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Legal distribute a book by Isaac Asimov The Last Question by Isaac Asimov, is freely available on the web, albeit not being a free work. This is not unusual, as piracy is quite rampant on the web. What I find unusual is the sources that are offering an apparent pirated copy of the book. For example, the Princeton physics website is a source. According to a website claiming to represent Isaac Asimov's estate: As a result, none of Asimov's fiction is legally available for free download on the net without the permission of his estate. Source How can Princeton University legally distribute the book?
As the quote in your question notes (albeit in contrapositive form), Asimov's fiction may be made legally available for free download on the net with the permission of his estate. It is either that case that Princeton University's physics department (or whatever individual person or agency put up the story online) has obtained permission from Asimov's estate to distribute the story on their website, or they simply distribute it without legal permission, and Asimov's estate has not taken legal action to have it removed, which they may or may not choose to do in the future. Consider also that the Princeton distribution does not appear to have been meant to be in any way public: looking one directory level up (Princeton University Physics 115A and B: Physics for Future Leaders) shows a course overview with syllabus and lecture notes, without any apparent link to the story. Probably, it was put online for use exclusively by students taking that particular class, and the professor(s) just didn't put any controls to stop it from being accessible to anyone who knew the URL. This doesn't really change that fact that its public accessibility is, strictly speaking, copyright infringement, but it may be a favorable factor toward a finding that distribution outside of the class was innocent infringement, which can lessen (or, rarely, nullify) the penalty. (And it may be quite possible that distribution within the class was defensible under fair use/dealing, which considers educational context as a favorable factor.)
In general this kind of brief literary reference is not unlawful, and such things occur in both novels and commercial games with some frequency. Making such a reference a major part of the plot, such as by using a name from a previous work as a major character, particularly if other aspects of that character are also used, is far more likely to cause a problem. In the united-states this would be a matter of fair use. In general, when only a very small part of the source work is used, such a a single name; where the use is "transformative", that is used for a rather different purpose than in the source work; where the use does not harm the market for the original work; and where the use does not serve as a replacement for the original, it is likely to be held to be fair use. But fair use decisions are always fact-dependent, and are made case-by-case, so it is hard to be absolutely sure of one in advance. But the kind of literary reference described in the question is very unlikely to be held to be copyright infringement.
"Educational use" does not get a free pass on the law against circumventing copy-protection. First, "educational use" is extremely broad and could include "to post on Stackexchange", or "so that I can learn something". The cited clause specifically limits this exception to "A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution" – the library must be nonprofit, and the archive or educational institution may also need to be nonprofit (until the courts fix the ambiguity in the scope of "nonprofit"). Second, the circumvention has to be very limited: the purpose must be only to evaluate the work, to see if you want to legally acquire it. So a nonprofit library can peek into a work to see if they want to buy a copy, but you may not. The only thing the library can do is evaluate the work for legal acquisition, and they have to get rid of the pirated copy once they've made the decision. Additionally (other parts of the subsection say), they can't do this is there is an equivalent legal copy available (e.g. if there's a print book available, they can't hack into the e-book to "determine" whether they want the book), and w.r.t. libraries and archives they must be open to the public.
Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.
Under Copyright? The first question is: Is this novel still under copyright. This depends on the place and date of publication. In many countries copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author. Some countries use different rules. In the US, a work published before 1978 is in most cases copyrighted for 95 years. Works published after that are protected for 70 years after the death of the author. More complex cases are detailed in this well-known chart. Who holds the Copyright? For most novels, copyright is initially held by the author(s). The author may sell or give away the copyright at any time. If the author does not transfer the copyright during life, it will pass with other property st the author's death. It may pass by will or by default (intestate) inheritance in the absence of a will. The author's surviving spouse children, if any, are often the heirs to any copyrights, but not always. Authors with many works still in print may have s "literary estate" set up to handle their copyrights. Works with multiple co-authors usually have the copyright shared between all authors; in equal shares unless they agree otherwise. Any one copyright holder may license a derivative work such as a translation. A would-be translator of a work still under copyright must find the copyright holder(s) and obtain permission. If the holders cannot be found, no permission can be obtained, and any translation would be an infringement of copyright. The copyright holder could sue for damages after publication. Damages may be quite substantial in some cases. This varies by country and by the facts of the case. In the US The Federal Copyright Office will search its records to try to determine who holds a copyright. They charge a fee for doing so, and success is not guaranteed. Other countries may have similar services. Addition: There is no automatic or guaranteed way to find who now owns a copyright. In some cases the owner does not even know that s/he owns the copyright. If the holder died without heirs the copyright may belong to the government (state government in the US). Research into the author's life may reveal probable heirs. An obituary may list the author's children, if any. Finding them and asking is a reasonable place to start.
Whether published or unpublished, they are still protected by copyright. (They are probably unpublished for copyright purposes, but in the US this makes little difference for any recently created work (that is anything after 2002). For older work see the Cornell chart.) They cannot be copied or distributed without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing applies. And it is hard to see how either would apply to entire essays simply begin placed in a database. Placing text in a database is probably making a copy, and might be distributing it or publishing it, depending on how access to the DB is granted. Now data from the essays, as opposed to the texts of the essays themselves, are probably facts. Facts are not protected by copyright in any Berne Convention country, including the US, the UK, and the EU.
In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.
You also retain the right to license the work to others. Therefore you can sell similar rights to MusicBook and anyone else, as long as you do not grant an exclusive license (you have already licensed another party to distribute). They do not gain the right to sub-license your work. If you had executed a copyright transfer, you would have no rights to the work whatsoever (leaving out moral rights for jurisdictions that have them and where they are absolute).
Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? I read in the news that recently inaugurated US President Donald Trump has been sued for "ethics violation" by a private entity for violating the emoluments clause of the Constitution. I thought that the President was immune from lawsuits by private citizens?
From Clinton v. Jones 520 U.S. 681 (1997): Deferral of this litigation until petitioner's Presidency ends is not constitutionally required. [...] The separation-of-powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. [...] Nixon v Fitzgerald provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982): Petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. [...] The President's absolute immunity extends to all acts within the "outer perimeter" of his duties of office.
First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened.
Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority.
A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ.
The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.
Double jeopardy in its usual sense wouldn't attach because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding, which is the only thing double jeopardy applies to (esoteric estoppel matters not withstanding). You might recall that OJ Simpson was tried and acquitted of murder in a criminal court, and then subsequently tried and found liable in a civil court for those murders. There was no double jeopardy protections of which he could avail himself. But the constitution says that the Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments, so for the most part we can expect that whatever they say goes. So they can dismiss for any reason they desire, in principle. The impeachment of Senator Blount is one example: the House impeached him, and on the same day the Senate expelled him under their constitutional power to do so, and then dismissed the impeachment for lack of jurisdiction (arguing that Congress members cannot be impeached; the impeachment was otherwise still relevant after his expulsion because it could result in preventing him from gaining office again). The costs here are political: in your hypothetical situation with very strong evidence, if popular opinion turns too strongly in favor of conviction then refusal to do so may cost the Senators and their party in subsequent elections. Attempts to argue arcane technicalities might not save you at the ballot box. Under existing impeachment precedent (as well as Congressional rules precedents), the courts would be loathe to get involved by default. Though if the action was sufficiently egregious (not even superficially resembling what a judge might call a trial, say) maybe they would feel judicial intervention and action was warranted and justified. But that's purely speculative.
Part of the problem you'll find is that there are so few impeachments in U.S. History (Only 21 articles of Impeachment have ever been drafted, of which only 8 resulted in convictions) and SCOTUS is so selective on cases it chooses to hear, that only one case has ever been heard and that was upheld (Nixon v. United States). In that case, SCOTUS ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legal question before it (was the new trial format a proper trial by the senate), but did not have an opinion one way or another to suggest that SCOTUS could not review other cases that come before it. One of the reasons they also haven't is in order to have a legal case in the U.S., the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. More impeachments ended without a conviction than with either acquittal (8), resignation before trial conclusion (4), and expulsion from senate (1, and will never occur again as Congressional office holders are not impeachable following this particular case). Since no harm was caused and courts do not rule on hypotheticals, a case with actual harm (conviction) must occur in order for SCOTUS to even consider hearing the case. Nixon does not bar SCOTUS from hearing more appeals resulting from Impeachment, it only bars those relating to the manner in which the senate chooses to hold the trial.
No But they aren’t suing over defamation against Trump; the are suing over (alleged) defamation of the campaign: the Campaign "assessed the potential risks and benefits of again seeking Russia's help in 2020 and has decided to leave that option on the table."
Would it be legal for bookmakers to take bets on someone being assassinated? Background: My colleague just told me that he reckons Donald Trump's presidency is most likely to end in assassination. My first thought was: "Why not put money on it then?"; my second thought was "Would that be legal?". From the bookmaker's point of view, taking such a bet would be stupid: if a person stands to win £100,000 from Trump being assassinated, it would give them motivation to pay someone up to that figure to carry out the killing. Further than that, I wonder whether giving someone motivation to kill someone could legally count as inciting someone to murder, which is illegal. Hence why I wonder whether it would be legal for a bookmaker to take such a bet. As I'm from the UK, I'm mainly interested from the UK legal perspective, but any other international perspective is welcome.
In general it is illegal to gamble on life. However, you might not even need to go to a bookmaker: A contract that pays money upon the death of a specific person is known commercially as "life insurance." In order to avoid the moral hazard (or reality) of creating a contract killing market, it has long been illegal to trade life insurance with any person or entity who does not have an "insurable interest" in the insured. (See also: The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, by Peter Swisher, who also has a good review of laws and regulations surrounding exceptions to the rule like viaticals and STOLI. Further reading on the subject here.) I don't know if it has been tested, but I think anyone could argue that they would face a significant financial loss if the U.S. President were killed or died in office: the stock markets plunged on JFK's assassination. Therefore, it could be both legal and possible for anyone to buy life insurance on the U.S. President. (Note that, in the U.S., the disputes about third-party life insurance have revolved for generations around the tax benefits associated with insurance premiums and benefits. See corporate-owned life insurance (COLI), a.k.a. "janitor's insurance.")
Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives.
It is legal, though not if the grounds are illegal discrimination (race, religion, etc), which by their (empirically supported – they raised the price) representation is not the case. As a marketing strategy (pick a low number, hope for a bidding frenzy that drives the price up) it is legal, though carries a non-trivial risk. It does not constitute "bait and switch" under any definition of the term, and it is not illegal to engage in a business practice that causes someone to frown, or otherwise disapprove.
In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted.
The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer.
Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.
In the US, in general anyone can claim anything. Others are free to believe or disbelieve the claim. In theory, a person might base their decision to do business with Hilton partly on this particular claim (this is why some software companies start presentations about their new features with a Safe Harbor statement letting the audience know not to base purchasing decisions on unreleased features), and in that case they could argue that Hilton's claim damaged them by causing them to enter into a contract under false pretenses. I doubt such a case would be meritorious, but there could be some contrived situation where the point of whether Hilton owned the hotel when it invented the brownie was actually important.
Yes, for those who 'liked' the business after reading the post, but less likely for those who had already liked the business. Under contract law, the business's post is an offer to share the winnings with anyone who is a friend of the business on Facebook. A promise is enforceable if consideration is provided under a bargain; the consideration can be of nominal value (e.g. the act of 'liking' a page). In the context of a business page, in a time when 'followers' and the like are regarded as valuable from a marketing perspective, it is entirely reasonable to interpret the post as offering an exchange of likes for a chance to win money. The commercial context and involvement of money would cause a court to presume that there was an intention to create a legally-binding contract (Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95; Banque Brussels Lambert SA v Australian National Industries Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 502). I am not entirely familiar with how the designation 'Friend' applies to businesses on Facebook. My understanding is that businesses have pages that are different to user pages. Businesses don't have 'friends'. They have people who 'like' the business. However, the word 'Friend' in the post has to be given content and therefore would be read as 'people who are listed as having liked this page'. People who had already liked the page are less likely to be able to enforce the promise to share the winnings, because they didn't do anything. They might be able to argue that they forwent the opportunity to un-like the business and that this forbearance is consideration. However, they would have to show that this was in consideration of the offer to share the winnings. Contract law is based on objective manifestations of agreement, not subjective thoughts (Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422), so it isn't necessary to show that the individual did in fact have the offer in mind when they liked (or didn't un-like) the page. However, it is necessary that the promisee have knowledge of the offer and not be acting out of some completely separate purpose (R v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227); therefore if a user had liked the page some time ago and never knew about the offer until after the lottery was won, then they might have a hard time claiming a binding contract. Aside from contract law, the other possible head of liability is equitable estoppel (I mention this particularly for the people who had already 'liked' the business page before the offer was posted). However, equitable estoppel usually requires some element of detrimental reliance. Leaving a pre-existing 'like' on a page in reliance on a promise to share lottery winnings is unlikely to stir a court to find an equitable estoppel, since the detriment is trivial. Contrast Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, where the detrimental reliance was knocking down a building and starting to construct a replacement. Equitable remedies are discretionary, so the judge has plenty of leeway to not order compensation. This answer is based on the common law. There is nothing in Texas law which would make the outcome any different to the outcome in any other common law jurisdiction.
Is cracking software with server emulators illegal? Let's say I have a program that needs you to login with a paid account in order to use it, and it sends authorization data to a server (username and pass) using this example link (I show example credentials): http://foo.bar/checkUser?user=PKTINOS&pass=password In this sample, the authorization link returns "Success" if the credentials are valid and "Failure" if they are not. And let's say I have another 3rd-party program that redirects that link to my own URL, e.g., http://bar.foo/checkUser, that happens to always return "Success." (This would allow you to use the program with false credentials.) Would that violate any law?
Forget about copyright or EULAs. In the UK this would be illegal under the Computer Misuse Act (1998) and you could be jailed for up to a year - specifically Unauthorised access to computer material. (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a)he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer, or to enable any such access to be secured; (b)the access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured, is unauthorised; and (c)he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is the case. This law has been applied even to simply altering parameters in a GET request to a website, so it is incredibly broad. Other jurisdictions have similar wording, so be aware!
Yes, it's illegal. 18 USC 1030 (a) (5) (A) [Whoever] knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer [shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section]. "Damage" is defined at (e)(8) to mean "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information". Your proposed attack would certainly cause impairment to the availability of the Stack Exchange system and the data and information which it hosts. Whatever else you may think about the Stack Exchange terms of service, they certainly do not authorize any user or moderator to "destroy the site" in any sense such as you describe. It's not necessary for the TOS to explicitly say "you may not do X"; it's enough that they don't say that you may do it. To use a firewall analogy, it's "default deny". "Protected computer" is defined in (e)(2) to mean, essentially, any computer that is used in or affects interstate commerce. Which means practically every computer that has ever accessed the Internet, and certainly includes Stack Exchange servers. So your proposed attack would include all the elements of a violation of this section. Such a violation is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment if it causes a loss of more than $5000 (see (4)(A)(i)(I)), which if such an attack were successful, it certainly would. Greater penalties are possible in certain circumstances. Even if the loss does not exceed $5000, or if the attack is merely attempted but without success, it is still punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine ((4)(G)(i)). There is nothing in the terms of service saying you will go to federal jail for destroying stack exchange. Irrelevant. It is not up to Stack Exchange Inc. or its TOS to determine who does or doesn't go to federal prison. Rather, it is up to Congress to determine what conduct deserves such punishment (as they did in 1984 by enacting this law), up to federal law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate and make a case against an alleged violator, and up to the federal courts to determine if the accused is guilty and how they should be punished.
I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.
The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.
This is more than a comment (too long), but not a definitive answer (since I am unfamiliar with the laws regarding this kind of thing). Please forgive me. First, there are some technical misunderstandings. They are not disabling SSL/TLS. Instead, they are inserting themselves in between these connections so they can make sure you aren't accessing material you are not allowed to access. They may actually be required to do this by law. Here is how it works. Typically when you connect to, say Google.com, you are given a certificate from Google.com that has a trusted chain all the way up to some trusted root. That trusted root is explicitly trusted by your web browser manufacturer. In order to be able to inspect these sorts of connections, security appliances will actually replace the certificate provided by Google.com with one that the appliance provides. It has to pretend to be Google.com so your browser doesn't freak out. The problem is, this certificate is no longer has a trusted chain to something that the browser manufacturer trusts. It is provided by the security appliance. So often, the appliance will have a root certificate that the administrators of the system must install on every machine they control. Then the browsers on these machines will not complain that the certificate is invalid. Obviously, you are getting the error on your own machine because you have not allowed the administrator to install these certificates on your machine. Nor should you. You should definitely not allow your school's network administrator to install these certificates on your personal computer. You say that "leaves people's private data being transferred over the school network (such as private e-mail, logins) unsecured and open to packet sniffing". This is not true. Any HTTPS website you visit is encrypted between your computer and the security monitoring appliance using the pretend certificate I mentioned above. Typically then, the traffic is decrypted and inspected by the appliance. Then it is re-encrypted using the real certificate, before being pushed out onto the internet. So, only at the security appliance is data turned back into the clear, only to be protected again before going out to the internet. So, is this illegal? Well, I think you would agree that definitely on the computers that your school owns, they can do anything they want with them. The computers belong to them. Furthermore, the network belongs to them. Likely you signed an agreement (or agree to it each time you connect) that they are allowed to monitor your usage of their computers and their network. This includes when connecting your personal machine to their network.
On the face of the CFAA: How does Aaron Swartz's mass download from JSTOR constitute hacking? He exceeded his authorised access on a protected computer. If this is hacking (the masking of one's IP address) then doesn't that make using VPN hacking? Hacking is not a term used in CFAA. In Aaron's case changing the IP address was a necessity for him to exceed his authorised access; if he stopped when blocked then the unauthorised access would have stopped. If you are authorised to use a VPN for access then you have not exceeded your authorisation, have you?
Legal unless you violate copyright. Screenshots will probably be fair use. The manuals/how-tos need to be your originals, not copies from anywhere.
This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement.
Can I legally sleep in the street in France? Can I legally sleep in the street in France? Assume my location does not perturb traffic circulation, i.e. I am on the pavement, or the road is only used by pedestrians.
If you sleep on the streets, you are considered a "SDF" (Sans Domicile Fixe), a tramp. Legality depends on where you sleep, and in which city. It's not illegal to be a SDF (under some conditions), but until the early 1990s it was illegal to be a beggar (mendiant/mendicité -- this reference, Mendicité, is about begging) For instance, sleeping in a car can be legal, except if you are located in a prohibited place where you could have a fine. Some cities have voted anti-SDF acts. See for instance (in French): Dormir dans sa voiture, est-ce légal? and Les précédents dispositifs anti-SDF qui ont fait polémique en France SDF in law acts: PERSONNE SANS DOMICILE FIXE (SDF)
Hot Pursuit What you're describing is a hot pursuit, and in the US, common law says that police officers crossing state lines while in hot pursuit is absolutely allowed. An active pursuit is considered an exigent circumstance, which gives police all kinds of temporary powers they don't normally have.
I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer In France, the Code de la Route (Article R413-15) outlaws the possession of devices that detect or disturb, or are intended to detect or disturb, the operation of devices or systems that record or regulate road traffic, or allow evasion of road traffic offenses. This Article was last amended on 3 January 2012, and it is punishable by a fine of up to €1,500, confiscation of the device, and confiscation of the vehicle. The law is not prescriptive about such devices, and this is likely intentionally so. This Article is technology-agnostic, and would apply to any device with such a purpose. You can therefore assume that all speed radar detectors are illegal.
england-and-wales In England, the use of a horn when stationary is restricted solely to advise other road users of your presence "at times of danger". Not spotting that the light has gone green would certainly not fit that description. Use of audible warning instruments 99.—(1) Subject to the following paragraphs, no person shall sound, or cause or permit to be sounded, any horn, gong, bell or siren fitted to or carried on a vehicle which is— (a) stationary on a road, at any time, other than at times of danger due to another moving vehicle on or near the road... The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 The policeman would be well within his rights and duties to provide you with a fixed penalty notice of £30.
In the US it is not a crime to be in the country illegally. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. Arizona v US So it's illegal, you get a state induced consequence (deportation) but it doesn't make you a criminal e.g. you don't go to jail for it. I have no idea if that's what's going on over there but it's a plausible explanation.
You do have the right to leave after the police were called on you, but leaving the scene could raise suspicion and make you seem guilty. It may be easier to wait until police arrive and explain your side of the story to clear things up. However, according to Canada’s Department of Justice, you can be placed under a Citizens Arrest. If someone sees you in the act of committing a crime, they are able to place you under citizens arrest and hold you there until police arrive. This individual is allowed to use as much amount of force that is reasonable. If this person did not place you under citizens arrest, you are not obligated to stay.
Probably not. There is an unenumerated constitutional "right to travel" (which has been recognized in case law, and has not yet been judicially overruled) and there is also a concept called the "dormant commerce clause" which prohibits legislation by a state that interferes with the ability of people to engage in interstate commerce even if Congress has passed no relevant legislation. There could also be a privileges and immunities clause argument arising under the original 1789 constitution and not the 14th Amendment to that document privileges and immunities clause, which affords people from outside a state the same rights as people in a state. Also, citizens of a state are defined as its residents, so a state only has jurisdiction over someone as a citizen for so long as they reside there. I was born in Georgia, for example, but haven't lived there since I was six years old, so I am not a citizen of Georgia. The proposed Texas law bears some similarity to the Mann Act of 1910 which prohibits transporting people across state lines for the purposes of prostitution (to slightly oversimplify). But the Mann Act is a federal law, not a state law. The proposed Texas law also bears some similarity to the infamous Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which required free states to respect the slave status of people treated as slaves in a slave state under the slave state's law by returning fugitive slaves to their out of state masters, when the slave escaped across state lines. But, this was also a federal law and reflect the greater extraterritorial force of contracts and property rights created under state law compared to the extraterritorial force of the police powers of a state government. There are constitutional provisions requiring states to honor each other's rulings as well, most notably the requirement to extradite felons, and the full faith and credit clause that requires states to honor the court judgments and government determinations of status (e.g. marriage certificates) of other states in most circumstances. But, I don't think that you get there in a case regulating the conduct of a state resident outside the state, or in a case where you want to criminalize assisting someone in the state to leave the state for a particular purpose. Neither of these examples, however, involve state laws. Generally, penalties for doing something across state lines need to be established by federal, rather than state, laws. This said, the issue has not been litigated in this particular context yet, and the legal theories implicated and structure of those lines in fine particulars could matter. States have only rarely tried to regulate the conduct of their residents outside their own states and have even less frequently been successful in doing so.
Everyone physically present in the US is protected by the US Federal constitution. (In some cases persons not physically in the US also have protection from the US constitution. When that applies is too complex for this answer.) Most of the rights protected by that constitution are available to anyone present, whether citizen, lawful immigrant, lawful visitor, or a person in the US without lawful authority. A few rights, such as the right to vote and to run for public office, are limited to citizens. If a person was arrested but not informed of his or her Miranda rights, then statements made to the arresting officers (or later interrogating officers) would not be admissible in court, unless an exception to the Miranda rules applies, which is unlikely. I can't say if this happened in the particular case mentioned in the question. In general, in the area of criminal procedure, there is no difference between citizens and others subject to US jurisdiction (accredited foreign diplomats normally have immunity). A few crimes can only be committed by citizens (or others owing allegiance to the US) such as treason. A few crimes, such as unlawful entry to the US, can't be committed by citizens, as citizens automatically have a right to enter. But criminal procedure and constitutional rights affecting criminal procedure, are the same for all in the US, citizen or not. (Oh, there are special laws for minors, but that isn't a matter of citizenship.)
Are there "rape shield" laws in the UK? This question is prompted by the BBC program "Is This Rape?" which is currently on iPlayer. The program contains a story of a fictional sexual assault, which goes to court (starts in the program at 19:07). In the fictional court a number of things happen that seem as if they might be in breach of rape shield laws. Below is a list of things that where particularly surprising; The defendant and the claimant are in the court room at the same time and apparently can see each other. The defendant talks about the past sexual activities of the claimant with the defendant. The defendant talks about the past sexual activities of the claimant with other people the defendant knows. The defendant's lawyer (might have been a lawyer, I don't know enough to tell the difference between different legal representatives) questions the claimant about past relationships with the defendant. The defendant's lawyer questions the claimant about past sexual activities with the defendant. The defendant's lawyer questions the claimant about past sexual activities with others. The defendant's lawyer questions the claimant about sexual photos sent to the defendant. Given that this fiction is set in the UK, which of these things, if any, would not be allowed to happen in a real court? What legal rule should prevent it from occurring?
Generally, irrespective of charge, there is no 'shield laws' in the UK legal system. Any such provisions are a matter of discretion for the judge on the same grounds as the admissibility of evidence. Though the following case relates to a murder case rather than rape, it does provide justification for the lack of 'shield laws'. In R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36; [2008] 1 A.C. 1128 (henceforth Davies), as described in para 3, per Lord Bingham, the witnesses were subject to extensive protective measures, as 'they claimed to be in fear forth their lives if it became known that they had given evidence against the defendant'. [Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2011 Penguin) 99]. The case addresses issues at the time of the original hearing. However, more recently, there have been statutory provisions for anonymity of witnesses, specifically section 86 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This enables witness anonymity orders to be made, however there are specific requirements that can be found in subsequent provisions of the Act, but there is no common or absolute protection of victims or witnesses. A closing note regarding the 'victim' in the rape case, it should be noted that in the UK legal system, as criminal cases are brought by the CPS on behalf of the Monarch, not the victim and as such the victim is, for all intents and purposes, a witness.
A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.
We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.
Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial.
The people on the show would be considered public figures, so if there was information that the fictitious writing was actually based on/about them, defamation must be proven to a different standard for public figures. Public figures, including officeholders and candidates, actors or musicians successful enough to be held in "the public eye," have to show that the defamation was made with malicious intent, which is a greater burden than defamation for the average person. Also, damages may be limited to actual (special) damages unless there is actual malice. Special damages being lost income or some other quantifiable measure of loss. If one cannot tell who it (the fictional story) is about because the name is changed, then Fox, or whomever, couldn't sue anyway because they need standing, which they wouldn't have if you called the person X, unless the story was so exact that it is obvious who you are talking about. For instance, the show Law and Order is often based on famous stories in the news, or criminal cases they dig up. Those fictional story lines often add or delete details. The case may be more or less damaging to the actual person it was based on. However, they make a statement before the show airs that says something like "Any similarity to real people or events is strictly coincidental. This show is not based on any real person or event, but is a work of fiction." If I were going to make a fictional account of a big network show, I would use some sort of disclosure like that to be safe. That said, if the statements or storyline is less damaging than the facts themselves, as revealed on the show, it isn't defamatory at all: Defamation necessarily must include the act of making untrue statements about another that damage their reputation. If it doesn't damage their "good character or reputation," than it's not defamatory. Keep in mind, however, that what you may consider less or more damaging may not be the same view held by the person it's loosely based on. That is why I'd use the disclosure. As to the question "would it protect you against a lawsuit?", if you mean would it protect you from being sued, the answer is always, anyone can sue file a lawsuit. That doesn't mean they'll win but it still means you have to defend. It may likely protect you in your defense.
england-and-wales The timing of charges being laid is a factor to take in to account, as is whether a charge is appropriate after taking in to account the suspect's circumstances described in the OP, but setting those aside - more often than not it's a negotiation between the various prosecuting agencies and the investigation teams' supervisors resulting with the more serious offences taking precedence. The lesser offences are either dealt with at a later trial or left to "lie on file", meaning there is enough evidence for a case to be made, but that it is not in the public interest for prosecution to proceed, usually because the defendant has acknowledged other, often more serious, charges. No admission to the charge is made by the defendant, and no verdict is recorded against them. Wikipedia
Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.
First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not.
Could someone who participated in a legal execution in the USA be arrested for murder in France? According to Wikipedia France is the most visited country in the world. At the same time, the USA is still practicing the death penalty. For example, 28 people were executed in 2015. For each execution a lot of evidence can be potentially gathered (official documents, video footage, declarations of individuals, etc). So could the people who have taken part in an execution be considered guilty of "collective murder"? Is it possible that they could be arrested as soon as they arrive in France?
I said this in a comment, but I'll put it in an answer. When France forcibly confines an American, the United States is entitled to ask France, "what the hell do you think you're doing, trying to confine our citizen in your country?" There are really just six basic answers that the United States will accept, and nothing in this scenario is specific to France or the US (it applies any time a foreign national is arrested by any country), and the six responses are the six basic principles of jurisdiction: Active nationality: "He's our citizen too! What the hell do you think you're doing, questioning how we treat our own citizens?" The US doesn't generally get to question how France treats French citizens, even if they're also American citizens. And France gets to require its citizens to obey French law anywhere in the world. Subjective territoriality: "He broke our laws on our soil. We don't care that he's your citizen, he has to obey our laws while he's here." This and nationality are by far the most well-accepted answers. Protective: "He threatened our state. We have the right to protect ourselves." This applies to things like attacking French government personnel or forging a French passport or similar: France isn't protecting its citizens, it's protecting France itself. Objective territoriality: "He may have committed this crime outside France, but its effects happened inside France. We can punish him for causing those effects." For instance, if you're in the US but hack a computer in France, France has an argument that they get to punish you for that. Passive nationality: "He may be American and have done this outside France, but he hurt our citizens. We have the right to protect our citizens." Again, a plausible argument. This is not necessarily a strong argument, but it can be made. Universality: "This thing is a crime against all of humanity. It's something that needs to be stamped out by all countries working together, without worrying too much about whether or not the defendant actually affected the country prosecuting him in any way." This is very rare. Murder is not a crime of universal jurisdiction. It's limited to more severe crimes, as well as crimes of a fundamentally international nature. So piracy is on the list, as is plane hijacking, as is genocide. Killing an ambassador is on the list: you're a threat to international order. But normal murder? Not even close. It's not a crime with international implications, and it's not a crime which is so fundamentally horrific that it needs to be ended by any means necessary. The death penalty has never been considered to be that fundamentally horrific, and likely never will be, particularly when (as in the US) it is limited to people who have committed something that is an extremely serious crime in any country (i.e. murder). The only way France could make a remotely plausible argument that it gets to punish American executioners is if they're dual citizens or if they executed a French citizen. Then France can't arrest the executioner because US is a sovereign state and gets to impose its own penal laws. But normally? France couldn't arrest them even if it wasn't for the fact that they're executing US government policy, because Americans in America don't generally have to obey French laws.
It depends on the state. Unlike France, a unitary nation, American Federalism typically means States may define different legal concepts differently. In California for example, Municipal courts hear Misdemeanor criminal Cases, preliminary Felony Cases, and Small Claims civil cases and serve county wide jurisdictions. In other states, the court may only hear cases arising only from city ordinances, traffic, and small claims and serve a jurisdiction that may not be bound by county lines. It should be pointed out that all "X County Court Houses" in the U.S. are branches of the State Court System, as counties are not sovereign in the United States, and thus the county court house is a local branch of the State Courts and often built in the County Seat (the county's "Capital City" if you will.).
Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he "should have" (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an "eggshell" victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was "fragile" - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the "Deep South" it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the "Deep South" at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.
Some of this will vary by Jurisdiction, that is by country, and by state in the US, or by province in some other countries. This answer will be focused on the US. Other answers may address other countries. Why did they only arrest the attacker and not the victim? There is not enough information here to say, but stories from participants or witnesses could have made it clear who the attacker was. If the police believed that one party was only defending himself, they might well arrest only the attacker. Can the victim be subpoenaed to court? Yes, the victim can be subpoenaed just as any witness can be. In some areas a victim is routinely subpoenaed even if s/he si expected to attend voluntarily. Could they have actually done anything without the victim present? Yes, if there is enough evidence. The victim rarely takes the stand in murder cases, after all. However, in some cases there is simply not enough evidence aside from the testimony of the victim, so that becomes vital to the case. But if there were many other credible witnesses, the prosecutor might choose not to call the victim. The prosecutor has wide latitude on what witnesses to call and what evidence to presnent, and what charges to bring. Would the attacker have been put in a holding cell? S/he might have, that would depend on the policy of the local police, and the facilities the police had available. Could he have requested to see the victim? This seems like the "one phone call" thing to me, but is that possible here? S/he could ask, but the police would not be required to grant any such request. Indeed permitting this would be a bit unusual, but not unheard of. Usually a visitor would not see a person in a cell, but in some sort of room for the purpose. Details vary. (Edit Comment suggest this is even less plausible than I had thought, unless this is set several decades or more ago. It probably dosen't change the plot much if the attacker was brought to some sort of conference room or visitor's room instead.) Is the victim's testimony enough to actually reduce the sentence down to aggravated assault? Is six months too short of a time? If the judge or jury believed the testimony that there was no intent to kill, then a conviction of aggravated assault would be possible, as a lesser included offense. But this would depend on the totality of the evidence, and the way in which the finder of fact (judge or jury) interpreted it, and whether all the elements of aggravated assault had been proved, and whether any elements of attempted murder had not been proved. In those jurisdictions that I know about, intent to kill is an element of attempted murder. As for the sentence, 6 months is not, I think, outside the range of plausibility for aggravated assault, depending on the facts and the view taken by the judge. The Judge has wide discretion to choose a sentence up to the maximum allowed by law, or much lower. The "usual sentence" varies by jurisdiction, and does not bind the judge anyway. Would the attacker just go back to normal after his release? Would there be any further punishments or restrictions? The court could impose an additional term of probation, with various restrictions, depending on the local law, and the choice of the Judge. These might include staying employed, not getting into other fights, not owning a firearm, taking anger management courses, or other possibilities. Failure to comply with such conditions might lead to a person being sent back to jail/prison. The Judge does not have to impose any such restrictions however. Could the victim change his testimony afterward and reopen the case? Or would that be unreliable? It can happen, but reopening the case is far from automatic. Generally a court has to order the case reopened, and courts generally are reluctant to do so. How many years would the attacker have been facing for the original attempted murder? Probably quite a few, but this varies a good deal by jurisdiction. And the Judge would have considerable discretion up to the maximum sentence permitted by the law in that jurisdiction. Why did it take so long for the case to start? The question does not say how long it took, but it is not uncommon for major cases to take several years before the start of the trial, partly because of the time taken to investigate, and partly because of backlogs in the court system. There are cases on record where the trial took place decades after the crime. That is unusual.
The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
As the gunman is dead (hence unable to be prosecuted), what is the value in understanding his motives? It is reasonable the LE would want to determine that the gunman "acted alone", but why is it important to understand a dead gunman's motives. Your point on ascertaining whether he acted alone is one good reason. Other reasons are to identify: whether the crime involved enticement or undue influence by others who ought to be prosecuted; patterns of action or of context, upon which intelligence agencies and Law Enforcement can be more effective in preventing similar tragedies; if gunman was mentally ill, whether an entity acted negligently or wantonly in allowing the release of this person; further statistical evidence for the legislator to improve the relevant statutes (or enact new ones if necessary) pursuant to the punishment and prevention of similar conduct. There might be other law-related reasons, but these are the ones I can think of right now.
Most likely, they chose enough victims to ensure a long prison term while having plenty of additional victims to charge if something went wrong at trial. Plus limiting the number of victims limits the amount of repetitive testimony and evidence the prosecutors had to introduce proving the death of each victim. If you charge with 19 counts when there are 492 victims and something goes wrong at trial, whether you think but can’t prove that the mob paid off a juror or whether you just get an oddball juror that votes to acquit, you can always pick some of the remaining 473 victims to bring charges. The prosecutors could have failed in 24 straight trials for 19 charges of manslaughter and still been able to bring charges a 25th time (though that would have been highly unusual). If you charge a defendant with manslaughter, you have to prove the death of a particular person. So there has to be evidence that Bob Smith went to the club, Bob Smith’s body was recovered and identified, Bob Smith was autopsied and the cause of death was smoke inhalation, etc. That gets repetitive after a time and jurors start thinking of the victims as numbers rather than people. Limiting the number of charges makes it much easier to make the victims seem like distinct humans to the jury. You can show pictures of the victims at trial and jurors can recognize particular individuals not just “1 of 492 dead people”.
This is an interesting hypothetical. In this scenario, Country Z does not have jurisdiction to enforce such a law on foreign nationals, unless Country Z has an extradition treaty with Country A. Generally, however, these types of laws would never be enforced as they are egregious abuses of government, and could possibly be elevated to the International Court of Justice if Country Z actually charges any individuals with such a crime. In these instances, however, war is a very unlikely scenario, since this would often be expensive and any escalation would most likely be small skirmishes that would lead to an eventual ceasefire, with the encouragement of the international community, without the involvement of UN Peacekeeping troops.
If a judge makes a factual error, can that be appealed? If a judge makes a factual error, and that error was an important part of his judgement, can the judgement be appealed? Normally, an appellate court will only consider matters of law and assume the matters of fact as being settled at the full discretion of the trial judge. What if the judgement makes a clear error of fact? For example, imagine that in the judgement it reads as follows: Since luminol will only fluoresce in the presence of blood, we can assume that the blood of the victim was present. This statement is simply factually incorrect. Luminol will fluoresce when in contact with a wide range of catalyst materials, not just blood. So, in this case the judge has made a factual error. Can such a provable error be the basis for an appellate court to overturn or remand a lower court decision?
When judges are finder of fact, the standard is one of deference to the trial court, but may be overcome if the trial court made a "clearly erroneous finding". See Concrete v. Const. Laborers, 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
The form calculat is late Latin, and so we may not find this exact phrasing in our earliest Roman sources. The general principle regarding correction of numerical errors is in the Digest of Justinian (530-533), which deals in 49.8 with decisions which can be rescinded without an appeal. The authority cited is Aemilius Macer, a jurist of the third century, whose work De Appellationibus ("On Appeals") is quoted as saying: si calculi error in sententia esse dicatur, appellare necesse non est: veluti si iudex ita pronuntiaverit: "cum constet titium seio ex illa specie quinquaginta, item ex illa specie viginti quinque debere, idcirco lucium titium seio centum condemno": nam quoniam error computationis est, nec appellare necesse est et citra provocationem corrigitur. sed et si huius quaestionis iudex sententiam centum confirmaverit, si quidem ideo, quod quinquaginta et viginti quinque fieri centum putaverit, adhuc idem error computationis est nec appellare necesse est: si vero ideo, quoniam et alias species viginti quinque fuisse dixerit, appellationi locus est. Translation from Samuel P. Scott, 1932: If an error in the calculation is alleged to exist in the decision, it is not necessary to appeal, for instance, if the judge decides as follows: "As it is proved that Titius owes Seius fifty sesterces for such-and-such an article, and also twenty-five for another; therefore I hold that Lucius Titius shall pay Seius a hundred sesterces;" because, as the mistake is one of computation, it is not necessary to appeal, and it can be corrected without doing so. If, however, the judge of this question should render a decision for a hundred sesterces, for the reason that he thought that fifty and twenty-five made a hundred, still, the same mistake is one of computation, and it is not necessary to appeal. But when the judge decides that there is another sum of twenty-five sesterces due, there will be ground for appeal. Another maxim for this situation is error calculi non nocet, an error in calculation does no harm. In the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 2.5, a similar formulation is attributed to a ruling from the co-Emperors Diocletian and Maximian, so the same rough time as Macer: errorem calculi ... veritati non adferre praeiudicum, an error in calculation does not prejudice the truth. The "non nocet" phrase can be found in much later sources, such as the 14th century commentary by Baldus de Ubaldis on Justinian. I think that this is a more precise and common term than iudex non calculat for that idea. The cited law is that a judge can correct their own calculational error, to make the outcome accord with the just outcome they had intended. The form iudex non calculat matches this idea for saying that the arithmetical working is not primary, but rather something that is deduced from the decision. This is also a feature of modern law systems, wherein obvious mistakes in court orders can be corrected by the court itself, on application. For the secondary meaning, assessing the strength of arguments rather than their quantity, this is so commonplace that it's hard to identify any particular source. It's certainly an idea we find in Cicero's rhetoric. His Orator, for example, has: The stress of an argument does not always, and in every cause, depend upon similar topics. He will, therefore, exercise his judgment; and not only discover what may be said, but thoroughly examine the force of it. ... An Orator, therefore, should carefully examine each, that he may be able to select with propriety. Otherwise, how can he enlarge upon those which are most pertinent, and dwell upon such as more particularly affect his cause? Cicero is suggesting that we should choose and hone our strongest arguments, not just reel off everything we can think of. Inclusion of weak or irrelevant material may make the overall case weaker, as well as trying the patience of the listener. I've heard similar sentiments from contemporary judges, so it's clearly something we've been struggling with for a couple of thousand years and counting. The phrase "iudex non calculat" does not appear to have much current live use: perhaps mainly jurists disclaiming any interest in figures, using the phrase slightly ironically.
Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.
Is official misconduct simply the act of "abusing public office" (or close to that)? There is no clear definition of malfeasance in office, or rather, there are many different definitions because there are so few appeals court judgments about it. Common elements of what definitions there are, are: First, malfeasance in office requires an affirmative act or omission. Second, the act must have been done in an official capacity—under the color of office. Finally, that that act somehow interferes with the performance of official duties—though some debate remains about "whose official" duties. It does not, necessarily, require that the malfeasance be criminal or unlawful in and of itself (i.e. things that would be unlawful if the person wasn't a public official), however, it really helps in obtaining a conviction. Did the judge act outside of the scope of his duties by even considering standing in a probable cause determination? Absolutely not. Standing is one of the matters a judge is required to consider. He may have got the decision wrong but that is why we have appeals courts. What in the citizen's complaint rule provides for the citizen's "closeness" to the crime? If nothing, then what else could the judge have based that decision on? It is a fundamental part of the common law that a person must have standing to bring a case. A statute can specifically grant or deny a class of people standing but if it doesn't the common law rule flows through. For a person to have standing absent a grant in the specific statute they must be sufficiently close to the act or omission that they have suffered damage or may yet do so. In general, just because the act or omission affects "all citizens" or "all taxpayers" is not generally enough - it must affect you personally and substantially enough to warrant the state dedicating scant resources to it. Time a court spends dealing with any particular case is time it cannot spend on every other case - probable cause is the judicial equivalent of medical triage.
While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ.
There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.
The standard of proof required to survive a motion to dismiss is very low. The factual (not legal) assertions of the plaintiff are assumed to be true, and the case is dismissed if the defense shows that even when the plaintiff is given that benefit, the assumed facts don't establish the case. This standard is somtimes referred to as "sufficiency of the claims".
Judges often issue orders and warrants that require people or entities to transfer property from one party to another. For example, a search warrant allows law enforcement to seize personal property. A garnishment requires an employer to transfer a worker's wages to someone else. A judgment can affirm that property was stolen and thereby invalidate what was previously good title to the property. Like any judicial order, such judgments can be found to be invalid and/or illegal. But unless and until they are modified, a judicial order is presumed to be lawful. In fact, it has the force of law. (It is not inaccurate to say a judgment is "law.") There are a few remedies for unfair, improper, or illegal judgments. The most common include: Motions for reconsideration. If a court makes a mistake of fact or law, this is the most expedient way to bring that to its attention and ask for an appropriate modification to the judgment. Appeals. Any party adversely affected by a judgment can usually find grounds to appeal it to a higher court. Of course, things can get messy for affected parties in scenarios like you describe. If a court orders you to transfer money from one person to another, then you cannot be found guilty of a crime for complying with the letter of that order. But depending on the broader circumstances you could later be found personally liable to the proper owners of the money. E.g., they might assert any number of legal claims that result in a court granting another judgment against you for restitution to them.
What do we call the rules written in an Act, laws? From CHAPTER III of Wildlife protection act,1972 (India) Prohibition of Hunting: No person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedule, I, II, III and IV except as provided under section 11 and section 12. Hunting of Wild animals to be permitted in certain cases....The killing or wounding in good faith of any wild animal in defence of oneself or of any other person shall not be an offence.... Source Can these be called laws mentioned in an Act? What I understand of these words is that: Law is a system of rules that are enforced through social institutions to govern behavior. (wikipedia) and an Act is a written law. (oxford dictionaries)
The concept of law predates writing. "Law" refers not only to the system of rules, as your definition notes, but to the individual rules making up that system (for example, there is a law that prohibits theft). An act is, more generally than the definition you quote, a thing that is done (for example, someone who is discovered committing a crime can be said to have been "caught in the act.") This also does not depend on writing. In our literate times, however, when a legislature (or any body, such as a corporate board of directors), wants to achieve something, someone writes a description of a proposed result. When the body makes a formal decision to adopt the written document (by a vote, for example), it is deciding to do the thing described in the document; that is, it is deciding to act. Typically, for a legislature, the thing it's doing is to create, modify, or repeal a law. It's not very difficult to see how a document that describes a legislature's desire to act came to be called an act. In some contexts, however, it can also be called a law. So the word law can refer to the entire system (as in law school), to a particular act (as in the legislature passed a law today called the XYZ Act), or indeed to a particular rule or section of an act (as in the law in question is subparagraph 2(B)(ii)(b) of the XYZ Act). Law can also refer to case law, of course, or regulatory law, so we tend to use statutory law or statute to denote the laws created through the legislative process. In conclusion, the word "law" has several related meanings, so its use can be imprecise. When speaking about specific paragraphs, precision may be in order. In a case like this, where a paragraph create exceptions to rules laid out in a preceding paragraph, it doesn't make a lot of sense to describe each paragraph as a "law." The numbered items in statutory text can be called many things, and usually have different names depending on the level at which they are found. So I would not know whether these are sections, subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, or something else. If I were unable to find the correct terminology for (in this case) India, would probably use a generic term like "items."
Is a fly an animal? Not in the context of the Highway Code Rule 286, as the underlying legislation at section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 states: (8) In this section “animal” means horse, cattle, ass, mule, sheep, pig, goat or dog.
Shall Whenever a law or legal text uses shall there is no discretion allowed. Read it as has to when it prescribes something. If it is written in the negative (shall not), you can read it as it is forbidden or X is barred. [the] Congress of the United States [...] shall consist of a Senate and House of Representative This prescribes that the congress has to have these two parts, not more, not less. Special meetings shall be called by the president or secretary in a like manner and on like notice on the written request of three (3) Directors. Whenever 3 directors sign letters demanding a meeting, then the president or secretary has to follow the process explained before. Congress shall make no law [that does X] Note that this is a negative shall! Read it as Congress is barred from doing a law that does X. Shall obviously can have exceptions or modifiers. Such often are in modifying sentences following them. Meetings of the Board of Administration shall be open to all unit owners. Notice of all meetings shall be posted on the official bulletin board ofthe Association at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of each scheduled meeting and directed to the attention of all unit owners. In case of an emergency, a meeting of the Board of Administration may be held without notice. There has to be a notice on the board at least 48 hours before a meeting, unless there is an emergency. May Legal texts usually use may whenever there is an option to do something. It usually marks the possibility to do something and vesting the discretion to do so in somebody. Often, they come with a minimum or maximum time an event has to occur from a deadline. The department may enter an order doing one or more of the following if the department finds that a person has violated or is operating in violation of any of the provisions of this section or the orders issued under this section: The decision if something happens is vested in the department [of Agriculture and Consumer Services]. If they decide to act, then it has to come from the list that follows the section. Special meetings of the Board may be called by the president on five(5)days notice to each Director [...] It is at the discretion of the president to call a special meeting. If they do, it has to be done with 5 (or more) days warning to the Directors. Including the other paragraph of OPs document, then it also has to be posted 48 hours before the meeting on the board, unless it is emergency.
A law that conflicts with the Constitution is void The enactment of a treaty is still a law. Even though the US has a Constitutional mechanism for ratifying treaties, once ratified, they are the “law of the land”.
In the vast majority of countries (both common law and civil law), statutes are interpreted in a manner that reflects the intend of the drafters of the statute a.k.a. legislative intent, when it is possible to reasonably determine what was intended. There is a canon of statutory interpretation in almost all legal systems that provides that absurd or nonsensical interpretations of legislative language are to be disregarded in favor of those that reflect the likely intent of the body passing the law, even if the literal and technical reading of the words does not state precisely what was intended. Thus, if there is a clear grammatical, punctuation, or spelling error and the intend meaning can be discerned from the language of the law, the larger context of the law, or extrinsic evidence such a legislative history and public discussion of the reasons for enacting the law in the first place, those clues will be used to interpret the legal effect of a law. Could this mean legal consequences or would I be safe as I "bought nothing illegal"? No. Ignorance of the law is no excuse even in cases where the interpretation of the law calls for the courts to ignore minor errors in legislative drafting. You would have an argument, but where you can state "in fact 'Scolopendra gigantica' does not exist and they most likely meant 'Scolopendra gigantea'." The likelihood that you will face legal consequences is great. Also, in this particular example, keep in mind that biological species sometimes have more than one accepted Latin name, or once had a different name than the currently accepted name. For example, in this case, "gigantica" and "gigantea" are different grammatical inflections of the same Latin root word, and really are the same word in the same way that "geese" and "goose" are different tenses of the same word in English that refer to the same genus of birds. If a scientist discovers a new type of centipede and names it 'Scolopendra gigantica', would it be illegal immediately? The judges would look at all of the facts and circumstances and decide if the new species was within the scope of what the law intended to ban. But, the mere fact that the word is the same would not make the law apply to it. In the same way, suppose that a law had an exemption and didn't apply to animals in the town of Zootopia where many exotic pets are naturally common in the wild because a failed zoo released them into the area. But, given that context, the town of Euclid could not make itself exempt from the law by renaming itself Zootopia after the former town of Zootopia was disincorporated after its residents were all eaten by lions. If it was illegal to own a 'Scolopendra gigantea' due to that law and a scientist now names a new centipede 'Scolopendra gigantica' would that immediately legalize the 'Scolopendra gigantea'? No. For the same reasons discussed above. Footnote Re Similar Issues With Controlled Substances Laws This said, the issue you discuss does come up, and sometimes wins and sometimes loses, in the case of laws regulating controlled substances (i.e. illegal drugs). One of the reasons that this comes up is that the proper names of chemical substances in organic chemistry is not, as it is in biology, arbitrary. The name of an organic chemical is determined from looking at which atomic elements in which combinations with what kinds of bonds to each other are present. Given a chemical diagram of an organic chemical, every organic chemist would give it the same name, even if they've never discussed it, and likewise, you could ban an organic chemical that has never been observed or synthesized in real life and it would be illegal if it ever was synthesized. These statutes have usually been interpreted strictly to apply only to the named chemicals, but usually include an additional statutory section that either ban "analog" chemicals that are intended to or do have the same biochemical effect as the banned chemical, or allow an administrative agency to add new chemicals to the list without legislative action. Still, complications do come up even then because many lawyers and legislators become lawyers or politicians because they couldn't become doctors or engineers, because they flunked organic chemistry. (Joking aside, almost 50% of college students in the United States taking organic chemistry for the first time fail the course. This and first semester calculus are the most frequently failed college courses in the United States.) The Florida Cheese Ban For example, Florida recently classified a chemical present in many kinds of ordinary cheese as a controlled substance, which would in theory make every grocery store owner and millions of Floridians felons. Florida probably meant to ban high concentration synthetic extracts of that chemical administered as a drug, but didn't do anything to say so. But interpreting the statute to have that meaning was harder in that case since the same statute applies to many, many different drugs and the interpretation of the statute would make the ban on the chemical found in cheese make sense, would not make sense for the other drugs on the list. But, Florida courts may ultimately end up ignoring the addition of that chemical to the list based upon the canon against absurd interpretations, at least on an "as applied" case by case basis where the literal meaning of the statute would make millions of Floridian felons for violating this law. The Grand Junction Conviction For Possession Of A Legal Drug Another case came up in Grand Junction, Colorado where a woman was prosecuted by a government lawyer for possession of a controlled substance for possession of a chemical named in the indictment, and her government provided public defender had his client plead guilty to the crime. The woman tried to explain that this made no sense since its was an ordinary prescription drug, but the prosecutor, her own lawyer and the judge didn't believe her, and her public defender told her she was certain to be convicted anyway. (It isn't clear if she actually had a prescription for the drug, but even if she didn't, it wouldn't have been a crime.) So, she took a plea deal and was sent to prison to serve a medium length incarceration with work release sentence, instead of the medium length prison sentence she could have received if she went to trial, was convicted, and received a typical sentence for that conviction. The problem was that the chemical she was indicted for possessing in violation of the controlled substances act wasn't actually on the controlled substances list and wasn't an analog version of a controlled substance. There was also no reason to think that the drug he was convicted of possessing which had no pleasurable psychoactive effect was ever intended by the legislature to be banned or regulated. About a year later, in the year 2005, when this issue was ultimately discovered, a different criminal defense lawyer brought a post-conviction challenge to the conviction on the convicted woman's behalf, and the convicted woman was released with the conviction vacated, because the crime she was indicted for committing and convicted of didn't exist. Allysan Isaac, 24, was held nearly a year in work release for something that a judge said Tuesday was not even illegal. "You were incarcerated for a case that was not a crime," said Mesa County District Judge Brian Flynn, who presided over the case. Flynn, the prosecutor and Isaac's defense attorney were unaware last year that the offense she was charged with was not a violation of the law. No one had noticed that a prescription drug found in Isaac's possession, an anti-anxiety medication called Buspirone, is not a controlled substance. ... District Attorney Pete Hautzinger said he had "no idea" why Isaac had been charged with and convicted of something that wasn't a crime. The defense attorney who represented Isaac in the first case was also baffled. "I don't have an answer," assistant public defender John Burkey said. "Nobody caught it. The police were saying it was a controlled substance." (Source quoting from and citing an article I read and confirmed the story from in the Rocky Mountain News, a now defunct newspaper. Corroborated here.) Incidentally, even though this woman was horribly wronged because of this wrongful conviction, the prosecutor and judge had absolute immunity from civil liability for the wrongful conviction, and criminal liability requires knowledge that you are committing a crime. The government likewise had no duty to compensate her for her wrongful incarceration because her rights weren't intentionally violated by anyone as required by civil rights statutes. She may have had a claim for legal malpractice against her own lawyer, for which negligence can be a basis of liability. Even that would have been a difficult case to win, however. This is because she would have to show that the public defender violated the standard of care of a reasonable lawyer by relying upon law enforcement's claim that a substance was a chemical banned by the controlled substances act which is a question of fact upon which expert witnesses could reasonably disagree. There is nothing in the public record to show that she pursued such a claim, but a private settlement reached before the case was filed wouldn't be revealed in that way. So, it is possible that a private settlement was reached in a legal malpractice case against her public defender that never actually resulted in a case being filed in court.
The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes).
Illegal activity is activity that contravenes the law. Criminal activity is illegal activity that is also a crime. What constitutes a crime is usually detailed in a criminal code in each jurisdiction but can derive from common law crimes like murder, arson, rape etc. A crime is an offense against society and is generally prosecuted by the state. For example (may vary by jurisdiction): Breaking a contract - illegal Stopping in a No Stopping zone - illegal Negligently polluting the environment - illegal Breaking someone's arm - crime Deliberately ramming someone with your car - crime Recklessly polluting the environment - crime
The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.
Pros and cons of binding arbitration vs. court of law? Some websites specify in their terms of service that disputes shall be resolved by binding arbitration rather than by going to court. What is the pros and cons of specifying binding arbitration vis-a-vis a court proceeding?
Usually web site owners will prefer arbitration and people who would potentially sue web site owners will prefer a court forum, but this is only a typical situation and not a die hard rule for all circumstances. Features of arbitration: Binding arbitration is not subject to appeal so it tends to favor repeat, low stakes litigators over one-time high stakes litigators. Binding arbitration precludes class action lawsuits and punitive damages in most cases. Binding arbitration creates an institutional bias in favor of the contract drafter because the arbitrator needs to rule in their favor to get future business from the party selecting arbitration v. non-arbitration. Binding arbitration has much higher filing fees than ordinary court and is usually faster than ordinary court, but litigation costs for the parties tend to be similar to ordinary court. Binding arbitration has a reputation for "baby-splitting results" rather than all-or-nothing decisions in favor of one side or another. Binding arbitration can escape biases (e.g. anti-gay, anti-religious minority, anti-marijuana, pro-local citizen) that might exist in a local court system. Binding arbitration generally allows for much more irrelevant evidence to be admitted, and binding arbitration decisions cannot generally be overruled on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to follow the law or completely screwed up in understanding the facts. There is a much weaker likelihood of getting a fair result. Binding arbitration is generally not public, so the proceedings are generally secret, avoiding publicity and disclosure of secrets discussed in the proceedings. Arbitration often considers written documents like letters and witness statements in circumstances where courts in the U.S. would require in-person testimony (this is less of a consideration outside the U.S. where the hearsay rule is much less strict or is non-existent). Arbitrators are more often subject area specialists in the matter that is disputed. Arbitrators are less likely to reinterpret language in a TOS in terms of policy considerations or judicial precedent glosses (i.e., they are more likely to read contracts literally). Arbitration awards are not immediately enforceable and must be filed with a court in a summary proceeding to be enforced which makes them inconvenient for cases that are mostly uncontested. Arbitration awards don't create precedents that can be used in future cases. Arbitration can more often be decided without an in person hearing than court cases, even in situations where there are factual disputed between the parties. Features of court: Filing fees in court cases are cheap. Judges in courts tend to be far more impartial than arbitrators. Court decisions are immediately enforceable without a collateral enforcement action. This is particularly important when preliminary relief like a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is desired. Court decisions that are incorrect under the law or not supported by the facts can be appealed. They are much more likely to follow the law. Less irrelevant information is considered in a court decision. Court decisions can serve as precedents in future cases. Jury trials and class actions are often available in court cases. Court decisions are more likely to clearly rule in favor of the party in the right and against the party in the wrong without "baby splitting." Judges and juries in courts are "generalists" who are less subject to institutional capture than arbitrators (especially specialist arbitrators). Court is a more favorable forum for one-time, high-stakes litigation. Courts can have jurisdiction over people who aren't parties to an arbitration agreement but who may be necessary to grant full relief or who have a stake in the outcome. Punitive damages are often available in court cases when they wouldn't be available in arbitration forums.
There is a firm difference between giving advice on "what the best decision is likely to be" and "what decision to make". The former is what lawyers must do, which comes from: Conduct and Client Care Rules: Whatever legal services your lawyer is providing, he or she must— discuss with you your objectives and how they should best be achieved: give you clear information and advice: Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006: legal work includes— advice in relation to any legal or equitable rights or obligations: So, there is nothing in the law that requires lawyers to advise you on "what decision to make". Instead, they explain to you the range of possible decisions and what ramifications / implications / consequences they have. They won't make the choice for you — it's always yours. Is it legally correct that a lawyer is not permitted to provide advice on what decision to make It is not strictly true that a lawyer "is not permitted". Rather, they are not obliged to do so. And they have a damn good reason not to: there is a huge difference between being responsible for legal facts based on which you make decisions, and being responsible for decisions themselves.
It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees.
In the event of a dispute, the person resolving the matter, probably an arbitrator in the case of a commission dispute between two realtors and either an arbitrator or a judge and jury depending upon what your listing agreement says about that issue, would hear the testimony from both parties and decide. The intent of the parties is supposed to govern in cases of clerical errors, but a signed document has a lot of weight, especially in such a prominent term. It is a little hard from the way the question is posed to determine who is willing to correct the typo and who insists on enforcing the contract containing the typo.
It is not necessary for an agreement to be verbose and written by a lawyer, for it to be binding. There is some danger in having untrained people writing up agreements (they don't know the distinction between "what the law says" versus "what we had in mind"). The agreement is binding, but their interpretation of the contract language does not automatically prevail. The statement "ALL TUTORS ARE PAID 8 HOURS, unless told otherwise" is slightly problematic since it is not true (you can't pay time, you pay money for time spend). With no other statements about time and payment, and just looking at the words, this says that an employee will be paid for 8 hours work, period. Unless they say something different. That could mean "even if you work 20 hours, you only get paid for 8" (illegal under various labor laws), or it could be "even if you only work 2 hours, you get paid for 8" (the most reasonable interpretation). The interpretation "You are limited to 8 hours of work per pay period / contract" is not a reasonable interpretation: that isn't what the clause says. Such a limit could be clearly expressed ("can work up to 8 hours" is a clear way to state the limit), and since they didn't say anything like that, that is not how the courts will read the clause. They can, however, inform you otherwise, e.g. say "your minimum automatic pay is now 2 hours", or "we will only guarantee 2 hours work", and at that point that's what the number is. Since this is (presumably) a take-it or leave it contract which they wrote up and you didn't actually negotiate, any unclarities are legally interpreted in your favor. If you have worked more than 8 hours and they are using the contract language to argue that you won't be paid for the overage, that is not at all likely to hold up in court. Under terms of the contract (interpreted as stating a minimum guarantee of hours), they can inform you that your new minimum is 0 hours. Also, unless there is some kind of tenure clause, they can terminate the contract at will, and maybe they'll hire you under a different contract. What the terms of employment were for you in the past does not matter, what matters is what the current terms are. If you did not pay attention to the fact that they changed the terms of the agreement as of this quarter, that is not their problem. If they decided to change to "actual hours worked" after the current contract was formed, and they informed you of that fact later, then thereafter that is what the agreement is. Until you are notified of that change, the guaranteed minimum is what it says in the contract. In case their argument is "The university sets this policy, the department made a mistake in not informing you", the university has to take responsibility for the errors of their inferiors.
Because threatening a lawsuit is a nuclear option If you are thinking about a lawsuit then you have a dispute. The best, most efficient, most effective and cheapest way to resolve a dispute is to negotiate a settlement. The best, most efficient and quickest way to derail a negotiation is to make threats. People don't like being threatened. It makes them upset and angry. People who are upset and angry like to make the person who made them upset and angry upset and angry in return. This rapidly leads to an escalation of tensions often to the point that the thing (a lawsuit) that was previously only one option out of many is now the only option. So instead of resolving the dispute cheaply, quickly and under the control of the parties to the dispute, it gets resolved expensively, slowly and by someone who doesn't give a rat's arse about the parties. Lawyers can't make empty threats Lawers have an ethical duty not to make threats they don't intend to follow through on. A lawyer who makes empty threats of lawsuits can be censured.
Because disputes are expensive, time-consuming and generally not fun An ambiguous term is a dispute waiting to happen. Far better to resolve the ambiguity and correctly allocate (and price) the risk at the start of a contract when nothing is at stake then have that term be at the centre of a dispute with $10 million on the table that both parties think is theirs. At best, a dispute strains the relationship, at worst, it involves time and costs putting the matter before an arbitrator or a judge and hope the resolve the ambiguity your way. I prefer to play roulette at a casino not a courtroom. Contra preferentum is unlikely to be a successful argument in any form of non-determinative dispute resolution - essentially the proffering party is never going to agree that it applies. Further, contra preferentum is a last-resort resolution mechanism. Maybe what you read as ambiguous is actually clear. Or clear in context, or clear when industry norms are considered or when past dealing or current dealings between the parties are considered. Relying on it is a real long shot. Also, almost all B2B contracts explicitly exclude contra preferentum as a method of resolving ambiguous terms.
Contracts don’t need to be signed Unless they are of a class that does - NDA’s aren’t. If the parties agree to a contract then it binds them. You agreed and your evidence for doing so is your signature. They agreed and their evidence for doing so is your signature on the contract they gave you.
Can my landlord double-dip rent after my month-to-month lease termination? I had a month-to-month tenancy with my previous landlord, which I terminated via written 30 days notice. The lease will terminate on the 21st of this month. I have already paid pro-rated rent until the 21st of this month. However, I have vacated the premises and returned the keys and the unit in good condition. The landlord told me that he has rented out the new unit to a new tenant starting on the 18th of this month. Am I legally entitled to a refund of the pro-rated rent from the 18th to the 21st? And if so, would it be at the rate I was paying, or at the reduced rate that the new tenant is paying? I reviewed my lease and don't see specific language governing this situation.
Probably not, although it is impossible to say without reading the lease. Usually leases are monthly. That means you pay for the entire month or lease term regardless of how much or how little you use the property. It seems weird that the lease ends on the 21st, but if that is the case, then you are legally obligated to pay for that time interval. That said, if you want to drive a hard bargain, you could threaten to reoccupy the apartment and stay in it until the 21st which are legally entitled to do, unless he refunds you some money. You would have to be a pretty serious hard-ass to pull this off, or be prepared to go to court. One possible course of action is that you demand return of the key and say you changed your mind and will be staying in the apartment until the 21st. Make sure the conversation is recorded and that he knows the conversation is recorded, or have a witness. He will refuse. You can then sue him for denying you the use of your property.
he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.
You should have seen this coming. This might vary a bit from place to place, however it would generally be accepted that if you are in a rented place, you have to pay rent. Most jurisdictions would have some law which requires pro-rata'd payment for the time you actually stay, there would not be any requiring the landlord let you stay free. An uninvested third party might ask "Why would a landlord provide you with 5 days free rent". Another way to look at it is that one of the elements of a contract is consideration (think payment) - Thus in contracting to stay in his place longer you should expect to provide consideration - and pro-rata'd rent would be typical.
If it's not in the lease agreement, then you did not agree to it. Even in the absence of the law prohibiting the late fee, the landlord would not be able to impose it because it is not in the lease. It is of course up to you whether you want to test it. It may be more trouble than it is worth. Then again, it's probably not worth the landlord's trouble to begin eviction proceedings over a late fee. Paying late and refusing to pay the fee would probably sour your relationship with the landlord, which is usually something you want to avoid. If you do pay late at some point, you may want to point out to the landlord the relevant provision of Massachusetts law. The matter would probably end there: either the landlord doesn't know about it, or the landlord is hoping that you don't know about it. Pointing it out in a polite manner will inform the landlord of the law and that you are acquainted with the law. Unless the landlord is quite unreasonable, that should take care of it. Whether there is any law prohibiting landlords from announcing an intention to take a prohibited action is indeed a different question. Is there any legal reason for me to bring this up and get the landlord to formally acknowledge that they will not in fact charge illegal late fees? No. You have a contract with the landlord that already says you are going to move in. He cannot modify that contract simply by sending you a letter.
You can be held liable for rent after you are off a lease. Rewriting a lease only affects future obligations, and doesn't extinguish past obligations. However, you appear to have released X from all obligations via paragraph 2. If you plan to sue for past rent, the court will have to interpret the statement that "The landlord, Y, and Z agree to relinquish X from any obligation regarding the lease as mentioned above", which is non-standard English. It is extremely likely that the court will interpret this to mean "release". You might argue, using earlier emails, that all parties had a clear understanding that this means "from all future obligations, but not past obligations", but that is not what the written agreement says, and the parol evidence rule, which is codified as explicit law in California, says execution of a contract in writing... supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument That clause lets X off the hook, in exchange for his claim on the security deposit and for relinquishing his tenant rights to the unit. You cannot sue X for any rent.
Section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 says In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. There is also an absolute right to enter in an emergency (such as fire). Note that the law does not require tenant permission (a landlord may obviously enter for any reason with permission): the law says when he may do so without permission. If the "viewing" is related to repairs, then you just have to accept it. However, "viewing" usually means "showing prospective new tenants". In that case, there is the 28 day end-of-tenancy entry right which, if you didn't omit anything, is not relevant. In light of the common law right to quiet enjoyment, you have the right to exclude the landlord (or anyone else) absent a statutorily expressed override. Permission can be inferred by word or action under common law, for example if a person appears at the door and you open it wide and step aside, you have implicitly granted permission even if you didn't say "I hereby permit". Explicitly denying permission (even once) eliminates any reasonable possibility of inferring permission. If you had gotten an email saying "we'll come by at 4:30" and you reply "Alrighteo, see you then", that can reasonably be interpreted as permission. If you do not reply, they cannot infer permission (obviously: X sending a message to Y does not entail that Y received or read the message). If a person does not have a right to enter property, then doing so by force constitutes trespass, which is plainly against the law.
I don't know Canadian rental law, but as a general rule in civil cases you don't get to play Perry Mason and bring in evidence at the last minute. If you have evidence that the landlord broke the law then disclose it immediately and use it to pressure him into settling. His later lies to you are less important than the fact that he broke the law in the first place. However you can certainly testify about what he said as evidence that he has acted in bad faith.
In any legal dealing, there is always some risk. The signature constitutes definitive proof that you have a contract, but you still have a contract, because you have mutual acceptance. A far-fetched scenario is that the lessor could allege that they did not agree to the terms of he contract with you (perhaps claiming that you obtained a blank contract form from them and filled in details, but they didn't agree to those details). However, if they allow you to move in, that is sufficient constructive evidence of a contract, so they could not argue "We didn't agree to this". The main risk would be your lack of proof that they ever agreed to lease the place to you (no emails, no texts, no witnesses, no legally-recorded conversations). There may be specific state laws about providing a copy of the rental agreement, such as this California law, where they must provide a copy to the tenant within 15 days of execution by the tenant. This provides a collection of relevant state laws, though you may have to dig a bit because this is a hook into all of the laws about leases and not just about providing copies.
What does Mgst mean? I am reading about special education law. In this article, I see phrases like this: Court adopted Mgst recommendation and ruled that ... What does "Mgst" mean?
In context I suspect it means magistrate.
Speaking strictly from a legal standpoint, what can be said on the issue? Strictly speaking, the Constitutional Court is the top authority on the legality of anything. One can speculate as much as they want on whether the Court was biased, pre-determined, corrupt, defiant, flagrantly blatant or ridiculously unjust. These speculations would be pure politics. They do not change the fact that whatever the Court has decided is legal just by definition.
So my understanding is that the phrase "common law" can refer to either the concept of laws established by court precedent or it can refer to a specific body of laws that have been established that way. Yes. Should I just be inferring that from context? Yes. Is there a single body of "common law"? No. Are there distinct bodies of "U.K. common law" and "U.S. common law" for example? Yes, furthermore there is different common law in England/Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland and each state of the US. Further, Scotland and Louisiana are not straightforward common law jurisdictions but rather a blend of common and civil law. If so, how are they related? They are related in that they all: have a common source, middle English common law evolve in the same way - judges interpreting the current common law and the statutes of the legislature follow an appeals system through higher levels of courts. They do not all go in the same direction though. Do judges in common law countries cite court decisions in other common law countries? Sometimes; it depends on the "distance" of the other jurisdiction. A judge in New South Wales is quite likely to consider how judges in Queensland and Victoria have considered similar laws, less likely to look at the UK and Canada and extremely unlikely to look at the USA. This has a lot to do with how far back it is since the "last common ancestor" of the law; the longer the corpus of law has been separated the more likely that the principles have diverged, partly this is cultural drift but mostly this is differences in statutes that actively modify the common law. Usually, jurisdictions within the same country are quite close to each other; partly due to common culture but often because of a genuine effort to "harmonise" laws across borders. There are occasions, however, where legislatures "steal" laws from other jurisdictions, in which case they often look to each other for early development of common law on those laws. For example, the Alberta (Canada) Builder's Lien Act 2000 and the NSW (Australia) Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 both address the same "wrong" and both had a common and parallel genesis pre-enactment; early cases in each jurisdiction were watched by the other.
"Esq" Is short for "Esquire" which was once the lowest level of the English system of titles for nobility and gentry (originally an esquire was a sort of apprentice knight, and later it indicated that a person was a "gentleman" but without any higher title) Lawyers started using it to indicate that although paid professionals, they claimed a social status above that of tradesmen and shopkeepers. It is now largely obsolete, but some lawyers still use it. Most of the other initials refer to the form of business organization that a lawyer or law firm uses. More specifically: "PA" means "professional association" a form of organization which reduces the individual liability of members of the firm. See this q&A A pay is in many ways similar to a corporation or an LLC. "PLLC" means "professional limited liability company" which is a version of an LLC used specifically by groups of doctors and lawyers. "PLC" like "PLLC" means "professional limited liability company". The two terms are interchangeable when used for law firms, but PLC is also used for a Public Limited Company, which is a quite different sort of thing, and will not be a lawyer or law firm. APC, A.P.C., PC, P.C., and Prof. Corp. all stand for "Professional Corporation" a form of organization which is similar to a PLLC. "LLP" means "Limited Liability Partnership" a variation on the classic partnership organization. "SP" means "Sole Proprietorship", that is one lawyer working alone. None of these tell you anything about the kind of law a lawyer or firm does. None except SP tell you anything about how many lawyers a firm has. And none tell you anything about how competent a lawyer is. For the most part, none of these terms is of any importance to a client or would-be client of a lawyer or law firm. Reputation of the specific firm is far more important.
When the Act was originally passed it didn't say Secretary of State, it said "Lord Chancellor". So depending on when the Act came into force fully, the current wording may be moot. The text of the Act was modified by The Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 2003 to make the Secretary of State for Consitutional Affairs responsible. That office was discontinued in 2007, and the post of Secretary of State for Justice created. Not being specific in the 2003 Order allows the Prime Minister to reorganise government departments without needing to modify legislation to track the changes. Secretary of State is defined in the Interpretation Act 1978: “Secretary of State” means one of Her Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State. So, legally, when the text of an Act isn't specific, the power isn't vested in the relevant Secretary of State but can be exercised by any of them.
The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, also called the "Constitution Annotated", is the constitution of record: the only constitutional law treatise formally authorized by federal law, the Constitution Annotated functions as the official Constitution of record What version is authoritative can be meaningful. See William W. Van Alstyne, "A Constitutional Conundrum of Second Amendment Commas". And although phoog and I have provided different answers, I think we are both correct. The text as shown in the Constitution Annotated is what is universally accepted as the version to quote from in judicial submissions and reasons. But it's because it has drawn from the version in phoog's answer. Basically, the document in the archives is authoritative, but there is no need for writers and judges to go look at that when they are quoting, because the Constitution Annotated is deemed to have replicated that content faithfully.
I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.
Yes though usually adverbs are not subject to statutory definition, so case law resolves most interpretive questions. But, 18 USC 1515: (b) As used in section 1505, the term “corruptly” means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information. The Model Penal Code defines a number of adverbs: this is applied in Kentucky.
I couldn't move in right away, can I claim my deposit back? I have got an issue in a tenancy agreement in the UK. On Jan 8th I visited an apartment. The agent told me the tenant's notice runs till Jan 31 but he said he would leave earlier. I have accepted to rent the apartment starting Jan 16th, and the agent insured me that I would get refunded of everything if I don't move in by Jan 16th. He told me that the date is indicated on the agreement. Now the tenant didn't move out and I have found another property. I thought it would be ok since I would get refunded. But now the agent says the deposit is not in his hands, and the building (they have like 200 apartments) say they won't refund since I have made the reservation, which starts in Jan 31. They say the contract says "Jan 16th" is a "proposed moving date", nothing else. So clearly the agent screwed me and made me sign something and explained something else and telling me I had guarantees I didn't have. Note that Im not a native English speaker. The agreement is attached, please let me know if I can do anything : small claims court, ... ? Note that I have recorded a phone conversation with the agent where he says I will get refunded by both parties. (he didn't know I recorded) I made it before I paid for the new property. Thanks in advance for your help
The fact that you're not a native speaker of English doesn't alter the legal situation. If you literally had no understanding of English but for some reason you signed a piece of paper, then you might argue that there was no agreement in the first place, but obviously you do speak some English. Most people don't actually understand what contracts mean (on both sides). Contracts are still enforced, based on what the contract says. The move-in data is proposed, not firm, and it even indicates what the charges are if your circumstances change and the dates have to change (whereas is their circumstances change, they wouldn't have a basis for charging extra). It also does say that there will be no refund if you change your mind. So the piece of paper says "No refund". The problem seems to be that there's an "agent" whose statements you relied on, who is ultimately responsible for this problem, and s/he implied that you could get a refund. It's not clear what kind of "agent" this is (is he working for you, or for the owners?). You'd have a somewhat different legal basis depending on which it is, but you could sue someone in either event, assuming that you could actually persuade the court that you were given false information which you relied on. The statement "they will refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is false; the statement "they may refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is true. If the latter was the statement that you relied on, then you knew (or should have known) that that isn't a promise, it's just a guess, and if you read the piece of paper you know that it's a promise with no basis. So I would say it comes down to establishing what promise was made to you. Arguing that the agent "made" you sign isn't going to get you anywhere (unless you can prove actual coersion).
No illegal eviction took place, if he wasn't a tenant The term of the room rental was specified beforehand. There was no renewable or extension clause in the rental agreement. Bob also is not a tenant: he is a guest in a hotel. The Hotel offers cleaning services, as the OP specified. By overstaying, his items now were trespassing, the removal was legitimate. However, there is a point at which a short term renting of a hotel becomes living at it. Where this is is often dependant on how long or in what way you stay. Where's the line between a Tenant and a Guest? THAT is the operative question. When does a Guest/Lodger become a Tenant and can get eviction protection? In germany a couple of Hotels actually do have renters with a special rental contract - which is vastly different from the normal room rental. For example, the Maritim in Hamburg has year-rentals. These are actual renters with a rental contract and eviction protection, that give up some tenant rights for services (e.g. room cleaning service for limits in remodeling). However, overstaying at a hotel can actually become a crime: Einmietbetrug - obtaining a room in a hotel or a residency but not wanting to pay or mischaracterizing your ability to do so - is a variant of fraud and thus can be punished under §263 StGB; Under the operating law, a hotel guest is not afforded with all rights of a tenant, unless they are explicitly pointed out like with longstay contracts. In california the line is 30 days, in new-york-state it is the same but they also need to not have a different residency. in england-and-wales, the operative case when someone is a lodger or tenant is Brillouet v Landless (1995) 28 H.L.R. 836: a hotel Guest is not a tenant, even after more than a month of stay. In fact, courts following this case argue, that such a person is only licensed to be on the premises, and the license could be revoked without eviction procedures. In fact, the Brillouet v Landless case is very close to the example. Brillouet rented a room in September, and extended the stay. Then he did not pay (or rather, his accommodation services didn't. In October, Landless sought to get rid of Brillouet for non-payment, just telling him to leave. Brillouet applied for an injunction against the eviction and got a temporary one (to preserve the status-quo) till the hearing. Mere days later, and the first instance court handed out judgement against the application of an injunction to protect Brillouet. The Hotel guest, so the court, was not a tenant under the Housing Act 1988: The Protection from Eviction Act depends on premises having been let as a dwelling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of protection from eviction and seeing no tenancy (emphasis mine): It is an essential prerequisite of any tenancy that the tenant should have, so it is said in some of the authorities, exclusive possession. In my judgment the facts of this case particularly when one bears in mind that Mr Brillouet upon his own assertion avails himself of at least some of the facilities (he goes to the restaurant occasionally for his breakfast) — come nowhere near demonstrating that he has or has had within this room exclusive occupation. At best in my judgment he could conceivably be a licensee. One then has to examine once more the terms of the statute to ascertain whether he is a licensee entitled to protection under the 1977 Act. As the section to which I have alluded makes plain, only licensees who occupy as a dwelling premises which they do occupy are entitled to protection. If, as in my judgment the facts here clearly demonstrate, the occupant is no more and no less than a hotel guest properly so-called, then the accommodation is not let to the licensee as a dwelling. Street v Mountford (1985) AC 809 most likely doesn't apply if any hotel services are offered by the hotel. In the case, Mountford was found a tenant because Street did not offer any services beyond the room and furnishings itself. The presence of any service would change the pattern significantly, as the House of Lords decided: It applies against Bob if the hotel offers cleaning service/room service, and by offering service beyond the room and the furnishing within it, it is lodging, not a tenancy: The occupier is a lodger if the landlord provides attendance or services which require the landlord or his servants to exercise unrestricted access to and use of the premises. A lodger is entitled to live in the premises but cannot call the place his own. [...] Street provided neither attendance nor services and only reserved the limited rights of inspection and maintenance and the like set forth in clause 3 of the agreement. On the traditional view of the matter, Mrs. Mountford not being a lodger must be a tenant. Mehta v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (2000) 32 H.L.R. 45 doesn't apply, as that case revolved around a verbal contract with the manager for 6 month exclusive use of rooms. Mehta became a tenant by that contract and eviction protection applied. In contrast, due to how agreements with hotels are generally written, Westminster CC v Clarke (1992) might apply: If the contact specified that the hotel does have unlimited access (which is typical) and that reassignments of rooms (like, another guest in the room) might apply, then there is no tenancy. Could Bob be a tenant? For Bob to be a tenant under the E&W interpretation (following the pattern established by Street & Brillouet), the facts must be such, that several things must be true: Exclusive possession: No services are offered at all beyond the room. For example, there can't be any shared facilities with the rest of the hotel that Bob has access to, and services such as room cleaning or fresh towels or laundry are not offered either. Not using them is not enough, they can't be offered at all. (both Street, Brillout) If in exclusive Possession, Bob still isn't a tenant if he is what Street calls a service occupier. That's an employee who is given a place to sleep in to perform his duties to the employer, like a Butler or Maid. (Street) Bob is also not an owner in fee simple, trespasser or mortgagee in possession, or an object of charity - for which all other rules apply. (Street) In the alternative, one fact makes them automatically one: There was a contract that in its form stipulates they are a Tenant (Mehta v RBS)
As far as I know, no jurisdiction in the US relieves a person of their contractual lease obligations when they are required by law to leave the country. However, many (perhaps most) states require the landlord to make an effort to re-rent an abandoned unit, which reduces the size of the tenant's liability. Unless the landlord just gives up on the claim for $8K, you would have that liability, which could be collected through legal process. The landlord might do this in her jurisdiction, which would no doubt result in a default judgment (because you won't show up). Theoretically, she could also pursue you in your home country, but that is much more complicated, expensive, and subject to whatever discretionary dim view the local courts have of US immigration law, or other tenant-related laws (the courts would have to conclude that there was a wrong by the standards of that country). A variant of suing you in your home country is suing you in the US and having the judgment enforced in the foreign country, but that against depends on the legal system of that country and treaties between the country and the US. Since visitor visas are a highly discretionary legal entitlement, it's impossible to say "won't" w.r.t. the question of whether a visa application will be denied because of an unpaid monetary judgment. It's also impossible to say "won't" because the law can change at any time. With those caveats, there does not appear to be any concrete reason to believe that a visitor visa will be denied because you skipped out on a lease. A visa can be denied and one can be perma-banned for lying on interview questions, so the hope is that there isn't a question "do you have any money judgments against you in the US".
My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose.
As a general rule, legal language is interpreted loosely with respect to singular versus plural, or male versus female (in interpreting pronouns). A clause that uses the word "tenant" can thus be construed as referring to multiple tenants, and "tenants" can also refer to a single tenant. Likewise, "he, him" refers to a third person, regardless of gender. If the intent of an agreement is that only a single person shall reside in a place, then the wording of the contract would have to say that, and you can't derive that from using "tenant" rather than "tenant or tenants". I don't think the issue comes down to "treating y'all as one person", it comes down to whether the obligation is joint, a series of several obligations, or a joint and several obligation. You would look for expressions like "We and each of us agree...", vs. "Each of us agree...", or "We agree..." to sort that out: I assume that the language just says "Tenant agrees...", that is, there is nothing at all in the wording of the lease that resolves the matter. Tenant (whoever that is) has an obligation to Landlord to pay rent. It doesn't matter if Tenant is 1 person or 10: you have to pay the rent. If 5 out of 10 of those people mysteriously disappear, the other 5 still have to pay a now-doubled rent per person. Each person is fully responsible for all of the lease obligations, and if you are the only reliable person in a lease with 10 parties, you could get stuck with the entire obligation. If Tenant needs to go away for some reason, Tenant can normally negotiate with another person to assume their obligations, so Tenant would come up with an arrangement with a new person, and the new person would have an obligation to (old) Tenant – this is basically a private arrangement that doesn't involve the Landlord. However: it is pretty standard that landlords get a say in letting in new tenants, and you have a clause in your agreement that says that. There are two ways for the old tenant to "go away". One is to completely terminate the old agreement, and the landlord signs a new lease with the new person: the old tenant is completely free of any subsequent obligations, and if the new tenant fails to pay rent, the landlord has to go after the new tenant. The other way is by assigning his obligation (as described above): the agreement is between the old tenant and the new tenant (with the landlord's consent). The question now is, what is the meaning of the clause "the assignee shall sign a separate written agreement with Landlord and Tenant"? (Earlier, I missed the significance of "Landlord and Tenant"). The core question is whether the new arrangement is a novation, or is it an assignment? A novation requires agreement between all parties, and that is what seems to be implied here. California landlord law then tells you that this "makes the new tenant (rather than the original tenant) solely responsible to the landlord". In contrast, "Like a sublease, an assignment is a contract between the original tenant and the new tenant (not the landlord)". Since this involves the landlord, the conclusion is inescapable that this is not actually an assignment (despite the use of the word "assignee"). All of the parties to the agreement would have to agree to these new terms, if in fact there is an agreement that substitutes D for C in this agreement with the landlord (a notation). If C remains on the hook and this is just a personal arrangement between C and D (with Landlords consent) – which is not what the clause says – then you don't get a vote in the C-D arrangement.
Since this seems to have been viewed a lot, an update/answer. I can't comment on the normalcy of such clauses since this has been my only experience. But the Estate Agent immediately struck the clause without any fight, so it seems like it was just there "in case I let it slide". It turned out to be a great decision, since I ended up finding my own buyer in the same week that the agent acquired a suitable offer, which I would then have been liable to pay the fees for.
The security deposit goes with the lease, so he will transfer the deposit to the new owner, who will return it to you when the time comes. Unless, in your state, security deposits are put in escrow accounts, and again you will get it back at the end of the lease..
In general, the words "due on" take on their ordinary meaning - that is, that the performance of a contract is required on or before the date specified. If it is not specified in the contract, a court will look to what is reasonable in the circumstances. For instance, if payment is due to a company that trades 24 hours a day including the day payment was due, then payment up until midnight may be found acceptable. However, if it is not known to the person making the payment that the business has such extended hours, and especially if it is known that the business has normal hours, then payment after close of business would likely not be reasonable. To your question, and having reviewed some Canadian residential rent legislation, although none define due on specifically - and I would not expect them to do so - most have clauses which provide for termination, and they only refer to serving notice either a certain number of days after rent falls due, or the day after rent falls due. This would tend to support my assertion that rent is payable on or before the specified date, unless the contract says otherwise, in line with the above considerations. NB: While rent is usually payable in advance, this simply means that you are paying for the occupancy during that follows, or substantially follows, rather than the period that has elapsed.
Are charges subject to Double jeopardy if they have been pleaded out of? Person C was charged with crimes A and B. Person C pled guilty to crime A, as part of a plea bargain with prosecution, in exchange for dropping charges on crime B. Executive branch (state or federal, as appropriate) pardoned/commuted the sentence of person C for crime A. Can prosecution decide to prosecute person C for crime B now, without it being thrown out as Double Jeopardy? Why it's unclear to me: Wikipedia says Double jeopardy is a procedural defence that prevents an accused person from being tried again on the same (or similar) charges and on the same facts, following a valid acquittal or conviction, which seems to exclude the situation where the charge was pleaded out of - which is neither acquittal nor a conviction.
The Fifth Amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;" which suggests that Crime B is still fair game under double jeopardy. However, if B is a lesser included offense under Blockburger, i.e. A is Aggravated Robbery and B is Robbery, then a prosecution could be barred by Double Jeopardy. Barring that, and jurisdiction specific law, the State isn't barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the 5th (and 14th) amendment. That does not foreclose Person C from finding an ethical, equitable, statutory remedy or controlling case enforcing a plea bargain. As far as I can tell, commutation is the equivalent of a conviction while a pardon is equivalent to an acquittal. I also imagine if the prosecution isn't barred and tried C for B, the Executive may just pardon/commute C again. Edit to add: Under Santobello, it would appear C may have an additional remedy enforcing a plea bargain. Santobello didn't involve a case dismissed in a plea bargain, nor commutation or pardon. A court might find that commutation or pardon are essentially a breach of the agreement.
You don't make plea bargains with police officers. This answer discusses the ethics of plea bargains. Even if you made this deal with the police officer, you could renege on it at trial, and the police officer would have lost his or her opportunity to search the trunk. Extortion is generally defined as (this example from California): this obtaining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right A plea bargain doesn't result in the obtaining of property. The plea bargain exchanges your statement of guilt of crime A for the prosecutions's dropping of charges for crime B.
It's a "greater offense" -- sometimes also called a "greater included offense." But you're generally going to be mistaken about whether the defendant can be re-charged after an acquittal on the lesser-included offense. In the United States, at least, the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit that prosecutorial strategy. One could still face new charges for the same conduct, but those charges have to pass the Blockburger test.
Yes, "The offender will receive a criminal record." But, you ask, "How is this squared with s14(1) of the 2000 Act?" Well, you will note that it states that it "shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings." The key here is "other than the purposes of the proceedings" which means that, although there is no further punishment for your crime, you have still been convicted officially and it will be noted (on your record) as per the proceedings, and may be brought up in any subsequent proceedings ( "and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under section 13 above." ). You will also note section 12(7): "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a court, on discharging an offender absolutely or conditionally in respect of any offence, from making an order for costs against the offender or imposing any disqualification on him or from making in respect of the offence an order under section 130, 143 or 148 below (compensation orders, deprivation orders and restitution orders)." Which further shows that an absolute discharge is not an absolute pardon, and should not be thought of as such. Rather, "You are very much guilty, but of such a minor crime that the experience of a trial has probably been enough, so we'll let you go without additional punishment."
Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.
Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction.
england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.
In the U.S., one trial can be held for multiple co-defendants, though prosecutors and defense attorneys will have reasons for seeking separate trials (If only to avoid having a scene similar to the on in Dark Knight where Harvey Dent has about 50 mobsters caught in one RICO violation plus their lawyers and the judge's simple question of "How do you plea?" is met with a din of responses.). The Defense's reason for this is that an individual may not have been a part of every step of the collective guilt and thus some charges might not be appropriate if it's an individual's guilt compared to a groups guilt. For example, the six police officers involved in the 2015 death of Freddie Gray at trial were all tried separately. The first trial was declared a mistrial over the hung jury, and two subsequent trial's resulted in findings of not guilty by a judge during a bench trial. The remaining individuals had charges dropped (The three officers who had yet to have trials plus the one officer whose trial resulted in a mistrial). One of the findings a running theme of the officers as individuals did nothing wrong, though had they been tried collectively, the results may have been different, since the individual trials meant certain facts couldn't be brought up as they didn't apply to the individual but did if they were tried as a group. From a prosecutor's standpoint, separate trials mean that you can use one suspect against the other and make a deal for lighter charges in exchange for testimony against a partner in crime. The U.S. legal system does allow for plea deals between the defense and prosecution (and while it's not the only nation that allows this, it's one of the few where plea bargaining is not viewed as a "dirty" tactic and is openly embraced (U.S. attorneys tend to hate going to trial and will try to avoid it.). Prosecutors are not above offering immunity or granting lighter sentences in exchange for help in other cases, often in the form of testimony against the big fish. For a criminal who believes "snitches get stitches", an offer of flipping on your co-defendant for a sentence of 10 years, with parole in 5 is nothing to sneeze at when you're looking at 25 to life without parole for what you did. It's not immunity for testimony (typically, witnesses in plea bargains are not allowed to take the 5th with respect to questions on the stand because they will typically plea before the trial, and thus can't be prosecuted for the same crime.).
Court order for a DMCA counter-notice I have sent a DMCA notice against a party which is infringing on some material of mine. They have now sent a DMCA counter-notice, and the site replied with the following We will replace the removed material or cease disabling access to it within ten (10) business days provided we do not receive notice from you that an action has been filed seeking a court order to restrain this user from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material How do I proceed? Can I take the matter to a court especially that neither me or the infringer is US-based? Can I take the matter to court without going through an attorney/lawyer?
When you file a DMCA notice, what it really means is that you are saying: "Dear website, there is some copyright infringement going on against my works, and I'm willing to take someone to court. You have the choice of removing these materials, which means I cannot sue you, or you can leave copyright infringement on your website and you will be part of the court case". When the purported infringer gives a counter notice, what it really means is that they are saying: "Bring it on. Take my to court. I'm not afraid of you. By the way, dear website, because you followed the DMCA procedures and I gave you the counter notice, you can't be sued for copyright infringement if you restore these materials, even if they are infringing on copyright. " And the website tells you politely "we played by the rules of the DMCA. So now it's between you and the purported infringer, you can't sue us for showing the contents. " So yes, if you don't take the copyright infringer to court, nothing will happen.
The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.
In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.
No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder.
A few years ago, there was a trial in the USA about some short sound on some music CD: One party claimed that one piece of music on the CD contained a sound of less than one second length which is copied from another CD without the permission of the copyright owner of the other CD. It could never be found out if this claim was really true. The court's decision was: If it is not possible to distinguish between a copy and a work that does not depend on the other work at all, it is not a copyright infringement - even if the sound has been copied from the other CD. For this reason, I'd guess that a 4x3 image would not be a copyright infringement, yet, while 60x45 would definitely be one. Just for reference: The same image as 3x4 and as 45x60:
The answer depends in part what venue you're talking about, e.g. Reddit, Facebook etc. The details are revealed somewhere in the Terms of Service for that venue. The general pattern is that you are allowed to use that venue, provides you grant permission for the service to do what they do with your content. You cannot legally send them a take-down notice for your stuff, because a take-down notice requires you to say that the stuff was posted without your permission (and that is false – and you can be punished for making that statement). There could be a venue where they do not hold you to an irrevocable license, in which case you could revoke that permission (but not Reddit: you granted them a "royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, unrestricted, worldwide license to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, or publicly display your user content in any medium and for any purpose, including commercial purposes, and to authorize others to do so"). I've seen a site that actually asserts ownership of user-contributed content (I don't know if their TOS ended up being litigated) – if is not at all hard to write a TOS that includes transfer of copyright, rather than granting of a license. The only hard parts are (1) figuring out what you want in terms of permission to use and (2) whether your answer to (1) means nobody will use your service. SE and Reddit TOS probably are as close as you need to get for what you describe.
There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question.
If an infringement suit is filed, the plaintiff(s) would have rights of discovery. They could subpoena the source code in such a case for comparison. They could take the depositions of EvilCorp's developers and ask them about the libraries that they used. There might well be other ways to achieve the same effect.
Is it illegal for someone holding a public office in the United States to accept money intended as a bribe if they do not act on the bribe? Theoretically say that an individual is offered a bribe from someone to not do action X. The individual accepts the money, but does action X anyways. The bribe was, obviously, not part of a legally binding document. If the officer in question discloses the bribe, pays tax on it etc, and continues to do the action they intended despite the bribe, are they legally allowed to accept it? In this case assume a situation with a simple binary option of doing either X or Y so that it's obvious that the officer either was or was not influenced by the bribe, with no ambiguous middle ground. For instance perhaps they were bribed to not report a violation of an appropriate law that they did report.
Bribery is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. 1 The money was offered to influence the actions of the official: it is irrelevant if the actions were influenced or not - its a bribe and, in most jurisdictions, accepting a bribe is a crime. The ethically correct behavior for the official (and the one that affords them the greatest legal protection) is to refuse the bribe if this is a safe thing to do (many bribes come with an implicit threat) or accept the money and then ASAP turn it over to the relevant law enforcement as proceeds of crime, report the bribery to relevant law enforcement, and recuse themselves from the decision: the fact that a bribe was offered raises the perception that the decision they make will be biased against the briber, that is, it will not be an impartial decision.
The first point that is already well-established in law is that there really is a legal requirement to pay taxes, not just federal income taxes, but taxes in general. On rare occasion, there is a legal dispute as to whether something is a tax (Obamacare) or whether a particular authority is allowed to levy such a tax. Let us assume that the tax in question is legally levied. Some taxes are independent of any specific intended purpose (e.g. federal income tax, state sales tax). Some are for a specific purpose (Medicare tax, the taxes that are local school levies). Even when a taxing authority corruptly but legally misdirects the funds designated for a specific purpose, you are still required to pay the tax. It's not that a tax law could not be written which allows a person to refuse to pay a tax if they judge that the revenues are being misdirected, it's that the law-makers did no cripple the tax law with such a provision. As far as I know, no taxing authority anywhere allows a person to refuse to pay a tax is they disagree with the use of the taxes, which is to say, taxation is mandatory, not voluntary. If it is voluntary, it is known as a "contribution". You are allowed to contribute to some governmental purpose, you are required to pay taxes. You can't overcome the requirement to pay taxes on First Amendment grounds (being forced to support something that you don't like). The IRS has a FAQ that addresses the First Amendment argument, with a mass of supporting court cases (US v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252; Jenkins v. Commissioner, 483 F.3d 90; US v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627; Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173; US v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 831; and so on).
In the United States, the answer depends on who is unlawfully in power. In the hypothetical you presented, the answer is probably that the law would remain valid, as Congress generally has the sole authority to pass judgment on whether to admit the elected person. A third party would not have the ability to challenge the law based on the qualifications of a lawmaker. But if we were dealing with an administrative official promulgating regulations, those rules would generally be void if that official were unlawfully appointed. That was the case in Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), where a cola distributor challenged a labor regulation, saying that the members of the NLRB who enacted it were improperly appointed. The Court agreed that the appointments were improper, so the regulations were nullified. A judicial decision coming out under these circumstances would also be nullified if one of the judges weren't really a judge. That happened just last year, in Yovino v. Rizo. In that case, ten judges from the Ninth Circuit heard a case, and the vote split 6-4. But the author of the majority opinion died before the decision was published, which is when it become effective. The Supreme Court held that because there were therefore only five votes for that decision, it was not a majority opinion, and therefore not binding on future Ninth Circuit panels.
International organizations such as the UN are typically treated similar to foreign governments, and thus enjoy various privileges. One consequence is that typically, income from employment by these organizations is not subject to taxation by the host countries where the employee lives or carries out their work. However, the details depend very much on the tax laws in that host country. The employee might still be required to file taxes, but would then likely be able to declare the income as tax-free under the corresponding provision of the national tax law. This usually also depends a lot on the treaties which created the international organisation. For example, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations contains an explicit tax exemption for UN officials, though not necessarily for regular employees. As an example for how a country treats employees of international organization, the IRS has guidance regarding US tax law here. Other countries tend to have similar rules, albeit with less accessible online documentation :)
Let's start with the most important point first: A campaign finance violation is not a ground to remove an elected official from office, no matter how egregious, on its own, even if one could prove that the campaign finance violation probably caused the outcome of an election to change. Congress could decide, however, that a campaign finance violation constitutes a "high crime or misdemeanor" for which a sitting President could be impeached, if a majority of the House of Representatives votes to impeach the President and a two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate trying the impeachment under the supervision of the Chief Justice of the United States (that and not "Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court" is the official title) finds that the offense set forth in the impeachment has been committed and constitutes sufficient grounds to remove the President from office. At the outset, there is some ambiguity over whether the violation of campaign finance laws would have been by individual person, or the political campaign of the individual person (which is a Section 529 non-profit organization). The individual or the campaign, as the case might be, would definitely owe either civil or criminal fines, as the case might be, for a violation of the particular campaign finance laws that the individual or campaign is alleged to have violated. The violation could also affect the ability of the violator to obtain all or any amount of federal matching funds in a future election. Depending upon the particular campaign finance law involved, which isn't clearly specified, there might be a criminal penalty (either a misdemeanor or a minor felony) as well, which could give rise to a probation sentence, a sentence to some period of incarceration, a period of post-release parole, criminal fines, court costs, and, at least in the case of a felony, some collateral consequences of that conviction such as a prohibition on owning a gun and ineligibility for many occupations and jobs. Neither a civil campaign finance violation, nor a criminal conviction for a campaign finance violation, disqualifies someone from holding the office of President. The President does not have immunity from civil or criminal consequences of campaign finance violations committed prior to taking office, and the President's campaign, at a minimum, is not immune to campaign finance violations at any time. Presidential immunity from liability is limited to the conduct of the President while holding the office in furtherance of the governance duties of the President. Generally speaking, campaigning would not be a governance duty of the President, but there are factual circumstances under which it is hard to distinguish between what constitutes governing and what constitutes campaigning in the case of a sitting President who is currently in office. Also, campaign finance violations can't be prosecuted by just anyone. A violation of federal campaign finance laws must be prosecuted by a federal government lawyer authorized to do so by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which has an even partisan balance of members by design and almost always deadlocks on motions to prosecute anything but the least controversial and most blatant campaign finance violations against members of either of the two major political parties in the United States. A "private attorney general" can't bring a lawsuit to enforce campaign finance laws unilaterally. The President can definitely pardon a criminal violation of a campaign finance law by anyone other than himself. The President definitely cannot pardon a civil violation of a campaign finance law by anyone. The majority and more analytically sound position is that the President cannot pardon himself for his own criminal violation of a campaign finance law (there are prior questions and answer at Law.SE regarding that question). A judge considering a campaign finance violation charge against a sitting President could, however, take steps short of dismissing the charges that could accommodate a sitting President. For example, the judge could be very deferential to the President in setting hearing dates, allowing the President to participate in proceedings by telephone or (in some but not all cases) through a representative, or in setting the amount of a bond or the terms of pre-trial release in the event of a criminal charge, or in cooperating with the President's security detail when the President is required to appear. In a civil violation case, the President would probably be allowed to be a deposition witness, with the deposition testimony used at trial, rather than appearing in person at trial, if his lawyers requested that treatment.
Because there is no duty to be honest Generally, there is no duty of honesty except in specific circumstances. These include: when under penalty of perjury when negotiating a contract when immediate and direct harm would result from dishonesty (e.g. telling someone it was safe to cross the road when it wasn’t) under most consumer protection laws, when engaged in trade or commerce (which politics isn’t) Definitions differ but fraud requires both dishonesty and deception to acquire property or money or to cause loss. A vote is not property or money. While donations involve money, they are gifts and are given without expectation of reciprocity.
Unless there is a law or regulation against it, it is legal. However in a big government it can be practically impossible to determine whether something is legal. For example, nobody even knows how many criminal statutes have been promulgated by the U.S. federal government. And that's nothing compared to the volume of executive regulation and judicial case-law that determines whether something is illegal. I.e., in practice determining that something is legal is a bit like proving a negative. Furthermore, if you look long enough some argue that you can probably find some law under which almost any action could be considered illegal. Note also that even if it is not against the law, it could be proscribed by contract (read your Terms and Conditions!), and breach of contract is in general – but with an astonishing number of exceptions! – illegal.
What you linked to is a list of definitions of terms used in the laws of Arkansas. The actual Arkansas law on gifts to elected officials reads as such: Persons elected or appointed to select offices, including members of the general assembly, shall not solicit or accept a gift from a lobbyist or a person acting on behalf of one. A lobbyist shall not offer or pay for food or drink at more than 1 planned activity in a 7 day period. Does not prohibit the acceptance of: (1) Food, drink, informational materials, or other items included in a conference registration fee; and (2) Food and drink at events coordinated through the regional or national conference and provided to persons registered to attend. Ark. Const. art. XIX,§ 30. http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx The official is just not supposed to accept gifts, besides the provision for lobbyists to pay for food or drink. It's not that they can take a gift and pay $100 dollars.
How can I have legal employees under an LLC without paying them? I'm currently a college student (US) for computer science and a few of my friends and I are going to develop a few games for PS4, Wii U, 3DS, and possibly soon the Switch. We're all fine developing these games for free, at least until we get a couple games released to bring in some profit, but we want to do it legally under a business. It's kind of iffy with the NDAs for gaming companies like Nintendo, Sony, etc to sign separate NDAs as individuals and work together (not to mention tricky to accomplish). I was going to make an LLC that we could all work under, but it's obviously not that easy. From my research I've found that I would need worker's compensation insurance and I'd obviously have to pay the employees. Is there any way to have like minded people working without pay under a single legal entity?
Tim Lymington got it right in the comment. If they don't get a wage, but expect a share of profit and/or loss, they are your partners and would be "members" of the LLC. Then you don't need workers comp or even to pay any salary at all. Of course, they will also be entitled to a share of the business, but from the description it sounds like they should be.
Your friend's relationship with the game company is one of contract. You don't say what the contract terms are, so it's impossible to say whether they were breached by your friend or the company. In any case, it is likely that the only remedy your friend could seek is damages, probably limited to whatever outstanding portion of the subscription they have not had the benefit of. It seems unlikely that it will be a large enough amount to be worth pursuing. As a private company the game provider can choose to contract with who they wish, or not as the case may be (unless they can be shown to be discriminating against protected characteristics).
For a definite answer, Bob should ask his tax advisor. German freelance status ("Freiberufler") is a bit difficult to navigate, because legally speaking, this status can only be applied to contract work that requires a university degree, everything else is a regular business ("Gewerbe") that is taxed differently and requires you to join the chamber of commerce. This has become a bit murky as there are freelance software developers without a degree (who should be careful about using the word "engineer") and the tax office seems to accept that, but I'm not entirely sure they are as lenient towards entertainers (which YT would fall under). The way I understand the Blue Card FAQ, freelancing is not allowed for Blue Card holders, I'd consider that the bigger problem (but that's an immigration issue, not a tax issue).
Usually, the only reason to set up an "ownerless" corporation is to set up a non-profit. Non-profit corporations can have self-perpetuating boards and are very similar to charitable trusts. If it ends up without any board members and has a self-perpetuating board, any person affected by the corporation or a suitable government representative (in the U.S., usually a state attorney general in the place of incorporation) can apply to a court to have new board members appointed. In a "for profit" context, this generally doesn't happen because the people investing in the company want to be able to profit from it and/or obtain a return of their investment. So, the question is largely hypothetical in that case.
Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.
"The company you are working for ..." Stop. We're done. An employer owns the IP created by an employee in the course of their employment: the hackathon is in the course of your employment.
By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.
If the company makes a contract, and as a result of that contract it owes more money than it has, then the company goes bankrupt and the owners and directors can walk away from it. This covers the owners/directors in cases of ordinary business contracts. However if an employee (including an owner or director) does something sufficiently harmful then under the law of torts they can be personally liable as well as the company. Examples are negligence and fraud; if you build someone's new roof while acting as an employee and the roof leaks then its likely to be the company on the hook for damages. However if you misrepresented your qualifications or acted negligently then you might well be personally liable. This is all very general. Details are going to be specific to your jurisdiction. So the answer is that having a company is certainly better than making every contract in your own name, but its not complete cover. You can probably get insurance if this is a concern, but its likely to be expensive.
What entitlements do I have if someone uses my video on Facebook and gets millions of views? I posted a video on Facebook and a page asked if they could use the video. I said as long as I get credit. That video now has almost 10 million views on their page and countless other pages and sites have used my video. Am I entitled to any of the money they make off of advertisements? Are pages legally allowed to use that video if I did not give them license?
Copyright law requires permission of the rights holder to e.g. post material. The terms of that permission could be very complicated, as seen in royalties contracts with publishers, but they can also be simple. If someone asks "can I post your video on my website" and you say "Sure, as long as you give me credit", then they can post the video on their site as long as that say something like "This video was made by Jake" or something like that. There is no exception to permission where permission is retroactively withdrawn just in case it turns out that one can make money off of the video. However: you gave That Guy permission, and that does not mean that the hundreds of Other Guys have permission. So you can pursue all of the Other Guys and demand that they take the video down, or require some payment to get your permission.
No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads "There should be more detail and complex lines over here" What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of "lines" does this refer to?
No You are limited to “your ... use only”. You are not given permission to make this available for 3rd parties either commercially or for free.
Reproducing someone else's copyrighted material without permission is a violation of that copyright. This includes using it to promote your Twitter account. This is a violation of copyright law and of Twitter's TOS. There may be Fair Use exceptions- this question is arguably fair use. However, it's extremely unlikely your intended post counts. In the case of the image in question, royalty-free means you pay for a single licence for that image and can then use it as much as you want (according to that licence). You can post that image in as many of your tweets as you like- you don't have to pay each time. If you don't want to pay for images you use, use public domain images, images with licenses that allow you to use them, or create them yourself.
If the blog author holds the copyright on the ebook, they can distribute the ebook anyway they choose, either via download from Github or elsewhere, or sell it in an online store. They hold the copyright, they alone can decide how to distribute it. If they also sell the ebook in the Microsoft press Store, they may have an agreement with the store to also allow their own free downloads; it's hard to say without knowing the agreement. If there are ebooks on Githb available for viewing or download, the owner of the Github page should hold copyright of the ebook, both 1) for their own protection against copyright infringement, and 2) to not break GitHub's TOS against copright infringement: https://help.github.com/articles/github-terms-of-service/#f-copyright-infringement-and-dmca-policy
Am I as the user of this site in any way liable if the music turns out to violate copyright? Yes. In a similar way to if I give you “permission” to take my neighbour’s car. Only worse. Because stealing requires intent - you have to mean to do it - while copyright violation is strict liability - if you do it, you’re guilty. If the user that uploaded the item did not have the authority to give the site permission then the site does not have permission and neither do you. If you take reasonable precautions such as performing a reverse image source and verifying that the item appears to be owned by the same person everywhere and, perhaps, reaching out to them then your violation will be an “innocent” infringement which mitigates but does not eliminate damages. The only way to be sure with copyright is to know the provenance of the copyright/licences back to the original creator.
Pay him the $1,000: it's his video so it his money. If you're lucky he won't sue you for copyright infringement. If you're very lucky he won't sue the TV station for copyright infringement (because they would immediately sue you under the indemnity clause you undoubtedly signed when you submitted a video you said you owned but didn't). If you're extremely lucky he might buy you a beer.
You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry.
Can law enforcement use a GPS tracking device without a warrant? In 2007, a man named Juan Pineda-Moreno was suspected of purchasing products to grow Cannabis. Rather than put a GPS tracking device on his car and leaving it, they put several GPS devices on his car throughout a four month investigation. Most of the time his vehicle was on public property, but twice the car was in his driveway, so they entered his property at 4 to 5 in the morning to place it. I'm aware that in United States v. Jones the Supreme Court ruled that police must obtain a warrant to use GPS devices. However, their conclusion had to do with how long the GPS was attached to Jones' car. In Pineda-Moreno's case, the GPS was used to follow him for short distances. I cannot find any new information on this case past 2010. Can officers still use a GPS tracking device without a warrent?
US v. Jones The majority opinion in US v. Jones 565 U. S. ____ (2012) , written by Justice Scalia, held that the attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle was a trespass and thus a search. The analysis ended there. It did not even need to reach the issue of how long Jones was monitored (although one of the concurring opinions took that into account). Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. This leaves open whether police can attach a GPS device to a car before it is obtained by a defendant and then later use that GPS device to monitor the defendant's movements. Based on the concurrences in Jones there are at least five votes for the principle that long term GPS surveillance is a search (Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor1) and at least one vote (Justice Sotomayor) for the principle that any GPS surveillance is a search. The latter holding would require overruling or distinguishing Karo and Knotts, two cases that allowed the placement of a surveillance device into things before the defendant purchased them.2 Effect on US v. Pineda-Moreno Regarding, US v. Pineda-Moreno, on remand to the 9th Circuit for consideration in light of Jones, the 9th Circuit said: Jones has made clear that the agents conducted Fourth Amendment searches when they attached tracking devices to Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep and used the devices to monitor the Jeep’s movements. Indeed, for purposes of this remand we will assume, without deciding, that those warrantless searches would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment after Jones. But Jones had not been decided when those searches occurred. And when the agents attached and used the mobile tracking devices that yielded the critical evidence, they did so in objectively reasonable reliance on then-binding precedent. Relying on Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), the 9th Circuit declined to suppress the evidence obtained against Pineda-Moreno. Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule. 1. While Justice Sotomayor did not join Justice Alito's concurrence, she wrote: "I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”" 2. In a pre-Jones dissent to the denial of a petition for en banc rehearing of US v Pineda-Moreno, Chief Judge Kozinski distinguished Knotts this way: The electronic tracking devices used by the police in this case have little in common with the [beepers] in Knotts. [...] Beepers could help police keep vehicles in view when following them, or find them when they lost sight of them, but they still required at least one officer—and usually many more—to follow the suspect. The modern devices used in Pineda-Moreno’s case can record the car’s movements without human intervention—quietly, invisibly, with uncanny precision.
There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf
There is no search analog to the Miranda requirement. The Supreme Court in Miranda didn't just decide that people had to be told their rights, for all rights in all contexts. Miranda applies just to 5th and 6th Amendment rights, in case a person is being held coercively. If you are free to go, you need not be apprised of your rights: so, if the police are just asking questions when you are not being held, they are not required to give a rights warning. Likewise, they are allowed to request permission to conduct a search. It is true than many people do not understand that a request is distinct from an order. A useful phrase to remember is "Am I free to go?". If the answer is no, you are busted and they can search you. If the answer is yes, you don't have to let them search you (to avoid the ambiguity of silence, refusing permission to search is not a bad strategy, unless you want then to search you – e.g. if you want to get on the plane).
This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.
Jurisdiction? washington. RCW 9A.16.020 says when force is lawful. (1) Whenever necessarily used by ...a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction Not apparently applicable in this case. (2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody Looks promising, except RCW 9A.52.070 says "(2) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a gross misdemeanor". For the record, (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary but you didn't describe malicious trespass (which incidentally is not statutorily defined in Washington). Our last hope is: (4) Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the possession of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to be intended to be open to members of the public For example, you can detain a person for a few seconds to ask what he's doing there and to get whatever answer you are going to get. It does not extend to "detain the trespasser until you are satisfied that he has truthfully identified himself", or "until the police show up".
Until it runs out of gas. With the caveat that I can't prove a negative: No, there is no such statute or case law restricting how long a police or law enforcement vehicle can follow someone on a road. However, law enforcement officers can be subject to investigation and sanction under "stalking" or "harassment" laws, which typically require a pattern of documented misbehavior in the absence of good cause for said behavior.
If you read the first link, every offense can lead to arrest without a warrant. Notwithstanding, you don’t have to be arrested to be charged and vice -versa.
Courts, particularly traffic courts, tend to take a police officer's word over that of an accused person. While legally the limit is 70, the driver has very little recourse if the officer claims falsely that the actual speed was over 70. But the deterant effect of a posted limit is lost, since drivers in general have no way to know that Officer O will ticket anyone going over 60. I suppose that driver D, or D's lawyer, could subpoena calibration records of any radar gun or other measuring devise used, and could insist on its being tested. However, unless they had reason to think there was an issue, I wonder if D and D's lawyer would go through that process. Some speed measuring devices print a paper slip showing the date and time along with the reading. If such a device was used that record would be harder to alter. Some cars are now equipped with devices provided by insurance companies that record speeds and other driving info in a secure way to help judge a driver's safety and allow individual rate setting. It might be that the record from such a device would be admissible to show the speed was under the posted limit. But there is a sense in which the law is what the police and the courts enforce. If anyone who drives the road over 60 is cited and must pay, one could say the effective limit there is 60.
Copyright vs. right to attribution Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (citations omitted) gives the primary purpose of copyright: The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art. According to this, it seems copyright is not as much for protecting the author's right to allow others to copy their work as it is to protect against distortions, misrepresentations, or misattributions of the work. Thus, is copyright really for protecting the author's right to attribution?(like a CC BY license?) Is the right to attribution contained within copyright?
Copyright does not contain the right to attribution (except with respect to authors of visual arts at 17 USC 106A). A copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce a work, create derivative works, distribute copies, etc. (17 USC §106). As we already answered here, when a copyright owner gives somebody else permission to do some of those things, the copyright owner can attach a condition to that permission. A common condition is that the licensee give credit to the the original creator. With respect to visual arts, the attribution right gives the author the right to "prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation." 17 USC §106A(a)(2)
Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center.
Under United States copyright law, according to the Copyright Office, 206.01 Edicts of government. Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are Federal, State, or local as well as to those of foreign governments. Referencing laws is even clearer: copyright doesn't protect referring to something like "Section 830 of the Penal Code of the State of California." Note that this is assuming that they remain within the US, where copyright law is a federal issue. Other countries don't all have the edict of government rule. If a place were to legally secede and become their own country, they would cease to be bound by US copyright law. They would get to decide if it was legal for them to do it or not; this is just like how it works between the UK and US (the UK claims copyright on its laws, but US courts will not enforce that copyright because it's incompatible with US law). Treaties complicate things, but the Berne Convention allows the edict of government exception. That said, seceding from the US unilaterally is both legally and practically impossible; seceding from a state is likewise generally going to be legally and practically impossible without permission from the state. So, it all depends on the agreements made. EDIT: To specifically address the model codes issue, Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) was a case specifically about what happens when model codes are adopted wholesale into law. The Fifth Circuit (after initially finding that the model codes were protected) reversed en banc, finding that a model code produced for the purpose of being incorporated into law, and which has been incorporated into law, and which is then reproduced as the law of the place that incorporated it into law, is not subject to copyright. Veeck may not apply to cases where the law merely references the model code, or where the thing in question was not made to be incorporated into law (e.g. state laws referencing the Red Book valuation of a car didn't make the Red Book public domain). If both of those are true, it probably doesn't apply; if one holds but not the other, it's unclear. However, if the actual municipal code directly contains the text of the model code, and you reprint it as the law of that municipality (rather than as the model code), there is no copyright in the law.
You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.
According to the current version of the TOS: You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. This explicitly says you own your content, although Medium has some rights to do some things. And they won't sell it without permission, so unless Medium itself is publishing this book, it would seem to be copyright infringement. (Of course, I don't know what the TOS said when you originally wrote the article.) If what was copied was not copyrightable (like a quote from the Constitution, or a simple uncreative graph of something obvious) then it wouldn't be infringement. But your article was probably more than that.
The MIT License (as distributed by OSI) does not include an attribution requirement beyond the requirement to include the copyright notice in any re-distributed copy including derivative works. The same is true of the description of the license as described in the Wikipedia article. If you sent back to the maintainer a modified version including your own contributions with an MIT license notice and your name in the copyright statement, that is a new work released under that license. The maintainer (or anyone else) may not lawfully use your work or incorporate it into a new derived work without complying with the license terms, which require retaining the copyright notice. By distributing the combined work using a copyright notice not including your name, it would seem that your license is being violated. You could contact the maintainer with a request that your name be included in the notice or your contributions be removed. If that is not accepted, you could use a take-down notice, or file suit. That last would involve significant costs, of course.
Under 17 USC 106 (3) one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is: to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; Distributing an entire book cannot plausibly be considered to be fair use. Nor does the library exception apply. The exception in sec 109 (first sale doctrine) applies only to: the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner... 17 USC 501 (a) says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. Therefore both Bob and Sue have infringed the copyright, and could in theory be sued for doing so. However I cannot see anything in 17USC which makes receiving an unlawful copy an infringement, or any other crime or tort. It seems to me that Alice has no legal liability, whatever her moral position may be, unless perhaps she could be charged with conspiracy to infringe the copyright, which seems unlikely to me in practice, and perhaps not possible even in theory. If Bob has in fact done this only once, for one book, the chancre of the copyright owner learning of it, or filing suit even if the owner does learn, is perhaps not large. But that would be no defense if the owner chose to sue. Some copyright owners choose to explicitly permit actions similar to that of Bob (where e-books are involved), provided that Bob does not charge a fee, regarding it as good advertising. But that is the copyright owner's choice to make, and most commercial publishers do not take that position. Bob could have legally loaned his copy to Sue, and Sue could have legally passed it on to Alice, without anyone infringing the copyright. Making the copy without permission was infringing, and passing on the unlawful copy was also an act of infringement. Receiving one copy or many does not seem to be a violation, unless it is part of a plan to later distribute unlawful copies. Sue did not make a copy. She distributed an unlawful copy, which is also infringement, as the quoted part of Sec 106 says. While in theory the publisher could have authorized Bob to make the copy, this is not plausible and no reasonable person would believe this to be an authorized copy. So Sue has good reason to believe that the copy is unauthorized. So the distribution is infringement.
Both Bob and Charles are liable for infringement in the US. The fact that Charles had no idea that Bob was an infringer is not a defense, but it mitigates the statutory damages consequences for him. Either party can negotiate with Alice after the fact for a license, and Alice can grant either party but not the other permission to copy. The terms of the license that Alice gives Bob could either allow CCo reposting, or some more restrictive redistribution right. If the license requires a notice prohibiting further redistribution and Bob omits that notification, Bob will have breached the terms of the license in omitting the notification, so we're back to square 1. If Alice fails to specify a no-redistribution notification condition on Bob's reposting, Alice may have granted an implied license to the world, a matter which has to be determined by the courts.
Can I used an ASCII generated version of a copyrighted image in my game? I'm going to guess the likely answer is no, but I'm interested to know more. So let's say I have an image of James Bond from Goldeneye. Then let's say I run it through ASCII art generator such as this http://picascii.com/ and it produces the following ASCII code made for the web as such (can't post here but here is a JSFiddle of the generated code). https://jsfiddle.net/caimen/ope1j9w0/ Why or why would I not be allowed to use this version of a copyrighted image in my game?
The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.
It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works.
A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases.
This would likely be considered a derivative work. You would need permission from the copyright holder to make it, especially if you intend to distribute it for profit.
Such an image is copyrighted, as part of the movie. You cannot legally use it without permission from the copyright holder, unless the use of the image falls under fair use (note that fair use is a strictly US legal concept. It does not apply anywhere else) or a similar exception to copyright, such as "fair dealing". There are multiple factors which must be considered in making a fair use judgement. No one factor ever totally controls the decision. It is a case-by-case decision. But several things about your proposed use suggest to me that it will not qualify as a fair use. The image is part of a creative work, not a work of non-fiction such as a news report or a textbook. That weighs against fair use. You seem to be using the whole image, although it is only part of the movie. That probably weighs against fair use to some extent. A use in "a social media post regarding a sales vacancy" sounds commercial to me. If so, that would weigh against fair use. The copyright owner might well wish to market images from the film. If so, and if many people used images from the film as you propose to use this one, that might harm the market. This weighs against fair use. You don't seem to be making any comment on the image, or using it in any significantly transformational way. That weighs against fair use. Use of the image does not seem vital or even important to the message you intend to communicate. That also weighs against fair use. In short, I think you would be wiser to use an image that you have or can get permission to use in this way. If you use this image, it is possible that the copyright holder would sue for copyright infringement, or issue a DMCA take-down notice, or both.
Probably not, without permission. Images of the character are usually copyrighted. The characters themselves are usually protected by trademark. Using the name of a fictional character without permission would imply endorsement by the firm that published works with that character. I've taken day long seminars focused mostly on all of the things that comic book companies do to protect their intellectual property rights in their characters. Of course, if you live in Finland, it is likely that no one in the U.S. would decide to take up the case for a U.S. media property, either because they aren't aware of it, or because it isn't economically worthwhile to pursue.
In general, the output of a program is not copyrighted by the author of the program. When you write a novel in Word, Microsoft doesn't own any copyright in your novel. When you prepare financial statements with Excel, Microsoft doesn't own any copyright in those either. There can be exceptions. Some programs (like GNU Bison, a parser generator) actually do output parts of their own source code, and their source code is copyright to the author. To clarify things, GNU made a statement in the license for Bison that officially says they don't have copyright to what it outputs. You should expect programs of this type to have such an exception, and if they don't, maybe ask the author or don't use them.
You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license.
Is copyright infringement theft? Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (citations omitted) gives the primary purpose of copyright: The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art. The first clause above seems to imply that U.S. law does not consider copyright infringement an act of injustice toward the copyright owner. Which countries do or do not consider copyright infringement theft? cf. the § "IP & Property Rights" of Stephen Kinsella's CC BY-licensed work Against Intellectual Property or Aaron Swartz's related short article "Downloading isn't Stealing"
Criminal copyright infringement is defined at 18 U.S. Code § 2319. 2319 does not call copyright infringement theft, and theft is a separate crime, defined at state level (except for a few categories of theft affecting federal interests). Copyright infringement doesn't meet the elements of theft in any state. For example, California's Penal Code Section 484: Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. All signatories of the Berne Convention define copyright infringement separately from theft.
"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.
The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it.
Your title and your question are totally different. If someone pirates a book, makes printed copies, and sells them for profit, that's the point where it switches from plain copyright infringement to being criminal copyright infringement. Which means jail instead of paying damages is possible. If you buy one of these printed copies, not knowing that they have been created illegally, and not being willfully ignorant that the printed copies were created illegal, then you didn't commit copyright infringement yourself. Since you are asking the question, it's obvious that you now know that there was copyright infringement, and buying any more copies would be encouraging copyright infringement with no excuses for you. You can be sued for damages. It is unlikely to happen since suing takes likely more effort than getting any damages from you is worth. The correct thing to do is ask the seller for your money back and destroy the copies. If they don't refund your money you can inform the copyright holder.
The relevant concept is dedicating a work to the public domain, that is, saying in the work something like "This work is dedicated to the public domain". I understand that this isn't entirely reliable in European civil law. The preferred alternative is to license it to the public. However, you have to decide how "free" you want the work to be made. The normal state of affairs, where you do nothing and just rely on copyright law, is that you have the sole right to allow copies to be made and derivative works to be created. Thus if someone were to make a derivative work based on your composition, they would need your permission: but then they would have the right what they created (such as a translation). If you just abandon your property right to the work, you impose no obligation on others, and a person can freely create a translation (which is now their property). If you execute the right public license, you can allow people to use your work as long as they include that license in their versions. A fairly common public licensing scheme is the Creative Commons licenses. That article gives a decent summary of relevant rights and how particular licenses correspond to configurations of permissions. I would say that the most difficult thing to do is to figure out what you don't want to happen, and pick a license that matches that interest.
Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center.
As for plagiarism, that is not a legal concept, so he can define plagiarism however he wants. It certainly isn't, under any definition I have ever seen on Earth and I have seen many (it has to do with "claiming someone else's work as your own"). As for copyright, a set of questions is (potentially) protected by copyright. If they are copied from somebody else's book of questions, then the book author (or publisher) holds copyright. Let's say that QM invented the questions, such as "What is the Turkish word for Janissary?", "What is the most prominent feature of Jannissary garb?" and so on. Then that set of questions, when put down in fixed form, are protected by copyright, and cannot be copied without permission.
The situation in Texas is unclear. It is worth mentioning Texas as a state where the law may require statutory authorization in order to copyright state documents. Although the statute does not explicitly state such as a requirement, it can be inferred from an attorney general opinion. At a bare minimum, the Department of Health, the State Preservation Board, the Water Development Board, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and county governments all have statutory authority to hold copyrights. In your specific case, there's an additional complication. Something is only a work of the State of Texas if one of the following is true: 1) it was created by a government employee as part of their job duties, or 2) it was a work for hire. It's quite likely that neither of the above is true for a student newspaper, rendering the question of Texas-owned copyrights irrelevant.
Can you be arrested the day a law is enacted? On October 2, 1937 the Marijuana Tax Act was enacted. On this same day, a man named Samuel R. Caldwell was arrested by federal agents for selling Marijuana to Moses Baca, who was also arrested. Is this still allowed, whether federally or on the state level? Can you be arrested the day a law is enacted?
The Act was enacted on August 2, 1937. Pub. 238, 75th Congress, 50 Stat. 551 It had an effective date of October 1, 1937, specified at Sec. 17: This Act shall take effect on the first day of the second month after the month during which it is enacted. As soon as a law defining a crime is in effect, you can be arrested for that crime. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) sets out the limits on ex post facto laws, as prohibited by clause 3 of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"). A law is prohibited if it "makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action." Thus, the limit is a strict limit against retroactivity, but a law can become effective immediately. Justice Story, in In re Richardson et al. 2 Story, 571 (1843) wrote: [...] it appears to me, that in all cases of public laws, the very time of the approval constitutes, and should constitute, the guide as to the time, when the law is to have its effect [...] The legislature have it in their power to prescribe the very moment, in futuro, after the approval, when a law shall have effect.
Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice.
The short answer is "yes". There is U.S. Supreme Court authority that supports this position, In particular, United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 599 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), stand for the proposition that a defendant may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurances that he will not be punished for those actions. If the U.S. Department of Justice (or a U.S. Attorney with jurisdiction over the place the offense was committed) (hereinafter DOJ) says this, people who reasonably rely on that pronouncement can't be prosecuted until a different policy is announced and people who acted in reliance on the previous DOJ position are given a reasonable opportunity to change their conduct in response to the newly announced policy. The statement does have to be a publicly announced policy (or a policy personally communicated to the defendant or his counsel), and not just a de facto reality in terms of prosecutions not being brought in the past, or a secret, unannounced policy (or, for example, an unofficial and offhand statement of the U.S. Attorney General at a party that does not amount to a policy statement). Of course, the defense doesn't protect you if the DOJ says it won't prosecute if you do X, but you do X times Y which goes beyond the safe harbor created by the DOJ pronouncement. For example, the DOJ might say that they will not prosecute conduct involving marijuana offenses that is legal under state law, if it does not violate any other laws, and also meets certain conditions found in federal law (e.g. no offenses within 1000 feet of a school) that the DOJ chooses not to refrain from enforcing. But, if the DOJ then publicly says that it will start enforcing federal law without exceptions on July 1, 2021 and has rescinded its prior policy, a reasonable time in advance, then this defense ceases for conduct after that date. What constitutes reasonable notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances. The DOJ can also reach a binding agreement not to prosecute a particular instance of conduct by a particular person irrevocably in connection with plea bargaining type agreements, with respect to offenses of which the DOJ has jurisdiction (but not necessarily prosecutions by a different government such as a state government or the government of another country, for which the DOJ is not an authorized representative). For example, suppose that a mail carrier is killed by a resident of a home claiming to have acted in self-defense in Denver, Colorado. The DOJ could reach an irrevocable agreement with the resident to accept a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of not paying the tax due on the sale of the firearm from a non-compliant gun shop, dismissing forever the charge of murder of a federal post office employee. But that agreement would not bar the District Attorney in Denver from bringing murder charges twenty years later under state law prohibiting murder of human beings in the State of Colorado. For the defendant resident to prevent that from happening definitively, an agreement from the State of Colorado's District Attorney in Denver, or the Colorado Attorney General, would also be required.
The police would still be able to get a warrant even if there was no suspicion against the current owners, provided that there was reasonable evidence to suggest that the body was in the garden. In the event that the police enter the garden and see something like the marijuana plants, plain sight doctrine would allow the police to charge the owners with growing marijuana. If there was something like a green house, separate from the garden area that the body may be located in, the search warrant, if limited in scope, may not apply to the greenhouse. This depends on how specific the location of the body is believed to be: anywhere in the garden? or right behind the house against the wall? The odds are good the police would bring in a cadaver dog (included in the warrant) and patrol the garden to see if the dog finds anything.
Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.
Space Force appears to have been specifically included on Dec 27, 2021. "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, or the Space Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Public Law 117-81, Sec. 1045 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1385
In English law during the late Medieval and early modern period (from 1321 to 1798), it was possible for Parliament to pass a "Bill Of Attainder". This declared a person guilty of a crime, often treason, by legislative act, without any trial or other legal process. See the Wikipedia article for more detail. Often a Bill of Attainder not only decreed that a person (or people) was guilty, but also confiscated the convicted person's property, preventing his (or rarely her) heirs from inheriting, and possibly rendering those heirs ineligible to hold public offices or peerages. The heir would also be prevented from inheriting through the attainted person. For example, property held by the father of the attainted person would not pass to the child of the attainted person. This was called "corruption of the blood", and was viewed with particular horror by many during the colonial period and before. It effectivly treated the heirs of the attainted person as illegitimate. Attainder was usually followed by execution, possibly by torture. The bill might specify the specific fate of the person attained. The US constitutional provision prohibits declaring people guilty of crimes by legislative act, and prohibits sentences for crimes that take property or rights from the family or heirs of the convicted person, even in cases of treason. At least that is how it has been interpreted. Fines may be levied, but may only fall on the actual property of the person convicted. The US Supreme Court has dealt with this clause in several cases: Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) (law requiring lawyers to swear that they had not supported the confederacy held unconstitutional); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) (Law requiring an oath that the person had not supported the confederacy for a professional license held unconstitutional); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (a state law barring convicted felons from practicing medicine upheld); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), (a state law newly requiring that practising physicians must have graduated from a licensed medical school upheld); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (federal law which declared three specific persons "subversive" and barred them from federal employment overturned); American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (federal law which required elected labour leaders to take an oath that they were not and had never been members of the Communist Party USA, and that they did not advocate violent overthrow of the U.S. government upheld); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (law which made it a crime for a former communist to serve on a union's board overturned); and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (law seizing Nixon's presidential papers upheld).
It seems you found out what happened. The police are wrong all the time and usually absolutely nothing happens from it. The police are not required to tell you why you are being arrested. See supreme court case Devenpeck v. Alford. The court merely considers that to be good police practice. They do have to justify probable cause for the arrest to the court.
Does anyone besides the president have the authority to pardon? There have been cases such as Antonio Bascaró, who has been in prison for 37 years because of non-violent marijuana charges. President Obama has had the opportunity to pardon him, but it was denied because Bascaró was prosecuted under "old laws", and Obama's agenda did not include old laws. Does anyone besides the president have the authority to pardon people like Bascaró? In other words, could he be pardoned by some other authority?
The president alone has power, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, to grant pardons for federal offenses. Many states have an analogous power for governors, to pardon state offenses. In some states, though (for example Minnesota), there is a board in charge of the process (made up, in Minnesota, of the Governor, Chief Justice and Attorney General). Likewise, in Canada, pardons are granted by a board. Although POTUS has the power, in terms of implementation it is a bit more complicated, since he doesn't sit around wondering "Who should I pardon": he has an Office of the Pardon Attorney who makes recommendations. However, there are other ways to get out of jail (besides doing the time), namely having the conviction overturned, being paroled, and credit for good behavior. Federal parole is no longer an option, but the other avenues are open, at least in principle.
No. A governor has no authority under the law of another state. The governor of West Sconsin can no more pardon a conviction under the laws of East Sconsin than can the president of Mexico pardon a conviction under the laws of the United States.
He was jailed for breaching an injunction imposed on the Shard in 2018 which was intended to prevent anyone from climbing it, according to a news report from the Guardian at the time. The actual offence he committed was contempt of court which is a criminal offence. Double jeopardy does not apply here because the crime he was cautioned for was not the same crime he was prosecuted for. It appears there was no precedent set, prior to this private prosecution, about whether or not someone could be jailed for breaching an injunction in this manner, as opposed to merely being fined, etc. Obviously, since he has been jailed, people in the future will be reluctant to copy his behaviour and a deterrent has been set.
First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened.
The Department of Justice's Office of the Pardon attorney says yes: Under the Constitution, only federal criminal convictions, such as those adjudicated in the United States District Courts, may be pardoned by the President. In addition, the President's pardon power extends to convictions adjudicated in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and military court-martial proceedings. Like other felonies committed in the District, murder charges are adjudicated by federal prosecutors in the Superior Court, so they would fall within the scope of the presidential pardon power, as interpreted by the DOJ.
Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.
I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”.
Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.
How to win against a moving violation ticket that was issued different than what I had allegedly committed? I was stopped by an officer that claimed I sped over a 30mph speed limit. When he saw that I have a radar detector, he proceeded to "cut me a break" and gave me a ticket for "failed to signal" (but I did use my signal, and the officer knows it). He did not use radar (my radar detector would have indicated otherwise) and I was in the lead among other cars. I wasn't speeding, but accelerated faster than the other cars. It seems to me that he realized that he may not have a strong argument in court when he saw my radar. Therefore, I received a citation that was different than the one I was stopped for. How would a typical case like this play out in court (generalized)? Would he tell the truth, and if he does, would that means the case would be dismissed on the grounds that I did not violate the law in which the citation has stated? (I would probably use "motion to summary judgement" if this happens.) RESULTS from my case: First Trial: Officer did not show up (did not give a reason). The Judge offered a continuance to the officer. Case postponed. (NYS penal code states along the lines that if the officer did not give a reason for missing the court date or is not one of the few exceptions for missing the date, case should be dismissed. However, in my case it wasn't. Perhaps the judge had the final say regarding this matter. 2nd Trial: Officer did not show up. Prosecutor tried to get me to come back. However, I mentioned the continuance is final and that the officer not showing up means there is no witness against me. I got my hearing in front of the judge and the case was dismissed. Notes: After going through this ordeal, I realized that the prosecutors were really out to get people to agree to plea bargains. Even going as for as lying to me the officer was present to get me to sign a plea.
I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it.
No Besides this being clearly unworkable, the requirements for the state providing public defense attorneys include being in need (you will need to provide an affadavit or similar to the effect) and when the defendant is at risk of significant time of confinement. The 5 to 15 minutes of the traffic or Terry stop are not considered significant. Nor are the processing times of arresting you and taking you in. Trying to make the officer provide you with an attorney (or declaring you aren't doing anything without one) before complying with their orders may well result in your incarceration and subsequent assignment of a public defender.
I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?
The policeman ordered, right as he took a step out of his car "Turn it off!" - which is a lawful demand to prevent the biker from possibly kicking the gas and running. As the driver did not seem to comply (from the policeman's PoV) during his walk over to the bike, he enforced the order himself by turning off the bike and confiscating the key for the moment. Having made it safe that the driver couldn't leg it, he guided traffic around him so he could get to the side of the road. We don't know what happened after the driver reached the curb to be lectured and/or arrested, the bike could be impounded or the confiscation might be temporary. So all we can do here is discuss the action of demanding that a motor vehicle be turned off, the doing of such and taking the keys. Demanding a vehicle to be shut off is standard procedure in police stop, as it is ensuring the safety of everybody involved. In a somewhat recent case (trying to find it again!), a driver did not shut off the car and had to stand on the brake to keep it where it was. As commands came conflicting (keep your hands where we can see them, get out of the car!) and he could not comply or the car would jump forward and ram somewhere, things escalated and the driver was shot. But back to the first step. Was the stop lawful? ACLU in NY tells us: Police may stop and briefly detain you only if there is reasonable suspicion that you committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime. Don’t bad-mouth a police officer or run away, even if you believe what is happening is unreasonable. That could lead to your arrest. There was a crime committed: Splitting is illegal in NY (among others: Section 1122, overtaking on the right), so the stop was justified under NY CPL 140.50. From my own experience, it is not uncommon for bikers to try to evade police by swerving back into traffic and using their higher mobility to get away. On its face, this makes it reasonable to demand the bike be shut off as the policeman advanced, and I'd like to congratulate the officer for taking the less escalating step and just turning the bike off himself on the noncompliance instead of drawing his gun and possibly escalating it to a use of force. Most lawyers suggest to drivers pulled over to do things akin to "After you brought your car to a complete stop [on the curb], roll down your window and shut off the engine". Like this one. Possibly confiscating the keys might be an overreach by the policeman, but the demand to turn it off clearly is not.
When a pedestrian is in a clearly marked crosswalk, and didn't suddenly leap out in front of an oncoming car, the vehicle operator is legally obligated to stop. Stop, not merely slow down, see for example RCW 46.61.235 The operator of an approaching vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian or bicycle to cross the roadway within an unmarked or marked crosswalk when the pedestrian or bicycle is upon or within one lane of the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For purposes of this section "half of the roadway" means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel, and includes the entire width of a one-way roadway It is legal to stop and ask "Excuse me, can I pass?", or words to that effect, in case a pedestrian gets stalled. There is no defense whereby you don't have to stop if it is dark, or you are free to ignore pedestrians in the crosswalk if there is a bright light. The burden is on the driver to see the pedestrian that he is about to hit. It is also not a defense that the guy in the right lane did not previously cream the pedestrian. The pedestrian is not invisible, although perhaps because of the light it was not possible to see the pedestrian until the car is maybe 20 feet away. If the driver had slowed down in a manner appropriate to the circumstances (as is required by law), he could have easily stopped before the crosswalk. It is not a defense that "this street is posted for 30, I was doing 30", because you are never allowed to drive faster than is safe for existing conditions.
There is a lot of confusion over the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. They are not the same thing. Reasonable suspicion is any justifiable belief that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Probable cause requires an officer to have actual, tangible evidence that you have committed a crime. Only after probable cause has been established can an officer arrest you (with limited ability to search your immediate person and effects). Reasonable suspicion only requires some articulatable justification that you did something wrong. The police can detain you on reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you why. This is called a Terry stop (after Terry v. Ohio where the Supreme Court ruled this was legal). However, they can only detain you long enough to ascertain whether or not they have probable cause to arrest you. If after conducting a preliminary investigation they can't find probable cause to make an arrest, they have to let you go. In that video, we have a guy walking around in Texas with a shotgun and some shells. We never see what this guy looks like or how he's carrying himself, but he appears to be a troll. The cops received a call, so they investigated. They had all the reasonable suspicion they needed to detain him. Texas is an open carry state (a person can walk around openly with a gun), and it is not a stop-and-identify state (the police cannot demand that you ID yourself). Therefore the man did not break any laws. But neither did the police officers. They were doing their job by asking questions, and after failing to find any evidence, they let him go. If he had run before the officers had cleared him to leave, they could have chased him down and arrested him. That is, after all, what a detention is. You don't get to run away because you don't recognize a cop's authority to stop you. And fleeing a law enforcement officer is a crime. But you do have the right not to answer any questions, including (in some states) what your name is.
In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.
If you want to have some fun and increase the likelihood that you will go to trial soon, you can file a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the Speedy Trial Act. If you have co-defendants they may be the reason for delay. You could then move for a severance. On a slightly different note, since 95% of federal criminal cases result in the imposition of a penalty on the accused, you should start calculating your guidelines.
If an officer has a warrant to collect an electronic device, can the owner insist it's turned off first? Another theoretical question just out of curiosity. Lets say that an officer has gotten a warrant to take/search an individuals laptop in the United States and comes to serve it. At the moment the officer appears to serve the warrant the individual has the laptop on (or in hibernation mode) and with incriminating data being viewed. If the laptop was taken as-is the incriminating data could be viewed when taken out of hibernate mode to be inspected later, but the data could not be retrieved if the computer was turned off completely (he's using an incognito browser or encrypted drive etc to cover his tracks). Does the person being searched have the right to demand the computer be turned off before it is taken on the grounds that the warrant is only for the computer, not for the activity he is currently involved in? Assuming the question is yes then as a follow up question what could the individual do if the computer was not turned off and the state tries to take him to trial using evidence that was only accessible because the device was not deactivated? could he get the evidence dismissed? Would he have to have requested, and been denied, that the computer be deactivated before confiscation for the evidence to be dismissed, or could he retroactively point out it should have been? In short, could I justify police knowing someone is guilty because of content he had viewed in a private browser at the moment the computer was confiscated, but being unable to prosecute because it isn't legally viable?
Does the person being searched have the right to demand the computer be turned off before it is taken on the grounds that the warrant is only for the computer, not for the activity he is currently involved in? No. A warrant will often specify that both information (which they have a reasonable suspicion is on the computer) and the computer itself (as contraband) are in the scope of the warrant. Even if it only specified specific information as the target, they can seize the computer that it may be on. The seizure takes place as-is. You don't get to tidy anything up. Things that the officers see while seizing the device or upon waking it from hibernation mode would be admissible under the "plain view" doctrine (or even just simply within the scope of the warrant, if what is on the screen is the information they're looking for).
Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch.
Footage of an arrest is clearly evidence: tampering with it is a crime. Notwithstanding, destroying someone's personal possessions without authorisation is a crime. Accessing a computer (which all modern image and audio recorders are) without authorisation is also a crime.
We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law.
YES in germany §23 StVO (1a) Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, darf ein elektronisches Gerät, das der Kommunikation, Information oder Organisation dient oder zu dienen bestimmt ist, nur benutzen, wenn hierfür das Gerät weder aufgenommen noch gehalten wird und [...] (1a) Whoever is driving a vehicle may only use an electrical device that is serving communication, information, or organization or destined to be used for this if... 1. they don't pick the device up or hold it and [...] That is plenty clear: holding the device is banned in any way, and implies using it under German legal precedent.
Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.
There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all.
The 4th Amendment exclusionary rule applies automatically in cases where law enforcement obtains evidence illegally (subject to exceptions not applicable here). In its 1920 decision in Burdeau vs. McDowell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 4th amendment is not applicable to searches by private parties, even when such searches are clearly illegal. This rule doesn't apply, however, if the private citizens was acting as an agent of the government. A more recent case reaffirming and clarifying Burdeau is United States v. Jacobsen 466 U.S. 109 (1984) in which a private courier finds drugs in a package and shows it to police who test the contents (the search was upheld as valid). If the defendant makes that argument, the defendant seeking to exclude the evidence bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the private citizen acted as an agent of the government. U.S. v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1987). Another case discussed here notes that: As it relates to computer files, states still differ on how broad the application of the Private Search Doctrine runs, but all seem to agree that if a document or photo has been opened by a private party, an officer can review that file or photo without a warrant. In People v. Wilson, 56 Cal. App. 5th 128 (2020), police opened 4 images they received from NCMEC (the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) who received the images in a CyberTip from Google. Neither NCMEC nor Google had opened these images in this case, but all 4 images had been reviewed by Google in the past and identified previously as child porn by their matching hash values. So here, the officer’s actions—consisting of opening the electronic files submitted to it by NCMEC and viewing the four images attached to Google’s Cybertip—did not exactly replicate Google’s private actions. The Wilson court set out to determine the degree to which the officer’s additional invasion of Wilson’s privacy exceeded the scope of Google’s private search (the search of his emails against known hash values). Before the officer even received Wilson’s photographs, Google had already reviewed identical images in the past; scanned all of Wilson’s electronic communications to search for content with matching hash values; flagged four of Wilson’s images as matching images Google had previously observed; classified the matching images as depictions of prepubescent minors engaged in sexual acts; forwarded all four images to NCMEC as part of a Cybertip report; and terminated Wilson’s account. The Jacobsen case above explained that, “[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.” Id. at 117. Because Google’s actions already frustrated any expectation of privacy Wilson possessed in the four photographs at issue, no privacy interest remained in the four images, so no expectation of privacy was violated. Wilson at 219. Because the assigned hash values, or “digital fingerprints,” are representative of the contents depicted in the photographs themselves, the government gained no new material information by viewing the images. The agent merely confirmed Google’s report that Wilson uploaded content constituting apparent child pornography. Id. at 220. When someone who is not law enforcement obtains evidence illegally, the court sometimes engages in a non-constitutional discretionary balancing test to determine if the evidence is admissible. Sometimes it comes in, sometimes it doesn't. I'll find a case setting forth the exact test if I have time. The fact that evidence is "irrefutable" (not that there is any such thing) and widely publicly known is absolutely irrelevant. The fact that a juror knows it would be grounds for excusing the juror for cause and for moving the venue of the trial where they can find enough jurors who aren't familiar with the evidence if they can't manage it in the usual venue.
If a criminal charge was "dismissed", does that mean the case was dismissed after conviction? If a crime is committed involving arrest and court appearance - and then case is dismissed within 120 days - what does it exactly mean? Does it mean the person was CONVICTED and then case was DISMISSED? (this is what I'm getting from some of the sites) I understand the arrest is on record but does that mean that there is a conviction followed by dismissal or no conviction at all?
If a case is dismissed, then it means the charge was thrown out of court. They were not even tried, much less convicted.
Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office.
I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.
At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances).
Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.
Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect.
england-and-wales "Lead defendant" is not used, unless colloquially by some, but a comparable term would be "principal defendant" which is more than mere style as it becomes important when establishing the hierarchy of defendants for, say, culpability and at sentencing (i.e. it has some legal implications). It could also relate to the first-named on the indictment (see rule 3.32(1)(b)(ii) Criminal Procedure Rules 2020) and often this is the principal, but the prosecutor has discretion on the order of names on the indictment, because: It is important to bear in mind that defendants are called to give evidence in the order in which their names appear on the indictment. This means that a tactical decision may need to be made as to the order of defendants on the indictment, bearing in mind the evidence and the nature of the case. Source Although tagged united-states, I have followed the guidance from the LawSE Help Centre: "Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"
As you said, "serious" is a subjective description of a crime, but most lawyers would probably have the same first reaction when asked to make the distinction: Is it a felony or a misdemeanor? Felonies are objectively more serious because they come with longer sentences, as well as a variety of awful collateral consequences -- lost voting rights, disqualification from gun ownership, etc. By that standard, unlawful entry into the United States (8 U.S. Code § 1325) is not, in most cases, a serious crime. For a first offense, it's a misdemeanor punishable by at most six months in jail. For subsequent offenses, though, it's a felony punishable by up to two years. I'd agree that the sentences meted out suggest that the judges don't view this offense as a particularly serious one. But that doesn't necessarily mean that it was pointless to prosecute. For instance, the first prosecution enables a harsher sentence if the immigrant lands in front of the judge again, and I'd bet that a fair share of the harsher sentences involved repeat offenders. Also, if you think that being a nation of laws means that we should always enforce every law (or if you at least believe this when it comes to immigrants), then the prosecutions are their own reward.
Was it legal to rant against trick or treating via loudspeaker during halloween? I went trick or treating with my goddaughter for Halloween. During it we came across a house where the owner of the house were 'preaching' about the evils of Halloween, I don't recall the details but something about not suffering a witch to live means not dressing up as one and that it would all lead to sacrificing a virgin, and for the record that last part is not hyperbole, I remember it as the highlight of their speech. They had set up a loudspeaker to project what they were saying, they could be heard from 2-3 houses down. On our way back we passed someone who claimed to be an off duty cop informing them they had to stop. The cop specifically was saying that they were upsetting young children with some of the things they were saying and thus had to stop. I was wondering about the legality of the action. I realize that the speech itself was protected within limits. I imagine the use of a loud speaker may push the action into disturbing the peace due to being too loud? From what I heard though the supposed cop never mentioned the volume of the loudspeaker, he was focusing on verbal depictions that were upsetting to young children. So were they illegal for use of loudspeaker, and separate from that was it illegal due to the use of disturbing mental imagery inflicted on young children?
Short Answer It was probably legal to rant and probably illegal to shut down the person doing the ranting. Analysis Generally speaking, "content based" restrictions on speech are very limited, although "time, place and manner" restrictions are allowed if they are reasonable and not a backdoor way to restrict content, under the First Amendment. The "time, place and manner" exception derives from the case Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (summarize here), which held that municipalities could charge fees for parade permits even if that imposed a content neutral burden on speech in the interest of maintaining a peaceful situation in which order is maintained. Some leading cases on the subject are cited here where the professor discussing them engages in some useful analysis: Content-neutral justifications for regulating speech are, however, still subject to overbreadth challenges, as demonstrated by the recent case of Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v Stratton (2002). In Watchtower, the Court struck down on an 8 to 1 vote the ordinance of an Ohio town that required all door-to-door advocates of causes, as well as commercial solicitors, to obtain a permit from the mayor's office. The town had attempted to justifiy its ordinance as a fraud-prevention and privacy-protection measure, but Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that the ordinance was "offensive not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society." The Court found the alleged interests in protecting residential privacy and preventing fraud insufficient to justify such a sweeping restriction. The Court noted that the ordinance reached religious proselyting and anonymous political speech (where fraud is not an issue) and that residential privacy could be adequately protected by another Stratton law that allowed homeowners to place themselves on a "Do Not Solicit" law and then post "no solicitation" signs on their property. The Stratton case strongly suggests that the Court would find a carefully drafted "Do Not Call" law applying to telemarketers to be constitutional. Two of our cases concern the state's interest in preventing disturbances of the public peace that might be caused by controversial speech. In Feiner (1951), the Court upheld the conviction of a speaker who refused three requests from a police officer to stop speaking after members of a street corner audience threatened to attack the speaker. Dissenting justices saw the decision as an outrage, suggesting that the police had an obligation to protect the speaker and arrest those who might try to assault him. (In Forsyth County (1992), the Court struck down an ordinance that allowed county officials to set permit fees for rallies and parades based on how much police protection was estimated to be required. The Court noted that such a permit system disproportionately burdens unpopular speech (allowing a "heckler's veto"). One wonders, after Forsyth County, whether Feiner remains good law.) For example, most municipalities have noise ordinances that set a decibel limit on noise for a particular time of day (usually quieter at night), and might even require a permit to use a loud speaker in a public area, on the content neutral basis of how loud the sound is (classic "time, place and manner"), rather than the content. The legal boundaries on using a "disturbing the peace" ordinance to limit troubling content are quite strict (the classic exception being shouting "fire" in a crowded theater or otherwise inciting a riot or provoking a fight). This particular example would implicate not only freedom of speech but also freedom of religion and so would be subject to particularly strict scrutiny to content based restrictions. It would probably be unconstitutional to shut down the speaker because it was upsetting to young children under some more general statute or ordinance, although one can imagine circumstances where a narrowly tailored ordinance or law might be held constitutional. For example, there are valid restrictions on sex and violence in publicly broadcast television content during hours when children typically watch television, but those restrictions do not extend to cable TV or streaming services. Two of the leading U.S. Supreme Court cases are Ginsberg v. New York (1968), reasoning that material can be obscene as to children (“harmful to minors”) but not as to adults. Society simply doesn’t want harmful material to fall into the hands of minors. However, the government has also attempted to regulate material even beyond the expression prohibited under a harmful-to-minors law. This is the area of indecent expression. And, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) that the government could fine a radio station for playing a George Carlin comedic monologue containing profanity during daytime hours. But, neither of these harmful to minors cases involved prostelytizing for minority religious views, which is less content neutral than limitations on profanity which is as much about the manner of the presentation of the content as the content itself. In any case, it is almost certain that there is no narrowly tailored statute or ordinance that actually exists in this particular situation. Remedies Indeed, shutting down the speaker while claiming to be an off duty police officer might very well constitute an intentional violation of civil rights of the speaker under color of state law under 42 USC Section 1983, in circumstances where clearly established first amendment law prohibits that conduct a denies the officer qualified immunity from liability. Even if there were content neutral ordinances that prohibited this content, in this situation, the clear basis for the action was not content neutral and did not refer to any content neutral limitation such as a noise ordinance. The damages would probably be nominal or modest, but the prevailing party would be entitled to attorneys' fees and costs and quite likely to injunctive relief against further attempts to limit speech in this manner.
First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile.
It is legal. What would be illegal is for a public school to promote or inhibit a religion. You can teach all sorts of facts that touch on religion (millennia of Western history) and you can e.g. survey the major religions of the worlds as a cultural phenomenon. You can use circumlocutions or proper names. It's not illegal to confess to having personal beliefs. This is about public schools, which is an arm of the government. A person who is in a school, for example a student, is not prohibited from promoting or demoting a religion, therefore a student who clearly and openly advocates the Pastafarian faith is not to be sanctioned, except insofar as the conduct is objectively disruptive. This is because the student is clearly not acting as an agent of a government institution. Things are a little murky when it comes to teachers and guest speakers. Teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter the classroom. Here is a summary of pertinent court rulings. The main principle that comes from such cases is that school districts can direct teachers to refrain from certain actions when there is a reasonable belief that the actions would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Individual teachers have been ordered to not engage in silent reading of prayers in school (Roberts v. Madigan). Case law on guest lecturers is probably close to zero, since guest lecturers don't have the same kind of property right to be at the school expressing themselves as teachers do.
In most US States (probably all of them) failure to follow the Lawful orders of a police officer is itself a crime, and is grounds for the officer to arrest the person, even if the person had not done anything wrong prior to that. This obviously leads to the question: what orders are lawful? The officer has a pretty broad range of discretion. Ordering a person out of a car, or to roll down a car window, is pretty clearly lawful. Ordering a person to commit a crime would not be lawful. Neither would ordering a person to submit while the officer rapes or robs the individual be lawful. In practice, the officer will usually think that all of his or her commands are lawful, and might feel threatened by any failure to comply. In which case, the officer might shoot. This might not be upheld later if the command was not lawful and/or the officer's fear was not reasonable, but that will do the person shot little good. It is usually wise to comply with any commend, unless it puts you very directly at serious risk. Remember you don't know what else has happed to the officer that day. Has the officer had a fight with his/her spouse that morning? Just been denied a promotion? Been turned down for a mortgage? None of that should matter, legally, but it will affect the officer's attitude, and can lead to escalation, even if the person stopped is in no way at fault. An instruction to "shut up" is probably not going to provoke an officer to shoot if it is disobeyed, but it might help to escalate the situation. It is probably lawful, depending non the exact circumstances. As to the first amendment issues, that would probably come under the 'time, place, or manner" regulations that may be applied to speech. And even if it is not held to be lawful, the time to contest it is in court, not during the stop. If the officer feels safer with the window fully rolled down so that the officer could reach in, that is probably a lawful command.
Of course a city can enforce their own laws. The possible laws that LA (or any other city) could enforce against the video producers and vbloggers are many: zoning laws (enforcing laws against operating a commercial film set or business in a residentially zoned area); the requirement for an open burning permit, either all year or during times of fire danger; excessive noise ordinances, either 24hr or in a time span from late evening until morning; ordinances regarding excessive traffic and street parking; ID age checks for drinking, if police can get access to the property through warrant or other means; and investigations of criminal behavior shown in the videos. "Basically, after today, if we film in this house we could face up to six months in prison because we need permits," https://www.popbuzz.com/internet/social-media/jake-paul-banned-from-vlogging-in-house/ He could be talking about filming permits, traffic permits, burn permits, occupancy permits, etc. Cities and municipalities can quickly enact new ordinances that criminalize behavior that impacts the neighborhood as a whole after taking into account complaints from neighbors and advice from police regarding activities of the problem residents. Another aspect of the story is that it appears that Jake Paul is a renter. That means the city and neighbors can put pressure on the landlord to encourage Paul to obey the law; failing that, the landlord could possibly evict Paul in a very short amount of time due to possible damage and other clauses in the lease regarding illegal activity, if the lease stipulates anything like that.
If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal.
Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..
As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.
Why is the U.S. government allowed to grow and distribute marijuana? In 1978, a program called the Compassionate Investigational New Drug program was established, in which the United States government began supplying certain individuals with marijuana that is grown at the University of Mississippi. Although the program ended in 1992, to this day four people are known to be living and receiving this government grown cannabis. What provisions, either in the CSA or a separate law, allow the federal government to ignore their own federally enacted laws so that they may grow and provide marijuana to patients?
It is not absolutely against the law to produce schedule 1 substances (such as marijuana). Per 21 USC 822(a)(1), Every person who manufactures or distributes any controlled substance or list I chemical...shall obtain annually a registration issued by the Attorney General which entails specific permissions to make, distribute etc, under (b). If you turn to the prohibitions in 21 USC 841, it starts the list of prohibitions saying "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful...". The code is liberally littered with the expression "unauthorized". The Attorney General is given authority under 21 USC 811 to make rules, thus can permit production. It's not actually clear who the grower is in the Compassionate IND program. In the Randall case, the "doctrine of necessity" was apparently invoked successfully which led to charges against Randall being dropped. The legal details of the AGs blind eye towards states like Washington are a little hazy, as it were.
As Mark's answer indicates, you are evidently thinking of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. "Public acts" being laws, it may seem at first glance that states must fully respect the laws of other states. But the interpretation of this clause by the courts is rather different, and has evolved a bit over time. The short of the (modern) matter is that it mostly applies to matters concerning the judiciary. SCOTUS has recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause, which limits the ability of the clause to force a state to abide by laws which are in conflict with their own (for the most part: they don't have to). Driving privileges, and more generally who is licensed to do what (doctors, hunting, concealed carry, etc.), within a state falls under that public policy exception. So Texas does not have to obey New Hampshire's laws concerning the legal privilege to drive. As a basic sanity test, if this were not the case, then why wouldn't everybody in Texas not simply bounce off to New Hampshire for a summer to get their license there and then return to Texas and never bother with insurance? It entirely undercuts the state's sovereignty and ability to set their own laws if any other state can so easily create loopholes around them. Moreover, despite what the name might suggest, a "driver's license" is more a certification that you have the requisite skills, physical performance (passing an eye test), and knowledge to drive safely and in accordance with that state's traffic laws. It certainly makes sense for a state to require you to demonstrate at least that much, but they may also impose additional requirements. A requirement for insurance demonstrates your ability to handle financial liabilities that may reasonably result from your driving. All states currently accept a valid out-of-state license in the above sense: that you are certified to have the requisite skills, that it is valid proof of age, etc. Though if you become a permanent resident there they may require you to take new tests. However to legally drive in any particular state you must not only have such certification (a driver's license) but also satisfy any other conditions, such as age requirements and insurance requirements. As an aside, such state-by-state variations as to who is licensed to do what are in fact quite common, especially across history, even on very prominent issues. But even nationwide resolutions of those issues via SCOTUS have never, to my knowledge, utilized the Full Faith and Credit clause to do so. And, really, how could they? By saying since some state could force all other states to do X via the clause, then X must be a constitutional requirement? Or that any one state could unilaterally dictate laws in all other states? Madness! For one example, anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed (certain) interracial marriages, were quite common until 1967, when SCOTUS struck them all down using the 14th amendment. More recently, gay marriage was forced to be recognized in all states, also via the 14th amendment. In both cases, before those SCOTUS rulings, the courts had generally recognized that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not compel the state to recognize (out-of-state) marriages it did not want to recognize. These both fell under the public policy exception.
This is indeed an area of law where the answer does depend on the jurisdiction. As a 2015 article on the subject noted (and I am loathe to refer to less current sources as this is a rapidly changing area): The United States has no national laws or regulations governing assisted reproduction. However, many states have piecemeal legislation. Some aspects are regulated, while others are not; some states have strict laws or regulations whereas others are looser. As a 2017 American Bar Association article with citations notes, this isn't entirely true. There are some national laws that apply, but they aren't comprehensive and probably don't control the situation described in the OP. It also notes that: Certain states, like California, have created a legislative environment supportive of surrogacy by providing for the validity and enforcement of commercial surrogacy agreements and enacting legislation to define the resulting nontraditional parental relationships.10 Others, like New York, explicitly prohibit commercial surrogate parenting contracts,11 requiring most residents and potential surrogates in the state to seek desirable surrogacy arrangements in other states. However, so many aspects of ART are simply not addressed by the states:12 there is no state regulation of the number of children that may be conceived by an individual donor, no rules regarding the types of medical information and updates that must be supplied by young donors as they age, no standards regarding genetic testing on embryos, no limits on the age of donors, and virtually no regulation of the gametic13 material market. (Gametic material means sperm and eggs.) The American Bar Association has more resources on related issues here. A 2014 article surveyed the issue broadly. Colorado has a law that permits arrangements like these and makes them enforceable if the formalities of the statute are followed. It is not easy to figure out exactly which states do and do not allow this because: (1) there is a model act to authorize this but many states that allow it crafted their own legislation rather than following the model act (Article 6 of the Model Act is the part relevant to the OP), and (2) some states have allowed this kind of arrangement via case law rather than statutory law. There are also states with no statutes on the subject and no clear case law one way or the other. As of 2010 all but a handful of states had some kind of legislation, but as noted above, some of that legislation disallowed rather than authorized certain practices or only address some issues and not others. This article reviews in detail the facts and rulings in several cases that are on point to this issue, for example, from California, Minnesota and Montana.
The Florida Supreme Court has held in State v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 462 Fla. that if a law enforcement agency manufactures drugs for use in a reverse-sting operation, then this constitutes governmental misconduct and is a violation of the Florida Constitution due process clause and that a conviction in these circumstances should be reversed. That is, the manufacturing of a controlled substance may be grounds for reversing a conviction which relies on that substance. However, based on this judgement, the circumstance you describe would not be a violation of due process. From the judgement, at 466: Section 893.02(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), defines "manufacture" as: the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, cultivating, growing, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance either directly or indirectly, by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container.... Further, the judgement distinguishes State v Bass 451 So.2d 986 (1984) wherein law enforcement officials delivered marijuana obtained from federal agents to defendants as part of a reverse-sting operation. At Appeal, it was held that law enforcement officials do not need statutory authority to "engage in reverse-sting deliveries of controlled substances". That is, simply using drugs from a pharmacy without modification, repackaging or otherwise relabelling, does not constitute conduct so outrageous as to violate Florida's due process clause, and on the facts that you have presented, there is no evidence that a due process defence would be held.
I did not perform a complete survey but The Jurisdictional Limits of Campus Police reports that, "subject to jurisdictional constraints, campus police officers had virtually the same powers as their municipal counterparts." (Internal quotes omitted.) Generally speaking, police are police not administration. Here are some statutes: ILLINOIS HIGHER EDUCATION (110 ILCS 1020/) Private College Campus Police Act. The Board of Trustees of a private college or private university, may appoint persons to be members of a campus police department.... Members of the campus police department shall have the powers of municipal peace officers and county sheriffs. MASSACHUSETTS General Laws PART I TITLE II CHAPTER 22C Section 63. The colonel may... at the request of an officer of a college, university, other educational institution... appoint employees of such college, university, other educational institution or hospital as special state police officers. Such special state police officers shall... have the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures owned, used or occupied by such college, university, or other institution or hospital. Oklahoma 74-360.17 ...certified campus police officer shall have the authority to enforce... State criminal statutes. Campus police departments formed by private institutions of higher education pursuant to this act shall be deemed to be public agencies in the State of Oklahoma Here is a case: People v. Boettner, 362 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y.Sup., 1974) is a case where school officials at a private school tried to get the cops to come execute a search. While the cops were dragging their feet obtaining a warrant, the school officials did their own search, found marijuana which they turned over to the police. Suspect was arrested and convicted. When the cops can't go into the room, send in the administration. Sort of. present search and seizure was conducted by college officials in a private capacity without government knowledge or participation and concludes that as such it is not subject to fourth amendment constraints. While it is true that a student does not lose his constitutional rights at the school house door or at the entrance to the college campus neither does he become cloaked with greater protection than any non-student who is the subject of a seizure of evidence by a private citizen. BUT the judge makes sure we understand that "State Police had no knowledge of and did not participate, directly or indirectly, in the search conducted by RIT officials on the 15th." So "it cannot be said that the RIT officials who decided on their own to search defendants' rooms were acting as agents, either actual or implied, of law enforcement.... Nor can it be said that the present search was only one incident in a close and continuing relationship between RIT and local law enforcement officers.... In the final analysis, RIT acted on its own, for its own reasons, and to further its own purposes." Regarding a written policy: The fact that the rules of the college regarding room searches were not complied with is of no consequence in determining the admissibility of the evidence for purposes of a criminal proceeding. Public schools are an entirely different animal. In those cases the university staff are public employees and their searches can be fourth amendment violations but they ARE allowed to conduct searches subject to the "reasonable exercise of University supervisory duties." "Even though the special relationship that existed between these petitioners and Troy University officials conferred upon the University officials the right to enter and search petitioners' dormitory rooms, that right cannot be expanded and used for purposes other than those pertaining to the special relationship." Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F.Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala., 1970) Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala., 1968)
Generally, the legislature is not restricted to passing laws that are a good idea. This has been remarked on by the Supreme Court (in Justice Stevens's concurrence, emphasis added): But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” There are some limits: for one thing, the law must pass the rational basis test, which, while extremely favorable to the legislature (Congress could probably ban coffee consumption, for instance), does impose some limits and might result in at least some of your examples being struck down—I cannot imagine a court finding that the government had a rational basis for taxing everyone 120% of their income, for example. However, the states do have a recourse in many cases, especially if Congress were to reduce the penalties for crimes: most "common" crimes (assault, battery, murder, theft, etc.) are state crimes, so Congress wouldn't have the power to change the penalties for those. Most cases where these things become federal crimes involve conduct affecting multiple states, and the person committing the crime would likely also commit at least one state crime. States also aren't required to assist the federal government in its enforcement of federal law. For instance, quite a number of states believe that the federal prohibition of marijuana is unjust, and won't enforce those laws within their boundaries.
In the specific example you have given, Florida law could not be applied. A state has jurisdiction over a crime under constitutional due process limits on the scope of a state's criminal jurisdiction if the crime is either committed within the state (regardless of where the harm occurs) or is directed at or impacts the state (the classic example is a gunshot fired from the Ohio side of the state line killing someone located in Indiana, which could be prosecuted in either state, or in both states as it doesn't violate double jeopardy to be prosecuted for the same offense by more than one sovereign). Sometimes these issues are framed not as "jurisdictional" per se, but as "conflict of law" questions limited by the constitution. The proof that a crime was committed in the territory where it is applicable is called proof of locus delecti and depends upon the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. To determine where a crime is committed depends on what acts constitute the crime, something that leaves considerable room for flexible interpretation and a careful reading of the exact wording of the relevant criminal statute. The most important limitation on the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This applies directly in the case of federal criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and applies in state courts because it is incorporated to apply in state court cases through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 20th century case law applying the "Selective Incorporation doctrine." The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal trials be conducted “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” If a suspect is not present in a state to be criminally prosecuted, then the options available to a state are (1) to toll the running of the statute of limitations while the suspect is outside the state to the extent permitted by the relevant state statute and the U.S. Constitution, (2) to bring a civil lawsuit against the suspect instead of a criminal prosecution, or (3) to seek extradition of the suspect, which must be granted under certain circumstances under the United State Constitution and reads as follows in the pertinent part: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. (Note that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuit trials can be conducted in a state other than the state where the breach of contract or tort giving rise to the lawsuit took place for jurisdictional purposes and not infrequently is brought in another state, although constitutional choice of law rules limit the circumstances under which a particular state's laws can be applied to a particular set of circumstances in a lawsuit.) The Sixth Amendment, on its face, prohibits Florida from prosecuting a case in the example given in the question involving a crime that was committed solely in Washington State. Of course, the exact definition of the crime might determine where it was committed. In traditional "common law" "blue collar" crimes there is usually no ambiguity over where it is committed except in the most extraordinary circumstances, but in prosecutions of conspiracies and crimes involving economic activity (such as owning or mailing something), the question of where a crime is committed can grow much fuzzier. For example, one could imagine a differently defined crime prohibiting providing funds to finance a purchase of marijuana in excess of 20 grams being committed both in Washington State and Florida at the same time (e.g. perhaps a purchase of marijuana in Washington State was financed by a Florida bank by delivering cash to a courier in Florida who is bound for Washington State knowing that the cash would be used to finance a marijuana purchase). Similar ideas apply in international circumstances where the Sixth Amendment and Extradition Clause do not apply. But, in those cases, the more flexible and less well defined "law of nations" as interpreted by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court and the President still does impose some territorial boundaries on prosecutions for actions which are not crimes in the country where they are committed under that country's domestic laws. But, those boundaries are not so hard and fast and the idea that a crime is committed in places where it has an impact allow for considerable flexibility in prosecuting crimes committed outside the United States. It has also been well settled since the earliest days of the United States that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (U.S. Supreme Court 1825) and that this applies to states applying each other's penal laws as well. So, Florida cannot enforce a violation of the criminal laws of Washington State in its courts either. If you get in a bar fight in Seattle, you can't be prosecute for assault in a court in Orlando, even if both of the parties to the bar fight were Orlando residents and U.S. citizens. Some notable cases resolving the question of whether locus delecti is present in a particular case include the following: In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) although none of the defendants had entered the District of Columbia as part of their conspiracy to defraud the United States, they were convicted because one co-conspirator had committed overt acts in Columbia (225 U.S., at 363). So conspiracy is a continuing offense committed in all the districts where a co-conspirator acts on the agreement. Similarly, In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) the sending of letters from New York to postmasters in Connecticut in an attempt to gain postage on credit, made Connecticut, where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received, an appropriate venue (136 U.S., at 266—268). A typical state statute on the subject from Colorado's Revised Statutes (2016) is as follows: § 18-1-201. State jurisdiction (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state. Case law under this statute sometimes describes the issue presented under this statute a question of "sovereign jurisdiction." See, e.g., People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984).
California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.
Constitutionality of laws restricting employment practices in the executive branch There is a large body of US Federal law dealing with the employment of government workers. For example, there are laws detailing under what circumstances an employee can be fired and what notifications and appeals must be provided when an employee is fired. Since, by these laws, Congress is attempting to regulate or control the conduct of the executive branch of the government, these laws could be construed as a violation of the Constitutional separation of powers. Has the Office of the President of the United States ever attempted to reject Congressional laws regarding the management of executive branch employees and test the validity of these laws in court?
Many laws control the conduct of the executive branch "Attempting to control the conduct of the executive branch" doesn't imply a violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Congress has many laws that control the executive. 35 USC 101 tells the Patent and Trademark Office what subject matter is patentable. 15 USC 1052 tells the Patent and Trademark Office that it must provide registration unless a trademark falls into one of several categories. There are many many more. This power comes from Article 1, Section 8 The power to enact laws that tell the executive branch what to do stems from Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives congress the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Example of intrusion on Executive authority But, when a statute intrudes on the authority conferred on the Executive by the Constitution, it is not constitutional. An example where Congress intruded on Executive authority is Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). The court held that "the power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone", and that "if Congress could alter the President’s statements on matters of recognition or force him to contradict them, Congress in effect would exercise the recognition power. An exclusive Presidential power disables the Congress from acting upon the subject." (Citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), an important separation of powers case that went the other way: the Executive issued an order that infringed on the law-making powers vested in Congress.) Executive acknowledges that Congress can control how vacancies are filled There is a case before the Supreme Court in October term 2016, where the Executive is defending its interpretation of a statute that concerns how particular executive employees are hired, fired, or directed: National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc.. The Executive is not challenging the constitutionality of the statute, though. The Executive even argues, basically, "If Congress wanted to control us, it has the ability to and knows how to control us.. it just didn't in this case." No bills of attainder United States v. Lovett 328 U.S. 303 (1946) is another case where Congress went too far. The background here was that Congress passed a law that said "no salary or other compensation shall be paid to certain employees of the Government (specified by name)". The court held that: "Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial, are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." This principle was refined in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The court upheld an act that directed "the Administrator of GSA to take custody of appellant's Presidential materials". Even given this specific direction to take a particular action, the court found that "the Act does not, on its face, violate the principle of separation of powers."
An oath of office cannot be legally enforced through the courts, other than to demand that officials take it in order to take office, and to bar people who have taken it and then engaged in treason or sedition from holding public office in any federal, state, or local office, military or civilian, in the United States. This is something which is required of all federal and state and local public officials under the U.S. Constitution, which states in the third paragraph of Article VI: The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States. The U.S. President's parallel oath of office is found in the last paragraph of Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. It states: Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." But, while taking the oath is required, it is also the case that: An oath is not justiciable. The FBI cannot investigate adherence to oaths because they are not enforceable as codified law. A prosecutor cannot establish that an oath has been broken by proving certain legal elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judge cannot adjudicate it. There is one exception to this rule, however. Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. So, an oath of office does impose a justiciable duty to not engage in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or give aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, upon pain of not being able to hold any state or federal, military or civilian public office without a two-third majority waiver from Congress (in addition to any other consequences that may flow from this conduct without regard to having taken an oath). But, this is a very slight slap on the wrist indeed for committing treason or engaging in sedition (which are criminally punishable by decades in prison or death) after having sworn this oath. Justice Joseph Story noted in his "A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States" (1842) that: A President, who shall dare to violate the obligations of his solemn oath or affirmation of office, may escape human censure, nay, may even receive applause from the giddy multitude. But he will be compelled to learn, that there is a watchful Providence, that cannot be deceived; and a righteous Being, the searcher of all hearts, who will render unto all men according to their deserts. Considerations of this sort will necessarily make a conscientious man more scrupulous in the discharge of his duty; and will even make a man of looser principles pause, when he is about to enter upon a deliberate violation of his official oath. The purpose of an oath of office is simply to deny public offices to people who are not willing to publicly state that the legal system in which the people taking them will operate is legitimate. An oath to support the constitution is the modern equivalent of the feudal European ritual of "bending the knee" to one's legitimate feudal superior. This ritual was highlighted, for example, in the Game of Thrones books by R. R. Martin, which is based loosely on the fights over legitimacy in 15th century England's "War of the Roses". Another legacy of this historical tradition is the duty of someone in military service to salute his or her superior officer. As a historical note, these seemingly toothless rituals have, historically, been surprisingly effective a screening out hard core extremist leaders trying to bring down a government based upon claims that the whole system is illegitimate when new regimes are established, and following civil wars and insurgencies. Many regimes, democratic and non-democratic, in Western political history, have imposed similar requirements. When they have done so, this has seriously influenced the political tactics used by factions that deny the legitimacy of the state and its incumbent leaders. Simply taking the oath undermines one's credibility as an insurgent leader, even if one does so in bad faith. In the United States, oaths of office were also key preconditions to the post-conflict settlements if the Whiskey Rebellion, the Civil War, and some of the lesser known episodes of a century of Indian Wars. As a more recent example, the requirement of an oath of office has materially influenced the 20th and 21st century political tactics of Sinn Féin, a political movement in Ireland, seeking to make the U.K. political subdivision known as Northern Ireland, which it deems illegitimate, a part of the Republic of Ireland. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), distinguished between a Congressional determination that someone has not satisfied the constitutionally established requirements to have an oath of office administered to them after they have been elected, which can be made by majority vote, and a Congressional determination that a member of Congress should be expelled by a two-thirds majority vote of the house of Congress to which the member of Congress has been elected. A Congressional vote to expel a member of Congress is a non-justiciable question that is not tied to the content of the member's oath of office. Similarly, judicial and executive branch officials in the federal government may be impeached by Congress, and removed from office through that process, only for "high crimes and misdemeanors" and not merely for otherwise failing to live up to their oath of office in a non-criminal manner (although what constitutes "high crimes and misdemeanors" is also a non-justiciable political question). Some legal authorities, however, have held that in some contexts, the oath of office does reflect an intent to empower executive branch officials to refuse to enforce what the President believes to be unconstitutional legislation, when its constitutionality has not yet been definitively adjudicated yet. But, courts have also held, for example, that a member of the U.S. military does not have standing to bring a suit claiming that military action in which he is involved was unconstitutionally authorized. This decision was reached on the grounds that the claim that the service member was forced to violate that service member's oath of office does not constitute a justiciable "injury in fact" to that member for standing to sue purposes. Smith v. Obama, No. 16-843, 2016 WL 6839357 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) at page 10 (as discussed here).
Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter.
Presidential power of that type might arise from congressional authorization, where Congress authorizes action when POTUS deems that such-and-such is the case. An example is 8 USC 1182(f), which says Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. Explicit constitutional powers are not numerous, but include commanding the armed forces and overseeing execution of national law by appointing and removing executive officers. POTUS is constitutionally the federal official responsible for relations with foreign nations, so he can make treaties (subject to Senate approval) and executive agreements (not subject to approval), can appoint US ambassadors and can receive foreign ambassadors. Executive agreements have the greatest potential for being an avenue for POTUS to act contrary to Congress, but they are limited to agreements pursuant to legislation, treaty and constitutional authority (and, as agreements, are not unilateral). Congress was able to somewhat limit presidential military authority by statutes such as the War Powers Act, and in the policy statement at 50 USC 1541, Congress declares The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces The law limits the length of engagement of the military, without Congressional approval, but there is no toothful restriction on deploying the military for up to 60 days. 50 USC Ch. 34 more generally addressed "national emergencies", and started by declaring an end to all existing declared emergencies. Other sections of the law require Congress to be notified and emergencies to be published in the Federal Register. An emergency can be terminated by POTUS or by act of Congress, and after 6 months (and every 6 months thereafter), Congress shall meet to discuss the emergency. POTUS must also annually re-declare the emergency to keep it in force. These are procedural requirements, not content requirements. In general, you wold have to go through Title 50 to check for particular powers granted by Congress The International Emergency Economic Powers Act grants powers to POTUS, with the following limit: (a) Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat. (b) The authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national emergency which must be with respect to such threat. which appears more limiting than the War Powers Act. There is an extensive list of powers granted under 50 USC 1702, which in that domain could be called "bright" lines. Generally, the lines are only as bright as Congress has painted them.
This can be effected without evidence or trial or a right to an appeal in front of an objective party. Not so. If a person is charged with a crime for violating such a code, (or refusing to leave when ordered under such a code) they could defend on the grounds that it is unreasonable, unauthorized, or violates that person's constitutional or statutory rights. Or, if a person has been ordered to leave, the person could comply and then seek an injunction forbidding future enforcement of the regulation. Such methods have been used in the past to challenge the lawfulness of administrative regulations. The Colorado code CRS 24-90-109. Powers and duties of board of trustees says that: (1) The board of trustees shall: (a) Adopt such bylaws, rules, and regulations for its own guidance and policies for the governance of the library as it deems expedient. ... (b) Have custody of all property of the library, including rooms or buildings constructed, leased, or set apart therefor; (c) Employ a director and, upon the director's recommendation, employ such other employees as may be necessary. The duties of the director shall include, but not limited to: (I) Implementing the policies adopted by the board of trustees pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section; ... (III) Performing all other acts necessary for the orderly and efficient management and control of the library. This law seems to authorize libraries to adopt and enforce codes of conduct for persons using the library. This page from the CO State library development agency gives example policies that libraries are encouraged to model their policies on. In the section under "Library Use/Behavior" there are three example policies. All of these list various prohibited acts, which seem relatively reasonable to me. Two of the three include an explicit appeals process for serious violations. You do not indicate what sort of behavior you have encaged in for which the library may wish to ban you. In general, government facilities are allowed to make reasonable regulations for members of the public using those facilities, and it is not a violation of people's Constitutional rights to make and enforce such regulations. However, that depends highly on what the regulations are. A regulation limiting access by race would obviously be struck down. A regulation prohibiting shouting, even though it impacts speech, would be permitted as a content-neutral regulation of "time, place and manner". In short it would depend very much on the specific regulation, and what rights it is alleged to violate.
Treason is basically the only crime explicitly defined by the Constitution. According to Article III, Section 3: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. So, no. What this hypothetical president is calling for is unconstitutional, is almost certainly grounds for impeachment, and may even be criminal, but treason it ain't. And that's assuming he actually does it. Simply calling for it, without acting (or directing others to act) to bring it about, may well be protected by the First Amendment.
No. A governor could not be held liable in a lawsuit on those grounds. Governors in every U.S. state have governmental immunity from liability in tort (and a lawsuit for wrongful death is a kind of tort lawsuit) for their official actions, and there is no U.S. state in which this kind of lawsuit would fall within an exception to that governmental immunity. There is not private cause of action against a state government executive branch official under federal law for a violation of "Trump administration official guidelines for reducing the covid-19 mitigation." Indeed, it isn't clear that a federal statute creating such a private cause of action that purported to pierce a state law official's governmental immunity from liability, even if it were enacted, would be constitutional. In contrast, if a corporation violated such a guideline, the violation of the guideline would be evidence of negligence, although probably not conclusive evidence, in a suit for wrongful death by a non-employee brought against the corporation.
There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says "Congress having occupied the field" it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.
Taking control of an adult's healthcare John Smith is over 18 but under 26. He lives with his parents in California. He has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder with possible comorbid psychological disorders. John has been hospitalized several times for psychotic episodes but more recently has been reasonably stable on medication. He receives health insurance under his parents' plan, but his parents refuse to pay for his co-pays, hospital bills, and other out-of-pocket costs. He currently receives disability money which allows him to pay for his co-pays. John is only marginally able to take responsibility for his own healthcare. He often does not schedule psychiatrist appointments until he has run out of medication (due to the nature of his medications, he must see the psychiatrist before every refill). He frequently misses scheduled appointments and spends more money on missed-appointment fees than on co-pays. He will discontinue new medications in as little as a week, without consulting with a doctor, if he believes he is experiencing any negative side effects. He refuses to take his medications at consistent times every day, and forgets to take his morning or evening meds at least once a week. John's parents do not take responsibility for his healthcare. They do nothing to make sure that he keeps his medications filled or takes his medications on time, nor make any effort to help him schedule or attend appointments. If John is unable to take care of his own medical needs, and his parents do not assist him in managing his medical needs, is it possible for a third party (e.g. a friend or parent of a friend) to assume responsibility for his medical care (e.g. scheduling appointments, picking up medications, administering medications)? Would this be termed Healthcare Power of Attorney (which is commonly associated with the elderly) or something else? If a non-family-member assumes responsibility for John's medical care, does the law still require that he (as an adult under the age of 26) be covered under his parents' healthcare plan?
As a preface, while the best course of action isn't always clear and the reality of implementing some solution is often rocky, the bipolar diagnosis situation you describe is probably the single most common situation in which legal arrangements must be made for an adult child, and is almost as common as the need for children to make legal arrangements for the care of their declining parents. You aren't the only one going through situations like these. Probably 0.5%-2% of people in any given area experience bipolar, usually starting in adolescence or young adulthood, and difficulties managing it of the kind that you describe are the rule and not the exception. Also, just ignoring the problems you describe is a very bad idea. Premature death either from suicide or bad judgment related to the bipolar diagnosis is all too common in these situations. It is serious business, not something that should be thought of as bad character, or futile to do anything about, or blameworthy. It just is, and if someone doesn't do something when the plan gets off course, serious consequences often follow. There are really several intertwined issues present here. Realistically, given the nature of the concerns expressed, a limited guardianship may be necessary to accomplish the goals expressed. What Are Medical Powers Of Attorney? A healthcare or medical power of attorney gives the person who holds it (who is called an "agent" or "proxy") the authority to make medical decisions for someone called the principal (i.e. John Smith) when the principal lacks the capacity to give informed consent at that very moment to do so. This is because a power of attorney is an inherently revocable document expressing the wishes of the person writing it. You generally can't bind yourself in the future without court approval or a contractual relationship with a third party which a power of attorney is not. It isn't uncommon for medical personnel to decide on the spot when to and not to listen to someone with a medical power of attorney based upon how mentally competent the patient seems at the time on a decision-by-decision basis. For example, they might defer to the medical power of attorney agent when the patient is unconscious or heavily drugged, and listen to the patient when the patient is conscious, not drugged, and not acting erratically. Parents, incidentally, do not automatically have this authority, nor do spouses. A medical POA is a document that allows the agent to say "yes" when the patient (i.e. John Smith) cannot. Another name for a document that is very similar and sometimes used is a "health care proxy." It would typically cost a few hundred dollars to $1,000 to have a medical power of attorney drawn up after discussing the situation and the principal's needs in a meeting with a lawyer and might take an initial meeting and then a second one at which the document is signed after it is prepared following the initial meeting. Other lawyers might manage this in a single meeting and draft it while you wait. If all you need is a power of attorney, don't be penny wise and pound foolish by doing it yourself, unless the form is provided to you by the health care provider you will spend most of your time dealing with and they prefer their own form. Otherwise, the likelihood that you will have to pay more to a lawyer later cleaning up your own mistakes probably exceeds any money that you will save. Other Kinds Of Authorizations Many medical providers will allow someone to act on behalf of a patient in matters other than matters that call for the kind of medical decision that would normally require the informed consent of the patient, even when the patient is not manifestly incapable of making medical decisions at that very moment. This could simply be a note in the file that the patient has given that person authority to do so, it could be a written authorization to access HIPAA protected personal health information of the patient, and it could be a variety of other things (e.g., authority to make financial arrangements). Some of this is often incorporated in the same document as a medical POA. Picking Up Controlled Substances A Medical POA may, or may not, necessarily be sufficient to authorize someone to pick up a controlled substance on behalf of a patient if the patient is physically able to do so, without the presence of the patient. I don't know what the true rule of law under the controlled substances acts and pharmacy regulation is, but I do know that practice in real life varies quite a bit. The best practical solution to the issue of picking up controlled substances would be to ask the usual pharmacist what they require and to comply. (A legal guardian would generally have the power to pick up controlled substances for a ward.) Guardianships and Limited Guardianships What Is a Guardianship? A guardian of the person is someone appointed by a court who has the authority to make medical decisions and other personal life decisions for their ward (i.e. John Smith), even contrary to their apparent stated wishes. A guardian has the authority to say "yes" and also to say "no" to the expressed wishes of the ward, overruling the ward. A guardianship of an adult can be general, or can be limited on a customized basis. A guardian must be appointed by a court with jurisdiction over these cases, usually in the county where the ward resides. But, a guardianship can be requested by the ward as opposed to contested. Realistically, a court would be unlikely to grant a full guardianship or a contested guardianship in these circumstances, but might grant a limited guardianship with the consent of the ward in these circumstances. The parents and possibly any siblings, would have a right to notice of the proceedings and to object or to seek to be appointed instead. What Process Is Involved In Having a Guardian Appointed? This would realistically be a proceeding that should ideally involve a specialist lawyer (with experience in mental health or elder law and guardianships) and at least one medical professional's statement (probably a treating psychiatrist or psychologist). There would also probably be a court investigator or guardian ad litem appointed at the ward's expense, to confirm that the facts represented in the petition to have a guardian appointed really reflect the ward's intent. Usually, a proposed guardian selected by the adult ward during a lucid interval would have priority for appointment. The medical professional and lawyer should be able to provide good suggestions regarding what the scope of the limited guardianship needs to be, although don't ignore or fail to give full credit to your own layperson's practical understanding of the situation either. The guardian would have to provide information to the court in connection with the petition showing eligibility to serve (e.g. criminal record check, credit check, CV, nomination by ward). Often the guardian would have to demonstrate good intentions towards the ward in some way, especially if the guardian is a third party and not someone who serves as a guardian as a livelihood. Some courts would require the guardian to have insurance for liability in connection with the task or a surety bond up to some dollar amount. The final decision would usually be made in an in-person hearing at which the ward, the proposed guardian, the proposed guardian's lawyer, the medical professional, the guardian ad litem or investigator, the judge, a court clerk, a court reporter, and any family members who chose to appear (with their lawyers, if any), were present. If the guardianship was granted, perhaps with modifications requested by the judge to the terms of the guardianship, then the Court would issue what are called "Letters" that formally appoint the guardian to the post. Once appointed, the guardian would have to file periodic status reports with the court and would also be subject to the court's jurisdiction in the event of any future dispute regarding the guardianship, or any allegations of misconduct by the guardian, or any circumstance that requires court approval such as a change in the terms of the guardianship or in the person serving as guardian. The procedural details I am describing are approximate and aren't necessarily up-to-the minute correct, and might vary somewhat even from court to court within California under local rules and customs of practice; but they give you a gist of what the process would be like if it is working properly and with best practices. Typically, this might cost $3,000 to $10,000 all in for an uncontested proceeding, and many times that much in the event of a contested attempt to have a guardian appointed. Health Insurance Eligibility I'll defer to someone else's answer regarding health insurance eligibility, as I don't have time to look into that at the moment. My instinct is that this wouldn't be a problem in any case except a guardianship and probably wouldn't be a problem even in a case with a third party guardian, but I can't confirm that without doing research.
The WHO regulations (according to that page; I haven't seen them) "provide an overarching legal framework that defines countries’ rights and obligations in handling public health events and emergencies that have the potential to cross borders." They don't dictate the conditions for practicing medicine. it does not make that much sense that an American living in Germany could not get telemedicine from America with the same level of convenience - for example, German insurance covering it, and the American prescription being somewhat valid. This would result in a geometric increase in the administrative burden. You need a system for the American prescriber to know what medicines are approved in both countries (and in every other covered country). You need some way for the German health authorities and the insurers to trust that prescribers in the United States are not endangering the health of people in Germany, which means that they need to evaluate the education and certification systems in place in the US (and every other covered country). You need to consider the legal recourse in cases of malpractice: if the prescriber makes a mistake, does the case go to the US courts or German? If German, will the US state that licensed the prescriber honor a judgment revoking the prescriber's medical license? And more. There are simply too many elements that need to be coordinated. With two countries, you have to reconcile one pair of systems. With three countries, three pairs. With four countries, six pairs. With N countries, it's N(N-1)/2, so even with a modest number of countries such as 20, you have 190 pairs of systems to consider. With 196, the number is 19,110.
OK, I talked to a lawyer (in Massachusetts) and these are the answers I got. One can draft a confidential exclusion letter to state wishes regarding excluding certain people from being guardians. In the letter you can explain in detail why you think somebody is unfit to be a guardian. Execute this document as you do for your will and tell your family that it exists so that they can access it if you die (or give them a copy). The advantage of a stand-alone document is that it is not public, differently from the will which is public. The lawyer also suggested to also have a separate stand-alone guardianship document (and so to not include the guardian section in the will). The reason is that a will can be executed only if somebody is dead. But if somebody is e.g. in a coma (or missing), he won't be able to take care of his children and yet his will would not be able to executed. A separate guardianship document would instead apply also in these situations thereby minimizing the chances that somebody, whom you do not consider fit, becomes a guardian of your children.
It is legal for a dentist to bill you for services rendered. You have an obligation to pay the dentist (in exchange for services); the insurance company has an obligation to cover certain expenses of yours (in exchange for money); the dentist has an obligation to the insurance company to accept certain terms specified by the insurance company (in exchange for being listed as 'in-network'). Your recourse is to object to the insurance company, since they are the ones who have an obligation to you. The brute force approach would be to sue the insurance company for failing to cover something that they are (ostensibly) obligated to pay on your behalf, under the terms of your insurance contract. However, the chances are virtually non-existent that they are actually obligated to pay the dentist. You can call the insurance company in advance of the procedure and get a definite decision as to whether the service in question is covered, and if they say "Yes", then you are covered, otherwise you will know you are not, and can plan accordingly. The insurance company has some (minor) leverage over the dentist, if the dentist has breached his contract with the company. If a service provider egregiously breaks the terms of an agreement with the insurance company, the provider could be sued or at least dropped from the in-network list. This is, however, fairly theoretical. The insurance company statement "You should not be billed for this service" has no legal force, but it does weakly suggest that they blame the dentist somewhat (the alternative is to simply say "This service is not covered"). Your obligation to the dentist arises from the service provided plus the rarely-read clause in the financial agreement document that you signed at some point which says something like "We will submit claims to your insurance company, but you are ultimately responsible for any unpaid charges". It is highly unlikely that the dentist actually lied to you about the cost, especially it is unlikely that he said anything that could be construed as a promise that the insurance company would provide a particular level of coverage. For future reference, you either need to get a clear written statement from the service provider that they will accept whatever the insurance company allows you (i.e. their seat of the pants estimates are legally binding), or you need to get a clear written statement from the insurance company regarding what is and is not covered.
north-carolina A parent is responsible for supporting their minor child, therefore they cannot "kick out" their child (they can arrange for someone else to take care of the child but they are financially responsible for this arrangement). This is true even if the parent is a minor. In that case, the grandparents and the parent (who is herself a minor child) are both responsible for the grandchild. We can turn to NCGS § 50-13.4(b) which states the hierarchy of responsibilities: In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, parents of a minor, unemancipated child who is the custodial or noncustodial parent of a child shall share this primary liability for their grandchild's support with the minor parent, the court determining the proper share, until the minor parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated. If both the parents of the child requiring support were unemancipated minors at the time of the child's conception, the parents of both minor parents share primary liability for their grandchild's support until both minor parents reach the age of 18 or become emancipated. The details could be different in another jurisdiction.
You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with.
Children/youths are allowed to make some decisions themselves even before becoming adults. In the US, COPPA has privacy protections for children under the age of 13. This means that many US-based or US-oriented online services refuse to provide services to people younger than 13. The terms of service often include language to the effect that no part of the service is intended to children under 13. In the EU, the GDPR lets member states pick a cutoff age between 13 and 16 years. Children below this age cannot give consent themselves. However, this is a very narrow condition as consent isn't generally needed to use a website (cookie consent banners are extremely common though). For example, Stack Exchange bans under 13 year olds, and under 16 year olds in the EU: 3. Age Eligibility You must be at least 13 years old to access or use the Network or Services, including without limitation to complete a Stack Overflow account registration. By accessing or using the Services or the Network in any manner, you represent and warrant that you are at least 13 years of age. If you are under 13 years old, you may not, under any circumstances or for any reason, access or use the Services or Network in any manner, and may not provide any personal information to or on the Services or Network (including, for example, a name, address, telephone number or email address). If you are located within the European Union, you must be at least 16 years old to access or use the Network or Services, including without limitation to complete a Stack Overflow Account Registration. By accessing or using the Services or the Network in any manner, you represent and warrant that you are at least 16 years of age. If you are under 16 years old, you may not, under any circumstances or for any reason, access or use the Services or Network in any manner, and may not provide any personal information to or on the Services or Network (including, for example, a name, address, telephone number or email address). Source: Public Network Terms of Service These age limits are solely related to privacy laws. This is not about whether the child has legal competency to enter into contracts, or about your rights as a parent to supervise the development of your children. As a matter of internal policy, but in respect of this legal landscape, many parental control/surveillance software tools limit the available degree of control/surveillance as the children become older. While this may not be required in your particular jurisdiction, software providers are often interested in applying uniform policies across multiple jurisdictions.
1) Bob could disclose the PTSD condition and seek accommodation for it (in reality, controlled narcotics aren't actually used to treat PTSD but it isn't hard to imagine a situation where another controlled substance, e.g. ketamine, was used to treat this or some other Americans with Disabilities Act recognized disability and the absence of that disability was not a bona fide qualification of the job). The legal analysis in the case of the FBI (a federal government civilian civil service employer subject to special rules applicable to governmental employers), and a private employer, is not exactly the same, but it ends up in the same place. 2) Medical marijuana is, as a matter of federal law an oxymoron, because it is a Class I controlled substance that as a matter of law (contrary to reasonable facts) has no medical applications, and the FBI is charged with enforcing this law (among other agencies), so medical marijuana would legally disqualify someone from FBI employment. In Colorado which has legal under state law medical marijuana, employers have been allowed to discriminate based upon medical marijuana use because an employer is at a minimum allowed to treat federal law as enforceable. It is conceivable that some U.S. state other than Colorado which allows medical marijuana at the state level might reach a different conclusion as a matter of state law on the employment discrimination point, but potentially, the employer could appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court on a pre-emption argument so it would be a tenuous legal position to take.
How does this agreement define 'revenue'? Microsoft restricts its license of some particular software for organizations with "more than one million US dollars (or the equivalent in other currencies) in annual revenues...." My clients are small business owners, less than 50 employees. I am confident that none of my clients net over a million dollars in profit in any given year, but can I define "revenue" as profit? If a client sells widgets for $5k each, 201 in a year, and makes 2% profit after Costs of Goods Sold, is that $1.005MM revenue, or $20.1k revenue? I don't want someone to give me assurances that I can win against Microsoft in court, but I don't know where to look to confirm my suspicion that revenue has very little legally to do with how much money moves through your account in a given year, but instead how much money you actually make. My suspicion comes from the fact that Microsoft seems to be equating an organization with $1MM in revenue with one that has 250 PCs in use at any given time. Without explicit legal clarification from Microsoft, can I determine how a court would construe this otherwise undefined term?
You cannot define "revenue" as profits. Indeed, you probably can't even deduct cost of goods sold. Revenue is the amount of money that a company brings in from selling goods and services (investment income is arguably more ambiguous, and loan proceeds would clearly not be revenue). In the absence of other indications, a court would probably look the generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP) to define revenue, or perhaps definitions used by the U.S. Small Business Admnistration, or dictionary definitions, in the context of a contract. Whatever "revenue" means, it almost certainly doesn't mean "profits". Revenue makes more sense than profits in any case in this circumstance. They are trying to use a measure that is hard to manipulate, easy to determine from accounting records, easy to estimate in the absence of good record keeping, and that reflects the scale of the enterprise. Revenue is a standard measure of small v. large businesses for many purposes. Profit, in contrast, can be easily manipulated (e.g. through salaries paid to insiders and related party cost of goods sold contracts). Businesses are also much more likely to publicly disclose their revenues (and hence create evidence relevant to the contract) than to disclose their profits.
What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation.
My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee.
Sources of Liability Liability can come from: Statute law Contract law Common law Statute Law There may be (almost certainly are) laws in the jurisdiction where Joes Cheap Carnival are operating relating to Work Health and Safety. In general, these laws will impose a non-delegable duty (i.e. one you cant get out of) to comply with certain minimum standards. If operating your software as instructed with reasonable assumptions gives results that lead to an unsafe design then you would be liable in both cases. Contract Law If you are selling this software then you can limit your liability in any way you like providing that the limitation is not unlawful. For example, under Australian Consumer Law (which covers B2B transactions up to AUD$40,000 - how much are you selling for?) you have a non-excludable warranty that the software is fit-for-purpose; so, again, if operating your software as instructed with reasonable assumptions gives results that lead to an unsafe design then you would be liable in both cases. Common Law Only parties to a contract can take action under a contract; anyone you owe a duty of care to can sue your for negligence. A person injured by a machine your software helped design need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; it would be hard to argue you didn't, You breached that duty; the software was not "fit-for-purpose", There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your software there would have been no loss, There was a legal (proximate) cause; you may be able to raise something here, if your software was used incorrectly by an engineer, your breach may be too distant Harm; the person must suffer real loss. The only plausible advantage of making your software open source is that you are showing a greater amount of care by allowing your algorithms to be sort-of peer reviewed. This is not a legal shield I would really like to depend on. TL;DR Nothing can stop someone suing you - if they want to sue you they can sue you. Your best defence to a lawsuit is to demonstrate that you did everything a reasonable person could do without the benefit of hindsight Do you really think publishing your code is "everything a reasonable person could do"? You would be far better off: Taking out professional indemnity insurance Validating you algorithms thoroughly Engaging an independent third-party to validate your algorithms Developing proper and thorough testing procedure for your software Testing it in-house Engaging an independent third-party to test it Thoroughly documenting your software including all the assumptions along with the domains where they are valid and invalid.
All Licenses are granted in the shape of contracts. Contracts contain clauses that allow or disallow their transferability. The typical way a License for a software is obtained is to buy a key that acts as proof of purchase, and then agreeing to an EULA. For example the Win10 one. very typical clauses from the Win10 EULA explicitly forbid to transfer of the license without the device it was installed on: Installation and Use Rights. a. License. The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one instance of the software on your device (the licensed device), for use by one person at a time, so long as you comply with all the terms of this agreement. Updating or upgrading from non-genuine software with software from Microsoft or authorized sources does not make your original version or the updated/upgraded version genuine, and in that situation, you do not have a license to use the software. c. Restrictions. The device manufacturer or installer and Microsoft reserve all rights (such as rights under intellectual property laws) not expressly granted in this agreement. For example, this license does not give you any right to, and you may not: (iii) transfer the software (except as permitted by this agreement); Transfer. The provisions of this section do not apply if you acquired the software in Germany or in any of the countries listed on this site (aka.ms/transfer), in which case any transfer of the software to a third party, and the right to use it, must comply with applicable law. a. Software preinstalled on device. If you acquired the software preinstalled on a device (and also if you upgraded from software preinstalled on a device), you may transfer the license to use the software directly to another user, only with the licensed device. The transfer must include the software and, if provided with the device, an authentic Windows label including the product key. Before any permitted transfer, the other party must agree that this agreement applies to the transfer and use of the software. b. Stand-alone software. If you acquired the software as stand-alone software (and also if you upgraded from software you acquired as stand-alone software), you may transfer the software to another device that belongs to you. You may also transfer the software to a device owned by someone else if (i) you are the first licensed user of the software and (ii) the new user agrees to the terms of this agreement. You may use the backup copy we allow you to make or the media that the software came on to transfer the software. Every time you transfer the software to a new device, you must remove the software from the prior device. You may not transfer the software to share licenses between devices Cincom Systems, Inc v Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. Sept 2009) held that you can not transfer software that was merely licensed, even as the part of your company that uses the software becomes part of another company through a merger. The licensor had put express language that forbids the transfer of the license by licensee into the contract: When Alcan Ohio merged with Alcan Texas, the license granted by Cincom solely to Alcan Ohio transferred to the surviving corporation, now known as Novelis. Because Novelis did not abide by the express terms of Cincom's license and gain Cincom's prior written approval, Novelis infringed Cincom's copyright. Likewise, the court in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) held that you can not re-sell an (installed) digital item as you create a new copy without the license for this. In a similar fashion, Disney recently changed the Terms of Service and contract on the digital codes that come with DVDs. The new terms explicitly forbid unbundling the code from the disk and forbid transferring the disk after using the code. This was what allowed Disney to gain an injunction in the case of Disney v RedBox. The end result is not out yet. In the EU, the ruling in one case fell different: UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp. held in 2012 that there is possibly a right to resell your used license... as long as it is a license forever (emphasis mine): in the event of the resale of a user licence entailing the resale of a copy of a computer program downloaded from the copyright holder’s website, that licence having originally been granted by that rightholder to the first acquirer for an unlimited period in return for payment of a fee intended to enable the rightholder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of that copy of his work, the second acquirer of the licence, as well as any subsequent acquirer of it, will be able to rely on the exhaustion of the distribution right under Article 4(2) of that directive As a result software licenses adapted and started to expressly sell the license as a license to obtain the service of a maintained software. To software as a service - which Windows and the Office suite are - this ruling does expressly not apply and you can not re-sell such a software license after it has been used. Signed License v. License Key That does not apply to the key, the representation of the payment. You can buy them in a store. They are a pretty tangible good. The principle is - in general - that you validate the license you sign by handing over the key to the supplier of the software. This usually voids the key. But... all those sites claim you can transfer?! not.... quite: once you agreed to the EULA and obtained the software service it can no longer be resold. Also, you just agreed you may not do that with transferable software. However, as long as you have the key unused the unused key for a license can be resold. That is a physical good that the first sale doctrine applies to. However, you may not retain a copy of the key to sell it, again and again, you would interfere with your customer's ability to contract as a used key often is rejected - you'd have defrauded the customer. Even in the EU, if you bought a perpetual license, you need to render your copy unusable under the ruling above: The CJEU held that the first purchaser needs to "make his own copy unusable at the time of its resale…in order to avoid infringing the exclusive right of reproduction of a computer program which belongs to its author“ The CJEU therefore briefly commented “to solve that problem, it is permissible for the distributor – whether ‘classic’ or ‘digital’ – to make use of technical protective measures such as product keys“. The key is a means to show you are entitled to a contract. It is the consideration Microsoft gets for signing the other side of the contract. Most software resellers deal with keys, the resale of keys is expressly possible. Some software companies mark a used-and re-sold key and require to contact the company to make sure that the software has been disabled on the other end. Since many companies can't render the software disabled on the seller's end, they refuse to acknowledge the sale on the same basis: the software was not disabled or rendered useless, and as a result, the sale did not happen in accordance with the judgment.
If such a case came to court, the court would presumably rule that merely publishing the advertising could not be considered to be doing something "commercial". (Otherwise the contract would be absurd, as the question points out.) The court would therefore define "commercial" as some act beyond merely displaying the advertising -- perhaps charging for the website on which it is displayed, or using it to sell goods. Moreover, since the company apparently wrote the contract, any ambiguity in it would be construed against the company, if there is another reasonable interpretation. Thus the contract would not be void, and could be sued on, but the company would win only if it established some conduct that the court was prepared to consider as "commercial" in light of the circumstances and the purpose of the contract. By the way it is not really on point, but it is a common misunderstanding that: some customers may be organized as nonprofit and they're not allowed to make profits Nonprofit entities may do business and make income that would be considered "profit" for an ordinary corporation. What they cannot do is distribute that income as "profit" to owners, shareholders, members, or other individuals.
In United States v. Microsoft, Microsoft was accused of abusing its monopoly power by bundling. A prerequisite for this type of Sherman Act Section 2 claim is that the company must have monopoly power to abuse. Market share is one of the primary measures courts use to determine if a company has monopoly powers, and therefore can be punished for abusing them. At the time of the Microsoft case, its market share was over 80% of all PCs and over 95% of Intel PCs. In United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, Learned Hand considered three possible market share numbers. He wrote that market share of more than 90% "is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not." Worldwide, iOS has about 15% of the smartphone OS market. In the US, it's about 40%. According to Judge Hand, that's well below "doubtful" and awfully close to "certainly not" a monopoly. No monopoly equals no monopoly power equals no Sherman Act Section 2 violation.
No They will list the price they are charging you. This will normally be greater than what they paid because that’s how business works. The amount they are allowed to charge is what you agreed in your contract with them (which may incorporate a price list) or, if the contract is silent, a reasonable amount. What is reasonable will be related to what the market in your geographical area charges. While this is indirectly related to the input cost of a given item, business can and do charge what the market allows.
What does "procedural defenses" mean? I have filed a petition with the New York State Review Office, to appeal the decision in my son's special education impartial hearing (using 2016 rules). The process allows for the school district to file an "Answer" within ten days of the petition having been served on the district. I am permitted to file a "Reply" within three days of the Answer having been served on me. The rules say: "The petitioner may reply to the Answer of the respondent only with respect to any procedural defenses asserted in the Answer or with respect to any additional documentary evidence filed with the Answer." I need some help understanding what I'm allowed to do in my Reply and what I'm not allowed to do. "Procedural defenses" sounds like specialized lingo and that is the part I don't understand. Here are some specific examples of things I'm not sure whether I can include in my Reply (some aspects of these might sound silly -- but the district feels that the child's special education eligibility hinges on these things; therefore they have become important): The district asked two of the child's teachers to fill out a special questionnaire about behavior. Teacher A's questionnaire showed frequent disruptive behavior; Teacher B's showed none. The district lawyer made a big thing out of this in the Answer. I have emails from this past fall (after the hearing sessions were complete, but before the decision was rendered) written by Teacher B about multiple incidents of disruptive behavior. I would like to include this type of additional evidence in the Reply. There are factual inaccuracies and distortions in the Answer. I would like to address these in the Reply. The district lawyer claimed, in the Reply, that the student's grades declined because he was involved in too many extracurricular activities. She gave as examples the music ensembles that he plays in as part of his coursework, and a college prep program for students of color called STEP, which is a program financed and administered by the state education departement. I printed a description of the STEP program from its website, and an email from the STEP program directed to parents of students in the program, showing that the primary activity students are offered when they get accepted into the STEP program is free weekly tutoring. I would like to include these materials as additional evidence in my Reply, to rebut the Answer. The Answer takes a number of statements in the transcript and the exhibits out of context, and then draws erroneous conclusions. I would like to point out the specific things in the record that show that the conclusions are erroneous. The Answer asserts "facts" that are not in evidence, and that aren't true. For one of these things, the review officer could in principle ask the district to disclose certain student records to get to the bottom of the matter. I would like to point this out in the Reply. There was no new evidence introduced with the Answer, just lots of distortions of the existing evidence. I'm not asking for legal advice, just for help understanding the phrase. I included examples in my question just to help people see where I'm confused. You don't even have to focus your answer on the specific examples if you'd rather not. Also note, my petition has already been accepted for review. The worst that can happen if I include something that's not kosher in my Reply is that it will be disregarded. However, even if that happened, the review officer will still go carefully through my petition and the hearing record.
Typically an Answer would have two parts. The first part presents the Defendant's side of the story raised in the Petition in an effort to assert that the Petition when viewed in light of the actual facts hasn't demonstrated a right to relief. The second part sets forth "affirmative defenses", most of which are procedural in nature. An affirmative defense raises some set of circumstances not discussed in the Petition that make it appropriate to deny relief even when, but for the defense, if everything in the Petition was true, this would suffice to establish grounds for relief. For example, procedural defenses might include: failure to meet a deadline, failure to give notice to the proper persons, failure to pay a filing fee, failure to include required information (such as a case number or a statement of facts or a signature) in the Petition, or lack of standing to file the Petition on behalf of the child because parental rights or legal guardianship are absent or because the person filing the Petition isn't an adult. The notion is that the Reply, in theory, should limit itself to responding to the newly raised procedural defenses stated in the Answer, or to new documents provided with the Answer, instead of trying to argue and resolve every dispute of fact or credibility issues between the Petition's version of the facts and the Answer's version of the facts. When in doubt, talk about it in the Reply. At worst, it is beyond the scope of what should be included in a Reply and can be ignored by the hearing officer as harmless. And, sometimes the hearing officer will decide that they want to know what is said even if it isn't strictly within the proper scope of a Reply. Certainly provide any documents that weren't previously provided that rebut the claims in the Answer.
This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off.
There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is "dismissed as improvidently granted" or "DIGed". This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term.
In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't".
Appeal proofing decisions is a common practice of trial judges (and even intermediate appellate court judges and state supreme court judges) well known to practitioners and even discussed by law professors in class at times, but I'd have a hard time coming up with a reference where it was discussed. There is probably a law review article that discusses the practice somewhere. It also comes in several versions. One is to make copious findings of fact (especially on credibility) that are hard to reverse on appeal. A judicial finding that someone had an intent to defraud another party based upon his demeanor when he testified about that issue can overcome all sorts of technical objections to a claim in a lawsuit on a more strict liability basis like breach of contract. Another is to give a "soon to lose" party everything he wants procedurally, even when he isn't entitled to it so he can't appeal on procedural grounds. For example, a court might admit otherwise inadmissible evidence over the objection of the other party and then rule against the party seeking to admit that evidence anyway on the merits. Lawyers often assume that this is happening when a judge starts making blatantly incorrect rulings on procedural issues against them repeatedly in an otherwise strong case in a bench trial. A third is to provide an alternative holding that reaches the same conclusion in case for a different legal reason in the event that an appellate court does not agree with the primary holding. A fourth (mostly limited to appellate contexts) is to decide a case on grounds that make the case uninteresting to review on further appeal (e.g. finding that a factual conclusion is supported by evidence in the record, or that an issue wasn't preserved adequately in a trial court) or beyond the jurisdiction of other courts (e.g. deciding a case based upon state law so that the U.S. Supreme Court won't review it).
However, in the last 233 years, only a handful of people have been prosecuted for violating this law. The census bureau has noticed that a more effective way to get everyone counted is to follow up in person if someone neglects to respond to the questionnaire. Once they follow up and the person has responded, there's no longer a basis for prosecuting. What is the point of one of the oldest laws, in which some people have cared enough to amend, but not enough to actually enforce? The possibility of prosecution is presumably thought to increase the response rate even if virtually nobody is ever prosecuted. The law also serves as a formal statement by congress that responding to the census is important, even if the executive doesn't prosecute people for failing to do so. Another thing to consider is that an element of the offense specified in 13 USC 221 is refusal or willful neglect. Without evidence of an affirmative refusal to respond, the prosecutor would need evidence of willfulness, which goes to state of mind, and that is notoriously difficult to prove. Any defendant who claims to have intended to respond but for chronic forgetfulness would introduce reasonable doubt unless the prosecutor had something to show that the defendant intentionally refrained from responding.
Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower.
I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.
Client wants me to sign a contract after 1 year of working together, cites US tax laws as the reason I'm a software developer freelancer, I have a client I have been working with for a while now (a year on the last projects, but many years before as employer-employee) which recently cited tax-law related issues due to which we need to sign a contract on the work done so far (in the last year). I "am" a Croatian 1-man company and the client is from US, an Inc. with a couple orders of magnitude more money then I have but not really a fully developed corporation with it's legal department etc. I generally work only with people I trust, and on handshake & trust basis, contracts excluded, judging that: if it comes to litigation, the client is lost, this is the biggest damage that no litigation will reverse if the client rips me off, I will not be able to recover my lost money through litigation because the fees are generally too low for a good lawyer to handle and for me to still have any money left out of it (~40.000$ per year, court on a different continent) if the client wants to screw me with litigation, I will not have the money to keep up the lawyer costs even if I'm in the right, my clients are typically MUCH bigger than I am contract is unnecessary if delivery & payout cycles are small enough to limit risk exposure of all parties the relationship has been arranged and agreed on through a Skype, meaning that any gross mishandling of the agreement (such as copyright issues) would still be covered via oral contract with physical proof of it happening (?) just paying for a competent Croatian lawyer with US & Croatian contract experience to look at the contract proposal the client sent me will cost me a fortune So the question, is the client really obliged by some aspect US law to sign a contract to continue working with me? Note that the client cites anti-money laundry laws as the reason yet doesn't clarify which law exactly, but wouldn't proof of oral contract and a mountain of proof from code commit logs hosted on a tamper-proof third party cloud service be sufficient to cover this? UPDATE 1 Now that I'm thinking about it, my arrangement with the client is quite a bit more complicated than the cookie cutter "you do work, we own software" agreement. I gave them full rights to some of my software in exchange for full rights on some of the software I developed for them, so accepting a cookie-cutter contract would kind of be a bad thing for me, and would almost certainly open a 2-way litigation venue should any kind of conflict happen down the road, with a litigation-happy client especially - and me being very litigation unhappy on the other end. That's why I'm asking if the contract is indeed necessary, because untangling which pieces of code are mine, which are shared, which are theirs, will be hard and expensive and would probably not be done 100% according to reality and open new pandora boxes, knowing lawyers and their level of software expertise. On the other hand, a bunch of Skype chats is a helluva lot more unclear than a written contract, but a general understanding is that it generally carries a lot less weight too? (due to those same ambiguities)
You already have a contract(s): you do work and they pay you is pretty much all you need to have a contract. Given that there is already a contract, formalising it in writing does not expose you to any greater risk and usually, clearly defining the terms of a contract reduces risk all around.
You have a contract - they have fulfilled their obligation (they paid you), if you do not fulfil their obligation (not to post it online) then you are in breach of the contract. Your obligation continues even if you gift the money back to them. If you breach the contract then they can sue you for the damage that they suffer. Presumably this would be damage to their reputation and for a public figure this could run into millions of dollars. In demanding additional money from them beyond what you are legally entitled to you are, at least, flirting with the crime of extortion/blackmail. This would not be a matter for them to sue you for, it would be a matter for the DA to prosecute if they chose to make a complaint. There doesn't seem to be a defamation issue here because you are not stating anything that isn't true. Now, the extent of the agreement appears to prohibit you posting it on the internet, however, the spirit of the agreement is that you will keep the information secret in all respects - that is likely how a court would look at it. Of course, if someone does steal the information from you then you haven't broken the agreement but you would probably have to prove that it was stolen when they sue you.
We can assume there was a meeting of the minds when the contract was drafted, and both parties expected payments to me made based on product usage. Plaintiff alleges that this did not happen. Thus plaintiff is indeed alleging that the contract was breached. Now plaintiff alleges that defendant broke the contract, while defendant counters that plaintiff broke the contract. "[T]o be determined by tracking software" is woefully ambiguous. The court will want to know which party drafted the contract, as disputes arising from ambiguity are often resolved in favor of the non-drafting party.
There is no contract between you (the licensee) and the licensor of the software. The creator of the open source software just says "here's the software, you may use it if you like, as long as you fulfil some conditions. ". No contract, no liability. I think the developer would only be liable if they intentionally created software that causes damage. (Which has happened, some open source browser plugins have recently been modified to run bitcoin mining software, or worse. I suppose the miscreants could follow all the GPL rules or whatever license is used).
The contract remains valid. Most contracts don't need to be written at all. Even if yours did need to be written under the Statute of Frauds or some other law, you're saying that it was made in writing, even though you later tore it up. The fact that the contract is missing or destroyed doesn't change the fact that it exists and obligates the parties; it just makes it harder to prove what it said.
It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.
As I understand it you are responsible for removing the stump and replacing the tree. The fact that a particular method was agreed (and failed) doesn’t relieve you of that responsibility. If a contract doesn’t specify a time for fulfilling an obligation then it must be done within a reasonable time. That is, a time that is reasonable in the particular circumstances. You suggested a time of April/May - it is now November and is probably beyond a reasonable time. By not stating a year, a reasonable interpretation is that you meant this year i.e. 2018. It would appear that you are in breach of your agreement and the other party can take whatever action the agreement contemplates.
Those two situations should be legally equivalent. The key thing is that you intend to agree to the contract, and are taking physical steps that are intended to manifest your agreement. If you had added an electronic signature to the PDF file, and transmitted this to the company, it should also be legally equivalent, and just as binding as the pen and paper method.
If I accidentally send a package to the wrong person, is it still my property? Suppose the following were to happen. I've got a package on my desk. I am planning to send it to person A with intent to give them ownership of it. Instead, by mistake, I send it to person B. Is it still my property? Obviously I can ask for it back - but if I ask after the package has been received, and person B refuses to send it back, do I have legal recourse? Or, alternatively, does person A have legal recourse against person B? Next, would the situation change if I gave person B advance notice (e.g. send an expedited letter that arrives before the package does, or a phone call) that they are not the intended recipient for the package?
I would think that this would be treated the same as lost property. In most places, if you notice lost property (for example because the postman hands it to you) you have the choice of ignoring it (don't touch it, don't accept it from the postman), or you have to make reasonable efforts to find the owner and return it. If you as the sender had no idea who received the package so you cannot contact them, and there was nothing in the package identifying the sender, the receiver would be able to keep the package when their efforts of finding the owner fail. But if you manage to contact them, then the receiver knows the owner, so there is no legal excuse to keep the package.
This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't
If the envelope had someone else's name and not your name, you should in theory not have opened it, and should instead have marked it "Not known at this address. Return to Sender." and handed it back to the postal service to be returned. If you were asked to sign for the letter, ideally you would check that it is not addressed to you (or anyone else now at your residence) and refuse to sign, but it is easy to overlook that at the moment a letter is presented to you. And sometimes certified mail is delivered without obtaining the signature of any resident. If, however, the envelope had your name on it, you were entitled to open it, and are not bound by any confidentiality statements in the cover letter, assuming that you had no previous relationship with the sender. You may well choose to respect them, but you cannot be legally bound unless you accepted such an obligation at some point, usually in a contract of some sort. If you did have a confidential relationship with the sender, then its terms would normally control, whatever they might be. You could prepare an envelope addressed to the sender, enclose the document, and mail it back to the sender. You could optionally add a short cover letter explaining how you received the document. If the envelope was addressed to some other person, this would, I think, be the best thing to do. If the document was addressed to you, this is totally optional, you could legally just discard the document and forget about it, and you can probably legally read it and do whatever you like about the contents. But as the answer by gnasher729 points out, returning it would be the nice thing. As the comment by Makyen points out, you may wish to retain evidence of what was received. One sided confidentially statements on letters or faxes are not legally effective in the absence of some prior or current relationship or agreement to be bound in confidence.
Yes From clause 7 of the Ebay agreement: When you enter into a transaction you create a legally binding contract with another user, unless the item is listed in a category under the Non-binding bid policy. You have a contract, if you don't fulfil your obligations under it you can be sued. You can only terminate a contract a) if the contract provides for termination and the relevant circumstances have happened, or b) due to a breach of a condition (but not a warranty) of the contract by the other party or c) some very limited and highly technical circumstances at law. The fact that the other party is rude doesn't fit within b) or c) and, barring some very unusual contract terms, won't fit in a) either. Make good on your legally enforcable promise.
would it be interpreted in favor of the person who did not draft the terms? Yes, provided that the interpretation is reasonable. That is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here, the term "deliverables and associated documents" might entail a contradiction if that term [allegedly or literally] encompasses "source code or content". That depends on what definition(s) of "deliverables and associated documents" can be adduced from the contract. The term could refer to items that are not "source code or content", such as the binary files (i.e., executables and DLLs), instructions & documentation on how to operate and troubleshoot the application, and so forth. In that case, there would be no contradiction because there is no overlap between these items and the source code. if term A) is written on line 10 and term B) is written on line 11, is it resonable to assume term B) takes precedence or modifies term A? No. The sequence of clauses/terms itself does not determine which one outweighs or qualifies the other. Instead, the language used in the contract is indicative of the parties' intent and therefore how the terms of that contract relate to each other.
They aren’t treated differently In most jurisdictions, law enforcement requires a warrant to intercept/open/read the contents of physical or electronic correspondence. Similarly, in most jurisdictions, a warrant is not required to read the metadata: who is communicating with whom, how and when but not what. That is they can read what’s written on the outside of the envelope or the routing information of the email/SMS. Telephony is not correspondence because it is not the intent of the parties to create a permanent record. It is usually treated as any other conversation - if it carried out in a place and manner that the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy it’s usually illegal to record it (electronically or by writing it down). If it’s said publicly, it isn’t illegal.
The primary question is whether you actually committed a crime in signing a credit card receipt, when you are not the cardholder nor are you authorized to sign on behalf of the cardholder: did you commit fraud? It is not possible to accidentally commit fraud, you have to have intended to deceived the other party that you are authorized to sign. For the sake of discussion, I will assume that you had no such intention. Presumably, the person who ordered the stuff will wonder "where is my stuff?", will complain to the vendor, they may then find the signed receipt and some evidence regarding where the goods were delivered. Whether or not they contact you asking for an explanation / return of the goods, the police would have to investigate the situation in light of some allegation that you committed fraud. The police will not just come knocking on the door and nab you (in the US: North Korean law is different). In many jurisdictions, there is a requirement for a warrant supported by probable cause. If the investigation provides sufficient credible evidence proving that you did intentionally falsely sign the receipt, to the point that given those facts you would be convicted of the crime, then there is probable cause for a warrant for your arrest. The fact of signing a receipt is not probable cause to support such an arrest, but other facts could be added to reach that level of evidence.
we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.
Does the father have the rights to keep the baby that the mother wants adopted? So, I was watching an "E.R." episode, and they had this bit of dialog between a doctor who's pregnant and trying to have the child adopted when born; and adoption agency person (being "ER", the jurisdiction is obviously Chicago, IL) : AAP: ... and what about the father? Is he prepared to sign away his parental rights? AAP: ... Does he know you're pregnant? Doctor: shakes her head "no" AAP: Well, he may want to keep the baby. Doctor But what if I don't want him to? AAP: He's the father. He has rights Is that dialog legally accurate? What are the rights that the father have?
Overview of Notice Requirements To Fathers Prior To Adoption In Illinois The father has some rights, but they are very limited in Illinois under the kind of circumstances set forth in the ER dialog. If the mother wants to put up the child for adoption and doesn't want to reveal anything about the father, perhaps with the specific intent of preventing him from interfering with the adoption, she has the practical ability to do so without penalty. In practice, either an "involved father", or spouse who theoretically could be the father during the course of a marriage, is very likely to receive notice of an adoption and to be required to consent to it, unless parental rights have been terminated or the father raped the mother. But, this isn't the kind of situation present in the ER dialog. But, an "uninvolved father" (even if uninvolved through no fault of his own because he doesn't know that he has gotten the mother pregnant, for example) is entitled only to a registered letter to his last known address and mention in a newspaper legal classified advertisement, generally as provided by the mother if she chooses to cooperate in providing accurate information. He has really no recourse if he isn't given the notice he is entitled to under the statute. His pretty much exclusive remedy is to go through the hoops of the Putative Father Registry and then to file a paternity action in court, on very tight timelines, which he has probably never heard of and is in practice incapable of managing to comply with 95%+ of the time. Unless he was voluntarily and accurately put on the birth certificate by the mother, an "uninvolved father" has a very decent chance of getting no notice at all and not being able to do anything about it even if he later learns of the child's existence, unless the mother is clear that he is the father and acts with more good faith towards him in the notice process than is commonplace. There are criminal penalties for providing false information about the father, but if the petition is brought by someone other than the mother (as is usually the case) the mother faces no penalties for failing to be forthright on the birth certificate or in cooperating with the people who are filing the adoption petition. She generally need only sign a surrender of the child. She may or may not make any statements under oath or penalty of perjury, depending upon the way the relevant statute is interpreted and there are ways she can avoid much exposure to criminal liability in answering vaguely or inaccurately or claiming not to know. So, a mother has a practical ability to put her child up for adoption without the involvement of an "uninvolved father" without any real penalty for doing so, although there is at least a moral expectation that she will be forthright with the people handling the adoption process when they make an effort to get information about the father. Unless the father is informed by someone that the mother is pregnant, and he knows which state the mother will give birth to the child in or move to in order to conduct the adoption in, and he is aware of the tough requirements of the putative father's registry, the father has no real reason to know that he has to do anything to prevent his child from being adopted, unless the mother provides his accurate name and address to the people prepare the adoption papers. He has no real clear and obvious way to learn what he has to do in order to prevent an adoption from going through, and is very likely to think he is entitled to more notice than he actually is, and thus to be less pro-active that he needs to be to preserve his paternity rights. If he's lucky, he could also get notice through a newspaper legal advertisement publications that someone who cares about him (he almost surely doesn't read them) could see - but even if he learns by publication he may have a hard time taking the acts required to give him the right to deny consent to an adoption in time for it to matter legally. The process is also very unforgiving towards fathers who change their minds, even if they change their minds before the legal adoption process is over. Generally speaking, a father has no right to have an attorney appointed for him in a case where he is trying to assert his paternity if he is unable to afford one himself. In addition to the requirements of Illinois law set forth below, there is also generally a requirement to affirmatively state in adoption proceeding if the father is, or might be, a member of a Native American tribe, as that goes to the jurisdictional issue of the applicability of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, which requires notice, at a minimum, to the father's Indian tribe, even if notice cannot be given to the father. The Relevant Laws With regard to Illinois adoption laws there are a couple of statutes that are relevant: A Petition for adoption must state under oath per § 750 ILCS 50/5(f) (line breaks inserted editorially for ease of readability in this online format and not present in the original): The names, if known, and the place of residence, if known, of the parents; and whether such parents are minors, or otherwise under any legal disability. The names and addresses of the parents shall be omitted and they shall not be made parties defendant to the petition if (1) the rights of the parents have been terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (2) the child has been surrendered to an agency, or (3) the parent or parents have been served with the notice provided in Section 12a of this Act and said parent or parents have filed a disclaimer of paternity as therein provided or have failed to file such declaration of paternity or a request for notice as provided in said Section, or (4) the parent is a putative father or legal father of the child who has waived his parental rights by signing a waiver as provided in subsection S of Section 10; . . . Whatever orders, judgments or decrees have heretofore been entered by any court affecting (1) adoption or custody of the child, or (2) the adoptive, custodial or parental rights of either petitioner, including the prior denial of any petition for adoption pertaining to such child, or to the petitioners, or either of them. I've omitted provisions related to children with no living parents which involve notice to guardians and next of kin, and provisions related to "standby adoption" which is also beyond the scope of this question. Surrender to an agency is basically putting a child up for adoption before adoptive parents are lined up, and otherwise involves the same surrender or waiver process. Notice requirements per § 750 ILCS 50/7 are as follows (emphasis and line breaks added): A. All persons named in the petition for adoption or standby adoption, other than the petitioners and any party who has previously either denied being a parent pursuant to Section 12a of this Act or whose rights have been terminated pursuant to Section 12a of this Act, but including the person sought to be adopted, shall be made parties defendant by name, and if the name or names of any such persons are alleged in the petition to be unknown such persons shall be made parties defendant under the name and style of "All whom it may concern". In all such actions petitioner or his attorney shall file, at the office of the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, an affidavit showing that the defendant resides or has gone out of this State, or on due inquiry cannot be found, or is concealed within this State, so that process cannot be served upon him, and stating the place of residence of the defendant, if known, or that upon diligent inquiry his place of residence cannot be ascertained, the clerk shall cause publication to be made in some newspaper published in the county in which the action is pending. . . . In the event there is service on any of the parties by publication, the publication shall contain notice of pendency of the action, the name of the person to be adopted and the name of the parties to be served by publication, and the date on or after which default may be entered against such parties. . . . B. A minor defendant who has been served in accordance with this Section may be defaulted in the same manner as any other defendant. C. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of this or any other law, and in addition to the notice requirements of any law pertaining to persons other than those specified in this subsection, the persons entitled to notice that a petition has been filed under Section 5 of this Act shall include: (a) any person adjudicated by a court in this State to be the father of the child; (b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order has been filed with the Putative Father Registry under Section 12.1 of this Act; (c) any person who at the time of the filing of the petition is registered in the Putative Father Registry under Section 12.1 of this Act as the putative father of the child; (d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father; (e) any person who is openly living with the child or the child's mother at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's father; (f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in a written, sworn statement, including an Affidavit of Identification as specified under Section 11 of this Act; (g) any person who was married to the child's mother on the date of the child's birth or within 300 days prior to the child's birth. The sole purpose of notice under this Section shall be to enable the person receiving notice to appear in the adoption proceedings to present evidence to the court relevant to whether the consent or surrender of the person to the adoption is required pursuant to Section 8 of this Act. If the court determines that the consent or surrender of the person is not required pursuant to Section 8, then the person shall not be entitled to participate in the proceedings or to any further notice of the proceedings. and § 750 ILCS 50/12a. Notice to putative father Upon the written request to any Clerk of any Circuit Court . . . a notice, the declaration of paternity and the disclaimer of paternity may be served on a putative father in the same manner as Summons is served in other civil proceedings, or, in lieu of personal service, service may be made as follows: . . . The Clerk shall forthwith mail to the putative father, at the address appearing in the Affidavit, the copy of the notice, the declaration of paternity and the disclaimer of paternity, by certified mail, return receipt requested; Consent requirements are as follows (line breaks added editorially, provisions for cases where there is a surrender to an agency and then a later adoption rather than a direct adoption, which are substantially similar, are also omitted): § 750 ILCS 50/8. Consents to adoption and surrenders for purposes of adoption (a) Except as hereinafter provided in this Section consents or surrenders shall be required in all cases, unless the person whose consent or surrender would otherwise be required shall be found by the court: (1) to be an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of this Act, by clear and convincing evidence; or (2) not to be the biological or adoptive father of the child; or (3) to have waived his parental rights to the child under Section 12a or 12.1 or subsection S of Section 10 of this Act; or (4) to be the parent of an adult sought to be adopted; or (5) to be the father of the child as a result of criminal sexual abuse or assault as defined under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or (6) to be the father of a child who: (i) is a family member of the mother of the child, and the mother is under the age of 18 at the time of the child's conception; for purposes of this subsection, a "family member" is a parent, step-parent, grandparent, step-grandparent, sibling, or cousin of the first degree, whether by whole blood, half-blood, or adoption, as well as a person age 18 or over at the time of the child's conception who has resided in the household with the mother continuously for at least one year; or (ii) is at least 5 years older than the child's mother, and the mother was under the age of 17 at the time of the child's conception, unless the mother and father voluntarily acknowledge the father's paternity of the child by marrying or by establishing the father's paternity by consent of the parties pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 or pursuant to a substantially similar statute in another state. A criminal conviction of any offense pursuant to Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-1.70, 12C-5, 12C-10, 12C-35, 12C-40, 12C-45, 18-6, 19-6, or Article 12 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 is not required. (b) Where consents are required in the case of an adoption of a minor child, the consents of the following persons shall be sufficient: (1) (A) The mother of the minor child; and (B) The father of the minor child, if the father: (i) was married to the mother on the date of birth of the child or within 300 days before the birth of the child, except for a husband or former husband who has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction not to be the biological father of the child; or (ii) is the father of the child under a judgment for adoption, an order of parentage, or an acknowledgment of parentage or paternity pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 5 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 or pursuant to Article 3 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015; or (iii) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents less than 6 months after birth, openly lived with the child, the child's biological mother, or both, and held himself out to be the child's biological father during the first 30 days following the birth of the child; or (iv) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents less than 6 months after birth, made a good faith effort to pay a reasonable amount of the expenses related to the birth of the child and to provide a reasonable amount for the financial support of the child before the expiration of 30 days following the birth of the child, provided that the court may consider in its determination all relevant circumstances, including the financial condition of both biological parents; or (v) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents more than 6 months after birth, has maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child as manifested by: (I) the payment by the father toward the support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum, according to the father's means, and either (II) the father's visiting the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to do so and not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child, or (III) the father's regular communication with the child or with the person or agency having the care or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the child or prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. The subjective intent of the father, whether expressed or otherwise unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this sub-paragraph as manifesting such intent, shall not preclude a determination that the father failed to maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child; or (vi) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents more than six months after birth, openly lived with the child for a period of six months within the one year period immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption and openly held himself out to be the father of the child; or (vii) has timely registered with Putative Father Registry, as provided in Section 12.1 of this Act, and prior to the expiration of 30 days from the date of such registration, commenced legal proceedings to establish paternity under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, under the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, or under the law of the jurisdiction of the child's birth; or . . . (4) Any person or agency having legal custody of a child by court order if the parental rights of the parents have been judicially terminated, and the court having jurisdiction of the guardianship of the child has authorized the consent to the adoption; or (5) The execution and verification of the petition by any petitioner who is also a parent of the child sought to be adopted shall be sufficient evidence of such parent's consent to the adoption. There are rules governing when a parent may consent to adoption: § 750 ILCS 50/9. Time for signing a waiver, consent, or surrender A. A consent or a surrender signed not less than 72 hours after the birth of the child is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. B. No consent or surrender shall be signed within the 72 hour period immediately following the birth of the child. C. A consent or a surrender may be signed by the father prior to the birth of the child. Such consent or surrender shall be revoked if, within 72 hours after the birth of the child, the father who gave such consent or surrender, notifies in writing the person, agency or court representative who acknowledged the surrender or consent or any individual representing or connected with such person, agency or court representative of the revocation of the consent or surrender. D. Any consent or surrender signed in accordance with paragraph C above which is not revoked within 72 hours after the birth of the child is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. . . . F. A waiver as provided in subsection S of Section 10 of this Act may be signed by a putative father or legal father of the child at any time prior to or after the birth of the child. A waiver is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. Consents and waivers have to follow a standard form with warnings in it set forth in Section 10 of the Act. An Affidavit of Identification by the mother has legal effect is she executes it as set forth in the section below, but it is optional and other forms of due diligence are permitted: § 750 ILCS 50/11. Consents, surrenders, waivers, irrevocability (a) A consent to adoption or standby adoption by a parent, including a minor, executed and acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of this Act, or a surrender of a child by a parent, including a minor, to an agency for the purpose of adoption shall be irrevocable unless it shall have been obtained by fraud or duress on the part of the person before whom such consent, surrender, or other document equivalent to a surrender is acknowledged pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of this Act or on the part of the adopting parents or their agents and a court of competent jurisdiction shall so find. No action to void or revoke a consent to or surrender for adoption, including an action based on fraud or duress, may be commenced after 12 months from the date the consent or surrender was executed. The consent or surrender of a parent who is a minor shall not be voidable because of such minority. (a-1) A waiver signed by a putative or legal father, including a minor, executed and acknowledged in accordance with Section 10 of this Act, shall be irrevocable unless it shall have been obtained by fraud or duress on the part of the adopting parents or their agents and a court of competent jurisdiction shall so find. No action to void a waiver may be commenced after 12 months from the date the waiver was executed. The waiver of a putative or legal father who is a minor shall not be voidable because of such minority. (b) The petitioners in an adoption proceeding are entitled to rely upon a sworn statement of the biological mother of the child to be adopted identifying the father of her child. The affidavit shall be conclusive evidence as to the biological mother regarding the facts stated therein, and shall create a rebuttable presumption of truth as to the biological father only. Except as provided in Section 11 of this Act, the biological mother of the child shall be permanently barred from attacking the proceeding thereafter. The biological mother shall execute such affidavit in writing and under oath. The affidavit shall be executed by the biological mother before or at the time of execution of the consent or surrender, and shall be retained by the court and be a part of the Court's files. One could read the language above as requiring an Affidavit of Identification, but there is also a fair reading of it that states that it is only one possible means of many to determine who is entitled to notice. In other words "shall execute" could mean that if you execute it at all, it must be in writing and under oath. The "shall be executed by the biological mother before or at the time of execution of the consent or surrender" language seems more firm, but in practice, even if she does sign it under oath, if she simply says "I don't know" there is really no way that anyone can prove anything different in a way that would stick and criminal perjury convictions, in practice, are almost completely non-existent. The Putative Father registry is subject to the following rules: § 750 ILCS 50/12.1. Putative Father Registry The Department of Children and Family Services shall establish a Putative Father Registry for the purpose of determining the identity and location of a putative father of a minor child who is, or is expected to be, the subject of an adoption proceeding, in order to provide notice of such proceeding to the putative father. . . . (a) The Department shall maintain the following information in the Registry: (1) With respect to the putative father: (i) Name, including any other names by which the putative father may be known and that he may provide to the Registry; (ii)Address at which he may be served with notice of a petition under this Act, including any change of address; (iii) Social Security Number; (iv)Date of birth; and (v) If applicable, a certified copy of an order by a court of this State or of another state or territory of the United States adjudicating the putative father to be the father of the child. (2) With respect to the mother of the child: (i) Name, including all other names known to the putative father by which the mother may be known; (ii) If known to the putative father, her last address; (iii)Social Security Number; and (iv)Date of birth. (3) If known to the putative father, the name, gender, place of birth, and date of birth or anticipated date of birth of the child. (4) The date that the Department received the putative father's registration. . . . (b) A putative father may register with the Department before the birth of the child but shall register no later than 30 days after the birth of the child. All registrations shall be in writing and signed by the putative father. No fee shall be charged for the initial registration. The Department shall have no independent obligation to gather the information to be maintained. (c) An interested party, including persons intending to adopt a child, a child welfare agency with whom the mother has placed or has given written notice of her intention to place a child for adoption, the mother of the child, or an attorney representing an interested party may request that the Department search the Registry to determine whether a putative father is registered in relation to a child who is or may be the subject to an adoption petition. . . . (d) A search of the Registry may be proven by the production of a certified copy of the registration form, or by the certified statement of the administrator of the Registry that after a search, no registration of a putative father in relation to a child who is or may be the subject of an adoption petition could be located. (e) Except as otherwise provided, information contained within the Registry is confidential and shall not be published or open to public inspection. (f) A person who knowingly or intentionally registers false information under this Section commits a Class B misdemeanor. A person who knowingly or intentionally releases confidential information in violation of this Section commits a Class B misdemeanor. (g) Except as provided in subsections (b) or (c) of Section 8 of this Act, a putative father who fails to register with the Putative Father Registry as provided in this Section is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert any interest in the child, unless he proves by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) it was not possible for him to register within the period of time specified in subsection (b) of this Section; and (2) his failure to register was through no fault of his own; and (3) he registered within 10 days after it became possible for him to file. A lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or birth is not an acceptable reason for failure to register. (h) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of Section 8 of this Act, failure to timely register with the Putative Father Registry (i) shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of the child, and the consent or surrender of that person to the adoption of the child is not required, and (ii) shall constitute an abandonment of the child and shall be prima facie evidence of sufficient grounds to support termination of such father's parental rights under this Act. (i) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born out of wedlock, if there is no showing that a putative father has executed a consent or surrender or waived his rights regarding the proposed adoption, certification as specified in subsection (d) shall be filed with the court prior to entry of a final judgment order of adoption. (j) The Registry shall not be used to notify a putative father who is the father of a child as a result of criminal sexual abuse or assault as defined under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012. This is limited by two other main provisions: § 750 ILCS 50/20b. Time limit for relief from final judgment or order A petition for relief from a final order or judgment entered in a proceeding under this Act, after 30 days from the entry thereof under the provisions of Sec. 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise, must be filed not later than one year after the entry of the order or judgment. and Illinois Compiled Statutes Rights and Remedies Chapter 750. Families Act 55. Contest of Adoptions Act Current through P.A. 99-0919 (2015-2016) § 750 ILCS 55/1. No attack upon or proceedings contesting the validity of an adoption decree heretofore entered shall be made either directly or collaterally because of the failure to serve notice on or give notice to the reputed father, unless such attack or proceedings shall be instituted within one year after the effective date of this Act. (The effective date was in 1949.)
I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?
Yes or no, depending. The question is investigated in "The Status of Pregnant Women and Fetuses in US Criminal Law" (JAMA), which collects 23 opinion in US jurisdiction. In Reinesto v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 190 where the court ruled that the state cannot prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child. However, in Whitner v South Carolina, 492 SE 2d 777 the court did find the mother criminally liable for child abuse, based on prenatal drug use. The South Carolina case is the sole example of that type, in the study (published 2003). Charges range from child endangerment/abuse, illegal drug delivery to a minor, or fetal murder/manslaughter. The general finding is that since a fetus is not legally deemed to be a person (in those jurisdictions, at that time), where was no "child abuse". South Carolina, on the other hand, reasoned, here and in prior cases, that We have no difficulty in concluding that a fetus having reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person. A different study ("Criminal Charges for Child Harm from Substance Use in Pregnancy", JAAPL) which included cases up to 2015, found a slightly different distribution but generally concludes that courts do not consider maternal drug use to be a legal question. That article also cites a web page which at the time is purported to say that 18 states allow civil child abuse proceedings. In Chenault v. Huie (Texas), the court found that Texas does not recognize a cause of action in tort for injuries to a child that result from the mother's negligent or grossly negligent conduct while she was pregnant with the child but according to the more current Guttmacher Institute study, about half of the states have such a civil cause of action.
The police (and any other involved public agencies) do not work for Steve. They make their own decisions. You didn't specify a location, and requirements to consent to a search vary by location. It wouldn't be surprising, though, if Steve can't legally consent to a search of someone else's room (but possibly could consent to search of common areas). One possibility you don't seem to have considered is that the police or prosecutor would, if Steve is willing to testify, use Steve's testimony as probable cause to get a warrant. Then they could obtain text messages from Mike's service provider (even if he's deleted them from his phone), search his room without his consent, etc. Details again vary by location. Finally, any jail/prison term is typically up to a judge or jury, not the police. Pre-trial detention is typically up to a judge or magistrate. (Also, outside the scope of your question, but if there is any chance Steve has allowed himself to become involved in the misdeeds, even slightly, Steve would be wise to talk to a lawyer. Or if he suspects the police could believe that.)
Your understanding of the bill is correct. Legislation takes effect 90 days after sine die adjournment unless there is an emergency or enactment clause. If a relevant provision of the law is struck down as unconstitutional, any suit dependent on the provision would be dismissed. Residency is not relevant, what is relevant is being subject to Arkansas jurisdiction, meaning "being in Arkansas". A non-resident traveling to Arkansas could not have a forbidden procedure in Arkansas, and an Arkansas resident can have a procedure allowed elsewhere if they are elsewhere. A spouse would not be able to get an injunction if, for instance, the wife traveled to Washington state for the procedure, because Arkansas courts have no jurisdiction over Washington state. The law imposes a restriction on what physicians in Arkansas can do, and the woman receiving the abortion is not subject to liability.
Given there was no answer here, I will state what I know about child abuse response, but note I am not a lawyer nor am I in Illinois, so my statements are likely generalized for most US states (individual laws vary by state, and I reside in Pennsylvania). In most US states, the police and child/youth services (that's what it's called in Pennsylvania but all states have similar services) work side by side and a complaint by the child to a police officer will have an emergency action taken to protect the child. The child is identified as a victim and the police and child/youth services have the obligation to protect the child and to keep them from harm. This is the main goal of police and children/youth services - to keep the child safe and act in the best interest of the child. Usually, a complaint to a child abuse center can take time to process. When a police complaint comes in it is more immediate, with police having more 'influence' with CYS (child/youth services). Especially when the child is in deadly danger (they were just stabbed, after all), the police may arrest the mother or abusive sibling or intervene therein to remove the child from the parents care with CYS-equivalent services working to find suitable alternative living situations for the child as a result of a order of removal/protection authorized by a judge. (PA at least had emergency situation response plans for these situations where a judge is just a phone call away). As well, the child will likely be made a ward of the state if the courts determine the mother cannot care for the child or is a threat as such (not caring enough to stop the brother may count), insomuch that the child may be removed from the dangerous situation and placed in the care of a willing relative or if none can be found will be placed in temporary foster care in a safer environment. Note that nothing happens rapidly without the initial complaint to the police. At age 16 the child is likely going to be taken more seriously (compared to a 12 year old, for example), and has the right to be allowed to reach out to hospital staff to ask to speak to a police officer - otherwise it takes a child abuse complaint from someone who knows the child and situation and that can sometimes take longer to process (though, the distance factor in the original question may make a complaint from overseas given a lower priority due to not knowing the person on a more personal in-person level)
You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with.
It seems to be violating IPC §375 Having sex is only the first half of the check. The other is the enumerated list 1-7 that describes pretty much circumstances of no consent. Among them are (1) Against her will. (2) Without her consent. (3) With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. There are two prongs here: You can argue that the consent wasn't properly given because it was given out of fear of coming injury (IPC §90), or it was given but for a fear of hurt coming from the eviction. In either case, the description demanded can be fulfilled: no-consent theory Being homeless directly leads to physical harm of the body, destruction or loss of property and reputation, and as such is an injury as defined in the IPC. As such, the threat of eviction is a threat of injury. Consent isn't present if the reason for a person to comply with a demand is fear of such an injury. As such, there is no consent as required by IPC §375 (2), and so it is rape. In the alternative, it is forced against the will, and thus violates IPC §375 (1). harm theory Being made homeless is directly harming any person in body and mind. Having obtained consent from a threat of harm to the person or close person, it is violating IPC §375 (3), and as a result is rape.
What legal responsibility does a mother have to the father of her child? Inspired by (and therefore using the same tags as) Does the father have the rights to keep the baby that the mother wants adopted? In particular, is a mother required to inform the biological father of her child that the child exists? By "biological father" I mean the man with whom the woman conceived the child through natural sexual activity, regardless of whether he is the child's legal father. Does the answer change if the mother is married to the father? another man? a woman?
The following answers are based upon general U.S. law, I have not personally confirmed that they apply in Illinois in particular under its adoption law, or each of its welfare benefits programs, or its wrongful death statute. There is no affirmative duty of a mother to inform a father or potential father of the existence of his child, at least outside (1) the context of relinquishment of parental rights in anticipation of an adoption (where there may be a statutory notice requirement in some cases), (2) applications for certain kinds of welfare benefits (where identification of a father is required for some programs), and (3) possibly in the context of a lawsuit for the wrongful death of a child in which both parents are frequently vested with authority to bring the suit. Identification of a father on a birth certificate is not mandatory (and not infrequently omitted). In an adoption case, due process often requires some effort "reasonably calculated to give notice" to the father of the proceeding relinquishing parental rights, although failure to do so is generally not a jurisdictional defect that renders the adoption void ab initio. There is also generally a requirement to affirmatively state in adoption proceeding if the father is, or might be, a member of a Native American tribe, as that goes to the jurisdictional issue of the applicability of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, which requires notice, at a minimum, to the father's Indian tribe, even if notice cannot be given to the father. There is a presumption that a child born to a woman married to a husband is the child of the husband and after a certain number of years, for certain purposes (such as child support). This presumption is usually conclusive and cannot be rebutted even by DNA evidence to the contrary, on the theory that the husband is the psychological parent of the child and has assumed that responsibility, and in order to discourage after the fact denials of paternity simply to avoid child support when paternity was never disputed. There is also a presumption that a birth certificate's statement of paternity is correct, although this is in often not a conclusive presumption. And, birth certificates are a matter of public record, so a man can search the vital statistics records of a state to see if anyone has identified him as a father even if he has not been told of that fact, arguably giving him constructive knowledge of his paternity in that case. But, the identity of the person who is the child's father, or of persons who could be the child's father, is not privileged (other than under the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination where applicable), and so, a woman can generally be legally compelled to disclose this information by subpoena or in response to discovery in litigation. For example, a woman under the age of consent at the time her child was conceived can be incarcerated for contempt of court for failing to disclose the name of the father in connection with a criminal prosecution of a suspected father of the child for statutory rape.
I think it is not possible to answer the question as is, but this document from the Indian courts lays out the relevant legal variables. A major split is between Sharers and Residuaries: a Sharers are all related by blood. A secondary split relates to testate vs. intestate succession (was there a will?). There are also special rules for West Bengal, Chennai and Bombay. A widow is generally entitled to a share of her husband's property, but if the husband dies before his father, the husband does not have his father's property. But then, if a Muslim marries under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, they are not treated legally as Muslim for purposes of inheritance. All told, it is most likely that the widow has no legal claim on the property, but still a person should engage an attorney who can assess the particulars of the case.
There isn't any indication in that news story that the disabled son was anywhere nearby. I agree the situation you describe sounds like a legitimate use of the placard, but it seems in this situation, the placard was being used in a manner totally unrelated to the transport of a disabled person. My guess is that the cops cited her because the son wasn't in the car, and was not inside the establishment at which she parked. California code has this to say: A person to whom a disabled person placard has been issued may permit another person to use the placard only while in the presence or reasonable proximity of the disabled person for the purpose of transporting the disabled person. So as long as the disabled person is within a "reasonable proximity", and the placard is being used to transport them, they do not have to be inside the car to make using the placard legitimate. In this case, the woman was just transporting herself and using the placard anyway, which is illegal.
Can a divorced man win a downward modification of alimony and/or child support if he were tricked into a marriage by a child that wasn't his? The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. Will the man likely be able to get reduced child support and/or alimony on the claim that he was tricked into a marriage he would not otherwise have undertaken? Generally speaking, marriages induced by fraud about anything other than the extreme case of fraud involving who someone is marrying in the act of marriage itself (i.e. someone believed they were marrying John Smith from Denver but actually was married to John Smith from Los Angeles, whom they had never met before, because the marriage ceremony was conducted with disguises and they didn't look closely at the marriage certificate), has no impact on marital rights. Evidence regarding fraud to induce a marriage wouldn't even be admissible at trial because it wouldn't be legally relevant. This has no impact on alimony. Paternity can be contested by filing a paternity suit within the statute of limitations for doing so which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (usually within two to five years of the child's birth). If the husband prevails in a timely paternity contest, child support will not be owed. Otherwise, actual genetic paternity would be irrelevant. In California, the statute of limitations to disavow paternity of a child born to one's wife is two years from the date of birth. N.B. I am making some interpretations of inexact language in the question. It says: The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. But I assume that what is really meant is that one or both of the members of the couple file for divorce and that in the course of the divorce proceeding the wife seeks alimony and child support. If the divorce proceeding is concluded without an adjudication of paternity that would usually preclude a later lawsuit to disavow paternity.
In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do.
No. The custodial person that is meant by this are usually the parents or another court-appointed person that stands in for their parents. I think the common law term closest is "legal guardian". The details are defined in § 1616 ff. of the German civil code.
You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with.
Can a woman living in Brazil collect child support from someone in the United States? Yes. There would need to be first, a legal establishment of paternity if that is not already in place, and then an application to a court for a child support order. The question of whether one should proceed in a U.S. court or a Brazilian court is a tactical one that would be evaluated based upon the circumstances by the lawyers involved in doing so. Generally, that would open the door to child custody proceedings as well in the same, or a parallel case.
How does a paid endorser avoid conflicts of interest? Suppose you are a blogger and you write about the products and services of Company X. You are being paid by Company X to do this. How do you avoid conflicts of interest in the process? I would imagine that the first step is to disclose the relationship so that people can judge the validity of your advice. Perhaps one might refrain from "advocacy," and just describe, rather than tout Company X's products? Or might one limit one's sales pitch to "sophisticated" buyers such as corporations, to avoid charges of misleading individual investors? Which of these methods, or others, make things acceptable in a potential conflict of interest situation?
The U.S. FTC gave extensive guidance on this subject in March 2013. (You may have noticed shortly thereafter that conspicuous disclosures of free samples and compensation started popping up in reviews and posts around the web.) The FTC's FAQ covers this question in such detail I would just encourage people to visit it directly. However, as is the custom on Stack Exchange, I will reproduce the most salient content here: If an endorser is acting on behalf of an advertiser, what she or he is saying is usually going to be commercial speech – and commercial speech violates the FTC Act if it’s deceptive. The FTC (ironically?) refers to 16 CFR §255 as "the Guides." The Guides, at their core, reflect the basic truth-in-advertising principle that endorsements must be honest and not misleading. An endorsement must reflect the honest opinion of the endorser and can’t be used to make a claim that the product’s marketer couldn’t legally make. In addition, the Guides say if there’s a connection between an endorser and the marketer that consumers would not expect and it would affect how consumers evaluate the endorsement, that connection should be disclosed. For example, if an ad features an endorser who’s a relative or employee of the marketer, the ad is misleading unless the connection is made clear. The same is usually true if the endorser has been paid or given something of value to tout the product. The reason is obvious: Knowing about the connection is important information for anyone evaluating the endorsement.
There are basically two kinds of conduct that you identify. One is backing away from what you believe were oral promises made by the employer and lawyer regarding payment. Whatever the status of the promises made by the employer, the oral statements made by the lawyer would probably be viewed by a court or ethics board as settlement offers or proposals rather than actual binding agreements, and this is unlikely to be considered an ethical lapse. For purposes of ethics questions and fraud lawsuits, lies about what kind of deal you are willing to make with an adversary don't count as lies. This isn't a terribly logical rule, but is is a well established one. Given that: I was told (by employer), verbally and in text/email messages that I "would be paid when the deals closed." It is going to be very hard for the employer to take back those written statements and text and email messages are usually given the effect of signed writings in a court of law. This is going to be taken as a confession of the employer regarding the probably unwritten agreement of the parties regarding your right to be paid on these deals, so you would be well advised to stick to your guns on this issue. The percentages will be another point that is hard for the employer to fight if there is a course of dealings between the parties in which you receive a consistent percentage or there was a written agreement concerning your commission percentage. Also, even if the lawyer did make a promise and breached it, this would still only be a breach by the employer of a contract made on the employer's behalf by his lawyer. It is not an ethical lapse to breach a contract about future conduct, and a lawyer is not personally responsible for contracts he makes as a disclosed agent of your former employer. The second is making a false statement of fact about whom the lawyer has discussed the matter with. Lawyers do have an ethical duty to be truthful and failing to do so is an ethical lapse. But, this duty is generally interpreted to apply only to statements of fact which are material. If a lawyer lies to you about how old he is, or whether he's ever had an affair, in the context of a pre-litigation negotiation like this one, the ethical officials won't care. If a lawyer lies to you about something material to the transaction (e.g. claiming that the employer has money in the bank to pay a settlement when in fact it is overdrawn on all of its accounts and has no money coming in and the lawyer knows those facts), this is a serious ethical breach. It is hard to see how this information would be material, even though it casts doubt on his credibility. Ethically, he owes any duty of confidentiality to his client and not to you, so it isn't your complaint to make from a confidentiality point of view. Also, unless he discusses confidential advice that he provided to his client when no one else was present to you, he has not waived the attorney-client privilege, contrary to the answer by @IñakiViggers on that issue. Of course, proving that the lawyer said anything in an oral conversation at which no one else was present comes down to a credibility fight between your sworn statement and his if the lawyer testifies inaccurately about the discussion. A sworn statement from you is proof and would meet the "burden of production" to provide proof in support of your case at a trial, but wouldn't necessarily prevail easily at trial since the judge might not be convinced regarding who is accurate in their account of the discussion (I have avoided the word "lying" because there are a variety of reasons that people inaccurately recall discussions). What would be the sensible way to use this information to my advantage while trying to resolve these matters with having to bring suit and go to court? Is there anything that this lawyer should fear, if his unethical behavior was brought to light, either in court or to a bar association? The conduct you describe on the part of the lawyer will provide you with little or no leverage in your negotiations and is likely to not even be considered admissible evidence in court since it may be considered a form of settlement negotiations. Your strongest leverage will be the written statements from the employer. But, depending upon the amount in dispute, it may still make sense to compromise given the time and expense and uncertainty of going to court. Even in the clearest case, you probably only have a 90% chance of winning a contested case, and you wouldn't cross the street if you knew you had a 10% chance of being hit by a car as you crossed, even if you knew that the collision wouldn't be fatal. Unless your state has a wage claims act that covers you, you may have little or not prospect of an attorneys' fee award if you prevail, and representing yourself when the employer has a lawyer will always put you at a disadvantage in a court setting. If the amount in dispute is great (e.g. $50,000+), hiring a lawyer is probably worth it. If the amount in dispute is small (e.g. $5,000) you may want to file a suit in small claims court and only hire a lawyer for a couple hours of pre-hearing coaching.
After a buyout, can a company legally continue to use old testimonials? Yes. What you describe would not suffice for a finding of false and misleading practices. For purposes of pricing the acquisition, it is most likely that company's A prestige was factored in. After all, as Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. US Dept. of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446, 461 (2018) points out, "reputation is an asset that companies cultivate, manage, and monetize". As company A has --or could have-- monetized its reputation via the acquisition price, it would be inconsistent to preclude company B from using an asset for which it paid.
The question is always, would a reasonable customer be confused into thinking that the two are the same, or that there is some relation or sponsorship or attribute to one product or firm the rightful reputation of another. That is always dependent on the specific facts and the specific market involved. So-called "famous" marks get extra protection. The exact markets involved will matter. Any stylizations such as colors and typefaces may matter. Logos may matter. I can't say if one of those specific names would be found to infringe on the other.
Depends on the specific terms in the NDA, but the short answer is that the News Services didn't sign the NDA, and have no contractual obligation to keep mum. Most NDA's I've signed or had others sign are very clear about the personal liability, and the conditions under which the proprietary intellectual property can be discussed. In the case of leaks, the injured party would have to identify the leaker, and that person would be liable. (Still a difficult proposition b/c most reporters won't give up sources unless you drag them in front of a Grand Jury, and often not even then.)
This is from a Canadian point of view, but the rules regarding how corporations run is generally pretty standard. I took a few classes in corporate governance, but I'm working mostly from memory, so hopefully most of the information is accurate! A corporation is its own entity, separate from any shareholders, and it can make whatever policies it wants. Unless you are an officer or on the board of directors, your participation in the company usually will be limited to voting in shareholders' meetings and receiving dividends. Refusal of service is a policy matter, so the fact that you are a shareholder (or anyone else, for that matter!) should be irrelevant. In fact, you might be denied service because you're an officer due to conflicts of interest. If the company was unincorporated, you may have more rights, but you'd probably be subject to some sort of agreement.
The inventor or would-be developer can require potential investors to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) before revealing the details of the idea. In an initial letter a statement such as "This idea is being disclosed in confidence to enable4 you to consider if you wish to invest in the project." That would put the investor on notice, and if the investor discloses it to another or makes use of the idea in a competitive project, there may be grounds for a suit for breach of confidence. If reasonable precautions are taken to disclose the information only to those under a duty of confidence, and to protected it from unauthorized disclosure, it may be protected as a trade secret, and any evasion of those precautions or breach of confidence may give grounds for a lawsuit. In the US the Uniform Trade Secret Act has been adopted by almost every state. In other jurisdictions there are other similar laws. As stated in the Wikipedia article A trade secret is information that is not generally known to the public; confers economic benefit on its holder because the information is not publicly known; and where the holder makes reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.
Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.
Declaration of war on a de-facto state? Does war have to be declared on a de jure state? Even though Daesh is not recognized as a state by the world, it is (IMO) a de facto state. (It has territory, population, government, and an ability to engage in relations with other states – even though other states are not so inclined.) Are there any differences in the laws of war with regards to engaging a such a de facto state?
The international laws of war are generally much easier to apply in the context of a group of people claiming to be a state, than in the context of a group of people who do not claim to be a state. For example, one of the critical questions for classifying an individual under the laws of war is whether the enemy combatant is publicly identified as a soldier of the entity against which a country has declared war. In the context of an entity that claims to be a state, like Daesh, the distinction between identified soldiers, civilians, and covert combatants is relatively workable to apply. There are actually tens of thousands of people who personally identify themselves as regular soldiers loyal to a particular Islamic State with a defined territory, chain of command and political leaders, and there are millions of people who personally identify themselves as civilian subjects of Daesh who are not soldiers, and there are probably even people who personally identify themselves as covert combatants for Daesh - like some of the European terror incident perpetrators we've seen over the last couple of years. People applying the laws of war still need to do their best to accurately determine who fits in which category, but the categories in question are bona fide meaningful categories that are mutually socially agreed to by everyone involved that are reasonably well defined. Recognition of something as a "state" for law of war purposes is also something quite different from recognition of something as a state for diplomatic purposes. Inherent in the laws of war is the understanding that one side may believe that the other side is an usurper or illegitimate government. In contrast, in conflicts with many organized groups that are clearly non-state actors in the eyes of all involved, the distinction between publicly identified soldiers of a state and covert combatants is often ill defined. Calling people citizens or subjects of that non-state group is likewise hard to analogize to the kinds of situations contemplated when the laws of war were devised. Does one have to be a "member" of the organization to qualify as a subject? Does one have to provide "material support" or conspire to carry out some specific acts? Or, does subjective support or a bare public statement of allegiance on a facebook page or bumper sticker suffice that did nothing material to aid the cause suffice? This matters because, under the laws of war, subjects of an enemy can be interned humanely even if they are not combatants, and the lawful treatment of public and covert combatants is very different under the laws of war.
Yes, and this is very common - Cuba, North Korea and Iran are often excluded. Mind you, this is from a US perspective. The banned country may have other ideas about the legality of the ban under its laws. But if you weren't planning to do business with that country anyway, that's not exactly going to hurt you.
I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.
Your question is based on an incorrect premise Heads of State can be and have been held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity. For example: Germany Japan Yugoslavia Rwanda
Does this mean that all four of the above are "equipotent"? No. The inclusion of these foundational documents in the Front Matter of the United States Code does not indicate anything regarding their legal status. It is more of a political statement, as a preamble to all laws in today's sovereign federal state, describing the foundation of the United States of America and its constitutional order. The only constitutional law in force today in the U.S. is the Constitution for the United States of America, beginning with We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. and the subsequent amendments. The ratification of the Constitution replaced any previous constitutional orders in effect between the States. A new government was created by the Constitution and replaced the old one under the Articles of the Confederation: Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The New Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble. Owings v. Speed The States abandoned their old agreement (the Articles of Confederation) and subjected themselves to the new Constitution. Of course, the other documents remain historically very significant and may shine lights on the interpretation of the present Constitution, for example, in Texas v. White, the reference made to the concept of "perpetual union" found in the Articles. The Declaration of Independence is not so much a legal document per se but a declaration of the existence of the States sovereign from the British Crown; but such sovereignty is not a result from the declaration, but from the acts of war. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, while remaining in effect under the Constitution by Acts of (the new) Congress, is in any case spent as its territorial extent is extinguished by the establishment and admission of states, who enjoy equal status under the Constitution. See for example, Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans and Strader v. Graham.
The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc.
There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France
To my mind, one of the major goals of the customary laws of war is to try to limit the overall harm caused by a war, especially harm caused to parties other than the military forces of the nations who are actually fighting each other. Obvious examples are prohibitions on attacking civilians, destroying civilian property and infrastructure, neglecting civilian public health, harming prisoners who are incapable of fighting, and so on. I wouldn't say these are about "fairness" or any other such abstract ethical principle; they are simply pragmatic. All other things equal, the world is better off if fewer civilians end up dead. And so just as the laws try to avoid collateral damage to individuals who are not fighting (civilians, prisoners, injured troops, etc), they likewise try to avoid collateral damage to nations who are not fighting (neutrals). Combat under a false flag carries a risk of harm to the nation whose flag is impersonated, as the belligerents may get the wrong idea about who is attacking them. Here are a couple of scenarios that could occur if false flag combat were considered acceptable: Potsylvania is at war with Grand Fenwick, while Freedonia remains neutral in the conflict. The Potsylvanian ship Fearless sights the Fenwickian ship Goose, and as a ruse, the Fearless runs up a Freedonian flag. The Goose, knowing that Freedonia is neutral, assumes the Fearless is harmless and lets it approach. When within range, the Fearless fires at the Goose, while still flying the Freedonian flag. The Goose reports back to its government that they have been attacked by a Freedonian vessel. The Fenwickian government considers this a hostile act, declares war on Freedonia, and launches an immediate retaliatory invasion of Freedonian territory. Now Freedonia has been brought into the war despite no party actually having anything against them. This is not desirable. Same scenario, but instead of raising a Freedonian flag, the Fearless runs up a Fenwickian flag. The Goose knows the flag must be fake, as no genuine Fenwickian vessel would attack them, but they don't know what nation the Fearless actually does belong to. They faintly hear the captain of the Fearless shouting orders in Potsylvanian, but he has a Freedonian accent and they think he's speaking in Freedonian. They report to their government that a Freedonian vessel has attacked them, and Grand Fenwick again declares war on Freedonia. Note that using a false flag when not attacking doesn't carry the same risks, which is why it is not included in the prohibition. Suppose that the Fearless doesn't plan to attack the Goose, but simply wants to avoid being attacked so they can get away. If their ruse of flying a Freedonian flag is successful, then the Goose simply thinks they saw a neutral Freedonian vessel going about its business, and Grand Fenwick does not get the idea that Freedonia is doing anything aggressive. And if it's unsuccessful, then the Goose must have figured out that the Fearless is not Freedonian at all, but instead Potsylvanian, and so likewise Freedonia does not come under suspicion.
Copyright law for an author: Can a word be copyrighted? So, in everything from World of Warcraft to Dungeons and Dragons, even Warhammer and an assortment of other games, both table top and computer based, there's Arcane magic. I've written a few books and, without thinking, I used the term Arcane to be the general name for magic practiced by witches and warlocks and prayer magic used by the clergy. I never thought about it until now, but is Arcane, or Arcane magic, a copyrighted word/phrase/term? To clarify, the spells in my work aren't direct copies of any from those other games, it's simply the usage of what I at first considered a generic word. Could there be trouble down the line? Examples of spells used in my work: Portal magic to move across large distances, "energy beams" for combat purposes, and magical infusion. Not entirely sure if this is the best place for this question, but I'm just wondering if there's any danger of it becoming problem down the line. Also, I apologize if I'm misunderstanding the usage of copyright, but as a relatively new author, I'm trying to make sure I'm not setting myself up for trouble in the future.
No, copyright protection does not exist for single words or even short phrases: see this. A word can be protected, in a certain context, by trademark. To take one example, the word "Apple" is protected in the domain of computer products, because Apple computers has registered "Apple" as their trademark, and you can't then start selling a line of computers named "Apple". You can however sell fruits called "apples", or you could sell knives with that name (unless someone has registered "apple" as a brand of knife). There are currently 45 "classes" for trademark protection. "Arcane" is a normal word of everyday language (YMMV), which means that there is relatively little protection for the word, as contrasted with "Microsoft", a word created by that company. It is unlikely that the courts would recognize "Arcane" as being distinctive. You can search the trademark database here: there is nothing for "arcane magic", and little for "arcane".
Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.)
Depending on your jurisdiction, such lists may be protected, but not by copyright. For example, in Germany there was a court decision that scanning all the country’s phone books and selling them on CD constituted “unfair competition” and was illegal, while hiring 1000 typists who would manually type in all this information would not be. Databases are protected in many jurisdictions, and a list of the 1000 most commonly used English words could reasonably be called a database.
You can't compare a novel and a computer program that way. With a novel, the expression and the essence of the work are the same. With a computer program, while the expression is hard work to create, and often is very original, the essence of the work is what it does. So I can create a totally independent computer program doing the exact same thing, without any copying whatsoever. With your novel, the essence of the work is copied. Unless you change Harry Potter to a pot smoking sanitary engineer, change his wand to a guitar, move him to a different world, where is not surrounded by fellow wizards but by intelligent, speaking animals, and write the whole thing a few years before Mrs. Rowling did.
This a bit dubious. You write "I know you can make a digital copy of a book or CD you own." but that is true only under limited circumstances. Making such a copy for one's own personal use would likely be fair use (in the US). Selling copies would pretty clearly be copyright infringement. Giving away free copies to significant numbers of people would also be infringement. Temporarily lending copies ro a small number of people might be considered fair use or might not. For the board game, you could allow others to play with the copy you own in person. But COVID makes that unsafe. Assuming the game art is under copyright protection (some older games might have protection expired) selling such images or making them widely available would clearly be infringement. Making them available only during the course of play to a limited group, with technical measures to prevent or discourage copying and no fee charged might pass as fair use, and the game company might well not want to pursue the matter in any case. If you create new art which can be used for the same game, it would be somewhat less likely to be considered infringing/ Even then selling access would probably be trademark infringement, and perhaps infringe the copyright on the rules of the game. There would be legal risk in doing this sort of thing.
Copyright In most (all?) jurisdictions, copyright protects creative expression, not ideas. In united-states doctrine, that is known as the idea-expression distinction, but that concept is not US-specific. Therefore, the text of a recipe, an accompanying image, and other similar elements can be copyrighted. However, the functional parts of the recipe (the exact ingredients, proportions, timing of steps etc.) are not. If the Youtube video reads out the text of the recipe, then it would be a derivative work, but if the script of the video is rewritten in different words, it is not. Even further, the creative elements are only protected insofar as the same underlying idea can be expressed in multiple ways (merger doctrine). The typical example is software code where the level of similarity required to show infringement is high: computer code is text, but that text has to follow strict rules to be valid when run through the computer, and industry best practices mandate additional similarities. Recipes are more flexible than computer code, but they still follow a guiding pattern. Similarities of content that would be considered close paraphrasing (hence infringement) in a free-form context could be deemed to not be infringement in a stricter-form context. For instance, in france, taking the recipes from a children’s cookbook and putting them into another children’s cookbook (in different words but the same "for-children" tone) was deemed to not be infringement: Ces recettes prennent la forme classique et stéréotypée d’une énumération des ingrédients puis d’une description étape par étape des opérations à effectuer. Si (...) la formulation prend en considération le jeune public auquel est destiné ces recettes, cette caractéristique qui n’est au demeurant pas innovante comme le montrent d’autres exemples de recettes destinées aux enfants versés au débat par la défenderesse qui adoptent un ton similaire, ne suffit pas à leur donner une forme ou un contenu qui porte l’empreinte de la personnalité du rédacteur. Aussi les recettes en cause ne relèvent pas d’une activité créatrice originale, et ne sont pas de ce fait protégées au titre des droits d’auteurs. Those recipes take the standard and stereotyped form of a list of ingredients followed by a step-by-step description of the operations to perform. If (...) the choice of words takes its young audience into consideration, that characteristic (which is not new, as proven by other examples of children-oriented recipes shown by the defendant) is not sufficient to give it a form or content bearing the mark of its creator’s personality. As such, those recipes are not considered an original creative work, and are thus not protected by copyright. Source: TGI PARIS 3ème 2ème section 24 janvier 2014 RG 12/00188, cited at this link. Other intellectual property rights Trademarks protect brand image. If John Doe publishes John Doe’s Recipe Book with a recipe for John Doe’s cookies, and fills out the appropriate trademark paperwork, you are allowed to follow the same recipe to make cookies (or another recipe that produces similar cookies), but you cannot sell them as "John Doe’s cookies". You can say that you followed the recipe of John Doe’s book, but you can not say or imply anything that could make anyone think John Doe approved your cookies. Patents protect inventions, which are novel and non-obvious solutions to (usually technical) problems. I am not familiar enough to know if a particularly inventive recipe could be patentable (I guess not, but the answer might vary across jurisdictions). However, most recipes are new takes on old ideas (add more of that ingredient, less of that, have a different texture etc.). Those are certainly not patentable because they are "obvious" (which, in the context of patent law, means that anyone who has read all existing cookbooks in all languages could imagine the modified recipe). There are other, highly jurisdiction-dependent rights. For instance, in france, the shape and presentation of John Doe’s cookies could be protected under a "dessins et modèles" (sketches and models) clause. (For most recipes, it is trivial to modify the appearance of the final product enough to escape that kind of protection, so it is best thought of as an extension of trademark - you cannot sell John-Doe-looking-cookies even if you make clear they are not John-Doe-approved.)
united-states Names and short phrases are not subject to copyright protection. A list of such phrases is probably not protectable either. Game mechanics are not protectable either. While short phrases can be protected as trademarks, they can be so protected only if they are used to identify a product or service, or to advertise that product or service. Terms used within the game are not normally subject to trademark protection. Even if such a term did have trademark protection, using it within the game would not be using it "in commerce" or "in trade", that is to identify or market the game. A brand name, a slogan, or a logo are typical trademarks, the name of a thing within the product is not. In short, a list of character classes would not, in the US at least, infringe copyright or trademark protections on another game.
There is no fixed legal meaning to "non-commercial", instead, every license must define what is meant by "non-commercial", if it uses that term. CC BY-NC 4.0 says that NonCommercial means not primarily intended for or directed towards commercial advantage or monetary compensation. For purposes of this Public License, the exchange of the Licensed Material for other material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights by digital file-sharing or similar means is NonCommercial provided there is no payment of monetary compensation in connection with the exchange. That would mean that you cannot sell software of a dataset so licensed, but you could give it away. Copyright does not prohibit using a work as raw data for some kind of analysis, such as counting occurrences of words, so it is legal to publish a table of word-counts from the Harry Potter novels, even though you can't publish the novels without permission. The word counts are facts, not "expression", and copyright doesn't protect facts. It is possible that your initial access to the expressive work was contingent on not doing something with that work, for example a license to copy a book in the first place might be contingent on you not using the data for purposes of statistical analysis. For Harry Potter books, there's really no way to show that Smith could only have gained access to the work by agreeing to a certain license and showing that Smith did agree (Potter books are everywhere). It is possible that some work is so well controlled that you did indeed agree to "not subject the work to statistical analysis". It is highly unlikely that there is any such condition is attached to a work that has is "non-commercially" licensed. You can read the license and see what it actually says. Basically, an abstract model of X is not X itself, it is a fact about X, and facts are not protected.
Why is the CC-BY license so long? The CC-BY 4.0 license is 1,958 words. As I understand it, the MIT license is functionally equivalent to CC-BY: it established that you can do whatever with the published work, as long as you give credit. But the MIT license is just 162 words, most of which are in the disclaimer. The ISC license, which should be functionally equivalent to the MIT license, is even shorter: just 111 words. Why is the CC-BY so much longer than the MIT or ISC license, even though it offers the same conditions? Or this question could also be reversed: why are the MIT/ISC licenses so short compared to the CC-BY license?
You have a false premise: "it offers the same conditions", and "MIT license is functionally equivalent to CC-BY". These premises are not true. CC-BY: applies to more than just software; it applies to artistic or literary work, databases, other material disclaims endorsement explicitly withholds moral rights explicitly does not license patent rights (MIT license gives anyone who obtains a copy of the software the right to use it, a patent right) prescribes the acceptable forms of attribution Those are just some of the differences.
The terms transfer IP rights only for the New IP, meaning that Customer would own the new stuff. Developer will still own their old stuff, but Customer will have the right to use the old stuff, depending on the license terms. If the license is as in your link, then it is forever (but this is a stub, so I assume that the license will be more specific and possibly restrictive). You retain all your rights to old stuff, customer will not pay royalties for the old stuff, and they can transfer or extend the license, or part of the license, to others.
Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.)
It's not clear to me that your website is, per se, illegal. (Though good luck finding a webhost with a hard drive large enough to store it. Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone is roughly 38,000 characters. If I've done my calculations correctly, storing all of the strings of this length or shorter would require something like 1053760 GB of storage. Give or take.) The main problem is in distributing the "index" of the string containing the text of Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone. This index is just the integer obtained by taking the entire text as a string and treating it as a number in base 26 (A = 1, B = 2, etc.) In other words, all of the information contained in the book is also contained in the index number, and in a relatively simple way. Distributing this number is therefore entirely equivalent to distributing the text; you don't need the website at all. It's entirely analogous to e-mailing the text to someone else; in that process, the text is transformed into a number (in binary, under a different encoding scheme) along the way. But you couldn't seriously argue in a court of law that you were not distributing the text, you were just telling a friend about a very large number. Just to back this up with some actual law citation: US copyright law gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to make and distribute copies of the work. And a "copy" is defined as follows: “Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. In other words, J.K. Rowling (and/or her publishers) have the exclusive rights to distribute that integer, since the work is "fixed" in it by its very nature, and since the work can be reproduced from it.
No It means you can use it in accordance with the terms of the MIT license.
Your GPL example detracts from the question: see this recent answer. Setting aside GPL-specific conditions, the legal underpinning of software licensing is copyright law, whereby copying source code or an executable is only allowed with the permission of the copyright holder. There are two partial exceptions: "fair use" (generally not relevant to software), and a specific statutory permission to copy software in particular ways (making a backup, plus the act of executing software which requires copying from disk to memory). The latter permission only applies if you have legally acquired a copy of the software. Which explains why nobody sells copies of software, they sell a license to use software (a subtle, legalistic distinction, which is essential to modern software qua business). The terms of the license say what you may and may not do: if you violate the terms, you do not have permission to copy the software, and are liable for copyright infringement. One limit on the terms is that they cannot take away a right that you already have by copyright law (e.g. "fair use" cannot be negated by a license term). Another limit is that the terms have to be consistent with contract law, hence the license cannot include a human centipede obligation – or, "all your stuff belong to us". When a contract is ambiguous, the ambiguity is construed against the writer, and that is also so with software licenses. Also like the situation with contracts, the terms have to be legal, that is, cannot deny some right or requirement encoded in law. There is a legal requirement that disclaimers have to be "prominent", and that holds of license terms. As for "tricking" a person, that's not supposed to happen, with a proper license. If you put stuff out there and say nothing, nobody has been given permission to copy the item. You can make it available to a specific named person, but that is limited to one person, thus a license includes language allowing anyone to copy, but also requiring that the license be retained with any subsequent copies. Hence B copies from A, and sees the license; B may share with C (assuming a decent license) but must include that or substantially equivalent license; and so on. A problem arises if B redistributes without original license, substituting a bogus license. When C copies, that copying is not done with the permission (implied or express) of A, and C could be open to legal consequences. B is also clearly open to consequences, since re-distribution with the self-perpetuating license is a violation of the terms of A's condition grant of permission. Ignorance of the true ownership of copyright is no excuse, and there is no general innocent-infringement exception to copyright law in the US. However, the part of copyright law that talks about remedies for infringement, 17 USC 504(b)(2) lessens the burden on the innocent infringer: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Still, not zero. I don't see how adding some NOPs would make it impossible to prove that you have a copy of someone else's IP. Perhaps it's not a trivial, but still quite possible.
In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.
These files are not public domain Read it carefully, it only says “public domain musical compositions in a MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) file format.” The compositions are public domain, the MIDI files aren’t - they are a derivative work (a translation) covered by their own copyright. Specifically, “© Copyright 2001 University of Arizona. All rights reserved” right next to a big “Contact us” link. Literary and artistic works that are derived (legally) from existing works have independent copyright even if the original no longer does. Mozart, for example, did not write his compositions in MIDI format. Now, it may be the intention of the University of Arizona that you can use it but, if so, they have not made this clear. It’s possible that the authors (mistakenly) thought that because the originals were public domain, their derivatives would be too. The music school should have talked to someone from the law school. All of the purposes that they talk about on the “Purpose” page are equally applicable to widely licensed (e.g. everyone) or narrowly controlled (e.g. staff of the University). Overall, a prudent person would assume that these works are copyright of the University of Arizona and can’t be used without permission or a fair use exemption. Your proposed usage is not fair use. However, there is a big “Contact us” link on every page so you can always ask for permission.
Why do you have to accept a licencing agreenment before installing Java but not C++? There is a license to use Java which you must accept before installing. Why isn't there one for C or C++? If there is, where can it be found? I'm guessing it has to do with how Oracle owns Java, but in a sense can't you say whoever makes the C++ owns it?
The reason for this is simple: You can’t install C or C++. C or C++ is just a programming language and C/C++ code compiles to machine code. Machine code can directly be executed by the processor (CPU) in your computer. Java, however, is normally compiled to byte-code only a Java Virtual Machine can execute. And this Java virtual machine is what you get from Oracle and Oracle wants you to accept a license agreement. You likely also have accepted some kind of license agreement when you began using or bought your computer. That’s the same you did for the Java Virtual Machine, but this time for your whole computer, which includes the processor that is responsible for executing the machine code. Java in this context also refers to the Java libraries that ship alongside the JVM. While C or C++ also have standard libraries they are part of your operating system and you have agreed to a license covering them when you installed your operating system (or began using it).
The GPL doesn’t require you to distribute the software to anyone. The only requirement to distribute something is that if you do distribute the software to someone as a binary, you must also distribute the source code to them at no additional charge. The focus of the GPL is ensuring freedom for people who have copies of the software, not ensuring that the software is available to the world at large. Because your final deliverable is source code, you’ve already complied with the requirement to distribute source alongside object code. You have to comply with the requirements in section 5: a) The work must carry prominent notices stating that you modified it, and giving a relevant date. b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is released under this License and any conditions added under section 7. This requirement modifies the requirement in section 4 to “keep intact all notices”. c) You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License to anyone who comes into possession of a copy. This License will therefore apply, along with any applicable section 7 additional terms, to the whole of the work, and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged. This License gives no permission to license the work in any other way, but it does not invalidate such permission if you have separately received it. d) If the work has interactive user interfaces, each must display Appropriate Legal Notices; however, if the Program has interactive interfaces that do not display Appropriate Legal Notices, your work need not make them do so. You have to license the software to the company that hired you under the GPL v3 (since parts of it were licensed to you under GPL v3), so you can’t stop them from distributing it to the world. But nothing requires you to distribute it to the world.
Using software generally does not entail any legal requirement to acknowledge the use of that software, and would only arise as a licensing condition. Google services, including Translate, are subject to certain terms of use especial the part about what they expect of you. They do not impose any requirement regarding acknowledgment, therefore they cannot later demand any royalties. If a translation program imposes any demands on your usage of the program, that has to be part of the original agreement whereby you were allowed to use the software at all.
The terms transfer IP rights only for the New IP, meaning that Customer would own the new stuff. Developer will still own their old stuff, but Customer will have the right to use the old stuff, depending on the license terms. If the license is as in your link, then it is forever (but this is a stub, so I assume that the license will be more specific and possibly restrictive). You retain all your rights to old stuff, customer will not pay royalties for the old stuff, and they can transfer or extend the license, or part of the license, to others.
A TOS is not intrinsically illegal, but an interpretation of a TOS may or may not be supported by a court, that remains to be seen. It probably does not constitute a "deceptive practice" under FTC standards. The TOS is your permission to use the software, and there can be no question that they have the right to impose conditions on customer use of the software. E.g. Amazon cannot freely use software that is only licensed for free educational use. They speak of "ownership" of IP so created and explicitly disclaim any claims about Current Law in Your Jurisdiction. At the crucial point in the agreement, they switch to talking about the license (BY-NC) that they grant when you are not a paid member. The exact details of this ownership are not part of the free tier TOS, but they do seem to add certain protections to "owned" content created under the Pro plan – they are under no legal obligation to make all content universally visible and usable.
Your understanding of the GPL is a bit off. GPLed code doesn't generally force you to GPL the output of the program, but that's just because the output of the program is normally not a derivative work of the program. For instance, if you write a novel in Emacs, your novel is an entirely original work. The fact that you used Emacs as a tool doesn't mean that your novel is somehow based on Emacs. This generator is different. It generates sprites by putting together art assets made by the program's creator. That means that the output contains a substantial amount of content made by the program creator, which means that it would likely be covered by the program creator's copyright. If the content was licensed to you under the GPL, you normally have to abide by GPL restrictions when you redistribute the content or incorporate it into your own program. Copyright holders can, if they want, grant additional permissions to their content and allow you to incorporate that content into nonfree software. For instance, the GCC compilers have an additional permission for their runtime libraries to let you use them in any GCC-compiled code; without that permission, GCC could only be used to compile GPL-compatible code. But unless the copyright holder has granted those permissions, when program output contains large amounts of their copyrighted content you're bound by the GPL when using it. In this case, the program specifically says that the art is dual-licensed under GPLv3 and CC-BY-SA-3.0. Since the generator's output is a combination of premade art assets (the buttons just let you tell the program which art assets to combine), the output is a derivative work of those assets. You can't use it unless your use is compatible with the GPL v3 or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (either works, since dual licensing lets you pick either license).
Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one!
Section 1 of the GPLv3 states: The “Corresponding Source” for a work in object code form means all the source code needed to generate, install, and (for an executable work) run the object code and to modify the work, including scripts to control those activities. The Corresponding Source need not include anything that users can regenerate automatically from other parts of the Corresponding Source. So Makefiles are clearly included if they exists. The point of the GPL is to let the user be free to modify the code. A lot of projects are very hard to modify without the scripts used to fetch dependencies & build the executable so not providing means to build the code would go against the license spirit.
Where can I report criminal intent found on the dark web? I wasn't sure if I should ask this here or on the Tor site. I think it fits more here. I came across a Stack Exchange clone on the dark web. I won't go into too much detail or provide a link, but one question was someone requesting advice on how to commit a violent crime. (He has a specific target in mind already, and it looks like he's already cased the house.) I don't know if it would make any difference (because of Tor's anonymizing), but should I report it? (If so, where to?) Or should I assume that the proper authorities are already monitoring the site? I'm in the U.S., but I don't know what country the poster is in. If I can do anything to stop this from happening, I would really like to do so. CORRECTION: I've been conflating the terms "deep web" and "dark web." I'm actually referring to Tor services websites, so the dark web part of the deep web. Sorry if that caused confusion. I've updated the question to use "dark web" instead of "deep web."
1/06/17 update regarding comments and other answers: You can report criminal intent while reasonably remaining anonymous by using various methods, and this will let you do want to do: take an ethical step and make an effort to report the potential crime. Read below. First of all, using Tor is not illegal. Yes, there is illegal activity on Tor and the dark web it can access, and there is activity that promotes illegal things on Tor and IRL, but that doesn't make you a criminal by default by using a system that can be used by criminals. See Is it legal to use the Tor Network and Tor Software in the United States? The FBI and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well aware of Tor and the dark web; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silk_Road_(marketplace) . (That may give you pause because some FBI agents were implicated in crimes when the agency investigated the broader crime.) Or should I assume that the proper authorities are already monitoring the site? I wouldn't assume they are already monitoring that particular site, but it's possible; the FBI at least is aware of its existence. It's a good idea to assume they run their own crawlers to index the site, and have agents who are members. Think of all the news stories your read about law enforcement posing as perps online to ensnare people; and then think about how much there is we don't know about these types of activities and their prevalence. If you really want to be paranoid and know that Tor is not perfect security, and that government agencies have serious power, know that the NSA is well-known to run many Tor exit nodes to packet sniff and store metadata and the full text of traffic (as well as clear, non-dark web traffic, too). And, it's an accepted fact that SSL has been cracked (SSL may or may not be in use in your case or technically relevant right now) by them, too, all re: Snowden. Deleting Tor from your PC/Mac means nothing; any 5th grader can do forensic analysis and discover the remnants of the Tor browser. Your local ISP may log Tor traffic, as such traffic has a signature. But again, simply using Tor doesn't not make you a criminal, but it could draw attention to you. And warrants get be gotten for ISPs and your PC. You remaining anonymous overall also assumes that you have not given out any information on that SE clone site that could identify you IRL. If you have, then you need to assess the risks to yourself; that could be your most serious privacy breach to other users beyond any technology (as well as to law enforcement if they for other reasons suspected you of illegal activity yourself.) That said, if you want to report the possible crime - for either legal or ethical reasons - you can remain mostly anonymous via email. Use the Tor browser from public wi-fi (try on a USB stick on a public PC and not from your laptop) and sign up for anonymous email with a fake name (breaking their TOS) at Yandex, which does not require phone verification. (Google, Yahoo, etc., require a phone number; this could be a burner or IP phone, but that's up to you). https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/tutorial-how-create-anonymous-email-accounts You could also use one of the various disposable email sites, as pointed out by another user, but some such email domains and services are often automatically flagged as spam or blocked by agencies due to their nature. Try Google for "disposable email". Ditto the anonymous phone call services or email-to-fax services. There are different methods with different anonymity pros/cons. And, you could use snail mail, as was pointed out by another user. Mail a printout in a plain envelope (with no fingerprints) in a public mailbox some distance from where you live and usually use the PO; the USPS records metadata on all mail, but this can be reasonably anonymous, with care. In any case, since you read that the person has already "cased the house" and have a general geographic location, the FBI may take the information (and your tip) seriously and look into the possibility of a crime. If the FBI looks, they may not deem it serious enough - or see enough evidence - to do the work required to find the true IP or other digital forensics to locate the person. I don't know if it would make any difference (because of Tor's anonymizing)... But we don't know the other digital breadcrumbs the alleged perp has left; it's possible they could be tracked more extensively online - and then possibly located IRL - by the FBI. And, if you do send an anonymous tip by any method, you've done what is appears you want to do: take the ethical step and make an effort to report the potential criminal situation. 1/05/17 original answer: Take a look at FBI Forms — Tips - fbi.gov to submit an email tip: Please use this website to report suspected terrorism or criminal activity. Your information will be reviewed promptly by an FBI special agent or a professional staff member. Due to the high volume of information that we receive, we are unable to reply to every submission; however, we appreciate the information that you have provided. And/or there are phone numbers here: Submit a Tip — FBI
Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved.
It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.
If the operators of a site post them in such a way that anyone with a browser can access them, with no login or other security precaution required, and not even any notice that the files are confidential, they are implicitly inviting anyone to view them, and thus it is legal to do so. There was a case where a site owner gave specific notice to a user not to access the site, and blocked the user's IP. When the user hired a proxy service to get around the blockage, this was held to be unauthorized access, a crime under the CFAA (Computer Fraud and Abuse act). But in that case the individual notice was considered essential to the applicability of the act. That case was Craigslist, Inc v. 3Taps, Inc et al, 942 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2015). See also This Wikipedia article and thisJaxEnter article. As the Wikipedia article put it: Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013) was a Northern District of California Court case in which the court held that sending a cease-and-desist letter and enacting an IP address block is sufficient notice of online trespassing, which a plaintiff can use to claim a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Note that in this case web scraping was apparently impacting the craigslist site.
You are mistaken: they deny you on your act When you use Tor, your browser is not sending a lot of information. That makes Tor browsers hilariously easy to detect: nobody knows where the real browser is, but it is hilariously easy to block all Tor users for using Tor, or at least those that the server knows are Tor IPs. Using Tor is an action, not how you look. The closest Brick and mortar equivalent would be "Show me your ID please" and you show them a paper cutout of something that has Sample stamped over it. "No shirt, no shoes, no service" in the united-states Yes, most places can deny service based on how you dress or your state of hygine. These two would in most cases not extend to the protections under the Civil Rights Act, which protects some characteristics like race and sex, but not visual factors like "being dressed" or "smelling of cow". There can be a fine line where religious dress code is concerned, but in general and broad strokes, the restaurant can deny you for wearing the wrong clothes. Actually, the slogan is much broader than it appears: as long as an establishment's dress code is not violating discrimination law (like the CRA), they can enforce it under their freedom to contract.
Probably not. Let us take the case US v. Lowe where the evidence seems even more damning. Lowe was convicted, because his computer actually did contain hundreds of child porn images. Police had IP logs that indicated that someone at Lowe's address was hosting a porn-sharing network and they downloaded some porn from the network. After a raid, illegal images were found on one computer, and forensic evidence provided a bit of evidence regarding when some of the files were downloaded, which was also connected with a person opening an invoice file containing the defendant's address 40 minutes before one of the porn files finished downloading. Lowe moved for acquittal and did not enter any evidence. The court denied the motion. Even so, the court commented that I have to say, in this case, it has been particularly difficult, even though it’s my job to do so, to discern where that line [between speculation and reasonable inference] is and where what might be a reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record evidence becomes nothing more than an invitation for the jury to speculate as to what the evidence may be or what it may show Lowe was convicted. On appeal, the court concluded that no rational juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented at trial. A juror could conclude that there was porn on the computer and that the defendant occasionally used the computer. But without improperly stacking inferences, no juror could infer from such limited evidence of ownership and use that James knowingly downloaded, possessed, and distributed the child pornography found on the laptop. The court noted that there were two other individuals in the house who also had access to the computer. In particular, no evidence was presented to prove that defendant's wife had not accessed the computer at the relevant time. There is a long list of things that the prosecution failed to prove (e.g. they provided no evidence regarding what the defendand and wife did for a living, which was relevant to the evidence regarding "opening an invoice". The court sums up by saying the evidence presented here fell well short of what we have found sufficient to convict in other cases involving multiple possible users of a single device. (Citations include US v. Oufnac, 449 F. App’x 472; US v. Mellies, 329 F. App’x 592. The court also found that the evidence did not permit a juror to conclude that James knew the HP Pavilion laptop contained child-pornography files and permitted them to remain on the computer. since the files were buried in a Shareaza file-sharing library, and no evidence was introduced to prove that the defendant had opened the file-sharing program. If you apply the findings in this case to your hypothetical, you could not possibly get a conviction that would not be overturned by a reasonable appeals court. The details of Lowe's trial are not clear from the appeal, but it appears that Lowe (or his attorney, if there was one) failed to create doubt regarding the government's case. Legally speaking, the defendant is not required to create doubt, but the instruction on reasonable doubt may have contributed to the problem. The jury is told that "Possible doubts or doubts based purely on speculation are not reasonable doubts", but since there was porn on the computer, a juror would have had to speculate that someone else downloaded it. The jury is told that "it may arise from the evidence, the lack of evidence, or the nature of the evidence". We do not know to what extent defense failed to make the argument that the government's evidence was severely lacking.
Ark. Code 5-60-120 is very clear that the act of intercepting is a crime. Not just "recording and using", not just "recording", but intercepting in any way. Specifically: It is unlawful for a person to intercept a wire, landline, oral, telephonic communication, or wireless communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception and recording. Intercepting is illegal, therefore it is not "okay". Perhaps the "sort of a lawyer" was speaking of the probability of getting caught doing it.
According to Julian Assange, CNN committed a crime violating § 135.60 of the New York criminal code "coercion". Reddit, while being a private company, is still considered a public forum. Anything said on these sites can be used against you if your actually identity is discovered.
Why can ONLY federal authorities regulate interstate commerce? The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. It seems the federal courts have held that only Congress, and not state legislatures, can regulate interstate commerce. In Sporhase v. Nebraska in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Nebraska law forbidding commercial exportation of water from the state was invalid because of that. I can imagine Congress passing a statute forbidding states to regulate interstate commerce, and that would be within their power to regulate interstate commerce. Did they? Or is there some other rationale for "only"?
The right belongs to the federal government because the Constitution says it does, in Article 1 (section 8, clause 3). This, and the other rights listed in that section, are known as enumerated rights - that is, somebody has explicitly listed them out. The section begins The Congress shall have power .. and each clause may be read separately with that phrase prepended. They should each all be read together with the final clause, which is To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. In the context of the Constitution, this enumeration means that Congress alone has the authority to make such laws. In particular, Congress is the only legislature with the right to make laws governing commerce between states and each other, states and Indian nations, or states and foreign nations. Other sections and their clauses enumerate rights explicitly reserved to the States and the People, and further clarify that any rights not enumerated are also reserved thusly.
Article III of the United States Constitution vests the nation's judicial power -- which includes the authority to hear "all cases, in law and equity, arising under ... the laws of the United States" -- in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the inferior courts established by Congress. The federal courts therefore have authority under the Constitution to hear basically any case alleging that a federal law has been violated. The federal district courts specifically have jurisdiction over any case in which the United States or any federal agency is a plaintiff or defendant. But jurisdiction to hear a case is different than being empowered to grant the relief requested in a case. That authority comes from the Administrative Procedure Act, where Congress has specifically permitted judicial review of agency actions in 5 U.S.C. § 702: A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
Nowhere Collectively The US doesn't know the number of laws on all the federal, state, and city books. Often the lowest level of laws and ordinances are only in a city database, and sometimes not on the internet. As a result, there is already an impossibility to get all the laws in the US in one database - and there are even countries that have not taken any steps to make their laws accessible on the internet at all. For example North Korean Law. This is compounded by different entities proclaiming their laws and regulations in only their own language and on different proclamation platforms. Where available at all, the countries have country-wide laws and ordinances on their own dedicated websites. But again, federalism for the win: there will be different proclamation platforms for lower levels of legislation. For example germany has its justice department host https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ which hosts all federal german laws. Schleswig Holstein hosts their state-level laws in corporation with the service Juris on https://www.gesetze-rechtsprechung.sh.juris.de/jportal/portal/page/bsshoprod.psml and the town of Kiel has all of its ordinances and special orders on https://www.kiel.de/de/politik_verwaltung/ortsrecht_bekanntmachungen/index.php Why a conglomerate is a bad idea Now, making a conglomerate of all the laws is actually a bad idea for several reasons: Updates. The different entities that are in making regulations with the force of law only update their official proclamation site. Often, such changes are not announced too loudly for the lowest levels, and with the number of cities in a single federal state, it's near impossible to keep the database up to date on a complete level. This is why different databases usually only scrape the federal levels. Scraping will break quickly. Each of the websites I pointed to in Germany has a different system setup, making scraping these websites for the relevant information basically useless. Compounding that, City ordinance pages are redesigned at a somewhat elevated pace, resulting in the scraping of these pages to break quickly, even if you manage to set it up. Citability. In a court of law, only the official text is relevant. If an update is missed, then the whole text is useless - you'll have to look up the actual, currently in-force version of the law or ordinance, so the conglomerate is not helping. You want a ginormous database. In some countries, judgments also make law as precedent. So you want every judgment in your database. Which quickly runs into a different problem: The US alone generates millions per day.
The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to set everyday procedural rules in state court, although it can mandate processes that flow from the constitution. In criminal cases, this allows it to regulate courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has prohibited keeping criminal defendants facing trial in a cage in the courtroom as is common in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. The Rittenhouse case took place in state court, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has limited authority in such matters. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has broad authority to establish court rules in the federal courts and could adopt rules in those courts if it deemed fit, and if its proposed rules were not legislatively vetoed by Congress.
No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to "get a convention started": This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates.
Analysis. This question has never been squarely resolved by case law. An analysis would look to the U.S. Constitution (the pertinent parts of which are restated below) and case law under it, to determine if Congress has the authority to enact such a law or not including whether laws currently on the books affect it. Caucuses and primaries are used by political parties as part of their process for determining their Presidential nominees, and the only constitutional acknowledgement that they exist, or are subject to federal regulation is in the 24th Amendment. Political parties also have a 1st Amendment freedom of association interest in choosing their nominees as they see fit, subject to reasonable regulation in an area of law that is not well spelled out in case law. On the the other hand, caucuses and primaries are government regulated, mostly at the state level, because their results have an officially recognized role in Presidential elections under state laws regulating elections for Presidential electors, and primaries are generally conducted at state expense by state and local government officials, rather than by political parties acting autonomously. And, states have wide expressly granted discretion regarding how they conduct Presidential elector elections subject to the authority of Congress to prohibit various kinds of discrimination in the conduct of elections and to set the date of Presidential elections (a right that Congress has chosen not to strictly enforce allowing early voting, for example). New Hampshire does have the authority to say what a political party must do to have its nominee recognized on its general election Presidential ballot, and when it will conduct its state primaries. But, it does not necessarily have the power to determine whether or to what extent a national political party will consider the results of that primary in the process of selecting its nominee for President. The Democratic party, for example, would probably be within its rights to award no delegates to its national convention based upon New Hampshire's primary election participants based upon the New Hampshire primary election, and to instead award New Hampshire delegates solely as "superdelegates" who serve ex-officio, or based solely upon an entirely privately funded and operated Presidential caucus it held in New Hampshire at a date of its choosing. The flip side is that New Hampshire might be within its rights, probably, to decline to put a Democratic party national convention chosen nominee on its Presidential elector ballots, a retaliation, although arguably that would deny the rights of its citizens to vote in the Presidential election over which the federal government has more regulatory authority. The exact details of any situation leading to litigation would matter a lot, and it isn't possible to predict with any great certainty how a challenge would come out, although it is possible to articulate what provisions of the U.S. Constitution (and with more research, what court cases (maybe a dozen or two are arguably pertinent), federal statutes and state statutes) would be pertinent to the decision. It is possible to advocate for an outcome within the range of legally relevant authority, but, in practice, a negotiated compromise that would not push up against the hard constitutional limits of the constitution, relevant statutes and cases would almost surely be reached before it came to that point. For example, while New Hampshire might arguably have the right to refuse to put the Democratic nominee on the ballot because it didn't consider the results of its first in the nation primary in choosing its nominee, I very much doubt that New Hampshire officials would actually go that far, if push came to shove. On the other hand, if Congress passed a law stating that the District of Columbia shall hold the first in the nation primary, as it is probably expressly authorized to do under the 23rd Amendment, that federal law would probably pre-empt New Hampshire's law on the point. Relevant Provisions Of The U.S. Constitution As Amended Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution might be relevant. It states: The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution might be pertinent, it states in the pertinent part that: The Congress shall have power . . . To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Even more directly, Article II, Section 1 which states, in part, that: The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected, as follows: Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. . . The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States. Article VI states in the pertinent part that: This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. Sections 1, 2, and 5 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. These sections state: Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. . . . Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. The 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 23rd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is the only one expressly recognizing the existence of primary elections, might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 26th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Collectively, these sections of the U.S. Constitution give the federal government considerable legislative authority to regulate state elections for federal offices.
Ballot photos Anti-ballot-photo laws may not be constitutional. Two of them have been struck down for violating the 1st Amendment. Rideout v Gardner Case 1:14-cv-00489-PB Indiana Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., d/b/a American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana v. Indiana Secretary of State, et al., Case 1:15-cv-1356-SEB-DML California's has been amended by the legislature to allow disclosure of a filled-in ballot as long as it isn't part of violating some other law (like vote buying). Open container laws Open-container laws have never been held to be unconstitutional. These are state laws, and states have broad freedom to legislate as long as they don't violate their constitution or elements of the Federal Constitution that have been incorporated by the 14th Amendment. My guess is that they would be upheld because they would pass rational basis review: they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Here is an example of an open-container law surviving a constitutional challenge. State are encouraged to pass open-container laws by 23 USC 154. If a state does not have an open container law, they receive less federal highway funding. This kind of condition was upheld by South Dakota v. Dole.
In lay terms, the Raich case cites authority pursuant to the "Commerce Clause" of the Constitution of the United States; specifically, that the government has the power to regulate interstate commerce, to the degree that crops of individuals (whether directly or indirectly, or not at all, in commercial circulation) can be regulated by Congress, citing the Filburn case, which had nothing to do with "marijuana" or "cannabis", or "THC" or "CBD"; in essence, the government has the power to tell a private individual which crops they can cultivate or not, depending on the intent of Congress in enacting the law. The premise being that since the intent of Congress in regulating "marijuana" within the scope of the CSA was for the express purpose of maintaining higher prices (including so-called "black market" prices) for "marijuana", an individual cultivating "marijuana" which was not intended to enter the "stream of commerce" nonetheless impacted the price of the crop (or commodity) by cultivating the crop at all (i.e.g., greater supply of available product reduces the price of the product in any market, whether "black market" or not; having access to the product by means of private cultivation reduces the resources necessary to acquire the crop) - thus resulting in the overall price of the crop not being higher, thwarting the intent of Congress in regulating that specific crop or commodity. Of importance, Congress has concluded that "marijuana" had (and still does not have) any medical purpose (various bills have been written over the years to exempt "marijuana" from Schedule I classification in the CSA; "medical marijuana" exemptions, etc.), or at least no medical purpose recognized by Congress (save for specific research done by Dr. ElSohly, and a very limited number of private individuals (patients) to consume the crops produced by Dr. ElSohly, et al. pursuant to licenses issued by a federal administrative agency). It is interesting to note that the United States holds a (potentially defensive) patent (and has so for several years as of 2018) on various medical applications of CBD via the National Institutes of Health. The "property rights" aspect of your inquiry can be categorized into two parts which are independent of each other, that is both actions can be ongoing simultaneously The government has the power to regulate the cultivation of any crop or commodity on private property pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the intent of Congress, irrespective of if that crop enters the stream of commerce proper or not The government can pursue medical research, apply for and be granted patents (intellectual property), by the government itself, for technologies relating to the medical use of crops or commodities defined by Congress as not having any recognized medical application (e.g., the identical crop or commodity at 1.), potentially for defensive purposes, investment in a potential future market (i.e.g., licensing of patented technologies to pharmaceutical or private equity concerns) for profit, or other undisclosed purposes
Must a health insurance in the United States provide a listing of procedure and diagnosis codes that are covered upon request? I wonder whether a health insurance in the United States must provide a listing of procedure and diagnosis codes that are covered, if requested by a policyholder? In my opinion, the listing of procedure codes that are covered should be part of the health insurance contract, and subsequently be made available to the policyholder, but the health insurance I am in discussion with (namely Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts) seems unwilling to provide such a list (see below for the exact message they sent me). I am mostly interested in the following locations: California, United States Massachusetts, United States Here is the message I received from my health insurance, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, when I asked them "Where can I find the list of all procedure codes, marked as covered or not covered by my insurance plan?": We do not have a listing of procedure codes that are covered or not covered that we can provide you with. We can check on certain procedure codes when they are provided to us, to see if they are covered based on medical policy guidelines. If you have codes from your provider you can contact us to check on them for you, however, the best way to find out is for the doctor to call provider services to confirm coverage. More details after further insisting: The procedure code alone is not what determines if a service will be covered, it is just one piece of the puzzle. Claims are billed with a procedure code and a diagnosis code. The procedure code is what tells us what service is done, and the diagnosis code tells us why. Not only does the procedure code need to be related to a covered service, but the reason for the service (the diagnosis) needs to indicate that the service was medically necessary. We do not have a list of all covered procedures and the related diagnosis codes and we are not clinically trained to determine medical necessity. Typically, it is the doctor’s responsibility to verify if the services are covered and that they are medically necessary. We can research the procedure code that the doctor plans to bill with to see if it is a service that we would potentially cover, but we cannot advise you if it is medically necessary. ADDITIONAL EXAMPLE To illustrate that this same problem goes beyond California and Massachusetts, here is an additional example from North Carolina where the insurance company attempting to excuse itself from providing procedure codes. The excuse is that the codes are "PHI" (protected health information). Of course the entire contents of the EOB, not just the codes, are "PHI", so the reasoning is laughable. And the letter is coming from UnitedHealthcare's "Regulatory Consumer Advocate"!
The health insurance contract should set forth what is and is not covered in detail (in addition, there would be a short summary version). They probably don't have to provide procedure codes that are covered or not covered because no such one to one correspondence exists because the language of the insurance contract is controlling and does not exactly correspond to procedure codes. For example, one of the basic eligibility questions is whether a procedure is medically necessary. A procedure may be medically necessary for one person, but not for another, and usually a denial based upon medical necessity is subject to appeal to other medical professionals engaged by the insurance company. Unless the insurance contract provides that an EOB must contain procedure codes, it probably doesn't have an affirmative obligation to do so, because there is no general principle of law that would require them to disclose their internal classification of services provided outside of a litigation context. And, in a litigation context, you probably could obtain procedure codes in discovery from the insurance company, as the code assigned to a procedure on an EOB would almost surely not be privileged or a legally protected secret. It may very well be that the company has an in house set of procedures for certain common diagnosis codes that are routinely allowed or are flagged for review by an insurance company bureaucrat. But, that would ordinarily be considered something of a trade secret of the company and is not a statement of what is or is not allowed under the actual health insurance contract. However, the privilege against disclosing the information in that context would flow from trade secret law and not from the fact that they are PHI. I don't agree that PHI is the correct reason for failing to disclose that information (unless some case law of which I am not aware has interpreted it differently). The federal law definition of PHI is at 45 CFR 160.103: Protected health information means individually identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years. The cross reference to 20 U.S.c. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv) reads as follows: (iv) records on a student who is eighteen years of age or older, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, which are made or maintained by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other recognized professional or paraprofessional acting in his professional or paraprofessional capacity, or assisting in that capacity, and which are made, maintained, or used only in connection with the provision of treatment to the student, and are not available to anyone other than persons providing such treatment, except that such records can be personally reviewed by a physician or other appropriate professional of the student’s choice. In short, it is B.S. that you are being given an illegitimate reason for not complying with your request, but it is probably still within the company's rights for other legitimate reasons to deny your request.
As a short answer, guidance from the Department of Health and Human Services has clarified that HIPAA does not require hospitals to provide separate rooms. As a longer answer, HIPAA is very deeply misunderstood. It does not prohibit "leaking" patient information; it prohibits unreasonable and unpermitted disclosures of protected health information (PHI). Among the PHI disclosures that are permitted are uses that are for the purpose of delivering medical treatment. Of course, the covered entity (in this case, the hospital) is required to take reasonable measures to safeguard that information. One of the areas that trips people up is figuring out exactly what it is we're safeguarding that information from. A lot people assume that the HIPAA imposes an absolute rule against disclosure of PHI, but it's more accurate to say that HIPAA requires reasonable safeguards against the unauthorized use of PHI. With that standard in mind, it becomes easier to see why you don't need to universally separate patients. In all likelihood, neither you nor your roommate is likely to use the other's PHI in any way not allowed under HIPAA. We can look at your question as proof: You've disclosed a person's health condition and medical history, but you were a reasonable person and omitted the man's name, birth date, record number, and anything else that might allow us to link that information to an individual. Hospitals -- and the law -- recognize that most people have no interest in a random strangers' medical information, let alone plans to do something nefarious with it. Because there isn't much of a threat there, the hospital isn't required to take exhaustive measures to protect the information. But when you put all that information for every patient for every doctor for every department for every hospital into a single database, the information starts getting a lot more valuable. That's why there are much tighter regulations surrounding protection of electronic records. Of course, the roommate situation might be different if the hospital had a patient that they somehow knew had a history of identity theft or even a history of disclosing PHI. I've never heard of this happening, but I'd imagine that that knowledge would require the hospital to either segregate that patient or otherwise take extra care to avoid disclosing any information about a roommate.
Employees of an employer aren't governed by a fault based liability regime in the United States (subject to some usually quite narrow exceptions that vary from state to state, which sometimes also limit tort liability). Instead, employers are required to have worker's compensation insurance policies in place, in exchange for not having any tort liability whatsoever to employees. (An employer who doesn't have worker's compensation in place is strictly liable to the worker for all injuries suffered by an employee whatsoever at work, without the prohibition of a worker's compensation insurance policy plan on paying things like pain and suffering damages as well.) Worker's compensation insurance provides coverage (in principle) for all medical costs incurred, all lost wages, and in the event of a death support for dependents if any and a modest death benefit sufficient to provide a funeral if there are no dependents. Often, in practice, worker's compensation insurance payments tend to be rather stingy. One of the most common big worker's compensation claims these days, especially in office and retail workplaces, is for employees who are seriously injured or killed in crimes at work. Often, a worker's compensation insurer will give an employer a discount if they have a "gun free" zone, because, statistically, doing so greatly reduces the average amount of harm experienced by employees at work. The presence of employees with guns in the workplace, as an actuarial matter, greatly increases the insurance company's risk of having to pay claims.
http://www.healthinfoprivacybc.ca/confidentiality/when-can-and-cant-they-tell-others is a pretty good summary. Different rules apply to private practices than public clinics and hospitals. I will assume that the clinic on campus is private. This is a summary of the summary about who your information can be shared with: Health care professionals can share information within your "circle of care". Specifically, they are allowed to assume your consent to this but you can explicitly withdraw that consent. This would include doctors within the same practice. Admin staff can access your information for administrative purposes. Anyone you have authorised them to share it with e.g. relatives, friends etc. The Medical Services Plan for billing and admin If you are unable to drive If there is suspected of child abuse If you are wounded by a gun or a knife If you are a danger to others For your specific questions: I asked about it and they said it's confidential, but confidential to the clinic. Correct, unless you explicitly revoke this. the counselling department can share information with the doctors This is tricker, these people may be either within your "circle of care" or they may be part of the same organisation. Notwithstanding, councillors are not doctors and are governed by the everyday laws related to confidentiality i.e. information given in confidence is confidential and everything else isn't. If you are told the limits of the confidentiality i.e. they tell the doctor, then those are the limits unless you renegotiate them. he would know I only have one kidney? Well you said "the counselling department can share information with the doctors" and this would require the information going the other way i.e. the doctor sharing with the councillor. Even if this type of sharing was OK in general (and I'm not sure it is, see above); the information shared should only be what is required for the councillor to do their job - the number of kidneys you have is probably irrelevant to this. What laws apply to situations like this where confidential information in one entity (medical office) decides to share it without the consent of the patients to another entity (the counselling dept.)? Well, we are not sure there are 2 entities: legally there may only be 1 - the university. Anyway, the laws are the Personal Information Protection Act and common law (Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455)
HIPAA imposes obligations on some people, but not all people. In the case of security and privacy questions, you would consult 45 CFR Part 164. A patient's actions are not subject to government sanctions, so a patient can provide or decline to provide email addresses following their own judgment. A healthcare or insurance provider would be required to securely keep PII under wraps. The regulations also do not impose obligations on unknowing potentially involved third-parties, i.e. no obligation is imposed on Google to know that an individual is using a Gmail account to transmit PII-related information. The medical provider has an obligation to store and transmit such information securely, which would mean for example that they do not send insecure plain text emails saying "Sally Jones at 12345 67th Ave SW was treated for a loathsome disease, we're coding that as 0102, and we want $500". That obligation is passed on to employees via employment-contractual obligations, for example that may dictate what computer or software you can use to do the job. If the provider passes the buck to the employee (and I assume that the employee is just an employee), they have violated the security rule. In that case, they may be attempting to mitigate the consequences of their actions or at least check if there were identifiable violations of the privacy rule. In the scenario where SmithMed provides all of the infrastructure needed to bill insurance companies, it is not a HIPAA violation to inspect computer logs, email etc. to verify that the employee has been complying with security and privacy policies. It would likewise not be a HIPAA violation to inspect third-party accounts (Gmail etc) to determine whether there has been a security / privacy rule violation. That is as far as HIPAA takes you. Whether or not the ex-employee has an obligation to turn over their email account information is mostly determined by the employment contract, but it is highly unlikely that any such contract has a "gimme your personal email on termination" clause. It is not inconceivable that the employee negligently used their personal account rather than opening a new billing-job only account. Also depending on the email service provider, it may well be a violation of the terms of service to hand over your account information. (Instead, for a certain email provider, the company is expected to set up and pay for a company account). Those are considerations bearing on possible legal impediments to turning over the email information. Needless to say, don't share passwords etc. because that exposes you legally, but that is not about HIPAA.
Can people with low incomes qualify for free medical care (Medi-Cal) in California regardless of their assets? For some programs, but not others. The main exception, discussed below, is the Medicaid expansion component of Obamacare (a.k.a. the Affordable Care Act). One of the exceptions to the general rule considering property is as follows: The Affordable Care Act introduced a new methodology – Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) – to define a family’s size and count income in order to determine eligibility for insurance affordability programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14). As a result, household determination and income counting rules are largely aligned among Medi-Cal, the Medi-Cal Access Program (MCAP, the low-cost health insurance for moderate income pregnant women), and Covered California, with some exceptions. For Medi-Cal, the MAGI rules apply to the following programs: Expansion Adults (adults aged 19 through 64); Parents and Caretaker Relatives; Pregnant Women; and Children. Medi-Cal’s Tuberculosis Program and the Refugee Medical Assistance program also now use the MAGI income methodology. See Welf. & Inst. Code 14005.20(b)(2) and ACWD 15-16 (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Documents/ACWDL2015/ACWDL15-16.pdf. These programs, however, are not considered MAGI Medi-Cal in the Medi-Cal hierarchy because they are limited in scope or duration and should only be used when an individual is not eligible for any other form of free Medi-Cal. In general, unless an individual gets Medi-Cal through a linked program such as SSI or CalWORKs, or due to former foster youth status, Medi-Cal eligibility is reviewed for the MAGI programs before looking to the Non-MAGI programs. Outside that Obamacare program, someone can have significant assets of types that are exempt from consideration (e.g. in the Medicaid nursing home program), but they cannot qualify regardless of their assets. The exact extent to which assets are disqualifying varies by subprogram, with ordinary Medi-Cal, the nursing home program, and the CHIP program for children, having different requirements. The key language is "countable asset levels". This is defined in a combination of state statutes and regulations which in turn are enacted in order to comply with federal Medicaid program requirements. Only some assets count for purposes of Medi-Cal eligibility. In particular, a personal residence, a single motor vehicle, certain household goods, certain retirement assets, certain cash value in life insurance policies, and investment assets that don't generate current cash income and are impracticable so sell in a timely manner at anything approaching their true value because they are illiquid for some reason or other, don't count. Exactly what does and does not count as a countable asset for purposes of Medi-Cal eligibility is a rather technical and detailed matter because there are some many different kinds of assets out there and the rules address them on a type by type basis. The most common exemptions are set forth here: The main regulations for the Department of Health Services that govern this are found here and here. More legal sources are found here. These primary sources, alas, aren't organized in a very user friendly way. In part, this is because the Medicaid Rules incorporate by reference (with modifications) the rules for the Aid To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) rules, rather than restating them with the modifications include in full. So the chart on the form is assembled from a mishmash of state and federal regulations in multiple locations. I didn't find a chapter and verse citation for a few kinds of non-countable assets but know they exist from continuing education classes and practicing in the area.
In the US, people are generally allowed to charge arbitrary amounts for services, as long as they do not violate various anti-discrimination laws in doing for. For example it would be illegal to charge people of one race less than they charge people of another race, because of federal and state anti-discrimination laws. Three primary factors govern the legality of a particular form of discrimination. One is the type of interaction, for example "voting rights", "public accommodation", "employment", "housing" – medical treatment would generally fall under "public accommodation". The second is jurisdiction – there can be federal, state, and municipal laws governing a particular kind of discrimination (the lower in the hierarchy you go, the stricter the laws tend to be). Finally there is the "protected class", that is, the basis for discrimination. Protected class is extremely variable, given the preceding two factors. Age discrimination is legal in ways that race discrimination is not. "Has insurance" is not a protected class anywhere, so this does not violate any discrimination laws (per se). There are numerous legal forms of discrimination which are analogous, for example to shop at Costco at all, you have to be a member; there are numerous businesses that offer "member discounts"; some doctors work on a "subscription" basis where they don't treat you unless you are a (paid) service subscriber. The idea that a service has to treat all comers identically is legally incorrect. Co-pay rates are dictated by insurance companies, and can vary depending on the specific insurance carrier that you have. To the extent that there are no specific laws saying otherwise, a service provider is legally entitled to charge less to a person who does not make a claims for coverage by medical insurance – or they could charge more. Indeed, the "without insurance" cost of medical services is typically higher, and the insurance company insists on doctors accepting lower compensation. A "practical" but somewhat risky solution is that if you know that the copay is higher than the street price, you can simply not reveal that you have insurance. However, sometimes an office visit results in a finding that some treatment is needed, and the street price for that treatment may be substantially higher than the insured price. At any rate, contractually-determined co-pays are legal. I should mention a remote possibility for applying anti-discrimination laws, owing to sec. 1557 of ACA. See this article on health care discrimination litigation, where the law enabled "private right of action for disparate impact claims opens the door to class-based claims challenging facially neutral health care policies, treatment decisions, and insurance coverage on the basis that they disproportionately affect members of protected classes". Under this regime, if a policy effectively discriminates on the basis of a protected class, without explicitly mentioning the class, the policy could still be found illegal. If there is a strong enough correlation between race and having health insurance, then "having health insurance" could be found to be a substitute for discrimination on prohibited grounds. There isn't enough case law on this issue, that we can clearly say that such an argument would or would not work.
There is not enough detail on the plan to say anything yet. But it is important to understand that the Canada Health Act is not an obligatory law but outlines conditions for provinces to receive significant federal contributions to their budget. Even if the conditions are breached, the federal government would be the only one who has the power to do anything, unlike a Charter violation that gives individuala a cause of action. It likely does not breach the prohibition of user charges: 2 [...] user charge means any charge for an insured health service that is authorized or permitted by a provincial health care insurance plan that is not payable, directly or indirectly, by a provincial health care insurance plan, but does not include any charge imposed by extra-billing. [...] 19 (1) In order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a fiscal year, user charges must not be permitted by the province for that fiscal year under the health care insurance plan of the province. [...] since the plan is to impose a financial charge on all vaccinated and such charge is not tied to their access to or actual usage of the public healthcare system. The accessibility criterion may be another ground of breach: 12 (1) In order to satisfy the criterion respecting accessibility, the health care insurance plan of a province (a) must provide for insured health services on uniform terms and conditions and on a basis that does not impede or preclude, either directly or indirectly whether by charges made to insured persons or otherwise, reasonable access to those services by insured persons; [...] But again, it is the access or the provision of services that matters, the other side of equation is not directly touched except that any charge or other measures, if there is any, should not impede or preclude reasonable access to healthcare. However, even if it does not violate the letters of the law, it violates, in my opinion and when framed like a tax on unvaccinated, the spirits of a universal, accessible health system underpinned by the Act, which is one of the political arguments against the plan. It would be much harder to argue against the fiscal equivalent, though. A bonus for vaccination would likely be much more politically and legally acceptable and less controversial.
501(c)(3) Bylaws Question - Does this clause mean a motion to amend bylaws can go forward without quorum? Voting Rights e. Quorum at annual or special meetings will be at least 51 percent of the directors and the lesser of 10 percent of the voting members or 10 voting members including any proxies. f. Voting on matters unrelated to the board elections will proceed with a motion, discussion and passed by a majority of members in attendance so long as those present represent a quorum. Amendments The Membership may amend these bylaws by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the membership voting at the annual or special meeting
No An amendment must happen at a meeting: without a quorum there is no meeting.
It would depends on the laws of the particular state, since each state has its own laws pertaining to voting. The law in North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §163-275(7), says that it is unlawful For any person with intent to commit a fraud to register or vote at more than one precinct or more than one time, or to induce another to do so, in the same primary or election, or to vote illegally at any primary or election The corresponding jury instruction says what it means to have an intent to commit a fraud: Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. You arrive at the intent of a person by such just and reasonable deductions from the circumstances proven as a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily draw therefrom. Specific intent is a mental purpose, aim or design to accomplish a specific harm or result. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant voted more than one time in the same election event, the (name election event or contest),and that defendant did so with the intent to commit a fraud, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty The prosecution would presumably construct an argument that the defendant intended that is vote be counted twice, and if they can prove that intent, then the jury should convict. Defense could argue that the intent was based on a reasonable belief that their absentee ballot was not counted thus disenfranchising defendant, and defendant acted with the lawful intent that their vote be counted, once. Because NC law contains procedural provisions to filter out double-voting, defendant can reasonably have a non-criminal intent, even if they are mistaken about the efficacy of those safeguards. However, the Ohio law does not carry an intent element: (A) No person shall do any of the following: ... (2) Vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election by any means, including voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter's ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by regular ballot at the polls at the same election, or voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter's ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by absent voter's ballots under Chapter 3509. or armed service absent voter's ballots under Chapter 3511. of the Revised Code at the same election; This doesn't even require that you know that you are voting twice. So it depends on the particular law of the state.
That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.
The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions.
Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.
The internal organizational documents and practices of the company would determine this in terms of actual authority and would vary from company to company even within the same jurisdiction of organization and entity type. For example, one company might give that authority to the general counsel, another to the corporate secretary, a third to the Vice President for Information Technology, and a fourth to their Chief Innovation Officer, yet another might allow any officer of the company to do so, or might allow any employee of the company to do so. Usually, the more often a company does something and the more routine it is to do that, the lower down in the organization the authority is allocated. Anyone who appeared to have the authority to do so to a reasonably third-party, however, could bind the company even if they didn't actually have the authority to do so.
Historically there were restrictions on voting that no longer exist: being white, male or property-owner are examples. For example, the 15th amendment prohibited denying the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; women got the right to vote under the 19th amendment; poll taxes and a requirement for paying any other tax were abolished by the 24th Amendment (this did not address state elections). In the case of property ownership, the property requirement was eliminated state-by state by 1856. Tax-payment was a requirement for a longer period, but again was abolished state-by-state. Later, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 SCOTUS ruled that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth
You don't have to interact with people if you don't want to If you don't want to talk or otherwise interact with somebody in a personal capacity, you don't have to. Your reasons for doing so are your reasons. Some of the congregation may have roles that require them to interact with Jane in what I will loosely call an "official" capacity. For example, if one of the congregants is a government employee and government business requires the interaction, they would have to do so. It gets a little tricky when there is not a clear legal duty to interact. For example, if a congregant is an employee of a company with which Jane has business and who would normally be the person to interact with Jane, they might reasonably claim that they have a religious belief that prevents them from doing so. Anti-discrimination law may require the employer to make reasonable accommodations for that belief, for example, by getting a different employee to interact with Jane.
Can I create a will before our baby is born? We are having a baby and I had a question about creating a will. I am planning on talking to a lawyer before doing so, but just wanted some quick advice. Can I create the will before the baby is born? When I tried to find some will samples online, the forms all asked for the child's name, which we don't have yet. I'd really like to get as much done before the baby is born, for obvious reasons, so is this something I can do, or do I have to have the baby named before I can create the will?
Yes. Typically, a will is drafted so that it applies not only to any current children but also to afterborn children. In a statement of family, in a Will, I would often say that: "children" as used in this Will including the following persons and any other person subsequently born to me or legally adopted by me. Then I would draft the guardianship and dispositive provisions using the term "children" without specifying a name. If children are born, but there might be a paternity issue, it isn't uncommon to state that "my children at the time this Will is executed are . . . . and I intentionally exclude from benefit hereunder or for any fiduciary position with respect to me, any other person claiming to be a child or other descendant of mine as of the time that this Will is executed, but do not intend to exclude subsequent children or children later adopted by me."
Often one chooses your accountant, your financial advisor, or your lawyer. Another option is to appoint the trust department of a bank. I personally, as a lawyer, have a policy of not consenting to do that except in rare cases like the one in this question, of a client who just doesn't have anyone and has an estate sufficiently small that a bank trust department would not be cost effective or well suited to handling some aspect of the executorship. But, I have done it a few times in those cases. Most lawyers I know of take a similar position. If no executor is designated, your estate will usually be administered either by a large unpaid creditor, or by the public administrator (whose job is primarily to administer estates in cases where there are no next of kin, no executor has been designated, and there are no unpaid creditors who have stepped up to do the job).
No To declare that a parent is "unfit" in the US requires at least a decision by a government agency (often called "child protective services" or "child welfare" depending on the state) usually confirmed by a judge. Medical testimony may be persuasive, but neither doctors nor hospitals may make such determinations.
She can't force him, but the court can. This would be a court ordered paternity test. If one parent can't give blood for some reason they could do something else like a cheek swab.
When they start giving legal advice ... unless your PA is a lawyer. In a nutshell, legal advice has the following characteristics: Requires legal knowledge, skill, education and judgment Applies specific law to a particular set of circumstances Affects someone's legal rights or responsibilities Creates rights and responsibilities in the advice-giver Unlike legal information - such as information posted on a street sign - legal advice proposes a specific course of action a client should take. For instance, it's the difference between telling someone what to do (legal advice) as opposed to how to do it (legal information). For your specific questions Can they research the CC&Rs, Bylaws or other such states, federal statues to help me better understand the letter? Researching and even summarising is not legal advice. If they give opinions on what you should do as a result of that research it is legal advice. Can they write up a response letter that I would look at and approve ... Yes ... or if minor enough they could just respond? It depends on what's involved. If it is a purely factual response ("Is this your car?") then this is ok. If it is legal advocacy, it isn't. Putting aside the legalities; how does your PA feel about you suing them if they stuff any of this up? If I was your PA, I wouldn't be acting as your agent without an indemnity.
OK, I talked to a lawyer (in Massachusetts) and these are the answers I got. One can draft a confidential exclusion letter to state wishes regarding excluding certain people from being guardians. In the letter you can explain in detail why you think somebody is unfit to be a guardian. Execute this document as you do for your will and tell your family that it exists so that they can access it if you die (or give them a copy). The advantage of a stand-alone document is that it is not public, differently from the will which is public. The lawyer also suggested to also have a separate stand-alone guardianship document (and so to not include the guardian section in the will). The reason is that a will can be executed only if somebody is dead. But if somebody is e.g. in a coma (or missing), he won't be able to take care of his children and yet his will would not be able to executed. A separate guardianship document would instead apply also in these situations thereby minimizing the chances that somebody, whom you do not consider fit, becomes a guardian of your children.
I am not aware of any U.S. state that allows amounts owed for future child support to be paid in a lump sum that cannot be modified in the future if there is a change in circumstances (e.g. increased or deceased incomes of the parties, or changes in parenting time). There may be an exception for very high income families where the child support guidelines set under state law (but mandated by federal law), apply and the maximum guideline amount is paid in a lump sum. Lump sum alimony (a.k.a. spousal maintenance), however, may be paid in a lump sum, as may child support for periods that have taken place in the past, whether or not they are past due.
There is no requirement that a will, or a trust created by a will, be "fair". The will could have left $500,000 in trust for one set of siblings, and $5,000 to another set. It could specifically exclude one beneficiary from some of the benefits, or specify an unequal division. That is all the choice of the testator. As described in the question, the trust does seem likely to give greater benefits to one set of children than to their cousins. Unless there are grounds to upset the will, that is just how it is. However, the wide "absolute" discretion granted to the trustee might allow the trustee to modify this outcome, but the trustee is not allowed to simply rewrite the trust. How much the payments can be varied will depend on the exact terms of the trust. It does sound as if this trust was not worded as carefully as it might be, since it does not specify a ration when the trust is to be split. The designated relative can decline to serve as trustee, then any specified alternate would serve, or if there is none, or none who will serve, the court would appoint a trustee.
Do I have recourse against my employer for broadcasting my suspension to coworkers? I was suspended for a day and the manager sent out an email to at least 13 other people with suspension written on the schedule. What recourse do I have? This is very humiliating to me.
No. Absent some collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, you have no recourse because you have not been legally wronged. You have no right to privacy in this regard. You have no right to be free of humiliation based upon truthful statements. If the email is truthful and you were indeed suspended, then the manager is entirely appropriate in sharing that information, and indeed has a need to do so. You would have no recourse in Tennessee, even if your manager gave a national television interview on your suspension and truthfully stated all reasons for the suspension and threw in statements of opinion disparaging you. Humiliation is only actionable if it amounts to "outrageous conduct" beyond mere truthful speech (e.g. throwing your clothes in the toilet or secretly putting some self-disparaging statement on the back of your uniform) and was calculated with a specific intent to cause you extraordinary emotional harm that was not necessary for some legitimate purpose.
united-states Under US law, unions and employees enjoy a set of protections codified under the National Labor Relations Act. Some of those rights specifically pertain to strikes, and in particular, employees engaged in "lawful" strikes cannot be fired merely for striking (but they can be replaced). Stack Exchange, Inc. takes the position that moderators are not employees and are not subject to the NLRA. Their reluctance to use the word "strike" likely stems from this position. If the moderation strike were a "strike" within the meaning of the NLRA, that would imply a large and complex set of restrictions on how Stack Exchange may respond to the strike. It would also suggest that moderators, as employees, have a right to discuss their "workplace conditions" with each other or the public - which might be construed to include some or all of the moderation policies that Stack Exchange has distributed in private (but I'm somewhat doubtful of that). Of course, it would also raise serious problems under the Fair Labor Standards Act (moderators are unpaid and the FLSA sets a minimum wage), but that is a different law, and it is theoretically possible that a court would rule that moderators are employees for NLRA purposes but not for FLSA purposes. I have never heard of such a ruling actually happening, and it is far more likely that moderators are not employees for either purpose. Still, it might be unwise to refer to the strike as a "strike," just in case the issue gets litigated.
I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks...
Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.
Legally, they can kick you out for any reason that isn't illegal discrimination. They can't kick you out for being black. They also can't kick you out for being white. But they can kick you out for not liking your face. Now the question is: Who can kick you out? The store owner obviously can. Anyone who is given the authority by the store owner can. Actually, anyone with the apparent authority can kick you out. However, everyone other than the store owner has been hired to work towards making profits. If throwing you out is bad for business, then whoever did it would have to answer to the store owner. So the ex-friend can't go to court for throwing you out, but they might get into trouble with their boss about it. PS. I interpreted "kicking out" as saying "Please leave our premises. If you don't leave then you will be trespassing and I will call the police", not actually kicking the person with your foot which would be most likely assault.
If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand.
It depends on the nature of the strike. If a strike is "protected" (allowed under the NLRA), you cannot be fired but if the strike is illegal, you can be. If the strike is legal and was at least in part over an unfair labor practice, you must be immediately reinstated after the strike ends. If the strike is over economic issues, you might have been replaced with a permanent employee so you are placed on a preferential hiring list. However this right to reinstatement can be lost if you engage in serious misconduct in connection with the strike or picketing.
The real question isn't whether there is a law, but whether you want to keep your job. If you want to do something that you believe will affect your company negatively, and you ask whether it's legal or not, the question alone should show you it's a bad idea. And another question is whether you can be sued, and what it will cost you even if you can win a case, and the answers to that are "yes" and "a lot".
What is the meaning and the implications of Art. 27, GG (German Basic Law)? What is the meaning and the implications of Art. 27, GG (German Basic Law)? Alle deutschen Kauffahrteischiffe bilden eine einheitliche Handelsflotte. I suspect it has something to do with maritime law, but I cannot find any explanations of its implications on the internet. Since I'm not a jurist, this article seems somehow obscure to me as an ordinary German citizen.
This is true of the merchant ships of most countries. The collection of all merchant ships bearing a nation's flag are collectively its merchant fleet. Basically, this means that German flagged merchant ships are subject to German admiralty law when on the high seas, and that German merchant ships can be conscripted to aid a war effort on behalf of Germany in times of war. Stated another more direct way, this means that in exchange for the benefits of German sovereignty for a merchant ship owner, the merchant ship owner must sign up to be eligible to have his ship drafted into the German navy in times of war. A U.S. specific description of the "merchant marine" can be found here, but the general concept that: "The Merchant Marine is the fleet of ships which carries imports and exports during peacetime and becomes a naval auxiliary during wartime to deliver troops and war materiel.", is equally applicable to the German Basic Law as used in this case. A unitary merchant fleet is the naval equivalent of an "unorganized militia" or "selective service" made up of people eligible to be drafted, but who haven't actually be called up for military service.
You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach.
germany I am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, Author's Right) can only be held by a natural person, which is a legal term of art that essentially means "human being". There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright. Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output. However, IFF a human being were actually involved in selecting specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting this particular work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up this particular piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach. So, if you simply generate these works and publish all of them, there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then select a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.
Impressum Requirement Wow, based on your citations, you've done a lot of research on this topic. I'm just going to add one more reference, which is from the same site as your first German citation and has incredibly detailed and judicially referenced information on almost everything related to the Impressum. All my non-GitHub links are to sections of that page. Based on your research, I'm going to take it for granted that you understand that according to the Telemediengesetz (TMG), an Impressum is required on a web page if it is "business-like" (geschäftsmäßig), or if it helps, I prefer to word it as "potentially commercial." I would have to argue that open source projects have to be seen as inherently "business-like" for the purposes of the TMG for two reasons: Some other legal person may have similar software as part of their business and might have the need to serve legal notifications to the owner of a GitHub project (TMG § 8 gives competitors the right to sue). Think potential copyright violations here. It is possible to build a more traditional commercial business around open source, for example what Canonical is doing around Ubuntu. Additionally, the common legal advice is to even include an Impressum on a personal blog, though I'm not aware of any court case having occurred at that level yet. In my opinion, a GitHub account can be seen as more "business-like" than a personal blog, and would follow that advice out of caution. I'll note that the XING situation you bring up is complicated. It centers over whether the content of XING pages is "business-like" according to the TMG. It may well turn out that some pages will need an Impressum and others won't. As for placing it in the project's readme.md, that might work but I have two concerns: The courts have essentially stated that the text of the link must imply that the required information under TMG § 5 is located there. For example, the words Impressum and Kontakt work, but the word Information does not. To me, "readme" is not sufficient, but this concern might be negated by the fact GitHub by default renders the readme.md directly on the project home page. While it has been ruled that the Impressum does not necessarily have to be directly on the home page (for GitHub, that would be the company's/users profile page), it must still be readily available in an intuitive location. I don't know if putting it in a project page satisfies the legal requirement. If it was sufficient, it's also likely that each project would have to have an Impressum so that it can't be missed. Examples The dominant pattern that I could find1 on GitHub is an off-site link to the Impressum contained in the profile page's byline right underneath the title. Examples: https://github.com/sedadigital, https://github.com/comsysto, https://github.com/znes, https://github.com/eSagu, https://github.com/TIBHannover. I'm almost certain this meets or exceeds the legal requirements. Example screenshot: Additionally, I found a few that had a repository specifically for an Impressum. Example: https://github.com/johsteffens. Since these repositories were clearly visible on the user's main page (either because there weren't enough repositories to make them span multiple pages, or because it was specifically pinned to the main page), I would argue these also meet the legal requirement for being readily available. While I didn't find any examples of it, another possibility would be to combine the above two approaches, having a link in the byline that links to an Impressum repository or some other page within GitHub. This would be useful if you didn't otherwise have an Impressum hosted elsewhere. There were also scattered examples of people placing an Impressum on a project wiki page or on an impressum.md file at the top level. However, none of the users I looked at were consistent in doing this across all their projects. Also as previously mentioned, it's questionable whether not having it on the main user profile page meets the legal requirement. The Wiki page in particular I don't think meets the requirement that it can easily be found. Found using the following Google search: site:github.com impressum -impressum.php -impressum.html -impressum.jsp -impressum-manager -github.io -issue. Exclusions meant to filter out a lot of false positives, mostly projects for websites that had their Impressum in code format meant for deploy and not for display on GitHub itself.
First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings.
If a law is struck-down as unconstitutional, but all the precedent used to find it unconstitutional gets reversed; what becomes of the law? In U.S. law, the law has effect again, unless it has been amended or repealed in the meantime. Is it totally dead, needing be passed anew? In the U.S., no. It is not totally dead. It is merely dormant. It stays on the books and legislators may decide not to repeal it as a political statement. It also might be considered for interpretive purposes when construing another part of the same law. For example, the meaning given to a phrase in an unconstitutional part of the law might be applied to a different part of the law that is constitutional. Can the judiciary be asked to reinstated, after which point it can be used again? In the U.S., any court can determine that a law is unconstitutional, but the extent to which that ruling is binding precedent on other courts or other parties than those to the case before it depends upon the court in question and upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). For example, the legal fight in the U.S. to hold bans on same sex marriage to be unconstitutional was fought in and resulted in ruling in dozens of courts at the trial court and state appellate court, and federal intermediate appellate court level before a uniform ruling was established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, even if the issue arises in another case where there is a controlling precedent, attorney ethics permit an attorney to make a good faith argument for a change in the law to any court, so if there is some good faith argument for doing so, the attorney can push that the issue be reconsidered. Of course, usually the answer from the court will be "no." Or can it just be enforced again without any formal process; so long as nobody sues and gets it killed again by a lower court? Sometimes government officials enforce laws that have been held unconstitutional, either because they aren't aware of the relevant court decisions, or because they think that their facts are distinguishable from those under which the law was held unconstitutional (which sometimes happens on an "as applied" basis rather than on a "facial" basis that applies to all cases), or because they think the judge before them might rule differently despite the precedent. Also, would the answer differ according to country? If so, could you please give me some examples of countries handling this differently. Yes. Many countries with legal systems based upon the legal system of countries of continental Europe like France and Germany and Spain, which are called "civil law" countries have a very different process of handling unconstitutional laws, as does the European Court of Human Rights and the highest court of the European Union. In Germany, for example, questions of the constitutionality of a law may be raised only in the Constitutional Court and not in other courts. This ruling is usually final. And, unlike U.S. courts, the Constitutional Court can rule a law unconstitutional during the legislative process, rather than in connection with an actual case or controversy relating to the law taking effect (in which case the law never gets on the books in the first place). I don't know what happens when the Constitutional Court declares a law unconstitutional. I do know, however, that in the case of the European Court of Human Rights and the highest courts of the E.U. that one of the usual remedies will be an order directed at a member state to amend its statutes to remove the offending law, with sanctions imposed if the member state fails to do so. Obviously, once such a law is repealed in this fashion, it would have to be re-enacted to take effect even if the precedent holding that the law was unconstitutional was undermined.
Probably not. I can't find the new text, but the existing law was probably just amended with a new category: "hate speech" based on race, religion, disability and "homosexual leanings, lifestyle, or orientation" was illegal – this new law seems to just tweak the categories. The Supreme Court has addressed the general law here in a race-based case, stating that expression of contempt is crucial to defining the crime ("to threaten or insult, or promote hatred, persecution or contempt" based on a protected category). The line that would be drawn is between reading the text, versus promoting hatred or contempt using the text as justification. You can't be prosecuted for hate speech in Norway by reporting the existence of racial etc. discrimination.
Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.
How much can I quote from an academic book for my lecture notes? I'm writing lecture notes for one of my exams, both as a process to learn the subject well and to be able to share it with other students later. The official lecture notes are just slides and are really vague, would be/is of no help for anybody who didn't attend the classes (like me). There is a huge book that describes many things I'd need to know for the exam. I'd like to know how much I could quote from the original book for my the lecture notes that I'd later make available online. I would not sell my lecture notes. I'd, of course, cite everything to the best of my knowledge. I'd like to share the final PDF with other students after I finished the university (in a couple of months). I even thought about sharing the TeX source with the professor, so he (or his students in the future) can keep the lecture notes up to date. The original books are +2K pages, my work would be around 30-50 pages, tops, with many other sources, if that makes a difference.
There aren't bright line rules in the area of fair use (which is the core issue - you are clearly copying a work that has copyright protected portions, at least - the question is whether fair use provides a defense and whether some portions are not copyright protected). This inquiry is fact specific and driven by general standards. Context such as whether the use would be free or commercial matter as well. For your own notes, anything goes pretty much. This generally wouldn't constitute "publication" of the work and would be for personal educational used by someone who paid for the book anyway. For shared notes - it depends. Also not all kinds of copying is created equal. Some parts of textbooks are themselves in the public domain or not protectable by copyright. For example, even a lengthy quote from a scientific journal article would probably be allowed with attribution. It would also be easier to evaluate based upon the type of textbook. A history textbook can have protection similar to trade non-fiction and can have very original exposition. An algebra textbook, less so. Your question also points to an end run. If the professor is the author of the textbook (many of mine were in something of a racket), you could get permission from the author.
From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.
Q1 and Q2 are definitely not copyright violations. Copyright protects original expression. Your questions are yours; the only things you are using are the names, and copyright doesn't cover them on their own. The quotation in Q3 might conceivably come under copyright. However in practice it is very likely to be fair use (unfortunately nothing is definitely fair use until a court rules on it, but I can't imagine a short quotation in a quiz being an issue).
1. You need to read and utilize law textbooks, the MOST UPDATED editione. Try to access a library of a university that has a law faculty. Failing that, try a local library — but local libraries may not stock (pricey) law textbooks, or their most updated edns. I scanned Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law Text Cases Materials (2020 9 edn), beneath for you. But the NEWEST edn is 2022, 10 edn, as at May 23 2022. Herring updates his book every 2 years. Two other leading textbooks are Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Criminal Law (2021 16 edn), and Smith, Hogan, & Ormerod's Text, Cases, & Materials on Criminal Law (2020 13 edn). 2. Look up the Act of Parliament in the Table of Legislation. See scan beneath. 3. Finally, you shall find the cases expatiated in the body, and cited in the footnotes! See scan beneath.
First, copyright means that permission from the author is generally required. The courts find three sorts of such permission: direct author-to-recipient explicit licensing (typical in the case of a book author to publisher relation), indirect licensing arising from platform usage (in using Stackexchange, you probably unknowingly click-agreed to allow me and everybody else to copy and redistribute your creations), and implicit licensing – where permission to use is reasonably inferrable, though not explicitly stated. Since the latter doesn't involve written-out statements of the conditions under which you are licensed to copy text, the courts don't rely heavily on implicit licensing. But implicit licensing is what makes it possible to legally read a web page without first signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an implicit license can be found. Second, irrespective of the desideratum of having permission, one is in the US allowed to copy without permission, for certain purposes known as "fair use". This is a complicated area of legal analysis, where one has to weigh factors such as whether the content is artistic vs. factual, whether your use simply re-propagates vs. makes a comment, whether the use is for profit vs. free and educational, and whether the use has a negative effect on the market for the original work.
Copyright includes authorization of derivative works such as translations, so you must have permission of the copyright holder to create a translation. You could be sued for creating the unauthorized translation for your friend. If you attempt to further distribute the book, the chances of getting sued increase substantially. That path probably includes your legal obligation to foot the bill for the publisher and distributor having to defend themselves in court, since your contract with the publisher or distributor probably includes an indemnification clause saying that you indemnify them (pay their costs) against damages for your infringement. So your are at risk, and it increases if you do anything to distribute the translation.
Yes, but maybe no. In many state universities that I am familiar with, there are contractual guarantees that exempt regular academic staff from the "we pwn all your stuff" rule, which does not extend to other staff. (I had to toss back a contract for subcontracted work once because they asserted automatic ownership of copyright). It depends on your contract, entirely. Which, if it is non-existent, is a bit problematic. Their claim would be based on "work for hire" law, 17 USC 101, where the central question is whether it is "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment". If this is a work for hire, they have more than a right to the proceeds of the work, they own the work and can sue you for publishing without permission. Work for hire means they own the copyright, and only the copyright owner can authorize publication. You do not legally have to have an attorney to request a release, but you should have one, because if you request a release, you are admitting that this is a work for hire. Your lawyer would tell you not to admit to such a thing. Of course, if you are reasonably certain that this is a work for hire and don't intend to contend otherwise, that kind of foot-shooting is not a concern. If your lawyer delivers a formal letter to your boss, the boss will almost certainly hand it to the university attorneys, and both parties will then take the hardest line possible, in defense of the interests of their clients.
The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation.
Does an absolute discharge result in a criminal record? In England and Wales, a court can impose an absolute discharge if it concludes that 'it is inexpedient to inflict punishment'. The power to do this is granted by s12(1) Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Section 14(1) of the Act provides that— ... a conviction of an offence for which an order is made under section 12 above discharging the offender absolutely or conditionally shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings in which the order is made ... However, the Crown Prosecution Service's guide to sentencing says this: Absolute discharge - no further action is taken, since either the offence was very minor, or the court considers that the experience has been enough of a deterrent. The offender will receive a criminal record. (emphasis mine in both extracts) If a person receives an absolute discharge and also a criminal record, surely this is treating the discharge as a conviction, which appears to fly in the face of s14(1) above. Does an absolute discharge result in a criminal record and, if so, how is this squared with s14(1) of the 2000 Act?
Yes, "The offender will receive a criminal record." But, you ask, "How is this squared with s14(1) of the 2000 Act?" Well, you will note that it states that it "shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings." The key here is "other than the purposes of the proceedings" which means that, although there is no further punishment for your crime, you have still been convicted officially and it will be noted (on your record) as per the proceedings, and may be brought up in any subsequent proceedings ( "and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under section 13 above." ). You will also note section 12(7): "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a court, on discharging an offender absolutely or conditionally in respect of any offence, from making an order for costs against the offender or imposing any disqualification on him or from making in respect of the offence an order under section 130, 143 or 148 below (compensation orders, deprivation orders and restitution orders)." Which further shows that an absolute discharge is not an absolute pardon, and should not be thought of as such. Rather, "You are very much guilty, but of such a minor crime that the experience of a trial has probably been enough, so we'll let you go without additional punishment."
united-states This answer is based upon general principles of criminal procedure in the United States which are quite similar in most states, although not necessarily exactly identical. The answer is likely to be different in other jurisdictions. If inadmissible evidence is offered by the prosecution and admitted at trial, this is a ground upon which the defense can move for a mistrial (which due to double jeopardy amounts to an acquittal), or upon which the defendant can appeal the conviction of the jury, if convicted. Acquittals of a defendant at trial cannot be appealed by the prosecution. But, to appeal, the error in admitting inadmissible evidence must be contemporaneously objected to by the defendant's lawyer (or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel), or the admission of the evidence must be "plain error" (which is very rarely met on evidentiary issues). If the defendant's lawyer doesn't promptly say "I object" that ground for contesting a conviction is usually lost. Even then, the standard of review on appeal is whether the judge abused the judge's discretion in admitting the evidence, not whether the appellate court would have ruled the same way if presented with that evidentiary question. Also, even if there is an error, a conviction on a particular count will not be overruled if the error was "harmless", which is to say that there is a reasonable possibility that admitting the inadmissible evidence caused the defendant to be convicted of that count. Often, if the evidence is overwhelming, or the inadmissible evidence wasn't that prejudicial, a conviction will be affirmed notwithstanding the admission of inadmissible evidence. Sometimes harmless error is evaluated considering all of the errors at trial as a whole, rather than individually, in addition to all of the other evidence admitted at trial. If an evidence issue can be foreseen and is central to the case (e.g. suppression of evidence of possession of drugs in a drug possession case), the issue of the admissibility of the evidence will often be resolved in a pre-trial hearing and subject to appeal then, prior to trial, rather than being resolved in the trial itself where the prosecution has no right to appeal, and the defendant risks conviction if the ruling goes against the defendant. If the conviction is overturned on appeal, the usual remedy is to remand the case to the same judge to conduct a new trial with a new jury, in a manner consistent with the appellate court's rulings.
“Serious harm” is a requirement in the Defamation Act 2013 The Supreme Court interpreted it in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd & Anor [2019] UKSC 27 (12 June 2019) at [10-20]: ... it not only raises the threshold of seriousness above that envisaged in Jameel (Yousef) and Thornton, but requires its application to be determined by reference to the actual facts about its impact and not just to the meaning of the words. You, as the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that you have or are likely to suffer serious harm. That is harm that is greater than the previous common law threshold of substantial. In this case, the court agreed that serious harm had been done so it’s useful to consider what Lord Sumption said about the evidence that had (correctly) convinced the trial judge at [21] (my emphasis): On the footing that (as I would hold) Mr Lachaux must demonstrate as a fact that the harm caused by the publications complained of was serious, Warby J held that it was. He heard evidence from Mr Lachaux himself and three other witnesses of fact, and received written evidence from his solicitor. He also received agreed figures, some of them estimates, of the print runs and estimated readership of the publications complained of and the user numbers for online publications. He based his finding of serious harm on (i) the scale of the publications; (ii) the fact that the statements complained of had come to the attention of at least one identifiable person in the United Kingdom who knew Mr Lachaux and (iii) that they were likely to have come to the attention of others who either knew him or would come to know him in future; and (iv) the gravity of the statements themselves, according to the meaning attributed to them by Sir David Eady. Mr Lachaux would have been entitled to produce evidence from those who had read the statements about its impact on them. But I do not accept, any more than the judge did, that his case must necessarily fail for want of such evidence. The judge’s finding was based on a combination of the meaning of the words, the situation of Mr Lachaux, the circumstances of publication and the inherent probabilities. There is no reason why inferences of fact as to the seriousness of the harm done to Mr Lachaux’s reputation should not be drawn from considerations of this kind. Warby J’s task was to evaluate the material before him, and arrive at a conclusion on an issue on which precision will rarely be possible. A concurrent assessment of the facts was made by the Court of Appeal. Findings of this kind would only rarely be disturbed by this court, in the absence of some error of principle potentially critical to the outcome. So, you must prove that it is likely that prospective employers/schools will see the defamatory statements and that they are so grave that it is likely that you would be refused a position because of them.
What is going to happen, could I get fined, placed in jail etc? Your summons should have explained the specific violation you're being charged with, and you could look up the relevant sections of the law. Assault is defined in Chapter 12 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. There are several types, and again, your summons should explain which one you are being charged with. My guess is it will probably be "simple assault", paragraph (a) (right at the beginning). This is defined as a "disorderly persons offense". Upon conviction, a disorderly persons offense is punishable in New Jersey by a term of up to 90 days in jail and probation, (section 2C:43-2 (b) (2)), and a fine of up to $1000 (section 2C:43-3 (c)). This represents the maximum. I do not know what kind of sentence is actually likely. It could depend on common practice in the state, the prosecutor's opinion of the severity of the crime, and the judge's discretion. A lawyer would be best qualified to help you find out how to contest the charge, or to receive a lesser sentence if convicted.
You are assuming that avoiding recidivism is the primary goal of a custodial sentence If that were the case, then the death penalty for every crime would be the most effective: not only do dead people not commit crime, they don’t even think about committing crime. Now, if you’re rebelling against that idea of the death penalty for shoplifting, that just demonstrates that criminal punishment has other goals than merely avoiding recidivism. Section 3A of the new-south-wales Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 codifies the common law: (a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence, (b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences, (c) to protect the community from the offender, (d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, (e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions, (f) to denounce the conduct of the offender, (g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and to the community. Custodial sentences are good at (a), (e), (f), and possibly (g). In the short term they are good for (c) but not so good in the long term and they are terrible at (b) and (d). Of course, if you’re in a jurisdiction where judges are subject to political pressure, either directly by being elected, or indirectly, by not being independent, then the primary purpose of sentencing is to ensure the judge keeps their job or otherwise advances their career. This can be considered the central dilemma of democratic politics: you cant do “good” unless you have power but getting or keeping power might require you to do “bad’ things. As for whether there are studies statistically linking any of these objectives to sentence length, there are literally thousands.
Generally speaking if it is substantively unconstitutional for the government to punish a certain kind of criminal conduct, then this provides a basis for a "collateral attack" on the conviction to set it aside (in a post-conviction motion in state or federal court), even if the criminal defendant serving a sentence has already appealed the conviction directly (i.e. to the court of appeals and all higher appellate court that review that court of appeals) to the fullest extent possible and lost. But this is not self-executing. Someone has to file a court case on behalf of the person incarcerated to make it happen. It does not generally entitle the criminal defendant to compensation for wrongful incarceration or to a return of fines paid, although it would end the authority of the state to incarcerate the individual going forward or the compel that individual to pay the balance of unpaid fines. There might be a right to have the case sealed, but the ruling does not automatically remove the conviction from the criminal record of the defendant. And, getting the case sealed is likely to be harder in the circumstance where all of the sentence for the unconstitutional offense has been fully served. When a past conviction does not meet the standards of current law from a procedural context, in contrast, this may be raised in pending direct appeals, but is rarely something that can be brought up in a post-decision collateral attack on the conviction unless certain other exceptions apply (e.g. sometimes if a collateral attack pending before the decision is still pending at the time of the decision or in certain extraordinary cases involving due process concerns that cast deep doubt on the validity of all convictions obtained by that means), and even in cases where it is set aside, does not pose a double jeopardy bar against a new prosecution for the crime that meets the appropriate procedural standards. The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering the proper treatment under these rules of its holding that non-unanimous juries were an unconstitutional manner by which to convict someone of a felony, which is a procedural rule, but may fall within the exception that makes the new rule retroactive anyway. For cases on direct review, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past Justice Harlan's habeas approach was first adopted by a plurality in Teague v. Lane and then by the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh. Thus, for collateral review in federal courts of state court criminal convictions, the general rule is that new rules of constitutional interpretation—those not 'dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final'—will not be applied. However, [a] new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 'watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Put another way, a new rule will be applied in a collateral proceeding only if it places certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to prescribe or constitutes a new procedure[ ] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court extended the holding of Teague beyond the context of federal habeas review, such that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, state collateral review courts must give retroactive effect to that rule in the same manner as federal courts engaging in habeas review. As a result, at least with regard to the first exception, the Court has held that the Teague rule is constitutionally based, as substantive rules set forth categorical guarantees that place certain laws and punishments beyond a state’s power, making the resulting conviction or sentence . . . by definition . . . unlawful. In contrast, procedural rules are those that are aimed at enhancing the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating the manner of determining the defendant’s guilt. As a consequence, with respect to a defendant who did not receive the benefit of a new procedural rule, the possibility exists that the underlying conviction or sentence may still be accurate and the defendant’s continued confinement may still be lawful under the Constitution. In this vein, the Court has described a substantive rule as one that alters the range of conduct that the law punishes, or that prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Under the second exception it is not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of a trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. From here.
england-and-wales The law on this point in England and Wales has recently changed. The main statute here is section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, amended in 2019 to add an exception relevant to police dogs. Under subsection (1), you commit an offence if you cause a dog (as an example of a "protected animal") to suffer unnecessarily. The necessity conditions in subsection (3) include the example of protecting yourself or someone else, in (3)(c)(ii), but this list is not exhaustive. Nonetheless, that specific defence is excluded by the new subsection (3A) in the case when the dog is a police dog being used by an officer "in a way that was reasonable in all the circumstances". This exception was added precisely to cover the example of a police dog being used to apprehend a suspect, to stop people from claiming self-defence; it's known as "Finn's Law" after a police dog who was stabbed in those circumstances. If this came up in practice, for the scenario you suggest, then the court would have to deal with (among other things): Was the officer's conduct reasonable in all the circumstances? Could the person have avoided harming the animal? Was the level of harm to the animal proportionate? The answers would depend on the exact facts involved, so it's not possible to say in a vacuum whether the elements of the offence could be proved. Note that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which might otherwise apply to the officer in charge of the dog for letting it be "dangerously out of control", actually does not by virtue of section 10(3) so long as it is being used "for a lawful purpose". Meanwhile, as a civil matter, there is a strict liability provision in the Animals Act 1971 which might catch police dogs. That Act distinguishes between animals of a dangerous species, where the liability always applies, and others where it only applies if the animal meets certain conditions. These have attracted some criticism by senior judges over unclarity in their drafting - see for example Ford v Seymour-Williams [2021] EWCA Civ 1848 and Mirvahedy v Henley [2003] UKHL 16 - but on the basis of those decisions, one could argue that the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species in the case of a police dog specifically trained to attack on command. However, on the other side, whether the claim is under the Animals Act, or for battery, etc.: The police may argue that the damage was due to the suspect's own fault. An example I found cited in Street on Torts is Dhesi v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2000] WL 491455. A claimant bitten by a police dog was held to have accepted the risk of sustaining damage when he refused to come out of his hiding place, after being warned a dog would be sent in to flush him out; this engaged section 5(1) of the Animals Act and defeated strict liability. The police can argue that their use of force was reasonable for the purpose of preventing crime and/or arresting a suspect. (The same argument by which human officers can use force.) The police can argue that the dog was no more dangerous than an ordinary dog, that the officer did not know it could cause such severe damage, etc., thus removing it from the category of animals where strict liability applies. The police have some protection from civil suit, known as "Hill immunity" after the case Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1988] UKHL 12, which is not absolute but is very likely to defeat claims where officers were not unusually negligent, not acting outside the bounds of their duties, exercised reasonable care and skill, or did the best they could in a fast and confusing situation. See the recent judgements in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, a case where officers arresting a suspect accidentally hurt an elderly lady, for a very thorough discussion of duty to bystanders and police negligence in general. So again, it all depends on the fact pattern in the specific case, but you may or may not be able to win a civil claim against the police based on the harm done to you by a police dog, even when you didn't hurt the dog.
In England and Wales, theft is defined by s1 Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it It does not matter if the victim is not the rightful owner of the property, as the law only requires that the property belongs to another: the victim and owner can be two different people. As long as the other elements are present, the offence is committed. It's important when considering theft to look for dishonesty and intention to permanently deprive: borrowing something without permission with the intention to return it isn't theft, and nor is taking something by mistake. Theft is an 'either-way' offence (i.e. it can be tried summarily or by a jury), and in the latter case carries a maximum penalty of seven years in prison (s7 TA 1968).
Can I use a store name as part of my trivia game? If I make a trivia card game or video game for sale and one the questions is "Which grocery store was founded in 1930 by George W. Jenkins?" and the the answer is presented as "Publix". Is this a trademark infringement? Can I use that name as part of my game? Do I need to use a little 'R', 'TM' or 'C' with the name?
A name is not protected by copyright. It can be protected as a trademark, but it would almost certainly be allowed as nominative fair use, since the alternative of indirect descriptive reference ("the grocery store founded in 1930 by George W. Jenkins") is not only cumbersome, but it doesn't even answer the question, where only the name can be used. Trademark protection is not absolute ownership of a word, it is the right to a specific use of a word (e.g. to identify a specific brand of computer for commercial purposes). If you use a trademark symbol, you have to be careful to use the right one (it may be illegal to imply registration by using R when the trademark is not registered). As far as I can determine, there is no obligation for a third party to so mark trademark terms, though it is commonly done.
It would not be a copyright. Names and short phrases are not subject to copyright, but it could be a trademark under common law ( e.g. state law in the U.S.) or could be registered. Some people think a trademark defines a product. That is not the case, a trademark identifies the source of a product or service.
This is likely not fair use. At first blush it appeared similar to things one might see in The Onion (parody print and online newspaper) or other parody publications or shows (SNL, Key and Peele, etc.). In this case, the context would have likely been deemed transformative. However, since they are selling coffee called "Dumb Starbucks" while using their trademark, they would be be found liable if sued. You can parody a trademark brand, so long as the work is transformative such that the use of the brand goes from selling coffee to making a commentary in which the brand itself is relevant. Amendment I don't think this would pass the test as a parody/commentary. Originally, I failed to notice that they are actually selling coffee. This takes it out of fair use and they would almost certainly lose if sued. If they never sold the coffee, but just had it open as a performance art (like I had originally read this) giving the coffee away to complete the parody, I think they'd be fine. However, they are literally using the Starbucks logo, and selling the same product. This is clearly an infringement of their copyright and not fair use. Sorry for the confusion.
You mean like Unilever, and countless others do? Yes. Many, many companies control a stable of brands, often of competing products. This is particularly prevalent in grocery lines (cleaning, food, beauty products) and motor vehicles (there are dozens of brands of motor vehicle but only a handful of automotive companies). Clearly, these products have different features (improvements) – you are entitled to segment your market anyway you like. If they are actually produced by the same company, keeping that secret would be virtually impossible. If they were separate companies (even with licencing agreements etc.), well, they are not the same company even if they have common ownership. As for having a monopoly: if you hold a patent you are allowed to have a monopoly, if you don't, expect to see knock-off rocket boots on the shelf in a week.
As is typical with legal matters, "it depends". It is not copyright infringement to mention the name of an artist or work of art. It may be infringement of trademark, or of the right of publicity. For example, Apple Computers has trademarked the name "Apple" in the domain of computers, so you cannot call your computer company "Apple Computers", without their permission. You also cannot advertise in a way that implies that Taylor Swift endorsed your product, without her permission – this is the "right of publicity" (the name may differ, e.g. "passing off" depending on jurisdiction). The situation in the US is highly variable, since it depends on state law. The legal inclinations of the particular artist may be irrelevant, since they often have legal arrangements with publishers, and if you are going to get sued, it might be the publisher that sues you. Hiring an attorney to evaluate the specifics of your idea is the only reasonable approach to the matter.
Can the word "Cola" be used for commercial purposes? It depends on what you want to do with it, but most uses would be permissible. "Cola" is, as you note, a generic term, comparable to "trout" or "sugar" or "beer." Still, generic words may be subject to trademark protection. Even "coca" is a generic word. Such protection is, furthermore, not exclusive; trademark protection is more subtle and complex than most people realize. There might be a company called "Cola" that operates guided outdoor activities, but that wouldn't necessarily prevent an unrelated company of the same name from pursuing the same business in another jurisdiction. Similarly, it might not prevent a company that repairs household appliances in the same jurisdiction from calling itself "Cola." For example, in the US, you can buy "Dove" personal care products and "Dove" chocolate; they are sold under distinct trademarks. The central criterion is confusion: trademark protection primarily prevents others from confusing consumers about the source of goods or services. Even if a word or phrase is unambiguously a protected trademark, there are still allowable uses, most notably to designate the product, service, or company associated with the trademark. For example, if someone wants to tell a story about a bottle of Coca Cola (or even to claim "our product is better than Coca Cola"), the owner of the Coca Cola trademark cannot use trademark protection to prevent them from using the phrase "Coca Cola" in the story (or to make the claim). For a specific opinion about a specific use of a specific trademark, you should engage a qualified lawyer with experience in trademark law.
Registering the text string Starbucks" should prevent anyone else using it in any font for related products. However, I do not think it is useful against "Startducks" that is printed in the standard logo in Starbucks green. With the stylized version, you cover things that misleadingly look like what you see on a Starbucks building.
Trademarks protect against consumer confusion. Ask yourself if a consumer seeing that image with the "studio" portion removed might think that the altered image represents the same company as the original image. Of course, the answer will be "yes." But in the end it also depends on how the trademark is used. You've used the original image in the question; have you violated the trademark? No. Do you violate Tesco's trademark when you say "I went shopping at Tesco"? No. Do you violate their trademark when you sell food using the name "Tesco"? Yes. A distinctive graphic design such as this will also be protected by copyright, so you will also have to consider whether your intended use infringes copyright.
Is there, in any jurisdiction, an hybrid between the "loser pays" rule and the "american rule"? Spawned from this question: is there any jurisdiction which implements an hybrid between the "loser pays" and the "american rules", concerning who pays the legal fees? I understand it would be very complicated to design a good system to deal with such a situation, but given that both systems have very bad downsides, I'd also be quite surprised if nobody tried to.
When people talk about the "American rule," they usually mean a system where every party pays their own legal costs, and the winner is not compensated in any way for the costs of litigation. Using that as your basis, the American system itself is actually a "hybrid." The details change a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But in general: The loser in many American civil cases is required to pay the actual court costs. These are not as substantial as the attorney's fees, but they can easily run into hundreds or thousands of dollars. These costs are for things like filing fees, process servers, witness fees, court recorders and transcripts, and other costs that, generally speaking, are going to be the same no matter how much your lawyer charges. (Again, what specifically is included in costs depends on your jurisdiction). This imposes a non-trivial expense on the loser of a lawsuit, without allowing the other side to run up the costs to an outrageous figure by hiring huge teams of expensive lawyer, as is possible under the pure English system. While the "American rule" is the default rule in most or all American jurisdictions, there are generally rules that allow the Court to shift part or all of a prevailing party's legal fees to the other side under certain circumstances. For example: in many courts, if you bring a frivolous motion, or a motion designed primarily to inflate the costs of the suit, the court can require you to immediately pay any attorneys' fees expended in responding to that motion, even if you eventually win the lawsuit as a whole. This is a more specific and targeted penalty for misconduct than the English rule. Similarly, if the Court finds that the entire lawsuit you brought – or the defense you presented – was frivolous, or presented in bad faith, or under certain other circumstances, the Court can include attorney's fees in the final damage award, just as would have been done under the English rule. The result is a hybrid system. The benefit of this hybrid system, at least in theory, is that frivolous lawsuits are discouraged, but lawsuits that have some merit – even if they are ultimately unsuccessful – do not have to worry about the imposition of massive costs. However, the disincentive is not as much as it might be, since the standards courts use to judge a motion or lawsuit "frivolous" are generally quite stringent.
Judge Judy is not a real judge; it's a TV show where the "litigants" sign contracts to enter into arbitration (Wikipedia) on the show in the format of court proceedings. The participants' travel expenses are paid by the show, as are the monetary settlements. The papers that can't be removed could be anything: their contracts for the show, the settlement agreements, NDAs, etc. The fact that they can't take the paperwork is outlined in the contracts they sign to be on the show.
There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.
Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.
The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures.
If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked.
There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.
The US has jurisdiction because the systems that the accused allegedly attacked are in the US. To use an example with older technology, you can't escape criminal liability for defrauding someone in one country simply because you did so through the mail or by telephone from another country. The UK and the US have an extradition treaty. The UK might refuse to extradite the accused; in that case the US would most likely complain loudly. If too many extradition requests are refused on one side, the other side might start limiting cooperation in any of several areas.
Is an excessive NDA legal? My daughter is a college student and is applying for an internship. The small "socially conscious" company, which has about 5 or 10 employees, is asking her to sign an NDA that looks way over the top to me. Is this the norm these days? In brief it says ... ALL information disclosed to the other party is Proprietary, except generally known information. There's a long list of specifics: marketing techniques, publicity, etc. The agreement lasts until mutually terminated, meaning forever since very likely the company would never agree to terminate it. This NDA includes everything my daughter is supposed to learn there -- marketing, social web development, etc. Is this the norm these days?
A NDA can only cover confidential information, that is information that is not in the public sphere, and that was transmitted to the recipient in confidence, that is it is specifically identifiable information that the recipient knew or should have known from the circumstances of the communication was confidential. For example, "marketing techniques" are not confidential information although the specific marketing strategy (pricing, promotion etc.) to be employed for a particular group may be confidential if the circumstances of the communication are such that the recipient should have known they were. Telling them "Hey, this marketing strategy is confidential" is best, however, the nature of the communication may make it implicit, for example, if it is only communicated to a subset of employees and contains information that would obviously damage the organisation if made public such as a price or client list. An NDA that states "all information given is confidential" is probably not enforceable even if exceptions are given because a) it is manifestly untrue (how can the location of the bathrooms or which day is pay day be confidential?) and b) it places an unreasonable burden on the recipient to determine what is and what is not real confidential information.
Basically, "in the course of your employment" means "while you are working, or should be working, for the employer". If you're not using company resources or time to create or acquire the works in question, and the works are unrelated to company business, they're quite unlikely to become the company's property. (Particularly since the company almost certainly doesn't have an interest in controlling the distribution of your vacation photos.) When you let your personal side projects and the company's stuff get intertwined, that's where the troubles begin. Works made on company time, or using company resources, or to do company-related things, may be claimed by the company, and this agreement basically says you'll cede ownership of the works to them, patents and all, for whatever amount of money they decide it's worth paying you.
A company generally cannot compel an employee to agree to a non-compete, but they have a wide variety of alternatives for inducing employees to do so. Most obviously, they may threaten to fire employees who refuse, whether immediately or at the end of their current term, as another answer observes. Indeed, if Big Company makes an NC a condition of employment then they are likely to insist on the same for employees they obtain from Original Employer. Firing employees for refusing to sign does, of course, put them in the job market as potential competitors, but the company may well find it acceptable to do that on their own terms. In particular, Big Company can ensure that those who won't sign go out the door with minimal knowledge of Big Company's clients, trade secrets, etc. other than those obtained from Original Employer. And that leads into other forms of inducement. Big Company can do some or all of the following things, depending on the particular employment situation: offer bonus compensation for signing promote those who sign and / or demote / reassign those who don't change job duties for those who refuse to sign do all manner of nastier things to be unfriendly to employees who refuse to sign Some of those fit directly into Big Company's perceived interest in avoiding employees using Big Company internal information to jump ship and compete with them, and others could fit into Big Company policy about which jobs require an NC. Some are just pressure tactics, but that does not necessarily make them unlawful (nor are all variations on the others necessarily lawful).
This is not legal advice, It is not even primarily a legal opinion. It is a legal position. The lawyer, acting on behalf of the agency from which you requested information, is giving the reasons why that agency is declining your request. The lawyer is presumably either an employee of the agency, or has the agency as a client. In any case, this is notice of the position that the agency would be likely to adopt if you took further legal action, such as a suit to compel disclosure. Lawyers provide such position statements ion behalf of clients or employers all the time. Such statements indicate why certain action is taken, what basis the client or employer has for taking or not taking certain action, and often indicate the nature of the defenses or theories that will be used should a lawsuit follow, although the client or employer is free to change the theory at the pleading stage. Not only is it not unethical for the lawyer to respond in this way, the agency is, I am fairly sure, required by the law to provide a valid reason when a request is declined. That is what they have done, provide a reason that they claim is valid, with some legal reasoning about why it is valid. Note that I express no view on whether the reason given is in fact valid, or would be sustained in a suit. That would be a different question.
The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work.
Anything that helps you with your business and that you keep secret is a trade secret. The "keeping it secret" is an important part. Competitors are free to discover the same information themselves and use it, but stealing it from you is illegal. If a contractor needs to learn this information to do their job, you make them sign a non-disclosure agreement or confidentiality agreement which forbids them to pass that information on. That way, it remains a trade secret. If the contractor gives your trade secrets away, that is breach of contract and you can sue for damages. If a competitor pays your contractor to give them your trade secrets, that's not just illegal, it's criminal. On the other hand, if the contractor puts the information on his blog for example where everyone can read it, without having been enticed by someone to do this, then I believe your trade secret is gone and competitors can use it. Same as if you left documents on a park bench and your competitor finds them and reads them. You have to keep a trade secret a secret; if you fail to do so you lose. Asked about patents: If there is a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement in place, then nobody can apply for a patent. The whole idea of a patent is that you get legal protection in exchange for disclosing your invention. Applying for a patent would mean violation of the non-disclosure agreement.
Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.
As the comment by Ron Beyer mentions when a company wants to impose such restrictions they are normally done through non-compete, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreements, as well as via trade secret law. Note the word "agreements". "Restrictions on working in the field" are simply a form of non-compete agreements. A company cannot, legally, simply impose such agreements on its employees. It can require an employee to sign such an agreement as a condition of employment, and it can often require such an agreement from a departing employee as a condition of a severance payment. Exactly what is covered by such an agreement depends on its terms, and those vary widely. In most US states there are limits on the scope and duration of such an agreement. In some states the restrictions can be broad and of fairly long duration, in others they must be narrow and of fairly short duration. An agreement that goes beyond a given state's limits will not be enforceable in court, if the defendant brings that fact up. Trade secret law can prevent an employee from disclosing the trade secrets of a former employer to a new employer, or indeed to anyone else. But that does not prevent a former employee from getting a new job in the field, as long as the employee does not disclose any trade secrets. If an employee has signed, or is asked to sign, such an agreement, it is a good idea to consult a lawyer with employment law experience. If the state is known, I could edit this answer to include the limits, if any, on such agreements in that state.
Assault in an airplane aisle Consider the following scenario: A, B, and C are passengers on a single-aisle commercial airplane that is disembarking in New York. A is blocking B from passing. A makes way for C to pass, but C does not. B sees the opportunity to pass and tries to do so. A blocks the passageway. B pushes past A. A puts B in a headlock and puts him on the floor. What common-law crimes have been committed by A and B?
IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.
The statute in question (which is unusual and not part of the law in most U.S. states) is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) observes the commission of a felony under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or death may have resulted; and (2) fails to immediately report the commission of the offense to a peace officer or law enforcement agency under circumstances in which: (A) a reasonable person would believe that the commission of the offense had not been reported; and (B) the person could immediately report the commission of the offense without placing himself or herself in danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death. (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. There is no indication that violation of this section gives rise to civil liability. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez came to its conclusion that there was no civil liability of a police department or police officers for failure to enforce a restraining order in the face of language in a state statute whose plain language fairly clearly created a mandatory duty to that effect. The offense of unlawful restraint Texas Penal Code § 20.02 is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly restrains another person. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child younger than 14 years of age; (2) the actor was a relative of the child; and (3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the child. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a state jail felony if the person restrained was a child younger than 17 years of age; or (2) a felony of the third degree if: (A) the actor recklessly exposes the victim to a substantial risk of serious bodily injury; (B) the actor restrains an individual the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or in retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant; or (C) the actor while in custody restrains any other person. (d) It is no offense to detain or move another under this section when it is for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest or detaining an individual lawfully arrested. (e) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child who is 14 years of age or older and younger than 17 years of age; (2) the actor does not restrain the child by force, intimidation, or deception; and (3) the actor is not more than three years older than the child. In practice, almost any restraint by a police officer would not obviously be outside the immunity for a lawful arrest sufficient to give rise to the duty to report a felony. Also, the person who decides whether to press charges is the prosecuting attorney who has a strong long term strategic interest in maintain a positive relationship with law enforcement and who often subjectively views law enforcement as his client even though this is the correct as a matter of legal doctrine. Question 1: Are any police on the scene responsible for reporting the crime of unlawful restraint which has become a felony in their presence? In general law enforcement may have a duty under department policy as a matter of employment law, but there is no general legal duty for a police officer to report a crime committed in their presence. Law enforcement officers, like prosecutors have wide discretion over whether they will choose to enforce crimes in the U.S. But, since Texas has a mandatory reporting law, this comes down more to a matter of interpretation and a restraint by an officer would almost never never give rise to a felony due to the privilege for an arrest. Also, it isn't at all obvious that a law enforcement officer has to report the crime to anyone but him or herself to satisfy the requirements of the law, and there is no duty for a law enforcement officer to act upon a report of a felony. Question 2: Would the police in not reporting the crime be implicating more involvement than mere presence and thereby threaten their immunity stance? Generally not. To have liability personally, the law enforcement officer would have to be a co-conspirator. Usually conspiracy liability would require an affirmative action in support of the illegal action and not merely inaction in the form of failing to report a crime. Police have qualified immunity from civil liability for any act that is not a clearly established violation of a constitutional right. If the police do not owe a duty to protect the person being unlawfully restrained, it would seem they still owe a duty to uphold the laws of the state like they would for the crimes of jaywalking, driving without a seat belt, or rape. This is mistaken. Law enforcement officers have no legally enforceable duty to uphold any laws. They may have a moral duty to do so, and they may have a strong employment relationship pressure to do so, but a law enforcement officer faces neither civil nor criminal liability for merely failing to enforce a criminal law when they know a crime has been committed. If the police do not owe a duty to the citizen to arrest another officer for violating the law do they at least owe a duty to the law to make a criminal complaint regarding the violation they witnessed? Arguably, there is a criminal law duty to report a clear felony, but since the duty is only to report the matter to a law enforcement officer and they are a law enforcement officer, it isn't clear that this statute applies at all. A report of a suspected felony is not a criminal complaint. And if so, and if they do not, would they be more accountable than the populace who are required by law to report felonies? No. As noted above, they are arguably less accountable than members of the general public.
AA "requests" that you remove batteries from checked laptops and put them in carry-on luggage. You must, per their contract of carriage, "comply with airline safety rules", and they say that they can deny you boarding if you do not comply, which includes "Are uncooperative, abusive, harassing, or show the potential to be while on board". You might then hope to sue them because you didn't violate any safety policy of theirs but they denied you your seat, but there's nothing in the contract that states "The following is a complete list of policies". You should discuss this in more detail with your lawyer, but on the face of it there is no legal recourse, except of course a refund.
Denver lawyer David Lane has said, “The First Amendment lives in a rough neighborhood and if you can’t stand the neighborhood move to China … or somewhere the First Amendment does not exist.” "One man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v. Cali. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) At this point, we need to define illegal as used in your question. For instance, do you mean "you can face any form of punishment"? If so, this question is extremely broad and governed by multiple sets of laws. Additionally, one should note that this is a Federal Question. The First Amendment, through the Due Process clause applies to states as well. Therefore, there will be extremely little discrepancy (if any - first impression issues being the main differences probably) between the States,. The FCC can limit profanity on air. Additionally, Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1464, (Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ) prohibits the utterance of any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication. The USPTO can limit Trademarks with "vulgar" meaning. (See EDIT below for update.) In School: High school student's First Amendment rights were not violated in suspension for uttering obscenity, regardless of whether she was merely repeating and returning words originally directed at her, particularly where words were clearly disruptive as they were heard by 90 students in cafeteria and, in opinion of assistant principal, were “fighting words.” Heller v. Hodgin, S.D.Ind.1996, 928 F.Supp. 789. Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight. Fighting words claim upheld: Arrestee's speech when crowd gathered near fallen tree that had blocked traffic constituted unprotected fighting words, so that his arrest under city disorderly conduct ordinance did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights; arrestee's repeated use of the word “bitch,” his accusation of matricide directed toward his sister, his use of the phrase “fucking queer,” his pushing of third party and his raised voice all tended to show that his conduct, under the circumstances, had tendency to provoke physical altercation. Fighting words claim not upheld: Detainee's profane words to police officer as officer conducted Terry stop, “son of a bitch,” while unpleasant and insulting, were not “fighting words,” given officer's confirmation of fact that words did not cause anyone to fight or become angry; thus, words could not constitute violation of disorderly conduct statute and in turn could not supply probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest. In addition to fighting words, true threats and incitement to imminent lawless action are not protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, the government can regulate free speech in public schools (hence Free Speech Zones) and while in their employ (no yelling at your boss if you want to keep your job). It is not part of the main question, but free speech inside the court room. Well, the Judge is pretty much king in a courtroom. What he says goes. (more or less, like nothing toooooo crazy). In a courtroom, if you do something a Judge doesn't like, he can hold you in contempt of court. (You get no jury for contempt cases.) EDIT: Since I wrote this answer, new law came out from the Supreme Court in Matel v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017). The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Federal Circuit that the disparagement clause [is] facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The decision aptly concludes with: "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered."
These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges.
X can be convicted of murder in all jurisdiction in the United States (and probably the other common law jurisdictions). The issue here is two-fold. Contracts that involve illegal actions are not enforceable. In fact, the contract killing example you gave is a classic illegal agreement/contract. See the Wikipedia articles on illegal agreements and contract killings. Most criminal prosecutions involving bodily injury or death proceed regardless of the victim's wishes. This is because the prosecution represents the State's interests and can prosecute a case where the victims want it dismissed. Consider and example where the "battered spouse" doesn't want to testify against his/her abuser. The prosecution can still bring changes where the victim is not cooperative. It just makes proving their case more difficult. Check out this article from the DOJ that discusses how victims do not have a right to veto a plea agreement or other prosecutorial decisions. http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/6439-input-into-plea-agreement One could make an argument that the affirmative defense of consent could apply; however, most states have consent statutes like Colorado's that would not apply to murder. See C.R.S. § 18-1-505(2), which states: When conduct is charged is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707. This statutes basically says consent doesn't apply where someone received serious bodily injury (murder would meet this standard), unless they are in a lawful athletic sport, such as boxing.
Depends on where you are, and what law would be broken and why. In germany, there is the concept of rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying emergency). If there is a present danger to a Rechtsgut (legally protected interest), one can take necessary and proportional steps against another legally protected interest. Say I walk through a winter landscape and there is a person who has broken through the ice of a lake (a present danger of the loss of life). Nearby is a yard with a ladder leaning on a shed. I would be allowed to enter the yard (normally trespas) and take the ladder (normally theft) in the rescue attempt (life counts for more than a ladder, using a ladder is necessary/appropriate for an ice rescue). The details are, as usual for Law SE, complicated.
Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).
Is editing a comment in SO copyright infringement? As stated at the bottom of this page : site design / logo © 2017 Stack Exchange Inc; user contributions licensed under cc by-sa 3.0 with attribution required I would assume this also applies to comments. The attribution part is what I think gets infinged upon when a comment is edited. Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. When a comment is edited by an user different than the original poster there is an small icon for it. And a tooltip pops up with the number of editions. But no mention that this is not the text by the original author is made. Is this usage of the user posted comment in agreement with CC BY-SA 3.0? Are there other stipulations besides CC BY-SA 3.0 that apply?
I'll clarify my understanding of your hypothetical. X authors a comment. StackExchange publishes that comment, under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license, properly attributed to the original author Y edits that comment. StackExchange continues to publish the comment, still under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license, properly attributing the original author, X, but does not give any attribution to Y for their contributions In this scenario, Stack Exchange is properly respecting the license agreement with X. X is still given attribution, and the comment is still CC BY-SA licensed, and it indicates "if changes were made". StackExchange has no duty to X to display who made the changes. Stack Exchange may be failing Y, by not giving them any attribution for their edit. However, edits to a comment are often so minor that they are not copyrightable (deletions, copyediting, link fixing, etc.). If the contribution isn't even copyrightable, it doesn't matter that Y isn't given attribution. Y certainly isn't infringing X's copyright. X is given the required attribution.
It is reasonable to interpret the statement in their Github repository README.md as a "public domain" license for anything contained there. However, their "usage guidelines" backpedals a bit ("generally are not copyrighted", the misleading implication that content used commercially is subject to restrictions that educational and personal uses are not subject to). Although it is true that works "created by the US government" are not protected by copyright, not everything associated with a government agency is created by the US government. An agency might have a policy that they will not post material that is not copyright-free, there is no practical means of knowing if an item is an actual government work, versus a government-supported or government-hosted work (where copyright is held by someone else). If you trust their implication that all of those items in the repository are indeed government works, then they are free of copyright. I don't know any reason to not believe them, although sometimes the government is wrong and they end up liable big-time for infringement. However... NASA Open Source Agreement Version 1.3 (another copy on a NASA web page) on first glance seems to contradict the "government work" theory. Here, they claim to grant certain rights to users and also impose impose restrictions (including obligatory registration). This does not make any sense for a work that is in the public domain. The license is legally defective in that it fails to fill in relevant blanks (agency name, title of work, URL for obligatory registration). Also notice that the license is only for software. The scope of that license therefore has to be something narrower – it applies only to software, and presumably software that is not "a government work". I have no idea what software NASA could legally give away and is not a government work which is therefore not protected by copyright.
It is legsl to include references showing readers where facts you include in your article were derived, or where they can be supported. Indeed academic ethics generally require doing so, although there is (in most cases) no legal requirement to do so. Listing the title, author, and publication information of a source is not an infringement of copyright. That J. Jones published an article on "How to Find the Purple Moth" [imaginary example] in volume 28 of the Journal of Moth Science is a fact.Facts are never protected by copyright. Indeed in US law 17 USC 102(b) provides that: b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The laws of other countries are similar on this point. Indeed I do not know of any country in which facts are protected by copyright. So, including such references is fully legal, and no permission from the sources being cited is required. This is true whatever form the reference takes. In particular, if an online address for the content is included, this is still true. I do not know whether Medium, or any other specific publishing platform, will pat fees to authors based on clik-thru from such citations. That depends on their particular policies, which might be found in their Terms of Service or other policy document.
No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though.
This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.
This is not (necessarily) copyright violation It's possible that Quora's usage falls within Fair Use. At the very least, the argument could be made. If it does, then there is nothing that Stack Exchange or the OP can do. Stack Exchange can choose not to protect their copyright Unlike trademarks, which lapse if not protected, copyright endures. Therefore Stack Exchange can pick and choose the copyright fights they want to get involved in and those they don't. If you have brought it to the attention of the copyright owner (or, in this case, licensee) and the copyright owner chooses not to act then you have done all you can and significantly more than you have to do. The OP has copyright I note that one of the examples is your question. As the copyright holder, you are free to issue a DCMA takedown notice on Quora if you feel your copyright has been violated.
I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made.
Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center.
Fair Use Quoting Reviews in Videos If I am making a video about a particular business, is it fair use to, within that video, quote a review or rating from Google or Yelp? i.e. Such and Such business has a 5 star rating from Jackie Joe Jim Bob on Yelp! They said, "This business is totally radtastic! We Love it!" And while the presenter says that, the quote would be printed on the screen. Is this ok?
This is pretty much exactly what the concept of "fair use" was invented for. The only thing that would be even more to the purpose is quoting and criticizing a politician's speech.
There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question.
Evaluating a potential copyright violation is very fact-intensive, so we don't have enough information to answer the question. Making a copy is generally going to be a copyright violation, but there's still going to be a lot of breathing room under the fair use doctrine. Again, we'd need more details to provide a useful answer, but you may be able to analyze the question yourself using the following information. Analysis of fair-use defenses looks at four questions, and the answers to the questions can tip the scales in favor of or against a finding of fair use: Does your kind of copying affect the market for the original? To what extent can your copy fulfill the demand for the original? What if there were widespread copying of the kind you're considering? The more potential there is for the copies to replace the original, the less likely it is to be fair use. This is the most important factor in the analysis. Why did you make the copy? If you made the copy for purposes of news reporting, criticism, or commentary, it's more likely to be fair use. If you made a copy just so you could watch again later whenever you feel like it, that's may still be fair use, but it is somewhat less likely. If you made a copy so you could sell it for profit, that's almost certainly not fair use. How much did you copy? Did you copy the whole thing, or did you copy only as much as you needed to achieve your purpose under Question 2? If you copy "too much" -- both in the raw amount and as a fraction of the whole work -- it's less likely to be fair use. What did you copy? Such works can be copyrighted but are not part of the Highly creative works, such as poems, music, and movies, are at the "core" of copyright principles. A fair use analysis will be more stringent in these cases than when copying a purely factual work, such as a phone book, biography, or list of statistics. This is the least important factor in the analysis. So take all of those and imagine the answer to each on a spectrum. If you see things generally tipping in the direction of fair use, that's a good indication that you're going to be safe. If you see things tipping in the other direction, you may want to reconsider. Again, these can be notoriously tricky questions. If you're dealing with a real situation, you should consult an attorney to get an answer specific to your situation.
In the United States, you almost certainly do. The most on-point case is Castle Rock Entertainment Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 1998). That was a case dealing with Seinfeld, where a publisher printed and sold The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a book of Seinfeld trivia. The publisher argued that the questions and answers were simply unprotected facts about the show, not copyrightable expression, but the court concluded that the facts were merely restatements of the expressive works of the show's creators. Although the book was in some senses transformative, the court found that the transformation was "slight to non-existent": [T]he fact that The SAT so minimally alters Seinfeld's original expression in this case is further evidence of The SAT's lack of transformative purpose. To be sure, the act of testing trivia about a creative work, in question and answer form, involves some creative expression... However, the work as a whole, drawn directly from the Seinfeld episodes without substantial alteration, is far less transformative than other works we have held not to constitute fair use. A major part of the problem in that case was that the facts suggested that the publisher was not looking to create an educational or critical work revolving around Seinfeld, but rather to provide Seinfeldesque entertainment to Seinfeld fans. There is some discussion in Castle Rock suggesting that certain behind-the-scenes facts might change the analysis, but from what you're saying, it seems doubtful that you'd have a different outcome.
I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.
All Government produced documents in the United States are public domain, as they belong to the people. The company may be asking for license to use their film, which may include several other clips that they put in any order. Their film, specifically, including any explanatory dialog, commentary, or editing choices, are not fair game. However, the clip you are asking about is not copyrighted and is fair for any use.
Yes it would be legal to do so. A full analysis would look at trademark law (where the bottom line is that the use of the Coke mark is not misleading since you are selling bona fide Coke), and copyright law. Whether it was non-infringing or fair use, is a closer call, but there is little doubt that one way or the other, this would be legal.
The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.
Legality of data "chunking" concerning child pornography Recently, I've become interested in distributed, peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing, including BitTorrent (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent) and the InterPlanetary File System (ipfs.io) (IPFS). This question specifically concerns IPFS. IPFS is very complicated for non-technical people, so I'll try and break it down for the purpose of this discussion: In IPFS, you can add data to the global file system, which produces a "hash" (a string uniquely identifying the data) that you can share with others. Data in IPFS is content-addressed, meaning that instead of using URLs or locations for data, it uses fingerprints of the data itself. This has several useful characteristics: anybody on the network with the same data can serve it to you, reducing the burden on a web server and eliminating the waste of bandwidth that is HTTP; data can remain available even after the original host fails, which makes archiving data much more reliable on IPFS; and there is no central system that can fail, like DNS resolvers, that can prevent the system from operating (aside from, of course, normal internet infrastructure). When sharing on IPFS, you aren't actually sending whole files to peers; instead, these files are broken apart into "blocks" of data which are retrieved separately (and often from different peers altogether). These blocks are re-assembled at the end to form the complete data. Now, suppose someone is sharing child pornography via IPFS. Under U.S. law, the mere possession of child pornography is illegal, so the sender is certainly acting illegally. The recipient of these files, after assembling the blocks to form the files, are now in possession of content that visually depicts minors engaging in sexual activity. However, would an intermediary node (hypothetically) that may have cached a block needed to form the violating data be guilty of possession? The block alone cannot represent the visual activity that constitutes illegal material, and in fact, the hash representing the block can represent any such block with the same data (since the hash identifies the data, not a location), so its entirely possible (if slightly improbable) that the same hash for a block used in child pornography could be a block used to represent part of a Disney movie. For example, these two sentences, broken down into uniquely identifiable chunks of two: I have two cats in my house. I |ha|ve| t|wo| c|at|s |in| m|y |ho|us|e. and You should burn in Hell. Yo|u |sh|ou|ld| b|ur|n |in| H|el|l. You'll notice that both sentences have a common chunk, "in". Under US law, would someone who possesses this block, "in", be responsible for its use in all contexts, such as in the second sentence? Obviously, in real data these chunks are between 256 kilobytes and 2 megabytes, so the chance for collision is greatly reduced, but by design of the system, content addressing allows for the avoidance of duplicate data. My question is how that affects legal regulations concerning said data.
18 U.S. Code § 2252 defines a crime and punishment for knowingly transporting, or reproducing for distribution by any means, visual depictions involving the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Here are some sample jury instructions that rephrase this and give definitions for each of these terms. Here are some others (at p. 469). This law review article discusses the knowledge requirement of this statute. It would be an easy argument that the operators of the intermediary nodes do not have the requisite knowledge of the material flowing over their networks and computers to be implicated by section 2252, especially when they are broken down into chunks that can only be re-assembled at the destination. United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006) is an example of a case where a defendant was found to not have the requisite knowledge of child pornography that was found in his browser's cache folders. These were complete files, no assembly required. However, the court said: where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and control of the child pornography images located in those files An IPFS user has no more knowledge of the pieces being passed through their computer than this defendant did of his cache (unless of course they are the source or destination).
Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained.
You're probably making an “international transfer” here, but that doesn't mean it is illegal. The GDPR has a very broad concept of “personal data” and of “processing”. Per Art 4(2), ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction Which I would summarize as: pretty much anything you do with the personal data counts as “processing”. So yes, your non-EU servers would be processing the personal data in HTTP requests, even when those servers aren't directly storing the personal data. Chapter V of the GDPR applies to Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third country […] Per this definition, the question whether an international transfer occurred is inextricably linked with the question whether the data is being processed in the destination country. The generally accepted interpretation here is that mere transfer through a country does not constitute processing. For example, if your requests happen to take a network route through other countries, that wasn't an international transfer. But your HTTP server is definitely doing processing, even if it doesn't store the data persistently. If the HTTP server is in a non-EU country, then you have to consider how this transfer of data is protected. You're supposed to uphold the high GDPR data protection standards regardless of where the processing occurs. Some countries have been granted an EU adequacy decision, meaning that their data protection laws are sufficiently similar to EU laws and no extra bureaucracy is needed for that transfer. The transfer still needs to be noted in your privacy notice (compare Art 13(1)(f)). In other cases, you may be able to rely on “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs), which are pre-formulated contracts provided by the EU that translate relevant GDPR aspects into a private contract between the data exporter and data importer. However, you as a data controller must make sure that the data importer is legally able to enter into that contract. For example, the terms of these SCCs are incompatible with US national security laws, meaning that US companies might not be able to enter into the SCCs. There are a couple of other ways to authorize international transfers, but they are mostly relevant for multinational groups of companies, or in exceptional situations. In any case, other GPDR requirements like the need to have a suitable contract with your data processors remain unaffected. Also unaffected is the obligation to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the compliance and security of your processing activities (e.g. see Art 24 and Art 32 of the GDPR). For example, this may imply the need to implement suitable encryption. In the wake of the Schrems II ruling that struck down the EU–US “Privacy Shield” adequacy decision, the EDPB published recommendations on extra compliance measures that could allow SCCs to remain valid for EU–US data transfers. But it's not easy to defend data processing activities when potential adversaries include literally the NSA, and measures such as end-to-end encryption (E2EE) are incompatible with cloud services that are more interesting than backup storage. Practically speaking, I would reconsider an architecture that would allow failover of EU data processing operations to non-EU locations, unless those target countries are covered by an adequacy decision. If you need a high availability setup for EU activities, it may be more appropriate to maintain multiple deployments within the EU.
The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is processing the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data. You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not necessarily a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have no other basis for data processing, you have to delete. Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to actively contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult. But consider that the news media can process some data about some people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time.
This sounds like it would fall under the "extreme pornography" part of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Section 63: (7) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, any of the following— (b) an act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person's anus, breasts or genitals, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person or animal was real. (7A) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, either of the following— (b) an act which involves the non-consensual sexual penetration of a person's vagina or anus by another with a part of the other person's body or anything else, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real. What you describe would likely result in serious injury to the victim, and the video appears to be non-consensual. Note that the actual origin is not relevant; if the videos were actually a brilliant piece of special effects and no anuses were harmed that gets you nowhere. The only thing that matters is what a "reasonable person" looking at the videos would have thought. Context might make a difference; if the videos were made by an identifiable company then a reasonable person might assume the producers would have at least obtained consent and complied with their local laws about safety. OTOH if they look like they were filmed on someone's phone and downloaded from some sketchy file-sharing site then a jury is likely to see this as suggesting to the "reasonable person" that the acts shown were real and non-consensual. Edit in response to comment: The law in question says 'An image is “pornographic” if it is of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal'. So it can still be porn even if it wasn't filmed consensually. If "pornography" could only refer to consensual images then the prosecution would need to obtain evidence of the consent or otherwise of the participants. This might be impossible if a participant is dead or cannot be identified. Also the definition above matches both the dictionary definition and most people's idea of what makes something "porn"; the point of porn is sexual arousal.
You are responsible for any processing of data that happens under your control – but are you the data controller in this scenario? Since you have no meaningful influence over whether or not this backup happens on the operating system level, there could be a strong argument that you aren't a data controller for these backups. And if you aren't a data controller for that processing activity, you aren't responsible for compliance. However, if you were to integrate directly with relevant Google APIs in order to facilitate backups that could make you a controller. Then, Google would either have to be your data processor (won't be the case here), or you would need a legal basis for sharing the user's data with Google. For example, you could ask for the user's consent before activating such features.
There is actually a rather recent law in Germany which would make nonconsensual distribution of images which could damage the reputation of a person illegal: §201a StGB [de|en] "Violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs or other images". This law says that: whoever, without being authorised to do so, makes available to a third party a photograph or other image of another person which is of such a nature as to significantly damage the reputation of the person depicted incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine. But even if the person has not already done so, just threatening to commit this crime might also be a crime according to §253 StGB [de|en] "Extortion": (1) Whoever unlawfully, by force or threat of serious harm, coerces a person to do, acquiesce to or refrain from an act, and thereby damages that person’s or another’s assets for the purpose of wrongful personal enrichment or enrichment of a third party, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) The act is unlawful if the use of force or the threat of harm is deemed reprehensible in respect of the desired objective. (3) The attempt is punishable. (4) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. An especially serious case typically occurs where the offender acts on a commercial basis or as a member of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of extortion. Considering the repercussions in the Saudi-Arabian culture and legal system for promiscuity, especially for women, it is hard to deny that there is a threat of "serious harm" in this case. So it might be a good idea to file a police report with the police of the federal state where the perpetrator lives. The police of most federal states allow to do that through their respective websites (look for the keywords "Internetwache" or "Strafanzeige"), so there is no need to travel to Germany to do so. This does of course require that there is enough information available to obtain the real identity of the perpetrator, which can be difficult with people you only know through online services.
Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
Employment contract prohibiting salary discussion in the UK? I work for a company in the UK and my employment contract states that I must not discuss my salary with colleagues. I know that this is illegal in the USA but cant find any information about in the UK Are there any laws in the UK that relate to this??
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/experts/article-1698485/Can-I-discuss-my-pay-with-colleagues.html In short, there are no laws prohibiting or rendering such contract clauses unenforceable, but an employer cannot rely on such a contractual clause to abrogate its obligations under the Equality Act 2010.
I don't think so. When it comes to wages, there may be a Tarifvertrag (union-negotiated wage schedule), which may apply even if the employee in question is no union member. It is enough if the employer is member of the employer's association negotiating the schedule, or in certain other cases. (Clever, really, by extending union benefits to non-members they weaken the unions ...) The Tarifvertrag stipulates minimum wages for certain positions, and it may define those positions implement that. An employer could not underpay a skilled machinist by calling her a 'gadget specialist' or similar non-scheduled position. But the deputy department head is likely paid above the highest bracket of the wage schedule, called außertariflich (AT, beyond the schedule). At this level, it comes down to individual negotiations between the employee and employer.
With respect to the first question, discussing an idea in a non-encrypted email is not a publication that forfeits the right to patent an idea, even though it is not 100% secure. In the same way, talking about an idea for a patent with your patent lawyer in a secluded booth of a coffee shop in person does not constitute publication of the idea for this purpose, even if someone is secretly spying on you at the time. Since I am at the moment employed by a company, even though the idea originates from myself, it seems that I should quit my job first not to have my current company have any claim over my idea. It is possible that the contract makes even ideas that you come up with yourself while employed by the company the property of the company. If so, you are legally in the wrong and the idea belongs to the company. But, proving the reality that you are stealing the idea from the company is harder if there is nothing in writing. An email discussing an idea while you are employed would have to be disclosed in litigation with your employer over whether the patent applied for belongs to you or to your employer under an employment agreement. If you didn't put it in an email, it wouldn't exist to turn over in litigation.
the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.
Some states (including California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, New York and Oregon, per the website below) have recently passed legislation outlawing pay secrecy requirements. Check online to see if the state you will work in is among them. Also see http://www.npr.org/2014/04/13/301989789/pay-secrecy-policies-at-work-often-illegal-and-misunderstood and https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/Pages/Proposed-State-Laws-Address-Pay-Secrecy.aspx
Assumed: United States jurisdiction, no discrimination component to your experiences. There is not a legal limit on how much time an employer requires you to be in another city so long as the employer is complying with wage and hour laws, family leave laws, and the like. They may be in violation of their employment contract with you if the contract specified that you were being hired for a position in one city. A four-week trip does not sound like "time travelling" to me, it sounds like a temporary posting in another city. Similarly, depending on how well the contract is drafted, the state whose law governs the employment, and the company's other behavior you may be able to sue them using material misrepresentation or fraudulent statements about the position you would be taking. If you want more insight into whether you might have a case, take your contract to an attorney. In practice, however, the solution is almost certainly not a lawsuit. The solution may be to start looking for a new job, to communicate better with your boss, or to figure out how much money it would take to keep you working doing the job you are actually doing rather than the one you were hired to do, and to negotiate a salary increase. Try posting your question with a few more facts over at workplace.stackexchange.com for more insight into how to deal with the problem professionally.
I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.
You're thinking of "unconscionability." In the United States, the general rule is that a contract provision will not be deemed unenforceable for unconscionability unless it is both procedurally and substantively unfair. A provision is considered procedurally unfair if it results from some sort of unfair asymmetry in bargaining positions. This could include situations where a party was acting under duress, had a diminished mental capacity, or unequal experience in the . A provision may be considered substantively unfair if it imposes disproportinately unfavorable terms on one party, perhaps by imposing costs far out of line with market prices, or by allocating all risk to that party. If the agreement is not both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, it won't be voided. So the Google TOS may be procedurally unfair because Google's market position gives it disproportionate bargaining power, but because they don't really impose any serious costs on you, they aren't unconscionable. Similarly, a contract provision requiring you to give me your house if you ever forget to turn off the porch lights at night wouldn't be unconscionable if it was agreed to after lengthy negotiations between our lawyers.
What are the downsides of using a service like LegalZoom for simple will / living will? Let's say someone is interested in a fairly simple will (simple financial picture with a house, mortgage, 2 bank accounts, 2 retirement accounts; no prior wills; simple family structure, nearly-bog-standard inheritance wishes); and a reasonably normal living will (largely based on standard one that can be found online in a state I live in). There seems to be a rather large cost difference between doing them with a regular lawyer (I saw quotes of $500 for 2 documents); vs. an online service like LegalZoom. Usually, it's prudent to assume that you get what you pay for, so it seems reasonable to worry that LegalZoom documents come with meaningful possible downsides. Is that the case, and if so, what are the downsides to worry about? Updates to clarify: An answer was posted that seemed to answer a slightly different situation than what was asked, so I'd like to clarify: The financial picture truly isn't complicated (no debts outside mortgage, no complicated assets outside house/checking/savings/401k accounts, all assets and family are in same state, assets are less than state/federal estate tax limit; no prior marriages or prior children or other potential liabilities, etc...). People doing the will are reasonably intelligent, e.g. they are smart enough to realise specific people named in the will may already be not alive during probate and designate reasonable backups for both will executor and child guardianship etc... The person getting the will is intelligent enough to know that if said picture changes in any way, the will DOES need to be updated, and can be relied on to do so (e.g. in case of a divorce, or if financial picture becomes less simple etc....). So "your internet made will is fine now but won't be in 40 years" is not really an applicable downside, assuming "fine now" is true of course.
Living Wills A "living will" which is a "pull the plug" document that isn't customized to an individual's preferences (probably 95%+ done by lawyers are not customized anyway) through a service like LegalZoom is probably fine, although doing it yourself you don't get the same guidance about how to use it in practice and are more likely to screw up the formal execution of the document (e.g. not having the proper witnesses and notary observe the execution, or signing in the wrong place, etc.). But this document is usually prepared by a lawyer at little or no extra cost when you have your last will and testament done, so the cost of not screwing up the execution of it isn't great. And, lawyer drafted documents are less likely to be contested in practice, even when a non-lawyer on paper does everything right. Someone who does their own living will also often doesn't realize the important of also having medical powers of attorney and durable powers of attorney for property which are also necessary. Simple Wills A "simple will" is quite another matter. First, I've never met a layperson who doesn't think that they need no more than a "simple will" when in fact they often do, either because they are affluent, or have a blended family, or need testamentary trusts to manage property for children or young adults or black sheep or for tax purposes or because some family members are non-citizens. In general, a lot of the value of having a lawyer do the work comes from the lawyer's ability to spot issues that are exceptional and take you out of the "simple will" solution by itself. Often an issue spotted can result in larger monetary savings or a much smoother probate process. For example, a lawyer can identify cases where a probate proceeding in more than one state is likely to be required and suggest steps to avoid that expensive result. Second, many non-lawyers have a very hard time thinking about all possibilities. They do fine thinking about what rules make sense if everybody alive today is still alive when you die and you own what you own now when you die, but have a very hard time thinking about what would be appropriate if people predecease them or if their assets change substantially. Lawyers are much better at working through what is sensible in all of these possibilities, many of which won't happen, but some of which will happen. This matters because a will never expires unless it is expressly revoked. I've probated wills drafted during WWII in basic training (as required) before the decedent went off to war and never amended over the next 60 years, and it is very hard to be that thoughtful when you are doing it yourself. Third, it is very common for non-lawyers to use language that isn't obviously ambiguous or otherwise problematic until you are forced to apply it in practice. Estate planning lawyers are much more aware of these traps in the "moving parts" of an estate plan and of the possibilities that need to be provided for. To give one example, suppose that you leave your second wife your house, and leave the remainder of your estate to your children (her stepchildren). It is very easy to say this in a way that does not make clear whether she takes the house subject to the mortgage, or if the mortgage is a debt to be paid before the remainder of the estate is distributed to the children. Similar issues often come up in relation to tax elections and allocation of tax debts among heirs. Providing for the disposition of pets is another thing that few non-lawyers manage to do well. Lawyers, in contrast, generally draft in a manner that avoids these ambiguities and sets forth rules that are sensible, fair and will work in practice. The issues are even more fraught if businesses or investment real estate is involved. And, non-lawyers (even sophisticated, affluent business people) routinely fail to grasp that a Will only governs assets which don't have beneficiary designations and is subject to forced marital share and minimum family inheritance laws that act by operation of law as well as other "gap filling" presumptions that modify the literal meaning of certain kinds of language in a Will. Finally, screwing up the execution of a Will is very common, while lawyer drafted wills are much less likely to be contested. In my twenty years of experience as a lawyer who does estate planning as part of his practice and teaches lawyers, financial planners and paralegals about the topic, I find that the increased litigation costs associated with a do it yourself will (on average) is about ten times as large as the savings associated with doing it yourself. Sure, one time in three or four or five, somebody does their own will and doesn't screw it up and it all goes fine, but a majority of the time, do it yourself will drafters do something that would be considered malpractice if a lawyer did it. Pay lawyers now, or pay lawyers more later. Honestly, if all you need is a "simple will" and you are not willing to spend the $500-$2,000 to have a lawyer draft appropriate documents, and help you execute them, you are probably better off doing nothing at all and dying intestate (i.e. without a will so that the default provisions of the law apply), which often isn't a horrible result in a plain vanilla, unblended nuclear family that isn't particularly affluent.
My interpretation would be: As related to the parents... Immediate family (e.g., brothers, sisters, etc.) First and second cousins, aunts and uncles Any direct ancestors (i.e., parents, grand-parents, great-grandparents, etc.) Any direct decendants (i.e., children, grandchildren, etc.) Any extended family members who have a close emotional relationship or frequent day-to-day interactions. Unfortunately, the vagueness of the requirement leaves the interpretation subjective — as you have noted. The interpretation of this requirement might be the reasonable person standard — i.e., what a reasonable person would consider related to to mean. However, IMHO, any future challenge would have a higher likelihood of success if any of the above family members were used as witnesses. Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. So don't follow my advice. Hire a real attorney if you need one.
In a typical divorce proceeding, both sides are required to provide a sworn statement of their finances, and to respond to written interrogatories, produce documents (e.g. financial statements made in loan applications, balance sheets, tax returns, bank statements, and copies of deeds and certificates of title and stock certificates) and be deposed in pre-trial discovery proceedings. Divorce lawyers have the authority to subpoena third-party records custodians and to take a small number of depositions of third-party witnesses prior to a permanent orders hearing and can usually get permission to take more if there is evidence suggesting that it would be fruitful to do so. There are a variety of sanctions that may be imposed for failure to cooperate, including adverse inferences regarding the facts that would have been disclosed if there had been disclosures in the discovery process. Still, it behooves a client to know as much as possible before commencing the process, since having lawyers gather this information during the course of divorce litigation is expensive and isn't always perfect. Where misconduct is suspected, a spouse's lawyer will typically retain forensic accountants and/or private investigators and will compare bank and accounting and tax records with other public records such as real property records, corporate records and tax filings. Unless an asset has produced no income or expenses flowing through a personal or business account, it will usually show up somewhere. Spouses will also often have familiarity with where to look based upon living with a spouse and often will have obtained copies of relevant correspondence or documents to provide a lead - perhaps a letter asking a spouse to fill out corporate paperwork or receipt from a foreign bank account. This investigation process (collectively called discovery) usually takes place between the filing for a divorce and the half year or more later when a permanent orders hearing is held. Often, in complex cases and cases where there is a likelihood that assets have been hidden, the final hearing will be set later after the original filing than it would otherwise be, and the planned hearing will be longer in light of the evidence that will need to be produced at that time. In my state, a spouse has up to five years after a divorce to reopen a proceeding is undisclosed assets are discovered. It isn't impossible to hide assets in a divorce, but it isn't easy either.
I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction I demand you give me your hat! You're not going to, are you? The point of that is that you are not obliged to do anything just because someone demands that you do. Now, if I had a court order that required you to give me your hat ... It appears that there is some confusion over who owns some land in Nebraska. This is a problem; it is not your problem. From my understanding which is entirely based on this: A warranty deed is a type of deed where the grantor (seller) guarantees that he or she holds clear title to a piece of real estate and has a right to sell it to the grantee (buyer). you would be extremely unwise to sign such a deed since it is in no way clear that you (or anyone) does have clear title. Now I take it that you are not interested in owning land in Nebraska and even less interested in getting into a legal battle over it. If that is the case then I suggest that you consult a local lawyer and ask for his advice on the following plan of action: You and your wife will renounce any claim that you may have if: You do not guarantee that you have any claim or title, The person to whom you are making this grant indemnifies you against any legal action that may result, They will prepare the documents, Your lawyer will review them, They will reimburse you for your lawyer's fees. Come back and tell us how this works out. Edit to address subsequent questions Can you be responsible for costs? Well, anything is possible but it would be extremely unlikely. If there was any wrongdoing it was many years ago by someone else! If you approach this in a reasonable way and attempt to assist in reaching a resolution (so long as it doesn't cost you time or money) then it is highly unlikely a court would award costs against you. What about background checks? This would be a civil case. It would not appear in your criminal history. While it is a matter of public record all it really means is that you and someone else had a dispute that required a court to settle; happens all the time.
While the state, or a creditor, can initiate a probate if no one else does (if the state does so, the official in charge of this is called the "public administrator"), neither are required to do so. Also, sometimes a guardianship is converted to a probate, but this doesn't appear to have happened. This is a thankless job that probably doesn't make sense to bother with if estate liabilities exceed the assets of the estate, but most states have a "non-claim statute" that bars creditors claims, other than liens including property tax liens, after a certain amount of time after the death. So, even if the estate may have been insolvent at death, if enough time has elapsed, many of the potential claims may now be barred, making the estate solvent again. Siblings generally have priority for appointment over a nephew, so to be appointed yourself, you would ordinarily have to receive a renunciation of their right to serve as executor before applying to do so yourself, but some states disregard that priority if no one has taken action after a certain period of time. You would initiate probate by contacting an Alaska lawyer in the vicinity of the place he was domiciled at death. The lawyer can review the guardianship court file, determine if an executor was appointed, and determine if there are assets that could justify opening an estate relative to lien debts including Medicaid liens. If there are not, letting the assets be lost to a property tax lien may make more sense that spending money to transfer his property in an orderly fashion to his creditors with nothing in it for any of his family.
It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.
It depends How good is your (legal) English? For example, do you know the legal difference between "will", "shall" and "must"? Or, the difference between "employee", "subcontractor" and "worker"? Or the difference between "bankruptcy", "insolvency" and an "act of bankruptcy"? Contingency What are you going to put in your dispute resolution clause? Do you prefer mediation, arbitration or litigation? Will it be a one size fits all or will it be escalating? What happens if one of you dies? Or emigrates? Or divorces? Or is convicted of a crime? A financial crime? A violent crime? A sexual crime? Or what if such is just alleged but not proven? What happens if the company ceases to exist? Or is sued? Or is acquired by someone else? Or by one of you? Who is responsible for insuring the subject matter of the contract (if anyone)? To what value? If the person who should doesn't can the other person effect the insurance and claim the premium as a debt due and payable? Not all of these will be relevant to your contract. Familiarity How familiar are you with this sort of contract? Is this something you do all the time or is this a one off? For example, I am happy to enter a construction contract without legal advice because that's my business and has been for many years - I know my risks and how to manage them, inside and outside the contract. However, when I set up shareholder's agreements, wills and business continuation insurance with my partners, we went to a lawyer. What is your relationship with the other person i.e. how much do you know and trust them? Stakes If the contract is not very important (which is something that varies with the participants, for some people a million dollar contract is not important for others a $5 one is), so that if, by screwing up, you are OK if you lose everything you've staked then write it yourself. Alternatively, if the contract is vitally important to you and your heirs and assignees unto the 6th generation, I'd get a lawyer to write it - its pretty cheap insurance. How long the contract lasts will be a factor in this - a contract that exposes you to risk for 3 months is different than one that does so for 25 years. Basically, its a risk reward calculation. TL;DR Contracts only matter when relationships break down. If you reach for the contract then you can expect that the other party will be playing for keeps and that contract is your only defense against the worst they can do. If you are happy with your skills in mitigating against a cashed-up opponent who wants to see you go down no matter the cost then draft it yourself.
You can hire someone to locate the defendant with the information that you have, or you can apply to a court for permission to serve them with process via "substituted service" because their physical address can't be determined. But, in general, better business practice is to not enter into contracts with people with whom you have more than a name that might be false, and an email address, unless you have some means of non-judicial enforcement of your agreement (like the practical ability to shut down access to an internet subscription). If you don't even know if someone's name is real and have done nothing to confirm that then you also have no assurances that they have any assets from which you could collect if you won a breach of contract lawsuit. If you deal with large numbers of people in low value contracts, it may be worth treating the fact that some contracts are effectively unenforceable as a cost of doing business. But, if a contract is important, it was foolish from a business perspective to rely on a contract on that basis alone, even if it is legal to do so.
Can I inspect websites' source in teaching video? As a web developer, I find that we can learn a ton about HTML, CSS and JavaScript by opening the Developer Tools in Chromium and inspect elements, seeing the names other developer choose for their CSS classes, how some effects are achieved, etc... I'm thinking about making a video where I demonstrate how powerful of a learning tool this is. I'm a bit torn on this, as anyone can do it for themselves, but still, readable source is not equal to open source. So my question is: Can I inspect websites' source in teaching video?
Distribution on YouTube implicates, at least, US copyright law. Shropshire v. Canning 809 F.Supp.2d 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2011), Subafilms v. MGM 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) Are you infringing? Is the original work eligible for copyright? "It is undisputed that computer programs— defined in the Copyright Act as a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result, can be subject to copyright protection as literary works." 17 USC 102, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Are you making a copy or displaying the work publicly? (17 USC 106) You concede that you are doing this in the hypothetical, so we can skip this step. Do you have permission to do this? Some work is licensed to allow your proposed use. If you have permission, then this entire answer is moot. Are you taking what amounts to a substantial taking of the original? Presumably, you will not need to show the entire source file to present the naming conventions and techniques that other developers have used. But, what you do show will be an exact reproduction of the original. In the case of computer programs, all US districts use the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). The abstraction stage of this test is irrelevant in this hypothetical because the reproduction is exact. Filtration excludes any uncopyrightable elements of the original from consideration (due to scènes à faire, merger, lack of originality). The comparison stage compares what remains after the filtration stage, to determine if the new work takes substantially from the original. Fair use defense If your use is found to be infringing based on the above analysis, the affirmative defense of fair use is available. I can't tell you whether a fair use defense would be applicable or successful in your particular case. However, you can search the US Copyright Office's Fair Use Index for many examples successful fair use defenses when a literary work was reproduced in part or whole for educational purposes. There are also other affirmative defenses available (implied license, for example), or defenses that directly attack the elements of copyright infringement. Some confusion exists regarding "idea/expression merger" as a defense after a prima facie case of copyright infringement has been made. This isn't completely correct. Where idea/expression merger enters the analysis differs from circuit to circuit. In the 6th circuit, merger enters in the copyrightability analysis (paragraph 1. above). But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat merger as part of the infringement analysis (paragraph 4. above) and in the 9th circuit, merger is an affirmative defense. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) The idea/expression merger doctrine is not implicated just because "the idea one that is expressing is 'this is the code they used.'" When you need to cite/show the original work for purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching", that is a direct implication of fair use. Using using this justification triggers the full four-factor fair use analysis. (17 USC 107). You don't get to reproduce a work just because you want to say "this is the work they created."
You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.
Modern websites use large amounts of Javascript scripts. These are small programs that are run on your machine. By accessing the website you implicitly give permission for this to occur. (Aside: I'm not aware of any case law on exactly what this implicit authorisation covers. CFAA case law on "authorised access" suggests that this is going to be complicated if it ever becomes an issue). Javascript is supposed to be run within a limited framework which allows the website to control the rendering of the website and track how you use it. So they can track your mouse clicks when the browser window has "focus", but not clicks you make when accessing something else. Like all software, the Javascript programs and the web browser "interpreter" that runs them can contain bugs. Javascript has to work on lots of browsers, so its not surprising when things don't always work properly. Coming on to the CFAA, criminal penalties only apply to intentional access. 5 (c) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss. So if a website runs Javascript on your computer with the intention of crashing it, that is a crime. However if the crash is inadvertent due to ordinary programming errors then it isn't. In this case it is almost certainly innocent. To prove otherwise you would need to study the code they are sending in detail to see if it is doing something strange and unreasonable.
Yes. This is infringement. This infringement might be excused by a "fair use" defense but it probably isn't. At a very small scale tailor to a very specific educational program, for example, for just members of a thirty person English class that they are currently taking, it might qualify as educational fair use. But I get the impression that the contemplated translation project is far more ambitious than that. The underlying content of the events reported in the news are not protected by copyright, but the language used to report those events and any translations of that language, is protected. The only reliable way to solve it is to get permission to do so from the holder of the copyright of the source of the new reports you are translating.
What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.
All Government produced documents in the United States are public domain, as they belong to the people. The company may be asking for license to use their film, which may include several other clips that they put in any order. Their film, specifically, including any explanatory dialog, commentary, or editing choices, are not fair game. However, the clip you are asking about is not copyrighted and is fair for any use.
Yep, you are. You still need to keep the LICENSE and NOTICE files in the repository, if there were any in your copy of the project. These files contain the terms and conditions for the project, and provide attribution to the original developers. If you're trying to attribute in the UI of your application, you probably should. It's considered courteous and in the spirit of open source as well. This is also related: Do I need to include the full text of the MIT license in the UI of my app?
If the tool circumvents Windows' copy protection (which is a computer question, not a legal one, but I cannot imagine a circumstance in which this isn't access-circumvention), then it is a violation of 17 USC 1201, which forbids "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title". It is both illegal to use, and to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic" in such a program.
Can I bundle Apache 2.0 licensed components in a GPL 3 licensed project? I am creating a project that I would like to open source and license under the GPL 3 License. The project will come with a bundled version of an open source component which is licensed under the Apache 2.0 license. Can I bundle Apache 2.0 licensed components in a GPL 3 licensed project? I would also be interested in an explanation on why the answer is yes or no.
The Free Software Foundation considers that the Apache 2.0 license is compatible with the GPL 3.0: This is a free software license, compatible with version 3 of the GNU GPL. But not compatible with the GPL 2.0, though: Please note that this license is not compatible with GPL version 2, because it has some requirements that are not in that GPL version. These include certain patent termination and indemnification provisions. The patent termination provision is a good thing, which is why we recommend the Apache 2.0 license for substantial programs over other lax permissive licenses. But what does it mean when the FSF says a license is "compatible with the GPL?" It means that the other license and the GNU GPL are compatible; you can combine code released under the other license with code released under the GNU GPL in one larger program. All GNU GPL versions permit such combinations privately; they also permit distribution of such combinations provided the combination is released under the same GNU GPL version. The other license is compatible with the GPL if it permits this too. GPLv3 is compatible with more licenses than GPLv2: it allows you to make combinations with code that has specific kinds of additional requirements that are not in GPLv3 itself. Section 7 has more information about this, including the list of additional requirements that are permitted. So what can you make of this? The FSF considers these two licenses compatible and it also means that when you combine code under these two licenses, the effective obligations that will apply are these of the Apache and GPL combined, including source code redistribution. But why are the compatible? Is the fact that the FSF says so enough? We can check what the Apache Software Foundation says on the topic: The Free Software Foundation considers the Apache License, Version 2.0 to be a free software license, compatible with version 3 of the GPL. The Software Freedom Law Center provides practical advice for developers about including permissively licensed source. Apache 2 software can therefore be included in GPLv3 projects, because the GPLv3 license accepts our software into GPLv3 works. So irrespective of the deeper why, they tend to agree and as they are the authors of the respective licenses, this carries some weight. But wait, this is not true the other way around as the ASF goes on: However, GPLv3 software cannot be included in Apache projects. The licenses are incompatible in one direction only, and it is a result of ASF's licensing philosophy and the GPLv3 authors' interpretation of copyright law. So in a nutshell, the FSF considers that the terms of the Apache license are compatible with the copyleft terms of the GPL 3.0. The ASF agrees, but the copyleft terms of the GPL 3.0 are not compatible with the permissive terms of the Apache 2.0: a combination of the two would have to be copyleft.
Basically, you cannot do it. You are required to include the MIT license in any derivative work. However, that holds only for the parts that you import from this other project. You can identify which parts of the final product are copied from the MIT-licensed program (and indicate "these parts are subject to the following MIT license"), and then you can do whatever you want with the remainder that you wrote. The downside of not licensing your material is that nobody can use it. To use it, people would need permission, which is what a license is. If you don't license it, you don't give permission, so people can't use it. You presumably want to subject your own contribution to different licensing conditions, so then you would state those conditions and clearly indicate what parts of the code you wrote.
Can you locate your license (generally not a trivial task)? It may appear under Help-About and a click to view EULA. The EULA specifically addresses redistribution of parts of the software and number of installations you can make with a single license. They do not say what uses you make make of the software, except that "You may not rent, lease, lend or provide commercial hosting services with the Software". There is no express prohibition against commercial or non-commercial political use of the product: anything not prohibited is allowed. The fact that they say nothing about the content that you create with Word means, they have declined to have a say in the matter. (I am not sure about the wording of the "Educational" versions of Office: those are somewhat negotiated between the institution and MS).
Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright.
Your understanding of the GPL is a bit off. GPLed code doesn't generally force you to GPL the output of the program, but that's just because the output of the program is normally not a derivative work of the program. For instance, if you write a novel in Emacs, your novel is an entirely original work. The fact that you used Emacs as a tool doesn't mean that your novel is somehow based on Emacs. This generator is different. It generates sprites by putting together art assets made by the program's creator. That means that the output contains a substantial amount of content made by the program creator, which means that it would likely be covered by the program creator's copyright. If the content was licensed to you under the GPL, you normally have to abide by GPL restrictions when you redistribute the content or incorporate it into your own program. Copyright holders can, if they want, grant additional permissions to their content and allow you to incorporate that content into nonfree software. For instance, the GCC compilers have an additional permission for their runtime libraries to let you use them in any GCC-compiled code; without that permission, GCC could only be used to compile GPL-compatible code. But unless the copyright holder has granted those permissions, when program output contains large amounts of their copyrighted content you're bound by the GPL when using it. In this case, the program specifically says that the art is dual-licensed under GPLv3 and CC-BY-SA-3.0. Since the generator's output is a combination of premade art assets (the buttons just let you tell the program which art assets to combine), the output is a derivative work of those assets. You can't use it unless your use is compatible with the GPL v3 or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (either works, since dual licensing lets you pick either license).
There is no loophole because a work released in object code form only — without the Corresponding Source — is not released under GPLv3, even if you say it is. GPLv3 only requires them to also provide whatever source came with it False. Providing the Corresponding Source is compulsory (§6 as pointed by @cHao). If they do not have access to it, it means the work has not been released under GPLv3.
No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com.
Yes, that’s allowed. Under the Stack Exchange terms of service, content you upload is licensed to Stack Exchange Inc. on a non-exclusive basis under CC-BY-SA 4.0. The terms of service do not give Stack Exchange the copyright to your contributions, and a non-exclusive license means you are not promising Stack Exchange that “only Stack Exchange will be allowed to use this content.” That means you can continue to do whatever you want with your own content and do not need to mention Stack Exchange at all. The only restriction is that you can’t stop Stack Exchange from continuing to use your Stack Exchange content under CC-BY-SA 4.0, and since it’s a Creative Commons license you also can’t stop anyone else from using your Stack Exchange content under that license.
Is it possible to end up in prison due to failure to appear in court for a civil matter? This is a question about the law in USA, and is regarding civil cases. This question is only regarding cases where a civilian, or a non-governmental organization, has sued another civilian. With this question I am not interested of cases related to traffic tickets or fines given by a police department (some law blog I was reading included these in an article about civil cases). The questions I wanted to ask are: Is it possible for the defendant to end up in prison if they fail to appear in the court for this kind of matter? If failure to appear does not always lead to prison, what are the kind of situations in which it would lead to that?
Prison v. Jail First of all, failure to appear (in the U.S.) would led to incarceration in jail (a local government facility allowing for detention typically up to one year for misdemeanors), rather than prison (which is typically a state or federal government institution incarcerating people for a year or more pursuant to a felony conviction). A jail is typically run by the county sheriff or a city's chief of police. A prison is typically run by a warden appointed by a state department of corrections. A civil court never sends anyone to prison for failure to appear, or for that matter, as a sanction for any purpose. Even a multi-year remedial civil contempt sanction is served in jail rather than prison. When Can One By Jailed For Failure To Appear In A Civil Matter? Second, failure to appear can only lead to incarceration if: (1) the person who fails to appear in either subject to a subpoena requiring that person to appear, at a date and time certain in a particular place, as a witnesses, that is personally served upon them (or where personal service is waived by the person) (this is the same in civil and criminal practice), or (2) the person is served with a judgment creditor's interrogatories to be answered in person (which are the moral equivalent of a subpoena) and must be served in the same manner, or (3) the person fails to deliver a person pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus (which is the moral equivalent of a contempt of court finding and very uncommon) that has been served in the same manner, or (4) the person has been personally served (or has personally waived such personal service) with an order to show cause (at a specific date, time and place) why they should not be held in contempt of court. The precise name of this document can vary and could also be called a "writ" or a "citation", rather than an "order to show cause". Citations for traffic offenses or other ordinance violations or civil offenses are functionally equivalent to (4). Of course, in each of the cases (1) to (4) you obviously aren't incarcerated at the moment that you fail to appear as the whole problem is that you aren't there. Instead, in each of those cases, a warrant for your arrest is issued by the court and you aren't actually incarcerated until law enforcement manages to arrest you before the warrant is vacated because you do appear, or the warrant is vacated by stipulation of the parties approved by the court, or is vacated because the matter you were required to appear for is now moot (e.g. in the case of judgment creditor's interrogatories, the judgment is paid in full). How Long Is One Incarcerated For Failure To Appear? In cases (1)-(4) the duration of incarceration is only from the time of arrest until the person can be brought before the court at the soonest possible time to do whatever they were supposed to have shown up in person to do and failed to appear at, often a matter of a few hours and rarely more than a long weekend. These forms of incarceration are for the purpose of compelling your appearance in court by force, not for punishing someone for not showing up. Other Reasons People Are Incarcerated In U.S. Civil Courts One can also be incarcerated in a civil court because one is found to be in contempt of court after one has appeared and been found by the court in an in person hearing to be in contempt of court, but incarceration for contempt of court itself, as opposed to failure to appear at a contempt of court hearing, is never a sanction imposed for failure to appear. Other Sanctions For Failing To Appear Also, keep in mind that failing to appear can result in other consequences besides incarceration, the most common of which is to be found in default causing you to lose you legal case or whatever other legal matter was pending as a result of your failure to appear. Another common sanction for failure to appear (e.g. at a deposition when you are not under subpoena) is a monetary sanction to compensate others for the attorneys' fees incurred due to your non-attendance, and a determination that facts that could have been established if you had appeared will be deemed to be true regardless of reality. Civil Law Systems Compared In "civil law" countries whose legal systems are not based upon the English common law, judges do not have a generalized contempt of court power and the scheme by which people are sanctioned for failing to appear in civil matters is different.
The only way in which you could be "incorrectly listed as a defendant" is if somehow your name was typed in as a party (there would be a glaring gap, that no paragraph of the complaint says anything about you as a defendant). Assuming the situation is nothing so bizarre as a typo, you are a defendant. Whether or not you are liable in this case is a matter of fact and law, and the plaintiff's attorney has probably done due diligence in suing everybody imaginable. Perhaps the plaintiff lied to his attorney about material facts (read the complaint); or perhaps there is a credible legal theory under which you would be liable (read the complaint). Your attorney will take care of your problems, to the best of his ability. He may be able to persuade the plaintiff's attorney that they stand no realistic hope of winning and some chance of getting smacked for pointlessly involving you. If the plaintiff's attorney isn't persuaded by the argument, your attorney could submit the legal arguments as a motion to dismiss. If the judge is not persuaded (at this stage), you (your attorney) will have to counter the arguments presented at trial.
Probably not. It appears that in the case in question, your lawyers, while they were representing you, agreed to a protective order that kept certain information including settlement offers made to them by the opposing parties' lawyers (even if those offers were rejected) confidential. You are bound by the agreements made by your lawyers if they are your lawyers at the time, even they later cease to be your lawyers. So, if you were to make the disclosure of this information subject to a protective order, the court involved could hold you in contempt of court and issue sanctions (including fines and incarceration) for failing to honor the court order to seal the case, because this protective order was binding upon you, because you agreed to it through your lawyers who were acting as your agents at the time. The fact that you are no longer represented by those lawyers doesn't vacate the protective order. CAVEAT: This is an interpretation of the facts made with incomplete information. A truly reliable answer would require review of the exact documents in the case filed with the court which is beyond the scope of Law.SE.
The appellate court gets the trial transcript which includes all the testimony (and exhibits or descriptions/photos of them) and the trial court's rulings. Also, each side presents an appeal brief, which will generally include a statement of facts, pointing out ones it thinks favorable to its views. In civil cases a jury may be asked/instructed to give yes/no answers to a series of questions, but this is not normal in criminal cases. An appellate court can (and sometimes does) rule that there was not sufficient evidence to permit any reasonable jury to convict; to that extent it can rule on questions of fact. But, as the comment by ohwilleke mentions, an appellate court does not hear new evidence. It can overturn the conviction and send the case back for a new trial, and in such a new trial additional evidence may be introduce at the trial court level.
This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up.
For most civil matters the answer is "no". Small claims court is special since there are restrictions on using attorneys, and in that context, it depends on the rules. In Indiana, the answer in their manual is no Small Claims Rule 8 allows a person to appear at trial and, if he or she chooses, represent himself or herself and avoid the cost of hiring an attorney. However, a person is allowed to hire an attorney and have the attorney appear with him or her at the trial. A person who has power of attorney for another person may not represent that person in court. "Have the attorney appear with him or her at the trial" is pretty unclear, since it doesn't say whether the attorney can represent them. Rule 8(C)(1) states that "A natural person may appear pro se or by counsel in any small claims proceeding", which clarifies that they don't just mean "have at your side". In Minnesota, the answer is more emphatic "no": A power of attorney does not authorize a nonlawyer to file a claim, appear, or in any other way “represent” a natural person in conciliation court. As for allowing attorneys in small claims court, Attorneys are only allowed to represent parties in conciliation court with permission of the court (emphasis added). The situation in California is somewhat of a hybrid, but as I read it, it means that the incapacitated person is out of luck, which strikes me as surprising. They say Self-representation is usually required. There are, however, several exceptions to this general rule: If the court determines that a party is unable to properly present his or her claim or defense for any reason, the court may allow another individual to assist that party. The individual who helps you can only provide assistance—the individual’s participation in court cannot amount to legal representation, and the person can’t be an attorney. So this is most unlike Indiana is that you can't have an attorney, and all the person can do is "assist". So unless they just waive the rules, this means that if the individual is incapacitated, they cannot have recourse to small claims court.
At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances).
They are two different courts, with different standards of proof. In a criminal court, the standard of proof is "guilty beyond any reasonable doubt". In a civil court, the standard of proof is "more likely guilty than not guilty". Actually, in a civil court it's not "guilty", it's often "liable for damages". It's obvious that there will always be cases where the evidence lies somewhere between these two. Consider what the reasons for both court cases are: In the first case, it's the state against you. The state doesn't suffer any injustice if you are not convicted, and the state is very powerful, that's why the standard of proof is high. In a civil court, you have often two private persons fighting it out. If you are correctly accused of breaking my arm and I sue you for damages, then if you are not convicted, I am suffering a broken arm and all the associated pain and cost. A standard as high as in a criminal court would be entirely unfair towards the victim.
How enforceable would a non-disparagement agreement be if one party has left the country? The 2 parties in a dispute lived in British Columbia, Canada. It was an employment discrimination case. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. The employer refused to provide the employee with a positive job reference and denied all allegations of discrimination. The employee left the country and got a new job and would now like to post disparaging comments about the employer on the internet. How enforceable would that be from overseas or does it matter because it's the internet?
Ask yourself... What are you trying to achieve? My understanding is an employer is not obliged to provide you a positive job reference. I believe at most, they are only to obliged to confirm that you worked there. Anything above that is optional. The fact that you have left British Columbia only makes it more difficult for the company to chase you - It does not alter your legal obligations. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. Why did you sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement if you still disagree? It leads me to believe there could be trust issues between you and others. Why do you think your old employer must abide by the agreement, but you have an exemption? Let's say you make noise - let's say your old employer in BC tracks you down. Ask yourself how an independent third party like your new employer would react when they read that you signed an agreement, then decided to ignore it. Both you and your previous employer have begun new separate journeys. You two crashed once - I suggest you not alter your path or you could crash again. Life is too short. Concentrate on making your new home in your new city and a new job a new start. It will bring you a greater benefit than breaking a signed, sealed non-disparagement agreement.
No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and "fall" on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria.
If everyone hired after date X has a different contract from anyone hired before that date it is not discriminatory. (As long as they do nothing naughty like changing the contract, hiring three black people, changing the contract back).
It depends. An agreement of the type you describe is called a post-nuptial agreement or marital agreement. These agreements are not prohibited, but are subject to heightened scrutiny. In determining if it is valid, courts consider financial disclosure, an opportunity to consult a lawyer, and a voluntary non-coerced agreement in writing, as well as a requirement that it not be unconscionable when signed or when enforced. Strictly speaking, while alimony can be eliminated in this manner and divorce attorneys' fees and property settlements can be managed in this manner, child support cannot be eliminated in this manner, although some agreement as to what constitutes payment in kind of a child support obligation that is currently existing can be reached. Modification of child support requires court approval since the child's rights are implicated and the child is not competent to agree. In the circumstances you describe, I do not think that any of the agreement would be upheld as it would likely be found to be flawed both substantively and in the process by which it was agreed. This is particularly true because New Jersey is quite hostile to post-nuptial agreements relative to most states and generally only permits them when there is evidence that the marriage was nearly moribund or the agreement was entered into in connection with a reconciliation. In general, some of the considerations that apply in New Jersey are that: If the agreement was oral and enforcement is sought of a promise to convey real estate, there must also be compliance with the statute of frauds. The court may have to resolve disputes over the terms of the agreement. The court must consider whether the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into were fair to the party charged. The terms of the agreement must have been conscionable when the agreement was made. The party seeking enforcement must have acted in good faith. Changed circumstances must not have rendered literal enforcement inequitable. This approach remains good law in New Jersey and has been enforced in a manner that is quite skeptical of these agreements. See, e.g., Kriss v. Kriss, A-3255-15T3, 2018 WL 1145753 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 5, 2018). Many others states are more inclined to uphold such agreements.
Don't do it. It is of course breach of contract when you signed a contract with no intention to fulfil it. However, you are talking about Germany. German employers take a very dim view of this. While a UK employer would say "good riddance" and do nothing, many German employers would see that as a personal insult. It's something that you just don't do in Germany. There's a good chance that they will do what they can to make you miserable if you do this. For example, inform authorities that you just cancelled your contract which may get a visa cancelled. Or tell the company that you want to start with, which will also take a very dim view of this. Or sue you for damages, not because they want to get the money, but to make you miserable. On the other hand, if they send you a contract, and you sign it, you have a contract.
You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".
At-will employers can fire you for almost any reason or no reason at all, aside from a few protected reasons for termination (defined by things like gender, race, religion, disability, etc.). "Employees who want to work remotely from another country" is not a protected class of individuals, so the company could almost certainly fire you for this with no repercussions whatsoever. Whether they will or not is an different question that's entirely dependent on your specific situation, but in general, US at-will employers have a very wide latitude to "tell you no" by simply firing you. All you can do is ask your manager. If they say no, then the answer is no. They do not require any "grounds" or justification for their decision.
"Reasonableness" is meant to be vague, because what is reasonable in one case or contract or industry is not always reasonable in another. Generally, though, you'll probably find courts interpreting it to take into account normal practices in your geographic area, in your industry, and between you and the other party. If one party looks like they're trying to unjustly enrich themselves or is asking for something that people just don't agree to in the real world, it's probably going to be unreasonable. If people are asking for the fair value of their work on terms that are normally agreed to when they're the subject of negotiations, it's probably reasonable. Dropping the reasonableness language would probably leave the assigning party in a bad position, as they're not required to make the assignment, with no qualifications as to the terms. The assignee could argue that they're free to take the IP on any terms whatsoever, though courts often read in a reasonableness requirement anyway. This answer is based on U.S. law, but there will be probably be pretty strong parallels if you're in a common law jurisdiction.
Do Google/Apple have total control over apps on their store? Can App stores remove specific apps at their discretion? Or do they have to set forth rules about what is allowed and then follow those rules? One thing tells me that it is their store, so they can do as they please. After all, if I had my store I would like to have total control over it. However, they have terms, and other companies might put millions into developing something according Google's terms, but that Google might not like and want to kick out after some time. So what can happen in this case? Can the company take legal action against Google for removing something by proving that it is not against any law or their terms of service? It is worth noting that Google reserves the right to change terms at any time.
You are making an argument along the lines of promissory estoppel, but this requires reliance on a promise (roughly). From Google's Developer Distribution Agreement: Google reserves the right to suspend and/or bar any Developer from the Store at its sole discretion. From Apple's iOS Developer Program Agreement: You understand and agree that Apple may, in its sole discretion, reject Your Application for distribution for any reason Apple and its licensors reserve the right to change, suspend, remove, or disable access to any services at any time. Neither company makes any representation or promise that a developer will have the right to distribute their product through these official stores. It is irrelevant that an app happens to not violate any terms of the agreement. Even if you demonstrated this, distribution of an app through the official stores is at the sole discretion of Apple and Google.
Google is an international company. It has employees in France. It has offices in France. It has costs and revenue in France. It has French subsidiaries, with French bank accounts. Google could absolutely try to ignore a French judgment against it, but the government could seize assets from their French bank accounts, and/or real property they have in the country. The French government could petition other countries in which Google has assets to enforce the judgment, and at least in other EU countries it would likely be successful. Ultimately, though, there'd be no need for such extreme measures. Google's business in France is selling ad space to French businesses. If they didn't have that available as a revenue stream, they might well cut off service to the country themselves.
I see that channel offers playlists and "videos" of popular music by several artists. The one video I tried had the music with no accompanying video or images. The channel's about page says that then operator does not own the copyrights to the music and cannot grant others permission to play it. It is possible that the channel operator has obtained permission from the artists and is thus operating under a valid license. It is possible that the channel is committing copyright infringement, but the various copyright owners have not noticed the channel, or have noticed it but decided not to take action. There is no easy way for an outsider to tell which of these is correct. If the operator has not obtained proper permission, then it seems that this would be copyright infringement. If so, any copyright owner could send a takedown notice, use YouTube's own copyright complaint mechanism, or could file a copyright infringement suit. But nothing compels the owner to act if the owner chooses not to, it is entirely the owner's choice. I do not see that the US fair use or any other exception to copyright would be likely to apply here. If the owner brought suit and won (and a win seems likely to me, from what I can see), the operator would be liable for damages, which might be sizable, or mild. In the US at least the owner could also obtain a court order (injunction) requiring the operator to stop using the owner's copyrighted music. If the owner complained to YouTube, the site could add a "copyright strike" against the operator's account. After a few strikes (I think three) YouTube will cancel the account, according to its posted policies. Similar outcomes could face anyone else who posted or made available for streaming copyrighted content (such as music) without permission from the copyright owner. But again, everything depends on action by the copyright owner. If the owner chooses, for whatever reason, not to act, then nothing is likely to be done about the infringement.
Great question - I work for a London based company who use a large amount of location data. The process for deletion of data is not as simple as it first sounds. We recently had a deep dive with our legal team and as a result actually created a product to process deletions. Personal data from users/customer is carried for lots of reasons, not just marketing. What if you're asked to delete data that is needed to bill customers, information that may be relevant to a legal case or information that needs by law to be retained for the purposes of audit? GDPR does not make it illegal to carry personal information, it simply needs you to justify why you are keeping the information - inform the named person about this and provide them with a timescale for deletion. For example if you are required by law to store a record of emails to document the work done, but the user asks you to delete that information. You would be entitled to keep that information but only for the purposes of maintaining that audit trail. You would delete all associated customer data that was unnecessary such as CRM info, payment details etc.. but could keep the audit trail. The proper way to respond to the user's deletion request would be "your data will be kept in a secure server for the purposes of maintaining an audit trail for x amount of time. Once this time has elapsed it will be deleted. If you are unhappy with our use of this data please contact our data officer". GDPR isn't designed to catch you out - if you have a legitimate reason to keep that information then you are entitled to. The law was designed to stop marketers and advertisers hoarding huge amounts of information, as well as undermine Google/Facebook's duopoly on our personal information.
A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap.
Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here.
You can't grant or license that which is not yours. For example, the Slack terms of service say: We grant to Customer a non-sublicensable, non-transferable, non-exclusive, limited license for Customer and its Authorized Users to use the object code version of these components, but solely as necessary to use the Services and in accordance with the Contract and the User Terms. So Slack's agreement with Org A does not give A any right to let any other organization B use the software. It does not matter how A and B are related, nor whether B is nonprofit or for-profit, nor what A would be getting in exchange. If B wants to use it, they need to make their own agreement with Slack.
Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".
What does equitable mean, especially in special education law? I understand equitable as it's used in ordinary speech, but not in the legal sense, apparently. Here is some legal text I'm having trouble understanding: "In order to have a chance at reimbursement, a court must find: (1) that the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement; (2) the private school was an appropriate placement; and (3) there are no equitable considerations that would require the court to reduce or deny reimbursement for the parents. [...] The third prong, which assesses equitable considerations, often acts as a catchall for evaluating the reasonableness of the parents and the school district." - Navigating Tuition Reimbursement. I have tried law dictionaries. Here's an example of something that didn't help: refers to positive remedies (orders to do something, not money damages) employed by the courts to solve disputes or give relief. - The Free Dictionary. Here's another example of some text that uses the word equitable in ways that I don't understand: - THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
In this context, the phrase "there are no equitable considerations that would require the court to reduce or deny reimbursement for the parents" largely refers to defenses to claims arising under the law of equity as applied historically in the chancery courts of England, and more recently, to claims of a type that would have been brought in equity courts if there were still a separate equity court system. Two of the more common equitable defenses are "unclean hands" and "laches". The equitable defense of "unclean hands" applies when the person seeking relief has engaged in misconduct of some kind in the same transaction. For example, if "the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement" because the student had previously been expelled for beating up another kid (especially if this had nothing to do with the reason that a FAPE is needed) or because the parents ignored a deadline for filing the application for a FAPE at their public school of which they had reasonable advanced notice, that student's parents might be denied reimbursement under the doctrine of unclean hands. The equitable defense of "laches" applies when unreasonable delay on the part of the person seeking relief causes prejudice to the person from whom relief is sought even in the absence of a date certain deadline or before a date certain deadline expires. For example, suppose that "the private school was an appropriate placement" but it had tuition three times as high as two other private schools in town. If the other two less expensive private schools had vacancies for months after the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement, but had no room for new students a week before school started leaving only the much more expensive private school with any vacancies, the request might be denied, or limited to the amount that would have been paid if the parents had applied to other private schools more promptly, under the doctrine of laches. Other equitable defenses include the duty to mitigate damages (e.g. there might be reimbursement for private school tuition, but not for late fees and interest that could have been avoided), impossibility and impracticability (e.g. no public or private placement is capable of addressing the fundamental problem that the child is in a catatonic state), acts of god/force majeure (e.g. the student was denied a FAPE because the school was destroyed in a hurricane and the school district had to shut down the schools for everyone for a semester), implied waiver or estoppel (e.g. after the student was denied a FAPE the student was enrolled for regular classes at that public school without complaint and without trying to find a private school placement), spoliation (e.g. the records needed to determine eligibility were intentionally destroyed by the applicant before the hearing), fraud as a defense and not a claim (e.g. the parents lied in their reimbursement application), payment (e.g. the student was denied a FAPE by two schools and already received reimbursement from another one and is not entitled to a double recovery), release or accord and satisfaction (e.g. a settlement agreement was already reached with the school denying reimbursement or agreeing to a particular reimbursement).
Caveat Keep in mind that words do not have uniform definitions for all times and places and contexts. Words can have different meanings in particular contexts and can be defined in a contract or statute to have a meaning different from the common meaning. "Person" Usually Includes Entities Of Any Kind This said, usually the term "person" in the law refers to any human being and any trust, estate or entity that is capable of suing and being sued and entering into contracts. An "entity" in this sense would often include partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, non-profit associations (whether or not incorporated), business trusts, joint ventures, local governments, states, the federal government and foreign governments. (I break out trusts and estates separately because there is divided authority in different jurisdictions over whether trusts and estates are entities, or are simply a special hat that the trustee or executor wears that are not entities, which can be relevant in some highly technical situations.) Agency Situations The term "person" is also often used in the sense that it refers to the principal and not the agent, when an agent is taking action on behalf of the principal. Thus, if there is a law that says "a person who enters into a real estate contract must disclose that person's taxpayer identification number", and someone with a power of attorney from you signs a real estate contract on your behalf, the power of attorney agent should disclosure your taxpayer identification number and not theirs. Why Is The Term "Person" Defined So Broadly? One important reason for using the term "person" to apply to entities as well as human beings, is that it allows for statutes and contract terms or case law legal rules to be stated in very general terms without being wordy in a way that accurately reflects how those legal rules or contract terms should apply to entities. For example, a statute using the word "person" might say: A person who is engaged in business in this state must register with the department of business licenses. By using the word "person" in this way, the statute wouldn't have to say instead (probably less accurately and less comprehensibly): Any individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, business trust, non-business trust, estate, governmental entity, or other entity, including the principal of any agent acting on behalf of the principal, engaged in business in this state, must register with the department of business licenses. The phrasing without the word "person" would be more likely to create loopholes because some kind of entity is omitted, and would be prone to ambiguity because one would have to decide which words that define the kind of persons and entities that are covered modify which other words in the sentence. Thus, using the word "person" is often makes entities more rather than less accountable to the law, by making legal language more clear and more general (and hence containing fewer loopholes). "Individual" or "Natural Person" Usually the term "individual" or "natural person" would mean a human being, although, of course, there are other senses of the word "individual" such as "an individual Widget" referring to exactly one Widget in particular, as opposed to Widgets in general. Alternative Definitions Of "Person" There are isolated times when the word "person" would not include minors and incapacitated people who are incapable of suing or entering into contracts in their own name due to lack of legal capacity. It isn't uncommon to have a definition of "person" in a statute or contract that omits governmental entities, that omits all kinds of entities, or that omits particular kinds of entities (e.g. foreign entities or corporations). For example, a tax statute might define "person" in a way that includes natural persons and entities, but excludes governments. Some of the definitions of terms like these in the bankruptcy code are particularly non-intuitive.
I wouldn't say that it "trumps state law". Indeed, the State of Georgia, either expressly by statute or through the common law, establishes that teachers and school administrators have the authority to create rules and regulations governing the conduct of students that are not themselves unconstitutional as applied to students, although, in general these consequences can't resort to criminal punishments. Instead, typical punishments include detention, suspension (in school or out of school), expulsion, and adjustment of grades for an assignment or a course. Marks in one's disciplinary record and public shaming, forfeiture of eligibility to participate in school sponsored extra-curricular activities or honors (including marching at graduation), refusing to release transcripts, and historically (but much less so in recent years) corporal punishments such as spanking, have been options for schools to enforce their punishments. A prohibition on recording in a syllabus certainly wouldn't result in criminal punishments, and probably wouldn't even give rise to civil liability. Depending upon the purpose for which the recording was being used, it is even conceivable that the school's right to punish someone for violating a school rule could be estopped by First Amendment and whistle blower protection law considerations (e.g. if it was used to document harassment and discriminatory conduct for use in sharing with the school board or law enforcement or publishing on radio or TV or an Internet news source). But, the mere fact that conduct is legal outside a school setting does not mean that a school cannot prohibit and punish that conduct in its own rules. The closer case, upon which there is more division of legal authority, is under what circumstances a school can legitimately punish conduct away from school, for example, uploading rap lyrics about a teacher to YouTube from home without using any school resources to do so.
Not in this case First, we are having an appeals court case that is filed against the dismissal of the real case - there had been no trial. It's a research into if there was a clear error of the court, not who would have won. The Appeals court decided to send it back to the district court with pretty much a direct order to have a trial and solve the issiue, as the very last paragraph of the file shows: We conclude that Schwake stated a Title IX claim against the University because he plausibly alleged gender bias. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s order and judgment dismissing the claim with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings. Now, back to your quote. As this is an appeal case, the standard is different than in the district court. In this case, it tries to see if there might have been a case, which was dismissed erroneously. Page 15 and 16, where you cite, states (emphasis mine): Schwake’s allegations of a pattern of gender-based decisionmaking against male respondents in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings make that inference plausible. He alleged that “[m]ale respondents in student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at [the University]” “are invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” Schwake further alleged that he was “aware of recent [University] disciplinary cases against male respondents in alleged sexual misconduct cases who were all found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” The district court was not free to ignore this non-conclusory and relevant factual allegation. [your quote] The absence of this level of detail from Schwake’s complaint does not render Schwake’s allegation conclusory or insufficient. There is no heightened pleading standard for Title IX claims. See Austin, 925 F.3d at 1137 n.4. That point is particularly apt here. It may be difficult for a plaintiff to know the full extent of alleged discrimination in decisionmaking before discovery allows a plaintiff to unearth information controlled by the defendant. This sheds much more light upon the situation of the case: Schwacke sued and alleged something. The University alleges the contrary in their reply brief and asks the court to dismiss the claim. The court dismissed in March 2018. This was before any discovery has taken place: nobody was subpoenaed, nobody had to testify in court, nobody had to turn over any documents. We have only statements from either side. As the next step, Schwacke appealed the dismissal, and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, as it found clear error in the handling in dismissal, as one can see in the last paragraphs from each claim's section: Here, we are satisfied that Schwake’s allegations of contemporaneous pressure and gender-based decisionmaking establish background indicia of sex discrimination relevant to his Title IX claim. Considering the combination of Schwake’s allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination along with the allegations concerning his particular disciplinary case, we conclude that sex discrimination is a plausible explanation for the University’s handling of the sexual misconduct disciplinary case against Schwake. This is sufficient for Schwake’s Title IX claim to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Now it is up to Schwacke to get into discovery, subpoena the information from the university and go into the courtroom trial... Unless the parties settles. Sidenote By the way, the quote of the university refers to a different case from the 6th Circuit (where Ohio is), which they try to pull up as a model standard. This case is not binding for the 9th Circuit (where Arizona is) but could have been used as a model. Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) is somewhat similar to Schwacke, as it had been previously dismissed. However, the Title IX was restored by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and it was sent back to the lower court to have a trial. Here too, the standard was reasonable expectation or plausibility: Plaintiff “allege[d] facts showing a potential pattern of gender-based decision-making that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination.”
You don't really "solve" a problem with IRAC. It is a rubric for summarizing cases and writing about how a legal issue was or should be resolved. As noted by @Putvi it stands for issue, rule, analysis and conclusion. It is common when writing a court opinion, or summarizing a case. For example, you first state the issue: Does the statute of frauds bar claims for promissory estoppel to establish who owns real property? Then to state the rule: Promissory estoppel can overcome the statute of frauds for many purposes, but not for purposes of lender liability or conveyances of real property. Then to provide analysis: Promissory estoppel has been used to substitute reliance for consideration and other formal requirements such as the requirement of a writing in many contexts, but the lender liability statute of frauds was enacted with a broader application than the traditional statute of frauds and the statute of frauds for conveyances of real property is definitional in nature since a conveyance of real property doesn't have a meaning in the absence of a deed or other instrument of conveyance. Since determining who owns real estate and not just who is obligated to transfer it in the future necessarily involves a conveyance, the exception to the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds applies. Finally, you state the conclusion: Therefore, the statute of frauds bars claims for promissory estoppel to establish who owns real property. IRAC is a tool used for communicating legal concepts and conclusions, not for reaching those conclusions. Usually, the first stage of research is that you are presented with a fact pattern from which you have to "spot issues" and you may need to do legal research to use terminology that will be helpful and accurate to determine what the exact issue you want to resolve is and what the legal rule that applies to the case is. This often involves significant analysis prior to stating the rule or defining the issue. Also, it isn't uncommon in adversary practice to start with a conclusion, and see if you can find a way to describe the issue, rule and analysis that will lead to that conclusion. It would also be common to ask a junior attorney or law clerk to IRAC a large pile of cases to allow the senior attorney to focus in on which ones matter more quickly.
In the US, rights are independent of "responsibilities". But, responsibilities is a very broad concept: some aspects of responsibility are encoded in law, others are not. You have an absolute legal obligation to not murder or steal, as defined by the law. Some people say you have a social responsibility to put others before your own interest: this may be legally true in certain contexts, especially fiduciary contexts where your broker is supposed to make decisions on your behalf that benefit you (regardless of personal effect on the broker). Contracts are another source of obligations – you gain a right (access to someone else's property) in exchange for something, which may include standards of behavior. You thus have a legal obligation on SE to not be hurtful in your postings (enforcement is via suspension, in the worst case). The rights spelled out in the Bill of Rights are about the government – it says what the government may not do, it isn't a source of permission for you to exercise your rights. Generally, the traditional US understanding of "rights" is that they are inherent in people and are not "granted" by the government, so the Bill of Rights is a codification of what that means. Therefore, (morally, intellectually) irresponsible speech is also protected.
Confidential is simply a less "forceful" name than "privilege". If something is "confidential", this means that the recipient won't voluntarily blab it. This covers a multitude of sins. The rubric I was taught in law school is that even the front page headline of the New York Times if it relates to your case, it is confidential, because you don't want to tip off an adversary who may not have read that paper that day for some reason to the disadvantage of your client. If something is privileged, you can't be compelled to do so involuntarily. A "privilege" is a more "forceful" word. In practice, most stuff that you have a legitimate need to keep secret in the face of compulsory evidence gathering tools are privileged, and confidential matters not covered by a privilege are kept that way because it is best practice not to be source of an opponent's discovery of information and not because it can't be found any other way from something that someone has a legitimate reason to keep secret from someone in a lawsuit or criminal case (which is the main circumstance when privileges are invoked).
canada united-kingdom equity A court exercising its equitable jurisdiction may disallow a minor from impeaching the validity of a contract on the grounds of minority if the minor acted fraudulently: Wilbur v. Jones (1881), 21 N.B.R. 4 (C.A.). See also Stocks v. Wilson (1913), 2 K.B. 235: What the Court of Equity has done in cases of this kind is to prevent the infant from retaining the benefit of what he has obtained by reason of his fraud. It has done no more than this, and this is a very different thing from making him liable to pay damages or compensation for the loss of the other party’s bargain. If the infant has obtained property by fraud he can be compelled to restore it; if he has obtained money he can be compelled to refund it. If he has not obtained either, but has only purported to bind himself by an obligation to transfer property or to pay money, neither in a Court of law nor a Court of Equity can he be compelled to make good his promise or to make satisfaction for its breach. Fraud in this context is not limited to literal misrepresentations at the time of contract formation: "support may be found for the view that the mere fact that the minor wishes to retain the property which he has obtained while at the same time pleading infancy as a defence to a claim for its value, is fradulent conduct in the requisite sense... 'for an infant to attempt to obtain something for nothing is, in effect, fraud in the eye of equity'": John D. McCamus, "Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Minors' Contract" (1979) 28 U.N.B. Law Journal 89. In the circumstances you describe, if all is believed by the court, the court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to require the infant to return any benefit they obtained from the transaction. I cannot find an example case, but it also seems open for the court to enjoin the minor to stop disclosing the secrets. Common law and equity user6726's answer focuses on the limited nature of remedies for this wrong at common law. user6726 is correct that fraudulent misrepresentation has a fairly narrow conception in common law, and it is a good answer for pointing this out. My answer is complementary in that it focuses on potential equitable remedies. This is yet another example where the distinction between common law and equity is significant: common law produces a somewhat harsh result for the wronged party, but equity may step in to return some fairness to the situation. The common law rule is that a minor is not liable to restore benefits conferred on him under a contract which is unenforceable against him, even if the contract results from his fraudulent misrepresentation of majority. Chitty on Contracts, §11-056.
What is the remedy if a lawyer forges a client's signature on a will? Assume that a lawyer forges his or her client's signature on a will. What is the remedy for anyone who believes they've been injured by the execution of the will?
You can ask a law enforcement officer or district attorney to press charges. Generally, you cannot do so yourself. In practice, this kind of allegation is almost never criminally prosecuted. A prosecution would be particularly unlikely if the witnesses and/or notary confirmed his story that it was your father's signature or was authorized, and if the lawyer received no personal benefit from the will. Sentences for forging a will vary from state to state and sometimes depend upon the amount of personal benefit secured from doing so. Absent a huge personal benefit, it would probably be a minor felony punishable by a few years in prison or more likely, in the case of a lawyer without prior convictions, a deferred judgment, or probation and a fine. Proving that the signature is forged is extremely difficult and under certain circumstances a person trying to execute a will can lawfully have someone do it for them by directing the lawyer to do so in the presence of the witnesses (for example, if your father's hand was shaking too much to make it possible for him to sign his name due to a condition like Parkinson's disease). The witnesses to the will would be in a bad position to testify against him because they could face charges too if they witnessed the will despite knowing that it was not signed or authorized by the testator. You could contest the validity of the will due to an allegedly forged signature by raising a timely objection in a probate proceeding to have the will determined valid. In this proceeding, you would only have to show that it is more likely than not that this happened and the consequence would be that the will would be found invalid. In theory, you could sue the lawyer for damages to you caused by the alleged forgery, but only if you were harmed and realistically, only if the will was found to be invalid, which would eliminate any harm, unless the probate process has already been completed. Finally, you could complain to the attorney regulatory body in the state where the lawyer practices. If they found your allegations to be credible they would investigate. If they found that your allegations were probably true following an investigation and a hearing, they could suspend his license or disbar him.
The will is overridden by the new law. Suppose the owner had not died: then he would have to comply with the change in the law. When a person inherits property, they gain the right to that property which the originally had, and they do not gain any additional immunity to the usual obligation to obey the law.
If a candidate chooses to sign by simply typing their name as shown (as an example) in the first and second photos, they'd obviously have to stick to the same name and font when signing the contract and non-disclosure agreement. This assertion is incorrect. But what repercussions would it have in future? If the candidate has to sign any more company documents much later (signing physically with a pen on paper or even signing electronically), would it have to match with the signatures that were first made in the offer letter? No. Or would commonsense be accepted, that the signature is basically the candidate's acceptance of the terms of the agreement, and that the signature can vary? Yes. A signature is ritualized way of showing legal agreement. The content of the signature does not impact its legal validity. For example, it used to be commonplace for illiterate people to sign contracts, wills, and other documents prepared by someone else and read to them with an "X". So long as a signature is made by the person who is supposed to be signing it with an intent to legally agree to what they are signing, it is a valid signature. When a signature is obtained in a manner that does not reflect the intent of the person signing it to legally agree to what they are actually signing, that is a special category of fraud called "fraud in the factum". For example, substituting a deed to a house from a receipt for a package delivery at the last moment when the person signing it doesn't notice the switch, is "fraud in the factum". A court's conclusion that there has been "fraud in the factum" has the legal effect of causing the document signed to be treated as if it was never signed at all. In contrast, different legal consequences are present when someone signs a document, knowing what they are signing, for reasons that rely on false statements that have been made to them, which is called "fraud in the inducement." If someone tries to enforce an agreement that purports to be signed, and the person who allegedly signed it claims that the signature was forged by a third-party, inconsistency between the signature and other times that the person who allegedly signed something did so is evidence that the signature is a forgery. But it is not conclusive evidence. People's signatures change over time for a variety of reasons, sometimes dramatically in a short period of time, for example, in the case of a stroke or a hand injury. When signatures differ over time and there are allegations of forgery, then it is a question of proof for a finder of fact (i.e. a judge or jury) to decide if the alleged forgery is really a forgery. Many businesses that routinely accept small dollar value personal checks, for example, also take a thumb-print of the person signing the check in order to make it cheap and easy to litigate the question of whether a signature on a check is forged, and to discourage litigants from falsely claiming that a check was forged in the first place. This practice was established because lying and claiming that a check was forged used to be a tactic that was used on a recurring basis in civil cases and in criminal bad check passing prosecutions to escape liability.
Ah, the old "is this contract invalid (but still legally binding for the other party)"? You signed a contract with someone else. You do not dispute that it was you who signed the contract and agreed to it. You made it abundantly clear that there was a contract between you when you allowed him to do the work. This means one of the following was true: There was a mistake in the contract. What was followed was how it was intended. You signed a contract containing false information in an attempt to defraud someone. One of these will end up much worse for you. The fact that the work was not completed to the agreed upon standard could be considered a breach of contract- this is something a small claims court would decide.
I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.
My impression, and the plausible explanation in the absence of the actual facts, is that this was something that the attorney agreed to, in order to allow a skittish client to reveal information pursuant to a favorable plea agreement. The police probably insisted that the client be handcuffed to someone while doing this to prevent the client from fleeing. The attorney probably offered to do the job instead of a police officer, to be able to provide advice to his client and keep his client calm enough to do it, which might not have happened (sacrificing the favorable plea deal that the attorney negotiated) if someone else were in that role.
That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life.
Can I sign legal documents with a smiley face? Yes, that is lawful. A person's signature does not necessarily have to include the person's name or initials. What matters is that the signature reliably and unequivocally identifies the person who produces it, which apparently you have been able to prove by showing your driver's license. The Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edition) states in its entry for signature that "whatever mark, symbol, or device one may choose to employ as representative of himself is sufficient". It directs to the entry for sign, which likewise speaks in terms of "any mark, as upon a document, in token of knowledge, approval, acceptance or obligation". Accordingly, your signature qualifies as mark or symbol that fits these purposes. Your history of signing other legally binding documents that way further reinforces the authenticity of your signature. If it is legal, is it a bad idea? It is a bad idea to the extent (if any) that (1) others can easily forge your signature (notwithstanding that forgery or identity theft might be proved circumstantially); and (2) verifying your identity may cause hassle or annoyance to you and/or third parties. But this paragraph obviously is applicable to any and all signatures, not just those which at first glance may seem to be a joke.
Does the USAF have any legal implications of being created much after the Constitution? The Constitution discusses appropriations and regulations for land forces and Navy. Is it possible that the Air Force can benefit (or suffer) from this omission (on account of not yet being invented, of course)?
It is a vanishingly small possibility. First, someone would need to bring a case that an appropriation for the Air Force was unconstitutional. A Federal court is unlikely to find that it is because: The constitution would be interpreted broadly where the thing being considered did not exist when it was ratified. That is, the court would consider if, had the Air Force existed the drafters of the constitution would have wanted it governed by the Federal government or the State governments. Almost certainly they would decide on the Federal government. The Air Force is a direct descendent of the Army - originally being the United States Army Air Force. As such, an alternative line of reasoning for the court is that the army contemplated by the constitution consists of both the Army and the Air Force - the fact that they have been split is not relevant.
Art II, Sec 2, Cl 1 of The Constitution says of the president "and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment". The Constitution does not state any further restrictions on the presidential power, and there are no statutory limits, because, as observed in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 The power of pardon conferred by the Constitution upon the President is unlimited except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. The power is not subject to legislative control. Accordingly, presidents have written pardons on and with numerous different writing instruments. Insofar as there are no constitutional restrictions beyond the aforementioned, it is not required that a pardon be signed, or that it be on a tangible semi-permanent medium. It is impossible to know what such a pardon tweet would look like, beyond the limit on length. The one place where a presidential signature is required is under the Presentment Clause, that when presented with a bill that passed the two houses of Congress, "If he approve he shall sign it". Such a signature need not be actually written by the president, it may and often is written by an autopen. The question of the legality of autopen signatures for bills has not been presented to SCOTUS, but the Department of Justice has issued an opinion (July 7, 2005) that it is legal. I have failed to locate a repository of presidential pardons (the actual documents), so I do not know if, so far, all presidential pardons were written down and signed, though I would expect it to be so. The Arpaio pardon was signed (or auto-signed), likewise Obama's final mass-pardon on Jan 17, and previous Obama pardons were, but pre-Obama, DOJ does not provide any document.
Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
The US President is Commander-in-chief of the US military. The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; (from Article II section 2) That does not make the president the direct boss of every federal employee. The Congressional Sergeants-at-arms, in particular (and their assistants) are employed by, and responsible to, Congress, not the President. The Secret Service is part of the Department of Homeland Security (formerly part of the Treasury Department, until 2002) which is part of the Executive branch, but I am sure the President cannot order them to arrest someone who has not committed any crime. If such a thing were pushed to a direct confrontation, I have no idea where it would go, I hope we do not find out. Article I Section 8 grants Congress the power (among a number of others): To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings That seems to say the ultimately Congress controls the District, and sets the rules there. There is also the provision in Article I section two that: The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers; which would include the Sargent-at-Arms, I think. Article I section five says: Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member. which again seems to grant control over the situation to the individual houses of Congress. Article I section 6 says: The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. which again puts Congress out of the direct control of the President.
The only real answer is that the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the constitution, and specifically the argument that the 13th Amendment prohibits a draft for compelled military services has totally rejected that argument. For many years now the US has not used a draft, and it is obviously possible for the US to have an enduring and powerful military without any draft, which was perhaps not apparent to the Justices in 1918. A draft had been common in this country from the colonial period, through the Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In reaction to the problems during the Vietnam War, and the great opposition to any draft at that time, the US has not used a draft since, although it retains a legal requirement to register for a possible draft, and the legal authority to impose one should it be thought wise. Note that this was not because of the 13th Amendment. Note also that compelled service by the citizens (or residents) in a locality, particularly to fight fires and floods, when the usual forces are inadequate to that end, has been commonly used. Such compulsory service has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Also, as mentioned in comments, citizens can be compelled to do jury duty, which could in theory be considered "involuntary servitude" but has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th amendment. The answer by Trish (now deleted) thoroughly described the many differences between a slave and a drafted soldier. Still, drafted military service might be thought to be a form of involuntary servitude. But the Court (and the laws and other courts as well) have not treated it as such. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) the Court thought the idea that compulsory military service constituted involuntary servitude was so wrongheaded that it thought a very brief mention sufficient to refute this contention. It wrote (at 245 U. S. 390): Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. It is clear from the text of that opinion that the justices thought that the existence of a power to draft soldiers was essential to the implementation of the constitutional power (article I section 8): To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; The opinion discusses the history of compelled military service in the United States, in the colonies before there was a United States, and in Great Britain before that. The opinion says that: Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it. and Further, it is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. One may disagree, but that is the law of the land as interpreted by the final body authorized to make such interpretations, the Supreme Court, and it remains good law today.
Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.
Almost no constitutional right, for the most part, applies or gives rise to an all-encompassing right at all times. Schools can determine that certain times are off limits as activity during those times may interrupt the environment most conducive to learning, or for other articulable reasons; this is fine so long as it is applied evenly. Schools may say you may not hand out literature at certain times, only before or after classes, weekends, or put limits on the place or manner of distribution. There are examples of this premise that exist, pertaining to nearly every right, otherwise considered absolute. This is no different than the principle that while Americans enjoy the right to free speech, not all speech is protected at all times, or that the right to bear arms does not apply to all people, places, or environs.
In the US usa, at least, the concept of ex post facto laws, which is what you have described, are specifically prohibited: Article I, Section 9, Clause 3: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
Law case title convention: Why sometimes not "Plaintiff v. Defendant"? Quoted from this page: Plaintiff v Defendant - the "v" is pronounced "and" in civil cases and "against" in criminal cases However, I've seen a few cases not following this rule. For example, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where the party of Twombly is the plaintiff. Why is that?
In appellate cases, the party appealing is called the "petitioner", and the other party is called the "respondent". These cases are listed Petitioner v. Respondent. In your example, Twombly was the original plaintiff, and Bell was the defendant in a class-action. This initial action would have been referred to as Twombly v. Bell. The case was dismissed by the trial court. Twombly appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. This action would have been still been called Twombly v. Bell, since Twombly was the party petitioning for the appeal. The 2nd Circuit agreed with Twombly, and reversed the district court's decision. Bell, then on the losing side, decided to appeal to the US Supreme Court. Because Bell was the petitioner in this action, Bell gets listed first.
A civil case, however, is often decided by a "bench" (judge) trial. Under what circumstances is a civil case likely to go to a jury trial, and under what circumstances can a party either demand, or prevent a jury trial (aside from a contract where both parties waive their rights to a jury trial)? In federal court, there is a right to a jury trial in cases where the complaint is predominantly based on a "legal" as opposed to an "equitable" theory (roughly speaking claims for money damages v. claims for injunctive relief, but actually based upon historical practice in 18th century England with some select historical exceptions), if the plaintiff demands one with the filing of the Complaint and pays a jury fee, or if the defendant demands one with or shortly after filing an Answer and pays a jury fee, under the 7th Amendment to the United States Constitution and related civil procedure rules. Pre- and post-dispute contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial are allowed in most matters (although jury waivers are not allowed for a few kinds of statutory claims)1, and of course, one could also waive not just the right to a civil jury trial, but also a right to court system based dispute resolution with a valid arbitration clause. Many kinds of contracts like promissory notes and written leases, routinely include a jury trial waiver. Other kinds of contracts (e.g. cell phone contracts, bank customer agreements, and securities broker engagement agreements) routinely contain arbitration clauses. 1 The states of California and Georgia are exceptions to the general rule that contractual pre-dispute jury trial waivers are valid. A non-exclusive list of common cases where there is a right to a jury trial (in the absence of a contractual waiver of this right) include: Breach of contract Damages claims for breach of a lease Common law tort claims such as negligence, nuisance, defamation and fraud Civil rights and discrimination claims seeking money damages Patent and copyright infringement cases seeking money damages Non-preliminary claims to recover tangible personal property Will contests Termination of parental rights Eminent domain just compensation hearings The vast majority of personal injury claims are brought are common law negligence tort cases. A non-exclusive list of common cases where there is not a right to a jury trial include: Foreclosure of liens and mortgages Receiverships Core bankruptcy matters (but PI claims in bankruptcy get a jury trial) Dissolution of marriage, legal separation and annulments Child custody Adoption and paternity actions Change of name petitions Municipal or special district incorporation or annexation petitions Probate matters other than will contests (e.g. guardianship and custodianship and trust cases). Claims to reform written instruments Claims to invalidate contracts on equitable grounds (e.g. mistake) Fraudulent transfer lawsuits (even if for money damages) Disputes involving management of a corporation Suits seeking principally injunctive relief other than recovery of tangible personal property Quiet title cases involving real estate Preliminary relief in the nature of eviction, attachment, or preliminary recovery of tangible personal property pending a determination on the merits Juvenile delinquency cases Hearings on the right to bring an eminent domain proceeding Court of claims suits for money damages against a governmental entity Suits seeking to declare a statute unconstitutional or invalid Actions to invoke, assist, or enforce an arbitration clause Election law disputes not predominantly seeking money damages Partition cases (to divide or sell co-owned real estate) Cases seeking an accounting (e.g. between partners in a partnership) Tax refund lawsuits (Phillips v. Commissioner , 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 2011 WL 2177248 (Cal., June 6, 2011)). The nature of counterclaims asserted is irrelevant to the jury trial right in federal court. But, in federal court, the case can be dismissed pursuant to a FRCP 12 motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings (basically for jurisdictional reasons or for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted), or can be resolved because all of the claims that give rise to the jury trial can be resolved as a matter of law based upon undisputed facts stated in affidavits under FRCP 56 (motion for summary judgment), or can be dismissed as a discovery sanction pursuant to FRCP 37, or can be dismissed due to a settlement reached by the parties pursuant to FRCP 41, or can be dismissed for failure to prosecute. If a jury is properly demanded and is not dismissed before trial, then the case will proceed to a trial by jury, but the jury will decide only "legal" claims in the case while the judge will decide any "equitable" claims in the case, when there is a jury trial. In most U.S. states and territories (other than Louisiana, Commonwealth court cases Puerto Rico and territorial court cases in American Samoa) which have civil legal systems based upon the French, Spanish and German legal systems respectively), the right to a civil jury trial is essentially the same, but arises under a state constitution, a state law, or a state court rule, since the 7th Amendment does not apply to state court proceedings. But, jury trials are often prohibited is small claims court cases. In actual practice, civil jury trials are quite rare (and have grown much more rare in both state and federal court over the last several decades). About 75% of civil jury trials involve personal injury tort causes, civil rights cases, or fraud. There is a right to a jury trial in contract cases (although many contracts contain pre-dispute waivers of the right to a jury trial), but it is much less common for either party to demand a jury trial in a breach of contract case that does not involve fraud than it is in tort or civil rights cases are involved. A jury is demanded is almost every case in which part of the damages sought include non-economic damages (e.g. pain and suffering, or emotional distress), or exemplary damages (i.e. punitive damages) are sought. For example, here is a breakdown of bench and jury trials held in 2005 in Colorado in state and federal court combined based upon their respective annual reports (which is fairly typical although jury trials were slightly less common across the board in 2016): Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Cases Infraction Final Hearings 8764 Traffic Trial To Court 187 (33%) Misdemeanor Trial To Court 298 (31%) Juvenile Trial To Court 281 (Delinquency and Parental Rights Terminations) (89%) District Court Criminal Trial To Court 28 (Mostly Felonies) (3%) Federal District Court Criminal Trial To Court 15* (41%) Subtotal: 809 (excludes infractions) (29%) Traffic Jury Trial 386 Misdemeanor Jury Trial 651 Juvenile Jury Trial 35 (Parental Rights Terminations) District Court Criminal Jury Trial 857 (Mostly Felonies) Federal District Court Criminal Jury Trial 22 Subtotal: 1,951 Criminal and quasi-criminal jury trials make up about 85% of all jury trials in Colorado. Civil Cases Civil Cases Small Claims Trial To Court 3,485 (100%) County Court Civil Trial To Court 1,236 (99%) District Court Civil Trial To Court 280 (50%) Evidentiary Federal Magistrate Civil Hearings 9 (100%) Evidentiary Federal Magistrate Prisoner's Case Hearings 7 (100%) Federal District Court Civil Trial To Court 36* (46%) Subtotal: 5,053 (94%) County Court Civil Jury Trial 17 District Court Civil Jury Trial 277 Federal District Court Civil Jury Trial 43 Subtotal: 337 Civil jury trials make up about 15% of all jury trials in Colorado In national statistics, about three-quarters of general jurisdiction state trial court jury trials are in personal injury cases. The available data makes it impossible to determine if this is true in Colorado, although there is no reason to think that Colorado is atypical in this regard. If Colorado is typical, about 95% of jury trials in Colorado are for criminal, quasi-criminal or personal injury cases, while all other cases account for about 5% of jury trials. Excludes 30 pre-trial evidentiary hearings and 7 evidentiary sentencing hearings. ** Excludes 36 evidentiary hearings in preliminary matters and motions, etc. In Colorado, small claims cases are up to $7,500 and county court has a $15,000 jurisdictional threshold. There is no dollar limit on federal question cases in federal court but diversity cases in federal court must have $75,000 or more in controversy. As the statistics above illustrate, a significant minority of criminal cases are tried in bench trials. About 3% of state felony trials are bench trials (the federal court data includes both bench trials in federal misdemeanor cases and bench trials in federal felony trials). About 30% of misdemeanor trials are bench trials rather than jury trials. More than 95% of civil cases in both state and federal courts, and more than 95% federal criminal cases are resolved by default, dismissal on motion, voluntary dismissal, or settlement before trial. About 80%-90% of state criminal cases are plea bargained and therefore do not go to trial. Federal civil cases are proportionately more likely to go to a jury trial than state general jurisdiction court civil cases.
The legal standard is whether the allegedly infringing mark is confusingly similar to the mark that is allegedly infringed. This is a mixed question of fact and law usually determined by the trier of fact (which is the jury, in a jury trial where there is a colorable dispute of fact regarding the issue).
There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.
They have the same standard of proof but different onus The legal system places the onus of proving an allegation on the person making the allegation. For your example, this is A if they are suing B or the government prosecutor if B is being prosecuted. The standard of proof is “beyond reasonable doubt” if B is defending a criminal prosecution and “balance of probabilities” if B is defending a civil prosecution or a lawsuit. Courts have historically been reluctant to define these terms further because doing so can lay grounds for an appeal if the judge oversteps so they mean what their plain English formulation means and what they mean precisely in any given case is one of the things the trier of fact has to decide. For A or the prosecutor to win, they have to meet this burden for each and every element of the offence or cause of action; if they don’t, then B wins. So, B doesn’t have to offer a defence at all and will still win if A doesn’t meet their burden. If B does offer a defence then the trier of fact compares the evidence of each side and decides which they prefer and therefore whether A has met their burden. A jury doesn’t have to give reasons for their decision; a judge does. In general, the decisions of the trier of fact are not appealable unless there was no reasonable basis in evidence to support the decision. For example, the evidence of B might not be believed - this is fine, unless the reason for not believing it is that B has a beard and everyone with beards are liars. Options 2 and 3 are simple matters of comparing evidence and deciding which is preferred. Option 1 is different; it is what’s called an affirmative defence. Here, A has met their burden because B conceded. Now B is relying on the position that they had a legal excuse, that is B is alleging a position and B has the burden of proving it. Now, the burden on B is always “balance of probabilities” because B is not alleging that anyone committed a crime so they don’t have to reach the criminal standard.
The Supreme Court does not handle hypotheticals. The court has interpreted Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution, the Case or Controversy Clause as a limit on the powers of the judicial branch. The courts have jurisdiction over various types of cases and controversies but only those listed in the Constitution. This limits courts to hearing actual cases and prevents them from issuing advisory opinions. Additionally, in order to bring a case, the plaintiff must have standing to bring the suit. You can't sue the government just because you don't like a law (well, you can, your suit will just be dismissed because it lacks standing). You have to show That you have been, or will imminently be, injured (injury-in-fact) That there is a direct correlation between that injury and the law (causation) And that a favorable court decision will redress the injury (redressability) As a practical matter, the courts are already overwhelmed by the number of actual cases that come up and the Supreme Court can only hear a tiny fraction of the cases they are asked to hear. If they added the ability to hear hypothetical cases as well, the court could easily be overwhelmed by Senators and Representatives asking them to weigh in on every remotely controversial bill or amendment before Congress or interest groups bringing cases for speculative grievances.
A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.
Can defense request findings of fact before resting? Is it possible for the Defense to avoid presenting affirmative defenses (like Self Defense) before the Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime? If so: How? No, no and not applicable. A verdict is a singular declaration by the jury (or judge) that the state has or has not proved their case. Affirmative Defence These are all affirmative defenses which defeat or mitigate the consequences of the unlawful conduct and the onus of proof lies with the Defence, not the Prosecution. An affirmative defence must be pleaded in a timely manner. If the Prosecution fails in their burden to prove the unlawful conduct the affirmative defence does not get engaged. This is a threshold decision point for the trier of fact and the judge should so instruct the jury. Of necessity, affirmative defences require some admission of fact, however, these facts may not be in contention anyway. Where they are in contention, it requires a strategic choice by the defendant as to whether to use the affirmative defence or not. Is there some theory or principle that illuminates why this is not considered a violation of the Defendant's fifth-amendment rights? Because the defendant is not compelled to make these defences.
Can a landlord forbid subletting if not stated in the lease? Situation: I don't want to renew my lease, but found a place that's available 2 months before my current expires. My solution: I found a replacement tenant, and offered to do whatever cleaning is necessary for them to move in. The unit would be vacant for 0 days. I also am willing to remain legally responsible for rent, and wait 2 months to get my deposit back. I'm not sure if I could be more accommodating as a tenant. Result: Refusal. The manager said I cannot terminate or sublet. They did say I could pay the remaining 2 months rent up front and end the lease. The lease: My lease explicitly disallows early termination by the tenant. Period. The lease is silent on subletting though. Not sure if it matters, but there is a "use" clause restricting, the use to residential property by myself and wife. Question: Can I legally allow my replacement tenant to move in, pay rent to me, and I pay the landlord? It doesn't seem right that the landlord can verbally add sublet restrictions not listed in the lease. Caveat: I realize I can just do this without the landlord's notice, and they all they could do is evict / terminate the lease, and they probably wouldn't. I'm not afraid of that risk, but I'd rather not actually break the law even if I can technically get away with it. Also, I live in Atlanta, Georgia.
Break the lease. Leave early and advise the agent, "I am leaving early in breach of the lease, I have found person X (references and police check attached) who is ready, willing and able to sign a lease on the same terms and conditions for the balance of my term or longer. I freely acknowledge that this is a breach of the contract but, in the circumstances the landlord has suffered no damage; I am willing to settle any claim for breach of contract for $1."
Presumably the lease contains an automatic renewal provision that says unless you give notice 60 days in advance, you commit to another month (otherwise, you can just leave at the end of the month). The landlord may have made a math error, or they may be misinterpreting what the agreement says. Most likely it says that the duration of the lease is a month, meaning a whole month, which can have between 28 and 31 days. Unless otherwise stated in the agreement, that means "to the last day in any given month". A 60 day notice provision states the minimum number of days to stop automatic renewal, not the maximum or exact number of days. The language of the agreement will most likely say something to the effect that the duration of the lease is a month, and that is what the courts will enforce.
No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons?
A "land contract" is not a way of renting property, it is a way of purchasing property on an installment basis without bank financing. It is Ohio's version of what in some other places is known as "contract for deed". See "What is a Land Contract in Ohio" and "How Land Contracts Work" The actual law is Section 5313. In a land contract, the buyer has equitable but not legal title. The buyer normally pays all taxes and fees, and is responsible for maintaining the property, just as if s/he has bought the property. But if the buyer defaults, all payments and equity would be forfeit to the seller. Until the buyer has paid 20% of the purchase price, or made 5 years of payments (whichever comes first) a single missed payment constitutes default and can lead to the buyer being evicted with all payments to date going to the seller, the buyer coming out of the deal with nothing. Also, if the seller still has a mortgage and defaults, the buyer may lose everything paid to date. The buyer does not have the protections that a lease gives a tenant, nor the protections that legal title gives a purchaser via a traditional mortgage. Land contracts are often used when the buyer cannot qualify for a mortgage. The buyer pays interest, and it is often at a higher rate than the current rate on a mortgage. Land contracts are often a form of predatory lending, but for some buyers they make sense. A buyer needs to carefully review the contract with a lawyer knowledgeable about land contracts, and consider the risks and benefits of this form of financing. As I understand it, there cannot be a valid land contract for one apartment in an apartment building. A land contract must be for title to the land and all fixtures, including all buildings, on it. (There was at one point some unclarity if the question referred to an apartment. It is now clear that it refers to a house, so this statement is not relevant to the OP, but may be to others.) It is not clear just what the OP's landlord (LL) has in mind. It may be that LL plans to offer a "land contract" in which the purchase would be completed only after a very long time, with the idea that the OP would simply default when s/he wanted to move. Such a default could harm the OP's credit. There seems no benefit to the OP in such a scheme compared to a lease, unless LL will lower the price significantly, taking into account maintenance costs and taxes, which OP may well be expected to pay under a land contract. Note that a landlord can't legally force a tenant to sign a document cancelling a lease, or to sign whatever s/he will call a "land contract". Nor can s/he cancel the lease without the tenant's consent except for good cause as specified in the law (such as not paying rent). S/He could become uncooperative on other matters if a tenant doesn't do as s/he wants. If a tenant does cancel his or her lease, s/he will lose some rights. Others are guaranteed by law as long as the tenant is paying rent. If one signs a "land contract", what happens depends on its provisions. OP needs to very carefully consider just what is being offered, and its risks and any possible benefits. Details of the contract will matter. No matter exactly what LL has in mind, this is not at all a usual procedure for a landlord. OP or anyone in a similar circumstance should be very careful.
Yes, they can. How would they enforce it? It seems like the HOA would have to be able to request to see the tenant's credit report, background check, proof of income, and rent checks to make sure the rules are being followed. The HOA might have to make a rule giving it the right to audit members on pain of a fine or something. What is to stop the HOA from making the requirements arbitrarily high to effectively prevent renting? (Minimum credit score set to 850, for example.) Nothing. It could ban renting entirely. This comes with one important caveat. If the rental restrictions have the intent or effect of violating fair housing laws, the regulations may be void as contrary to public policy. In some cases, a total ban on renting would expose the HOA and its members to less risks than a rule that does this by implication or via selective enforcement of the rules. Basically, this means that regulations designed to bar renting based upon protected categories under the particular acts that apply (e.g. race, disability, sex, marital status, religion) would be invalid. Also the HOA has to get its members to approve the rule and not repeal it. If the rule is so draconian that it reduces the fair market value of units, the members may decline to adopt such a rule or may get rid of it.
Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?”
In Virginia there is a distinction between a tenant and an authorized occupant. An authorized occupant is a person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit with the consent of the landlord, but who has not signed the rental agreement and therefore does not have the financial obligations as a tenant under the rental agreement. A tenant is a person entitled only under the terms of a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others and shall include roomer. There is a third category, guest or invitee which means a person, other than the tenant or person authorized by the landlord to occupy the premises, who has the permission of the tenant to visit but not to occupy the premises. Such people who live there would not be invitees. Clearly, you can have others living with you who are not on the lease, if the landlord agrees. The landlord's main concern regarding credit rating is probably financial responsibility, and if you qualify, having people live with you who have low or no credit rating is unlikely to make any difference. There may be other concerns, such as background checks or increases utility costs). Virginia law does not specifically allow "unauthorized occupants", i.e. occupants not approved by the landlord, nor does it specifically disallow such occupants. Leases often include a provision that addresses this matter, prohibiting unauthorized occupants. Supposing that the lease is silent on the matter (not likely) and the landlord wanted to compel the other occupants to leave, the procedure would be to tell the tenant that the unauthorized occupants must leave. Then if you do not comply (do not get them to move out), the landlord could start the procedure of evicting the lot of you, and the question would be whether the court would find that you have a right to let unauthorized other people live with you. I can't find any applicable case law, but it is unlikely that the court would find such a right. Tenants have special statutory rights, as do authorized occupants under the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. A court would not find that the rights of an authorized occupant extend to an unauthorized occupant, which means that the landlord's rights as property owner are dispositive of the matter.
Your question is not particularly clear, but it sounds like you're describing a situation where: The tenant doesn't pay the rent The landlord files an action to evict the tenant, and The tenant files a request for a jury trial. The act of filing for a jury trial doesn't guarantee that the tenant won't be evicted, but it will likely make the eviction process more time-consuming and expensive for the landlord. I'm assuming the tenant is entitled to a jury trial--otherwise this would be useless as a stalling tactic. In that case, the question you really want answered is, can the landlord force the tenant to waive any right to a jury trial by contract, for example in the lease? In California, the answer is no. The linked document suggests that you may be able to specify some form of ADR, which would avoid the expense of a jury trial, but the California courts won't let you get away with a straight jury trial waiver.
Can a group continue with app development without the member who originated the idea? Following situation: 5 friends started an app together: The idea guy, a designer, backend, android and iOS engineer. The friends worked on the app for roughly a year however the idea guy started getting more and more angry about the project taking too long to finish. Eventually he started threatening us to shut down the project if we don't work faster and tried to replace members. We refused and he eventually 'stopped' the project by removing access to all servers and cancelled paid accounts to Github and Co (most of them were held by shared accounts where he wasn't even the one paying them) Now, the 4 of us are not happy about this at all since we worked for 1 year almost every day on this thing and in our opinion this 1 guy does have no right to decide whether the project is dead or not so we want to finish it without him: Put together some money, re-purchase servers and so on. The idea guy incorporated a real company on paper but none of us signed anything, nor did he pay any of us. There are also no patents or anything like that. (When we asked him a few times to finally get the paperwork done he always avoided the question which seemed to be like he never really intended of sharing anything with us from the beginning.) The idea guy also mentioned very strongly that this idea is his property and he will pursue legal actions if we do anything without him. Certain assets like sounds, a few graphics and the project name were created by him which is obviously his IP. If we were to remove this, could the 4 of us legally continue with the project under a different name?
There is no IP in ideas Any code would by subject to copyright (who owns that copyright is itself a convoluted and separate question), however, if the 4 of you abandoned any existing code, notes and images and start over you would have no legal impediment.
You need a lawyer There is no magic phrase to do what you want. The company will care about defending their assets, while you will want to defend yours. Only a lawyer will be able to tailor the condition that makes sense based on what your job's domain covers and your side projects. It is entirely possible that your personal projects conflict with your employer's, and you must then put your personal projects on hold or risk getting sued. e.g.) developing two pieces of software that does the same thing. Your lawyer will be able to advise on how that looks and what to do. No random strangers on the internet can give you accurate advice.
I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made.
You don't say what jurisdiction's patent laws you're interested in, and priority dates can differ in different schemes. I'm answering as to U.S. law only. In the United States, under the current hybrid "first-inventor-to-file" system, the priority date--the date that determines who "wins" if there are multiple claims to a specific invention--is, with some exceptions that I won't go into, the date of your first application. In other words, the date that the PTO got it in the mail. Once your application is submitted, it is--again, with some limitations I won't get into--prior art for the purposes of any later-submitted application. They can't get another application later, grant it first, and then deny your application based on the later-submitted application. Your application date would still win out. Could someone in the USPTO slip your application out of the stack, fudge the dates, and convince some other company to submit a similar application to get priority over you? Not as a practical matter, no. The USPTO isn't one guy in a room; it's a large organization, and the person who opens the mail, types in your application details, and sends you a receipt, isn't the same guy who knows whether your invention is any good or not. And, frankly, very few patentable inventions are going to be worth someone risking their job and/or jail time over--especially when there would be significant evidence of the misconduct--for example, your patent agent's files. So what are the chances that the examiner on your patent: 1) Is a nefarious character who has lived a life of public service long enough and wants to go rogue; 2) Has a friend in the mailroom who is also an expert in the field of your invention; and 3) Has a conduct in industry who is willing to break the law for the rights to your invention? Slim to none. And if you have an invention that is really so revolutionary that it's going to be worth so many people risking so much to steal it, odds are there will be other evidence that you were the inventor.
Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal.
Germany may be different, however in the United States this would be considered work-for-hire and the employer would be the rightful owner of the source code. Regardless of jurisdiction, and from a more practical point of view, you are better off not having a copy of the source code. Using it as reference or example in the future could easily turn into (unintentional) copyright infringement. If, in the future, you write code you would like to be able to freely keep and reuse in any project, make sure the owner/employer licenses it using something like the BSD, MIT, or ISC license.
How to send a document restricting its spread? In theory you could have the company sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) prior to sharing the details of your project. However, your chances of enforcing the NDA seem negligible except maybe for George White's suggestion about a patent application. It is otherwise in your best interest to think of another way of showcasing your skills set. Assuming that the company signs your NDA, you have no realistic way to prevent the company from misappropriating (i.e., stealing) your idea(s). You will have no access to the company's systems to ensure that it has deleted all copies and records that could result in unauthorized disclosure. Even if you find out that the company misappropriated your information, it could be too late because the statute of limitations expired, and/or too costly --not just in terms of money-- to bring court proceedings for misappropriation.
There are basically two kinds of things one could do. One could assign or transfer intellectual property rights and contracts related to the app to the entity, or one could license the intellectual property rights to the entity. Generally speaking, in a related party transaction, everything should be in a signed writing, and a notice of the transfer of an intellectual property right that has been registered or filed with a government agency should be provided to the government agency in question. Since there are potentially copyright, patent, trademark, publicity, and contractual rights that might be associated with the app, each aspect which exists should be transferred or licensed, as the case may be. While the forms to do this aren't particular long, the concepts involved and correct terminology are subtle, so this would not be a wise undertaking to attempt on a do it yourself basis.
How does the U.S. Code organizational structure work? The U.S. Code has the following organizational structure: Title > Chatper > Subchapter > Part > Section A good example of that is shown on the Cornell law site. How are these components actually defined? What specifically is a title, chapter, subchapter, part and section?
This detailed guide to the U.S. Code is the source for this answer. Titles are the largest organizational units, with each title focused on a fairly broad, but closely related area of legislation. For example, Title 17 is Copyrights, Title 35 is Patents, Title 18 is Crimes and Criminal Procedure. Within each chapter, the main unit of organization is the Section (§). For example, 35 USC §101 is the section that outlines subject-matter-eligibility for patents. Between the Title level and Section level, the U.S. Code uses chapters, subchapters, parts, and subparts, not necessarily in that order, and not consistently from title to title. Title 35 is divided into Parts, then Chapters, then Sections. Title 17 is divided into Chapters, then sometimes Subchapters, then Sections. Title 26 is divided into Subtitles, then Chapters, then Subchapters, then Parts, then Sections. In the end though, you always get to Sections. Sections can be subdivided quite finely into subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, clauses, subclauses, items, subitems. Here is an example of a section that is organized quite finely: 26 USC §401. It includes divisions all the way down to subclauses (the things identified with capital roman numerals: I, II, III).
This appears to be a fairly straightforward construction. Section 9(2) and 18b share a number of requirements, so 18b points back instead of repeating them. But not all requirements are shared. In particular, requirement 3 (covering pensions) does not apply to newly-graduated students. That's not strange since students are not paid wages. Also, they're not subject to the 5 year residence permit requirement. As for "sentences 2 to 6 shall apply accordingly.", this covers waivers to these requirements.
There is no one answer, but here are some examples. India is famous for deriving general principles of more important constitutional law concepts that can be used to find constitutional amendments to be unconstitutional. The U.S. has not gone to that extreme but does derive constitutional protections for the overall scheme of the constitution and from the legal context of the nation when constitutional provisions were enacted that don't obvious flow from the text of the legislation (e.g. the 11th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) has been interpreted to establish state sovereign immunity that the text of that amendment does not expressly provide for). Another somewhat weird source of law in the U.S. (constitutional at the federal level and usually common law at the state level) is that the 21st century right to a jury trial in a civil case depends upon whether the claim would have been litigated in England in 1789 in the courts of law or the courts of chancery in England. Customary international law is a thing. It also often arises from international practices or diplomatic norms, rather than tribunal adjudications. In the jurisprudence of the legislative process and some aspects of federalism, historical practices that have not been litigated are frequently resorted to as a source of law. For example, the question of whether a legislature is in recess has been resolved based upon historical practice. Prior to the French Revolution, customary practice was an important source of law in France. Customary practice was an important source of the English common law. In many British colonies and former British colonies (e.g. South Africa and Kenya and Sudan), lower tribal or village courts were often expressly permitted to apply local custom in their decision making. In the U.S., a collection of secondary authority texts compiled by the American Law Institute, an affiliate of the American Bar Association, called the Restatements, which summarize in codified form, various subjects in common law, are often used by courts as a source of law where there is no case law on point in a jurisdiction. In civil law countries, the leading legal treatises of law professors are an important source of interpretive authority of the civil code and other major codification of the law. Most Islamic countries provide in their constitutions that Islamic law is the highest authority and supersedes any secular law including other provisions of the constitution to the contrary. In many parts of the United States, mostly in the west, but also in Florida and Louisiana, property rights arising under Spanish/Mexican law, or under Native American law continue in force even though they derived from legal systems other than U.S. statutes and common law. See, for example: Tribe: We have "aboriginal title" to these lands in New Mexico because we had exclusive occupation of them from around 1300 to 1650, and then still used them a lot since then. Further, the "sovereign" (the U.S.) has never properly taken them away, so they're still ours. District court: No. Tribe on motion to reconsider: How about just these bits of the lands? District court: Still no. Tenth Circuit: There's still a claim for one of the bits. Concurrence 1: No bits for you. Concurrence 2: Two bits. (Source)
As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do.
See Article VI of the Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. This seems to me that it pretty clearly establishes the Constitution as taking the place of any previous laws. In particular, Article XI of the Articles is in conflict with Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). The Constitution says that Congress's action is required to create a new state, and doesn't mention any exceptions. The Constitution's terms presumably take precedence. If Canada wanted to become a state, it would have to be admitted by Congress under Article IV Section 3.
Yes, explicitly. It even laid out the procedure and method (i.e. on equal footing) of these new states. Specifically, Article IV, Section 3, the "Admissions Clause": New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. Note that many of the things in your quoted section are forbidden to the States, but are explicitly granted to the Federal Government (in various sections). So it's not "this shall not be done", but rather "the individual states shall not do these things; Federal Government shall be the only one to do these things if they can, as else where they may be banned from doing so".
5 CFR 2635.102 provides definitions for 5 CFR Part 2635 (which contains 5 CFR 2635.502). (h) Employee means any officer or employee of an agency, including a special Government employee. It includes officers but not enlisted members of the uniformed services. It includes employees of a State or local government or other organization who are serving on detail to an agency, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 3371, et seq. For purposes other than subparts B and C of this part, it does not include the President or Vice President. Status as an employee is unaffected by pay or leave status or, in the case of a special Government employee, by the fact that the individual does not perform official duties on a given day. Subparts B & C pertain to gifts and range from §2635.201-304, whereas the section you are asking about is in Subpart E. So §2635.502 expressly does not apply to the VP. The "why" part is more challenging. The statutory authority invoked for these regulations is 5 USC 7301, 7351, 7353, 5 USC App, acts passed by Congress. The rule-making rationale is in 57 FR 35042, which does not overtly invoke any specific statutory authority for this specific item. In contrast, Subpart B is the implementation of 5 USC §7353, which governs gifts to federal employees, and (d)(2) of that section says the term "officer or employee" means an individual holding an appointive or elective position in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of Government, other than a Member of Congress. In other words, the mixed definition of "employee" (the VP is an employee only for subparts B, C) under the regulations is because Congress passed some laws that included the VP, but did not pass a law that required non-appearance of conflict. Such a regulation would be within the authority given the president in 5 USC 7301, which simply says that "The President may prescribe regulations for the conduct of employees in the executive branch". Since there is no Congressional authority to subject the VP to 5 CFR 2635.502, it is written to exclude that person (also the president).
§1 states what the design of the flag shall be (§2 mandates addition of stars when a new state is added). In essence, 4 USC 1-2 define what the flag is, and the rest of that chapter addresses what you can do with it. These are laws (passed by Congress), not rules or customs. That is, it's not a custom that the flag is 50 starts and 13 stripes, it's the law. POTUS cannot unilaterally change the law. (4 USC 3 also specifies punishments for certain kinds of flag abuse, and this too is outside the scope of that the president can do by declaration). 4 USC 5 in fact states that "The flag of the United States for the purpose of this chapter shall be defined according to sections 1 and 2 of this title", and that The following codification of existing rules and customs pertaining to the display and use of the flag of the United States of America is established for the use of such civilians or civilian groups or organizations as may not be required to conform with regulations promulgated by one or more executive departments of the Government of the United States. §§6-9 specify standard flag etiquette (violation of which incurs no legal punishment), and those are the rules that the president can rewrite.
Is it OK to name our app generically? We're creating an app and want to name it generically, like Calendar. Calendar is already trademarked for alcoholic beverages except beers. We want to make sure we're doing our due diligence in choosing a name. What else should we consider beyond: Corporate Entity Names App Store Names Trademarks Internet Domain Names Social Media Usernames
I am answering primarily with regard to the U.S. Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.) and state trademark laws in the U.S., but except as noted, these concepts are widely honored internationally in trademark law. As a general rule, generic names cannot be trademarked. Thus, you can't trademark "liquor store" for a liquor store, or "Calendar" for a calendar, but you might be able to trademark "liquor store' for a copying machine line, or "Calendar" for a perfume. Sometimes a trademark can be obtained for a stylized logo incorporating a generic name (e.g. "liquor store" in bold pink 48 point comic-sans), but to be valid, the trademark must disclaim any assertion of rights in the mere genetic words themselves. Also, sometimes a trademark that is descriptive but not truly generic, like "Palisade Red" for red wine made in Palisade, Colorado (as opposed to the truly generic name "red wine"), can acquire what is known as a "secondary meaning" through exclusive use over a period of time while registered with the Patent and Trademark Office, without contest from anyone else. If it meets these requirement it can win an entitlement to trademark protection. But, the nuances of this particular route to trademark protection are particular to U.S. Lanham Act (which is the name of the federal trademark law in the U.S.). Domain names and entity names in a particular jurisdiction are somewhat different. While it is possible for two competing products or firms to share a generic name, it is not possible for two owners to have precisely the same domain name or precisely the same entity name in the same jurisdiction, even if the firms seeking the same name sell completely dissimilar types of products. For example, there can only be one: "Calendar.com" domain name, even if one company uses the name "Calendar" to sell calendars and the other company uses the name "Calendar" to sell perfume. In those cases, however, it is relatively straightforward to determine what names are and are not taken.
The standard for fair use of trademarks is as follows: (1) the product or service in question is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark (2) only so much of the mark as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service is used (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. I think you might run into a problem with (1). In other words the trademark owner would argue that you could have used fake trademarks to satisfy your product description needs, so you are using their trademark unnecessarily.
united-states Names and short phrases are not subject to copyright protection. A list of such phrases is probably not protectable either. Game mechanics are not protectable either. While short phrases can be protected as trademarks, they can be so protected only if they are used to identify a product or service, or to advertise that product or service. Terms used within the game are not normally subject to trademark protection. Even if such a term did have trademark protection, using it within the game would not be using it "in commerce" or "in trade", that is to identify or market the game. A brand name, a slogan, or a logo are typical trademarks, the name of a thing within the product is not. In short, a list of character classes would not, in the US at least, infringe copyright or trademark protections on another game.
If your app is published under US law, then the DMCA would apply, just as if it was a web site. The DMCA doesn't say anything about what particular technology the distributor is using. TO be protected by by the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, you will need to include a notice in your app that you accept takedowns, and provide an address or method by which they can be sent, and an agent who will receive them. (You can be your own agent if you choose.) When and if you recieve a take down notice, you must check if it is valid in form. According to this Wikipedia article, a takedown notice must include: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (See the actual text of the relevant section of the law.) If you receive (through your designated agent) a valid takedown notice, you must promptly remove the content and notify the poster (or you can instruct to poster to remove it, but you must do so yourself if the poster does not). If the poster then files a valid counter notice (see the linked sources above) with your agent, you must notify the sender of the original notice, and if the sender does not notify you of a copyright suit filed within 10-14 days, you must restore the content. Provided that these rules are complied with, the host gets a 'safe harbor" and cannot be sued for copyright infringement, nor for the act of taking down the content. I believe that the agent must be registered with the US copyright office. The courts have not ruled on just how quickly an ISP or other host must react to the takedown notice. It must be "expeditious". Moreover, Under the DMCA (i) 1) (a) The host must have, post, and enforce a policy denying access to repeat infringers, or lose safe harbor protection. The text of the provision is: (i) Conditions for Eligibility. -(1)Accommodation of technology. —The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider— --(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers;
The use of the icon must be specific to the function of the icon within the Microsoft software. ... is pretty specific. What you have described isn't so it is not permitted by the licence.
Names cannot be copyrighted at all, in any country. They can, however, be protected as trademarks. The general idea is that if one uses a name to identify a product or service, or a creator of products or services, others cannot use the same or a similar name to identify their products or services in such a way that a reasonable person might be confused into thinking that the two came from the same source, or one was endorsed or approved by the other. Trademarks are limited in scope to a particular country, A name that is protected in Canada, say, will not be protected in the US unless steps have been taken to protect it there. In some countries a trademark must be officially registered to get any protection, In others, such as the United States, merely using the mark can give a degree of protection, although registration give more protection. Each country maintains a trademark registry which can be searched for existing marks. There are search firms that will do such searches for a client, and also search for marks in use but not registered, for a fee. Trademark protection is generally restricted by the type of product or service involved. An anti-virus program, say, called "Guard dog" would probably not interfere with a fantasy game called "Guardog". A private security service of the same name would pretty surely not interfere. The range of protection depends on how widely known the product is, but "software related" is a very wide area, and except for famous marks, a mark protected in connection with one area of software will not be protected in a very different area of software. Names that a purely invented, such as Kodak, are more strongly protected than descriptive marks such as "Best Pizza" Particularly famous names such as "Microsoft" get additional protection even outside their usual areas, so "Microsoft Pizza" might be a problem. Logos and other graphic marks can also be protected as trademarks, but that is not what the question asked about. The styling of a trademark, such as a particular font, choice of colors, and so on, can also be protected. This is called "trade dress". A disclaimer making it clear that a somewhat similar name is not related, and the is no affiliation can help avoid avoid an infringement suit. For example: Pear brand kites are in no way associated with, sponsored or approved by the makers of Pear smartphones. On this site we cannot give specific legal advise, so we cannot evaluate whether a specific proposed trademark would or would not infringe an existing mark. It might be well to consult an attorney with trademark experiences before finally choosing a name and doing marketing under it.
I don't think so. While JSON stands for "JavaScript Object Notation", it doesn't say that. So the term "JSON" isn't infringing on a trademark for "JavaScript". To sue somebody because of an alleged trademark infringement, one needs to prove that the offender abused a trade name of the suing company in a way to make the public believe the offending company was related to the suing company. Nobody is even trying that by just using a file format. The file structure itself was developed as an open standard, so they can't claim any rights on that. I have not heard about a company claiming rights in file structures recently, because the data is considered the property of the user, not of the company that wrote the program it was created with. And users are often no longer accepting file formats that can only be read by a specific (expensive) application from a particular company. They want to be flexible to change their vendor and keep the data.
Some people make the Kft. to LLC translation that you suggest and it would probably not be illegal to do so if other text did not imply that it was anything other than a Hungarian entity. From a practical perspective, the best solution is to spell out the company type in Hungarian, possibly in a footnote. For example, suppose that your company is called "Magyar Delponeous" (because it is easier to explain by example). You could say "Magyar Delphoneous*" or "Magyar Delphoneous, Kft.*" in the body text, with a footnote at the bottom of a page that says following an asterisks that: "The company is a Hungarian Kft. (korlátolt felelősségű társaság), a non-stock business form similar to a U.S. limited liability company or a German GmbH". It would also be proper to say "Magyar Delponeous, a Hungarian limited liability company" in unabbreviated form, because the most common translation of "korlátolt felelősségű társaság" is "limited liability company". But, I would disfavor using the form "Magyar Delphoneous, LLC" because it could implicitly suggest a non-Hungarian place of entity formation where the abbreviation LLC is used, and avoiding any implication of being misleading is best. KFC is not the common or correct abbreviation for this form of entity.
How far does Programming Language license go? I know that source code can have a license. For example, if my code is released under GPL(e.g. v2), there are some restrictions that say what anyone who wants to use my code must do. I've found a tutorial for SDL(lazyfoo). There's FAQ. One of the points mentions "translating the code to the other programming languages". The author strictly prohibits this. Is this backed up by law? Can an author of the code forbid me from rewriting his code into other lanuage, and if yes, what are limitations of what can I (re)write?
A prohibition on "translating the code to the other programming languages" is a prohibition on creating a particular type of derivative work. The right to create any derivative work is an exclusive right of the copyright owner. 17 USC 106(2) They can licence or give that right to you in part, and with limitations. You are limited from taking what would amount to a "substantial similarity" compared to the copyrightable elements of the original. For computer programs, US courts use the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.
Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.
The GPL doesn’t require you to distribute the software to anyone. The only requirement to distribute something is that if you do distribute the software to someone as a binary, you must also distribute the source code to them at no additional charge. The focus of the GPL is ensuring freedom for people who have copies of the software, not ensuring that the software is available to the world at large. Because your final deliverable is source code, you’ve already complied with the requirement to distribute source alongside object code. You have to comply with the requirements in section 5: a) The work must carry prominent notices stating that you modified it, and giving a relevant date. b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is released under this License and any conditions added under section 7. This requirement modifies the requirement in section 4 to “keep intact all notices”. c) You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License to anyone who comes into possession of a copy. This License will therefore apply, along with any applicable section 7 additional terms, to the whole of the work, and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged. This License gives no permission to license the work in any other way, but it does not invalidate such permission if you have separately received it. d) If the work has interactive user interfaces, each must display Appropriate Legal Notices; however, if the Program has interactive interfaces that do not display Appropriate Legal Notices, your work need not make them do so. You have to license the software to the company that hired you under the GPL v3 (since parts of it were licensed to you under GPL v3), so you can’t stop them from distributing it to the world. But nothing requires you to distribute it to the world.
Is this limitation enforceable? Sure it is; you agree to a TOS or EULA with the company to use the API, and that's a legally binding contract. If the contract stipulates limits to caching, that's enforceable in civil court by lawsuit (possibly criminal court, which will depend on jurisdiction). What if the end-user is the one caching the data on their end? If your end users might be caching, that's something you may need to outline in your own TOS/EULA to adhere to the API's stipulations. And, the API may not allow you to serve API data to your own users; read it and see. the information provided by the API is not proprietary,... That doesn't matter; you're using their API and service. If you don't like that, you need to write your own API or develop your own queries for the information. I'm designing a web application that will make use of a (non-free) third-party API. If that App is going to be distributed and used by others, talk to a lawyer about the API and have them write a TOS/EULA for your App; you run the risk of significant legal liability with a publicly distributed App that uses someone else's API, paid or free.
The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.
The first thing that people need to do is to quit over thinking it. That being said, I'm going to see if I can tackle your problems one by one, before summarizing and providing my own opinion: Many users don't care if their code is copied. I'm like that. I left a couple comments on Shog9's post that read this: Good point: Licensing does not prevent careless or malicious use. I'm surprised about how many people are thinking that this license will let them steal their code, because it's already happening right now. I don't want to sound pessimistic, but when thousands of people break a license/law/contract, it's a bit of a lost cause. You're not significantly damaged in a direct way, so honestly, let it go. All I want is to make sure that no one can come up to me if something of mine screwed something on there side. Aside from that, I don't care about people who don't attribute me: chances are, they have no moral sanity, and I will appreciate the people who do, and help me out. As it is, I'm 16, I share what I know with a good heart, and in a well-spirited manner, and at the end of the day, knowing that I was able to help someone out makes my day. I don't mind if my code is copied. I know that people will copy my code whether I like it or not, but I also know that there will be people in the world who will say "thanks", and will try to attribute me where possible. I feel good about that. That being said, I don't care. But the person who uses my code does. The license that affects all Stack Exchange posts are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike license, or CC BY-SA. Code contributions don't fit well with this. This excellent post on Open Source explains why it's discouraged for code. What these people want is a code-friendly license, so that they can stay in the clear when it comes to copyright issues. The next thing they want, is for someone to come after them over some licensing issue. You may think that people are good, but you never know the world around you. They can be evil. For other users, they don't mind their code being copied to another post, as long as there is a link to the post and a mention of the original author. Most people post with good intention. There's not that much of an issue from a legal perspective either: The license allows people to copy and paste into answers of their own, and since the license remains the same, there's no issue to get into. The license allows it, and contributors kind of have to acknowledge it. I don't think anyone cares what happens to code that is less than 3-4 lines at least. I can probably agree. Such code probably wouldn't be eligible for copyright anyway, since it's so trivial. Many jurisdictions have a "Threshold of Originality," which means that simple things can't be under copyright. Stack Exchange does not probably want people to own the code they submit. For example, Stack Exchange has (and probably wishes to retain) the right to keep even deleted posts in the visibility of the high rep users (even if the author is against it). Wait what? You may be right that it is in Stack Exchange's interest to host content. After all, they get hits, which helps them as a business. It is illegal for companies to host illegal content. If somebody sees objectionable, copyrighted content hosted on Stack Exchange that they would like removed, then they need to file a DMCA Takedown Request. This is also why moderators, like myself, cannot process legal requests. The reason why Stack Exchange doesn't act themselves, even if they see something that is copyrighted and objectionable, is because it's a form of liability. When YouTube began removing copyrighted content themselves, they received a wave of lawsuits (If you remove some, you need to remove all. Why didn't you remove mine? being the argument). The plaintiff's won those, and when YouTube did nothing, they weren't liable at all. If a user wants to have their content taken down, it's tricky. You need to look at the Terms of Service for Stack Exchange: (quoting Section 3) You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange When Stack Exchanges gets your content, you grant them an irrevocable license to your contribution. This is pretty standard across a lot of sites: it's just a way to secure data and stay in the clear of licensing issues. At the same time, it doesn't seem fair for SE to acquire complete ownership of the content. The user must still have the final say, if the content is to be used for purposes not already agreed upon in the licence. They don't. What users have done is that they have provided a license of their content to Stack Exchange. This is done, again, through their Terms of Service: You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. The user grants a license to their content to Stack Exchange, but they do not assign or relinquish copyright. The code still belongs to them. It's important not to conflate the user contribution policy, with copyright assignment. You are still free to add an additional license to your content (known as dual or multi-licensing), and have a copy for your own use. Stack Exchange will always host a copy licensed under the CC BY-SA license. Stack Exchange can expect a high level of decorum and respect for laws from its users. At the same time, it cannot expect redundant attributions anywhere and everywhere, because one of its main aims is to not waste the users' time. Not only Stack Exchange expects it, but many copyright laws in various jurisdictions require it too. There's a concept known in many jurisdictions known as moral rights. These are rights that are irrevocable, whether you like it or not. Generally, these include attributions, disclaimer of liability, and other rights as well. Even if your work is in the public domain, you still retain these moral rights. If memory serves me right, the right to be attributed is revokable under United States copyright law. Therefore, attribution becomes more a courtesy, when the right is revoked. Licenses such as CC BY, and CC BY-SA still require attribution as a part of their licensing terms. What defines attribution is generally up to the person who uses the content. If memory serves right again, one can not demand how to attribute. There should be a clear-cut way to determine what is code and what isn't. The code formatting indicators on SE may not be adequate because some users simply use backticks, or 4-space indented text for other not-so-codey text. Personally, I feel like making the entirety of a post under both the Creative Commons license and whatever proposed code license they use is the best option, and allow people to use moral judgement to determine the most appropriate license. The concern comes about people who lack such judgment. I bet these same people don't follow the existing license anyway - and are a lost cause. We made it through! There will always be debate on the license of choice. Some people want the GPL, a license that's apparently closer to the status quo of Creative Commons license (I disagree that it's a good match), while other's want permissive licenses, such as the MIT or the Apache licenses. I'd prefer the permissive type, since it allows use in closed-source applications, and grant more rights (i.e. less restrictions) to the people that use them. I'm not going to right much because my hands are tired, but I'm sure if you've got more questions about the open source licenses themselves, you can probably ask on Open Source Stack Exchange.
The lack of a copyright notice is irrelevant, what matters is whether permission is granted. The material cannot be copied, except if the copyright holder grants you permission to copy. However, you might be able to create something legal and satisfactory on your own, because the underlying ideas are not protected. By way of analogy, you cannot copy the Turbo Pascal Numeric Methods library without permission, but you can study the logic of a module and write your own FFT routine. The status of something as "declaring code" is entirely irrelevant to the court's decision in Google v. Oracle. What is relevant to the court's finding of fair use is that the content constituted 0.4 percent of the entire API, and the fact that the copied lines of code are inextricably bound to other lines of code that are accessed by programmers, allowing programmers to bring their skills to a new environment. The court found that he amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose.
Your understanding of the GPL is a bit off. GPLed code doesn't generally force you to GPL the output of the program, but that's just because the output of the program is normally not a derivative work of the program. For instance, if you write a novel in Emacs, your novel is an entirely original work. The fact that you used Emacs as a tool doesn't mean that your novel is somehow based on Emacs. This generator is different. It generates sprites by putting together art assets made by the program's creator. That means that the output contains a substantial amount of content made by the program creator, which means that it would likely be covered by the program creator's copyright. If the content was licensed to you under the GPL, you normally have to abide by GPL restrictions when you redistribute the content or incorporate it into your own program. Copyright holders can, if they want, grant additional permissions to their content and allow you to incorporate that content into nonfree software. For instance, the GCC compilers have an additional permission for their runtime libraries to let you use them in any GCC-compiled code; without that permission, GCC could only be used to compile GPL-compatible code. But unless the copyright holder has granted those permissions, when program output contains large amounts of their copyrighted content you're bound by the GPL when using it. In this case, the program specifically says that the art is dual-licensed under GPLv3 and CC-BY-SA-3.0. Since the generator's output is a combination of premade art assets (the buttons just let you tell the program which art assets to combine), the output is a derivative work of those assets. You can't use it unless your use is compatible with the GPL v3 or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (either works, since dual licensing lets you pick either license).
Seeking advice regarding illegal compulsory purchase of local government on property in Finland I am fighting for my rights to keep the ownership of my land falling to the local municipal government in Finland. The act of the local town zoning and construction committee has resulted in a decision by the municipal government against our right to keep our private property. We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. I have evidence in my possession that the original plans made by the zoning and construction committee were based on false information about the ownership of my land. The evidence consists from official documents proving the ownership of my land and statements from the members of the local town zoning and construction committee that they were given false information at the time decisions were made. In other words, the local municipal government is illegally trying to take my land. The law concerning land use and construction in Finland states: Zoning must not cause any significant declining in the quality of living environment which is not justified taking into account the purpose of the zoning. Zoning must not also cause excessive limitations or harm to the landowner which can be avoided without discarding the goals of the zoning. In the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17 it is stated: Right to property Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. Under the decisions of the town zoning and construction committee my land consisting from 700m2 will be subject to a compulsory purchasing for the planned 20000m2 recreational area. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. My question is: what can I do in my situation? The highest court in Finland did not even allow me to complain even though I have made thorough and detailed documents of all the facts concerning this matter proving that the decision was made on false grounds. All help and suggestions are deeply appreciated! UPDATE: I am posting my reply here to answer user @ohwilleke. First of all, let me thank you once again for your reply, even though it does not comfort me :) In Finland you won't even get answers or justifications from government officials, you're simply told how things are from now on regarding your property (in practice I mean). I want to comment some of the points you made and perhaps see your further thoughts about them. About the lawyer, no we have not hired a lawyer. We have consulted though many acquaintances who are lawyers. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. There is one question this comment makes me want to ask: Is it considered as illegal or legal action to justify a decision based on falsely provided facts? As a hypothetical toy example, if the municipal government (in my case this is < 10 people) decides to increase e.g. taxes based on a made up study in order to get economical advantage, then is this considered a legal action if the procedure is implemented legally? In other words, is it legal to use fake evidence to support decisions in government? This is what has happened in my case, and I have proof to back this up. The point is, the courts have not even considered this. They simply rejected it, without any kind of justifications. You might see why I am a little concerned about this. The local municipal government is abusing its power for its own interest, which is the story as usual. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. I do not understand this, could you perhaps elaborate this a little bit more? :) I'm keen on understanding who makes this decision in practice and is it required for them to justify their decision with facts or not? Or is it simply a matter of opinion like it seems to be. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." What the decision of the local government will lead to eventually (because of the zoning) will result in the decrease of the value of my property, after which they will do a compulsory purchase of the land. In other words, they are using the law to firstly, decrease the value of my land and secondly, to buy it off with a lower value. The definition of this might not be robbery, but practically this is exactly what it is.
We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances.
The ordinance is not very specific about how notice is to be given: therefore, it need not be in writing, and it need not be sent by mail. It would not be surprising if the "notification" came in the form of a city person inspecting the reported obstruction, walking up to the house and knocking and finding nobody home (thus triggering the "In case the owner cannot be found" condition), whereupon the city removes the rocks. That clause does not mean "In case we do not know who the owner is", it almost certainly means "in case the owner cannot be contacted immediately". Article III is in general about obstructions on streets, which are not allowed, except by permit in section 78 under "Permit to Obstruct Traffic Lane". Assuming that no obstruction permit was obtained, what usually happens is that an officer is sent to tell the owner to remove the obstruction (more or less immediately), and if nobody is at the site whom they can tell, they probably won't go any further (e.g. asking neighbors where the owner is). There is no legal definition of "reasonable time", instead the law simply takes that to mean "the amount of time a reasonable person would require". It would thus depend particularly on the size of the obstruction and the volume of traffic. One measure would be how quickly the rocks were moved -- if it was a matter of days and there was no notice, written or otherwise, then there would not be the kind of urgency that might justify the "We knocked and nobody was home" version of notification.
As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine.
In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved.
A tenant has a right to "live in a property that’s safe and in a good state of repair". There are additional regulations possibly applicable in your situation if this is a "house in multiple occupation", summarized here. "Hazards" are explained here. However, these rules pertain to the condition of the building, not other tenants (except that "overcrowding" is also a hazard). They also say you should "report anti-social behaviour to your local council". It is legal to rent a room in the UK to a person convicted of a violent crime, so it would also be legal to rent a room to a person who hasn't committed a crime (assuming he is legally in the UK). If the person did not engage in actual anti-social behavior towards you, there is nothing to report to the local council. The landlord has no affirmative duty to disclose such a fact, and it might be illegal to do so under the Data Protection Act, since this is "sensitive personal data".
This is a live political issue. Currently, the various datasets are incomplete and have known accuracy issues. Considering a particular parcel of land: It might not be in the Land Registry at all. About 85% of land in England and Wales is registered, and less in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scottish registered land might only appear on the paper "Register of Sasines", as opposed to the more recent electronic database, or potentially in even older county-specific sasine registers. The owner might be a company, partnership, trust, etc., rather than a natural person. The ownership and control of that company (etc.) can be hard to trace. Companies House data is not verified; companies can be incorporated overseas; the trusts register is not publicly searchable; things can be muddled. Raw data might not show that a dozen properties, each owned by a single company that owns nothing else, are in fact ultimately controlled by a particular person of interest. Different people may own the freehold, or a leasehold, or have various other forms of ownership or control. Even a long-term tenancy may be of interest for database purposes. Because of continuing interest in anti-money laundering, tax evasion, and general accumulation of wealth, there have been plans to have a new "register of beneficial ownership". Such a register would record, for each plot of land, the name of the human beings who actually own and control it in the end. In the anticipated structure, each of those people would have an identifying number, and so we would get your proposed reverse index where you could look up a person and see what they owned. The register introduced by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 is the "Register of Overseas Entities" (ROE). However, as the name suggests, it only covers companies/partnerships/etc. from outside the UK. It's operated by Companies House. Overseas entities who have dealt in UK land since 1999/2014/2022 (depending on which part of the UK the land was in) have to list their beneficial owners. Because this is new, it is also not very complete yet: it only went live on 1 August 2022 and no penalties apply until the deadline of 31 January 2023. In Scotland, the "Register of Persons Holding a Controlled Interest in Land" (RCI) is meant to do the same but not just for overseas entities. It is live since 1 April 2022 and the initial registration period ends on 1 April 2023, so again it may not be very complete just yet. There will likely be more political tussle over potential creation of a more extensive UK-wide register. Until that exists, this is a known problem with the extent of current data. You can get a partial view but even that will be frustrating when it comes to the most interesting chunks of property.
This an instance of the general rule ignorantia legis neminem excusat: ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the municipal ordinances state that a particular place does not allow parking at certain times, then if you park there you have violated the law and will get ticketed. There is no requirement that there be signs prominently posted saying that you must obey the law in this particular location. A law might itself require there to be postings, for example speed limit law pertaining to school zones typically are stated in terms of "posted" boundaries. Assuming that the ordinance doesn't have such a "as posted" requirement, you have no legal leg to stand on, and the burden must be shifted to your political leg. If, for example, you were in Pennsylvania, 75 PaCSA 3353(d) permits local parking ordinances: The department on State-designated highways and local authorities on any highway within their boundaries may by erection of official traffic-control devices prohibit, limit or restrict stopping, standing or parking of vehicles on any highway where engineering and traffic studies indicate that stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or where the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. Signs are kinds of traffic control devices. Since PA does not statutorily prohibit overnight parking, any local restrictions on overnight parking would require signage. Thus restriction such as this one that "The following vehicles shall not be parked between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on the streets...", applying to commercial vehicles among others, would require a sign. That borough has an interesting ordinance stating that In the event of a conflict between the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale and the provisions set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3351 through 3354, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale shall control. Generally speaking, local ordinances are subordinate to state law, so this provision is legally questionable (although: the borough does not actually deny the signage requirement, so technically this is not a conflict, it is just ignoring state law – if there is no signage). The borough could of course argue that they were unaware of the state requirement to post no-parking signs, but ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
You are free to ask them to stop. If they do, great. If they don’t, you legal options depend on if they are legally able to make such noise at that time or not. I am not familiar with UK law but typical laws give wide powers to the owners of infrastructure to construct/repair it. Again, typically, permits may be required but exceptions exist for urgent work. If they have such a permit (or don’t need one) your legal options are nil. If they don’t you can go to court seeking an injunction to stop them until they do.
What type of lawyer would I need to help me deal with issues of academic misconduct? What can stop a university from doing whatever they want and screwing students over in terms of accusing them of cheating, plagiarism, or a misunderstanding of professor authorization of essay re-submission in a second class, trying to take a student's degree or credit away after the course is completed/graduated with little evidence and no proof of circumstantial evidence that truly happened at the time of the incident? Since they are private and go by their own rules and apparently there is no standard policy for how all universities are supposed to deal with issues. This is in St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada. Thanks.
What stops a university form doing anything it wants is the contract you entered with the university when you enrolled. (I'm writing from the perspective of a student, not faculty). You and they are bound by the contract, and part of that contract will be a clear outline of academic processes such as ethics, grading, class requirements and test taking, as well as penalties for cheating and plagiarism. That contract will be outlined in your student handbook. That handbook and contract will also clearly outline (or should) the grievance process and remediation for both students and faculty. Since you feel that the university is not being fair, you need to start with investigating that formal grievance process and look into gathering your materials and filing a complaint. The college will have an office that handles such grievances; you need to find it and talk to them. If they are a private college, yes, they do have their "own rules," but some aspects of federal, provincial and local civil and criminal law will still apply. Be aware that the school contract may bind you to arbitration - which means you have to deal with the college on all matters - and you may not be able to go to a public court on a civil matter. A lawyer will be able to tell if you are bound by arbitration and if so, that's the end of the road. If not, a lawyer will tell you if you have a criminal or civil case. In any event, the grievance process at the U will more than likely be your first step. If by chance criminal misconduct is found during the grievance process, then a federal, provincial or local prosecutor would be involved; we would assume the university would be forthcoming if that need appeared.
A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.
This refers to state law (not federal law) RCW 9A.60.070, titled "False academic credentials". It is against the law to issue a false academic credential, and also to use a false academic credential. Getting to the penalty part, issuing a false academic credential is a class C felony, but knowingly using a false academic credential is only a gross misdemeanor. A false academic credential is a document that provides evidence or demonstrates completion of an academic or professional course of instruction beyond the secondary level that results in the attainment of an academic certificate, degree, or rank, and that is not issued by a person or entity that: (i) Is an entity accredited by an agency recognized as such by rule of the student achievement council or has the international equivalents of such accreditation; or (ii) is an entity authorized as a degree-granting institution by the student achievement council; or (iii) is an entity exempt from the requirements of authorization as a degree-granting institution by the student achievement council; or (iv) is an entity that has been granted a waiver by the student achievement council from the requirements of authorization by the council. Such documents include, but are not limited to, academic certificates, degrees, coursework, degree credits, transcripts, or certification of completion of a degree. It then depends on the way in which you modify the transcript. One thing you could do is add text indicating that you received a BA degree, when in fact you did not receive any degree: this would be a false academic credential. If you want to go all the way for a felony charge, you have to issue and not just use a false academic credential. To issue a false credential, you have to do one of the following things: (a) Grants or awards a false academic credential or offers to grant or award a false academic credential in violation of this section; (b) Represents that a credit earned or granted by the person in violation of this section can be applied toward a credential offered by another person; (c) Grants or offers to grant a credit for which a representation as described in (b) of this subsection is made; or (d) Solicits another person to seek a credential or to earn a credit the person knows is offered in violation of this section. whereas the misdemeanor of using a false credential is (paraphrasing para 2) falsely using or claiming to have a credential issued by an accredited institution for certain purposes. Those purposes include advertisement of a business, or with the intent to get a job, license, promotion, admission to educational program, or getting a government position. However, there is also a law against forgery, which is if a person with intent to injure or defraud: (a) He or she falsely makes, completes, or alters a written instrument or; (b) He or she possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he or she knows to be forged. A forged instrument is defined as "a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed, or altered", and a "written instrument" is (a) Any paper, document, or other instrument containing written or printed matter or its equivalent; or (b) any access device, token, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, or other evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege, or identification. and forgery is a class C felony. You can be charged with both crimes.
This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.
Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.
What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction.
Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to "lawyer up" if we want to be safe? If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, if they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle. If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff. Otherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case. If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them. As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.) To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear.
Being disabled has nothing to do with it. If he is harassing students then after there is a complaint and investigation, then he can be banned from campus, and arrested for trespassing if he returns. But there would have to be a formal complaint made to the authorities first.
Are you required to act to preserve evidence that will otherwise be destroyed? Deliberate destruction of evidence is a crime in most jurisdictions. However, consider the following scenarios: Log files that could be used as evidence are periodically deleted unless you act. On the third incorrect password entry data is automatically erased, and you witnessed the police about to enter the third wrong password. You set up a dead man's switch that will incinerate your personal papers if not reset. You are arrested and asked for the papers, but decline to produce them. The police believe you attacked someone with knife, and your fingerprints will be on it. You wait until the knife has rusted and the fingerprints are unrecoverable before revealing its location. What are the legal consequences of not acting to preserve evidence in these cases?
I will assume that your question pertains to the United States. In other jurisdictions, different rules could apply. Context matters. The usual penalty for spoliation of evidence (the technical term for what you describe) in a civil case is a judicial determination or jury instruction that the evidence destroyed would have established the relevant part of the other side's case had it not been destroyed. In all of these cases, your failure to take affirmative action to preserve the evidence once you knew that there was a bona fide likelihood that you would be sued could be held against you by making an adverse determination that the evidence would have been unfavorable to you and possibly also money sanctions. You could not be held in contempt of court for this if these events happened before a case was commenced. In a criminal case, where you are a defendant, you have an absolute right to not incriminate yourself and do not have to take affirmative action to preserve evidence, although this right is limited to criminal cases and your failure to preserve evidence can still be held against you in a civil case. Certainly, in situation 4 you are a potential criminal defendant, so the 5th Amendment protection would apply. In situations 1 and 2, where the precautions were not put in place to facilitate a crime, the 5th Amendment would protect you if you were a potential criminal defendant, but suppose that you are a bystander like a third party ISP representative. If you were a third party, at a minimum you would have to be put on notice of the police need for the evidence, would probably have had to have had the police ask you for the evidence, and of course, would have to be aware that the destruction was imminent and have the power to prevent that destruction. If all those conditions were present, you might be guilty of obstruction of justice (there are precedents for inaction knowing of the consequences in the fact of a police question amounting to obstruction of justice). In situation 3, this kind of action pretty much amounts to being an accessory to some crime before the fact (unless someone was successfully deceived by a very elaborate story) and would likely make anyone involved part of a conspiracy to commit the crime that the destruction of the papers would facilitate. While the papers themselves might have been evidence of a crime or civil wrong, the destruction of the papers might itself be considered part of the crime, regardless of what could be established regarding the actual content of the papers.
This is a good question, although it discusses crimes. This answer generalizes the question by giving a response for civil violations. In the united-states, where federal civil-procedure is followed and provided the tape isn't solely for impeachment purposes (i.e. it also documents other elements), there are certain disclosures required at the beginning of discovery governed by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). If a party withholds one of these disclosures, under Rule 37(c)(1), the court is able to take a number of actions, including throwing the evidence out. This could, of course, result in the withholder's conviction. Yet, if the court does not go to that extreme, it may impose the sanctions in Rule 37(b). So the withholder's attorney might try to make a case that the evidence is, indeed, solely for impeachment purposes.
Intent would greatly factor into the case. As mentioned, possession of child pornography is illegal. There was a case, where a man had inadvertently downloaded such images. In the case, it was shown that there was sufficient evidence that it was accidental and without his knowledge. Presumably, if you by happenstance created an identical code through encryption/compiling, there would be a lack of evidence of intent or evidence of your intended use. For example, your stored password manager file happens to store data identical to an illegal image. The password manager output is provable and repeatable to show that it was simply circumstantial. If you have hundreds of such outputs that all "just happen to be illicit images" you would probably fall on the wrong side of reasonable doubt. As to whether you can keep the data, the programmers for the password manager would probably update their system to modify the output to avoid bad press. The general idea is that the "illegal number" is so incredibly specific that accidental cases are very unlikely to occur, and if it did, that there would be forensic evidence indicating intent and use.
It doesn't really require anything beyond your say-so that it is what you say it is; that would be enough to satisfy the requirement for authentication. From there though, as with any evidence, it's going to be up to a jury to decide how much weight to give the evidence. So the more you can show them to prove that the record is real -- and to knock down any questions the opposing party will raise -- the more likely they are to believe it. So if you just bring a printout that looks like it could easily have been forged, the jury may be thinking about that. If you can bring in a data forensics expert to say the document couldn't have been faked, that's probably going to help. Addendum: As a practical matter, I wouldn't expect this to be much of an issue. Unless you're dealing with a savvy opposing party, the authenticity of e-mails seems to be generally assumed. Courts (1) generally assume that parties aren't perpetrating frauds; and (2) are generally run by judges with little to no technical savvy, who don't realize that one could forge an e-mail, let alone all the different ways it could be done. I've personally entered countless e-mail printouts without them being questioned, even though either party could have just gone down into the e-mail thread and changed what the other side had said earlier in the conversation. To avoid the issue, though, it might be that sending the e-mail to a Gmail account would elimimate the question.
Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!
Doing something to a dead body that would kill it if it were a living person is not murder, manslaughter, or any form of homicide in any country that I know of. It may be a crime to mutilate a corpse, or some similar provision. It may also be attempted murder. For example, in the US state of Oklahoma, section §21-1161.1 provides: A. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and willfully desecrate a human corpse for any purpose of: Tampering with the evidence of a crime; Camouflaging the death of human being; Disposing of a dead body; Impeding or prohibiting the detection, investigation or prosecution of a crime; Altering, inhibiting or concealing the identification of a dead body, a crime victim, or a criminal offender; or Disrupting, prohibiting or interfering with any law enforcement agency or the Office of the State Medical Examiner in detecting, investigating, examining, determining, identifying or processing a dead body, cause of death, the scene where a dead body is found, or any forensic examination or investigation relating to a dead body or a crime. B. Upon conviction, the violator of any provision of this section shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections for a term not more than seven (7) years, by a fine not exceeding Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment. In addition, if the person thought that the dead body was a living person, and tried to kill that person. There may be a charge of attempted murder on which a conviction might be possible. See "attempted murder" of a dead man? for details. In general, if property (such as a cell phone) has been stole from a person, that person my reclaim such property, and doing so is not theft. However, a person is not in most jurisdictions permitted to enter someone else's property, to break and enter, or to assault a suspected thief in order to recover property. A person who actually observes a theft (or other serious crime) is in many jurisdictions allowed to pursue the thief/criminal and use reasonable non-deadly force to stop and detain the thief pending the arrival of law enforcement, who should be promptly summoned. The details vary widely from place to place. The use of deadly force, such as a gun, is generally not permitted, except in proper self-defense, but again the details vary widely.
The common law adversarial system is just that: the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The defense is not obliged to call evidence at all. They are allowed to though: they will do it merely if they feel that the prosecution evidence needs rebuttal — in order to discredit the evidence or, at least, raise that "reasonable doubt".
If that which you describe in your comment ( Facebook post as only basis for warrantless search) is, and can be shown, to be the only basis for the search, and there was no evidence of a crime in plain view when they arrived.....then yes, it is likely the search and all evidence acquired from the search would be excludable. As to whether the individual could still be prosecuted, that depends if a case could be built independent of the evidence collected during the search.
Would a conspiracy to break patient confidentiality be a crime? Inspired by this question on The Workplace, I wonder if a company that hired a doctor to spy on patient/employees would be committing a crime in the US. And would the doctor be committing a crime by doing so? Details: Patient/employee means a patient of the doctor and employee of the company. By "spy" I mean the company says, "Employee: this doctor is our health provider, go to him for all your health care needs, with a small or even zero co-pay;" and, "Doctor, we will send our employees to you, and you will in turn provide all records of their visits to us, while telling our employees (your patients) that the records would never be shared with us."
Without the patient's permission, the doctor cannot legally share the patient's health information with the patient's employer. Your Rights Under HIPAA: [...] without your authorization, your provider generally cannot [...] give your information to your employer Remedies for confidentiality violations include civil actions, administrative fines, and criminal charges. (Remedies for Violation of HIPAA Privacy Rights and Medical Confidentiality, HIPAA Violations and Enforcement, What is the Penalty for a HIPAA Violation) Individual states also have confidentiality laws that are violated by the hypothetical in the question.
Under 45 CFR 164.402 a "breach" is the acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information in a manner not permitted under subpart E of this part which compromises the security or privacy of the protected health information. Disclosing PHI to random people is not permitted under subpart E. Then then allow that it can be deemed to not be a breach if they can "demonstrate[] that there is a low probability that the protected health information has been compromised based on a risk assessment of certain factors – there isn't any clear yes/no rule as to how you could say that disclosing PHI is not a breach. If they discover a breach, they must notify the affected individual. One ploy would be for them to stick their heads in the sand and be careful to not discover: but §164.404(2) says A covered entity shall be deemed to have knowledge of a breach if such breach is known, or by exercising reasonable diligence would have been known, to any person, other than the person committing the breach, who is a workforce member or agent of the covered entity So if, for example, they had been told that person X has moved, a reasonably diligent person would know that sending PHI to the old address will result in a breach. The Sec'y of HHS must also be notified of the breach, though this can go in the annual report if the breach involves fewer than 500 people. The affected individual can also file a complaint with HHS.
Your data is not anonymous since from the picture of the face the individual can be identified. It would be anonymous, if the face was blurred and other possible identifiable information was removed. Of course, that would defeat your purpose. Please note that, in any case, Anonymization Techniques are, themselves, a type of personal data processing that requires a legal ground, and achieving real anonymization is not a trivial matter (see Article 29 Working Party's opinion 0829/14/EN WP216 on the subject). 1. The face of a person includes biometric information, which is defined in article 4 (14) among other types of personal information regulated by the GDPR as: "personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physio­logical or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data". A facial recognition software's purpose is exactly to perform a specific technical processing based on the facial features of the persons, to achieve a unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. Article 9 of the GDPR includes biometric data among the types of prohibited processing, unless one of the exceptions in § 2 applies. There are 10 types of exceptions among which: consent of the person, employment context, personal data made public by the person, scientific or historical research,... (each exception having its own conditions). You should check that you comply with one of these exceptions stated in article 9 § 2, if your application is about using facial images for unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. 2. In turn, if your processing is not about unique identification of a person based on these biometric features, but only about emotions recognition (which you briefly mentioned at the beginning of your post), it could be considered as not falling under the requirements of Article 9. That would still be a processing of personal information, but it would fall under the normal article 6 requirements.
It is possible. If you say e.g. "On March 12 2021 I stole a steak from the grocery store at the corner of Smith St. and Wesson Ave.", that is a confession. It is voluntary and not coerced (you're not required to apply for the job), so it is admissible. It is extremely unlikely that there is any insulating provision in the job-application process ("information obtained via applying for this job will never be used against you in a court of law"). Whether or not you would actually be arrested and tried depends on the circumstances (basically, is it "worth it" to them to prosecute you). Also, what you say in the "explanation" box matters, so I gave you a clear confession to criminal culpability. Something like "I was at the store when some dude shot a lady" isn't a confession to committing a crime, it more satisfies the full-disclosure requirement.
Doctors are obliged to act in the best interest of their patients. If it would be in your best interest to see another doctor (due to the doctor being out of practice for that particular diagnosis), your current doctor would be obligated to tell you and refuse treatment. The physician‑patient relationship is fiduciary in nature and certain duties arise from that special relationship of trust and confidence. These include the duties of the doctor to act with utmost good faith and loyalty[.] MvInerney v. MacDonald Now, onto your question about the counselors assessment; probably not worth it's weight in salt. They likely have little to no training regarding diagnostic medicine and are by no means an expert.
It is not legal to give false responses on such a declaration. The point of anti-discrimination laws is that they say when it is legal vs. not legal to discriminate against an employee, and Alex is expected to have faith in the legal system to protect his legal rights. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the law may be understandable, but still does not legally justify falsifying information given to an employer. In certain cases (look for the fine print and mentions of "penalty of perjury") you can be fined and imprisoned for lying. More commonly, your employment can be terminated when you are discovered. You may also be held liable for consequences of such lies. Your employer's health insurance contract might require truthful and accurate reporting of medical facts and a lie about your condition could result in termination of coverage.
Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself.
Every State in the union has some form of involuntary mental health hold. Regardless of whether or not the patient claims it was an accident, it is incumbent upon the hospital or facility where the individual is held (which is typically at least 72 hours) to do an in-depth analysis of whether the person is a danger to themselves or others. While in this scenario it may've been an inadvertent overdose, the empirical evidence suggests it could have been intentional as the practitioner cannot see into the thoughts and motivations behind the patient's actions. Even taking the patient at face-value, addiction to the extent of overdose is also a mental health issue, which may cause a person to be a danger to themselves. From a clinical perspective, it is much more likely than not that one of the two scenarios occurred, versus a truly mistaken overdose. One would need to mistake their actions numerous times in a day to take so much as to overdose. If you look at it from the inverse perspective, if the facility failed to keep a person who'd just overdosed, or the first responder failed to initiate a hold and the person later died, minimally they would be liable if sued by the family in an action for wrongful death. The unfortunate facts are that if a person was set on committing suicide, it unlikely they would be forthcoming with that fact, for this very reason (the mandatory hold), so a person's word cannot be the determining factor. Even if someone was not intentionally trying to take their life, having taken enough Xanax to cause medical overdose would suggest the potential that even if not suicidal, the individual was at a minimum abusing the medication by taking much more than prescribed (or in a way that is contraindicated - such as with alcohol or other depressants) and potentially suffering from benzodiazepine addiction. Either way, if the hold was not initiated or cut short - and then someone ended up dying from an overdoes - the responsibility and potential liability is the same. A person who is suicidal can reassess what may be a snap decision, or have a chemical imbalance stabilized, or a severe addiction identified in that amount of time. For the person who ctually takes so much medication as to mistakenly cause overdose, this is certainly inconvenient; however, 72 hours is a short time in the grand scheme of things to potentially save a life. The law will nearly always err on the side of safety and prevention.
If you commit a crime on the border of two different countries, which will you be charged in? If you commit a crime on the border of two different countries*, which will you be charged in? In addition, for the sake of argument: Both countries want to separately trial the criminal The criminal is a citizen of both countries** The police of both countries appear at the same time The suspect stays on the border after committing the crime. The criminal act is illegal in both countries, but the sentences are different. The countries hate each other It is not a crime against humanity - just a violent crime such as a murder. *technically, jurisdictions, but then it interferes with the wording of this question **or, alternatively, the criminal is stateless
The decision will be made by whichever country arrests him first (although a minority of countries allow for the trial of people who break their criminal laws in absentia). Needless to say, if nobody manages to arrest him ever, he will not face any criminal consequences except the issuance of an arrest warrant possibly accompanied by a pre-existing conviction in absentia if arrested in countries that allow for such a proceeding. Normally, in these circumstances, either country would have jurisdiction under its own laws to prosecute and punish the criminal, and many extradition treaties would not require the extradition of someone who committed a crime punished domestically in the state in whose custody the criminal is as part of the same course of events. Many countries will not extradite someone if they could face the death penalty in the receiving country. But, sometimes law enforcement in a country with a less serious penalty will intentionally defer to law enforcement in a country with a more serious penalty that is simultaneously trying to arrest him. Ordinarily, law enforcement is not authorized to use deadly force to arrest someone who is simultaneously being arrested by law enforcement from another country against either the arrestee or the law enforcement from the other country. Indeed, using deadly force against another country's law enforcement officers who are carrying out a lawful arrest in their own country would ordinarily be considered an act of war. U.S. double jeopardy provisions of the constitution do not prohibit a second prosecution of an offender in these circumstances because of a first prosecution by another sovereign, but many prosecutors in many countries would decline to prosecute someone a second time for the offense that they have already been convicted of in exercise of their discretion, and many judges would consider time served in another country for the same offense as a factor in setting their own sentence.
The maximum determinate sentence for anything (outside of military law) was 21 years (in 2013 increased to 30 years for serious terrorism offenses). The law on penalties §43 says that In a sentence of detention, a time frame is set which should not normally exceed 15 years and cannot exceed 21 years. Breivik was tried once for the crime of intentional murder, and convicted -- 21 years is the sentence. I believe that Norwegian law does not have the "multiple counts" system that the US has whereby an act can be punished under multiple sections of the law or for each victim. He performed an act of killing with very many victims, so no penalty longer than 21 years is allowed.
Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.
Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough.
None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story.
Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.
Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about.
"Police" that one would generally encounter in the US are local or state agencies, and the ordinary crimes you mentioned are matters of state law, so they would be reported to local or state police. (There are federal law enforcement agencies, but they only deal with specialized areas of federal law, and you wouldn't ordinarily encounter them in daily life.) On the other hand, immigration is a matter of federal law. The responsibilities of local or state police are governed by state law, and the federal government cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law. A specific state's law could potentially require state and local police to ask about people's immigration status and/or ask the federal government to check on the status of someone they suspect might be illegal. I believe a few red states have enacted, or are considering, such laws, though they usually deal with people stopped by police rather than people filing a report. Some of these laws have been challenged in court, and I am not sure which exact parts of which laws are still being implemented for each of those states. Most states do not have such laws.
Can I record a phone call made to the office of my congressman or senator? Suppose I'm not too pleased with my Congressman's stance on an issue, and that I plan on calling his or her office. Is it legal to record a phone call made to the office of my Congressman (or Senator) in New York State, without telling them? Said office may be either their local office or their Washington office. Does it make a difference if I make the phone call from within the state or district (maybe I'm in New Jersey for the day)? And while we're at it, is it legal to publish this audio recording online or send it to journalists?
"One-party consent" law governs recording of conversations in New York state and under federal law. What that means is that a conversation can be recorded, provided one of the parties consent. You can publish any legally-acquired material, or send it to journalists.
I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.
Because an "Order, Resolution, or Vote" is not the same as a Bill, and does not become a law. Thus the procedure for presentation, leading to signing, pocket acceptance, veto, or pocket veto, does not apply to Orders, Resolutions, or Votes. Therefore it is repeated to indicate that it applies to those legislative acts also. A "Vote", in the sense used here is a legislative decision or action that is neither a Bill nor a resolution. For example, the decision on when to adjourn to, that is, when Congress will come back into session after an adornment, is a Vote. A "Bill" is a proposed law. If it is passed by Congress and not vetoed, or if any veto is overridden, it becomes a law. Other legislative actions do not become laws, but otherwise go through much the same procedure. Note that some legislative actions do notneed the "Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives". For example, when the House votes on a new Speaker, it is a vote of the House only, and neither the Senate nor the President has a say.
Anywhere in the world, do parties to court hearings have no absolute right to access those transcripts (or recordings)? I have not checked every common law jurisdiction but I suspect that as all (?) such courts have their own inherent powers to make directions the answer is probably: NO. That said, a close-but-no-cigar example may be found at Rule 79.30 of the Civil Procedure Rules concerning terrorist financing proceedings in england-and-wales: Unless the court directs otherwise, rule 5.4 (Register of Claims), rule 5.4B (Supply of documents from court records – a party) and rule 5.4C (Supply of documents from court records –a non-party) do not apply to any proceedings to which Section 2 or 3 of this Part applies or to any document relating to such proceedings. "Sections 2 and 3 of this Part" refers to applications to set aside financial restrictions and appeals against being designated as being linked to terrorism. The relevant cited Rules are: 5.4 (1) A court or court office may keep a publicly accessible register of claims which have been issued out of that court or court office. (2) Any person who pays the prescribed fee may, during office hours, search any available register of claims. And 5.4B (1) A party to proceedings may, unless the court orders otherwise, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any document listed in paragraph 4.2A of Practice Direction 5A. (2) A party to proceedings may, if the court gives permission, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any other document filed by a party or communication between the court and a party or another person.
Since your consent is not required in Texas, revocation is irrelevant. Restrictions of use of recordings flow from the legal nature of the recording itself, so there is no provision saying, for example, that only one party needs to consent for just recording, but all parties must consent to make any use of the recording. Since these laws were devised to regulate the practice of wearing a wire and collecting evidence of crimes, requiring consent from all parties would be counterproductive to the purposes of the law. You could try drafting a contract where you pay people to not record you (anybody who doesn't sign, you shouldn't talk to them), but enforcement could be tricky, so I would not try a DIY contract: get a lawyer. You would have to show that you were harmed by them making an unconsented recording. It should be in the form of a contract where you give something of value in exchange for something of value, which is a thing typically enforced by the courts. Also bear in mind that even in an all-party state, if you know that you are being recorded, you cannot just say "I do not consent", you have to stop talking. Continuing to talk when notified that there is or may be a recording constitutes implied consent, which is why on the phone companies often announce via recording that the conversation may be monitored, and they do not ask "Do you consent". By not hanging up, you consented.
Is there any way I can defend myself against penalties when mistakes are made in my favor? Another option, in a similar vein to your suggestions, is to make a contemporaneous record of the conversations. Then send an email* to the public official detailing what was said and agreed, along with a request that they reply with any observations or amendments within a certain time frame. That way you have a date-stamped document properly addressed to the other party to use as evidence or leverage. *or a recorded delivery letter etc
Yes. This would require the consent of Congress and the accepting U.S. state, but Puerto Rico's consent would not be constitutionally required (although it would be prudent to obtain and probably would be obtained as a matter of custom and fairness). New York States has floated the possibility of annexing Puerto Rico since it is the single most concentrated destination of Puerto Rican migration to the mainland historically and has a large and politically well organized Puerto Rican community and would favor the expansion of Democratic political party power that this annexation would entail. Contiguity is less of a concern for Puerto Rico since it is an island in any case. Florida would be another natural candidate, but its conservative/purple political makeup would probably oppose such an annexation even though geographically it would be a more natural annexing state. In a similar vein, there have been proposals to annex all of the District of Columbia except the federal mall to Maryland subject to the same formal requirements. Either annexation would be a compromise. It would give these territories full statehood status and full representation in the U.S. House but would deny Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, respective, their own two seats in the U.S. Senate which would favor Democrats more than mere annexation would.
So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.
Are "sock puppet" sites that generate ad revenue with recycled articles legal? I'm wondering about the legality of a practice, for which I can only think to title it "sock puppet site ad revenue farming by recycling articles". I don't know what else to call this, what I've found. It's run by some rich dude, and after investigating, I understand now why he's rich. I'm wondering about the legality of this, and I can't find the answer online. Here's the deal: There is one website that is fairly popular among computer geeks, which is part of a "network" of other websites. This network of websites is properly registered to him, in the USA. It's headquartered at a bank, though. (Thanks, Google Maps.) I found out through other means that he also owns another "network" of websites, which recycles all the same stories from his main news network. These websites are registered in Canada. They're definitely the same network - they left behind an accidental link from one network to the next. Besides the accidental link between the networks, I can be certain that they are the same - they use the same methods. The second network which recycles the first network's stories shares the exact same layout, posting method, and About pages are the same (just reworded). From the second network, I found a third network in a similar way. Again, it just recycles all the same news stories as the first. Same layout, same About page. I'm still looking for more site networks, but the reason I question the legality of this is due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. These seem to be fraudulent websites, but I am not trained in nuanced legal matters. ... "sock puppeted news" ...
...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on.
You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article.
...articles are never signed by authors. Is it then enough that the magazine itself is in the public domain? Absolutely not. Even though articles are not signed, they are still copyrighted at moment of being written by whoever wrote them, and upon publication by who the authors are writing for. That's basic copyright law; read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berne_Convention Further, the magazine's own Terms of Service outlines this: Intellectual Property The contents ... supplied to you in conjunction with the Site and/or a Digital Application (such contents, design and materials being collectively referred to as the "Economist Content"), is copyright of The Economist and its licensors. You may not use or reproduce ... for any reason without written permission from The Economist... http://www.economist.com/legal/terms-of-use
First, copyright does not apply to "brands". Copyright exists in literary works which includes art - a picture (any picture) usually has a copyright belonging to the creator of the picture. Brands are protected by Trade Marks. To be clear: A picture of you is protected by copyright belonging to the creator The phrase "Mickey Mouse" is protected by trade mark belonging to the Disney corporation A picture of Micky Mouse is protected by copyright and trade mark. (when) would it be legally OK for me to do so without the copyright owner's permission? You can use copyright material without permission if you meet the fair use criteria in your jurisdiction. You can use trade marks if there is no risk of people confusing your goods and services with the trade mark holder's and you do not cause damage (including loss of potential income) to the trade mark holder or it is fair use (e.g. you are writing a review of a Micky Mouse cartoon). Is it legal if I do not distribute them to others at all? No, this would be OK as copyright fair use, but not as trade mark fair use. Is it legal if I give them to my family/relatives for free, e.g. as a gift? No, not fair use for either copyright or trade mark. Is it legal if I give them away to others for free (meaning I'm losing my own money on them)? No, see above. Is it legal if I sell them to others at-cost (i.e. for the same price I obtained them, meaning I'm not making any money from them)? No, see above. If the answer is "yes" to any of the above, can the copyright holder explicitly prohibit me from doing so, or would such a prohibition be unenforceable (e.g. if this would be fair use)? It isn't allowed. Yes they can stop you. No, it isn't fair use; there is no "fair use" defence for trade mark infringement here - you are depriving them of income because you are not buying their T-shirt! Any other factors that are relevant but which I'm forgetting? Will they sue you for doing these things? Probably not.
I only address the core legal question. The first question regards where the review appeared: on the facility's own web page, or on some third party web page? In the latter case, there is the possibility that soliciting a modified review in exchange for something of value violates the terms of usage for that web site. There are also US federal regulations pertaining to advertising, as well as state regulations. The federal regulations are here. The main question is whether what you say constitutes an endorsement, as specified here. They define an endorsement as: any advertising message (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser. The regulation in fact gives some helpful examples (reading them helps to clarify what an "endorsement" is), the last of which involves a dog: Example 8: A consumer who regularly purchases a particular brand of dog food decides one day to purchase a new, more expensive brand made by the same manufacturer. She writes in her personal blog that the change in diet has made her dog's fur noticeably softer and shinier, and that in her opinion, the new food definitely is worth the extra money. This posting would not be deemed an endorsement under the Guides. Assume now that the consumer joins a network marketing program under which she periodically receives various products about which she can write reviews if she wants to do so. If she receives a free bag of the new dog food through this program, her positive review would be considered an endorsement under the Guides. The distinction at issue is whether the suggestion of receiving something of value might influence a person's statements. You can pay for a positive review, as a reward for saying nice things, as long as the reviewer had no reason to think that they would get get something in return for a review. Taking your review to be an endorsement, as required here, Endorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser. The regulation does not require you to reveal every thing that came into your mind in writing the review, but it is pretty clear that suppressing the concern about vaccination paperwork and the star count constitutes a dishonest statement of opinion of the endorser. Material connections must also be revealed: When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience), such connection must be fully disclosed. For example, when an endorser who appears in a television commercial is neither represented in the advertisement as an expert nor is known to a significant portion of the viewing public, then the advertiser should clearly and conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of compensation prior to and in exchange for the endorsement or the fact that the endorser knew or had reason to know or to believe that if the endorsement favored the advertised product some benefit, such as an appearance on television, would be extended to the endorser In the 7th example under material disclosure, they describe a blogger who received something of value in connection with a review: the blogger should clearly and conspicuously disclose that he received the gaming system free of charge I should point out that these regulations are written by the FTC, and the implied interpretation (such as that the blogger should disclose... with no clearly stated penalty for failure to disclose) is an FTC interpretation. 15 USC 52 prohibits false advertisements for services affecting commerce. This is the jurisdictional aspect of their complaint against Cure Encapsulations, where defendants paid for reviews on a third-party website (this case involves a relationship between defendant and a fourth-party company that apparently hunts for and pays reviewers). This is apparently the first instance in which the FTC has gone against a business for paying for reviews on a third party web site, so it's not a foregone conclusion that they will prevail in court. Still, Chevron deference means that they will probably win at least on the jurisdictional question. The main difference is that in the Cure Encapsulation case, the violation was even more egregious in that the individuals were not even customers, and in this instance the would-(not)-be review was not the honest opinion of the endorser.
The use may constitute trademark infringement if it implies sponsorship or endorsement I'm going to assume US jurisdiction for this question, because you've not provided one, and you haven't provided enough car manufacturer names to suggest that this wouldn't apply to the US. I'll also only cover Federal law (the cases were tried in state courts), so be aware that there may be additional responsibilities under state law that I don't examine here. 15 U.S. Code § 1114: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S. Code § 1125: (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. These actions - the use of the trademarked manufacturer logo within the app - is likely to constitute trademark infringement, if the trademark owner's permission is not sought prior to publication, and the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods. What this means, is that if the trademarks are used in such a way that a reasonable person is likely to think that: The product is an official product from the owner/brand associated with the trademark; The product is sponsored by the owner/brand associated with the trademark; or The product is approved or endorsed by the owner/brand associated with the trademark. Then an action in trademark infringement may be brought by the trademark owner. Consider the following two cases: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) In this case, judgement was made for the defendant, as the defendant's field was not considered close enough to the plaintiff's for there to be a likely chance of confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) In this case the trial judge decided that the trademarks Slickcraft and Sleekcraft were unlikely to cause confusion. This ruling was overturned on appeal and an injunction was ordered by the court. Possible defenses Nominative use of a mark When a mark is used solely to identify a product, this use is privileged. A descriptive mark used for its primary purpose Descriptive marks are a subtype of trademarks, which are descriptive in nature but have acquired a secondary meaning. Here, using a descriptive mark for its primary purpose has been found not to constitute infringement. General First Amendment protection Satire and parody are generally recognized as defenses if the primary purpose of the use is not directly commercial. If the products are not similar enough to be likely to cause confusion; and The use does not imply endorsement, sponsorship or approval of the product by the trademark owner then it should be fine. It seems that the situation in the question above would not give rise to confusion (unless the car manufacturer also develops an app, for instance), the second issue - endorsement - should be avoided. Many programs will have a legal section that includes ownership information and disclaims any association with the trademark owner(s). I have not been able to locate any cases where the effect of these sections have been tested. Further reading Overview of Trademark Law
I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law.
Let's say for now we have definitive proof that the person hosting a site that spreads conspiracy theories does not believe their theories are true, say they are recorded making fun of their watchers for believing the nonsense they say, including explicitly saying they make it up because people will pay to hear it. I'm guessing you're asking if this is 'wire fraud'. I expect that if the advertised offer is that "people will pay to hear it", then so long as they actually hear it, that's not fraud. It would be different if people paid to hear it and then they failed to deliver what people wanted—if they didn't hear what they had paid for. If the customers are satisfied, it doesn't matter how the seller values it. Different people can legitimately value the same goods/services differently. A salesperson selling fairy unicorn dolls to little girls does not have to believe in fairies themselves. It is also highly dangerous for the purposes of Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Belief to set any sort of 'truth' standard on what is allowed to be said. Who gets to decide 'the truth'? Authoritative sources are sometimes wrong. New discoveries can sometimes contradict a widespread 'common sense' orthodoxy, and sound crazy. The Earth is spinning around the sun. Time passes at different rates for different people depending on how fast you move. If you think a claim is wrong, the proper response is to present the evidence and argument you think proves it wrong, not try to silence it or punish it. That only drives it underground, where the glamour of being persecuted and the absence of contrary arguments only makes it stronger and more persuasive. And there are always other people who think many of our beliefs are false and crazy! We don't want to be persecuted for wrongthink ourselves. Tolerance for and a listening openness to differing beliefs, even beliefs we hold in contempt, makes our own beliefs safer and more secure. As Noam Chomsky put it: "If we don't believe in freedom of expression for people we despise, we don't believe in it at all." If we don't grant freedom of belief to other people, why should they grant it to us? It's probably also worth noting that this isn't "definitive proof", as they may instead be lying when they say they don't believe it. Somebody who believes in conspiracy theories may deny it in conversation with someone (e.g., an employer or a friend or family member) who would treat them negatively if they were discovered to 'believe in conspiracy theories'. "No, of course I don't believe in banned religion X/heretical politics Y! It's all a load of nonsense!" The same goes for any socially unacceptable heresy. People who are commonly persecuted for their beliefs frequently hide them.
If I giveaway half of my wage saving to my parent, Is there any chance that my wife could ask some of this back after divorce? If I giveaway half of my wage saving to my parent, Is there any chance that my wife could ask some of this back after divorce? Show your reference from authentic sources.
Gifts that are sincerely given away are generally not part of the assets to be split up in a divorce. However, if you transfer assets to a parent, only to start receiving that value back from them after the divorce, this is considered hiding assets and is illegal Whatever the reason, hiding assets, income and debt is not only unethical; it’s also illegal and subject to severe penalties IF discovered. You’ll likely be deposed, which means you’ll have to provide live testimony, under oath, about assets and property. If you lie during discovery or your deposition in order to hide assets, you’ve committed perjury (a punishable crime). If your lies are discovered by your spouse, your spouse’s attorney, or a judge, you may face severe sanctions (monetary fines) or a perjury charge. in some states, you can even be arrested for very serious incidences of hiding assets
Fact is, your things are gone, disappeared, you are not going to get them back. You can try to get money by suing your parents. But suing your parents is rarely a good long term strategy. Your father made some argument why he isn't going to give you any money for your losses; whether it is a good or bad argument is irrelevant until you take him to court, and then what counts are the arguments that his lawyer will make, which will be much better arguments. In court, you would have to actually prove your losses. Have you got a receipt for your winter boots? How long ago is "when you were 19", important to estimate their value now. You would have to prove that you didn't just abandon everything. Did you just leave, or did you sign a contract that your parents should look after your things, and you would pay them some rental fee for the space in their loft, for example? How many years time did you have to pick up your things?
This situation is unlikely to come about in practice. If you were born into such extreme poverty, your parents would considered guilty of child neglect, and CPS/social services would take you into foster services where you would be given clothes. If you previously had clothes, but recently became poor, it is very unlikely that any creditors would repossess your last shirt off your back. It would probably be illegal for them to leave you in that situation, and a used shirt wouldn't be worth much. For the same reason, it's unlikely you would sell your last shirt to, eg. pay for food: Who would buy it? For how much? In many countries, there are extensive welfare systems and private charities that private food, free clothing and other resources to the very poor. Even before you lost your last clothes, you could go to these for assistance. So again you are unlikely to involuntarily end up in this position. Also, technically the amount of clothes you are required to wear is usually very small. I believe you are usually only required to cover the groin and breasts if female. In theory you could easily collect a discarded plastic bag, piece of paper, scrap fabric, cardboard box or some other trash to fashion a crude loincloth. Lastly, when the police do show up and arrest you, you will likely have the opportunity to explain to them your situation. They would probably try to get you some basic clothing and other assistance. But if they do end up pressing charges, you would be able to either convince the judge to let you off or challenge the law itself for failing to consider poor people like you. Generally, laws are designed such that there is always an option to follow them and nobody would be "too poor" to comply, failing to do this could make a politician extremely unpopular. Many laws with significant cost burden offer alternatives to the poor. Courts will also tend to be sympathetic to cases such as this. But as I said, the situation is very unlikely to come about.
They aren't "imposing tax laws at the state level", and the states are still perfectly free to award whatever credits they like. There's a more complete explanation here. Before 2017, if you paid, say, $30,000 in state taxes, you could take a $30,000 deduction from your federal taxable income, thus reducing your federal income taxes by some fraction of $30,000 (depending on your tax bracket). The 2017 tax bill placed a $10,000 limit on this deduction. Some states responded by creating a provision where you could donate $30,000 to the state and receive a $30,000 credit against your state taxes owed - so you end up paying the same amount to the state, but now you characterize it as a charitable donation, which is still deductible from your federal taxable income. The new IRS regulation says that such a "donation" will no longer be deductible from your federal taxable income; that's all. Your state can still issue you a tax credit for such a donation if they want - the federal government has no control over that - but any such credit will reduce the amount you are allowed to deduct on your federal return, making the whole exercise pointless. The federal government certainly has the power to determine how you should compute your income for the purposes of your federal income taxes, including what you may or may not deduct. That's the power they're using here.
As a general rule, if a business, like a bank, is legally required to keep information confidential, and an employee breeches confidentiality, then your recourse is to sue the business for damages. See for example ch. 35 of Title 12. The bank cannot claim "It's not our fault, an employee did it" (the Latin for this is "respondeat superior", whereby a part is also responsible for the acts of their agents). As far as I know, there is no law against asking for information that can't be given. This does assume, however, that your mother does not have a legal right to the information (which could arise from some form of co-signing). Also, would assume that they have a normal privacy policy, and not one where they say "We will tell your mother if she asks" (they would have informed you of that, so read the privacy policy). This is a question best answered by your own attorney, to whom you would reveal all of the details.
A divorce settlement must be approved by the court. A Judge might well refuse to approve a settlement with such a provision in it, although I do not know of any law specifically barring such a term. But once the settlement is final, one party could certainly offer a separate contract to the other, under which one party would agree to remain outside the state (or metropolitan region, or county, or wherever) in return for an agreed recurring payment. There would be no compulsion to accept such a contract, but if the payment offered was large enough, it might be accepted voluntarily. However, if there was a child involved, and such a move would significantly hinder that child's contact with both parents, and this were not in the child's best interest, such a contract might be attacked as against public policy.
Fraud involves gain. It does not have to be financial gain. By the way, he's probably right about free education etc. to some extent - as the father he will be (partially) responsible for child support.
He gets exactly what you give him. If you think the home is worth $225,000 then you should offer him to buy the house for $225,000, and that's it. There is no reason why would accept a lower purchase price of $150,000, there is absolutely no reason to deduct $50,000 rent from the purchase price, because that $50,000 is rent for living there, and there is no reason for anyone other than him to pay the $10,000 for changes that he wanted. Alternatively, you can put the house on the market for $225,000, and if it is sold, your daughter and boyfriend can find somewhere else to live. On further thought, and reading the comment: This boyfriend seems to be quite the sleaze bag. So if you gave in to his demand, and sold him the house for less than half what it's worth, you shouldn't be surprised if he sold it for $225,000, moved away with his new girlfriend who is not your daughter, and left your daughter homeless.
What is the law regarding Christmas activities in public school systems? Consider a scenario where a public school that set aside some time to show Christmas themed movies and for the students to exchange some gifts with each other. Is this permitted? What is the law about religious holidays and public schools? What if some of the students gave dirty looks to other students who didn't bring presents? Is that permitted?
The law of Texas is controlled by federal law, viz. the First Amendment. This item by the ACLU summarizes what that law is. Regarding your concern, public schools are not required to be "religion-free zones". Individuals have the right to hold and express their religious beliefs, or their lack of such beliefs, as long as it is contextually appropriate. That is, you don't get to invoke the First Amendment in the middle of a math lesson in order to engage in a rant. Students are allowed to try to persuade others to believe whatever they want, and students are allowed to be snarky about people who don't share their beliefs. Schools can teach about religion as part of the curriculum, though they cannot teach religion. It is okay to teach the historical fact that some guy decided based on the Bible that the world was created 10,000 years ago, but it not not okay to teach as a scientific fact that the world was created 10,000 years ago. Although I can't name a specific movie about Christmas that would be plainly objectionable to a non-Christian, we could assume that there is some such movie which is plainly advocacy of a religious viewpoint and which mocks Yazidism. A Yazidi student could then be excused from this movie, just as Christian students could be excused from attending an analogous Yazidi-advocating movie.
This is a mixed bag of so-called "laws", often interpreted in an unfavorable or satirical light. Because of this, you might say that none (save one) of these laws are literally laws, but they are the effects of laws that do exist. I'll do my best to sort this out. A fine of $25 can be levied for flirting. Almost certainly an anti-prostitution law taken to the extreme. I only found one example of a bill, but it failed, and was only tangentially related. It's not hard to imagine that at some point, flirting was technically illegal. A license must be purchased before hanging clothes on a clothesline. This is most likely a satire of the actual law, which probably states that you cannot hang anything out your window or in your yard without a permit. Many cities and states have rules about what you can, and can't, put on your property. These are usually related to health and/or aesthetics. Carmel: A man can't go outside while wearing a jacket and pants that do not match. It's too hard to track this one down right now, but that sounds like a satire of something like a specific situation where a person must be wearing specific clothing. For example, I would imagine a firefighter or school crossing guard having these requirements for safety reasons. Citizens may not greet each other by "putting one's thumb to the nose and wiggling the fingers". Edited for clarity While we do have the First Amendment right to Free Speech, it is sometimes recognized in jurisdictions that certain actions and phrases may pass the "imminent lawless action" exception. It is likely some kind of ordinance that prohibits being unnecessarily rude to the point where the offender may end up being assaulted or worse as a result of the gesture. This gesture was known as early as Shakespeare, with the "I thumb my nose at thee" line, also known as the "cock-a-snook" gesture in some regions. Of course, the actual law is probably much more nuanced than that, and this is just a funny way of reducing this law down to the most absurd example that someone could think of. Thanks to some comments, I just realized that this is very likely § 240.20 Disorderly conduct. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: ... In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or ... Several states have some sort of statute like this that are technically First Amendment Free Speech violations, yet generally recognized by those jurisdictions as having legal force, since the purpose is to discourage violence that can be caused by "fighting words." Donkeys are not allowed to sleep in bathtubs in Brooklyn, N.Y. This is likely a structural integrity joke that doesn't hold up well (sorry, couldn't resist). Floors only have limited strength. If you look up the weight of a cast-iron bathtub and the maximum weight of a full-grown donkey, you'll find it weighs just less than a ton (about 1,800 pounds, assuming a heavy tub and large donkey). Someone probably saw a law about the maximum weight you can put on a floor, then looked up how much things weigh, and the joke practically writes itself. During a concert, it is illegal to eat peanuts and walk backwards on the sidewalks. Again, this is probably taken out of context, but I presume that someone was doing something stupid and got hurt or killed, so a law was written about not walking on the sidewalk without paying attention to where you were walking. For example, if a sidewalk had a open manhole cover or something, and a person fell in. This is just a hyperbole example of the actual law, whatever it may be. In New York, you can teach your pet parrot to speak, but not to squawk. Easy. Noise ordinance law somewhere. A parrot's squawk can exceed 105 dB, and is generally disruptive to living next door to you in a thin-walled apartment. This person just found something really loud, and translated this law to match that law's prohibition. It's unlikely you'll find a law this specific, but noise ordinance laws exist in many areas. My area is 75 dB during the day, 70 dB at night. In New York City it's illegal to shake a dust mop out a window. That's definitely still on the books. It's part of the littering law. Littering, sweeping, throwing, or casting any material such as ashes, garbage, paper, dust, or other garbage or rubbish into or upon any street or public place, vacant lot, air shaft, areaway, backyard, court, or alley is illegal. Throwing garbage out of windows (for example, from buildings or vehicles) is also a violation. In addition, no person may allow anyone under his/her control (agent or employee) to commit a littering, sweep- out, or throw-out violation. Merchants must put all sweepings into suitable garbage receptacles for pickup by a private carter. Residential units must put sweepings into suitable garbage receptacles for pick up by DSNY. Sanitation litter baskets may not be used for this purpose. It is against the law to throw a ball at someone's head for fun. As far as I can tell, this has a serious history. Carnival workers ("carnies") often had setups that involved heavy solid balls. The kind that could literally cause concussions if they were hit in the head. Dunk tanks, knock-stuff-over games, and so on. Presumably, people thought it would be funny to assault the carnies, so laws were written. Of course, assault is already illegal, but it was probably put there was a way to let people know it was a serious situation. Jaywalking is legal, as long as it's not diagonal. That is, you can cross the street out of the crosswalk, but you can't cross a street diagonally. This is really just saying that there's no law prohibiting jaywalking specifically, but there are laws about when you're allowed to cross an intersection diagonally. Again, making it sound weird or strange. It's just a loophole in the lawbooks. Presumably, if people started getting hit while crossing mid-street, they'd add a new law to address that. Slippers are not to be worn after 10:00 P.M. This is likely another oversimplification. It's probably something more like "you have to wear solid-soled shoes at night to protect your feet from broken debris and rats" or something like that. Staten Island: You may only water your lawn if the hose is held in your hand. This is likely a water conservation law. Automated sprinklers and lawn sprinklers waste water. In an effort to combat that problem, requiring hand-holding your hose makes you more likely to not overwater your lawn. While riding in an elevator, one must talk to no one, and fold his hands while looking toward the door. Of this list, this one is presumably a satire law that makes a statement about societal customs in some places of New York. It's highly unlikely this would be real law, but rather an expectation of how to behave in an elevator if you didn't want to have a bad experience. So, overall, I'd say that virtually none of the laws actually read like they do on this list, but some variant of the law in a more generalized form probably does exist.
I found a number of news stories and official documents about public schools with such policies including: "Parents face more fines and rules if their children miss too much school" from Public Opinion; "School Adopts Strict Policy on Parents Picking Up Children Late" from the Los Angeles Times; "If you're late to pick up your kid at school, expect more than embarrassment" from The Oregonian; "Late Again? This School Fines Kids Who Aren't on Time" from Parents; "Late Pick Up Policy" from Hazelwood Elementary; and "School Issues Terrifying Threat to Parents Who Pick Up Kids Late" from Yahoo Parenting The last story is about a school that threatened to call the local child protection authorities to take children into custody if parents were late, even by a short time. This was rescinded and apologized for. None of these stories mentioned any source of authority to impose such fines, nor any parent who had legally contested such fines. Public schools do not generally have authority to fine parents unless a law or ordinance grants such authority. Usually a school would need to file a report with law enforcement, and any fine be imposed by a court. But it may well be that parents are simply paying in such cases, rather than insisting on legal authority. If a student is left unsupervised, a school would pretty clearly have the right, and in some cases the duty, to notify the police or the appropriate child protection agency. Parents might fear that resisting the fines would lead to that far more drastic response, and so not challenge any fine. I did not include any of several news stories about similar practices in the UK, as the legal basis would be different there. But there were several such stories. There were also several stories suggesting that such fines can be counterproductive. It seems that some parents tend to come to regard them as fees, and are perfectly willing to pay, and the fine replaces the feeling of social obligation which might have been stronger. But that is not really a matter of law.
So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.
In New South Wales it is entirely legal to film police (or anyone else). However, as discussed (What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?) audio recording is more restricted: you must either have the permission of all the participants in a conversation or be a party to the conversation. I do not imagine the law is any different in Victoria.
Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.
Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..
I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.
Can the phrase "who is on my wifi?" be protected from use by others? I own a app called "who is on my wifi?" which offers a functionality you can guess, giving you list of devices connected to your wifi router. There is one similar app which is older than mine and own a domain whoisonmywifi.com and claiming that it own a phrase and I can not use them in my app. I have following sub-questions. Is "Who is on my wifi?" copyrighted? I have gone through their site but there is no such copyright taken by them, so does just owning a .com domain mean have copyright? Links: My App: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.speednethalvad.whoisinmywifi Their App: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.whoisonmywifi.agent
Copyright applies to literary and artistic works from the moment of their creation: they do not need any form of registration - your question and my answer are copyrighted materials owned by you and me respectively. However, "Who is on my wifi" is probably not a literary work - short phrases do not qualify for copyright protection. That said, "Who is on my wifi" can be, and probably is a trademark belonging to the developers of the other app. A trademark is anything used to identify the goods and services of a particular person, their app in this case. You are not allowed to use this phrase if it could cause confusion between their product and yours - on the face of it, it is hard to see how your use wouldn't do that. You need to find another name. Unfortunately for you, the name belongs to whoever used it first.
First, copyright does not apply to "brands". Copyright exists in literary works which includes art - a picture (any picture) usually has a copyright belonging to the creator of the picture. Brands are protected by Trade Marks. To be clear: A picture of you is protected by copyright belonging to the creator The phrase "Mickey Mouse" is protected by trade mark belonging to the Disney corporation A picture of Micky Mouse is protected by copyright and trade mark. (when) would it be legally OK for me to do so without the copyright owner's permission? You can use copyright material without permission if you meet the fair use criteria in your jurisdiction. You can use trade marks if there is no risk of people confusing your goods and services with the trade mark holder's and you do not cause damage (including loss of potential income) to the trade mark holder or it is fair use (e.g. you are writing a review of a Micky Mouse cartoon). Is it legal if I do not distribute them to others at all? No, this would be OK as copyright fair use, but not as trade mark fair use. Is it legal if I give them to my family/relatives for free, e.g. as a gift? No, not fair use for either copyright or trade mark. Is it legal if I give them away to others for free (meaning I'm losing my own money on them)? No, see above. Is it legal if I sell them to others at-cost (i.e. for the same price I obtained them, meaning I'm not making any money from them)? No, see above. If the answer is "yes" to any of the above, can the copyright holder explicitly prohibit me from doing so, or would such a prohibition be unenforceable (e.g. if this would be fair use)? It isn't allowed. Yes they can stop you. No, it isn't fair use; there is no "fair use" defence for trade mark infringement here - you are depriving them of income because you are not buying their T-shirt! Any other factors that are relevant but which I'm forgetting? Will they sue you for doing these things? Probably not.
If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc. However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators. If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database.
Using it without permission is copyright infringement and illegal. Legally, you can try offering money to the company for the copyright or for a suitable license. For example offer them $1000 for a copy of the code licensed under the GPL license. If they accept, you are fine.
No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.)
I will try to answer some of my questions based on recent developments and other information I've seen. Yes. 2. No. On page 23 of this Commerce Dept. memo on TikTok, it describes: This prohibition would remove the TikTok app from U.S.-based mobile app stores, preventing mobile users from being able to download the app to their devices or receive updates. As scoped, this prohibition would only apply to app stores accessible in the United States, thus users would still be able to download the app while outside the United States. On page 15 of this Commerce Dept. memo on WeChat, it describes: This prohibition would remove the WeChat app from U.S.-based mobile app stores, preventing mobile users from being able to download the app to their devices or receive updates. As scoped, this prohibition would only apply to app stores accessible in the United States, thus users would still be able to download the app while outside the United States. 3,4,5. No for WeChat. In letters sent to the opposite party in a lawsuit and filed with the court, the US government has provided assurances that WeChat users will not have any civil or criminal liability for downloading or using the app for personal or business communication. we can provide assurances that the Secretary does not intend to take actions that would target persons or groups whose only connection with WeChat is their use or downloading of the app to convey personal or business information between users, or otherwise define the relevant transactions in such a way that would impose criminal or civil liability on such users. In other words, while use of the app for such communications could be directly or indirectly impaired through measures targeted at other transactions, use and downloading of the app for this limited purpose will not be a defined transaction, and such users will not be targeted or subject to penalties. I'm not entirely sure for TikTok, but the same may be true for TikTok since the prohibited transactions for both are essentially the same. No. The regulations on prohibited transactions do not require the blocking of traffic from the apps. Simply carrying the traffic of the app is not one of the prohibited transactions, as long as the company does not have a contract for internet transit or peering with ByteDance/Tencent, nor are providing hosting or content delivery services to ByteDance/Tencent. On page 23 of the Commerce Dept. memo on TikTok linked above, it says: User data could still be served by data centers, [redacted] operating outside of the United States. On page 7 of this declaration by a Commerce Dept. official further explains that WeChat traffic will still flow through the US: Moreover, this prohibition would not affect Internet transit or peering services in the United States that are not “directly contracted or arranged” by Tencent, and thus would leave the overwhelming majority of Internet traffic, including WeChat data, untouched.
united-states Facts are not copyrightable. Assuming Scrapehero collected these facts in a legal manner and assuming the source of these facts does not contain copyrighted (protected) material, then selling such a collection may be legal. Of particular relevance is Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co.. Here, Feist Publications copied Rural's phone directory into Feist's own phone directory. The supreme court found that Rural's phone directory was not copyrightable and thus not protected. Of course, this cuts both ways. Assuming Scrapehero did not inject creativity into the data, nothing stops a recipient of such data from distributing it themselves. In practice, this probably isn't a concern for Scrapehero. This answer is US-specific. Some countries recognize Database Rights, which may prevent such activity.
Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.
If a law is proven to be unconstitutional, can the Legislators who approved it be sued? In Argentina several laws are sanctioned which later are proved to be unconstitutional. Yet, until someone appeals the law, that law is applied unconstitutionally to a lot of people with the harm it makes to them. Many times you know that a law they are about to approve is wrong, it's approved by legislators not for the sake of people but to profit their own interests, and that the law is going to harm many people. My question is: Can such legislators be sued?
Short answer, no. Articles 68-70 of Argentina's constitution effectively provide for legislative immunity while in office. There are two issues with your plans to sue: 68 protects the legislature for opinions and speeches (such as approval of an unconstitutional law).68 appears particularly troublesome to your lawsuit, as it covers conduct that occurred during their office holding tenure, and seems to continue after their tenure. Note: I have not read this in Spanish, and instead I am reliant on the below translation. Now, if your accusations are true, you could make a case for this to be considered fraud or treason (or some other crime). If that legislator is currently in office, then their respective House would have to suspend them before any investigation could continue (which is unlikely). Also, regardless of during or after their term, you'd have to convince a prosecutor to press these charges, as these would be criminal charges, and those are (generally) the state's sole prerogative to prosecute. http://www.biblioteca.jus.gov.ar/argentina-constitution.pdf Section 68.- No member of Congress shall be accused, judicially examined, or disturbed for opinions expressed or speeches delivered by him while holding office as legislator. Section 69.- No senator or deputy shall be arrested as from the day of his election until the expiration of his term, except when flagrantly surprised committing a crime deserving capital punishment or other infamous or serious punishment, in which case a summary report of the facts shall be submitted to the corresponding House. Section 70.- When a written complaint is filed before the ordinary courts against any senator or deputy, once examined if there is enough evidence in a public trial, each House may, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the votes, suspend the accused party from his office and place him under the jurisdiction of the competent court to be judged.
The UK has parliamentary sovereignty, not separation of powers Unlike, say, the United States, where the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive have co-equal power in their respective spheres, in the UK, the judiciary and the executive are subordinate to Parliament. The courts have no power to nullify an Act of Parliament for being unconstitutional like they do in jurisdictions where a written constitution gives them such a power like the USA, Canada, or Australia. The purpose of the Declaration of Incompatibility is to advise Parliament that the law they have passed contradicts the HRA and they should think about that and decide if that’s what they really wanted to do. That means that the UK Parliament could pass the Arbitrary Bollock Removal Act 2023 (ABRA) tomorrow and it would be valid law. The courts can still provide judicial review of the actions of the executive under ABRA but they cannot declare the law a nullity. That is, the Minister’s actions can be scrutinised to ensure they followed the ABRA and other established principles such as procedural fairness and, if they didn’t, declare the executive actions void. However, if they did follow the law, off come your nuts.
Civil law instead of criminal law Not all things that we commonly refer to as "illegal" are actually crimes - many of them refer to violations of contracts or other obligations where the harmed party may (or may not) use the civil system to obtain some satisfaction, but the government and prosecutors will not do it for them. In general (with some exceptions, depends on jurisdiction and circumstances), most low scale copyright violations are treated as a civil matter - it allows the harmed party (i.e. the copyright owner) to sue you for damages in a civil court, if they wish and are able to do so. However, it generally is not a crime (again, with some exceptions - e.g. large scale distribution often is) so the government and police on their own cannot, should not and does not investigate and prosecute violations of software licence terms.
Newspapers often say things that are not technically true by the standards of legal usage, especially in headlines which must be brief. "Legalize" is a popular or political concept, not a legal one. Instead, the legal concept underlying such court actions is that (1) an existing prohibition is unconstitutional, and thus such a law cannot exist, and (2) anything is legal unless it is specifically made illegal. "Legalize" is a reasonable term that describes what happens in such cases: to make something be legal (per (2) that means "remove a restriction").
Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone.
The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.")
In law, there is a distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law. If the law prohibits X, and you think you're doing Y, that's a mistake of fact. If the law prohibits X, and you know you're doing X, but you think the law prohibits Y, that's a mistake of law. Mistake of fact is generally a defense (although that principle is being eroded), but mistake of law is not. In your hypothetical, you clearly had the intent to sell coffee, so you had mens rea. Mens rea refers to the intent to perform the act that is illegal, not the intent to break the law. If you intend to follow the law, but intentionally perform an act that is against the law, it is the latter that forms mens rea; mens rea refers to your intent regarding the act you are performing, not your intent regarding the law.
Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).
What are the legal steps I can take if buyer doesn't pay me for an item? I am about to send a package to a shop. I talked to them through Instagram and they have sent me pictures showing they are really that shop. Also my friend just visited the shop a few days ago. We agreed to a price and they told me the shop's address which is really the one from the shop. They also have a webpage. But I have no names and I am unsure what they can or have to do after they receive the package. Does an agreement in a chat count as a valid contract? What steps could I take if they don't send the money?
Does an agreement in a chat count as a valid contract? In most jurisdictions (and for most transactions): yes. Usually the only thing that matters for a valid contract is that there is a mutual agreement – whether that is in writing, orally, via chat or via sign language does not matter. Of course, having things in writing makes it easier to prove in court if there is a problem, so it's still advisable. What steps could I take if they don't send the money? You can: remind them to pay if they still don't pay, you can sue them. Some juridictions have accelerated court proceedings for simple cases like this (e.g. Gerichtliches Mahnverfahren in Germany), otherwise you will have to sue in a regular court that deals with contract disputes. But I have no names and I am unsure what they can or have to do after they received the package. This is going to be the main problem. It's no good to enter into a contract if you do not know who the other party is :-). You definitely need to find out who exactly entered into an agreement with you. If the sale is to a private person, find out their name and address. If the sale is to a business (seems to be the case here), find the official name and legal type of the business, and make sure whoever you deal with is authorized to enter into contracts. Otherwise the contract will be hard to enforce in court if things go wrong.
Consumer Protection In addition to whatever the provisions of the contract may be, consumer protection laws will apply to this transaction, and will override any contrary provisions in the contract. There are federal protections, mostly administered by the FTC. The State of California also has consumer protection statutes, the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and False Advertising Law (FAL). Contracts may not override these laws except where a specific provision permits such contract terms. Federal Rules The official FTC page "What To Do If You’re Billed for Things You Never Got, or You Get Unordered Products" states: The federal Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule applies to most things you order by mail, online, or by phone. It says: Sellers have to ship your order within the time they (or their ads) say — that goes whether they say “2-Day Shipping” or “In Stock & Ships Today.” If they don’t give a time, they must ship within 30 days of when you placed your order. If there’s a delay shipping your order, the seller has to tell you and give you the choice of either agreeing to the delay or canceling your order for a full refund. If the seller doesn’t ship your order, it has to give you a full refund — not just a gift card or store credit. ... Disputing credit card billing errors within the 60-day dispute period By law, you have to dispute a credit card billing error in writing within 60 days of the date that the first statement that has the billing error was sent to you. Otherwise, you may get stuck with the bill. ... Disputing credit card billing errors after the 60-day dispute period ends What if you agreed to delivery on a date in the future that turns out to be more than 60 days after your statement showing the charge was sent to you — but the delivery didn’t arrive or you rejected it because it was not what you agreed to purchase? Can you still dispute the charge? You’re likely outside the protection of the Fair Credit Billing Act. Still, some credit card issuers may extend the 60-day dispute period when a shipment is delayed. Send a dispute letter to your credit card company. Include copies of any documents showing the expected and actual delivery dates, including any notice the seller sent you about the shipment delay. See also the official "Business Guide to the FTC's Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule" The actual Federal Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule is at 16 CFR Part 435; relevant parts of this rule provide: (435.1 (b)) "Prompt refund" shall mean: (1) Where a refund is made pursuant to paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2)(ii), (d)(2)(iii), or (d)(3) of this section, a refund sent by any means at least as fast and reliable as first class mail within seven (7) working days of the date on which the buyer's right to refund vests under the provisions of this part. Provided, however, that where the seller cannot provide a refund by the same method payment was tendered, prompt refund shall mean a refund sent in the form of cash, check, or money order, by any means at least as fast and reliable as first class mail, within seven (7) working days of the date on which the seller discovers it cannot provide a refund by the same method as payment was tendered; (§ 435.2) ... it constitutes an unfair method of competition, and an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a seller: (a) (1) To solicit any order for the sale of merchandise to be ordered by the buyer through the mail, via the Internet, or by telephone unless, at the time of the solicitation, the seller has a reasonable basis to expect that it will be able to ship any ordered merchandise to the buyer: (a) (1) (i) Within that time clearly and conspicuously stated in any such solicitation; or (a) (1) (ii) If no time is clearly and conspicuously stated, within thirty (30) days after receipt of a properly completed order from the buyer. Provided, however, where, at the time the merchandise is ordered the buyer applies to the seller for credit to pay for the merchandise in whole or in part, the seller shall have fifty (50) days, rather than thirty (30) days, to perform the actions required in this paragraph (a)(1)(ii). (a) (2) To provide any buyer with any revised shipping date, as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, unless, at the time any such revised shipping date is provided, the seller has a reasonable basis for making such representation regarding a definite revised shipping date. (a) (3) To inform any buyer that it is unable to make any representation regarding the length of any delay unless: (a) (3) (i) The seller has a reasonable basis for so informing the buyer; and (a) (3) (ii) The seller informs the buyer of the reason or reasons for the delay. (a) (4) In any action brought by the Federal Trade Commission, alleging a violation of this part, the failure of a respondent-seller to have records or other documentary proof establishing its use of systems and procedures which assure the shipment of merchandise in the ordinary course of business within any applicable time set forth in this part will create a rebuttable presumption that the seller lacked a reasonable basis for any expectation of shipment within said applicable time. (b) (1) Where a seller is unable to ship merchandise within the applicable time set forth in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, to fail to offer to the buyer, clearly and conspicuously and without prior demand, an option either to consent to a delay in shipping or to cancel the buyer`s order and receive a prompt refund. Said offer shall be made within a reasonable time after the seller first becomes aware of its inability to ship within the applicable time set forth in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, but in no event later than said applicable time. There are further provisions which deal with the situation where a delayed order is further delayed, and what consent the buyer may have already given to any delay. In short, where the seller is unable to meet its estimated time for shipment of the order, the seller must promptly inform the buyer, in no case later than the original estimated shipment date, and must offer an option to cancel the order. Unless the buyer explicitly consents to the delay (definite or indefinite) the seller must send a prompt refund, which means within 7 working days. No contract purporting to waive or modify these rights is valid or enforceable on these points, although if the initial order explicitly states that the date of shipment is indefinite, and the customer agrees to this, no shipment date can be enforced under this rule. California Laws California Civil Code section 1723 requires that a retail store selling goods allow returns or exchanges for at least 7 days, or else prominently post its actual policy. But that does not apply to goods ordered for later delivery. The California Business and Professions Code section 17500 makes it unlawful for: any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services, professional or otherwise, or anything of any nature whatsoever or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this state, or to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning that real or personal property or those services, professional or otherwise, or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact connected with the proposed performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading This would include advertising a shipment date which was not reasonably achievable, and which the seller knew or should have know was likely not to be met. The California Civil code section 17770 makes unlawful: (10) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity. This may not apply to the fact pattern described in the question, depending on what the seller knew and when.
Short Answer You are legally entitled to the cost of an adequate replacement (possibly a lightly used previously owned computer) reduced by the amount refunded. This is sometimes called a "benefit of the bargain" measure of the relief to which you are entitled. But as a practical matter, there is no cost effective way of enforcing your legal rights under these facts, that doesn't deeply compromise you chances of success. But, trying to litigate the case on the cheap, because it is unlikely to succeed, makes the effort to enforce your rights even less worthwhile. Your best options are those you could take outside the formal legal process (such as social media gripes, or complaining to "the manager" of the person you dealt with first if they refuse to give you what you want or are entitled to under the law). Long Answer Applicable Law The default rules of law, absent an express contractual term to the contrary, are as follows: In every U.S. jurisdiction in an intra-U.S. transaction, this is governed by the following section of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which apart from section and subsection numbering conventions is substantially identical in all of these jurisdictions. It states: § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-delivery or Repudiation. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. (2)Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival. In international transactions between signatory countries, the relevant body of law of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (1980). The primary applicable provisions of that Convention (to which the U.S. is a party) are: Article 45 (1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may: (a) exercise the rights provided in articles 46 to 52; (b) claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 77. (2) The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies. (3) No period of grace may be granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when the buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of contract. Article 46 (1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement. . . . Article 47 (1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for performance by the seller of his obligations. (2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is not ­deprived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance. Article 48 (1) Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer ­unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim ­damages as provided for in this Convention. (2) If the seller requests the buyer to make known whether he will accept performance and the buyer does not comply with the request within a reasonable time, the seller may perform within the time indicated in his request. The buyer may not, during that period of time, resort to any remedy which is inconsistent with performance by the seller. (3) A notice by the seller that he will perform within a specified period of time is assumed to include a request, under the preceding paragraph, that the buyer make known his decision. (4) A request or notice by the seller under paragraph (2) or (3) of this article is not effective unless received by the buyer. Article 49 (1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or (b) in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. . . . Article 74 Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. Article 75 If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. Article 76 (1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under article 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the ­contract and the current price at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. If, however, the party claiming ­damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied instead of the current price at the time of avoidance. (2) For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the current price is the price prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods. Article 77 A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated. Your Legal Rights This brings us to the question: What buyer protections are there for this? Will I be able to easily sue the manufacturer for monetary losses if the manufacturer refunds me anyway instead of letting me wait for the item to come back in stock? The buyer is legally entitled to the fair market value of obtaining a replacement (perhaps in the secondary market for used laptops) that is equivalent to what was ordered reduced by the amount of money refunded. Practical Vindication Of Your Legal Rights But it is much easier to get the refund than it is to prevail in a lawsuit for the additional damages to which the buyer is legally entitled, a prevailing buyer will probably not get their attorney fees if they prevail, and there is a good chance that the dispute will be sent to arbitration which is, generally speaking (according to strong empirical evidence) a forum with a strong anti-consumer bias (although consumer arbitration can be fairly inexpensive to litigate in, is somewhat more tolerant of lack of legal expertise by a self-represented party, and sometimes despite everything, you win, or can even get an unfair result that works in your favor rather than that of the seller). If you are fighting over $1,500 to $2,500, and you have a fairly complex case to prove that will require expert testimony (and expert witness fees and court costs would be awarded to a prevailing party in addition to the actual damages to which they are legally entitled even though attorney fees are not recoverable in most cases), it will be very hard to find a lawyer willing to take the case. This is because it will take far more than 5-12 hours of attorney work to take the case to its conclusion, which is your maximum cost effective litigation budget, even if everything you win goes to the attorney and you receive no actual benefit. To get even a 50% recovery, your lawyer needs to get the job done ins 2-6 hours depending on your lawyer's hourly rate, which is close to impossible when your legal argument is as difficult to prove as it is in this case. So, basically, the only cost effective way to litigate the case is without a lawyer in small claims court or consumer arbitration, even though representing yourself without a lawyer greatly reduces your chances of success on the merits. On balance, you would usually be better off accepting a refund and acknowledging that you have been damaged in a manner for which the law provides no reliable and cost effective remedy, because the harm is too small. Bad mouthing the offending company on social media (which sometimes results in a PR driven instead of lawyer driven, favorable resolution) would probably be a more fruitful strategy. Complaining to a manager or writing a letter to the President of the company might also be a more fruitful strategy. Sometimes small disputes can be resolved with class action lawsuits, but this isn't a case where this is an option, since it involves just a single individual or a handful of individuals who are harmed. This is also not the sort of case where a state consumer protection agency or attorney general's office or federal consumer protection agency is likely to get involved, since it doesn't involve a systemic deceptive trade practice, just an unfair to you bad situation. Why have these laws if they are so hard to enforce in consumer cases? As my commercial transactions professor in law school (James J. White, the author of the leading legal treatise on the subject) was fond of saying: all legal issues become more interesting if you add more zeros to the amount in controversy. If the computer system you bought had a price of $150,000 that had since gone up to $300,000, this dispute would absolutely be worth litigating. Furthermore, since you could litigate it adequately on the litigation budget that this amount in controversy would make possible, your prospects of successfully vindicating your rights as a buyer, at only a modest discount for unrecoverable litigation costs, would be much greater. Essentially, our system is designed to get close to justice in the most important disputes, as measured by the amount in controversy, while it tolerates small injustices that are not as damaging (in raw absolute dollar terms) as big disputes. This is unfair, but the source of this unfairness is intrinsic to the nature of the problem (rather than simply being a matter of artificial bias created by the people who designed the civil justice system). Also, this unfair bias comes close to maximizing the aggregate improvement in economic value that the legal system as a whole can provide for a given legal of expenditure on this system. Basically, at a fundamental economic level, the economic costs of justly resolving small wrongs can be greater due to the deadweight loss of litigation expenses for the economy as a whole, than the economic benefits of resolving the wrongs fairly (which provides not only justice to those involved but also provides an incentive to act justly in future transactions before one knows whether a problem or dispute will arise).
The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.
You asked the rep about how to change some details on your account, and asked him about the cost. It is clear from the recording that you are not changing anything right now. I can't see anything where you state that you want to enter a contract right now, I can not see anything where the rep indicates they want to enter a contract right now. In other words, no contract has been formed. The rep did tell you that a name change will not increase the phone plan price. That was a promise. It was a verbal promise, and you have evidence that the promise was made. Your contract will determine whether the company is bound by such a verbal promise. If you change the name on the contract, with nobody mentioning a price increase, and the price increases, you can surely complain that you were misled and wouldn't have changed the name if you had known about the price increase. However, if you get told that the price will increase before the name change, and you quote the previous promise, I don't think that will force the company to allow a name change without price increase, because your phone conversation didn't create a contract.
Online stores shipping stuff internationally usually include a clause in their Terms along the lines "buyer is responsible for all clearance/import fees and taxes". What those fees and taxes are depends on: destination country (the actual tax) carrier (e.g. FedEx) (clearance charges as the carrier also acts as your customs broker) value and, sometimes, what the item is. The onus is on the buyer to check all those charges in advance before deciding to buy. It would have been naive to assume that, when you buy internationally, all that you pay is what the store gets plus import tax (unless you're ready to be present at the customs when the item arrives, fill forms and liaise with them yourself).
Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?”
From a legal POV, we can mostly remove the fact that you re-orderd the item from someone else and now don't know whether the expected shipment is in fulfillment of contract 1 or contract 2. Assume that there was only one order, the seller or manufacturer (it could be either) believed they were out of stock, then cancelled the order and issued a refund (which you did not refuse to accept). That is the end of the contract -- it has been cancelled. They cannot unilaterally create a new contract that you are bound to. That does not mean you get a free grape crusher (or similar item) - that would be "unjust enrichment". There are a number of steps you could taks, apart from just paying them again, or making them sue you to get their money. One is that you can allow them to pick it up and return it, after it is delivered. You can also contact "them" (perhaps the manufacturer, perhaps the intermediary company) and tell them so that they can stop the shipment. They may advise you to refuse the package so that the shipper sends it back (not totally unproblematic). Given that it is possible that the item being shipped is in fulfillment of contract 2, it is important to not leap to a uncertain conclusion. To complicate the matter further, Amazon is a party to this deal, so this may be Amazon's error. They will cancel orders and refund payments for various reasons, for example a vendor failing to provide certification documentation in a particular format. What matters in this case is that you are not obligated to pay twice or to incur expenses for returning the item.
What is the legal status of data (intentionally deleted or not) on a second-hand computer? If a person purchases a second-hand computer, and the seller has not wiped the hard drives of that computer before the sale, is it legal for the buyer to access the data on it? Alternatively, if the data on the drive was intentionally deleted, would it be legal to use a data recovery program to recover the deleted files, and access them? Accessing an online account with credentials found on the drive would (of course) be illegal, so this question is strictly about the legality of file access, not use.
Data, as it happens in law, can also be owned. That's why we have a discipline called "Intellectual Property". It is a "thing" - like other properties like cars, houses etc., someone owns it. Now, does the transfer of a computer also includes a transfer of data ownership stored inside the computer? Practically speaking, this clause is very unlikely to be included in the agreement when a computer is sold. It didn't explicitly say "yes" (you may use anything you find in the hard drive), but it didn't explicitly say "no" either, hence the question. Looking at data, we can list a few legal concepts related to them: Data collection Data storage Data usage Copyright The exact details vary by jurisdiction, but in general: Data must be collected through legal means Data must be stored in a secure manner to protect the data subjects Data must only be used by purposes agreed during data collection by the data subjects Copyright is not transferrable without signatures "License to use" is not transferrable either Example 1, let's say a software is installed in the computer, with an appropriate license. This license was purchased by the original owner, therefore the software company licensed him to use the software, not you. The agreement does not have your name on it. Example 2, the original owner is a photographer and have some beautiful photos stored on the hard drive. By virtue of Copyright, he is the author and copyright owner of these photos. There has been no signed document describing the transfer of copyright ownership to you, nor license you to use these photos in any way. Example 3, the computer belongs to a company, and client information is stored on the hard drive. By transferring the computer to a third-party without wiping the drive clean, the company fails to use reasonable measures to protect the data of their clients. If somebody uses this data, then he is using data collected through illegal means, and can be prosecuted. A counter example would be someone transferring ownership of the computer for the purpose of transferring the data inside. Note this is different: it is clear to both parties that the purpose of the exchange is to obtain the data stored inside the medium. The ownership of the storage medium and the data inside are separated. Likewise any intellectual property associated to a physical object. When you go to the store and purchase a Bluray of a movie, you buy the physical ownership of the plastic disc + permission (license) to view the contents of the disc in a private setting. You do not buy the copyright of the movie even though it is in your hand. To conclude, the answer is No - transfer of ownership of a storage medium has nothing whatsoever about the transfer of ownership of the data inside.
Based on a reply from the Charitable Law Office of Ohio Attorney General: Hello, I am in receipt of your inquiry below. Please be advised that there is nothing to prohibit using electronic storage for your organization’s business documents. Many organizations find this method to be a very effective measure as opposed to retaining hard copies. ... it seems electronic storage is wholly permitted.
You are responsible for any processing of data that happens under your control – but are you the data controller in this scenario? Since you have no meaningful influence over whether or not this backup happens on the operating system level, there could be a strong argument that you aren't a data controller for these backups. And if you aren't a data controller for that processing activity, you aren't responsible for compliance. However, if you were to integrate directly with relevant Google APIs in order to facilitate backups that could make you a controller. Then, Google would either have to be your data processor (won't be the case here), or you would need a legal basis for sharing the user's data with Google. For example, you could ask for the user's consent before activating such features.
It is possible to abandon copyright ... maybe. However, this game has not been abandoned. When the owner of the company was liquidated, the copyright became the legal property of the liquidator in trust for the creditors. It is for him or her to decide how to deal with the property but the copyright still exists until 70 years after the author(s) death. If you allow downloads you are breaching copyright unless you have permission (or you meet the Fair Dealing criteria - you probably don't). The person to seek permission from is the liquidator od the company. If you get sued they do not need to demonstrate financial loss - copyright claims can either be pursued for actual or statutory damages, that is, a fixed amount per violation. In addition, in egregious cases, copyright violation is a crime prosecutable by the state.
Yes, it's illegal. 18 USC 1030 (a) (5) (A) [Whoever] knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer [shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section]. "Damage" is defined at (e)(8) to mean "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information". Your proposed attack would certainly cause impairment to the availability of the Stack Exchange system and the data and information which it hosts. Whatever else you may think about the Stack Exchange terms of service, they certainly do not authorize any user or moderator to "destroy the site" in any sense such as you describe. It's not necessary for the TOS to explicitly say "you may not do X"; it's enough that they don't say that you may do it. To use a firewall analogy, it's "default deny". "Protected computer" is defined in (e)(2) to mean, essentially, any computer that is used in or affects interstate commerce. Which means practically every computer that has ever accessed the Internet, and certainly includes Stack Exchange servers. So your proposed attack would include all the elements of a violation of this section. Such a violation is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment if it causes a loss of more than $5000 (see (4)(A)(i)(I)), which if such an attack were successful, it certainly would. Greater penalties are possible in certain circumstances. Even if the loss does not exceed $5000, or if the attack is merely attempted but without success, it is still punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine ((4)(G)(i)). There is nothing in the terms of service saying you will go to federal jail for destroying stack exchange. Irrelevant. It is not up to Stack Exchange Inc. or its TOS to determine who does or doesn't go to federal prison. Rather, it is up to Congress to determine what conduct deserves such punishment (as they did in 1984 by enacting this law), up to federal law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate and make a case against an alleged violator, and up to the federal courts to determine if the accused is guilty and how they should be punished.
As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum).
united-states If the computer is in fact a HAL-9001 (no doubt running the Clarke-68 OS) then the reseller can so describe it without trademark infringement. This is a case of nominative use, where the trademark is used as the name of the thing, to describe and/or refer to it. In addition, under US law, an attempt to prohibit the reseller from using that term would run into first amendment issues, and would be subject to strict scrutiny. If the term were used in such a way as to disparage the brand, there could possibly be an action for tarnishment of the trademark. but such actions are now limited in the US on first amendment grounds, following the case of Matal v. Tam. See What is trademark tarnishment or dilution under US law? for more details.
Yes, it's illegal You are missing something terribly important: The package might not be your property [yet]. In any way, it is not in your possession, while it is in the hands of the postal service! The contents of the package started fully owned by the sender and were entrusted to the postal service to deliver it. This entrustment is (contractually) defined as the time it is handed to the postal service, but the postal service does not gain any ownership. They do however have insurance on the parcel (to some degree), as they are liable for the loss of it. In many cases, the transfer of ownership happens upon delivery (for example, in the UK), so that you can't even be sure you own the contents while the box is still on the truck. At least in the eye of many postal services I know, it is the basic presumption, that they hold the item as entrusted. So to be on the safe side, it's best to presume that the package only becomes your package the moment you sign for the receipt of the package or it is dropped into your mailbox or at your dedicated dropoff point (you can specify that with many postal carriers btw). Otherwise, your actions might interfere with the contract of the mail service [to bring it to your door] and might incur liability upon them as their insurance presumes the parcel was lost and it has to be replaced. By the way, it is customary that any message of the parcel is damaged go to the sender, not the receiver so that in the case of commercial mail they can send/fund a replacement, as the sender needs to ensure that a non-defect item is delivered under their own contract with the recipient. Criminal lawsuits But, you want to know which specific law you'd be sued under 18 USC §1708 (2) not only for taking the box, but also for taking the item from the box (emphasis mine)! Whoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains, or attempts so to obtain, from or out of any mail, post office, or station thereof, letter box, mail receptacle, or any mail route or other authorized depository for mail matter, or from a letter or mail carrier, any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or abstracts or removes from any such letter, package, bag, or mail, any article or thing contained therein, or secretes, embezzles, or destroys any such letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained therein [...] Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. The act of taking is relevant. It is irrelevant that you would receive the parcel later. You take it from the car on the delivery route. You also do trespass under whatever jurisdiction applies where the car is parked. For example, Criminal Trespass on Indian country is defined under 25.CFR § 11.411 (b). The rules in other jurisdictions are very similar: you are not allowed to enter the car, as it is clearly off-limits to the general public. The car is btw. supposed to be closed to prevent such, so you have to actually break property of the postal service (which is an extra charge to just the normal B&E). (b) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so, he or she enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by: (3) Fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders. A car door, even if not locked and left ajar, is an enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders, and the inside of a car is "any place". So, in the correct jurisdiction, this statute of criminal trespass does apply. And as pointed out above, taking the mail without the driver knowing is illegal. In some fashion, taking your own mail is also a strange case of obstructing the correspondence, which specifically calls out that the parcel has to be given by the mailman to the recipient (emphasis mine). Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If it is discovered by the driver while still on route, they will have to call the base and investigate the missing parcel, which takes time from the delivery, so might constitute retarding the passage of mail. If you break the lock to the car, you'd be charged as Injury to mail bags: Whoever tears, cuts, or otherwise injures any mail bag, pouch, or other thing used or designed for use in the conveyance of the mail, or draws or breaks any staple or loosens any part of any lock, chain, or strap attached thereto, with intent to rob or steal any such mail, or to render the same insecure, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. A Postal car, especially with a lock on the door, is such a device. And if you somehow had the key to the car, you'd break 18 USC § 1704 instead. Plus, your taking does possibly incur monetary damages to the postal carrier, so civil charges for that money and expenses in investigating would also accrue against the taking person. civil lawsuits? If you'd take the parcel, you make the postal driver accountable for the loss of the parcel and the worth of the package, as the internal system of the postal service does recognize that they did not deliver the parcel, did not scan it out at the home base, but they did scan it onto their route. So unless they can point the finger at you or a known thief, they might need to admit that they did not lock the car or committed some other misconduct that allowed someone to steal the parcel. This can lead to the financial loss of the delivery driver or them being fired. Should the mail carrier or the postal service discover it was you, the mail carrier can now sue you for the injury the lost parcel meant to them as you interfered with their work contract. The tort is Tortious interference. Then, the mail service can sue you for intentionally interfering with the delivery contract the service had with the one ordering the delivery done: they were required to bring the parcel to the target and got paid for that. Only your action of taking did prevent this. Would you not have taken the parcel, they would have delivered, so you interfered with their contract. Life Advice: Approach the driver, get out a photo-ID (Drivers license, passport, ID-card etc) and ask them something akin to this "The website told me you might have a parcel for me. Can you look? I am this person, and this ID proves I live at the target address, as indicated on this ID." With those credentials in hand, the postal driver can check and give it to you but isn't technically obligated to. But as it often means they can save a few valuable minutes getting to your house, they might, especially if you know your mail carrier and are friendly. On the other hand, it's extremely unlikely for letter mail to be given this way, as searching for a parcel on a truck is much easier than looking for the letter mails in the bags.
Can you be bound to an unsigned contract even though services are rendered informally? So you are working on a project to build a SaaS (Software as a Service). You prepare a technical contract and have it reviewed by intellectual property lawyers and it passes their approval. You present the contract to the client and they refuse to agree to the terms of the contract. But they still want to move forward with the project. They give you the agreed upon deposit and you begin work. Several months into the project, the relationship with the client goes sour and you refuse to continue to work on the project. Can the client hold you to the contract which was not signed by either party? Can they use the non-signed contract and copy of the deposit check as evidence in court as a verbal contract? If they sue to try to recover the deposit, do they have any legal standing?
This is largely a contract law issue, with little to do with intellectual property. Let's take a closer look at Offer and Acceptance of a Contract. An Offer or Acceptance can be made: Orally In writing By conduct First, you offer your client a written contract, with terms and conditions. Your client refused to accept. There is no contract. Then, your client offers you another contract, orally: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. It is irrelevant whether $X and $Y are the same as in the written contract or not. This is a separate contract, and the original terms you proposed does not apply. Did you accept this contract? From Felhouse v. Bindley (1862): Acceptance must be communicated clearly and cannot be imposed due to silence of one of the parties. Since you accepted the deposit and began work, you have accepted the contract by conduct. This is a contract where there is no terms and conditions besides that one sentence mentioned by your client. Furthermore, you intent to carry on this contract (you wish to complete the project and get the money). This contract has benefits to you for Consideration. Would it have made a difference? Suppose that your client's response is: We are sorry, our company has a weird policy about accepting contracts in writing, 30 people have to approve it and it takes 3 months. Would you take a verbal acceptance? We will give you $X as deposit and you will begin work, after work is finished we will give you $Y, as stated in the contract. Then this would be an oral acceptance of the original (written) contract with terms and conditions. But that cannot happen, since the client explicitly refused your offer. An acceptance must be unconditional. Qualification of terms of offer means to destroy the original offer. Counter-offer means to reject the original offer. Can the client use the deposit as evidence that there is a verbal contract? Yes, certainly. But this contract is not the un-signed contract. Read this conversation, again, carefully: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. There is no mention that your proposed terms and conditions apply, is there? Even if the client, after 2 weeks, come back to you and says: Sorry for refusing your offer earlier. After due consideration, we think your company's proposal is best. We would like to move forward with you. It will be $X for the deposit, and $Y after completion. All your proposed terms and conditions apply. Deal? This time your client is making an Offer. If you accept, it will be a new contract, not the same one you offered to the client earlier. About the money. This is really a case by case situation. Depending on how much the entire project is completed and the nature of the project, results can be different. A deposit is necessary to begin work. The deposit secures the client's intention to carry on the project. The final payment is make after work is finished satisfactorily. Isn't the current situation exactly what a deposit is for?
Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?”
Contracts don’t have to be in writing Generally, there are specific exemptions. For example, in some jurisdictions, copyright transfers have to be in writing. Written contracts do not have to take any particular form Again, in general, some specific contracts may need to be in particular forms or explicitly deal with particular matters. Writing doesn’t mean ink on paper Of course, ink on paper is “writing” but so is an email, a text message, a Facebook post, a photo, a comic book. In law, writing simply means a semi-permanent record. Signatures are not required Unless, of course, they are in the specific circumstances. Your examples The plumber’s promise is both binding and unnecessary - the plumber is responsible for his own negligent acts and omissions even without such an agreement. On the other hand, if you promised not to hold him responsible, that promise would be binding. The designer’s agreement to transfer copyright is binding even where such agreements must be in writing because it is in writing. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?
Preface and Caveats The question doesn't specify where this happened. I am providing an outline of the way that most U.S. states would handle this situation, if the fats are as they are much more likely to be and not as claimed in the question probably due to a misunderstanding of the underlying transaction. I identify areas where state laws most often vary and don't describe those areas of the law in detail since that is impossible without knowing where this happens. This is a matter of state law and varies from state to state, although most U.S. states are quite similar until you get to the fine details. Atypical language in the contract between the contractor and the client could also lead to a different conclusion. I don't know how this would be resolved in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Background: The Structure Of A Typical Construction Loan Financed Construction Project In business and contractual disputes you can only understand the answer if you understand the underlying business transaction, which the question itself doesn't spell out very fully. The fact pattern identified in the question is so unusual that I strongly suspect that there is a misunderstanding of the facts, or an inadvertent misstatement in the language used in the question due to sloppy writing that flows from not appreciating the importance of some key facts. The transaction was almost surely structures more or less as follows (for background, I'm presenting a more general very of this kind of transaction rather than the simple one with no subcontractors or material suppliers involved, because this context helps someone understand why the laws are written the way that they are written.) Usually, the client owns real property, takes out a construction loan from a bank secured by the real estate, and hires a general contractor. The client will usually make some down payment to the general contractor who will take care of paying the subcontractors and material suppliers, and will pay the balance of the amount due to the general contractor through proceeds of the construction loan disbursed by the bank which are drawn as the work is done and payment is earned. Typically, each drawn cycle, which is often monthly for a smaller project and weekly, biweekly or semimonthly in a larger project, materials suppliers and subcontractors submit invoices and lien waivers to the general contractor based upon the work done. If the work is complete, a complete lien waiver is submitted, if he work in only partially finished, a partial lien waiver is submitted. The general contractor substantively reviews the invoices based upon a physical review of the construction site and a review of the subcontract. If there are problems it is rejected and must be resubmitted by the material supplier or subcontractor. If it is approved, the general contractor attaches that invoice as a supporting document to a draw request for the draw cycle summarizing all validly submitted invoices from material suppliers, subcontractors and itself, and also attaching a partial lien waiver from the general contractor. Then, the general contractor submits that draw request to a bank officer handling the construction loan as an agent of the property owner-client, and also a client representative for approval. The bank officer and client representative make a much less probing review of the draw request, looking only for obvious irregularities or suspicious amounts, and if everything is in order, they approve the request. Then, the bank write a check in the draw amount approved to the general contractor. The general contractor then disburses the invoiced amounts to the materials materials suppliers and subcontractors and pays itself the amounts that it has earned. Sometimes, however, the general contractor gets a valid invoice from a material supplier or subcontractor, and receives funds from the client in the form of a downpayment or a loan draw, but doesn't pay the subcontractor or material supplier with those funds. Also, sometimes, the general contractor does work that it is entitled to be paid for or incurs an obligation to a material supplier or subcontractor, but the client doesn't pay or the bank doesn't disburse the funds requested even though the request is valid. When a general contractor, material supplier or subcontractor doesn't get paid for work that is actually done at a particular piece of real estate, the law gives the firm that wasn't paid for its work on that particular piece of real estate what is called a mechanic's lien encumbering that piece of real estate. The details of how a firm with a mechanic's lien gives notice to the world of its rights, the priorities of lien's vis-a-vis each other, and the way that mechanic's liens are enforced varies significantly from state to state. But typically the notice must be given very promptly and not long after notice of non-payment is given, a lawsuit to foreclose on the real estate encumbered by the lien is commenced. An unpaid material supplier or subcontractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the general contractor for breach of contract, and sometimes also for misappropriation of disbursements from the client or the bank. An unpaid general contractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the owner of the property for breach of contract. The Facts In The Question and Analysis The first paragraph of the question tells us what went wrong. The client paid an employee of the general contractor (probably a project manager) instead of the firm the employee worked for (basically embezzling the money by deceiving the client into thinking that the employee was authorized to receive a payment to the employee's firm on its behalf when that wasn't the case), and the firm of the employee who was paid now wants to get paid. This happens and lawsuits usually follows when it does. But exactly what happens next depends upon the facts in the next to paragraphs. The next two paragraphs of the question, however, are probably confused and incorrect. The next two paragraphs say: Two weeks later, the client received a letter from the contractor's lender asking the client for money owed to the contractor, saying that if it was not paid, the client could be double charged. Does the client owe the contractor's lender? What probably actually happened is that the finance office of the contractor submitted a draw request to the bank officer in charge of the client's construction loan with the bank, and also gave a notice of the draw request to the client. The client tells the bank officer not to approve the draw request because the client has already paid the draw request directly to the employee of the contractor (probably the project manager) without the knowledge of the firm the employee worked for. What Happens Next If The Facts Are As I Believe Them To Be? When this happens, the finance officer at the contractor firm talks to the client figures out what happens and then talks to the employee to whom the payment was made. If the employee promptly turns over the funds the the contractor firm, the finance officers at the contractor firm scolds the employee for screwing up the system and the client for making a payment to the wrong person and there is no harm, no foul, and the matter is over. But if the employee who took the client's money doesn't turn over the money which the client can prove to the contractor firm that he paid to the employee, several things are likely to happen. Non-Lawsuit Actions: The client will direct the bank not to pay the draw request. The employee who took the money from the client is fired (no big deal, he was probably long gone). The contractor firm and/or the client will often, but not always, report to the police that the employee embezzled the funds from the client, and if the police find it credible, will issue an arrest warrant. The main reason not to do so is that the facts are uncertain enough that the police and prosecutor don't want to touch it (e.g. the client paid the employee in cash and didn't get a receipt, or the employee when asked says that the payment was made but was a "tip" or was payment for something unrelated), or the client and/or the contractor firm don't want to harm their reputations by making public the fact that there was a theft on this job. Three lawsuits could be brought, although, in practice, these might be consolidated as claims against different parties and cross-claims between defendants, in a lawsuit brought by the contractor, or in some other configuration. The contractor firm sues the employee who took the money for converting money from a client intended for it (probably both as a tort and as a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent of the construction firm). The contractor firm sues the client for breach of contract. The question is about the liability of the client in this second lawsuit. The client might also bring a counterclaim against the contractor for negligent supervision of its employee if the employee did indeed abscond with the money and the facts support that counterclaim. If the client prevailed on that counterclaim, the judgment on the counterclaim for negligent supervision (e.g. if the contractor knew that the employee had a history of doing things like this and didn't warn the client) would be setoff against the breach of contract judgment, rather than being a defense to the breach of contract claim. The client sues the employee for fraud, conversion or theft. What Are The Rights Of The Parties In These Lawsuits? In the second lawsuit, the client has breached the contract. The contract said to pay the firm, the client paid someone else, and so the obligation under the contract was not satisfied. The disputes in the lawsuit between the contracting firm and the client will be over whether the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds as an agent of he contracting firm, over whether the payment that the client says was made to the employee was made at all, and over the purpose of the payment if a payment was made to the employee but the employee claims that it was a "tip" or a payment for something else (e.g. the employee also had a catering side hustle and the employee says it was for catering services). The issue of whether the client made the payment at all may be hard to prove if the payment was made in cash and the employee didn't provide a receipt and will come down to the credibility of the client and employee's testimony at trial. if the payment was made with a check or credit card, bank records will make it an open and shut case on that issue that will probably not be disputed at trial. If the facts reveal that the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds from the client for the contractor firm and that the payment was for work on the project and not something else, then the the payment made by the client to the employee satisfies the client's duty under the contract even if the employee wasn't actually authorized to receive the funds for the contractor firm. So, the client wins and the contractor firm's sole remedy is to sue its employee for misappropriating the client's funds. On the the other hand, if the employee did not have apparent authority to accept the funds from the client, or the payment was for something other than work on the project, or the client fails to prove that the payment was ever made, then the client owes the money to the contracting firm and must pay the contracting firm for the amount due (plus interest, litigation costs and possibly attorneys' fees depending on the terms of the contract). The client may pay that obligation out of separate funds of the client's own, or may authorize a the bank officer to make a draw on the construction loan to pay the amount owed. The construction loan bank of the client wouldn't sue the client or demand payment from the client for the amount that should have been paid to the contractor firm but was instead paid to the employee. It didn't pay money to someone it shouldn't have paid it to unless the client authorized the bank to do so. And, the bank won't pay the contractor without the client/borrower's say so. If the client authorized a draw payment from the construction loan to the employee rather than the contractor firm, the client still owes the bank for what it paid to the employee at the direction of the client (in addition to all other draws on the project), although the client may have a suit against the bank officer for negligence in administering the loan by failing to flag that the payee was wrong (which might lose but isn't a sure loss). The amount owed to the contractor firm proceeds under the analysis set forth above. What If The Facts Are Right? If, improbably, the facts as stating in the question are actually what happened, the client will owe or not owe the contractor money under the same analysis as above. But the client will not have liability to any company that the contractor got a loan from (which would not encumber the client's real estate), since the client has no contractual relationship with the contractor's lender. Post-Script On Double Payment Prevention Laws The question hinges on the unfairness of the client having to possibly pay twice for the same construction work. In some situations, where the general contractor firm is at fault for causing the double payment to happen, the law protects the client from double payment, even though those laws don't apply here. I explain why these laws don't apply below. Basically, the client has to eat the double payment when the double payment occurs because the client screwed up though no fault of the general contractor and the general contractor doesn't benefit from the double payment. Some states have laws designed to prevent property owners, often only residential property owners having work performed on their own residences, from having to double pay for work done in some circumstances. But these laws usually only apply when the client pays the general contractor firm as the client is supposed to, satisfying his contractual obligation, and the general contractor doesn't pay the subcontractor, causing the subcontractor to sue the general contractor for breach of contract and the owner to enforce the subcontractor's mechanic's lien. In those situations, the double payment prevention law eliminates the subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights when the client pays the general contractor in full, and the subcontractor is left only with a lawsuit against the general contractor who didn't pass on the client's or the client's bank's payment to the general contractor for the subcontractor's share of work to the subcontractor. In this case, the double payment laws usually wouldn't apply because the legal issue here is whether the client paid the contractor, or was deceived by the employee into paying someone other than the contractor in an act of conversion/embezzlement/fraud.
One of the principles of contract law is that the offer and acceptance are evaluated based on the objectively ascertainable intentions as judged by a reasonable person. On the facts that you have provided - even if your friend claims that they filled it out wrong, there is no reason for someone to objectively think so, particularly given the fact that they went to the trouble of writing the information in. However, this will depend on what kind of legally binding document this is. If it is, in fact, a contract, then the employer must accept it before it becomes legally binding, and they must actually communicate this acceptance to your friend (the offeror). If this is a policy document, then it is only legally binding if another contract has said that it is legally binding - generally, (smart) employers will include a clause in their employment contract stating that you are to adhere to policies but that those policies do not form part of the contract. If that is the case, then your friend is legally bound by the terms of the policy and will breach their employment contract if they do not adhere to this policy. This is unlikely to be an issue of contract law in and of itself - your friend cannot unilaterally bind their employer to terms as he sees fit. More information - including the nature of the document and other agreements that were made - would be required to provide more useful information (and that's what you would give to a lawyer).
This depends very much on the nature of the agreement, and whether it affects the client's rights and obligations. It may also depend on which US state this is in. If the agreement is "We will hold the negotiating meetings at your office instead of mine." the client's rights are not affected and the client probably has no veto. If the agreement is "Yes we will plead guilty to manslaughter." it isn't valid without the client's consent. If the client is giving up any rights or making any significant concessions, then the client's consent is probably required, but I can give no better answer without an indication of the subject of the agreement.
Is sales person required by law to give a copy of signed contract at the time you sign up for service? No. If I would ask for copy of all documents from that company are they required by law to send her these copies? No. Is there a law that mandates process on how contracts should be signed in California? There are many, however, they relate to specific classes of contract. In general, it is not a requirement that a contract be signed or even written; verbal contracts are totally legitimate. Given that every single transaction where money changes hands in return for goods and/or services is or is part of a contract it is not feasible that they all be signed. Have you bought a cup of coffee today? Did you sign a contract when you did? Here's the thing Your friend has learned several valuable business lessons: the first is some people in business will rip you off. If you are a consumer then you have (some) legal protection, however, if you are in business then the courts and the legislature expect you to look after yourself. Your friend has signed a contract. Pretty much, any court will consider that what they signed would be the entire contract unless there was compelling evidence to the contrary. Her word that the sales rep said there would be no break charges would not on its own be compelling evidence. Your friend has an obvious incentive to lie. Here is the second lesson: don't sign anything unless and until you have read and understood it; hire a lawyer if you need to in order to understand it. Now, either under the contract the company is legitimately allowed to charge these fees or it isn't. Without having a copy of the contract you have no way to tell. Thus the third lesson: always keep your own copy of everything you sign. What your friend can do is: nothing. Don't pay the bill, write to them saying that she disputes that she owes them any money at all. If you want to be provocative, suggest which court would be most convenient if they want to prove the debt. Odds are this will go no further. If they do proceed with a summons then they will need to state their case. At that point she can request through the court a copy of the contract they are relying on. If their claims are legit she can simply roll over.
It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.
What does "electronic verbatim record" mean? What does "electronic verbatim record" mean, and how is it different from "written" in the following: (v) A written or, at the option of the parents, electronic verbatim record of the proceedings before the impartial hearing officer shall be maintained and made available to the parties. I'm wondering if it has something to do with audio recordings (which I requested, but was told were not permitted). There was a court reporter. I have a copy of the transcripts made by the court reporter. They have a lot of mistakes.
Verbatim, despite sounding like verbal, only means that it is an exact account of what was said during the proceedings. Thus appending electronic to it means that this exact record is available in some electronic form, like as a Word or PDF document - however they store it electronically. So it is simply stating you can get the verbatim record in either written or electronic form, depending on your preference.
The standard practice is to send the opposing party -- or better yet, its attorney -- a preservation letter, also known as a litigation hold. The letter notifies the receiving party that the sender is contemplating litigation, which triggers the recipient's duty to retain relevant records. Google for "sample presevation letter" or "sample litigation hold" and you'll find plenty of examples.
The jury would never hear the recording The recording and its provenience would be provided to the prosecution who would, rightly, have issues with its admissibility. The defence and prosecution would make submissions on this to the judge, normally well before the trial date and the empaneling of the jury. If the recording had genuinely emerged during the trial, such submissions would be made without the jury seeing them. The submissions would typically be in writing rather than verbal. If the judge decided the evidence was inadmissible the jury would never see it and never know of its existence. If the jury somehow found out about it anyway, this would be grounds for an immediate mistrial and we would start again with a new jury. Illegally obtained evidence is not automatically inadmissible Hong Kong is not the United States - admitting or excluding illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion of the judge based on where the interests of overall justice are best served. In any event, the absolute prohibition in the US applies only to prosecution evidence - evidence illegally obtained by the defence is subject to the same rules as in Hong Kong; the judge decides.
How does John protect himself from false claims (e.g. if the woman decides to roll down the stairs and blame him)? It would be very helpful if John has evidence of Oxana making false statements about him or others, and/or of Oxana threatening to make them. False accusations are common --and hardly ever prosecuted-- in a context of divorce. Examples of that are police reports (here and here) and excerpts of court proceedings that ensued during my father's (desisted) proceedings to divorce his 2nd wife (for additional excerpts, see also at 22:49-24:29). According to one of those police reports, my father's 2nd wife allegedly extorted him with "You'll have to pay me even until my ring!" (see page 15 of the pdf file) at the time they were going through the divorce proceedings he filed. Based on your description, it is not far-fetched that John could end up experiencing a similar mess as reflected in these police reports. Note: I don't know whether the poorly written quote from page 15 of the pdf was my father's translation of their interactions or whether he merely transcribed them to the police. Is there any downside to basically putting a camera in every room of the house except hers? John is strongly suggested to check Ohio law to avoid criminal charges. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 750.539d(1)(a) prohibits to "Install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place.". As a wife, Oxana would be reasonably entitled to that privacy in rooms other than --and including-- her room. Moreover, placing cameras in every room will not preempt false accusations. For instance, Oxana could still calumniate John by falsely alleging that he and the daughter went to a hotel to have intercourse. How do you find a good divorce lawyer? Before you even decide to retain a lawyer, see this report about New Jersey Family Court, where judges and attorneys allegedly are in the habit of dragging divorce cases for as long as it is profitable to the lawyers (obviously, at the expense of the parties pursuing the divorce). I don't really follow --and have never litigated-- divorce matters, but the multi-year divorce & custody case of Tsimhoni --formerly presided by Michigan infamous judge Lisa Gorcyca-- illustrates that NJ is not the only state where parties fall prey of legal malpractice. John should search for Ohio court opinions related to divorce matters and get acquainted with the applicable concepts, laws, and doctrines. For that purpose, one free, very useful resource is http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch . Court opinions usually cite relevant statutes, whence John can get an idea of what laws are decisive on divorce matters. Is it reasonable to ask for some sort of record of past outcomes (are there standards to provide full and complete records like for financial companies)? It is reasonable, but no, there are no such standards at all. An attorney will most likely allege grounds of attorney-client privilege, the extensive time that would be needed to redact court documents, and possibly other excuses to deny John's request. Instead, John should go to the court in his county and study as many files of divorce cases as he can. A number of courts display some information of cases in their website. For example, some Michigan trial courts have deployed Odyssey (see here and here), whence a party could search from home whether an attorney has litigated cases in that court and how long they've taken. To see the contents of complaints/motions/etc., John can read them only in the courthouse, unless the county court has configured Odyssey (or its equivalent) to allow the public to read the contents from elsewhere. I don't know what progress Ohio courts have made on this. Regardless of the attorney's transparency to share with John any redacted records about his performance, another important variable is the judge. In this regard, see the next item. Is it reasonable to ask to pay way less if the lawyer fails to get certain terms? Unfortunately, that is neither reaonsable nor realistic. Just from meeting with John, it is impossible for the attorney to know aspects such as: whether John is truthful and the meritorious party; how much trouble Oxana will cause during the divorce proceedings (see the aforementioned police reports); how vexatious the opposing counsel will be; whether John will weaken or sabotage his case during an unforeseen situation or lose control as a result of exasperation; whether the case will be presided by a judge who follows the law (instead of incurring personal bias or influence trafficking); if the judge engages in influence trafficking instead of following the law, whether the attorney is in cozy terms with that judge; whether the opposing counsel is in even cozier terms with that judge; in the event that the matter is appealed, any of the three previous items may apply; whether the parties settle (or John desists for whatever reason). Given the multitude of unknown/uncertain variables and possible outcomes, no person (attorney or otherwise) could establish beforehand the semi-contingent pricing that you have in mind. Do the lawyers even do anything other than fill out paperwork? Yes, they do, but that doesn't necessarily mean that what their work is any effective. Even if the lawyer is diligent, the court might negligently fail to enforce its own orders.
You will most likely be instructed to not share or even use your own translation of the testimony. In California, the instruction on translations is: Some testimony may be given in [insert name or description of language other than English]. An interpreter will provide a translation for you at the time that the testimony is given. You must rely on the translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand the language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any testimony for other jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly, let me know immediately by writing a note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff). In People v. Cabrera 230 Cal.App.3d 300, it was ruled that supplying a competing translation is juror misconduct, see also People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d 907 (it is misconduct for a juror to inject expertise into the deliberations, referring to the fact that a juror "informed the jury ... [that he had a] background in law enforcement, and that the lack of evidence did not mean the defendant has no criminal background, because juvenile records are automatically sealed at 18 years of age." Florida has a similar instruction: The evidence you are to consider is only that provided through the official court [interpreters] [translators]. Although some of you may know (language used), it is important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept the English [interpretation] [translation]. You must disregard any different meaning. If, however, during the testimony there is a question as to the accuracy of the English interpretation, you should bring this matter to my attention immediately by raising your hand. You should not ask your question or make any comment about the interpretation in the presence of the other jurors, or otherwise share your question or concern with any of them. I will take steps to see if your question can be answered and any discrepancy resolved. If, however, after such efforts a discrepancy remains, I emphasize that you must rely only upon the official English interpretation as provided by the court interpreter and disregard any other contrary interpretation.
The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.
Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
In the United States, it does not matter how you save any evidence; the other side will essentially always be permitted to question its authenticity. Even if they don't question it, a judge or jury would still be free to do so. That said, the standard means of saving this kind of evidence would be to make a screengrab or print it to PDF, and to attach that to an affidavit in which you swear that the image is an authentic representation of the content of the web page as of whatever date and time. If you want something that is harder to question, you could also ask some independent third party to do so. There are, for instance, archiving services like archive.org and perma.cc that will copy a page and store it indefinitely, largely removing the question of whether you might have manipulated the page in any way.
Can son/wife stop an addict from selling family property in India? If a person (not a senior citizen) is addicted and trying to sell off his farming land (which has been inherited from his grandfather and later through his father) without the consent his wife and children, is there anything that can be done to stop this transaction?
No. As long as it is owned by him he is free to do as he likes. The wife / children do not have any claims as it is ancestral property and they can have a claim only after his demise. Until then, he is free to do as he likes legally.
There is commonly a law like RCW 69.50.309 which says that A person to whom or for whose use any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed by a practitioner, and the owner of any animal for which such controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was delivered to him or her by the person selling or dispensing the same. A controlled substance is "a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V as set forth in federal or state laws, or federal or commission rules". Schedule V includes some opiates with low potential for abuse and dependency. It does not include prescription antibiotics, and does not include Ibuprofen and other OTC NSAIDs. The cop may be right about keeping your narcotics in the original container, but wrong about anything less. I can't presently locate the Oklahoma analog of this law. After diligent searching, I even suspect that Oklahoma does not have such an "original container" law. It would count as a "counterfeit substance" if it is a controlled substance and is in a container with labeling that is not that of the original distributor, but if the contain is completely blank, it is not legally a "counterfeit substance". And again, that only applies to controlled substances.
Sarah, thanks for your question. You have asked this on the Legal forum; and whilst there might be many moral or ethical considerations surrounding your situation - I'll try to deal with the legal principles here - which are distinct from what people consider 'fair' in the common sense of the word - simply discussing the legal basis of what you are asking. The relevant law here is 'Gifting' under the Law of Property - here A gift, in the law of property, is the voluntary transfer of property from one person (the donor or grantor) to another (the donee or grantee) without full valuable consideration. In order for a gift to be legally effective, three requirements must be met: Intention of donor to give the gift to the donee (donative intent) Delivery of gift to donee. Acceptance of gift by donee. Gifts are generally considered by the court to be either 'outright, remunerative or onerous' - so there can be conditions placed on the acceptance/receipt of a gift. However, it doesn't sound like these apply and that you have given this gift, free of conditions to the donee. There are special legal considerations with respect to engagement rings between would-be spouses where the donee actually typically keeps an engagement ring even if they fail to get married. This is under revocation. Unfortunately, from a strict legal point of view - a gift, is a gift - which broadly speaking means that if the person is not willing to return the gift, they are under no strict duty to do so. One can sue for return of the gift if undue influence was exerted over the donor by the donee: There are two main forms of conduct that are unacceptable: Acts of improper pressure or coercion such as unlawful threats. In the case of Etridge the judge made it clear that the court will intervene to set aside a transaction which is the product of “excessive pressure, emotional blackmail or bullying”. Failure to perform an equitable duty; g. where A trusts B and B takes unfair advantage of A. see here It would ultimately be for first, your solicitor and secondarily a court (or similar) to decide whether you had a legal case based on any undue influence you may have been under, based on the situation which you did not know that she had other items of your mother, leading you to gift her the ring. This is very context dependent. This legal process would be under a civil action against the donee. Of interest, the supreme court have limited the scope of 'undue influence'; the technical details can be seen here. I hope this is helpful.
Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first.
As the article suggests, this is called adverse possession. This seems to have occurred because the original owner did not make use of the property, nor monitored for adverse possession. The reason this method of acquiring title exists is for a number of reasons, including the prudent use of land, as well as being analogous to a limitation on the time period during which a claim can be brought. It would be reasonably easily avoided if the original owner had made use of the property, or monitored it and took action to eject the adverse possessor prior to their fulfilment of the necessary conditions.
There's the question whether something is lost property or abandoned property. You'd be allowed to keep abandoned property, but keeping lost property without looking for the owner is in many places considered theft. A car on your land is quite likely abandoned by the last driver (people don't usually lose cars). But the question is whether it is abandoned by the owner; if the car looks like it has some value then it is unlikely to be abandoned by the owner and more likely that it has been stolen. I'd report the car to the police; then it's up to them to find the owner or not. If they can find him, and the car was not abandoned, but actually lost (unlikely) or stolen (more likely), you have the satisfaction of being an honest person helping either a very stupid car owner or a crime victim to get their property back. If they can't find him, usually the property will then belong to the finder.
You can't You are asking the analogue of "What happens when you start a game of chess with the black queen on D1?" and the only correct answer is "That is not a legal starting position, the only position the Black Queen may have at the start of the game is D8. Re-setup the board to how it should be." An AI can't hold property, because it is not a recognized legal entity, and trying to file for a transfer to an illegal recipient is in itself impossible. As such, all your plan fails on step 1 (transfer property to AI) and all other questions are moot - the position required can't come up legally, and attempting to get it done results in the documents that tried to do it being all Void and Null: The person that tried to get rid of the company is the owner. That person is liable for all the tax that needs to be paid. All lawsuits against the corporate or the owner proceed as if nothing had happened. YES, you could be sued for attempted tax evasion, communally called "tax fraud".
It is almost certainly illegal. I was unable to find UK provisions but the penalties for stealing an Australian passport are 10 years imprisonment or a fine of up to 1,000 penalty units (at time of writing a penalty unit was $170 so, $170,000) (Section 32(4) of the Australian Passports Act 2005). Under this law, the crime is knowingly having it in your possession when you know it isn't yours. Obviously, normal familial relationships would not be prosecuted (i.e. one member of the family carrying all the family's passports). Certainly, if the true owner asked for it and the possessor refused, that would trigger the crime. Furthermore, it is completely pointless - all the original owner has to do is report it stolen and apply for another one.
Am I authorized to publish a solution manual for a book I haven't written? Bob wrote a solution manual for book X. (solution manual = a manual that presents solutions for some/all exercises of the book) Is Bob authorized to publish it, given that Bob hasn't written book X and doesn't own any right on it? Book X was written and published in the United States, and Bob plans to publish the solution manual in the United States (either on Internet or on paper, and either free of charge or with a charge).
Bob is not authorized, but he may legally do so (in the US, you don't need specific authorization to perform a non-forbidden act). In creating the manual, Bob would need to avoid reproducing the questions (which are protected by copyright), and just give the answers. Copyright protection for the textbook includes not just the actual words, but also organizational structure, so Bob would need to avoid copying the structure of the exercises. As for "structure of the exercises", textbooks often have exercises for each chapter, with a clear logic to the order and content of chapters. Within the chapter exercises, there is often some rationale to the order of presentation of the dozen exercises, like starting for with simplest concepts presented in the text and moving up the ladder. In a given exercise, there my be subparts, where understanding part 1 leads you to understanding part 2, and so on. In a well-structure textbook, maybe 20% of the creative nature of the book is that artful ordering. Imposing an entirely different order on your solutions avoids copying the author's protected expression.
Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."
Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors.
The MIT License (as distributed by OSI) does not include an attribution requirement beyond the requirement to include the copyright notice in any re-distributed copy including derivative works. The same is true of the description of the license as described in the Wikipedia article. If you sent back to the maintainer a modified version including your own contributions with an MIT license notice and your name in the copyright statement, that is a new work released under that license. The maintainer (or anyone else) may not lawfully use your work or incorporate it into a new derived work without complying with the license terms, which require retaining the copyright notice. By distributing the combined work using a copyright notice not including your name, it would seem that your license is being violated. You could contact the maintainer with a request that your name be included in the notice or your contributions be removed. If that is not accepted, you could use a take-down notice, or file suit. That last would involve significant costs, of course.
The text may be public domain in the United States It depends on when it was created/published. The eBook is subject to its own copyright The eBook itself is a derivative work and subject to its own copyright protection. The translation of an ink and paper book into an eBook contains enough artistic choice to trigger copyright protection. If the original is really public domain, you can copy the text but not the eBook.
In most countries, there is a standard format for citations. The guiding principle behind these is to make it easy to verify the law says what you claim it says. So you only need to give information needed to find the law you are citing. Usually, citations go the opposite of your example -- they start with the most general reference, and get more specific. Also, most citations only give information for sections that are numbered or lettered. Unless sentences are numbered or lettered, I would not cite them. For example, to find something in the US code, we need to know the: Title/Chapter/Section/subsection...and so on. For example, the federal law prohibiting the ownership of machine guns is in US Code, Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Ch 44 Firearms, § 922 Unlawful Acts subsection (o)(1). Since sections are numbered consecutively, we usually leave out the chapter: 18 USC § 922(o)(1). In Ukraine, it appears law is organized into Codes, Chapters, Articles and Sections. Since Articles are numbered consecutively, we can leave out the Chapters. Thus, the citation for the definition of murder would be Ukrainian Criminal Code, Art 115 § 1. Caveat: I am not an expert in Ukrainian law and may be wrong on some details, so you should look at some Ukrainian legal sources to double check.
Per the comment, the applicable license term seems to be Licensee agrees to maintain in confidence the source code version of the Licensed Software by using at least the same physical and other security measures as Licensee uses for its own confidential technical information and documentation, but in no case less than reasonable measures. So if your own code is on a physically unconnected thumbprint-secured blah blah blah computer deep in a mountain, with files encrypted, so must theirs be. If yours is stored in "the cloud" with decent password protection, theirs must be as well. This seems to describe your Github use (I don't have any knowledge of the degree of hackability of private Github repositories). The legal judgment as to whether this is "reasonably secure" is based on whether a prudent person would know that it is practical to gain unauthorized access. Protecting a file with the password "password" would probably be found to be unreasonably insecure.
In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.
Are immigration officers who grant visas to a convicted terrorist guilty of a crime? I'm not a lawyer or an expert on laws, but from what I know it is the visa officers' first and foremost responsibility to screen applicants/referrals and filter out potentially dangerous ones. They get paid from taxpayers money just to do it, and if they are so incompetent as to admit a blood thirsty psychopathic terrorist who later attacks people with a car and a butcher knife, shouldn't victims and/or their families have the right to sue them? And if they do, are they likely to win?
The answer from @BlueDogRanch is right as far as it goes, but omits a critical point. There are certain acts that are excluded from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act and granting a visa when it should have been denied is almost certainly one of them. The critical provisions are 28 USC § 2680(a) and (h). 28 USC § 2680. Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-- (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. . . . (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law. The decision to grant or deny a visa is generally placed in the discretion of a visa officer, evaluating the facts when informed by guidelines established by the U.S. Secretary of State and Department of Homeland Security which is a quasi-judicial role, and is subject to administrative appeal in some cases. As a result, even if that discretion is abused, the employee and the agency are immune from liability under the FTCA. The claim may be barred under 2680(h), as well, if the visa officer is sued for conspiring to cause one of the enunciated intentional torts and the visa officer is not a law enforcement officer. Also, if liability exists at all under the FTCA, it arises against the United States and not against the employee personally: The general rule is that federal employees enjoy absolute immunity from tort claims that challenge negligent or wrongful acts performed while acting within the scope of government employment. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229-30 (2007). The source of this absolute immunity is the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2010). Under the Westfall Act, the exclusive remedy for anyone injured by the negligent or wrongful act of a federal employee acting in the scope of employment is a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2010). The bottom line is that there are no private causes of action that arise under the immigration laws for a person not personally claiming improper denial of an immigration benefit. Cf. Mirmehdi v. United States, 662 F.3d 1073, Footnote 4 (9th Cir. 2011) (no cause of action exists for selective enforcement of the immigration laws); Tsolmon v. United States, 15-20609 (5th Cir. November 7, 2016) (discretionary exception clause barred FTCA action for failure to follow department policy re potential visa issue). But see Watson v. United States, 14-CV-6459 (E.D. New York, February 25, 2016) (discretionary acts exception did not apply to the deportation of a child who was a known U.S. citizen by immigration officers since this is beyond the scope of their authority). There is also no constitutional right to have the government deny a visa to someone not entitled to a visa under U.S. law or immigration guidelines. If someone brought a suit of the kind described in the question, they would almost certainly lose, probably on a motion to dismiss by the government filed before they were required to answer the complaint on the merits. A sufficiently negligent decision might constitute good cause to fire the visa officer from that person's civil service job, if their supervisor chose to seek the termination of the visa officer's employment. I will refrain from answering whether the sovereign immunity that exists in this circumstance is good policy as the question asks as that would be beyond the scope of this forum and implicate wide ranging questions of pure opinion. Suffice it to say that U.S. law on this question would not necessarily apply in every country.
No The police and the office of the public prosecutor have discretion in which cases they investigate or prosecute. The court may refer an instance of criminality to them but they are under no obligation to do anything with that referral.
Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.
Since the treason statute is quite vague, you have to discover what the details of the law is by looking at precedent. Almost all federal treason convictions in the US have involved declared wars. There is the case of John Fries, an early tax rebellion case in 1800, who was pardoned by the president thus rendering the need for legal appeal moot, but this involved armed insurrection and is thus not analogous. All other federal cases have involved people supporting the enemy in case of a declared war. In this specific case, the allegation is that by advocating not working with Syrian Kurds in an assault on Raqqa (because it was thought to be in the best interests of the US in terms of our relationship with Turkey, given the position of the Turkish state w.r.t. Kurds), Flynn benefited ISIS. Compared to various wartime treason convictions, such as Tokyo Rose and Axis Sally, the difference between imaginary "aid" in the case of Flynn vs. actual aid in the other cases is so stark that there is no case to be made for a treason charge.
No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412
First of all, to clarify some numbering, HR 4635 (107th Congress) was not actually passed. The language was passed as part of HR 5005, becoming Public Law 107-296, and this provision now appears at 49 USC 44921. The exact text of this provision is: A Federal flight deck officer shall not be liable for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in defending the flight deck of an aircraft against acts of criminal violence or air piracy unless the officer is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The language makes it clear that this is only referring to civil liability. So, if the officer is defending the flight deck, and they are sued for damages resulting from their actions, the plaintiff will not win (assuming the law is correctly applied). But this law says nothing about whether or not they can be prosecuted for a crime. In any case, the officer in your example does not appear to have been defending the flight deck, so this law wouldn't apply at all. In your example, the officer's defense against a murder charge would probably be based on defense of others. There is a discussion on Justia. It seems that a key question would be whether shooting the unruly passenger was proportional - was there a reasonable fear that the passenger was actually going to kill someone?
I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case.
The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with.
Can you get Discovery on an Austin TX traffic citation before requesting a trial / appearance? In Austin, Texas, you are given several options for an alleged traffic speed violation, which, other than the Request Trial and the Pay options, include a Driving Safety course option, and a Deferred Disposition option, both of which must be selected prior to the appearance date on the citation (which appears to be within 4 weeks of the citation). Would Discovery and Request for Information requests (would these have to be separate in Texas, or can they be a matter of a single request?) have to be entertained prior to entering a plea of not guilty (e.g., requesting a trial)? Do they at all have to be satisfied prior to the 20-work-days date of appearance as per the citation? E.g., is it at all possible to make a fully informed decision about which of the options to take on a citation (prior to the original 4-week appearance date), after having all the facts on the case, or is there no such legal rights at all?
This is a general answer based on the state of affairs in various jurisdictions. By that I mean it's not legal advice. Do not assume that the 20 days is the arraignment. Often the thing that happens when you show up at the 20 days is you talk to a D.A. (and I use that term lightly) who asks you if you are going to pay. Maybe offers you a "deal" which is mostly requiring you to pay the full amount but reduce or eliminate the record. If you try to talk to this DA she will act like she's not a DA and say that she can't discuss the facts. If you don't pay she'll schedule your arraignment and THAT's when you plea. Your best bet is to tell her that you are requesting evidence and in likelihood she'll put your date out far enough. You should consider the deferral and the safety course as offers. Offers the DA makes before you get all the evidence. No, you do not have a right to see the evidence before accepting an offer. You have the right to say no to the offer. That's the reason the offer is made; to save the DA the time of the process. (The song and dance I mention above is the pre-arraignment offer for low-level cases) If you reject the offer and get arraigned before you see the evidence you need to tell the judge this before you enter your plea. (Be prepared to show her the written requests) One thing - this stuff is all way easier if you have an attorney. And this is not the "consult an attorney..." disclaimer (although that applies!). Attorneys will short cut all of this for you. They know the clerks, they get you the front of the line at any appearance, and they generally give your argument credibility. It's totally unfair and it's totally the way it works. Walk into a courtroom at 8am and see 30 people waiting. No clerk, no one, just defendants. Between 8 and 8:10 various people in suits will walk past the bar and start rifling through folders on the clerk's desk. They'll read a folder and put it back. See, they're looking for their client. If you do this the sheriff will handcuff you.
The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.
Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.
In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work.
The Google search is not itself a crime or any other kind of offense. It could be used as circumstantial evidence that you did something intentionally or with pre-mediation, rather than accidentally, or not at all. If you can provide an alternative explanation for the search that is plausible, such as the one in the question, and there isn't a close proximity of time, a jury is unlikely to give the search much weight as circumstantial evidence. But ultimately, the weight to give any piece of evidence is for the jury to decide in the context of all of the evidence in the case combined.
Because the hosts are part of the defendants. A party in a lawsuit can demand documents to be turned over to them from the opposing party. That is called Discovery and participation is mandatory. Not turning over the documents requested and not providing a good reason why they should not be turned over is contempt of court. Discovery under the Federal Rules is very broad. According to Rule 26(b)(1), "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." The federal rules also provide several tools that can be used to get information from other parties, including interrogatories, depositions, and requests for admission. A party may also compel other parties to give them access to documents, real property, or other things for review or testing. See Rules 26-37. The Delaware rules of Civil Procedure mimic the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure very closely, and their Rule 26 is close to the Federal Rule 34. Especially interesting here is: Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 26 (b) (1) In general. - Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any documents, electronically stored information (EST), or tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial. [...] The hosts are employees of the defendant, the phones contain EST that is regarding the matter and relevant to Dominion's claim, and disclosure is proportional to the needs of the case. As such, The employer has to make them comply with discovery requests by the opposing party and hand over the text messages.
Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records.
The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.
Is it legal to cross the channel in a private rowing boat or sailing boat? To go to France, you have to show your passport. I don't know how exactly that works if you swim across... but in any case, if you can (physically) swim across, then rowing or sailing across must be (relatively) easy. Assuming that such a sailor (a British citizen) were not doing anything (else) illegal, would he be permitted to travel to France in his private boat? Can he land on any old beach, or does he have to go to a port to identify himself?
Is it legal to cross the channel in a private rowing boat or sailing boat? Yes. Can he land on any old beach, or does he have to go to a port to identify himself? It depends. Who is on board, where did they come from, what have they got in their pockets, etc. This may be helpful Notice 8: sailing your pleasure craft to and from the UK When arriving direct from a country outside the EU (the Channel Islands are regarded as outside the EU for this purpose), you must phone the National Yacht line on Telephone: 0845 723 1110. You will need to inform the Yachtline if any of the following apply: etc etc Since France is in the EU, whether you need to phone the NYL to report your departure from the UK depends on a complicated bunch of conditions you can read in the link above. Maybe the French have similar rules? The RYA say Some countries specify ports of entry (ports where one may lawfully enter a country), which should be used by a vessel arriving from abroad. It is often a requirement that you proceed directly to such a port of entry on entering territorial waters. A vessel arriving in a country from outside its customs territory should fly the Q flag until it has been given clearance from the authorities. Even once clearance has been given, some countries may ask to inspect the vessel’s papers periodically, for example at each port of call. and so on.
You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective).
Obviously you can refuse, nobody can force you to give them a new passport. There may be consequences. The worst: The company's country likely has laws that require the company to make sure you have the right to work there, and to have evidence of it. If you are an EU citizen in an EU country, a valid EU passport would be that evidence. When your passport expires, the company might not have anything that is legally sufficient to allow you working for them. They could have the choice between breaking the law, risking a fine, or firing you. This will depend on the exact laws of the country, and likely somewhere deep in the small print of the laws :-) In the UK, where this isn't relevant anymore, the laws were changed in 2014 to require that you have a valid passport. So in the last seven years you would have had to give them a valid passport. BTW. Having a copy of your valid passport can make it possible for your employer to buy you flight tickets for foreign countries, for example, which could be useful. I was once in a situation away from home where I unexpectedly needed a copy of my passport (privately), called HR, and they emailed me a copy of it, so that was also useful.
First, what the law says about "right of way" is who has to yield (nobody "has the right of way"). Vehicles always must yield to pedestrians. One of the principles is that you are to yield to the guy who gets there first -- if the guy on your left gets to the intersection first, you must yield to him. If you arrive at the same time, the guy on the left yields (at least in the US). The rationale is that there has to be a convention for deciding who must wait when two people want to occupy the same space in the intersection. That isn't what you are describing. You can turn left and he can turn right at the same time, and no collision should result. The other general rule is that you can turn only when it is safe to do so. If you can't see traffic coming from the left or from the right, then you can't turn. If the guy on the right is blocking your view of the right and you are blocking his view of the left, you will have to find some other social means of deciding who gets out of the way, the law doesn't help you.
It is not obvious that is it illegal in Washington state. Everett WA has local ordinances against "lewd conduct" (there are versions of this at the state level and in most municipalities). Having sex and masturbation are included in the class of "lewd acts", and are also included in "sexual conduct". An activity is "obscene" if three things are true. First, the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest and when considered as a whole, and in the context in which it is used, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. I think having sex or masturbating could pass these two tests. The third condition is that the act explicitly depicts or describes patently offensive representations or descriptions of... [sex, masturbation, or excretion] The prohibition is more narrow: A person is guilty of lewd conduct if he or she intentionally performs any lewd act in a public place or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public. If lewd conduct were completely illegal, you could not excrete or have sex withing the city limits. Now we have to turn to the definition of "public place": an area generally visible to public view, and includes streets, sidewalks, bridges, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, automobiles (whether moving or not), buildings open to the general public, including those which serve food or drink or provide entertainment and the doorways and entrances to buildings or dwellings and the grounds enclosing them, and businesses contained in structures which can serve customers who remain in their vehicles, by means of a drive-up window Focusing not on the probable intent but on the words, it is primarily defined as "an area generally visible to public view". Your house qua building is probably generally visible to public view, as is a public toilet or hotel. The inside of your bedroom is probably not generally visible to public view, nor is the inside of a toilet stall. While the building is probably a public place, a closed stall within the building does not meet the definition (nor does a hotel room). It might however qualify under the clause "or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public". The statute does not give a definition of "observe", but under ordinary language interpretation, observation may be seeing or hearing. Silent sex, masturbation or defecation might not qualify as being public. Obviously, excretion in a stall of a public bathroom cannot be a lewd act, presumably because the average person does not generally consider ordinary excretion as appealing to the prurient interest: but there could be contexts where it does. Another avenue for prosecution is the Indecent Exposure state law which is when one intentionally makes any open and obscene exposure of his or her person or the person of another knowing that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. It is totally non-obvious that sex or masturbation in a toilet stall is "open". There is a slippery slope regarding quiet sex or masturbation w.r.t. knowing that the conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. Because the contexts where sex and masturbation are not clearly spelled out by statutory law, the matter would depend on how courts had interpreted previous cases. There have been arrests in Washington of people having bathroom sex, but I don't know if anyone has ever or recently-enough been convicted for having quiet sex out of view in a toilet stall, or similar place. There is a potentially applicable case, Seattle v. Johnson, 58 Wn. App. 64, which seems to involve public sex, and the conviction was overturned because the complaint was defective, in not including the element "that the defendant must know 'that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm'". It is not clear from the appeal what the act actually was – it probably was for public nudity. There is also an decision by the state appeal court division 3 (not publicly available) in Spokane v. Ismail which, in connection with a charge of public urination declares that "A toilet stall is not a public place. The center of Riverfront Park during the lunch hour is a public place", in connection with an ordinance just like the Everett one against public lewd acts.
You don’t have to swear Witnesses are given the option to swear (technically take an oath) or to affirm, which has no religious connotations. You also don’t actually swear on a Bible if you do swear. For example california. The US is a very religious state france is a secular state - it prohibits religious clothing (hijabs, crucifixes etc.) in schools. The united-kingdom (specifically England) has an official state religion (Anglican) but religion is far less prevalent in politics or society than it is in the US. For example, outside of a place of worship, who your mother is sleeping with is a far more acceptable topic of conversation than what her religious beliefs are. Which is not to say it actually is an acceptable topic of conversation, just that it’s more acceptable than religion. australia elected its first openly atheist Prime Minister in 1983. The US was not founded on the idea that there shouldn’t be established religion, just that there shouldn’t be a state religion - that is, a church backed by the power of the government. Many of the early settlers were fleeing religious prosecution from state religions. Nevertheless, it was never the intention to exclude religion from politics. Indeed, religion in the US influences politics to a much greater degree than it does in most European or Anglophone countries.
I am aware of a view of the California law that if a pedestrian looks like they might want to cross the street, any car must stop, but this is not supported by the law, which is about "yielding". The law incorporates both "yield" and "stop", the former being "and allow the other person to proceed". Ignoring the photo for a moment, the requirement to yield (not stop) allows a car to continue driving when the driver is e.g. 10 ft from the crosswalk and the pedestrian is three lanes over when they enter the crosswalk, remaining in compliance with the law. The pedestrian and the driven can continue with their journey because there is no conflict. The requirement to yield states whose right to proceed is subordinated to the other person's, in case of conflict. Turning to the video which shows what is in front but not behind, it is evident that the vehicle did not actually conflict with the pedestrian, who did not slow down in order to let the vehicle pass. The violation of social conventions is clear, in that the pedestrian enters the crosswalk while the car is 5 or so car lengths back, and can safely slow down so that there would be zero chance of hitting the pedestrian (it starts to slow but only trivially one the pedestrian is visibly 'crossing the street'). As far as I can determine, California case law has not established any numbers that constitute "not yielding". While I would stop in this circumstance, I don't see that there is a conflict between the pedestrian and the vehicle.
It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."
What is the legal stance of a person who receives misaddressed court documents Say an address were to recieve repeated traffic citations from security cameras to an individual who does not live at the address. The address on the citation was correct, but the person listed did not (nor has ever) lived at that address. All letters have been returned to sender, but no address change appears to have been processed. What is the legal responsibility of the property owner? If it matters, this would be in the United States, with the recipient being in one state, and the complainant being in a different state.
You aren't allowed to open it or destroy it. (18 USC 1702). USPS says (at http://faq.usps.com/): If the mailpiece is delivered to the correct location but the recipient on the mailpiece does not reside at the address: Write "Not at this address" on mailpiece. Don't erase or mark over the address. Provide the mailpiece to your mailperson or drop into a Collection Box receptacle. Destroying mail that was not intended for you may be prohibited by US laws. Willfully destroying mail is an act that may be punishable by the Federal Government.
I cannot answer whether this particular person committed a crime or not. Only a court can answer that. I can give you general information about laws involving destruction of mail. Under 18 USC 1703: Whoever, being a Postal Service officer or employee, unlawfully secretes, destroys, detains, delays, or opens any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail entrusted to him or which shall come into his possession, and which was intended to be conveyed by mail, or carried or delivered by any carrier or other employee of the Postal Service, or forwarded through or delivered from any post office or station thereof established by authority of the Postmaster General or the Postal Service, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. So it would generally be a crime to deliberately destroy or delay mail that was otherwise deliverable. If a carrier took back mail that should have been delivered, that would probably count as "detaining" or "delaying" that mail. In the case at hand, though, I suppose the carrier might argue that when you refused to sign for the letter, it gave her reason to doubt that the addressee(s) actually lived there, in which case perhaps the mail should not have been delivered after all. So she might say that she took it all back to the post office for further investigation as to where or whether it should be delivered. Destroying the mail would similarly be illegal. However, based on other information in your question that is now removed, it appears that she did not actually do so. Merely threatening to destroy mail, if the threat is not carried out, does not seem to be a crime under this section. I don't know whether it might be prohibited by some other statute. Crimes involving mail are normally investigated by the US Postal Inspection Service, not by local police. Of course, even if the behavior is not a crime, it may still be cause for the postal employee to be fired or otherwise disciplined.
The exact situation depends on where you are. If you are in Washington state, what you get (but did not realize) is a notice to appear in court. By not paying the fine or showing up to court, you could be subject to RCW 46.64.025, so that the department of licensing is notified. You have 15 days to respond to the notice. We assume that you are a resident, because if you are a non-resident (and not resident of another state with a reciprocal agreement), they would have required you to pay a bond at the time of the ticket (though that isn't possible with automated infraction-detection). When the Dept. of Licensing gets the notice of the unpaid ticket, they may suspend or revoke your license. At this point, you will have received notice that your license was suspended (unless you changed your address and mail isn't forwarded, in which case you have a different problem, that you're supposed to apprise DOL of your current address, and didn't do so). At that point (after they send the letter), you have 15 days to respond. One response is to pay the ticket plus the added fines, or, you can request an administrative review (to appeal the suspension). The point of going to court to plead your case would presumably be to modify the judgment against you, for instance to reduce or eliminate the added fine. You would then need to give a good reason for not being punished: RCW 46.64.025 already has you covered, because the suspension process starts with willfully failing to appear. You would then need to show that your failure to appear was not willful. It does not legally matter whether you are a foreigner or have problems understanding the language. Speeding tickets usually say pretty clearly that you must pay the ticket within a specified time frame, or appear in court, but people don't always read tickets. It is entirely plausible that one's grasp of the language is low enough that there really was a misunderstanding. If you can provide credible evidence that your failure was not willful, by law you would only be liable for the ticket. In other states and countries, the situation could be somewhat or quite different (e.g. Norwegian traffic laws are stricter). In New Mexico, it is more serious to fail to appear. NM Statute 66-8-126 states that "It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate his written promise to appear in court, given to an officer upon issuance of a uniform traffic citation, regardless of the disposition of the charge for which the citation was issued". Your license can/will be suspended (it is not clear whether suspension is automatic), but additionally since failure to appear is a misdemeanor, you can be arrested. Unlike Washington law, there is no willfullness requirement for such a penalty. Given the criminal nature of failure to appear, a traffic attorney would need to suggest an appropriate belated response.
Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood.
I live in MD near DC, and have been ticketed by the cameras in both DC and MD. At least for speeding and red-light violations (and I think for all camera detected violations) these are just fines, not true moving violations in that no license points are assessed, and there is no impact on insurance, provided the ticket is paid, unlike what would have happened had an officer written the ticket in person. One can contest the ticket, but it is not likely to be worth the time and trouble. This policy of not assessing points is precisely because there is no assured way of determining who the driver is with current technology, although cameras that can see the driver through the windshield and match him or her against a database by facial recognition may be coming. Currently a human reviews the images in an effort to rule out false positives and certify that an actual violation is shown. The name and title of this person is shown on the notice I get, at least from MD. What one can do "proactively": do not speed or go through red lights pay all camera tickets promptly (or file the paperwork to contest them). If unpaid beyond the deadline they turn into more serious violations that do carry points, just like failing to attend a court date.
there was absolutely nothing in the letter. You could hold it up to the sunlight and see that it was empty. There is no legal reason to do this. Somebody screwed up. Office workers are not infallible. It happens. I've seen government officials with no grudge against my client do it too now and then. Taken together with the spelling errors in your name it reflects general administrative incompetence and not some nefarious plot. The cautious thing to do would be to call them and tell them that you got a misaddressed letter with nothing inside it. A judge might frown at your conduct if you had some inkling they were trying to communicate with you and did nothing. Save the empty envelope to prove that they didn't send you a security deposit letter as they claimed if there is a dispute or litigation down the road.
If a police officer reviewed the footage and then went out and issued a citation in person to the offender, this could probably be used. Many states limit tickets issued by mail based upon camera evidence alone. But, while some state laws have specific requirements, but in general, authenticated video recordings are admissible evidence in court proceedings, and a citizen complaint can be a basis for initiating a traffic offense prosecution. To prove some offenses, like speeding, dashcam evidence of a third-party may not be very good evidence, but for running a red light or a stop sign, it could be powerful evidence.
I spent 26 years in Law Enforcement (two years in Fraud, Identity Theft, and Embezzlement) and here is the answer I would often give other people in this situation: By law, recipients are not required to do anything. It can be deleted without a second thought. There is no specific law requiring someone to report this as it doesn't rise to the level of a crime. Contacting the sender or intended recipient can be risky because the other person is unknown. Return addresses online may be masked by redirects or other traps. What is displayed may not be the full picture of the site where they want someone to go. Having information about someone, although private, is not a crime unless there is a specific intent to use that information for a crime: fraud, identity theft, theft, etc. Doctors, banks, and numerous other businesses have access to personal identifying information about people. Unless they were to use it illegally, just having the information is not a crime. Phishing attempts: As far as sending the information on to the intended recipient, that would be very noble; but there is no requirement to do so. This type of transaction is likened to having a stranger call looking for someone else. There are people around the world just hoping to get people to click on their site so they can download everything on the victim's computer. I once taught a class in Internet Safety to senior citizens. The message was simple: Don't put any information on-line that you wouldn't post on your front door. Advances on computer security have made it possible to securely handle more information but still be on-guard; Phishing still happens. Most reputable companies won't send you e-mails asking for personal information, passwords, or account numbers. Hackers, thieves, and criminals have access to personal information regularly. In today's society, it's just a part of life in a digital world. How does one protect themselves? Be diligent about all transactions. For instance: Check bank accounts, credit card purchases, and credit reports regularly. A TV show, Adam Ruins Everything - Adam Ruins Security, clearly outlines a lot of these facts. (Season 1, Episode 2 - First aired October 6, 2015) To recap: 1) Do nothing. 2) Stay vigilant. 3) Be wary. Common idiom - If it looks too good to be true, it probably is.
Letter of notice for seizure of car in UK I have 2 friends in the UK. Friend A has a valid driving license, Car, Mot and insurance Friend B has no driving license Friend A let friend B drive his car whilst friend A sat in the passenger seat and they got pulled over by the police. They where both drunk and Friend B got arrested for driving without insurance and a valid driving license and also driving whilst drunk. Friend A's car got seized by the police as he was unable to drive it home, The only documentation the police gave to friend A when the car was seized is a business card for the company that seized it. To my understanding the police have to issue you a notice of seizure (when you are present) that they have taken your car, how and where to pick it up and also that there is an appeal process. The police did none of these things and friend A had to spend an entire day calling several different numbers (police and company who seized the car) to try and piece together the process of retrieving his car. Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance?
Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.
There's a good answer in this thread by Trap_Door_Spiders Assuming the car was really stolen, not "stolen" in the sense my friend borrowed it and never gave it back, you could absolutely recover the car. The reason you could, is because you can't steal your own property. Theft is very specifically the taking of ANOTHER's property. Here the property and the title to it has remained with you, because it was stolen. A thief never gets title in stolen property--it's called a void title. A void title is no rights at all as compared to a voidable title which has no rights against the true owner, unless you are subsequent transferee for value without notice (Bona Fide Purchaser). Now we can even take this slightly further. Imagine our thief stole your car and now sold it to Hapless John and all the remaining facts are the same, can you still take the car? Yes, because title in property tracks from the seller of the property. You can only over transfer as good a title as you have in the property. So thief has a void title. When he sold Hapless John the car he transferred a void title, which is no interest at all. So when you see the car and take it back, Hapless John calls the police and reports it stolen too. As long as you could demonstrate it was stolen first, that's the end of the issue. Hapless John has to go find the thief and get his money from thief. Now obviously this all assumes you see the car on say a street or whatever. If you saw it saw it in a driveway, you could end up being charged with trespass unless your state privileges the recovery of stolen property by peaceable means. You still wouldn't be liable for theft, because of the void title, but you can get the other charges. All that said, you are better off having the police come and assist you. If you are even slightly wrong you get hit with the full force of the consequences. It's better just to have a police officer come and assist from a criminal liability stand point.
Unlikely, but specific facts may change this. The fact a vehicle gets the approval of the NHTSA and/or other safety regulatory bodies will probably mean that it already passed a certain level of safety testing, and any reasons for a recall will only surface after orders of magnitude greater sample and/or testing time. Therefore, the probability of causing endangering participants in traffic and others are negligible. The duty of notice will most likely be on the manufacturer under a product liability theory. Driving continuously and/or repeatedly after notice may be a different matter if it actually results in harming one — theoretically even oneself.
First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat.
Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch.
Yes, in england-and-wales the Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced 'Unexplained Wealth Orders', which compel the respondent to provide a statement: (a) setting out the nature and extent of the respondent’s interest in the property in respect of which the order is made, (b) explaining how the respondent obtained the property (including, in particular, how any costs incurred in obtaining it were met), (c) where the property is held by the trustees of a settlement, setting out such details of the settlement as may be specified in the order, and (d) setting out such other information in connection with the property as may be so specified. There a few requirements set out in section 362B, for example, the property must have value of over £50,000; there should be "reasonable grounds" for suspicion that the respondent would have been unable to obtain the property using their lawfully obtained income; the respondent or their connections must have either been involved in serious or organised crime, or be a politically exposed person, and so on. If the respondent refuses to make such a statement, the police may apply for a Civil Recovery Order to confiscate the property, with the property in question "presumed to be recoverable property" (section 362C(2)). Giving false information in such a statement is a criminal offence.
If you have a license and drive but forget your license and get pulled over what happens? You could receive a summons or citation (a.k.a. "ticket") for failing to carry a driver's license. Section § 46.2-104 of the Virginia Code states that it is a traffic infraction with a $10 fine to not have your license while driving. The operator of any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer being operated on the highways in the Commonwealth, shall have in his possession: (i) the registration card issued by the Department or the registration card issued by the state or country in which the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is registered, and (ii) his driver's license, learner's permit, or temporary driver's permit. Every person licensed by the Department as a driver . . . who fails to carry his license. . . for the vehicle which he operates, shall be guilty of a traffic infraction and upon conviction punished by a fine of ten dollars. (Emphasis added.) Do you get a penalty for forgetting it at your house? Yes, if you have a valid license that you left at home, you can get the case dismissed by showing the license to the the court (presumably a clerk), but you will still have to pay "court costs." However, if any person summoned to appear before a court for failure to display his license . . . presents, before the return date of the summons, to the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . or appears pursuant to the summons and produces before the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . , he shall, upon payment of all applicable court costs, have complied with the provisions of this section. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-104 (2016).
a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.
Bar Admissions Geography New York Judiciary Law § 478 makes it illegal to practice law in New York state. I imagine that there is some law defining what constitutes practicing "in" the state, and that questions probably involve whether they are advising people in the state and whether they are located in the state while advising. My question is: does any law prohibit an attorney who is admitted in New York from practicing the law of other jurisdictions, while that attorney is in New York state. Obviously one must meet certain criteria (admission, pro hac vice, etc) to appear in court in another State as an attorney. But is it correct to assume that an Admitted Lawyer can practice the law of any jurisdiction, so long as they do so from within their home state? Additional wrinkles: I vaguely remember something about it being the primary place you practice, such that (some/most) states don't prohibit an admitted New York attorney from occasionally providing advice in their state. I am interested in international jurisdictions as well. I imagine my assumption must be right, because a New York attorney is certainly not constrained from interpreting a contract with a Texas choice of law clause, so long that attorney does so in the context of practicing in New York.
The issue you describe is usually characterized as the multijurisdictional practice of law and is not terribly straightforward, in part, because the "practice of law" is not a well defined or consistently defined term. For example, in New York, preparation of a title opinion is considered to be the practice of law, while in Colorado, it is not and title opinions are routinely prepared by non-lawyers in title companies and by a type of independent paraprofessional (with no formal licensing) known as a "landman". As a rule of thumb: All work involving law in a jurisdiction where you are not admitted is subject to the ethical requirement that you be actually competent to render the opinion regardless of your formal licensure, and Normally, work involving law in a jurisdiction where you are not admitted must be incident to your representation of a client in a state where you are admitted to practice. A leading analysis of the issues related to multijurisdictional practice is a 2002 report of the American Bar Association on the subject, much of which has been incorporated into the rules of professional ethics for attorneys of many states. The core rule of professional conduct that was proposed and adopted in identical or similar form by many states from that report is as follows: Rule 5.5 Unauthorized Practice Of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice Of Law (a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so. (b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not: (1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or (2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. (c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that: (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; (2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized; (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or (4) are not within paragraphs (c) (2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. (d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or in a foreign jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction or the equivalent thereof, or a person otherwise lawfully practicing as an in-house counsel under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, may provide legal services through an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction that: (1) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates, are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; and when performed by a foreign lawyer and requires advice on the law of this or another U.S. jurisdiction or of the United States, such advice shall be based upon the advice of a lawyer who is duly licensed and authorized by the jurisdiction to provide such advice; or (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized by federal or other law or rule to provide in this jurisdiction. (e) For purposes of paragraph (d): (1) the foreign lawyer must be a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted to practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent, and subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority; or, (2) the person otherwise lawfully practicing as an in-house counsel under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction must be authorized to practice under this rule by, in the exercise of its discretion, [the highest court of this jurisdiction]. The meaning of the rule quoted above is discussed in official and unofficial commentary beginning at page 19 of the ABA Report.
New York State's sentencing laws do not have sentencing guidelines in the sense that the federal courts do. Donald Trump is an individual with no prior felony convictions who is charged with Class E felonies. The statutory sentencing range for these offenses under New York Penal Law Section 70.02(1)(d) is a determinate sentence of 1.5 to 4 years. Under some circumstances, alternative sentencing (like probation) might be authorized. Essentially the whole ballgame is the discretion of the sentencing judge and the question of whether the sentences of conviction would be served concurrently or consecutively. The sentencing hearing would happen only after a jury enters its verdict on guilt or innocence, and only in the event that there was a conviction on at least one count of the indictment. It would be an evidentiary hearing at which evidence regarding an appropriate sentence would be presented by the prosecution and the defense. I am not familiar enough with the facts of the complaint and the applicable New York State Penal Law provisions to know how the issue of consecutive v. concurrent sentences would be resolved.
The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps.
There are some complexities here. First of all, in the US, trademarks may be protected under either state or federal laws. Suits for trademark infringement under either kind of laws may be filed in state courts, although suit under federal laws are more often filed in federal courts. My understanding is that to file a trademark infringement lawsuit, I have to file it in the state where the "infringing activity" is occurring, in other words the location of the defendant. That is not quite correct. The infringing activity occurs wherever sales are made, and often wherever goods or services with an infringing marks are advertised. If goods are sold by mail, the infringing activity may be held to occur where the customers are located. If an infringing mark is being used to sell or advertise goods or services in a particular US state, suit may normally be filed in that state, whether in state or federal court, no matter where the infringer is located. (However it may be much easier to secure damages if a suit is won when suing in the jurisdiction where the infringer is located.) Procedures are different if the trademark is registered than if it is not. Trademark suits are often complex and costly. It would be very wise to consult an experienced trademark lawyer when considering bringing such suits. If goods carrying infringing marks are being imported into the US, the US Customs can seize or deny entry to such goods. A trademark lawyer might be able to advise how to get the customs service to act on such situations, and what the limits of such enforcement is. Trademarks are generally matters of national law. A mark that is valid and fully protected in the US, may not be protected at all in Hong Kong, for example.
In the united-states, attorneys are almost never placed under oath. Their statements -- whether they are assertions of fact or legal arguments -- are not evidence, and they are not subject to cross examination. There are limited circumstances in which an attorney would be competent to present actual evidence. In such cases, the attorney would be sworn in as a witness and subject to cross examination, but the attorney would likely also be disqualified from acting as an attorney in such a situation under Model Rule 3.7.
No There is some room for change of venue from, say, one county to another, or one municipality to another, within the same state. In certain circumstances this may even be constitutionally required. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (U.S. 1966) ("where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity"). But, there's no mechanism to move a state criminal trial to another state. A cousin of the scenario you're talking about is where D has committed crimes in multiple states. In such a situation the prosecutors from different states (and also the federal system) may meet and co-ordinate their strategies, and part of that will be deciding who charges what and who goes first. An example of this is the DC sniper case, which I remember pretty vividly because I grew up in the area. The Maryland and Virginia prosecutors reached an agreement to try them in Virginia first, and second in Maryland.
In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.
Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system.
Is Samsung's "bricking" of Note 7 devices legal? Last week Samsung announced their intention to push a software update to all (recalled) Galaxy Note 7 devices in the United States that will effectively disable ("brick") those devices. The update will happen automatically and without the customer's prior consent. I'm having a very hard time believing this could be legal in any jurisdiction. It's as if a car manufacturer, after issuing a model recall, sent out squads to destroy the vehicles not returned thus far. What are the legal aspects of mass-bricking mobile phones without prior consent? How is this not simply willful destruction of people's property? What if the bricking prevents someone from making an emergency call, resulting in loss of life or limb?
First of all, you own the mobile phone, you do not own the software on it - you have a licence to that software that almost certainly includes terms allowing Samsung to change the software and/or revoke your license. Second, changing the software does not destroy the phone - the hardware is completely intact. You can present that hardware and, in exchange, receive a brand new working phone which has the added advantage that it won't spontaneously explode. Alternatively, if you are an idiot, you can install a non-Samsung OS and cause your bomb, sorry, phone, to work again. Third, Samsung is probably not liable for any consequences that flow from an inability to make phone calls in any event - their contract will almost certainly exclude it and a case in negligence would probably fail for lack of both a duty of care and/or lack of foreseeability. Alternatively, Samsung is aware of a real risk to the users of their phone and have gone to great lengths to get them back. Having reached a 93% return rate they have identified a way to make the remaining 7% completely harmless. It is arguable that if they can do this and don't, then they are being negligent.
Obviously you may end up voiding warranties, losing on-going support from the manufacturer, or there may be a contract you agreed to stating that you won't do it, but assuming none of that is relevant (e.g. a salvaged Tesla doesn't get support/warranty anyway) is there any law preventing you from modifying your property to remove the limits placed on it? This assumes away one of the biggest issues, which is doing this is almost certainly a breach of contract unless the contract term is void as against public policy (which it probably isn't). So, the manufacturer can sue you for money damages probably equal to the difference in value between the limited and unlimited hardware in the marketplace. The manufacturer might also be able to obtain an injunction against this practice, which could result in the incarceration of someone who knowingly violated this court order for contempt of court, once an injunction is secured from a court to enforce the contract. There is also an anti-hacking statute in the United States, whose plain language appears to prohibit taking actions that override a digital system's security features. Unlocking these hardware features would appear to violate this statute. This is part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and is codified at United States Code Title 17, Section 1201. As Wikipedia explains: 17 U.S.C. 1201 is often known as the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. These provisions changed the remedies for the circumvention of copy-prevention systems (also called "technical protection measures") and required that all analog video recorders have support for a specific form of copy prevention created by Macrovision (now Rovi Corporation) built in, giving Macrovision an effective monopoly on the analog video-recording copy-prevention market. The section contains a number of specific limitations and exemptions, for such things as government research and reverse engineering in specified situations. Although, section 1201(c) of the title stated that the section does not change the underlying substantive copyright infringement rights, remedies, or defenses, it did not make those defenses available in circumvention actions. The section does not include a fair use exemption from criminality nor a scienter requirement, so criminal liability could attach to even unintended circumvention for legitimate purposes. The statute is quite lengthy and full of technical definitions and narrow exceptions and exceptions to exceptions to the general rule. These legal issues have mostly gained media attention in the context of farmers who seek to hack into the built in software of their farm machinery in order to repair it where the manufacturing companies have not cooperated. There have been legislative fixes proposed that would make these prohibition void as against public policy for some specific purposes like doing repairs. There have also been efforts to characterize this kind of business practice as an anti-trust violation. But, none of that legislation has passed in the United States, to the best of my knowledge and belief. But, I am not aware of any high profile legal precedent that has addressed this point but I wouldn't rule out the possibility that there is one. The closest case I could find on point (from the High Court in Australia) is Stevens v. Sony, which holds "that a device allowing PlayStations to play games with a different region code did not violate the anti-circumvention laws, because the mechanism in the PlayStation did not directly prevent the infringement of copyright." I am not personally familiar with non-U.S. law on this topic. Wikipedia reviews some of the applicable law in the E.U. and Australia. According to this Wikipedia entry, pursuant to European Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of May 22, 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, E.U. member nations must adopt domestic anti-circumvention statutes that meet certain minimum E.U. standards set forth in the directive. Also according to the same Wikipedia entry: "Australia prohibits circumvention of "access control technical protection measures" in Section 116 of the Copyright Act." In Australia, "Penalties for violation of the anti-circumvention laws include an injunction, monetary damages, and destruction of enabling devices."
Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.
First-class mail is acceptable for many different kinds of delivery in legal contexts. It is often not sufficient for service of a summons or subpoena, as noted in the other answer. But I don't think any of that is relevant, because you're dealing with a product recall, not legal service. This is almost certainly a voluntary recall, as mandatory recalls are very rare. If that is the case, I don't know of any law that requires a notice to be made in any particular way whatsoever. Instead, the Consumer Products Safety Commission has broad guidelines (see page 18) for how a company may consider communicating the fact of a recall, and they include many mechanisms that are even less verifiable than first class-mail: a joint news release from CPSC and the company ... information on company external websites ... a national news conference and/or television or radio announcements; use of a firm’s social media presence to notify consumers of the recall, including Facebook, Google +, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, Pinterest, company blogger networks, and blog announcements ... And so on. I don't have that much experience with consumer-protection law, but I'd be surprised if it imposed any obligation to send certified mail or anything more certain than first-class mail. Separate from the recall requirements, though, it may be that a contract with a dealership or the warranty provides some other requirements.
It is not different. But one company can decide to approach compliance differently from another. Here, TomTom has chosen a fairly safe/conservative interpretation, whereas Google and Apple decided that more data collection is appropriate. A “find my device” style functionality appears to be entirely unproblematic if the user books that particular service (regardless of whether the service is paid or gratis) and provides consent for the location data collection. The legal basis for such a service could then be Art 6(1)(a) consent or Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract to which the data subject is party. Personally, I believe that Google is not sufficiently transparent about how Find My Device works, but that TomTom could provide a compliant service if they wanted to. That TomTom doesn't offer this service primarily shows that they don't think developing this service is worth it. Wiping a remote device is unrelated to this issue and doesn't seem to provide GDPR challenges. At least in a business context, remote wiping may be an appropriate security measure and may then even be mandated by the GDPR (e.g. see Art 24 or Art 32).
It is likely that the law applying will be both that of the USA and your country. If you went to court this would be one of the things you argued over. For example, Australian Consumer Law applies to any goods or services sold to a customer in Australia irrespective of where the vendor is located. Your jurisdiction may have similar laws. At first blush you must comply with the term of the contract preventing reverse engineering. They would be within their rights to terminate the licence if you don't. However, they probably have an obligation under your equivalent to the ACL to supply a product that: is merchantable is fit for purpose does what it says it will do If it doesn't then you have a right to terminate and get your money back, sue for damages and your country's government may prosecute.
I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must.
Washington state dedicated a section of their code to explicitly make this illegal (to install it, not just use it). RCW 46.37.685(1)(b) says It is unlawful for a person to have an installed license plate flipping device on a vehicle, use technology to flip a license plate on a vehicle, or use technology to change the appearance of a license plate on a vehicle. and it is illegal to sell them. Georgia does not seem to have a specific law on the topic, but the same effect holds under GA Code §40-2-41, which says: Unless otherwise permitted under this chapter, every vehicle required to be registered under this chapter, which is in use upon the highways, shall at all times display the license plate issued to the owner for such vehicle, and the plate shall be fastened to the rear of the vehicle in a position so as not to swing and shall be at all times plainly visible... It shall be the duty of the operator of any vehicle to keep the license plate legible at all times. No license plate shall be covered with any material unless the material is colorless and transparent. No apparatus that obstructs or hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate shall be attached to the rear of any motor vehicle required to be registered in the state. We can start with the question of whether the vehicle must be registered: yes, it does. Then we can ask if "which is in use upon the highways" is true. This is not obvious, because that clause could be interpreted as meaning "which is at some time or other in use upon the highway", or else as "at those times when it is in use upon the highway". I strongly suspect that the courts would find in favor of the first interpretation, not the second, especially since the law also says that you must "keep the license plate legible at all times" (not "at all times when you are on the highway"). Finally, a plate flipper clearly "hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate", and the law prohibits the attachment of such device, not just its use. So obscuring your license plate is just not legal.
Which presidential cabinet picks require congressional approval? Which new presidential cabinet position require congressional approval?
All of them. The "cabinet" refers to the heads of the executive departments listed at 5 USC 101. "Cabinet" isn't defined in the Constitution or legislation, but this interpretation is supported by the American Heritage Dictionary (cabinet), the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, and some discussion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). All of these are consistent with an interpretation of "cabinet" to mean heads of departments of the executive branch. All cabinet appointments require the advice and consent of the Senate (except for recess appointments). The requirement for advice and consent of the Senate is given in individual statutes relating to each department. For the Secretary of State, for example, see 22 U.S. Code § 2651a (a) (2): The Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of State, and the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. That statute also happens to require some deputies to gain the consent of the Senate. For the Secretary of the Treasury, see 31 U.S. Code § 301: [...] The Secretary is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are hundreds of non-cabinet positions that require the advice and consent of the Senate. These are presented in the report, "Presidential Appointee Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nominations".
First, there are many versions of Robert's Rules of Order: here is an early free version. §26(c) suggests a procedure for creation of a committee to draft resolutions, and §53 contemplates other (standing) committees. Nothing therein suggests that there are restrictions on the right of a member to vote, in terms of a mandatory adjournment. However, RRO is not a Universal Organizational Bylaws, so in order to have any force, it must be adopted as part of the bylaws (in whole or part). It especially cannot dictate who is eligible to vote – that is a detail that has to be in the organization's bylaws.
With the president, no. In the case where the election results cannot be certified, a safe harbor provision (3 U.S. Sec. 5) allows, if not requires, the state to appoint the electors by alternate means. Under most conceivable circumstances, the process ends here. However, if the House of Representatives refuses to accept the validity of those electors, and the president-elect still has a majority of the Electoral College, the state will simply have no say in the president's election. If rejecting those electors leaves no candidate with a majority of the Electoral College, the House of Representatives itself will elect the president per the process in Art. II of the constitution, as amended by Amend. 12. If the president-elect makes it past all these considerations to the oath of office, the only removal mechanism is impeachment. With other state and federal offices, each state, as well as the federal government, has its own laws regarding disputed elections. But one remedy would have to be a new election.
Congress has the power to propose amendments, but not to enact them. Amendments are only enacted once they're ratified by 3/4ths of the state legislatures. And yes, there's no reason to think it would be unconstitutional for 2/3rds of each house of Congress plus 3/4ths of the state legislatures to make fundamental changes to the Constitution like eliminating other branches of government. The only limit on amendments that's still in effect is that states can't be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate without their consent.
No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal.
It's not a violation because Congress created and gave the Federal Reserve the power to issue Federal Reserve Notes in the Federal Reserve Act which created the Federal Reserve. More here on the relationship between Congress and the Fed: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-27/how-congress-governs-the-federal-reserve.
Under article II, section 1 of the Constitution: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th Amendment doesn't cover the case of the President and Vice-President becoming incapacitated simultaneously, so instead the original section of the Constitution can be consulted. And unlike the 25th Amendment, this is quite clear: Congress passes a law deciding who the acting President is. The current law is the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.
The Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, the Afghanistan War of 2001 and the Iraq War - none of them were initiated with an official vote by congress. This is inaccurate. President Truman did break from precedent when he initiated a "police action" (read: not a war) on the Korean peninsula in mid-1950, and perhaps took advantage of an impending July recess when that "police action" started to look more and more like a "war". There were however plenty of votes that Congress held during the remainder of the year that supported the actions that President Truman was taking. There were quite a few people serving in congress that raised a fuss about it at the time, but ultimately went along and funded the operations. Congress passed H.J. RES 1145, dated August 7th, 1964 after a US ship was attacked in international waters (the Gulf of Tonkin, which is why this legislation is more informally known as the "Gulf of Tonkin resolution"). This gave President Johnson authority to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam. After awhile, Congress decided to retake some control back from President Nixon when they passed the "War Powers Resolution" in 1973. From their point of view this gave the Commander-in-Chief the power to protect American interests while at the same time limiting the scope of any action possible by placing a time limit on what the President can do unilaterally. A President can commit forces if they feel it necessary, but must notify Congress within 48 hours of doing so and only allows action to proceed for a total maximum of 90 days. After that, for any military involvement by the United States to continue, Congress must authorize it. Because of that legislation, Congress now passes what people call "AUMFs" (authorization for the use of military force). Desert Storm was authorized by a bill titled "Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678". Military operations in Afghanistan were also approved in a similar way with a bill titled "Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States" which was signed into law by President Bush on September 18th, 2001 (one week after 9/11). All of this is to say that Congress has, in effect, ceded some of the power granted to them under the Constitution to the Office of the President, but not without reason. The ultimate answer to your title question, however, is that we have absolutely no idea. The only people with standing that can challenge in a court of law any given action would be Congress itself, and it has never chosen to do so. And, really, why would it when it can just pass legislation targeting anything the President does that they don't at least tacitly agree to? That way they can get what they want without having to worry how a squeamish Supreme Court may rule. It doesn't help matters that pretty much every single President since Nixon has in some form argued that the War Powers Act itself is unconstitutional. Additionally, there's not a single member of any branch of the Armed Forces which would listen to orders given to them by any member of Congress which contradict orders given to them by the President because doing so is likely to land them in jail. What we've more or less settled in to is that yes, Congress controls the power of "war making" by controlling the funding of the operations themselves, and the President can fulfill their obligation to protect and defend the United States and it's interests regardless of whether Congress is currently back home kissing babies at the moment. Below is a non-exhaustive list of pre-World War II military actions that the US participated in or against foreign territories without a formal declaration of war: "The Indian Wars"* First Barbary War (1801-1805) Philippine–American War (1899-1902) Pancho Villa Expedition (1916) *- The Indian Wars is actually a 300+ year long intermittent conflict between European Settlers (after awhile referred to as "Americans") and different groups of Native Americans who had lived on the continent for thousands of years. This one bullet point could easily be deconstructed into dozens of individual conflicts.
How to deal with a cheque fraud in my Westpac (Australian Bank) account? I sold bitcoins worth of $9500 to a person who told me that he made cheque deposit to my account by using SMART ATM of Westpac bank. When I logged into my Westpac, it was showing that $9500 was pending. Normally Westpac shows every other deposits as pending at first and then eventually clears fund within 2/3 business days. So I released the bitcoins to that guy. Later, Bank manager called me and said they could not find the cheque anywhere in deposit machine and asked me to provide more information. I asked them if cheque was not found or validated, why would you show it in my transaction history. I have a screenshot of that as well. Later, I understood it was probably a cheque fraud. Was there any faults by Bank? I think the scammer actually fooled the bank machine? Can I claim my money back from Westpac or file a case against them?
You have been scammed - report this to the police. There is little to no chance this person will ever be found or that if they are that you will get your bitcoins back from them. On the plus side, for the bargain price of $9,500 you have learned never to trust a cheque until it is cleared. You do, however, have avenues with your bank. You can ask Westpac what redress they will make. You can make a formal complaint to their complaints department. You can then go to the Financial Ombudsman Service. Legally, I don't think you have a leg to stand on as your releasing goods on the basis of a pending cheque is your own idiocy, however, the bank may make some redress as a commercial decision to a loyal customer.
She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.
Online banks in the US are not legally special: they have to comply with the obligations of brick and mortar banks. I assume that this is actually a US bank, and not a Nigerian bank that you access from the US. However, there is no regulation that requires a bank to be able to handle mobile deposits. If the problem is just that you can't make online deposits, that is legally allowed. For example, my own bank did not have the facility for processing mobile deposits until a few years ago, and even now I have to use a smart phone to make such deposits (it is a traditional bank). The only way in which your situation would be legally problematic would be if your contract with the bank promises that you can make mobile deposits. You could reasonably argue that an 8 month delay in solving the problem was unreasonable. Presumably there is some benefit to maintaining this bank, one which you'd like to keep rather than closing the account and moving on. It might be something like "if you close this account, we will claw back the interest that we paid". That is the point at which it might be worthwhile to talk to your lawyer about taking legal action.
Insurance fraud But not for the medical part of the form. Almost all procedures in Australia involve some type of insurance (Medicare, private, workers comp. etc.) - the notice is about the part of the form where you are authorizing payment.
If the situation described is accurate, then maybe First, let's deal with the implicit assumption that sales tax is not payable on gifts. Whether that is true or not depends on the law in your jurisdiction. For example, in australia there is no Goods and Services Tax (GST) payable on a gift because a gift is not a "supply" under the law. Technically, a value-added tax like the GST is not a sales tax but close enough. However, exchanging a "gift" for something of value (airline points, for example) is not a gift. Of course, Australian States and Territories levy Stamp Duty on the transfer of a vehicle's registration, and this is calculated on the sale price or the market price whichever is the greater. Also, technically, that's not a sales tax either. If it's a tax avoidance scheme, then no and it's a crime Assuming that there is no sales tax payable on a gift; if John and David entered into this arrangement (not a contract because of its illegal purpose) to avoid tax, then tax is payable and they are now criminals. If the relevant tax authority learns what happened and decides to investigate, then John and David might have some explaining to do. If David can show that he has routinely given John large cash gifts on John's birthday, then they may convince the authority not to prosecute. If they can't, then they get to try to convince a judge. It is not atypical for tax law to reverse the onus of proof: the government doesn't have to prove tax is payable, John and Dave have to prove it isn't.
This is fraud. The defrauded party can sue for damages. The state can prosecute: in NSW the penalty is up to 10 years jail (s192E Crimes Act 1900).
You would be amazed at how vanishingly few the number of cases are where a signature is disputed. Signatures are easy, quick and don't require you having inky fingers all the time. They are so useful that to throw them out to deal with infinintesimally small fractions of disputes over their veracity (bearing in mind that 99.999999999% of contracts never have a dispute that gets to a court [or at all]) is ridiculous. When it does happen, handwriting analysis is probably not going to be put into evidence anyway. Testimony like "I saw him sign it" is way more likely to be used.
There are some problems with this kind of vandalism, one of them clearly that the internet is international and vandalism can be performed from everywhere on servers everywhere in the world. And so it may be (both technically and legally) difficult to get hold of the vandal. Therefore, most wikis primarily focus on blocking offending accounts or their IPs and hope that this helps at least for a while. Only if it doesn't and the vandalism continues for extended time periods, legal measures are considered. Legally speaking though, vandalism is prohibited by many jurisdictions and of course by the terms of use of the wiki operators. For instance, the Swiss criminal code Art 147 explicitly puts "abusing of data processing equipment" under penalty and hence gives website operators a legal backup for setting up rules for the use of their services. Computer fraud Art. 147 1 Any person who with a view to his own or another's unlawful gain, by the incorrect, incomplete or unauthorised use of data, or in a similar way, influences the electronic or similar processing or transmission of data and as a result causes the transfer of financial assets, thus occasioning loss to another, or immediately thereafter conceals such a transfer shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 2 If the offender acts for commercial gain, he shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding ten years or to a monetary penalty of not less than 90 daily penalty units. Technically, the law even requires prosecution ex officio, even though without a hint from the operator, the police won't start an investigation. I'm sure the US has a similar law. The problem is, as with all internet crimes, it's practical application, particularly because often website operator and offender are not living in the same country. Edit After reading the exact text again (it was unavailable yesterday) Art 147 is mostly about fraud performed by computers (classical "hacking") but it shouldn't be difficult to argue that fighting and reverting vandalism requires significant (technical and personal) effort and hence the operator looses money. Additionally, there's Art 144bis which matches even better for the scenario here: Damage to data Art. 144bis Any person who without authority alters, deletes or renders unusable data that is stored or transmitted electronically or in some other similar way shall be liable on complaint to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender has caused major damage, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. The offence is prosecuted ex officio. Any person who manufactures, imports, markets, advertises, offers or otherwise makes accessible programs that he knows or must assume will be used for the purposes described in paragraph 1 above, or provides instructions on the manufacture of such programs shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender acts for commercial gain, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed.