPs can provide
incentives such as special food items. However, when the incentive is
withdrawn, the MPs still must provide the normal rations.
• Using incentives does not violate detainee custody and control or
facility security. This means that if a HUMINT collector requests MPs
to provide an incentive (for instance, specialty food) but the detainee
has been spitting on the guards, then MPs would not provide the
incentive because it might reinforce inappropriate behavior.
5-61. MPs exercise the overall responsibility for the safety of detainees, even
in those cases in which detainees are in the temporary custody of HUMINT
collectors or other agency personnel for the purpose of interrogation.
HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP supervisor to debrief MP
guards. Guards who observe and interact with detainees can report the
detainees’ disposition, activities, mood, and other observable characteristics.
5-62. HUMINT collectors conduct interrogations for intelligence information.
They normally work within the confines of the detainee detention facility, but
have no involvement in the mission of the security of detainees. MPs follow a
strict protocol concerning access to detainees. Accompanied and
unaccompanied access to detainees must be coordinated and approved in
advance by the MP commander responsible for the detainees or that
commander’s designated representative.
5-63. When HUMINT collectors coordinate for a detainee interrogation in an
internment facility, the MPs escort the detainee to the interrogation site,
which is collocated with, or located within the internment facility. MPs verify
that the HUMINT collector is authorized access to the detainee. Depending
on security concerns, the HUMINT collector may request that the MP
remain, or he may request the MP depart until the detainee needs to be
returned to the living area. If the MP remains, his functions are to maintain
the security, accountability, and safety of the detainee and the safety of the
interrogator, interpreter, and others in the interrogation site. The MP will
perform no role in the interrogation. When conducting interrogations in a
holding area such as a detainee collection point (DCP), MPs may not be
available to provide security for interrogation operations. In that case, the |
2-22.3 | 93 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT collector will need to arrange for security from the unit that has
established the holding area.
5-64. If the MP departs the immediate area where the detainee is being
questioned (for example, asked to wait outside the interrogation room), the
HUMINT collector will assume custody and responsibility for the detainee by
signing for the detainee, noting the detainee’s physical condition.
5-65. SOPs should be written to comply with a requirement that
interrogation operations will always be under observation, whether
conducted in fixed sites, holding areas, or in the field. Physical setup and
logistical availability will dictate whether observation is conducted directly,
from a concealed location, or by video monitoring. HUMINT collectors should
never be alone with a detainee without being under observation.
5-66. Once a HUMINT collector has assumed custody of a detainee, he will
not turn the detainee over to anyone other than an MP. Specifically, he will
not allow another government agency to assume custody from him. The
HUMINT collector will instead return the detainee to the custody of the MP,
and the agency seeking custody of the detainee will then be required to do so
from the MP. Likewise, HUMINT collectors will not assume custody of a
detainee directly from another government agency, but will require them to
return the detainee directly to the custody of the MP.
LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND POLICY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
5-67. The GPW (Appendix A, Section I), the GC (Appendix A, Section III),
and the UCMJ are relevant documents pertaining to interrogations of
detainees.
5-68. The approaches, psychological techniques, and other principles
presented in this manual must be conducted in accordance with applicable
law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war;
relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive
3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense
Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including
FRAGOs. US policy is to treat all detainees and conduct all interrogations,
wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with this commitment.
Authority for conducting interrogations of personnel detained by military
forces rests primarily upon the traditional concept that the commander may
use all available resources and lawful means to accomplish the mission and
to protect and secure the unit. |
2-22.3 | 94 | FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
“Prisoners of war do not belong to the power for which they have fought; they are all under the
safeguard of honor and generosity of the nation that has disarmed them.”
▬Napoleon, The Military Maxims of Napoleon
1927, ed. Burnod
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•• MMaanneeuuvveerr aanndd MMoobbiilliittyy SSuuppppoorrtt OOppeerraattiioonnss •• SSccrreeeenn aanndd qquueessttiioonn ddeettaaiinneeeess aatt TTCCPPss aanndd
•• AArreeaa SSeeccuurriittyy cchheecckkppooiinnttss
•• IInntteerrnnmmeenntt aanndd RReesseettttlleemmeenntt OOppeerraattiioonnss •• QQuueessttiioonn ccoonnttaaccttss,, llooccaall cciivviilliiaannss,, rreeffuuggeeeess,,
•• LLaaww aanndd OOrrddeerr OOppeerraattiioonnss aanndd EEPPWWss
•• PPoolliiccee IInntteelllliiggeennccee OOppeerraattiioonnss •• CCoonndduucctt lliiaaiissoonn wwiitthh mmiilliittaarryy aanndd cciivviilliiaann
•• EEnnssuurree ddeettaaiinneeee aabbuussee iiss aavvooiiddeedd aanndd aaggeenncciieess
rreeppoorrtteedd •• RReeppoorrtt iinnffoorrmmaattiioonn oobbttaaiinneedd
•• EEnnssuurree ddeettaaiinneeee aabbuussee iiss aavvooiiddeedd aanndd
rreeppoorrtteedd
•• SSuuppppoorrtt DDOOCCEEXX
DDEETTEENNTTIIOONN FFAACCIILLIITTYY
MMPP FFuunnccttiioonnss HHUUMMIINNTT FFuunnccttiioonnss
•• DDeettaaiinn aanndd gguuaarrdd EEPPWWss,, cciivviilliiaann iinntteerrnneeeess,, •• DDeebbrriieeff gguuaarrddss
aanndd ootthheerr ddeettaaiinneeeess •• SSccrreeeenn ddeettaaiinneeeess aanndd EEPPWWss ffoorr PPIIRR aanndd IIRR
•• CCoonndduucctt rreecceeppttiioonn aanndd pprroocceessssiinngg •• PPrroovviiddee lliinngguuiisstt ssuuppppoorrtt wwhheenn ppoossssiibbllee
•• CCoooorrddiinnaattee CCllaasssseess II,, IIII,, aanndd VVIIIIII ssuupppplliieess •• OObbsseerrvvee ddeettaaiinneeeess uunnddeerr MMPP ccoonnttrrooll
•• CCoooorrddiinnaattee NNGGOOss,, PPVVOOss,, aanndd iinntteerraaggeennccyy •• EEnnssuurree ddeettaaiinneeee aabbuussee iiss aavvooiiddeedd aanndd
vviissiittss rreeppoorrtteedd
•• EEnnssuurree ddeettaaiinneeee aabbuussee iiss aavvooiiddeedd aanndd rreeppoorrtteedd •• CCoonndduucctt iinntteerrrrooggaattiioonnss
•• TTrraannssppoorrtt ddeettaaiinneeeess wwiitthhiinn tthhee ddeetteennttiioonn •• RReeppoorrtt iinnffoorrmmaattiioonn oobbttaaiinneedd
ffaacciilliittyy ttoo iinntteerrrrooggaattiioonn aarreeaa •• CCrroossss--ccuuee ootthheerr iinntteelllliiggeennccee ddiisscciipplliinneess
•• MMaaiinnttaaiinn sseeccuurriittyy dduurriinngg iinntteerrrrooggaattiioonn ((aass nneeeeddeedd))
ooppeerraattiioonnss •• SSuuppppoorrtt DDOOCCEEXX
Figure 5-1. MP vs HUMINT Responsibilities.
5-69. The Geneva Conventions establish specific standards for humane care
and treatment of enemy personnel captured, retained, or detained by US
military forces and its allies. All persons who have knowledge of suspected or
alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions are obligated by regulation to
report such matters through command channels or to designated individuals,
such as the SJA or IG. For example, HUMINT collectors who are working
with others must ensure that no incidents of detainee abuse occur, whether
committed by a fellow HUMINT collector, an interpreter, HN or coalition
personnel, MP, representative of another government agency, or anyone else.
5-70. Failure to report a suspected or alleged violation of the law of war may
subject the service member to disciplinary actions. Violations of the Geneva
Conventions committed by US personnel may constitute violations of the
UCMJ. The commander is responsible for ensuring that the forces under his
command comply with the Geneva Conventions. If violations occur in the
conduct of warfare, the commander bears primary responsibility for
investigating and taking appropriate action with respect to the violators.
5-71. Every soldier has the duty to report serious incidents, whether
observed or suspected, in accordance with AR 190-40. Such incidents are
reported to the chain of command. If the chain of command itself is |
2-22.3 | 95 | _________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
implicated, the soldier can report the incident to the SJA, IG, chaplain, or
provost marshal.
5-72. There are reasons for reporting serious incidents beyond those related
to legal requirements. For instance, the publishing of enemy war crimes can
be used to influence public opinion against the enemy. Also, reporting war
crimes of other countries provides important information that may become
relevant, since we would not be able to transfer detainees to any power that
we could not rely on to treat them appropriately under the law of war,
including the Geneva Conventions.
5-73. Several articles of the GPW apply to HUMINT collectors and
interrogation operations. Excerpts from some of the most relevant articles of
the Geneva Conventions are listed below. Although the following excerpts are
specific to EPWs, service members must treat all detainees captured during
armed conflict consistent with the provisions of the GPW unless a
determination to the contrary is made. Moreover, US policy requires that US
forces apply the principles of the Geneva Conventions, during military
operations. (See Appendix A.)
• Article 5 - Should any doubt arise as to whether persons having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
• Article 13 - PWs must at all times be treated humanely. Any unlawful
act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously
endangering the health of a PW in its custody is prohibited. Likewise,
PWs must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of
violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
• Article 14 - PWs are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their
persons and honor. Women shall be treated with all regard due to their
sex, and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favorable as that
granted to men.
• Article 15 - The Power detaining PWs shall be bound to provide, free of
charge, for their maintenance and medical attention required by their
state of health.
• Article 17 - This article covers several requirements with direct impact
on interrogation.
Every PW, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental,
personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If
he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a
restriction of the privileges (emphasis added) accorded to his rank or
status.
For example, this does not mean if a prisoner fails to give this
information he loses status as a prisoner, only special privileges. An
example might be an officer who fails to identify himself as such. An
officer cannot be compelled to work (Article 49). An officer who fails
to identify himself as such could lose this privilege. |
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