anchor
stringlengths 60
12.5k
| positive
stringlengths 32
27.7k
| negative_1
stringlengths 63
27.2k
| negative_2
stringlengths 67
27.7k
| negative_3
stringlengths 63
27.7k
| negative_4
stringlengths 32
27.7k
| negative_5
stringlengths 53
27.7k
| negative_6
stringlengths 90
27.7k
| negative_7
stringlengths 67
27.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
In Vermont, what determines which prison does a non-binary person goes to? The non-binary actor Ezra Miller has been charged with felony burglary in Vermont. In the event a person who does not identify as male or female is convicted and sent to prison in Vermont, how is it decided which prison they go to (or is there a third prison for non-binary inmates)? Is there a process? It is simply automatic by birth sex? Does it matter if a US state has officially recognized the person as non-binary? | This document answers the question for Vermont. The question "which prison" is not particularly relevant, what matter is "what policies are followed". The DOC defines a reasonably rich set of distinctions, inmates are given a gender preference form at intake, and they do not treat inmates solely on the basis of their identity. There is segregation housing, and an inmate may be assigned to such housing if the facts warrant – and not solely because of their professed or perceived identify. | The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well. | It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata, but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment. | It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange. | LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision. | "If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining. | There seems to be no current applicable prohibition state law in Iowa in Iowa Code 39A, the Election Misconduct and Penalties Act. It is also not at all clear that precinct caucuses count as "elections" as applicable to the sections with criminal prohibitions (the precinct caucus does not appear to constitute a "primary election" under Iowa law). | In the US, only crimes that involve death or crimes against the state can be punished with death, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (this was a child rape case and execution was held to be unconstitutional). There is a consideration of "proportionality" whereby execution is not an option for all crimes involving death. The court doesn't include or exclude non-death cases, they explicitly kick the can down the road ("We do not address, for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the State"). Therefore, there is no ruling that bars execution for treason, but there is for rape and burning someone's stack of hundreds. This is a list of 2008 pre-Kennedy non-murder "surviving" state capital offenses (most of the cases listed in the article are for rape, which was ruled unconstitutional): Treason (Arkansas, Calif., Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Washington) Aggravated kidnapping (Co., Idaho, Il., Missouri, Mont.) Drug trafficking (Fl., Missouri) Aircraft hijacking (Ga., Mo.) Placing a bomb near a bus terminal (Mo.) Espionage (New Mexico) Aggravated assault by incarcerated, persistent felons, or murderers (Mont.) However, in Washington the death penalty is now unconstititional. The Missouri penalty for treason has been since reduced to a maximum of life imprisonment. On the other hand, Florida still has a "capital drug trafficking" penalty if you import 300+ kg of cocaine, knowing that "the probable result of such importation would be the death of any person" (death does not have to actually result). Here is a list of federal crimes that allow execution, which includes only large-scale drug trafficking, espionage and treason in the non-death crimes. |
Do ages in Georgia now count from conception? In Georgia, a person must be at least 15 years old to obtain a learners permit for driving. Historically, this would unambiguously be understood to mean that today, August 16, 2022, a person must have been born on or before August 16, 2007. With the LIFE Act, can this be interpreted to include anyone conceived on or after that date? Could a person conceived on August 16, 2007, and born nine months later on May 16, 2008 (14 years and 3 months ago) obtain a Georgia learners permit today? | Georgia Code § 40-5-24 says: Any resident of this state who is at least 15 years of age may apply to the department for an instruction permit to operate a noncommercial Class C vehicle. What is “age”? According to § 15-11-6, (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, a child attains a specified age the first second past midnight on the day of the anniversary of such child's birth. (b) A child born on February 29 attains a specified age on March 1 of any year that is not a leap year. So, you still have to wait until the 15th anniversary of your birth to apply for a permit. | No, she cannot 42-2-101(3), C.R.S. provides: “No person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has in his or her immediate possession a current driver’s or minor driver’s license or an instruction permit issued by the department under this article.” "(5) No person who has been issued a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit shall operate a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without having such license or permit in such person's immediate possession." The law requires you to carry your license. If your sister only has an instruction permit in her possession, she must operate under its rules until she is in possession of her permanent license. Just in case people think "highway" means a high-speed roadway, the CRS defines highway: "Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or the entire width of every way declared to be a public highway by any law of this state. | There is no basis for the view that requiring a driver's license is unconstitutional. First, it's critical to realize that a right to travel has nothing whatsoever to do with licensing drivers. A right to travel does not in any way mean there's a right to travel in a particular way. Likewise, using a car does not mean you're traveling. Schactman is about the right to obtain a passport, which is a requirement to travel overseas. Kent is likewise about international travel. Freedom of movement means the government cannot, without good cause (like being on parole), prevent you from traveling within the US, living where you choose, or working where you choose. Likewise, there's a right to international travel that means that without good cause, the government can't stop you from leaving the US or re-entering if you're a citizen. Requiring a drivers license to use public roads doesn't stop you from doing that -- there are other ways to travel. The Thompson v. Smith decision explicitly supports the idea that requiring drivers licenses is allowed. To quote a more representative section from the case: STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen of Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles. -- The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day. This right is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen to Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles -- Police Power. -- The right of a citizen to travel and transport property and to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day may, under the police power, be regulated by the city in the interest of public safety and welfare; but the city may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. AUTOMOBILES -- Drivers' Permits -- Arbitrary Revocation. -- The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking under rules of general application permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to others of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. While Chicago Motor Coach doesn't seem to be available online, searching it finds other sites stating that the real issue was a commercial operator licensed by the State of Illinois, and whether Chicago, as a municipality within Illinois, could require them to also be permitted by the city. Another line from it seems to be "Even the Legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience." To quote more recent precedent, Miller v. Reed from the 9th Circuit (a federal court of appeals, not a state court) states that The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right. (incidentally: Drivers licenses are not required by federal law. They are required by state laws.) | At time of answering, the question is: What's the most crucial issue when deciding Senator Cruz's citizenship? The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, Section 1, states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States[.] Cruz did not go through a naturalization process. He was also not born within the territorial limits of the US. If either of those facts were different, those would be the crucial issue. Since they are not, we then look to the Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the first Congress, which states that children born to citizen parents outside the United States are also citizens, specifically: The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens[.] (emphasis added) According to the Wikipedia article and/or sources it cites, this is the only legislation to use the phrase "natural born citizens" and it seems clear this is intended to refer to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution which states a requirement: No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States. (emphasis added) The 1790 Act was repealed and replaced in 1795, but the new law also contained the language (lacking "natural born"): The children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States[.] The specific laws have been further changed, as the naturalization process has, reintroducing ambiguity about the "natural born" requirement, but birthright citizenship from parents is not in question and the "natural born" aspect is not in this question. So, to answer the question directly, the most crucial issue is: Were Cruz's parents citizens when Cruz was born? Cruz's Wikipedia page says his father was not naturalized until later, but his mother was born in Wilmington, DE, which is in the United States, and so unless she renounced her citizenship she would have been a US citizen at the time of Cruz's birth. This means there's a crucial issue: Did Cruz's mother renounce her US citizenship before Cruz was born? "Kaithar" commented on this answer with speculation that she voted in a Canadian election at a time (1947-1977) when Canada didn't recognize dual citizenship in that it required its own citizens to give that up if they acquired foreign citizenship; "user102008" refutes that. However, if we don't want to end this issue-identifying answer at that question, let's assume the answer is "no" and that Cruz's mother was a US citizen when Cruz was born. Then we have to see if birthright citizenship from parents extends to Cruz. For this, we can look to Public Law 414 (66 Stat. 236), passed June 27, 1952, especially section 301(a)(7): The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: […] A person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph. Side note: Section (4) (modern (d)) would matter if Cruz's father were considered a noncitizen national of the US, slightly relaxing the requirements so that the mother only had to spend only one continuous year in the US prior to the birth. The armed forces exemption was broadened Nov. 6, 1966 to cover the parent (or their parent's) nonmilitary employment by the US government or certain international organizations. If that's relevant, this answer can be edited to expand on this point. Section 309 of that law addresses children born out of wedlock, and says that section 301(a)(7) (quoted above) applies directly as if the parents were married, "if the paternity of such child is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation." To the best of my knowledge, section 301(a)(7) applies to Cruz. If I were wrong on that, we'd look to Section 309(c): A person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year. The equivalent of the first quote today is in 8 U.S. Code § 1401(g) if parents are married at the time of a child's birth, replacing "ten years, at least five" with "five years, at least two" (Nov. 14, 1986; see Section 12 in this law). The quote from 309(c) is now 8 U.S. Code § 1409(c). So then the crucial question is: Did Cruz's mother spent the requisite period of time in the US before Cruz was born? Apparently she did, regardless of marital status, and if that's true it means Ted Cruz is a US citizen and has been since at least birth*. Again, the "natural born" aspect is omitted from this now-answered question. The answer to the question you meant to ask (perhaps "What's the most crucial issue when deciding if Senator Cruz's citizenship makes him eligible for the Presidency?") is "What does the phrase 'natural born citizen' mean in context of Article II, Section 1 of the US Constitution?" (*) Which may mean that he hasn't been a citizen his whole life, using a Cruz definition for when life begins. That's a separate discussion, though, and not very relevant to this one. | Are minors allowed to possess handguns in Oregon? Yes, with exceptions, although they may not purchase or own handguns, and are not permitted to conceal carry handguns. Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.470 prohibits any person from intentionally selling, delivering, or otherwise transferring a handgun to anyone under 21 years of age, ORS § 166.470(1)(a), except the temporary transfer of any firearm to a minor for hunting, target practice, or any other lawful purpose. ORS § 166.470(3)(b). The other primary statute that is relevant is Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.250 which also provides that minors may possess any firearm temporarily for hunting, target practice, or any other lawful purpose. ORS § 166.250(2)(a)(B). But, despite this general rule, a minor may not possess a firearm if they are under 18 years of age, and while a minor, committed the equivalent of an adult felony or a misdemeanor involving violence, within four years of being charged with possession. ORS § 166.250(1)(c). (Source). | Yes, maybe The legislation varies by state but s494 of the Victorian Children, Young Persons and Families Act is typical. A person who has the control or charge of a child must not leave the child without making reasonable provision for the child's supervision and care for a time which is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. If the child is 17 years old then the circumstances are such that it is not unreasonable to leave them, even for a period of days. If the child is 17 days old, even 30 seconds may be unreasonable. | Short Answer Typically, about four weeks in an uncontested case and six weeks in a contested case, although this depends to some extent upon how business the relevant courts are at the time. Long Answer The time limits break down as follows into different parts of the process: Minimum time from formally demanding possession to being legally allowed to bring suit in this situation. This is almost certainly set by statute. In Georgia, there is no waiting period for this part of the process when rent is not paid as agreed. A lawsuit can be filed the same day that a demand for possession is made by the landlord. OCGA § 44-7-50. The time from serving a lawsuit on the tenant to the time that the tenant is required to respond in court. This is almost certainly set by statute or court rule. In Georgia this is seven days from service of process. OCGA § 44-7-51. Georgia, like most states, allows "nail and mail" service by posting a notice on the premises and mailing a notice to the last known address of the tenant, after some reasonable effort has been made to personally service the tenant or any other adult resident, so this step will typically take about seven to ten days. The time from an appearance in court or court filing by the tenant objecting to the eviction to the time that a hearing is scheduled, in the event that the tenant raises an objection (which is easily done, even if there isn't ultimately a legally valid defense to raise). There may be a legal deadline for this in the statute or court rules, although it can usually be waived. This can also vary based on how many cases are pending relative to the number of available judges, something that usually varies seasonally. Georgia does not have a fixed time period for this step, but "Every effort should be made by the trial court to expedite a trial of the issues." OCGA § 44-7-53. The time from an order of eviction as the conclusion of an eviction hearing until the sheriff or marshall actually carries out the eviction that has been ordered by the court. This is almost never a matter of public record or a legal mandate, and it would typically vary seasonally and over the course of a month as the staff available to carry out evictions is pretty constant, but the demand for evictions has monthly peaks that flow from month end leases and rental payment due dates, and seasonally with the end of school years and the end of calendar years being particularly busy times when delays are greater. Sheriffs have also been known to intentionally stall in holiday seasons. This part of the process in Fulton County is set forth here. The total time is the sum of these four times. Most evictions lawyers in the area would know what is typical for (3) and (4) and would also have a good grasp of how likely it is for a tenant to assert a defense (if the tenant does not, part (3) is skipped and a default judgment for eviction is entered on the appearance date). In my area (in Colorado), (1) is three days, (3) is usually about two weeks and (4) is usually about one to three weeks, but as noted above, your experience in Atlanta, Georgia could easily vary based upon how busy the courts and the marshall are at that time. According to this website, in Georgia, it is customary to allow 3-10 days for step 1 even though it is not legally required, step 3 is typically one to two weeks, and step 4 is typically about two weeks. It is also possible to extent step 2 by one week from one week to two weeks with a procedural tool that most lawyers are aware of in Georgia. So, you are typically looking at about four weeks in an uncontested case and about six in a contested case from notice to actually having people removed. | I think your confusion stems from assuming there is a universal definition of "minor" across laws, jurisdictions, and rights. 18 is the age of majority for the purpose of voting (26th Amendment), the death penalty, labor law (although age 14 is the minimum age for employment), and many other laws. But, 21 is the age required to buy alcohol in all states (by their own choice in order to receive highway funding). Nothing requires the age of majority to be consistent across different sections of code or statute or between jurisdictions (except when constitutionally prescribed, like voting age, or minimum age for certain elected offices). There are many counties that prohibit purchase of alcohol at any age. The age of consent varies between 14 and 18 across US states. Age 65 is a threshold for certain tax credits. You need to be 25 in order to be a member of the US House of Representatives, 30 to be a Senator, 35 to be President. You are only protected from age discrimination if you are 40 or older. Here is a rough list of various age-based thresholds for various rights, privileges, or responsibilities in the US. (I havn't vetted this whole list, and some are clearly satire, but the ones I know about are consistent with my understanding.) |
What UK law would prevent news outlets from allowing people to comment on stories? The Daily Mail Online is an online news outlet in the UK which provides a comment section for each new article they publish. Sometimes the comment sections are moderated and other times they are turned off entirely. On their FAQ page they say this is "usually for legal reasons": Why are comments not allowed under some articles? We do not allow comments under some articles or blogs. This is usually for legal reasons. Despite this the Daily Mail still runs a Twitter account where they post most of their news articles including the articles that have had their comments disabled. This means people are still able to comment on the news article, but only from a third party website. At this point it seems more likely they are disabling the comment sections because they don't have the resources to moderate a very popular news story. Before I jump to conclusions, are you aware of any legal reasons why they would have to disable the comments section on their website? | Like many other jurisdictions, in the UK sites like the Daily Mail are liable for the content they host. In other words, the legal issue here is they either do not have the staff available to (or simply do not want to) spend the time moderating the comment sections in order to remove potentially defamatory or otherwise illegal content. As Lag added in a comment below: another legal reason may be liability for publishing something that creates a substantial risk of seriously impeding or prejudicing the course of justice in some ongoing legal proceeding. Far easier to prevent it beforehand than moderate it (and risk missing it) later. Content on Twitter (for example, replies to their own tweets), on the other hand, is not the Daily Mail's problem to moderate. | These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information. | Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform. | To preface my answer, this aspect of UK law is unclear at best and I try to set out general principles where available. If you are acting in a private sphere, then the recording of conversations are unregulated, however this is only for personal use – i.e., should you desire to make notes on what was said for your reference at a later date. Should you wish to share it with a third party, then you would need consent from all participants or be able to demonstrate that it would be in the public interest. If you are acting as an employee or a company, then the situation changes. Firstly, you need to check your contract, whilst this does not constitute a crime, it may be against the terms of your employment. Secondly, a company can only make recordings without knowledge under statutory conditions, such as to establish facts, ensure regulatory compliance or demonstrate standards that are achieved or need to be achieved by training. It is a general principle that conversations recorded without consent are inadmissible in court, particularly in terms of a criminal proceedings. In civil matters, it similarly follows the concept that a claimant should come to court with clean hands. However, judges are usually more pragmatic in civil cases and if parties are aware of the existence of the recording, then it often be subject to usual rules of disclosure, though this may open the creator of the recording to subsequent litigation regarding the illegality of the recording under Data Protection Act or others. | Defamation of public figures is governed by the "actual malice" standard: the person making the statement must either have known that it was false at the time they said it, or must have been acting with reckless disregard for the truth (meaning they had serious doubts that the statement was true at the time they said it). The First Amendment bars a public figure from winning a libel suit unless they demonstrate that the defendant fell in one of those categories, because any lesser requirement would discourage people from speaking on topics of public concern for fear that they might say something wrong and be sued for it. The standard was first applied for public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan, and later cases have extended it to public figures in general. If someone genuinely thinks Obama was born in Kenya, it is not libel for them to say that. Even though you could argue that any reasonable person should know that's wrong, it's not enough -- the defendant had to have known it was wrong or seriously doubted it. Even if your sole basis for claiming he was a gay prostitute is that you heard a rumor from a friend, if you actually believed them, you can say he was. You aren't required to check Clinton's book to verify a quote before repeating it; if you read it on a website and had no reason to think they were lying, you can say that the quote was in there. It is extremely difficult for a public figure in the United States to win a defamation lawsuit. This is the system working as designed; a public figure who wants to correct lies being told about them can put out the correct information (which is easier for them than for most people), which is preferable to government action (and libel judgments are government action, because they involve a government officer ordering you to pay someone else money and/or do and/or not do something). | This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be. | The ruling that allows the ban on child pornography is based on two SCOTUS decisions: Miller v. Califorina, which legally defined "obscene" and declared obscenities to be beyond the protection of the First Amendment (just an fyi, the definition includes that the material is lacking in "serious scientific, literary, artistic, or political value" which the courts usually don't hold a high threshold of quality above. Obscenity laws are also, per Miller, to be in the power of the most local levels of governance among a body of people (so while the U.S. cannot ban content on a web forum, the forum's own rules may). The other case is law is New York v. Furber which held that there is a compeling government interest in protecting the physical and mental health and well being of a child and that the manufacture and sale of child porn leads to the abuse of children and tramautic memories of the experience that last for much of their lifetime that overrides any protection offered by the First Amendment, thus the material need not be legally obscene to make illegal. It's that compelling government interest that forms the basis of the answer. Because that is the justification for the illegalization of child porn and as such it would not always fall to obscenity laws without the interest, there is a bit of a loop hole. To be illegal, the pictures in question must have a real child featured in the porn in question. Thus pictures depicting fictional characters in their entirety (such as cartoon depictions of children) and erotica (literature featuring sexual content) are not illegal under Ferber and must fall to Miller to determine if it is illegal. Because Miller leaves the rules to the lowest level of community law possible, these pictures can be against the rules of many websites, 4chan is (in)famous for having next to no standards, this kind of material is perfectly legal on this site as far as higher levels of government are concerned and it falls to the moderation team of 4chan (such as they are) to limit the offensive content. It is because these materials do not depict actual real children that they are legal. This is due to the fact that these works can just barely qualify as having an artistic or literary value (the bar is very very low as to what qualifies as "merit" under Miller). It's also acceptable to make pictures of a real child portraying a fictional character who in the story is a victim of child pornography, regardless of the work's depiction so long as you aren't actually having the child actor strip on camera. This can be done by giving the child flesh colored clothing that covers the areas deemed obscene and using shoot angles that depict the child's skin that is legally allowed to be exposed (to hid the fact that for legal reasons the child is legally dressed on the set. Other production tricks are to hire actors who are older than 18 years old, but look younger than they are and can play a kid.). So long as you are not actually making child porn (showing the "no-no areas" on a real child), you can make fiction works that depict fictional characters involved in such activities in artistic ways to make any statement you want on the subject matter. In your two examples, Operation Avalance targeted sites that had materials such as pictures and videos that depicted actual children in pornographic situations. In the case of the Megaupload, the U.S. was requesting extradition for money laundering and racketeering in connection with the legal seizure of Megaupload following investigations into the site concerning digital piracy. I'm unaware of actual instances of child porn involved, but not saying it's not impossible. Extradition only works if the country requested (Here New Zealand) chooses to honor the request (the U.S. and New Zealand have an extradition treaty and very similar laws so extradition is both required per treaty when requested AND the accused person would face similar charges if the crime was committed in the requested country.). | What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be "crucial military information". |
Must public content/data created by a US city have an open license? I read on https://resources.data.gov/open-licenses/ that works created by U.S. Government employees within the scope of their employment default to the public domain: The Federal Open Data Policy states: “Agencies must apply open licenses, in consultation with the best practices found in Project Open Data, to information as it is collected or created so that if data are made public there are no restrictions on copying, publishing, distributing, transmitting, adapting, or otherwise using the information for non-commercial or for commercial purposes.” As described below, works created by U.S. Government employees within the scope of their employment default to U.S. Public Domain. However, works produced by outside parties which are created or obtained for use by the U.S. Government may need open licenses applied to them: “When information is acquired or accessed by an agency through performance of a contract, appropriate existing clauses 22 shall be utilized to meet these objectives” The Project Open Data Metadata Schema provides a license field which is defined as “the license or non-license (i.e. Public Domain) status with which the dataset or API has been published” and must be provided as a URL. Guidance and example URLs can be found below for properly documenting the license or non-license of your agency’s data in accordance with the open data policy. And according to https://legalaidatwork.org/factsheet/government-workers-rights/, person who works a local city or county are US government or “public sector” employee: Any person who works for the U.S. government, the State of California, a local city or county, or any other public employer, such as a school district or transportation agency (e.g., Bay Area Rapid Transit) is a government or “public sector” employee. Those employees have employment rights that are often different than the rights given to employees who work for non-government, or “private” employers. Am I correct to infer that public content/data created by a US city have an open license (public domain if created by US city employees or open license if created by a contractor)? For example, must the minutes and agendas PDF documents on https://sfgov.legistar.com/Calendar.aspx (City and County of San Francisco) have an open license? I did email them ([email protected]) and their answer was "Minutes and agendas are official public documents, but may not be reposted or edited.", which contradicts my understanding, but perhaps I am missing something. | Am I correct to infer that content/data created by a US city have an open license (public domain if created by US city employees or open license if created by a contractor)? No. For example, Larimer County, Colorado created election administration software in-house rather than using an outside contractor to do so, and it would be lawful for it to license that software to other governments in a manner that helps recover its development costs. There is an issue over whether a city or state can copyright its municipal ordinances or statutes or regulations in a legally enforceable way when people have a legal duty to comply with them. Some courts have held that state statutes that are binding upon people can't be protected in that manner. Efforts of the West Corporation to protect its page numbering system that was widely used by courts to refer to public domain case opinions were mostly invalidated in litigation. An open question is that most municipal governments incorporate by reference in their ordinances Uniform Building Codes that are subject to private copyrights and are not terribly cheap to obtain copies of. Yet, every person doing construction work is bound to follow the enacted ordinance including the parts incorporated by reference. | When you license your creative work under one non-exclusive license such as CC-BY-SA, you are in no way prevented from also licensing your works under different non-exclusive licenses such as MIT. The other license doesn't even have to be an open source license – dual-licensing is a common business model. You are the sole copyright holder of the creative work. No one else can use your works. By offering licenses, you are giving permissions to other people. But you still retain all your rights. You are not required to comply with these licenses yourself – you are the licensor, not the licensee. Technically, the licensor of CC-BY-SA 4.0 material does give up some rights. For example, you waive the right to collect royalties when recipients exercise the permissions you gave them through this license (cf section 2.b.3). But that doesn't restrict you outside of that license. | Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive. | This answer to a related question sums up the relevant concepts regarding work for hire. Since, according to your description of your relationship to A, you are not an employee (Commun. for Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Reid 490 U.S. 730), and you do not a written agreement, under US law, this would not be a work for hire: thus you hold copyright to something. I presume Company A gave you the source code and you are rewriting it to fit some technical requirement, so you have been given permission by the copyright holder to create a derivative work. You do not gain copyright to the original code: you only hold copyright to what you wrote. You would therefore need the permission of the copyright holder (of the original program) to sell copies of the modified program (currently A, company B in the future once the transfer is complete). There isn't a special "signing-over" ceremony for permission to copy, but the situation you describe is very messy. Even without a written agreement, you do understand that they intend to make multiple copies of the resulting program which includes your contribution, and you have received something of value in exchange for your contribution. So, one would argue, you have at least given permission to copy your stuff, even without a piece of signed paper -- in hiring you, you have given them an implied license to use what they paid you to create. The unclarity would be in whether you transferred your property rights, or simply licensed them to use it. Hence the recommendation to get an IP attorney. | You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction. | If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens. | Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need. | Both the displayed site (including all text and images) and the html, css, javascript and other code that generates the display are protected by copyright. This is true in pretty much every country. You would not be able to reuse them lawfully without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. If no exception applies, and you have not obtained permission, this is copyright infringement. In most cases copyright infringement is treated as a tort (a civil matter), not as a crime. This means that law enforcement generally will take no action and have no interest in such a situation. The copyright owner could sue for infringement, and possibly collect money damages. In the US, statutory damages can be as high as $30,000, or up to $150,000 for "wilful" infringement, or as low as $750 (per work infringed). Or actual damages can be collected instead. In other countries, actual damages plus costs of suit are more likely, but the rule can be different in each country. The possible exceptions to copyright vary significantly in different countries. In the US the major exception is Fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? for more information In general short snippets of code can probably be used under fair use, but substantial parts of the code or the displayed site are less likely to qualify as fair use. And if it is illegal then why are there so many legal open source or paid software and applications for cloning of website like httrack, cyotek, webcopy etc? Most of these tools have legitimate uses, including learning how a site is constructed without distributing copied content; and cloning or partial cloning of a site with permission. Even if the tools were mostly used for unlawful copying, that might well not be a high priority for law enforcement, and cross-border law enforcement (which this in many cases would involve) is often much harder for the police and other authorities. |
In the US, under what circumstances can I re-write code I previously wrote but do not own? I write code for company X in the USA using popular technology Y. In the course of my job I end up developing a number of useful libraries/widgets/utilities for use within the Y ecosystem that have nothing to do with X's business product per se: they are broadly useful across many applications. Some of these libraries/widgets/utilities are trivial to write, while others are elaborate and have taken months of work. The commonality is that none of them require any proprietary technology or information to function or to develop: any of them could be written by any Y developer sufficiently skilled and motivated. The code I wrote is work made-for-hire and belongs to company X; let's take it as a given that I can't use or publish this specific source code outside the company. (Let's further assume that none of the code is patented.) Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? If I need to solve the same problem again (or if I just want to publish open-source code), how close can my solution come to the original? There are a number of related questions out there on Stack Exchange and elsewhere: How can I reuse generic code for consulting between companies? Can I rewrite code I wrote for a company from scratch? Can I adapt code I wrote for work and release it as open source? Does a company have IP rights to the stuff I do in my spare time? There are some very helpful answers in all those threads, but none of them really cover all the bases. I'm hoping this answer can be definitive by considering all the dimensions: Similarity to original What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? What if the new code comes out almost exactly the same? What if the code achieves precisely the same function -- i.e., produces exactly the same outputs for the same inputs -- but works substantially differently? What if I change variable names or otherwise obfuscate the code purely to avoid copyright infringement, without changing the functionality? Circumstances under which the new code is derived What if I copy-and-paste from the original, but update a bunch of stuff so that the algorithm / architecture / etc. is substantially different? What if I look at the original code in one window while I re-type it verbatim in another? What if I look at the original code as a reference but substantially change things as I re-write? What if I don't look at the original at all, but it still comes out extremely close to the original? What if I have a photographic memory and reproduce the entire code verbatim without looking? Complexity What if the code is very complex and requires considerable engineering effort? What if the code is simple and requires little time to reproduce once you know how it works? Timing What if I rewrite the code immediately after leaving company X? What if I rewrite the code on nights and weekends while I'm still employed by company X? What if I rewrite it N years later? There may well be other dimensions I'm forgetting -- feel free to suggest them! My question is specifically about U.S. law, but illustrative points from other countries are welcome. I don't want to narrow the scope of the question to a single state within the US, so pointing out what is universal and what might differ between states would be very helpful. | Assumptions Let us assume that the code involved was created during the period of employment, was within the scope of that employment, and was validly work-made-for-hire (WFH). In that case, the code copyright is owned by the former employer.dn the person who wrote it has no more rights than a random stranger would. I am also going to assume US law. Ownership of Ideas Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? No one does. In the absence of a patent, no one ever "owns" an idea. ]17 USC 102(b)](https://copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102) provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Derivative Works Copyright law does prohibit anyone making a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without the permission of the owner. A derivative work is one "based on" the source work. The classic case is a translation. Exactly when a piece of software is a derivative work of another is fact-dependent. Bu several things are clear. If the source work is trivial and obvious, ther may not be sufficient "originality" for the source work to be protected by copyright at all. If the source work is not protected by a valid copyright, nothing is a derivative work of it. A "hello world" program, for example, is probably not original enough for any copyright. A straight-forward implementation of a basic algorithm like quicksort is probably not original enough, either. If there is only one way, or only a small number of ways, to express the ideas of the source work, the merger doctrine applies. This means that the expression of the work is merged into the idea, leaving the expression unprotected. When the merger doctrine applies, there is, in effect, no copyright. If a work copies ideas from a source, but none of its particular expression of those ideas, the result is not a derivative work, and is not an infringement of copyright. If a work is definitive, but is also a fair use of the source work, it is not an infringement. The usual four-factor fir use analysis must be made to determine this. In particular, if a work is highly transformative, it is likey to be found to be a fair use. Issues from the Question What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? That Rather suggests that the work was too trivial to be original enough to have copyright protection at all, or else that there are only a few ways to express the idea, and the merger doctrine applies. But if neither o those were true, this might be an infringement. [* To be coninued*] | Yes. The copyright owner of a work has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work" or to make "derivative works" of it. 17 USC 106. Copyright law is older than the photocopier, and it applies to copies made by means of any technology. If your intent is to duplicate the protected work, whether you do it by tracing, photocopying, or even freehand, you are infringing that right. It is possible that you could squeeze into one of the copyright exceptions, such as fair use, but these are much narrower than people tend to assume they are (especially outside of the U.S.), and they boil down to: "Well, yes, I copied your copyrighted work, but..." The bottom line is: is it copyrighted? Did you copy it, in whole or in part? Then, unless you have a very good reason, you've infringed the copyright. Whether you do it by means of tracing paper, jellygraph, or iPhone doesn't matter. | It depends on what you are selling to the enterprises. You could be selling just a licence to use the program, and retain all the rights on the source code. You could be selling the rights to the source code. For #1, the source code is yours and you can do what it pleases with it1. In fact many programs offer both an open-source licence (which usually forces the user to make its changes to the code publicly available) and a commercial one (which allows the user to keep the modifications of the source code for themselves). For #2, the source code is no longer yours so it is not up to you to decide what to do with it. 1I am assuming no other agreements imposing limits on those; for example that none of your contracts to your customers have a clause forbidding you from making the code available to the public. | Ideas aren't property Your employer does not own your ideas. However, neither do you. Ideas are not something that is protected by intellectual property law. To be IP, you need more than an idea. What is IP? The most common types are: Patents - protect inventions and new processes Trade marks - protect logos, words and other branding Copyright - protects art, writing, music, film, and computer programs Registered designs - protects the visual design of a product Circuit layout rights - protect layout designs or plans of integrated circuits used in computer-generated designs Plant breeders rights - protect the commercial rights of new plant varieties. The normal operation of IP law is that if a person is engaged under a contract of service (e.g. an employment contract) then their employer owns all the IP they make which includes progress towards something that might be IP (e.g. all the work that leads up to a patentable invention). However, if they are engaged under a contract for service (e.g. an independent contractor), then the worker owns the IP. The work the employer owns is generally limited to work in the course of the employment. So if you are a software developer they will generally own all code you write that is useful for their business but won't own the romantic novel you write in your spare time. In either case, the specific contract can override the default assumption. What can you do? You can certainly use the idea for the app but you can't use anything that is subject to your employer's IP. That means you can't use any code or copy the user interface - it all has to be redeveloped from scratch. You also can’t develop something that would be of use to their business while you are still an employee. | All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on. | No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.) | There is no IP in ideas Any code would by subject to copyright (who owns that copyright is itself a convoluted and separate question), however, if the 4 of you abandoned any existing code, notes and images and start over you would have no legal impediment. | Company B has created a derived work from company A's copyright-protected work, so yes, B has infringed on A's copyright. It might be difficult for A to prove it, however, so B might get away with it, but it's still infringement. On the other hand, if B creates software that behaves like A's through reverse engineering, that is, by examining the program's function without examining its code, then they will not have infringed the copyright in the code. |
Does MIT license oblige me to publish its code in open sources I found several libraries on GitHub that I plan to use for a commercial application. They are all licensed under MIT or Apache 2.0. Having studied them, I realized that I can use them for free in development, but does this oblige me to publish its code in open sources after developing the application? | You'll want to read the actual licenses yourself and understand what is required. If you don't understand, then you'll want to consult an attorney. But neither of these licenses are all that complex in my opinion. MIT: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Apache 2.0: Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You meet the following conditions: (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices stating that You changed the files; and (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution notices from the Source form of the Work, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works; and (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or, within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed as modifying the License. Nowhere does either license require you to publish your application's source code, even if your application is directly based on the original code. | If you do, can you build/run it without being bound by said license? No, you cannot. Because there is no way to "build/run" it without making a copy. You copy the sourcecode, before you can run your compiler. That is the copy you are making, not copying the file that results from this process. A valid question might be, are you bound by the license? Well, that is up for lawyers and a court to decide, but in all countries I know, copyright is automatic for anything worth copying. And the copyright holder can grant licenses to people to allow things. So arguing you are not bound by a specific license would mean you would argue that you are bound by the legal default, which in most countries is "You cannot copy that. At all. Unless you have explicit permission". That argument would sound like "I stole all 10, because the offer of buy-one-get-one-free was not legally binding". Maybe it wasn't. But that doesn't mean you get to do something unrelated illegal instead. Now, there are many exceptions for "personal use". You can sing any song in the shower. I would assume you can compile any program there, too. You just cannot use that program for anything worthwhile, the same way you cannot record your song in the shower and sell it. | You should probably get a lawyer, but my reading is this: The company whose SDK you use owns their SDK, owns their code, and is free to take any of your ideas how to improve their code without paying you. But they say that ideas are ten a penny, so this is mostly there to prevent pointless lawsuits. On the other hand, it says that everything you do with your product is yours. I might be completely wrong, that's why you should get a lawyer. | Am I correct to infer that content/data created by a US city have an open license (public domain if created by US city employees or open license if created by a contractor)? No. For example, Larimer County, Colorado created election administration software in-house rather than using an outside contractor to do so, and it would be lawful for it to license that software to other governments in a manner that helps recover its development costs. There is an issue over whether a city or state can copyright its municipal ordinances or statutes or regulations in a legally enforceable way when people have a legal duty to comply with them. Some courts have held that state statutes that are binding upon people can't be protected in that manner. Efforts of the West Corporation to protect its page numbering system that was widely used by courts to refer to public domain case opinions were mostly invalidated in litigation. An open question is that most municipal governments incorporate by reference in their ordinances Uniform Building Codes that are subject to private copyrights and are not terribly cheap to obtain copies of. Yet, every person doing construction work is bound to follow the enacted ordinance including the parts incorporated by reference. | First off: Legally, everything is copyrighted anyway. Licensing is not at all necessary. Hence, even if a court would disagree with # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0, that would just make it closed source. Having said that, the law generally doesn't bother with trivialities such as "file headers". Any commonly accepted way to state the copyright and license terms is OK. Your LICENSE is such a common convention. If you want to avoid all doubt what is covered under that license, put a reference to that LICENSE in each header. If you have just five files in one directory that are all licensed the same, I wouldn't even bother with that. Again, the default position is that everything is closed source. | In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid. | What you are missing is that the original copyright holder can give permission to make derivative works with strings attached. There is no automatic right to derive something from a copyrighted work. Those strings could include constraints on what you create in the process of making the derivative work. Yes it is a string limiting what you can do with something you own, but you would have been warned in the license and had the choice to start from scratch. People do create work-alike software with no copyright strings using two teams and a "clean room" design process. It is a lot harder than modifying something another person has developed. Also, law and someone's understanding of morals need not be aligned at all. And, in patent law, just creating something all by yourself from scratch does not give you ownership. If someone else did it first and got a patent you can't make the item you might think you own. IP law is complex and looking for "fundamentals" may not get you anywhere. | The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923. |
How long is "5 years or such other period as permitted by law"? I have to sign an NDA with a non-disparagement clause, which is defined to last for a period of five years or for such other period as permitted by law. I've tried to find any laws limiting how long an NDA can last, and I couldn't find any limit. Does this mean that this NDA is in effect indefinitely? If yes, why would the NDA mention the five years at all? The company is based in California, the court they name in the contract is in California. I'm in EU. | The alternative is that in some jurisdiction, an NDA cannot last as long as 5 years, it might be only allowed to last 3 years (this page has some of the state restrictions. In that jurisdiction, the NDA is therefore good for 3 years. It's not practical for an employer to know all of the possible legal conditions on duration of an NDA, so the option "for such other period as permitted by law" allows the contract to recognize local time limits, which are exceptions to the general 5 year duration as stated in the contract. The duration could in principle be indefinite, but the wording in this case says "5 years". | Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law. | Note that the answer to most of your questions has nothing to do with the GDPR specifically, but has to do with the legal force that an EU Regulation has. Here's a related answer on EU Regulations vs. Directives. That said, here are my answers to your specific questions: So member states can define a different age, even though the GDPR says that it should be 16. But is this an exception? Yes. Are there any other exceptions? Yes. Scanning the Regulation for instances of "Member State" is a good way to find them. In my opinion, the biggest area of the GDPR where Member States have influence is Article 6, "Lawfulness of Processing". In some circumstances, it allows Member States to specify what could be considered a lawful basis for processing. Must these exceptions be explicitly stated in the GDPR? Yes. As a Regulation, exceptions must be explicitly stated in order to be permissible because Member States have no authority to overrule EU law*. I'd like to understand to what extent the GDPR must be followed by member states, and to what extent it could be amended in national laws. "Amended" is a fuzzy term. It can mean adding, changing, or removing from the law. Unless otherwise specified, Member States could not change or remove provisions, but there could very well be additions consistent with the GDPR. *Some Member States dispute this statement when it comes to constitutional issues. | The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime. | There are three answers here. First, as is common on this site, you are using the term, "legal" and "illegal." Those are not legally meaningfully terms. A good lawyer won't use those terms to mean allowed or disallowed. We talk in terms of potential civil or criminal liability, or other sanctions and consequences. To say that something is "legal" does not communicate much. Second, all contracts are governed by a duty of good faith. That means that you cannot try to "trick" someone with the terms of the contract and expect to enforce that contract against them and you cannot try to skirt your obligations by finding a tricky form of compliance not within the mutual understanding of the agreement. As with all things, defining good faith is not easy, and depends on the specific context of a situation. It is worth distinguishing between the duty of good faith, and the duties one owes to a fiduciary; good faith is surely far less, but nevertheless still meaningful. Third, a defense to non-performance of a contract is that the agreement as written is unconscionable. A contract that is a grossly unfair deal where the contract was not actively negotiated (i.e. Blindly signing a bad form contract), may fall under this category. Note: I am not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; contact a licensed attorney in your area; do not rely on my statements; I merely am providing a general answer that is academic in nature. | The customer will own exactly what is stated in the contract. As the contractor, who wants to be able to reuse code (which is in everybody’s best interest) you want to keep the copyright, with the client having the license to use the code any way they want. If the customer wants the copyright with the contractor losing all rights, that will be in the contract, and it will cost. If the contractor produced an application that use lots of domain knowledge supplied by the client, that will often not give the client copyright, if the contractor is the one producing the actual expression of that knowledge by translating knowledge into code. If the client provides knowledge that is actually a trade secret, then an NDA should be signed. And again, it’s contracts. The client can put into the contract that their domain knowledge must not be reused. That is quite reasonable. The client might add to the contract that the contractor will not write software for any competitor. That is legal if it is in the contract, but it will cost. | Such a clause must be presented before or at the same time the offer is made. The (somewhat new) law NH RSA 275:70 says Any employer who requires an employee who has not previously been employed by the employer to execute a noncompete agreement as a condition of employment shall provide a copy of such agreement to the potential employee prior to the employee's acceptance of an offer of employment. A noncompete agreement that has not been disclosed to an employee as required by this section shall not be enforceable against the employee, but all other provisions of any employment, confidentiality, nondisclosure, trade secret, intellectual property assignment, or any other type of employment agreement or provision shall remain in full force and effect The question is whether such an agreement would mean you can't set up shop on your own and take a bunch of customers with you (it seems that such clauses are enforceable), or does it mean you can't work in that trade (competing for new customers, or as an employee of a competitor) – such an interpretation would not be enforced, in the analysis of this article. The clause must be "drafted narrowly to protect only a company's legitimate business interests, like customer goodwill and confidential information". A specific case of this interpretation is Merrimack Valley Wood Products v. Near, 152 N.H. 192, which finds that the law does not look with favor upon contracts in restraint of trade or competition...Such contracts are to be narrowly construed. Nonetheless, restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable, given the particular circumstances of the case In assessing reasonableness, three tests must be passed (must be answered "no"): first, whether the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer; second, whether the restriction imposes an undue hardship upon the employee; and third, whether the restriction is injurious to the public interest. As an example of a reasonable restriction: When an employee is put in a position involving client contact, it is natural that some of the goodwill emanating from the client is directed to the employee rather than to the employer. The employer has a legitimate interest in preventing its employees from appropriating this goodwill to its detriment. But restricting a person from working with any customers of the company (not just the employees work-related contacts) is unenforceable, because the company had no legitimate interest in protecting its entire client base from its former employee, because he had no advantage over any other complete stranger, possessing no special hold on the goodwill of the majority of Technical Aid's customers. See also Brian's Fitness v. Woodward for reaffirmation ("valid only to the extent that it prevents an employee from appropriating assets that legitimately belong to the employer"), and additional citations. The question arises whether there is a distinction between the former employee approaching former customers, versus those same customers approaching the former employee. I have not located any case that directly addresses that, but Technical Aid v. Allen, 134 N.H. 1 says A restrictive covenant must unreasonably limit the public's right to choose before it will be found to be injurious to the public interest. I think it is likely that the courts would find it to be an unreasonable limit on the public's right to choose, if a customer were prevented from choosing a different company to provide the desired service simply because the customer happened to have previously had a business relationship with the former employee. This "right to choose" is asymmetrical – the public has a right to choose any service provider, an employee does not have an equivalent right to pursue (seek out, woo) a customer, in light of a restrictiveness covenant. | Yes, patents expire. The term is generally 20 years, but a patent can expire earlier if the owner fails to pay the scheduled maintenance fees. 35 U.S.C. § 154, 35 U.S.C. § 41 The patent owner could grant you permission to make, use, or sell the invention. This isn't the same as getting permission to call it your own, and it is completely separate from copyright. |
Is it now lawful to exclude people unable to wear face coverings from a public service or venue? Until earlier this year there was guidance by the cabinet office instructing that mask mandates must not be applied to those who are according to the government's published definitions (effectively self-declared) exempt. I don't know what the legal status of that guidance had been, but its purpose had seemed to be to provide an official interpretation/application of the equality act 2010, which remains now in full force despite the guidance having earlier this year been officially declared "withdrawn." As of August 2022, some business establishments may provide a public service but of their own free volition require its recipients to wear face coverings as a condition of doing business. While the cabinet office guidance was officially withdrawn, court decisions set precedents which certainly agreed with its interpretations of the equality act 2010, which continues to remain fully in force. What is the legal status now of offering a venue or service to the public while excluding those who purport to be unable to wear face coverings? | The Equality Act (2010) lists the following protected classes (emphasis mine): age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. It is unlawful for businesses to discriminate against anyone, in the goods or services (or physical access) that they offer, based on any of those characteristics. Some disabilities may prevent people from wearing masks, and those people cannot be discriminated against. I couldn't find a source in the law that says this explicitly, but according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission there is no legal requirement for people who have disabilities to be able to prove that they are disabled in order to receive accommodations for their disabilities. While you could, theoretically, ask people to prove that they have a disability if you don't believe them, you'd basically just be setting yourself up to have to pay a bunch of money in compensation when you eventually run in to somebody who actually does have such a disability, and doesn't have proof with them, who then takes you to court for discrimination and wins. | You can't just interpret the word "require" in isolation, you have to focus on what is allowed vs. disallowed by law. Guidance point K.1 starts with the rhetorical question Under the ADA, Title VII, and other federal employment nondiscrimination laws, may an employer require all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19? They respond that no federal EEO laws prohibit such a requirement "subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations" (thus providing an answer to the question whether it can always be "required". However, they do not discuss the possibility that other laws (non-EEO, state, local: also contract law) that would prevent an employer from "requiring" a vaccination. They do not elaborate on ways that an employer might "require" a vaccination, leaving it to the inventive reader to figure out what legal leverage a company might have to get compliance. Assaulting non-compliant employees is not legal; withholding wages is not legal. Reassigning a non-compliant worker to working in the sub-basement may be legal, requiring a non-compliant worker to wear an anti-vaxer warning badge might be legal. Firing the employee, or reducing their hours to 0 until they comply, might be legal. But the EEOC is not advising employers in safe ways to sanction non-compliant workers, they are just stating their interpretation of applicable anti-discrimination law. Indeed, they can only address matters of discrimination, because that is what they address in general. They do not write the labor law regulations, that's the job of the Dept. of Labor. They are not giving legal advice as to the scope of allowed requirements set by employers. | Although an academy is state-funded, it is not the government, so limitations on what a government is allowed to do are not applicable, and anyway there is no First Amendment separation of church and state in the UK. I presume your school has a formal faith designation, which means that it is not subject to Section 85 of the Equality Act 2010, which might maybe be a path for escaping the requirement. The "collective worship" requirement is mandated by the government under Section 70 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, which is extended to academy schools by the funding agreements. The requirement is that "each pupil in attendance at a community, foundation or voluntary school shall on each school day take part in an act of collective worship". Section 71 provides an exception: If the parent of a pupil at a community, foundation or voluntary school requests that he may be wholly or partly excused from receiving religious education given in the school in accordance with the school’s basic curriculum, from attendance at religious worship in the school, or both from receiving such education and from such attendance, the pupil shall be so excused until the request is withdrawn. Since a religious academy is not subject to the national curriculum, deviation from whatever the religious requirements are stated in that curriculum is allowed. | Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.) | First of all, even if it is not allowed to test them, you can also refuse to service someone untested - and that is not illegal discrimination, as "untested for COVID 19" is not a protected class. Public Schools however are not companies in the normal way, and the CDC can only advise in the rulemaking of local legislators and executives. And in the current health crisis, the school board and health authorities can order things for the protection of others and this can be enough justification to exclude individuals or several people from groups. After all, being teste or not is clearly not a protected class under the Civil Rights Act, and neither is easily regarded as a form of first amendment speech - unlike a black armband (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community). Being untested is much more akin to being a person on a ship and then attempting to disembark in a quarantine zone - which was decided in Compagnie Francaise & Lousiana Board of Health (there are two of those btw). The majority opinion in the SCOTUS case (1902) writes (emphasis mine): 24 True it is that, in some of the cases relied on in the argument, it was held that a state law absolutely prohibiting the introduction, under all circumstances, of objects actually affected with [a contagious] disease, was valid because such objects were not legitimate commerce. But this implies no limitation on the power to regulate by health laws the subjects of legitimate commerce. 34 [A]ssuming that all the treaties relied on are applicable, we think it clearly results from their context that they were not intended to, and did not, deprive the government of the United States of those powers necessarily inhering in it and essential to the health and safety of its people. Using a similar vein as in Compagnie Francaise, the public health interest might be enough for even a public school to only allow presence in the building with a test and otherwise demand online or remote learning (which isn't always an option) or even just suspend people that are not tested until such a time their presence is deemed safe. A private school is vastly more free in rulemaking, and as even a public school can muster strict scrutiny regarding presence teaching, a private school surely will get away with it. But nothing can force a private school to suspend teaching, switching to online classes or demand to test, unless they like to or their accreditation hinges on it - and here religious schools come in: There are religious groups that to an extent of not allowing medical procedures on their members, including COVID-testing. Those schools could ban people from attending that are tested. Endnote Public Health Interest is a hammer that can be rather heavy. It can't be used to discriminate against HIV, as that doesn't spread from touch and sneeze, but it can be used to ban people from buildings that have Communicable Diseases. While nobody classed COVID 19 as such yet, having such an illness [Plague, Cholera, Botulism, and others] allows the government to isolate you under strict scrutiny or even has been used to quarantine whole areas in the past (see the Compagnie Francaise case). And as you see in the current pandemic, legislative bodies globally do dish out rules for schools and public places in short order, some of which include testing strategies, and ways to overwrite consent via a state order. Some are struck down: some of them on procedural grounds (e.g. wrong body), others on grounds of equality (e.g. religious bias). | I will assume B.C. as your specific jurisdiction: there could be provincial differences. As phoog says, you certainly may mention this problem to management, who have an interest in keeping you happy. No law against that. As for the "legality" of sexual harassment, the CBA BC branch says that "Sexual harassment, which is discrimination based on sex, is illegal under the BC Human Rights Code". It is interesting to see what the code actually says. Section 8 Discrimination in accommodation, service and facility says (1) A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable justification, (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public, or (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or class of persons. The question is whether using the term "babe" constitutes discrimination against a person regarding service because of sex. This article on the Law Society of BC web site specifically identifies "verbal harassment" as an instance: Verbal harassment – This comes from anyone within the firm and or other workplace or a person who does business with the firm or company. Some examples are: referring to an adult as a babe, honey, girl or stud; whistling at someone; turning work discussion to sexual topics; asking personal questions of a sexual nature; making sexual comments about a person’s clothing, anatomy or looks; or asking someone repeatedly for dates and refusing to take no for an answer. (emphasis added). In case you're thinking that maybe there's a difference in what the code says regarding services and what it says regarding employment, section 13 Discrimination in Employment says: (1) A person must not (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or (b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of employment because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that person. In other words, it is defined simply in terms of "discrimination", which means "making a distinction". It is known that unwanted sexual advances constitute illegal discrimination, see Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 SCR 1252. The court found that Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Sexual harassment in the workplace is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job‑related consequences for the victims of the harassment. They did not, however, find that this is the only form of sexual discrimination (obviously, since it isn't). I can't point to case law indicating whether gender-biased expression are actionable, but that would be consistent with the letter of the law and "babe" is indeed an example cited in the Law Society article. | Vaccination status does not currently define a protected class under Florida or Federal law. Being or not being vaccinated is not legally recognized as a condition that "substantially limits a major life activity", hence is not an example of disability-related discrimination. The opposite scenario, where an employer refuses to hire an un-vaccinated person, potentially runs afoul of disability discrimination laws when a person has a legal disability that prevents their vaccination. As noted here, due to the scope of the Privacy Rule HIPAA does not directly apply to your question, when the patient discloses information. However, the healthcare provider cannot disclose such information without patient authorization. It's hard to see a First Amendment basis supporting the action (in case the law changes w.r.t. vaccination and discrimination). You could imagine a religion which holds that vaccination against some disease is blasphemy, and forcing an employer to hire the vaccinated is compelled speech which repudiates a fundament of their belief. Even so, it is not sufficient that the business owner holds some odd belief, the belief has to be essential to the nature of the business (see BSA v. Dale). That could be the case of a religious school. | Is it lawful to offer smaller portions only to children below a certain age..? Yes Part 3 of the Equality Act 2010 covers "Services and Public Functions" and at section 29 states: Provision of services, etc. (1)A person (a “service-provider”) concerned with the provision of a service to the public or a section of the public (for payment or not) must not discriminate against a person requiring the service by not providing the person with the service. This is the only definition of "service-provider" in the Act, but the Equality and Human Rights Commission confirms a restaurant falls with the scope of Part 3: Equality law applies to any business that provides goods, facilities or services to members of the public. This includes a wide range of different businesses and services. These include: [...] restaurants [...] However all that is moot (but posted here for context) as Part 3 of the Act opens with caveats at section 28 which establishes that: (1)This Part does not apply to the protected characteristic of— (a)age, so far as relating to persons who have not attained the age of 18; [...] |
Is citizenship a requirement for jury duty? Would a permanent resident be asked to do jury duty, or must a juror be a citizen? What are the rules of who is eligible for jury duty? Are there people in the US who go their whole lives and never do jury duty or is it usually the case that a person does it at least once in his/her lifetime? | For federal trials, 28 USC 1865(b) states that the judge shall deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the district court unless he (1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district There are similar requirements in other states, for example in Washington, RCW 2.36.070 which includes being a citizen as a mandatory qualification. There are typically also age and residency requirement, requirements for competency in English, mental capacity also felon-exclusion provisions and charges-pending exclusions. The qualifications are jurisdiction-specific. Many people never serve on a jury, indeed many are never called to serve on a jury. There is no reliable count, but polling indicated that around 1/3 of adults have served on a jury. | I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police). | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. | Unless you are an ambassador or one of the US states, SCOTUS doesn't have original jurisdiction over your lawsuit, so they can't hear it either. If you've named all the judges of all the courts that do have jurisdiction, then one of them will handle it anyway, under the doctrine of necessity noted before. For cases that do fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, a jury trial is theoretically possible, but it appears it has not occurred since the 1790s, and only one has surviving records: Georgia v. Brailsford in 1794. See "Special Juries in the Supreme Court" by Lochlan F. Shelfer, Yale Law Journal 123:1, 2013-2014. Otherwise, non-jury original jurisdiction cases are usually delegated to a special master, a sort of "contract judge" who hears all the evidence and recommends a judgment that the full court typically rubber-stamps. | The right to trial by jury in criminal cases by a unanimous jury of twelve under the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution and some related rights are only partially incorporated to apply against states via the 14th Amendment due process clause. (The right to a jury trial in a civil case under the 7th Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to the states.) As noted, the federal right to a jury trial in a criminal case applies only when more than six months of imprisonment are a possible sentence pursuant to Baldwin v. New York. (Proceeding to trial without a jury on a more serious charge is allowed so long as the actual sentence does not exceed six months.) In practice, many states establish a right to a jury trial in many criminal cases where the U.S. Constitution does not require them. Juries are not required in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The 6th Amendment right to a criminal jury trial does not apply to military justice either, although there are constitutional limitations that do apply to military justice. There are no jury trials in the territorial courts of American Samoa which is beyond the scope of 6th Amendment protection. A unanimous jury of six or more jurors is allowed (at least in non-death penalty cases). A state jury does not have to be unanimous (at least in non-death penalty cases). Ten of twelve is constitutionally sufficient for a twelve person jury; nine of twelve is not sufficient constitutionally. In practice, only one or two states permit non-unanimous jury verdicts. [Since this post was originally written, the precent implicitly referenced here was overturned and all criminal case juries must be unanimous. New York State, however, never allowed non-unanimous jury trials anyway.] There is not a federal constitutional right to waive a jury trial, although this exists in some states by state constitution or other forms of state law. The right to have felony charges screened by a grand jury also does not apply to the states. About half of U.S. states require grand juries to screen felony charges, mostly in the eastern U.S. I have the precedents in a criminal procedure text book and will update is I get a chance. See also the footnotes here. To some extent, the constitutional provision in NY State is designed to make clear that bench trials are allowed when a jury has been waived. It also authorizes bench trials where the U.S. Constitution and state law permits them. | None of the above. A grand jury issues an indictment. It usually (universally?) does so at the recommendation of a federal prosecutor, who may decide based on a recommendation from the FBI. This is required by the 5th Amendment, which says "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces...". See this DoJ account of charging, and this broader FAQ on federal indictments. | One does not introduce statutes in a trial, criminal of civil. Rather, one introduces facts. The judge will present "the law", and will present it in a digested form in the form of interpreted instructions to the jury about what the law says. Jurors are not required to interpret the meaning of statutes, because jurors are also not expected to know the relevant case law surrounding a statute. A party might make a motion to the judge where the argument depends in part on the wording of a statute. Then there is a standard but jurisdiction-dependent way of referring to s statute, e.g. ORS 164.015, RCW 9A.56.010. For Minnesota there are three interchangeable forms: "Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 123.45, subdivision 6" which is the same as "MINN. STAT. 123.45 (2008)" or "MINN. STAT. ANN. 123.45 (2008)", which is for statutes. You have to look it up on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis – here is the answer that Minnesota gives (all legal citations). |
Is a sign that only says "POSTED", nothing else, sufficient to be understood as "No Trespassing"? In 2014 I hiked in the Adirondack Mountains, New York, United States of America. The trail passed a sign that had a single word on it: "POSTED". There was no other text on the sign either on the front or on the back. Not understanding what it meant, I ignored it. I camped around 10 metre behind it. When I returned the following day, a fellow hiker commented on it and told me I had camped in an area I wasn't supposed to enter in the first place. According to this SE answer, in New York state specifically: It is a defense to this type of trespass that there are not signs posted instructing people to stay off the property. It may also be a defense that any signs posted in the area are not in the proper place to be easily seen by visitors to the property. Would a sign that only says "POSTED" with no other text be a sign "instructing people to stay off the property"? I wasn't shot and left no trace, so the landowner probably never found out I trespassed, but I'm still wondering about the validity of the sign that is cryptic to foreigners like me, who may not be familiar with the specific context in which the term "POSTED" is used on signs in the USA. | This varies depending on the specific law of the state or locality involved. In New York, the word "POSTED", along with the name and address of the owner is sufficient to notify people not to intrude, and anyone ignoring such a sign is technically trespassing (although, in practice, if such a person leaves the property when asked, did no damage, and appeared honestly ignorant, it is likely that no legal action would be taken). In California, as specified by penal code section 553 (quoted in the linked answer) a sign for this purpose must include: the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” in letters at least two inches tall, and follow other specifications in the law. The word "Posted" is neither required nor sufficient, although the law calls land with such signs "posted property". | Yellowstone is part of the National Park Service. Parts of it are located in Idaho, Montana and Wyoming. The rules concerning firearms on National Park Service properties are set forth at the National Park Service website. Some key excerpts from this are as follows: In areas administered by the National Park Service, an individual can possess a firearm if that individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm and if the possession of the firearm complies with the laws of the state where the park area is located. 54 U.S.C. 104906. . . . Unless expressly authorized, Federal law prohibits the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon in NPS facilities. These buildings include, but are not limited to, government offices, visitor centers, ranger stations, fee collection buildings, and maintenance facilities. 18 U.S.C. 930. . . . Unless authorized, the use or discharge of a firearm within a park area is prohibited. 36 CFR 2.4(b) and 13.30(c). In parks where hunting is specifically mandated or authorized by federal statute, firearms may be used to hunt in accordance with NPS regulations and state laws. 36 CFR 2.2. The referenced statutes state (emphasis added): 18 U.S. Code § 930 - Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal facilities (a)Except as provided in subsection (d), whoever knowingly possesses or causes to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal facility (other than a Federal court facility), or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. (b)Whoever, with intent that a firearm or other dangerous weapon be used in the commission of a crime, knowingly possesses or causes to be present such firearm or dangerous weapon in a Federal facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. (c)A person who kills any person in the course of a violation of subsection (a) or (b), or in the course of an attack on a Federal facility involving the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be punished as provided in sections 1111, 1112, 1113, and 1117. (d)Subsection (a) shall not apply to— (1)the lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent, or employee of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, who is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of law; (2)the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a Federal official or a member of the Armed Forces if such possession is authorized by law; or (3)the lawful carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a Federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes. (e)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), whoever knowingly possesses or causes to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal court facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. (2)Paragraph (1) shall not apply to conduct which is described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d). (f)Nothing in this section limits the power of a court of the United States to punish for contempt or to promulgate rules or orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting the possession of weapons within any building housing such court or any of its proceedings, or upon any grounds appurtenant to such building. (g)As used in this section: (1)The term “Federal facility” means a building or part thereof owned or leased by the Federal Government, where Federal employees are regularly present for the purpose of performing their official duties. (2)The term “dangerous weapon” means a weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate, that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death or serious bodily injury, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a blade of less than 2½ inches in length. (3)The term “Federal court facility” means the courtroom, judges’ chambers, witness rooms, jury deliberation rooms, attorney conference rooms, prisoner holding cells, offices of the court clerks, the United States attorney, and the United States marshal, probation and parole offices, and adjoining corridors of any court of the United States. (h)Notice of the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) shall be posted conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal facility, and notice of subsection (e) shall be posted conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal court facility, and no person shall be convicted of an offense under subsection (a) or (e) with respect to a Federal facility if such notice is not so posted at such facility, unless such person had actual notice of subsection (a) or (e), as the case may be. . . . 54 U.S. Code § 104906. Protection of right of individuals to bear arms (a)Findings.—Congress finds the following: (1)The 2d amendment to the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”. (2)Section 2.4(a)(1) of title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, provides that “except as otherwise provided in this section and parts 7 (special regulations) and 13 (Alaska regulations), the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon, trap or net”. (3)The regulations described in paragraph (2) prevent individuals complying with Federal and State laws from exercising the 2d amendment rights of the individuals while at System units. (4)The existence of different laws relating to the transportation and possession of firearms at different System units entrapped law-abiding gun owners while at System units. (5)Although the Bush administration issued new regulations relating to the 2d amendment rights of law-abiding citizens in System units that went into effect on January 9, 2009— (A)on March 19, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction with respect to the implementation and enforcement of the new regulations; and (B)the new regulations— (i)are under review by the Obama administration; and (ii)may be altered. (6)Congress needs to weigh in on the new regulations to ensure that unelected bureaucrats and judges cannot again override the 2d amendment rights of law-abiding citizens on 83,600,000 acres of System land. (7)Federal laws should make it clear that the 2d amendment rights of an individual at a System unit should not be infringed. (b)Protection of Right of Individuals To Bear Arms in System Units.—The Secretary shall not promulgate or enforce any regulation that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm, including an assembled or functional firearm, in any System unit if— (1)the individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm; and (2)the possession of the firearm is in compliance with the law of the State in which the System unit is located. The references regulations in Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations state (emphasis added): § 2.2 Wildlife protection. (a) **The following are prohibited: (1) The taking of wildlife, except by authorized hunting and trapping activities conducted in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section. (2) The feeding, touching, teasing, frightening or intentional disturbing of wildlife nesting, breeding or other activities.** (3) Possessing unlawfully taken wildlife or portions thereof. (b) Hunting and trapping. (1) Hunting shall be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically mandated by Federal statutory law. (2) Hunting may be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically authorized as a discretionary activity under Federal statutory law if the superintendent determines that such activity is consistent with public safety and enjoyment, and sound resource management principles. Such hunting shall be allowed pursuant to special regulations. (3) Trapping shall be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically mandated by Federal statutory law. (4) Where hunting or trapping or both are authorized, such activities shall be conducted in accordance with Federal law and the laws of the State within whose exterior boundaries a park area or a portion thereof is located. Nonconflicting State laws are adopted as a part of these regulations. (c) Except in emergencies or in areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the superintendent shall consult with appropriate State agencies before invoking the authority of § 1.5 for the purpose of restricting hunting and trapping or closing park areas to the taking of wildlife where such activities are mandated or authorized by Federal statutory law. (d) The superintendent may establish conditions and procedures for transporting lawfully taken wildlife through the park area. Violation of these conditions and procedures is prohibited. (e) The Superintendent may designate all or portions of a park area as closed to the viewing of wildlife with an artificial light. Use of an artificial light for purposes of viewing wildlife in closed areas is prohibited. (f) Authorized persons may check hunting and trapping licenses and permits; inspect weapons, traps and hunting and trapping gear for compliance with equipment restrictions; and inspect wildlife that has been taken for compliance with species, size and other taking restrictions. (g) The regulations contained in this section apply, regardless of land ownership, on all lands and waters within a park area that are under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States. . . . § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a) None of the provisions in this section or any regulation in this chapter may be enforced to prohibit an individual from possessing a firearm, including an assembled or functional firearm, in any National Park System unit if: (1) The individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm; and (2) The possession of the firearm is in compliance with the law of the State in which the National Park System unit is located. (b) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and parts 7 (special regulations) and 13 (Alaska regulations), the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon, trap or net (2) Weapons, traps or nets may be carried, possessed or used: (i) At designated times and locations in park areas where: (A) The taking of wildlife is authorized by law in accordance with § 2.2 of this chapter; (B) The taking of fish is authorized by law in accordance with § 2.3 of this part. (ii) When used for target practice at designated times and at facilities or locations designed and constructed specifically for this purpose and designated pursuant to special regulations. (iii) Within a residential dwelling. For purposes of this subparagraph only, the term “residential dwelling” means a fixed housing structure which is either the principal residence of its occupants, or is occupied on a regular and recurring basis by its occupants as an alternate residence or vacation home. (3)(i) Traps, nets and unloaded weapons may be possessed within a temporary lodging or mechanical mode of conveyance when such implements are rendered temporarily inoperable or are packed, cased or stored in a manner that will prevent their ready use. (ii) An individual may carry or possess an unloaded bow or crossbow when accessing otherwise inaccessible lands or waters contiguous to a park area when other means of access are otherwise impracticable or impossible if: (A) The individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the bow or crossbow; and (B) The possession of the bow or crossbow is in compliance with the law of the State in which the park area is located. (c) Carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel or other mode of transportation is prohibited, except that carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a vessel is allowed when such vessel is not being propelled by machinery and is used as a shooting platform in accordance with Federal and State law. (d) The use of a weapon, trap or net in a manner that endangers persons or property is prohibited. (e) The superintendent may issue a permit to carry or possess a weapon that is not otherwise authorized, a trap, or a net under the following circumstances: (1) When necessary to support research activities conducted in accordance with § 2.5. (2) To carry firearms for persons in charge of pack trains or saddle horses for emergency use. (3) For employees, agents or cooperating officials in the performance of their official duties. (4) To provide access to otherwise inaccessible lands or waters contiguous to a park area when other means of access are otherwise impracticable or impossible. Violation of the terms and conditions of a permit issued pursuant to this paragraph is prohibited and may result in the suspension or revocation of the permit. (f) Authorized Federal, State and local law enforcement officers may carry firearms in the performance of their official duties. (g) The carrying or possessing of a weapon, trap or net in violation of applicable Federal and State laws is prohibited. (h) The regulations contained in this section apply, regardless of land ownership, on all lands and waters within a park area that are under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States. . . . § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a) Irritant chemical devices, including bear spray, may be carried, possessed, and used in accordance with applicable Federal and non-conflicting State laws, except when prohibited or restricted under § 13.50. (b) Paragraphs (d) through (g) of this section apply to all park areas in Alaska except Klondike Gold Rush National Historical Park, Sitka National Historical Park and the former Mt. McKinley National Park, Glacier Bay National Monument and Katmai National Monument. (c) Except as provided in this section and § 2.4 of this chapter, the following are prohibited - (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying a weapon, trap, or net; (3) Using a weapon, trap, or net. (d) Firearms may be carried, possessed, and used within park areas in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws, except where such carrying, possession, or use is prohibited or otherwise restricted under § 13.50. (e) Traps, bows and other implements (other than firearms) authorized by applicable State and Federal law for the taking of fish and wildlife may be carried, possessed, and used within park areas only during those times when the taking of fish and wildlife is authorized by applicable law or regulation. (f) In addition to the authorities provided in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, weapons (other than firearms), traps, and nets may be possessed within park areas provided such weapons, traps, or nets are within or upon a device or animal used for transportation and are unloaded and cased or otherwise packed in such a manner as to prevent their ready use while in a park area. (g) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, local rural residents who are authorized to engage in subsistence uses, including the taking of wildlife under § 13.480, may use, possess, or carry traps, nets and other weapons in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws. . . . § 13.50 Closure and restriction procedures. (a) Applicability and authority. The Superintendent will follow the provisions of this section to close an area or restrict an activity, or terminate or relax a closure or restriction, in NPS areas in Alaska. (b) Factors. In determining whether to close an area or restrict an activity, or whether to terminate or relax a closure or restriction, the Superintendent must ensure that the activity or area is managed in a manner compatible with the purposes for which the park area was established. The Superintendent's decision under this paragraph must therefore be guided by factors such as public health and safety, resource protection, protection of cultural or scientific values, subsistence uses, conservation of endangered or threatened species, and other management considerations. (c) Rulemaking requirements. This paragraph applies only to a closure or restriction, or the termination or relaxation of such, which is of a nature, magnitude and duration that will result in a significant alteration in the public use pattern of the area; adversely affect the area's natural, aesthetic, scenic, or cultural values; or require a long-term modification in the resource management objectives of the area. Except in emergency situations, the closure or restriction, or the termination or relaxation of such, must be published as a rulemaking in the Federal Register. (d) Written determination. Except in emergency situations, prior to implementing or terminating a closure or restriction, the superintendent shall prepare a written determination justifying the action. That determination shall set forth the reasons the closure or restriction authorized by paragraph (a) of this section has been established. This determination will be posted on the NPS Web site at www.nps.gov. (e) Restrictions on taking fish or wildlife. (1) Except in emergencies, the NPS will consult with the State agency having responsibility over fishing, hunting, or trapping and provide an opportunity for public comment, including one or more public meetings near the affected NPS unit, prior to implementing a closure or restriction on taking fish or wildlife. (2) Emergency closures or restrictions may not exceed a period of 60 days and may not be extended without following the nonemergency procedures of this section. (f) Notice. A list of closures and restrictions will be compiled in writing and updated annually. The list will be posted on the NPS Web site at www.nps.gov and made available at park headquarters. Additional means of notice reasonably likely to inform residents in the affected vicinity will also be provided where available, such as: (1) Publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the State or in local newspapers; (2) Use of electronic media, such as the internet and email lists; (3) Radio broadcast; or (4) Posting of signs in the local vicinity. (g) Violating a closure or restriction is prohibited. While the website notes that "Visitors should not consider firearms as protection from wildlife," this is advice, rather than a prohibition on using firearms in that fashion. It is a warning that firearms are a poor choice rather than a prohibition on using them for self-defense purposes. Also, if a use of firearms as self-defense against wildlife is determined to be unjustified, the park visitor might be charged with hunting without a permit. The state gun control laws in the pertinent states are summarized as follows (by the High County News newspaper) (apologies for the small print): | In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it. | What is the lawful implication of text enclosed within a (stroked) text box in a document? I have heard this means this text is left out of the contract, or possibly adds an exception to it. You are mistaken. The boxed language means that the notary public who authenticates the document has liability only if an imposter signs the contract, not for anything else in the contract. The liability of the person signing the contract is not affected by the boxed language. For example, suppose that someone purporting to be Fred signs an affidavit of Fred in a real estate transaction that falsely states that the real estate is free of toxic waste when the person signing it knows that it is actually a toxic waste burial site. If the affidavit that Martin, a notary public, notarizes is actually signed by Jane, then Martin and Jane both have liability to anyone harmed by the fact that the buyer in the real estate transaction believed that the affidavit was signed by Fred when it was not. But, if the affidavit is actually signed by Fred, then Fred may have liability to someone harmed by the fact that the affidavit was false, but Martin will not have liability for notarizing Fred's signature. This is the default rule of U.S. law in any case, so the boxed language doesn't actually have any legal effect. The boxed language is probably present to alert people, such as people from Latin America or Europe, who are familiar with a legal regime in which a notary public has a more expansive set of responsibilities than a notary public does in the U.S. | The crime of trespass carries with it the "warning" requirement (alternatively, no warning is needed if you enter "with intent to vex or annoy the owner or occupant thereof, or to commit any unlawful act"). There is no expiration for the oral warning, though the warning method only applies to a "guest", defined as "any person entertained or to whom hospitality is extended, including, but not limited to, any person who stays overnight", (and excluding tenants). It is reported that Clark County prosecutors tend not to prosecute casino trespass cases where the warning is more than a year old, but in principle a permanent ban is possible (hence, call your attorney to negotiate a return, if that is the applicable context). A civil lawsuit over trespass is also possible, and in that case there is no prosecutor exercising discretion to prosecute or not. Instead, the plaintiff can pursue the case anytime, as long as it is within the statute of limits: an oral or written warning does not "expire". | I believe the answer you seek can be found by searching for the terms "(desired state name) statutes pedestrian crossing." In the case of the state of Florida, there are references to the situation you describe. Some of it appears slightly contradictory, but the ones that apply are not ambiguous: (10) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. (12) No pedestrian shall, except in a marked crosswalk, cross a roadway at any other place than by a route at right angles to the curb or by the shortest route to the opposite curb. The contradictory portion appears thus: (11) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. There appears to be no reference regarding distances between adjacent intersections. It's unreasonable for one to be expected to walk a half mile (0.8 km) if there's a mile between intersections. There's an area nearby in which the traffic control signals are spaced about that distance apart. Cities may have specific regulations regarding such activities. | Even if the authorities aren't injured, the homeowner may well face criminal charges. Many states make it illegal to set booby traps; for instance, California makes it a felony in section 20110 of the Penal Code. The definition of "boobytrap" in the code is "any concealed or camouflaged device designed to cause great bodily injury when triggered by an action of any unsuspecting person coming across the device;" on the face of it, it is definitely not clear that a generic "there are traps" sign makes it not a boobytrap (whereas a sign on the trap announcing its presence probably would). If a trespasser falls victim to a trap, that can be grounds for a successful lawsuit against the homeowner; see Katko v. Briney (an Iowa civil case). The duty of care to trespassers is low; there's no general duty to mitigate hazards. However, one part of the duty is generally that one may not lay a trap for trespassers (example: report from Connecticut Office of Legal Research). | 4511.71, "driving on a closed road", doesn't apply here: it requires that the closure be done using a sign, rather than a generic "traffic control device". It also appears to be intended to apply specifically to construction closures, not closures in general. However, what you describe is, at a minimum, a violation of: 4511.25, lanes of travel: (A) Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: [exceptions that don't apply] where "roadway" is defined in 4511.01 as (EE) "Roadway" means that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, except the berm or shoulder. and 4511.28, passing on the right: (A) The driver of a vehicle or trackless trolley may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle or trackless trolley only under the following conditions: (1) When the vehicle or trackless trolley overtaken is making or about to make a left turn; (2) Upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for two or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being traveled by the overtaking vehicle. In short, the road is "closed" in the sense that there is no legal way for you to drive past the police car. And it doesn't really matter which offense you're charged with: all three are classified as "minor misdemeanors", carrying the exact same penalties. |
What are the possible repercussions of failing to pay, or alternatively register for utility bills? A common trope among self styled sovereign citizens is that there's effectively no real need to pay for utilities. Because they "can't" shut them off. I can easily imagine some human rights type legislation that states that it's illegal to discontinue one's electricity water and heating due to failure to pay or destitution. But I also can easily imagine that the cost would become a civil debt that may be pursued like others, through the county court and ultimately through bailiffs' visits. Unless, still completely speculating in the spirit of providing inspiration for prospective answers, when various utility service providers when privatised through deregulation and outsourcing and pawning off the functions of the government under Thatcher there were provisions to placate anti austerity forces by ensuring that the new privatised/outsourced entities were heavily regulated and didn't operate "too" much like a for profit business. | england-and-wales The household that doesn't pay its water bill cannot by law be cut off or restricted from the water supply. However, there have been reports that some companies have disconnected households anyway, claiming the premises were not occupied. In some circumstances the gas or electricity supplier may disconnect the domestic consumer that is not paying its bills. However, "Suppliers must take all reasonable steps to avoid disconnecting an energy supply for debt. It should always be a last resort and avoided wherever possible" (Ofgem, the regulator). The question asks for "possible" repercussions, not probable or usual. So here are some "possible" repercussions. The utility company may pursue the debt; first by mail, then via a debt collection agency and may ultimately seek court orders to resolve the matter one way or another. Generally, utility companies and the regulator Ofgem don't want things to get to court and will try to agree a repayment plan with the debtor and/or (in the case of electricity or gas) offer to install a prepayment meter. There are payment support options for households in financial difficulties but the question seems to be about outright refusals to pay. All creditors pursuing a debt are expected to follow the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims. This should be followed before a court order for a County Court Judgment for the debt can be made. Failure to follow the protocol does not invalidate the debt but can affect the court's decision. If the creditor wins a county court judgment (CCJ) against the debtor, the debtor will be obliged to pay the debt at a rate the court decides is appropriate. A CCJ is recorded on the Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines. The Register is checked by companies to determine the credit-worthiness of applicants for credit cards, loans, mortgages, some bank accounts and rental agreements. If the debtor pays the full amount within one month of the CCJ, the record can be removed from the Register. If the debtor pays later, they can get the record marked as 'satisfied' - it will stay on the register for six years but searchers will see that the debtor paid the debt. If the debtor sticks to the payment plan the record can reflect this. Otherwise the record of the debt remains on the Register for six years. If the debtor still refuses to pay, the debtor may expect visits from bailiffs who will ask for payment and, failing that, the bailiffs might try to remove property to sell at auction to raise money to cover the debt and the bailiffs' costs. The creditor may seek an order for an attachment of earnings or an attachment of benefits / benefit deductions. In this case, the employer or benefits agency is ordered to divert money from the wages or benefits to the court that made the order, and the court sends the money to the creditor - the debtor doesn't receive that money. (The benefits attachment is likely more appropriate for non-payment of council tax.) The creditor may seek a third-party debt order, which orders the debtor's bank to freeze money in the debtor's account to the amount of the debt. The creditor may seek a charging order, which secures the debt against the debtor's property (e.g. their home if they own it). This can be followed up with an order for sale, which obliges the debtor to sell that property and the debt will be paid from the proceeds. The creditor could seek a court order that allows them to change the utility meter on the property to a prepayment meter. In this case the debtor has not been disconnected as such but they must pay (or get help to pay) in advance for their electricity or gas consumption. As noted earlier, the last resort is disconnection of the gas or electricity supply. In terms of criminal law, I don't know if any such debtors have been charged with illegal abstraction of electricity or gas but those seem like "possible" charges. | In the U.K., bankruptcy law applies to individuals and partnerships, while the U.K. insolvency law applies to companies. In an insolvency proceeding, there is administration (the rough equivalent of a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the U.S.)or a liquidation (the rough equivalent fo a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S.). In administration, the administrator of the company renegotiates debt payments so that carrying costs of office buildings can be brought to less than rental income, if possible, and if not, or if it is a liquidation in the first place, sells the building at auction to the highest bidder and stiffs unpaid creditors if this is not enough to pay them all according to priority and pro rata within each priority ranking. Simple. Negative value property is trickier. Sometimes someone can be paid to take it over (this happens often with depleted oil and gas wells that have to be plugged), if there are sufficient funds to do so. The administrator may instead disclaim the property. A disclaimer under this section— (a)operates so as to determine, as from the date of the disclaimer, the rights, interests and liabilities of the bankrupt and his estate in or in respect of the property disclaimed, and (b)discharges the trustee from all personal liability in respect of that property as from the commencement of his trusteeship, but does not, except so far as is necessary for the purpose of releasing the bankrupt, the bankrupt’s estate and the trustee from any liability, affect the rights or liabilities of any other person.. . . (5)Any person sustaining loss or damage in consequence of the operation of a disclaimer under this section is deemed to be a creditor of the bankrupt to the extent of the loss or damage and accordingly may prove for the loss or damage as a bankruptcy debt. Basically, a court decides what to do with it. If no one claims it and it has been disclaimed by the administrator, it escheats to the Crown (i.e. the U.K. state) as it would if a decedent's estate with no creditors or heirs. This disclaimer process is similar to the process in Australia described in the answer by @DaleM and has the same name in U.K. law as it does in Australia. Escheat can still occur in England and Wales, if a person is made bankrupt or a corporation is liquidated. Usually this means that all the property held by that person is 'vested in' (transferred to) the Official Receiver or Trustee in Bankruptcy. However, it is open to the Receiver or Trustee to refuse to accept that property by disclaiming it. It is relatively common for a trustee in bankruptcy to disclaim freehold property which may give rise to a liability, for example the common parts of a block of flats owned by the bankrupt would ordinarily pass to the trustee to be realised in order to pay his debts, but the property may give the landlord an obligation to spend money for the benefit of lessees of the flats. The bankruptcy of the original owner means that the freehold is no longer the bankrupt's legal property, and the disclaimer destroys the freehold estate, so that the land ceases to be owned by anyone and effectively escheats to become land held by the Crown in demesne. This situation affects a few hundred properties each year. Although such escheated property is owned by the Crown, it is not part of the Crown Estate, unless the Crown (through the Crown Estate Commissioners) 'completes' the escheat, by taking steps to exert rights as owner. However, usually, in the example given above, the tenants of the flats, or their mortgagees would exercise their rights given by the Insolvency Act 1986 to have the freehold property transferred to them. This is the main difference between escheat and bona vacantia, as in the latter, a grant takes place automatically, with no need to 'complete' the transaction. Thus, the toxic property would escheat to the Crown, but not the Crown Estate (defined below, which would not claim it since it has no value) and no one else would claim it. So, it would be technically owned by the government but not administered by anyone, unless the government affirmatively decided to do so. The Crown Estate is a collection of lands and holdings in the United Kingdom belonging to the British monarch as a corporation sole, making it the "Sovereign's public estate", which is neither government property nor part of the monarch's private estate. As a result of this arrangement, the sovereign is not involved with the management or administration of the estate, and exercises only very limited control of its affairs. Instead, the estate's extensive portfolio is overseen by a semi-independent, incorporated public body headed by the Crown Estate Commissioners, who exercise "the powers of ownership" of the estate, although they are not "owners in their own right". The revenues from these hereditary possessions have been placed by the monarch at the disposition of Her Majesty's Government in exchange for relief from the responsibility to fund the Civil Government. These revenues thus proceed directly to Her Majesty's Treasury, for the benefit of the British nation. The Crown Estate is formally accountable to the Parliament of the United Kingdom, where it is legally mandated to make an annual report to the sovereign, a copy of which is forwarded to the House of Commons. The Crown Estate is one of the largest property managers in the United Kingdom, overseeing property worth £12 billion, with urban properties valued at £9.1 billion representing the majority of the estate by value. These include a large number of properties in central London, but the estate also controls 792,000 ha (1,960,000 acres) of agricultural land and forest and more than half of the UK's foreshore, and retains various other traditional holdings and rights, including Ascot Racecourse and Windsor Great Park. Naturally occurring gold and silver in the UK, collectively known as "Mines Royal", are managed by the Crown Estate and leased to mining operators. Also, while not strictly on point, the Environment Agency in the U.K. may criminally prosecute people who were involved in breaking the environmental laws in question, if they are still living. (In Colorado, where I live, most toxic mines date to the 19th century, were abandoned, everyone who was personally involved with them is dead, and the state and federal EPA try to clean them up as funds become available, sometimes making the problem worse due to unexpected mishaps that occur in the cleanup process.) | The most minimal elements of theft are: An unauthorised taking or use of another's property; and An intent to permanently deprive that person of that property or its use You've authorised the fee as per the terms of service that you agreed to. If you didn't read the terms of service, you are deemed to have read it. As the first element is not satisifed, no, it's not theft. As to what that fee is for, it's not really a question of law, but because they're a business and they are entitled to recover the costs of providing products or services and make a profit when you use their products or services, I fairly confidently would say that they're charging you to recover the costs of providing you their products and services as well as to make a profit from your use of their products and services. But again, not a question of law. | Possibly In most contracts, the parties sign in their capacity as people (or agents for other people). However, some contracts are signed in the capacity as the owner of a piece of land and the contract transfers with the land. The liability rests with the current owner and, if unpaid, creates a lien over the property. These are particularly common in contracts with utilities or where the contract involves the a structure on the land. Surprise, surprise, the situation you describe involves both. You need to refer back to your contract for the land as these types of contracts are usually disclosed (unless they are a function of local law because everyone just knows - I don't know anything about Pa. law on this) and the original contract with the gas company. Your settlement may have also involved you paying a figure to purchase the gas in the tank as at the date of settlement. For example, in new-south-wales, council rates and water rates attach to the land as a matter of law and the vendor pays the purchaser for any amount they have paid in advance (or vice-versa if they are in arrears). Electricity and piped gas don't; the vendor ends their account on or before settlement and the buyer opens a new account on or after settlement and each pays for their own use. Propane for portable bottles doesn't but for fixed installations does as a matter of contract with the gas company. | You owe money if there is a contract obliging you to pay. Whether you receive what you pay for (e.g. services) only affects your stance when suing for non-performance/damages; your obligation to pay still stands until the court decides it does not (or there is a mutual agreement to discharge the contract). It is irrelevant whether the original payment method still works or not. If it does not but you still owe money — you have to pay. The ability to turn the credit card off is just a handy feature. It does not affect your contractual obligations in any way except for when the terms explicitly provide for it (like automatic cancelling subscription when payment method fails). | Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-). | In general, you still need to pay for the drink. If you had purchased the drink (on credit, ie a tab or similar as you appear to have done), and you had offered the vendor CASH, and he had refused, [if you can prove you offered him cash] he would be unable to pursue you for the debt (technically you would still owe it to him, but as he had declined government issued tender the government won't act on his claim, so he has no remedy available to him to extract payment - although he can refuse to serve you in future etc). Paying through a debit card is not the same as paying cash - although the money goes out of your account and into his, its not "legal tender" in the same way cash is. | Until the estate is settled and the interest in the house is definitively resolved, the estate has to pay property taxes. There is no requirement for the house to be insured, unless there is a mortgage and insurance is mandated by the lender. The duties of the personal representative generally include taking reasonable steps to protect the assets of the estate, which would include reasonable insurance coverage -- which the estate would pay for. Necessary maintenance would also be included in the things that are to covered by the estate, for example the cost of repairing a broken water pipe (which can cause serious loss, if not repaired). Freshening up the paint in preparation for selling the house, assuming that the house is to be sold and the assets divided, would also be covered by the estate. Utilities, on the other hand, are not within the realm of things that need to be done to protect the interests of the beneficiaries: that is a benefit to whoever lives there, making it their responsibility. The question is foot-dragging is a separate issue, one that should be resolved with the aid of your lawyer. I do not understand why he would maintain that the estate is responsible for paying the utilities. |
Is it legal for me to provide a download of an unchanged fork of an application that is on GitHub? I plan to write some tech blogs, where one of them showcases an application from GitHub without a license. Now I just forked it as a backup because I don't want my viewers can't find it someday if the original uploader deleted it. Now instead of showing the original GitHub URL of the application, I put my fork URL, where I don't change any bit of it. Of cause I will cite the original URL as a backup link in my blog. The question: Is it legal that I use my forked URL inside my blog (and only use the original GitHub URL as backup)? Since I don't have any right to the repo besides the right from GitHub of forking it. PS: Now, I don't modify the repo itself at all. If any visitor from my blog click on GitHub to download. Any notice I need to share on my blog to protect myself? | There seems to be no controversy about whether you are allowed to make a copy of a publicly accessible GitHub repository by forking it. As they agreed by accepting the GitHub terms of service and making their repository public, the repository owner grants that and a few other rights to all GitHub users. The actual question seems to be whether you may then publish the URL of your fork. Of course you may, to the same extent that you may publish anything else. The URL is data, not a creative work, so copyright does not apply to it. The considerations are the same as for publishing URL of the original repo. There are things you might say about the URL or the repository it identifies that could get you into trouble, such as claiming rights you do not have, or misrepresenting the rights that others have or that you can grant to them. Or publishing false and derogatory remarks about the code might conceivably land you in hot water. But the URL itself is not an issue. | It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation. | You can't grant or license that which is not yours. For example, the Slack terms of service say: We grant to Customer a non-sublicensable, non-transferable, non-exclusive, limited license for Customer and its Authorized Users to use the object code version of these components, but solely as necessary to use the Services and in accordance with the Contract and the User Terms. So Slack's agreement with Org A does not give A any right to let any other organization B use the software. It does not matter how A and B are related, nor whether B is nonprofit or for-profit, nor what A would be getting in exchange. If B wants to use it, they need to make their own agreement with Slack. | You'll want to read the actual licenses yourself and understand what is required. If you don't understand, then you'll want to consult an attorney. But neither of these licenses are all that complex in my opinion. MIT: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Apache 2.0: Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You meet the following conditions: (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices stating that You changed the files; and (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution notices from the Source form of the Work, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works; and (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or, within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed as modifying the License. Nowhere does either license require you to publish your application's source code, even if your application is directly based on the original code. | The code and the “look” of the user interface is protected by copyright - you can’t duplicate either. You can create your own app with the same functionality. | You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction. | At least in theory an end user could be sued for infringing on a patent, especially a method claim. Given the cost of a patent lawsuit, this strikes me as extremely unlikely to happen though, unless the user in question were an extremely large company, or something on that order. Theoretically, the only difference between open-source software and proprietary software would be that availability of the source code makes it easier to prove use of a patent in open-source software. Releasing the software as open-source doesn't confer any immunity from patent law or anything like that though. Realistically, however, the chances of being sued for infringement if you're basically giving away the software in question are fairly remote. It rarely makes sense for a patent holder to spend millions of dollars on a lawsuit where they stand no chance of even recovering their cost (but no, that certainly should not be taken as legal advice that you're free to infringe on patents, or anything similar--in fact, none of this should be taken as legal advice at all). If you can actually prove that a technique was published or publicly known and used (e.g., in a product that was offered for sale) well before the patent was applied for, the patent is probably invalid (and if proven so in court, the case would normally be dismissed with prejudice, which basically means the patent holder wouldn't be able to sue anybody else for infringement of that patent). I'd note, however, that in my experience this is much less common than most people imagine--many look at (for example) the title of a patent, and assume it lacks originality because it refers to some well-known technique, and ignore the claims where it details the precise differences between the previously known technique and what the patent really covers. Just for example, the EFF used to have a web page talking about a (now long-since expired) patent on how to draw a cursor on screen. In an apparent attempt at scaring the unwary, they showed code they claimed infringed in the patent--despite the fact that the patent's "background of the invention" specifically cited the technique they showed as being previously known, and not covered by the patent. | As @amon stated in a comment, copyright requires creativity. If the author of a tool wants to claim copyright on the output of that tool, then that output must contain something that required the creativity of the tool author. For a tool that just re-indents its input, the output is created from the input with a mechanical, non-creative, transformation and the output does not contain any creative content that wasn't already present in the input. For that reason, authors of such tools can't claim any copyright on the output. For a tool like bison, which was mentioned in the comments, the output contains a measurable amount of creative content that was not present in the input, but which was provided by the authors of bison. For that reason, the authors of 'bison' do have a copyright claim on the output of the tool (for which they give a broad permission to use). So, the basic question becomes, how much of the (creative) content of the output can be traced back to the tool itself and not to the input that the tool processed. For linters/formatters, that is likely to be very little. For code generators, it can be anywhere between very little and all of the output. The license restrictions on the code produced by the tool itself are by default the same as the license restrictions on the source of the tool, but the tool author can choose to apply any other license to the tool code that ends up in the output. If the output of the tool is, at least in part, dependent on an input file, then the authors of the input file also have a copyright claim on the tool output (as their creative work influenced the output), so the tool author can not claim exclusive ownership. The usual situation is that for tools that don't add creative content to the output, the author explicitly states that the don't have any copyright claims on the output. For tools that do add creative content, that content might be released under very permissive conditions (like, "you can use the output as a whole for any purpose, but you can only separate out the code that comes from the tool's codebase if you adhere to the <X> license") |
Is it legal to bypass Keurig coffee maker DRM? Keurig coffee makers have DRM so only approved pods will work. Is it legal to circumvent this DRM and use "unauthorized" pods? | TL;DR: Yes, it's legal. There is no patent nor copyright infringement when consumers use third party coffee pods or modify their appliance to accept those pods. There may be antitrust infringement when companies take steps to block consumers from using third party consumables like coffee pods. It's not just legal, Keurig paid $31 million to settle a lawsuit over claims their attempts to block people from using third-party pods violated antitrust law. The Supreme Court confirmed consumers' right to use a product however they like once it has been purchased in a very related 2016 case about printer cartridges: The Supreme Court decided 7-1 in favor of Impression on both counts, ruling that once a company has sold a product, it can’t dictate how the product is used—meaning that consumers have free rein to refurbish, repair, or resell items they’ve lawfully bought. “The purchaser and all subsequent owners are free to use or resell the product just like any other item of personal property, without fear of an infringement lawsuit,” Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority opinion. | Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal. | Stack Exchange questions are not public domain, they are protected by copyright. Authors have granted a license under Subscriber Content, specifically content is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC BY-SA 4.0) As long as you comply with the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 license, you may copy user content. | From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end. | A TOS is not intrinsically illegal, but an interpretation of a TOS may or may not be supported by a court, that remains to be seen. It probably does not constitute a "deceptive practice" under FTC standards. The TOS is your permission to use the software, and there can be no question that they have the right to impose conditions on customer use of the software. E.g. Amazon cannot freely use software that is only licensed for free educational use. They speak of "ownership" of IP so created and explicitly disclaim any claims about Current Law in Your Jurisdiction. At the crucial point in the agreement, they switch to talking about the license (BY-NC) that they grant when you are not a paid member. The exact details of this ownership are not part of the free tier TOS, but they do seem to add certain protections to "owned" content created under the Pro plan – they are under no legal obligation to make all content universally visible and usable. | Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing. | You are granted the free trial as part of a trial, not to permanently use the program. When the user downloaded the trial version of the program, he probably had to accept T&C granting a one-time only say 3‑month trial period. It is a mere breach of contract if you’re circumventing this, but you might still be liable to damages. Circumventing technological protection measures is forbidden, § 95a UrhG. However, these protection measures must be considered effective. Now, lawyers are usually no computer gurus, so they might arrive at completely different conclusions, but I guess/hope editing a plain text file, substituting a plaintext ISO 8601 date, will not be deemed “effective”. (I presume the same effect could be achieved by resetting the computer’s RTC.) Having said that, since you intend to “publish a guide […] detailing how to use this exploit” I suspect it might not be that trivial and thus, from a lawyer’s POV, be considered an “effective” technological protection measure. If it is considered an effective technological protection measure, you might be punishable via § 108b UrhG, but I’m not sure about that. The wording is terribly complex. | Source code is protected by copyright, even if it is designed for an unethical or illegal purpose. Making a copy without permission is copyright infringement, as is distributing a copy without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. In the US the primary exception is fair use. Whether a use constitutes a fair use or not depends on the detailed facts, including the nature and purpose of the use, and the plausible effect on the market for the protected work. The question does not contain enough information for even a rough fair use analysis. It is generally not unlawful to create malware, only to use it to access a computer or network without permission, or to do other unlawful acts. Thus the copyright holder could sue without implicating him- or herself in a crime. However, damages would probably depend largely on the commercial value of the program, and if the only plausible use was criminal, the legitimate value might be quite low. Possessing an unauthorized copy of a work is not a crime, nor is it infringement. The maker and distributor of an unauthorized copy commits infringement, but the recipient does not. Whether unauthorized access and downloading is a crime under the CFAA depends on the factual details. Many things that might technically be crimes under the CFAA are not prosecuted. That is a matter for the relevant prosecutor to determine. |
Strange Clause in Employment Contract Concerning Leaving Job My teenager has applied for a tutoring job at a local after-school tutoring center and there is the following clause in her employment contract: If you decide to discontinue after your term is over, you need to provide a referral and train him or her before you leave. Has anyone ever seen an employment clause like this before? Is it even legal? We live in the state of California. Edit (P.S.: Actually, I may have been incorrect in stating that this requirement was part of an "employment contract" since there is no place for the prospective employee to sign and date their acceptance of all of the clauses at the bottom of the page. My daughter says that the clauses are actually stated to be "rules" for employees.) | Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to. | Provincial jurisdiction may need to be specified. But in general, assuming you are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, you can be terminated for any reason or even no reason, as long as the contract is followed, the actual or apparent reason is not discriminatory or otherwise illegal and the termination procedure meets the provincial employment standards. The labour law usually provide requirements for notice periods or severance pay (or both), unless there exists a just cause (e.g. extreme disregard of duty, theft, repeated insubordination, etc.; lack of funds on the part of the employer is not a just cause). shouldn't the employer be fully responsible for the salary coverage of his employee in the course of his contract? Yes, but the contract is saying it can be terminated under certain conditions, after which time you are no longer "in the course" of your contract. Termination due to lack of funds is usually not considered discriminatory or otherwise illegal. You remain entitled to wages for any period you have worked. Additionally, the employer needs to respect the required notice period or severance pay under the provincial employment standards related to termination with or without cause, regardless of the funding situation. | Restraint of trade clauses are tricky. They are only enforceable if there is a legitimate interest which needs to be protected and only to the minimum extent needed to protect that interest. Therefore, you must have specific business knowledge (algorithms, code, customer information etc.), not general knowledge (stuff taught in schools or generally available) and preventing you working for a competitor is the only reasonable way of protecting it. If this is so then 6 months is not unreasonable. Assuming that the clause is valid then for you to take a job with a competitor is a breach of contract and you would be subject to all the normal sanctions including an injunction to stop and damages. Your new employer is not exposed as they are not a party to the contract, however, if you are forced to breach your new employment contract then they can sue you too. In both cases the employer has to initiate action and it may not be worthwhile. You can take the risk if you want but you should seek legal advice. | A company generally cannot compel an employee to agree to a non-compete, but they have a wide variety of alternatives for inducing employees to do so. Most obviously, they may threaten to fire employees who refuse, whether immediately or at the end of their current term, as another answer observes. Indeed, if Big Company makes an NC a condition of employment then they are likely to insist on the same for employees they obtain from Original Employer. Firing employees for refusing to sign does, of course, put them in the job market as potential competitors, but the company may well find it acceptable to do that on their own terms. In particular, Big Company can ensure that those who won't sign go out the door with minimal knowledge of Big Company's clients, trade secrets, etc. other than those obtained from Original Employer. And that leads into other forms of inducement. Big Company can do some or all of the following things, depending on the particular employment situation: offer bonus compensation for signing promote those who sign and / or demote / reassign those who don't change job duties for those who refuse to sign do all manner of nastier things to be unfriendly to employees who refuse to sign Some of those fit directly into Big Company's perceived interest in avoiding employees using Big Company internal information to jump ship and compete with them, and others could fit into Big Company policy about which jobs require an NC. Some are just pressure tactics, but that does not necessarily make them unlawful (nor are all variations on the others necessarily lawful). | You are probably an employee Answer these questions: Can you say “no” when the University offers you work? Or vice-versa, can they say “no” when you want to work? Can you subcontract the work? That is, can you hire someone to do what the University hired you to do? Do you control how and when you work? For example, when you break University rules are you subject to University discipline or is this treated as a breach of contract? Do you provide your own tools and equipment? Can you make a profit or loss (if you get paid by the hour the answer is “no”)? Do you take out your own public liability and/or professional indemnity insurance? If the answers to most of these questions are “no”, you’re an employee. | Can he/lawyer try to use the payment to me as leverage, for example, offer to give me that payment only if I agree to sign a non-compete or other document? The employer ultimately ought to comply with the written agreements between you two. The employer is not allowed to belatedly impose conditions that alter (to your detriment) the contract(s), let alone when you are no longer his employee. The clause "You will be paid on X and Y when/if they close" does not reflect whatsoever that payment is contingent on your acceptance of a non-compete agreement. Your description does not reflect any legal merits that would justify your employer to further withhold the compensation to which you are entitled pursuant to the deal/sale that got closed. The employer and his lawyer are just being vexatious. | An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA. | Am I contractually obligated to follow that old handbook? Yes. Consider this: your employer gave you a copy of the handbook saying, "here is a copy of the staff handbook." Because of this, you know that the document in question is the staff handbook of your company, regardless of the fact that it bears an old name, and that the policies it expresses are part of the terms of your employment contract. If you were truly concerned that the document in question had no validity as the staff handbook, you perhaps should have expressed that concern by telling the person giving you the document that they appear to have given you the wrong document, because it bears a different name. By not doing this, you accept the terms in the document. On the other hand, if you do do that, you'll just irritate the people who have to produce a rebranded staff handbook so they can give you a copy. |
Is it legal for BMW owners to enable heated car seats without paying the subscription fee? Its been recently reported that: BMW is now selling subscriptions for heated seats in a number of countries — the latest example of the company’s adoption of microtransactions for high-end car features. A monthly subscription to heat your BMW’s front seats costs roughly $18, with options to subscribe for a year ($180), three years ($300), or pay for “unlimited” access for $415. Heated seats only use simple electronics so you could presumably open up the car's panel and rewire the cables to bypass the computer entirely, making it possible to trigger the seat heater using a physical button. There would be zero software modifications, so presumably you won't be violating any copyright laws. Would it be legal to do this in the US? | There are limits to what you are allowed to modify on your car. Federal safety regulations require certain features to be installed by the manufacturer, and to be maintained by the owner in a state that they remain functional. Besides obvious things like brakes, you need working headlights, turn signals, bumpers, wipers, etc. Heated seats is an option. A luxury convenience feature. Most cars don't have heated seats. If you had heated seats, but left them off or the switch broke and they weren't working, there would be no reason for the State Patrol to care one bit that your rump was a bit chilly. So, the state doesn't care enough make it illegal to have heated seats or not. It is entirely your choice. The question then becomes, does the state have any reason to care whether you have a manual switch to turn them on or off, or use a special software code to enable the feature? Logic dictates that if they don't care whether or not you have the feature, and don't care if you are using it or not, they would have not reason to care about the particular method you use to turn it on or off... Therefore the only real question is does BMW care? They might, if you came up with a method of enabling heat without a subscription and it became known to them. Especially if you made money publishing a how-to guide that cost them potential revenue. But that would be a civil, rather than a criminal matter. To me this action would be equivalent to buying a burger at a place that charges $.25 for a packet of ketchup, and instead using your own ketchup. It's your burger, and your ketchup, do what you want! ADDENDUM: Based on discussion on the other answer, as well as a suggestion in comments, I would like to briefly address (my opinion) on the applicability of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DCMA) of 1998. I actually just looked up this act, and have only a layman's understanding of copyright law, but there is a basic element that needs to be met for a violation to occur: The copyrighted material must be reproduced, altered, repurposed, and distributed in some manner. Private avoidance or selective non-use of a digital feature would not seem to rise to that level. I touched on this above when I alluded to publishing a written hack. It would probably also apply if you offered code that would bypass a feature, or to a car tuner offering to enable the feature for a fee. If there is a commercial benefit, there is a potential "victim", and a copyright issue. However, even code is questionable... There are many examples of companies offering aftermarket Engine Control Module code to enhance performance or improve gas mileage. Of course a manufacturer could always challenge a commercial competitor, but lawsuits cause money and create publicity - positive and negative. About the only "free" enforcement tool a manufacturer has is to not honor the warranty on any owner altered parts. Of note is the fact that seat heating elements are not digital, copyrighted, or otherwise protected work. The digital intellectual property that MIGHT potentially be at the center of a copyright controversy is the function of the pay system and the processing of an access code that unlocks a relay. What that relay sends electrical current to is really immaterial. It could be your stereo, it could be the airbag... One person snipping and splicing wire to avoid the IP "brain" and install a simple on/off switch or rheostat for personal use of seat heat should not be violation of any digital copyright law. | As described, this may be a form of illegal bait-and-switch advertising, but not breach of contract. The contract states the specific vehicle to be sold, which does not match the test-driven car. If the dealer had listed the better car's VIN in the contract but supplied a different car, that would be breach of contract. Whether it is illegal advertisement depends on the representations and disclaimers made by the dealer. To the extent that the dealer supplied indications that there was a difference between the test model and the purchase model, or to the extent that the customer should have known that the test car had features not found in the specific model that the customer believed he was buying and paying for, the dealer was being non-deceptive. To the extent that the dealer holds that selling model X instead of model Y is an "honest mistake" on their part, the dealer was being deceptive (or, was plainly in breach of contract). It's hard to see what "honest mistake" the dealer might have made, but perhaps the mistake was "not being clearer to the customer that they had test-driven a fancier model, not the one that they were actually buying". The customer's attorney could pursue this matter and either get the better car, or get a better financial deal, but it really hinges on who said / wrote what (and has a more believable story about what was said). | My understanding of contract law is the original fees are implied if no new explicit agreement is signed and therefore the invoice amount should be $1,000. Is that correct? No. At the outset, the presumption that the price would be equal to that of filings covered in the engagement letter is inaccurate. The actual terms of the engagement letter might support a different conclusion, though, which is why I asked about them. The offer in the engagement letter seems to be just a marketing practice, and as such it is neither uncommon nor unlawful. The rationale for that marketing practice is that offering [in this case] the first two tax filings at a lower price is likelier to persuade new customers to try the services the company provides. Thereafter, those customers will be billed what the company would call a normal or ordinary price. Statutory law does not provide specific constraints to how greater the ordinary price. But the details would help ascertain whether an excessive, unannounced increase amounts to what is known as unfair and misleading practices or otherwise contravenes consumer protection laws. These laws vary by jurisdiction and might or might not defeat the argument that the customer bears the risk of mistake. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. | No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false. | certain kinds of payments just are tax-free There are several kinds of tax-free special payments in germany, such as certain types of additional payments (for example "Vermögenswirksame Leistungen" and "Steuerfreibeträge"), or gifts within a certain value (e.g. goods/services up to 50 € a month). In this case, they most likely fully use the "Inflationsausgleichsprämie", which is tax-free up to 3000 €. | Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease. | It sounds like you may be conflating ownership and control. It's very common for an affiliate to have a contract with the parent company. These terms can be very detailed - it may give the parent company the right to sell the affiliates widgets, but not sprockets (as those are sold by another parent company). As such, you can't really measure "control" as a simple percentage. So, when the parent is selling widgets, it can reasonably claim control over its affiliate. The buyer does not need to know the exact terms governing the relation between parent and affiliate. |
Who has to pay restaurant bill Based on a story from another site: It’s A’s birthday. A’s mum invites mum, dad, A and A’s brother B to a meal in an expensive restaurant. At the end, mum gets the bill, pays money, and mum, dad and brother B leave. A wants to leave but mum didn’t pay the complete bill: She didn’t pay for B’s meal and didn’t pay a tip which is maybe legal but very rude. So A is stopped from leaving the restaurant. Question: Is the restaurant entitled to ask any member of the group to pay (and since A is the only one still present they demand money from A)? If A explains the situation and the restaurant owner is sympathetic, would he be entitled to ask for payment from mum instead (who isn’t there anymore, but A can provide name, address and phone number)? | Who entered the contract with the restaurant? In order for the restaurant to collect from a person, that person must have entered into a contract for the meal. That is, from the restaurant's point of view, they must have indicated that they would like some food and, since everyone knows how restaurants work, they know that the food will have to be paid for. Whether a given person entered a contract will depend on the specific facts. If they opened their mouth and said to the waiter something like “I’ll have the chicken”, they almost certainly entered a contract and they are obliged to pay. This is even if they had an expectation that someone else would pay for them - the restaurant is not involved in any other contracts or arrangements you might have with third-parties. You ordered, you’re on the hook. In a situation where you didn’t order, the answer is still probably yes, you have to pay. Again, because you know how restaurants work, by eating the meal that was placed in front of you rather than saying, “Just so you know, your contract for this meal is with that guy over there, is that okay?”, you probably entered a contract by your action of eating the meal. More broadly, when a group collectively enters a contract with the restaurant, they are probably agreeing with the restaurant that they will be jointly and severally bound. That is, each is responsible for all and the restaurant can pursue any or all of the people they have a contract with. A minor dining with their parents is probably not entering a contract with the restaurant. Not because minors can’t enter contracts (they absolutely can) but because of the normal expectation that the parent is entering the contract. This is because of a principle that contract terms may be implied by custom. That is, if there is a general understanding that this is the way things are done, then that will be something the law will enforce. This is a simple expedient adopted in order to make the world work - if every term of every contract had to be explicitly detailed in advance this would be a) unworkable and b) impossible. Even if there is no contract, the restaurant has equitable remedies like unjust enrichment. The diner has had the benefit of the meal and it would be unjust if the restaurant was left out of pocket. Equitable remedies can be even more complicated than contract law so we’ll just leave it at that. As for whether the restaurant will accept a promise from one diner that another will pay, that’s up to them. | There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order. | Small claims court was created for such matters. There is the possibility of a fee waiver, and if you prevail, you could get some of your costs covered (though there are other hoops to jump through if you need enforcement). A formal letter (written by you) stating that you intend to seek a legal judgment against him/her in the amount owed might be sufficient motivation for the person to pay what is owed. | The issue of who pays directly for the items and/or to contractors is irrelevant. The important thing is to memorialize the agreement/arrangement in writing so as to preempt or solve eventual disputes. A clearly written agreement signed by the parties would supersede any presumption of conditions and rights arising solely from the parties' conduct. | Your description of the facts is vague enough that we can't offer an informed judgment, but to remedy this, I will paraphrase your account of the facts (you can decide whether this is what you were trying to say). I was sitting outside of the Sprint store today waiting for my step daughter to come out. While waiting, two police officers walked up to my car and asked me to turn off my vehicle and come inside. When I voluntarily went inside, the store staff said that they called the police because they had had some sort of problems with people applying for service and absconding with the phone to resell on the black market, and they thought that was part of some such criminal plan. Because of that, they refused to give her a phone or service contract. But then they also told us to never come back, threatening arrest for trespassing. I have never been in that store before. Were my rights violated? No, neither by the police nor by the manager. The police, or the store manager, can legally request you to come in for a conversation: what matters most is whether you were forced to come in against your will. By your report, you were not, so your rights were not violated. The police are irrelevant to the remainder of the question. What remains is whether your rights were violated because the manager told you to go away and never come back under pain of prosecution. The store is private property, meaning that the owner has wide latitude to grant or deny permission to enter. If they hate pink hair and your hair is pink, they can legally "ban" you. If they suspect you of involvement in a criminal activity, that can most certainly legally ban you. That does not mean that it was a righteous or justified decision on their part, or a good business choice, but it is their legal right. So, no, your rights were not violated. | The two cases are very different. The first involves a debt collector entering onto property in connection with an allegedly overdue utility bill, which is something a debt collector ordinarily would not be permitted to do without a money judgment following a court proceeding and further court orders authorizing collection of the debt from tangible personal property on the premises. This is pretty much completely without justification and realistically is a criminal offense as well as a basis for a civil lawsuit, although the modest money damages involved may have made such a lawsuit ill advised for the resident impacted by the unlawful entry. Notably, in this case Scottish Power, "admitted the error, apologised and offered compensation." I doubt that an American utility company would have had the good sense and grace to act the same way. The story doesn't make entirely clear if these were Scottish Power employees or debt collection contractors hired by Scottish Power. The question implies that abusive utility company collection agents are a systemic problem in Scotland, although the article itself does not. The second involves a utility company, Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE), drilling a lock to enter onto property in order to check a utility meter, in a building where some other tenant at a different address was not paying an electric bill on a different meter, which presents a very different issue. The customer at the address drilled had reasonably documented the utility company's mistake, but the company, for some reason, didn't believe the customer and didn't make arrangements to visit consensually when the customer was home. Instead, while the customer was work on Wednesday two male SSE workers drilled through the lock to gain entry into the flat, and when they got in and looked at the meter, they realized that they were mistaken. The fact that the story describes the two men as a "warrant team" leaves open the possibility that a warrant for entry was received from a court based upon bad information from the utility company when it should have known better, although that issue isn't clarified in the story. The customer “lodged a formal complaint against SSE for unlawful entry and reported the incident to the police.” And an ombudsman elevated the issue. According to the utility company, it "offered to replace all the locks in her property and offered her a goodwill gesture payment of £500. Both were rejected by Ms Harvey who wanted compensation for further rental, hotel and new property costs which we were unable to agree to." Utility companies will generally have an easement or some similar legal right to enter onto a customer's property to read a utility meter or the deal with something broken on the premises that affects the larger utility system such as a short circuit that is bringing down the power of everyone on the block, without notice in cases of emergencies. So, in this case, the issue is not the absence of a right to enter somewhere, but the fact that the utility company went to the wrong place (where it may very well have had no right to enter because there may have been no utility meter to check at that location), which in and of itself, would be mere negligence if it hadn't received such clear communication from the customer and ignored it, and secondly, whether the method it used to gain access to the property in the good faith belief that it had a legal right to enter to gain access to the property was reasonable. Charitably, it could be that the utility company had a key allowing it to enter and read the meter at the proper address, but that key didn't work because they were at the wrong address and the utility official may have mistakenly believes that the lock was broken rather than that the address was wrong. In that case, the question would be whether it was reasonable to force entry in a non-emergency case like a meter readings, rather than trying to contact the owner to resolve the question, which it probably was not. It isn't quite as obvious that this would be a criminal trespass, because ordinarily entry onto property under a claim of right, even if mistaken in good faith, does not constitute criminal conduct, although a claim of good faith in a context where the company as a whole knew better even if the right hand may not have known what the left hand was doing, probably doesn't hold up under agency law that imputes the knowledge of any agent of the company to the company as a whole. But, while the company may have committed a crime, the two workmen detailed to do the work may have been acting in good faith personally, and may have even had a warrant. Certainly, the utility company should have liability to repair any damage that was done to the premises in order to gain entry that arose from its negligence in going to the wrong address and its unreasonable failure to confer with the customer about the problem in a non-emergency. SSE would probably be well advised to admit with good grace that it was in the wrong and to pay the still very modest amount that the customer claimed for an alternate rental, rather than fight this issue where its fumbling became not just rude but abusive. | As a matter of contract law it would not be possible to enforce a requirement to pay legal fees without agreement. You could easily see how this would be problematic: one could just draft letters to hundreds or thousands of people and require them to pay the costs of composing the letter. My understanding is that this is common practice in the United States (see speculative invoicing). However, people are generally free to pay whatever they want to anyone they want. The other side is free to pay the legal costs, they just probably won't. In some common law jurisdictions, the concept of a Calderbank offer may be another reason to write a letter such as this; the settlement offer can be relied upon in later proceedings as an indication as to the costs that would be appropriate to award to the winning party, should the offeree unnecessarily prolong legal proceedings | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. |
Is it legal to record Internet audio streams? Is it legal to record an Internet audio stream (sometimes incorrectly called "Internet radio") for later playback for private use? Does it matter if you delete immediately after listening vs. saving as a music library? | Yes Time shifting for personal use was ruled fair use by SCOTUS in 1984. | In general, a gameplay video would be either a partial copy or a derivative work, and in either case an infringement if created without permission. Such a video might be covered under fair use in US copyright law, particularly if made for the purpose of commentary on a game or instruction in how to play or design a game. In general, a fair use defense is more likely to succeed if only the minimum amount of the work required for the purpose is used, and sound tracks might not be required for such a purpose. Thus a maker of such a video might choose to omit the sound to improve the fair-use case. Moreover, when the sound track contains licensed popular music it would be subject to a separate copyright, and many music publishers are notoriously litigious, so prudence would advise omitting the sound. All that said, fair-use is a case-by-case determination, and if the makers of such videos have not been sued, they (and we) can only guess how a case would turn out. As to why game makers refrain from having such videos taken down (if they in fact do refrain) one can only speculate. Game publishers may consider the videos good advertising. Questions based on the absence of legal proceedings are inherently speculative, unless a copyright holder has announced a policy of not taking action and the reasons for it. | The conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. As for it being legal for website operators to log the IP-addresses of visitors, this is covered by the following paragraph (also pointed out by phoog in a comment). The paragraph says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) You are not the only web site that logs IP addresses for the purpose of security. Every web site I've ever worked on - from those controlled by large corporations to tiny NGOs - do this. This security practice will not be impacted by the GDPR (if it were, I am sure we would have heard about it by now). there is the EU cookie law too If your website are going to be accessible to European citizens and not only accessible by your friends and familiy, you have to comply with the EU cookie directive of 2002 (a exemption for "personal websites" does not exist). | What is allowed and what happens are different things; this is why we have police, courts and prisons. If everyone followed all of the laws all of the time we would need none of these. The videos are copyright and without the permission of the copyright holder (the NFL) you cannot reproduce or distribute them. A defense to copyright violation is if the usage is fair use or fair dealing. What you see on line is: Done with permission of the NFL Fair use as it is being used to comment on or analyze the performance; like a critic's book review. Unlawful and not pursued (yet) because the NFL considers it not worthwhile. | I believe the relevant section is 28 CFR 35.150 - Existing facilities § 35.150 Existing facilities: (a)General. A public entity shall operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This paragraph does not - Because of this, it seems theoretically possible that someone could complain that the youtube videos of lectures are not accessible enough to disabled persons, and therefore have them taken down. Regardless, it seems that UC Berkley decided to preemptively take down the videos in order to "reset" their online lectures catalogue and make large improvements. But yeah, nothing in the statute says they must take such videos down, but it would be a theoretical violation of the law to leave them up. | Unless they have permission or pay the required royalty: yes. If they are playing it for personal entertainment or at a private function then they can make a fair use/dealing defence. | Twitter don’t have to host your account UMG’s and Sony’s business is probably more important to Twitter than yours is. It seems Twitter have made a commercial decision to close your account down. They can do this: We may suspend or terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part of the Services at any time for any or no reason, … What’s happening is not fair use Fair use is a lot narrower than you think it is. UMG and Sony (and every other music label) get paid when people use their music on a commercial platform like Twitter. Which means, you enabling people to avoid this is directly reducing their market so this is not fair use. Giving credit does not help. Now, if your program blocked the use of copyrighted songs that might be ok. Your program looks exactly like a piracy tool I’m sure you have the best intentions but your tool readily enables copyright violations by others. That’s moving out of the realms of civil breach and into possible criminal sanctions. I wouldn’t push this if I were you. Your understanding of copyright is flawed This video is a good primer on copyright. | It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK. |
Are Name, Image and Likeness (NIL) of public athletes protected by copyright? Assume the following facts: Jurisdiction: Ohio Alice is a professional athlete, well known to the public. Bob makes "fan art" of Alice and attempts to sell his art to the public. Question: Under what circumstances would Bob's actions give rise to any civil claims by Alice against Bob? Given the principles of "fair use" (copyright), "public figure exceptions" (defamation) and "expectations of privacy" (privacy) in the law, I'm wondering if any of these principles have found their way into the NIL space? And what the legal environment is like under the circumstances contemplated by this question. | Copyright, No US Copyright does not protect names, images, or "personas". The US Copyright Office Circular 33 ("Works Not Protected by Copyright") states, on pages 2-3: Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. Examples of names, titles, or short phrases that do not contain a sufficient amount of creativity to support a claim in copyright include: The name of an individual (including pseudonyms, pen names, or stage names) The title or subtitle of a work, such as a book, a song, or a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work The name of a business or organization The name of a band or performing group The name of a product or service A domain name or URL The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expression An image, including a portrait, is usually protected by copyright (unless it is old enough that the protection has expired). But the copyright most often belongs to the creator of the image, such as the photographer or artist, not by the subject represented. If Bob draws or paints or otherwise creates an image of Alice, from seeing her in person or from multiple publicly available likenesses of her, not clearly based on any one such image, Bob will hold the copyright in that image unless he sells or otherwise transfers the copyright. Alice will not have any copyright in such an image. Right of Publicity, Yes Some but not all US states, and some but not all countries, recognize a "right of publicity". In Ohio, the "Right of publicity" is protected by Chapter 2741 of the Ohio Revised Code. This right extends to various aspects of a person's "persona", and may be enforced by a civil suit. These rights do not depend on a person's status as a "public figure" or "celebrity" or not. These rights are separate from any copyrights involved. These rights may be limited by the rights granted by the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. Section 2741.01 (Defnitions) provides, in relevant part, that: (A) "Persona" means an individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, or distinctive appearance, if any of these aspects have commercial value. (B) "Commercial purpose" means the use of or reference to an aspect of an individual's persona in any of the following manners: (B) (1) On or in connection with a place, product, merchandise, goods, services, or other commercial activities not expressly exempted under this chapter; (B) (2) For advertising or soliciting the purchase of products, merchandise, goods, services, or other commercial activities not expressly exempted under this chapter; (B) (3) For the purpose of promoting travel to a place; (B) (4) For the purpose of fundraising. (C) "Name" means the actual, assumed, or clearly identifiable name of or reference to a living or deceased individual that identifies the individual. (D) "Right of publicity" means the property right in an individual's persona to use the individual's persona for a commercial purpose. Section 2741.02 (Using individual's persona for commercial purpose without authorization.) provides that: (A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not use any aspect of an individual's persona for a commercial purpose: (A) (1) During the individual's lifetime; (A) (2) For a period of sixty years after the date of the individual's death; or (A) (3) For a period of ten years after the date of death of a deceased member of the Ohio national guard or the armed forces of the United States. (B) A person may use an individual's persona for a commercial purpose during the individual's lifetime if the person first obtains the written consent to use the individual's persona from a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code. If an individual whose persona is at issue has died, a person may use the individual's persona for a commercial purpose if either of the following applies: (B) (1) The person first obtains the written consent to use the individual's persona from a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code who owns the individual's right of publicity. (B) (2) The name of the individual whose persona is used was the name of a business entity or a trade name at the time of the individual's death. (C) Subject to the terms of any agreement between a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code and a person to whom that person grants consent to use an individual's right of publicity, a consent obtained before the death of an individual whose persona is at issue remains valid after the individual's death. (D) For purposes of this section: (D) (1) A use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with any news, public affairs, sports broadcast, or account does not constitute a use for which consent is required under division (A) of this section. (D) (2) A use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with any political campaign and in compliance with Title XXXV of the Revised Code does not constitute a use for which consent is required under division (A) of this section. (E) The owners or employees of any medium used for advertising, including but not limited to, a newspaper, magazine, radio or television network or station, cable television system, billboard, transit ad, and global communications network, by whom any advertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is published or disseminated are not liable under this section or section 2741.07 of the Revised Code unless it is established that those owners or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the persona as prohibited by this section. Section 2741.03 states that these rights apply only to the use of the persona of a person resident in the state of Ohio, or who was so resident when that person died on or after January 1, 1998. Section 2741.04 states that the rights of publicity can be livened, transferred by contract, or left as an inheritance. Section 2741.05 defines who may grant written consent for use of a persona, including the person whose persona it is, a person who owns more than 50% of the rights, and a person explicitly authorized to grant such consent (such as an agent). Sections 2741.06 and 2741.07 authorize a civil suit for violation of rights of publicity. The plaintiff may receive any or all of: actual damages; statutory damages in an amount between $2,500.00 and $10,000.00; and in an appropriate case punitive or exemplary damages. Awards of legal costs add attorney fees are authorized. Injunctions to halt further violations are authorized. Triple damages are authorized against certain parties. Products, merchandise, and goods made in violation of these rights may be seized, and after a final judgemetn, destroyed orm otherwise disposed of. Section 2741.09 (Exceptions) provides that: (A) This chapter does not apply to any of the following: (A) (1) (a) A literary work, dramatic work, fictional work, historical work, audiovisual work, or musical work regardless of the media in which the work appears or is transmitted, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under division (A)(1)(d) of this section; (A) (1) (b) Material that has political or newsworthy value; (A) (1) (c) Original works of fine art; (A) (1) (d) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by division (A)(1)(a), (b), or (c) of this section. < (A) (2) The use of an individual's name to truthfully identify the individual as the author of or contributor to a written work or the performer of a recorded performance under circumstances in which the written work or the recorded performance is otherwise lawfully reproduced, exhibited, or broadcast; (A) (3) The use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or topic of general or public interest; (A) (4) The use of the persona of an individual solely in the individual's role as a member of the public if the individual is not named or otherwise singled out as an individual; (A) (5) A use of an individual's persona by an institution of higher education if all of the following apply: (A) (5) (a) The individual is or was a student at, or a member of the faculty or staff of, the institution of higher education. (A) (5) (b) The use of the individual's persona is for educational purposes or for the promotion of the institution of higher education and its educational or institutional objectives. (A) (6) A use of the persona of an individual that is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as long as the use does not convey or reasonably suggest endorsement by the individual whose persona is at issue. (B) This chapter does not affect rights or privileges recognized under the Ohio Constitution or United States Constitution. | Names of people, institutions, and events are not protected by copyright. Things that have occurred at events like math tournaments are facts, and may be recounted, in your own words, with no fear of infringing any copyright. Facts are never protected by copyright, although a particular description of facts could be, and so could a particular selection and arrangement of facts. Specific math techniques and their names are not protected either, and may be described without infringing copyright. The items you mention in the question are: video game / movie references and names No copyright issue here. common integration bee problems No copyright issue here. names of a university / math competition organizers No copyright issue here. integration techniques and formulas No copyright issue here, unless you copy an extensive description of a technique without rewriting it in your mown words.. using someone's Overleaf Latex package to format the book This depends on the license for the package, but there is not likely to be an issue. In short I think you are worrying over issues that are in fact non-issues. | Words themselves are not protected by copyright. Curated lists of words, however, are (what's protected is the artful collection of words chosen for a purpose). Hence Hasbro owns the copyright in the list of playable words, though it is a matter for future possible litigation to see if the courts agree. If you have permission from the copyright holder, that permission (license) should state how you can use the list (it does not matter if there is a title). However, you may need to obtain the list from the copyright holder. The website operator presumably already has a license, the terms of which may allow them to prevent you from copying from the website. E.g. the author may have granted the website operator the right to use the list as long as they don't restrict redistribution; but that license may also require restricting redistribution. So you also have to study the website terms of use – or get a copy directly from the copyright holder (assuming that that is the original author). | If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes. | "Public domain" refers informally to copyright status, usually works whose protected status has expired. A list of names, addresses and criminal offenses is "factual", not a creative expression, and is not subject to copyright protection. You may be thinking of "public record", which is closer to an relevant expression. Typically, as instantiated in Washington state under RCW 9a.44.130 ff, a person convicted of certain offenses is required to register with the county sheriff, and that registration is thus a "public record". Under a separate law, RCW 4.24.550 disclosure is allowed "when the agency determines that disclosure of the information is relevant and necessary to protect the public and counteract the danger created by the particular offender" – in other jurisdictions disclosure may be mandatory. The specific information to be disclosed is "name, relevant criminal convictions, address by hundred block, physical description, and photograph. The website shall provide mapping capabilities that display the sex offender's address by hundred block on a map". The Public Records Act does not exclude disclosure and copying of that information, so it is a public record in the sense that it must be disclosed on request. Every state has its own laws implementing this desideratum: all states have such laws, they vary somewhat in details. | No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though. | Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it. | It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement. |
In the US are new product safety features implemented by manufacturers ipso facto proof that they were aware their earlier products were unsafe? I've been reading up on features to make table saws safer and in one forum there was a post that said, basically, manufacturers have had no incentive to license a table-saw safety device from the inventor because doing so would only increase their exposure to product liability lawsuits relating to their older models: developing a safety feature themselves or licensing one developed by a third party would be ipso facto proof that they are aware their previous models are unsafe. In the US product liability arena is there really such a paralyzing disincentive for manufacturers to make safety improvements to their products? Does a manufacturer really incur risk by making safety improvements? | In order to avoid this perverse incentive, Rule 407 prohibits the use of subsequent safety measures as evidence for liability: Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove: negligence; culpable conduct; a defect in a product or its design; or a need for a warning or instruction. But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or — if disputed — proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures. https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_407 | I've answered this in the context of US patent law, but similar principles apply elsewhere in the world. As stated in 35 USC 271, "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent". Thus, a patent provides the patent owner with the right to exclude others from performing these actions, and the right to sue anyone who does perform these actions (both to stop them from infringing the patent, and to collect monetary damages for their infringement). Creating an infringing product and then licensing it under the GPL (or any other scheme) does not change the fact that it infringes a patent. 35 USC 271 also states that "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer". This means that, even if the creator of the infringing product does not perform any infringing acts in the US, the act of offering it for free use could be construed as induced infringement of the patent, and they could still be sued for that infringement. | Regular maintenance does not include repairs for being broken – I have a contract with a company that (for a monthly payment) provides regular maintenance on the furnace, which does not cover the situation where the motor wears out, or whatever. In the worst case scenario of an oil line breech, the tenant would not be liable for the tens of thousands of dollars of cleanup that would be required. Under Pennsylvania law, there is an implied warranty of habilitability, for example the landlord warrants that it doesn't rain inside the house, there is hot and cold running water, and so on. Safe heat is an example of something that is included in a place being habitable. This warranty is not waivable by lease provision (Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240). However, the subjective recommendation of a repair guy has little legal cash value: what is needed is an arms-length evaluation of the safety and functionality of the system. If the recommendation is based on inefficient fuel use and long-term likelihood of eventual system failure, that is probably not sufficient to compel a repair. Excess CO on the other hand is a clear danger. The repairman should be able to at least explain the specifics of the improper setup and the consequences of doing nothing. Documentation of actions taken is a good idea. | Yes, the original designer (or the designer's employer) would have a legal right to the design, insofar as it included protectable design elements. Copyright on the design of "useful" products is limited, and the exact limitations vary from country to country. However, it might be hard for the designer (or the company for which the designer works) to prove that the creation was original, and was not an actual leak. But if the designer or company has retained sufficient evidence to convince a court, then a suit could be successful. Such a possibility makes me doubt that Apple or a similar large company would do that. The risks are too great when a design of their own creation would probably be quite good enough for their purposes. But that is all speculation. | A patent grants the holder exclusive rights to make, use and sell the patented item. As such, you can look at the patented object, you can document it, you can study it, you can draw up plans for it. A patent cannot be granted unless the applicant discloses what exactly is being patented. So you can get all the details of a patent from the USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office). You cannot, however, make one without infringement unless you have permission, usually a license, from the patent holder. Now I am not in any way recommending this but as a practical matter, if you, as an individual, were to make such a piece of furniture incorporating a patented feature for your use, how would they know? There are no "patent police" going from door-to-door looking for infringers. On the other hand if you were to begin selling copies of this piece at your small shop, that might come to the patent holder's attention and they might take action against you. | You may not have a clear understanding of patents. They are 99.9%* territorial. A patent issued by the USPTO is the only patent relevant to the making, selling, offering for sale, importing, or using a patented product in the U.S. And the same for all other countries. Of course U.S. companies not only file for U.S. patents; they also file for German, Chinese and any other places they see fit and have the funds to pursue. Likewise, Chinese companies file with the USPTO for U.S. patents. If a filing by by company A in any country occurs before a filing by company B in any country and A's filing makes B's not new, then B should not a patent in whatever place it has filed. Also, merely getting a patent does not violate someone else's patent, a product can infringe a patent. Actually a product can infringe many patents from many patent owners. And having a patent doesn't automatically allow for the production of a product practicing that patent. (the 0.1% is for odd corner cases at sea or involving importing of components of patented items) | Employees of an employer aren't governed by a fault based liability regime in the United States (subject to some usually quite narrow exceptions that vary from state to state, which sometimes also limit tort liability). Instead, employers are required to have worker's compensation insurance policies in place, in exchange for not having any tort liability whatsoever to employees. (An employer who doesn't have worker's compensation in place is strictly liable to the worker for all injuries suffered by an employee whatsoever at work, without the prohibition of a worker's compensation insurance policy plan on paying things like pain and suffering damages as well.) Worker's compensation insurance provides coverage (in principle) for all medical costs incurred, all lost wages, and in the event of a death support for dependents if any and a modest death benefit sufficient to provide a funeral if there are no dependents. Often, in practice, worker's compensation insurance payments tend to be rather stingy. One of the most common big worker's compensation claims these days, especially in office and retail workplaces, is for employees who are seriously injured or killed in crimes at work. Often, a worker's compensation insurer will give an employer a discount if they have a "gun free" zone, because, statistically, doing so greatly reduces the average amount of harm experienced by employees at work. The presence of employees with guns in the workplace, as an actuarial matter, greatly increases the insurance company's risk of having to pay claims. | This supposes that the patentable concept can’t be learned form the operation of the whole program and hiding the invention while making use of the invention in public is not a disclosure. However, in the US there is a famous case In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) that concluded a public demonstration that didn’t expose the inner workings did start the clock on a bar to patentability. See previous question https://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/20886/would-the-demonstration-of-an-invention-be-considered-public-disclosure The answer (from me) has the caveat that this is a pre-AIA case and courts might come to a different answer under that current law. The U.S. has viewed public use, especially commercial public use, as disqualifying (after a grace period) but the rest of the world puts its emphasis on actual disclosure of the inventive concept so this result might be different elsewhere. One thought experiment would be to analogize with an article in a widely available journal with the words Don’t read the article that starts on page 19 on the cover. From a disclosure point of view I do not think that is different from it being possible, but illegal, to read. |
What is the point of saying "no trespassing"? The more I've thought about my question about no-trespassing signs saying "POSTED", I've realized that "no trespassing" doesn't really make sense either. Trespassing is, by definition, illegal, making "no trespassing" a tautology. Saying "no trespassing" is equivalent to putting a "no stealing" sign on a car or a "no speeding" sign on a road. "No trespassing" is a true statement anywhere, even if the public is allowed, because if everyone is allowed to be on the property, nobody is trespassing, making "no trespassing" an irrelevant statement, just as a "no stealing" sign on a car is irrelevant to someone who is not stealing it and a "no speeding" sign is irrelevant to someone who is driving at the speed limit. Why do some private property signs say "no trespassing"? "Private Property" seems like the most logical wording in cases where "POSTED" is not legally necessary, and while it is common, "no trespassing" is also quite common. | Trespassing requires knowledge by the trespasser If you are on somebody’s land without knowing you are, or under the impression (which is the default for unenclosed land) that you have permission, you aren’t trespassing. The signs, if prominent enough, make the entry knowingly against the wishes of the controller and therefore trespassing. | Trespass to chattels — which is "intentionally… dispossessing another of the chattel, or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another." But don't hold your breath re having a valid case. An attempt to sue would likely be dismissed as de minimis. This is just a trivial interpersonal issue. | The applicable Singapore statute is: Singapore Statute There it says: 441 Criminal trespass ...Criminal trespass Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit criminal trespass It seems highly unlikely that the local authorities would consider it trespass if it was done by another person lawfully in the property. | In Ohio, a stop sign would be a traffic control device, but not a traffic control signal. From R.C. 4511.01: (QQ) "Traffic control device" means a flagger, sign, signal, marking, or other device used to regulate, warn, or guide traffic, placed on, over, or adjacent to a street, highway, private road open to public travel, pedestrian facility, or shared-use path by authority of a public agency or official having jurisdiction, or, in the case of a private road open to public travel, by authority of the private owner or private official having jurisdiction. (RR) "Traffic control signal" means any highway traffic signal by which traffic is alternately directed to stop and permitted to proceed. | Bob has no defense Speeding in western-australia, as it is throughout australia, is a strict liability offense. That means that intention to or knowledge that you are breaking the law is not required. Don’t know the limit? Doesn’t matter, you are still legally obliged to comply. However, all the way up the chain, from the police officer, through the administrative arm to the judge, each person has discretion to waive the infringement notice. Basically, they can do that if they don’t think it’s “fair” on Bob in the circumstances. Given that Bob managed to reach 40+km/h within 20m of a more than 90 degree corner I think the infringement notice is very fair. Negligent Driving is possibly the more appropriate offense. However, it’s possible to imagine circumstances where waiving the infringement notice is fair. For example, if a speed limit sign has been removed or completely obscured by foliage or a parked vehicle and Bob could show he was not familiar with the area. The question on Alice is, from above, moot. | No it is not legal; it is trespassing. the common law definition of trespassing is to enter someone's land or property without their permission. By locking the door they have denied permission to everyone except those to whom they have given a key. If someone finds a key that happens to fit the lock, there is no longer a physical restriction but as they do not have permission, the legal restriction is still in force. | It is not legally reaching into a person's property if you post a sign on your property that can be seem from the person's property. If the fence is physically on / over your friend's property, the fence is encroaching and would be removable by legal means: a sign on the fence would encroach just as much as the fence does. Your friend can legally construct a fence on a portion of his property than makes the offending fence invisible; or your friend could ignore the sign. | There is ample reason to conclude that "non-commercial" would include a church, as well as advocating a political cause or candidate. The hard part of "personal". In the context of (Canadian) bankruptcy law, it can mean "non-business use"; in the context of "personal use property", it can be "A type of property that an individual does not use for business purposes or hold as an investment. In other words, property that an individual owns for personal enjoyment". US tax law takes "personal purposes" to refer to non-business purposes. But in the context of copyright (especially music downloading / copying), it is taken to refer to the use of or by an individual. Distributing free copies of a protected work does not get legally sanctioned due to the copying being non-commercial. The alternative term "private" is much clearer, in identifying "just you", but is probably avoided in this kind of context so as to avoid the wrong inference that you can only play Pokemon in the privacy of your own home. So the slightly less clear term "personal" is used instead of "private" especially in copyright-related contexts. "Personal" and "private" are not exactly the same, but when it's about use, I don't see any difference, and I think there is no question that use to attract to a church or political candidate is not "private", it is public. Since the license does not define "your own personal purposes" and there is not an existing crystal-clear definition of "personal purposes", the phrase could be given its "ordinary (plain) meaning". Of course, plain meaning has to give way to contractual intent, so we have to figure out what the parties intended. Except, you don't have a contract with Niantic, but still, plain meaning surely has some place in the law of licenses. At this point, in a lawsuit, both sides would hire an expert witness like a linguist or English teacher to make the case that a church or other non-commercial non-private use is / is not included in the meaning of "personal purpose". A silly argument could be made to the effect that if you personally have an interest in doing something then it is a personal purpose (if specifically commercial, it would be precluded by the term "noncommercial"). What makes this silly is that everybody does things for personal purposes (even acting in a way that benefits others, since you do so for the personal reason that you should do so), and thus "personal" would not mean anything. That is, "personal purposes" does not mean "whatever motivation or interest you personally have". You can also gain a certain understanding of what "personal purposes" means by looking at similar licenses. In the context of academic publishing, authors are typically granted license to copy "for personal, professional, or teaching purposes". Professional purposes and teaching purposes are things that the person has an interest in, so by mentioning these things separately, we must conclude that "teaching" is not a "personal purpose". And so: I would conclude that a court could find that using a product to support a political campaign, philosophy, or religion, is a "public" purpose, not a "personal" purpose. At the same time, at least as I understand it, a lure module is a thing that others besides yourself personally can see (I admit, I don't go), which implies that the purpose of the thing is not entirely private. In addition, there is a fair amount of buzz out there about how a lure could be good for business, which is (1) clearly in contradiction of the license terms and (2) clearly a golden opportunity for Niantic, perhaps in a few weeks after everybody gets hooked and then they will offer non-personal licenses. Their license terms also say that you will not "use the Services or Content, or any portion thereof, for any commercial purpose or for the benefit of any third party or in a manner not permitted by these Terms". I would say that that definitively says "No don't do it", and it also means that you can't be nice to a neighbor. So what they literally say and what they really intend are probably completely different things. |
Are out-of-state learner's permits valid for driving in California? Can a teen driver with a learner's permit drive in California if (s)he follows the restrictions of the permit? | Maybe: In California, you must be at least 16 years old to drive with an out-of-state permit. Since some states offer permits to persons younger than 16, those would not be valid in CA until the individual's 16th birthday. An out-of-state learner's permit is only valid for 10 days following the date of entry (inclusive). For periods longer than 10 days, one must apply for a Nonresident Minor's Certificate. Cal. Veh. Code § 12504(a) takes the previous two sections on nonresident licensing, which apply to persons over the age of 18, applies them to persons aged 16-18, and adds the 10-day caveat as described above: (a) Sections 12502 and 12503 apply to any nonresident over the age of 16 years but under the age of 18 years. The maximum period during which that nonresident may operate a motor vehicle in this state without obtaining a driver's license is limited to a period of 10 days immediately following the entry of the nonresident into this state except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section. (b) provides that the 10-day restriction does not apply where the person has a license and has a Nonresident Minor's Certificate: (b) Any nonresident over the age of 16 years but under the age of 18 years who is a resident of a foreign jurisdiction which requires the licensing of drivers may continue to operate a motor vehicle in this state after 10 days from his or her date of entry into this state if he or she meets both the following: He or she has a valid driver's license, issued by the foreign jurisdiction, in his or her immediate possession. He or she has been issued and has in his or her immediate possession a nonresident minor's certificate, which the department issues to a nonresident minor who holds a valid driver's license issued to him or her by his or her home state or country, and who files proof of financial responsibility. General learners permit information for non-residents travelling in the 50 states can be found here. | It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state. | You can give your friend limited power of attorney in respect to selling your car, if you trust your friend enough with managing this transaction. Basically this is just a legal form you sign telling anybody who questions that you give your friend the legal right to stand in your place (in legal matters) and act as if they were you. The limited part is important as you don't want to give unlimited power of attorney (not sure you even can without more involved work), but you need to spell out exactly what your friend can do, like sign your title, sign and deliver a bill of sale, and complete a transaction in your name. Your friend would be signing their name to the title and submitting it with the power of attorney paperwork. In California, the DMV has a specific form for exactly this. You should print out, sign, and mail that form to your friend. | The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question). | Different states vary on all of this stuff but many times the roadside breathalyzer is given to establish probable cause to arrest a driver. After that the driver is given another test on a computer-connected breath tester at the station (or wherever). It's these big testers that are usually used as the evidence and are the ones which are at the center of controversy in various states. As @Dale M stated, for roadside tests the officer can write the results in a notebook, some breathalyzers have printers, and other are connected to a computer. Whatever the case, there is usually a process that officers go through to ensure this stuff is accurate and complete. A lot of it is departmental policy and would only be revealed if challenged in court or perhaps via an open data request. But again, this record is to show probable cause for the arrest and the trip to the bigger badder test which is fully computerized and documented and witnessed. (In at least one state (NC) you have the right to have a witness present when you are tested.) EDIT: Oh, and if your plan is to challenge probable cause because the record-keeping on the roadside breathalyzer is mediocre, the cop can cite all sorts of other probable cause, like he saw you swerving, you were slurring your speech, he smelled alcohol, you failed the in-car test, and you failed the roadside walking, touching, dancing, singing test. | California Vehicle Code Section 21453 (b) regulates right turns on red: Except when a sign is in place prohibiting a turn, a driver, after stopping as required by subdivision (a), facing a steady circular red signal, may turn right, or turn left from a one-way street onto a one-way street. A driver making that turn shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to any vehicle that has approached or is approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard to the driver, and shall continue to yield the right-of-way to that vehicle until the driver can proceed with reasonable safety. No exception is made for intersections where bicycles can go straight, so I conclude that right on red is legal in that case as well. Logically: it is legal to turn right on red from a lane where all traffic must turn right, and it is also legal from a non-turn-only lane where all traffic is allowed to either turn right or go straight. There is no reason for this intermediate case, where some vehicles may go straight and others may not, to be different from the two extremes. Especially since, when the light is red, neither bicycles nor cars nor anything else should be going straight through the intersection. | Public schools are open to all residents. There is no citizenship requirement and no "tax payer" requirement. Unless excepted for home schooling or attending a recognized private school, in most locations it would not only be allowed, but mandatory between certain ages. | You are required by state law to register and license a personal (or commercial) vehicle because state laws govern vehicle licensing, not the federal government as you cite. See Motor vehicle registration - Wikipedia. States have the right, well established in case law, to require registration, taxation and insurance for all vehicles on all public roads. The various websites and "sovereign citizen" arguments on the web that say you don't need to register or license a vehicle are wrong. In some special cases, states issue waivers for what are known as farm or ranch vehicles driven solely on private property, and those cases may or may not pay taxes or require insurance. |
What date is considered “start of residency” for Maryland MVA? I am new to Maryland and am trying to resister and title my vehicle. On the MVA website, it states the following: If you qualify for the tax credit by titling in MD within 60 days of residency, vehicle(s) titled in a state with a tax rate equal to or higher than Maryland's 6% tax rate will cost $100. If the vehicle is registered in a state that imposes no tax or you have been a resident over 60 days, the tax will be assessed at 6% of the value of the vehicle. I do not want to pay an extra 6% of my car’s value, but I have no clue when the start of residency is. Does it refer to the start of my apartment lease, my actual move-in date (a couple of months after the lease started), the 183rd day living in Maryland (full-time tax residency definition), or when I get my driver’s license? How do they determine the residency start date? | There is a requirement that you register your vehicle in Maryland within 60 days of having moved to Maryland. There is no statutory definition of "moving", so the courts apply an "ordinary meaning" interpretation to the concept. Various things constitute evidence that you have "moved" to a new state, for example, moving out of some other state and arriving in Maryland. Tax residency is completely unrelated to vehicle-registration residency (or in-state tuition residency). It has nothing to do with your driver's license, and everything to do with actually living in Maryland. It also does not have anything to do with signing a lease. For example, if you stay with a friend for a few weeks after arriving in Maryland, you have been living in Maryland. It is possible that you are on a road trip (with all of your stuff, having decided that no matter what you won't live in Ohio anymore), spend a week on vacation in Maryland, then decide "I should just live here", in that case there is some discrepancy between when you first appeared in the state vs. when you started "living" there. Barring any such complications, it starts with when you arrived in Maryland, with the intention to live there. The lease / move-in discrepancy is mildly peculiar, but I can imagine a situation where you have to nab an apartment in advance, while living in Ohio, and then you actually move there two months later. It comes down to when you actually started living there, even if you leave the state for short trips. | You can’t die “during” a sale The formation of a contract is instantaneous, if the buyer dies they have to die before there was a contract in which case the seller keeps the car or after there was one in which case the buyer’s executor and the seller must do everything necessary to complete the sale (or breach the contract and get sued). This has nothing to do with any administrative obligations that either party owes to a third party like the DMV. Failing to properly transfer title may lead to complications and disputes latter on but it doesn’t directly affect the contract. | Sample answer: Be a US citizen - automatic US tax residency Own a UK property and live there for 91 days to gain UK tax residency Spend 60 days in India plus a total of 365 days over the previous 4 years Spend 62 days in Norway, having been tax resident there the previous year. If I understand correctly, this status can be maintained indefinitely by spending 62 days there per year once first gained. Spend 120 days in Paraguay On the last day of the tax year, start working in the Philippines on an indefinite contract Spend 183 days or more in Singapore during the prior tax year Spend a total of 270 days in Mauritius over the current tax year and the previous two years (our calendar is getting pretty constrained at this point but I think this is still all technically possible) Have access to a spare room that a friend informally keeps available for you in Germany Be a member of the crew of a vessel registered in Mozambique Have at least one essential connection to Sweden, having been tax resident there less than 5 years previously Have a spouse who lives as a permanent resident in Spain and is somehow a contributing member of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (triggering Australian tax residency) Total tax residencies: 13 Total marginal income tax rate after double tax treaties and reliefs for the tie break: no idea | If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected. | The driver of a vehicle is responsible for moving violations, the owner is responsible for other tickets such as parking and vehicle correction notices. California Vehicle Code section 4000 states: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. A ticket for a moving violation, including driving an unregistered vehicle, is issued to the driver; the driver is responsible. Section 40610 of the California Vehicle Code describes what occurs with an unregistered vehicle. If there is no evidence of fraud or persistent neglect then a "Notice to Correct Violation" will be issued and will be the responsibility of the vehicle owner. The correction notice to have the vehicle registered is different than the violation of driving an unregistered vehicle. Non-moving violations, such as parking tickets are the responsibility of the vehicle's owner if the vehicle is being operated with the owner's permission. Section 40200 describes this as it relates to parking tickets: (a) Any violation of any regulation that is not a misdemeanor governing the standing or parking of a vehicle under this code, under any federal statute or regulation, or under any ordinance enacted by local authorities is subject to a civil penalty. The enforcement of those civil penalties shall be governed by the civil administrative procedures set forth in this article. (b) Except as provided in Section 40209, the registered owner and driver, rentee, or lessee of a vehicle cited for any violation of any regulation governing the parking of a vehicle under this code, under any federal statute or regulation, or under any ordinance enacted by a local authority shall be jointly liable for parking penalties imposed under this article, unless the owner can show that the vehicle was used without consent of that person, express or implied. An owner who pays any parking penalty, civil judgment, costs, or administrative fees pursuant to this article shall have the right to recover the same from the driver, rentee, or lessee. (c) The driver of a vehicle who is not the owner thereof but who uses or operates the vehicle with the express or implied permission of the owner shall be considered the agent of the owner to receive notices of parking violations served in accordance with this article and may contest the notice of violation. While the owner of the vehicle is legally responsible for non-moving violations of the vehicle code, a reasonable argument can be made that the person who committed the infraction, such as parking illegally, is morally responsible and may incur a civil liability to the owner of the vehicle as highlighted by bold in section (b) above. | Yes, the police can give you a ticket for not having insurance/registration in the vehicle, even if they know it is registered/insured. The requirement is not just that you must have it, but you must carry proof of it in the vehicle. California Law (CVC §16058) requires that insurance companies electronically report insurance information to the DMV, which the officer has access to and can verify insurance. From the California DMV Page: Financial responsibility (commonly known as insurance) is required on all vehicles operated or parked on California roadways. You must carry evidence of financial responsibility in your vehicle at all times and it must be provided as specified below when: Requested by law enforcement. Renewing vehicle registration. The vehicle is involved in a traffic collision. The reason it must be in your vehicle is that when you are involved in a collision, you have to be able to provide that to the other party. And yes, you can receive the citation even if the vehicle is not yours. It is your responsibility as a driver to abide by the laws and verify that the vehicle is legal to drive. California Vehicle Code (CVC) §4000(a)(1) requires registration: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. I'm not advocating that you should just "suck it up and pay" this ticket. I would certainly bring proof of registration/insurance at the time of the ticket to your court date and provide that you are not the registered owner of the vehicle (you don't say, but I assume you were borrowing a friends vehicle). The court should look at that evidence and issue a warning or dismiss the ticket. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lien A lien is a form of security interest granted over an item of property to secure the payment of a debt or performance of some other obligation. So the garage might have held a lien on Wilson's car as a way to secure a debt that he owed them, such as payment owed for repairs. If so, it would have prevented Wilson from selling the car until the debt was paid. It would also have made it a little less clear who was truly in possession of the car if the garage had a security interest in the car. However, in this particular case, Wilson had a monthly credit account with the garage. I would assume that means he had come to some arrangement with the garage where they would do the work without demanding payment on the spot, and that he would pay what he owed at the end of the month, or something like that; perhaps on terms like net 30 days. They evidently trusted him enough to grant him unsecured credit, instead of demanding a lien on the car as security. So the issue of a lien did not come up in determining possession. This sort of arrangement would have been a lot more common in 1963, before credit cards were common, so I'm not surprised that your garage today doesn't offer it. Nowadays the garage is more likely to demand payment as soon as the work is done, but you can get much the same effect by paying them with a credit card; then you will have about a month before you have to pay your credit card bill (or begin paying interest on it). | According to Virginia law, Every person convicted of reckless driving under the provisions of this article is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. That speed easily qualifies as reckless driving: A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth (i) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit or (ii) in excess of eighty miles per hour regardless of the applicable maximum speed limit. The punishment for a class 1 misdemeanor is "confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both." But wait! An airplane is heavy, so this may also apply: If it is found by the judge of a court of proper jurisdiction that the violation of any provision of this title (i) was a serious traffic violation as defined in § 46.2-341.20 and (ii) that such violation was committed while operating a vehicle or combination of vehicles used to transport property that either: (a) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds or (b) has a gross combination weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds inclusive of a towed vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds, the judge may assess, in addition to any other penalty assessed, a further monetary penalty not exceeding $500. By the way, I couldn't find a general reckless endangerment statute (unrelated to specific objects like firearms or specific results like injury or death) in Virginia law. The closest thing I could find was disorderly conduct, which is also a class 1 misdemeanor. It's possible I just don't know where to look. |
Is accidental, unknowing tresspassing possible? John is hunting on public land. If John accidentally crosses an unmarked property line of which he is not aware onto Joe's property, is he trespassing? | Your question goes to a person's state of mind, which gets tricky; the intention of the law is that to be guilty of trespassing a reasonable person would need to know they had entered into or were remaining in a place they are not supposed to be. Specific requirements for what that means is going to vary by jurisdiction (closed-off area, posted signs, verbal notice, etc). Trespass is knowingly entering another owners’ property or land without permission, which encroaches on the owners’ privacy or property interests (Cornell Law). In your example, John would not be trespassing unless and until Joe asked him to leave and John refused to do so. | Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me. | What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. | No it is not legal; it is trespassing. the common law definition of trespassing is to enter someone's land or property without their permission. By locking the door they have denied permission to everyone except those to whom they have given a key. If someone finds a key that happens to fit the lock, there is no longer a physical restriction but as they do not have permission, the legal restriction is still in force. | There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case. | In California, you may use reasonable force to protect property from imminent harm. The jury instruction on that point is here. The instruction regarding justifiable homicide and defense of property is more restricted, because it only applies to protection of property when the deceased enters a home. If a stranger attacks your dog on a walk, you can use force to defend your dog, but you cannot shoot to kill. If the attack is against a person and not property, then the attack does not have to be in a home in order to be justifiable. | I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction I demand you give me your hat! You're not going to, are you? The point of that is that you are not obliged to do anything just because someone demands that you do. Now, if I had a court order that required you to give me your hat ... It appears that there is some confusion over who owns some land in Nebraska. This is a problem; it is not your problem. From my understanding which is entirely based on this: A warranty deed is a type of deed where the grantor (seller) guarantees that he or she holds clear title to a piece of real estate and has a right to sell it to the grantee (buyer). you would be extremely unwise to sign such a deed since it is in no way clear that you (or anyone) does have clear title. Now I take it that you are not interested in owning land in Nebraska and even less interested in getting into a legal battle over it. If that is the case then I suggest that you consult a local lawyer and ask for his advice on the following plan of action: You and your wife will renounce any claim that you may have if: You do not guarantee that you have any claim or title, The person to whom you are making this grant indemnifies you against any legal action that may result, They will prepare the documents, Your lawyer will review them, They will reimburse you for your lawyer's fees. Come back and tell us how this works out. Edit to address subsequent questions Can you be responsible for costs? Well, anything is possible but it would be extremely unlikely. If there was any wrongdoing it was many years ago by someone else! If you approach this in a reasonable way and attempt to assist in reaching a resolution (so long as it doesn't cost you time or money) then it is highly unlikely a court would award costs against you. What about background checks? This would be a civil case. It would not appear in your criminal history. While it is a matter of public record all it really means is that you and someone else had a dispute that required a court to settle; happens all the time. | Since the incident was on private property (inside a building), a person does not have the same right to be there that you would have on the street outside the building. Yale police therefore can legally make a determination whether a person is trespassing (for example, by asking for identification), especially when there is an allegation that a person is trespassing. A law holding a person criminally or civilly liable for reporting their "suspicions" to the government without e.g. "reasonable suspicion" could easily run afoul of the First Amendment. |
What laws require establishments to serve free tap water in the UK and what are the parameters of these requirements? Can an ice cream / "fast food" shop, that purports not to be a restaurant, decline to serve fresh drinking water free of charge when asked for by a customer? | In England and Wales and Scotland, 'licensed premises', i.e. premises authorised to serve alcohol, are obliged to provide free drinking water to customers on request. Unlicensed premises are not obliged to provide drinking water. In England and Wales, all licensed premises "must ensure that free potable water is provided on request to customers where it is reasonably available". https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111116906/schedule?view=plain In Scotland, all licensed premises are obliged to provide "tap water fit for drinking" free to customers on request. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2005/16/schedule/4/paragraph/8/2005-12-21?view=plain In Northern Ireland there is no law providing for giving customers free water on request. Schools in Great Britain (i.e. not Northern Ireland) are obliged to supply free drinking water. England https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1943/made Scotland https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2020/153/regulation/7/made Wales https://www.legislation.gov.uk/mwa/2009/3/section/5 All UK workplaces must provide workers an "adequate supply of wholesome drinking water". https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/3004/regulation/22/made | england Admittedly it's not very clear, but paragraph 5 of Schedule 4 restricts the use of anything else apart from the resulting consumers' bottles, ergo bottling has to take place at the point of extraction (Subject to sub-para 3): 5.—(1) Subject to sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), water must not be transported in containers other than those authorised for distribution to the ultimate consumer. (2) [omitted] (3) Water distributed to the ultimate consumer in a bottle marked or labelled with the description “spring water” may be transported from the spring to the bottling plant in a container which is not for distribution to the ultimate consumer if, on or before 13th December 1996, water from that spring was so transported. | A store owner may ban any person from that store that s/he chooses, provided that the ban is not for a reason forbidden by applicable anti-discrimination law, such as banning all people of a particular race or religion. That does not appear to be the case in this situation, from the description. Since this is a franchise, the store has a local owner who is not the chain company. The company will have a franchise contract with the local owner, which will specify in what ways the company can and cannot control the store. They might or might not have the power to require the store owner not to ban you, or not to engage in verbally abusive behavior in the store. In any case, you, or any third party, cannot force them to exercise such power, even if they have it under such a contract. It is very unlikely that law enforcement the authorities will treat the verbal harassment as a crime based on a customer report. You could publicize the situation, as by an online review, which might cause the chain company to take some action, for fear of bad publicity. But be careful. You have already learned that your initial understanding of the situation was significantly incomplete. If any public statements you make are untrue, and harmful to reputation, you could be accused of defamation and sued, perhaps successfully. | According to this site in the UK apparently there are laws against calling something free if it was part of the entire package before or if was added later and the price went up Example of the latter: LG sold a TV. They then added a sound bar, increased the price and listed the TV as TV for $XXX + free sound bar. They ran afoul of the regulations Also adding something and calling the addition free is okay if the price didn't go up but you can only advertize it as free for 6 months. After 6 months the law considers it included by default and therefore no longer free. | Trademarks protect against consumer confusion. Ask yourself if a consumer seeing that image with the "studio" portion removed might think that the altered image represents the same company as the original image. Of course, the answer will be "yes." But in the end it also depends on how the trademark is used. You've used the original image in the question; have you violated the trademark? No. Do you violate Tesco's trademark when you say "I went shopping at Tesco"? No. Do you violate their trademark when you sell food using the name "Tesco"? Yes. A distinctive graphic design such as this will also be protected by copyright, so you will also have to consider whether your intended use infringes copyright. | The police can arrest and charge anyone if they have a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed so: yes. However, if the question is: can they secure a conviction the answer is a resounding no. North Carolina law has three prohibitions on minors and alcohol: supplying to, possession of and buying. Possession is easily dealt with: the minor never possessed the alcohol. Supplying is also dealt with perfunctorily: the supply went from the restaurant to a person 21 or over. This only leaves buying. Now, buying something requires a contract (or since the object is illegal, what would be a contract but for that). Did the minor have a contract with anyone? That is, were they under an obligation to pay for the alcohol? No. If the pair had skipped out on the bill, the restaurant would pursue the adult for payment because that is who they have a contract with. Any arrangement between the diners as to how they will split the bill is a private, unenforceable arrangement, not a contract. | I only address the core legal question. The first question regards where the review appeared: on the facility's own web page, or on some third party web page? In the latter case, there is the possibility that soliciting a modified review in exchange for something of value violates the terms of usage for that web site. There are also US federal regulations pertaining to advertising, as well as state regulations. The federal regulations are here. The main question is whether what you say constitutes an endorsement, as specified here. They define an endorsement as: any advertising message (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser. The regulation in fact gives some helpful examples (reading them helps to clarify what an "endorsement" is), the last of which involves a dog: Example 8: A consumer who regularly purchases a particular brand of dog food decides one day to purchase a new, more expensive brand made by the same manufacturer. She writes in her personal blog that the change in diet has made her dog's fur noticeably softer and shinier, and that in her opinion, the new food definitely is worth the extra money. This posting would not be deemed an endorsement under the Guides. Assume now that the consumer joins a network marketing program under which she periodically receives various products about which she can write reviews if she wants to do so. If she receives a free bag of the new dog food through this program, her positive review would be considered an endorsement under the Guides. The distinction at issue is whether the suggestion of receiving something of value might influence a person's statements. You can pay for a positive review, as a reward for saying nice things, as long as the reviewer had no reason to think that they would get get something in return for a review. Taking your review to be an endorsement, as required here, Endorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser. The regulation does not require you to reveal every thing that came into your mind in writing the review, but it is pretty clear that suppressing the concern about vaccination paperwork and the star count constitutes a dishonest statement of opinion of the endorser. Material connections must also be revealed: When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience), such connection must be fully disclosed. For example, when an endorser who appears in a television commercial is neither represented in the advertisement as an expert nor is known to a significant portion of the viewing public, then the advertiser should clearly and conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of compensation prior to and in exchange for the endorsement or the fact that the endorser knew or had reason to know or to believe that if the endorsement favored the advertised product some benefit, such as an appearance on television, would be extended to the endorser In the 7th example under material disclosure, they describe a blogger who received something of value in connection with a review: the blogger should clearly and conspicuously disclose that he received the gaming system free of charge I should point out that these regulations are written by the FTC, and the implied interpretation (such as that the blogger should disclose... with no clearly stated penalty for failure to disclose) is an FTC interpretation. 15 USC 52 prohibits false advertisements for services affecting commerce. This is the jurisdictional aspect of their complaint against Cure Encapsulations, where defendants paid for reviews on a third-party website (this case involves a relationship between defendant and a fourth-party company that apparently hunts for and pays reviewers). This is apparently the first instance in which the FTC has gone against a business for paying for reviews on a third party web site, so it's not a foregone conclusion that they will prevail in court. Still, Chevron deference means that they will probably win at least on the jurisdictional question. The main difference is that in the Cure Encapsulation case, the violation was even more egregious in that the individuals were not even customers, and in this instance the would-(not)-be review was not the honest opinion of the endorser. | Yes as wearing (or not wearing) a mask is not a protected trait so there is nothing protecting a patron from being removed. While you make reference to religious garb a mask is not religious garb and should not be compared to that. https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/restaurants-right-to-refuse-service.html While there are a few exceptions under some state laws, the answer is usually no. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly prohibits restaurants from refusing service to patrons based on race, color, religion, or national origin. In other words, restaurants do not have a constitutional right to refuse service. However, this law does not protect those from discrimination based on sexual orientation. This means restaurants can prevent gay people from entering their restaurant and it is not against federal law. There are up to about 20 states, including New York and California, that have enacted that prohibit discrimination in public accommodations based on sexual orientation. However, it gets even more complicated when factoring in local city ordinances within states that allow certain discrimination laws. Listed below there several legal reasons for a restaurant to refuse service, some of which include: Patrons that act in a certain way that is rude or disrupting other guests Patrons that overfill the capacity of the restaurant can lead to safety hazards Patrons that enter the restaurant after the restaurant is closed and no longer serving food to customers Patrons accompanied by large groups of non-customers looking to create rowdy behavior after hours For patrons lacking adequate hygiene or cleanliness, discrimination for this purpose is acceptable because it puts the health and safety of others in the restaurant or establishment at risk Patrons who bring their dog to your restaurant, which is a violation of local health ordinances. When this happens it is okay to tell the patron to leave because of their dog. One exception would be if the dog is a service dog and protected by the American Disabilities Act. Patrons looking to enter a private establishment that requires a certain dress code for etiquette purposes |
One person patenting a biology researcher's published idea If a biology researcher publishes a paper indicating that a certain molecule can be used to treat a certain condition, can another person then patent that molecule or would the right to patent that molecule be exclusively the original researcher's? If that researcher does not patent that molecule, would it then become freely usable by anyone? (It seems to me like the idea to treat this condition in this way would then be public knowledge.) | Once thwe molecule and its use have been published, that becomes prior art, and no other person can patent this. Whether the original researcher can seek a patent, or is precluded by his or her own prior disclosure, I think depends on the exact facts. I know that in some cases, disclosing an invention to the public waives any claim to a patent. | If you want to implement this or a similar feature, you'd look up the patents, and either get a license (unlikely that Microsoft would give you a license), or figure out how to implement the feature without violating the patent. An example how a company I worked for worked around a patent: In order to compress data. in the best possible way, the idea was to try eight different methods to compress the data and pick the best compressed data. There was a patent for that (even though to me, this was quite obvious). Workaround: The software tried eight different methods and reported a number from 1 to 8 indicating which method gave the best result (unlike the patent, which actually gave the best result). Then the data was compressed once using the best method. No patent violation. You'd probably want a patent lawyer to check if your idea how to implement the feature violates the patent or not, and how to get around it. It takes a specific mindset that you and I don't have. And even good lawyers who are not patent lawyers might not be able to help you there. Commercial vs. open source/free software makes no difference, except that Microsoft might not bother suing you if there is no money to be made. Unless the intent is to prevent you from implementing the feature, in which case the would sue companies without money as well. | If it's patented then it doesn't matter that you independently came up with it. Most software is not patented, though. Most developers do not even think about patents when writing code. In theory you could spend your time keeping up to date on software patents so that you avoid infringing. But this probably only makes sense for specialists who would want to read the latest patents in their field anyway. All software is protected by literary copyright, though. In this case they will try to prove that you did not independently created it, and did copy it. Whelan v. Jaslow in 1986 ruled that structure, sequence and organization of a computer program were protected by copyright. So you could be liable even if you did not just copy and paste sections of code. But even if you're worried the court would get things wrong and think you copied a program when you never even saw it in the first place, there is really nothing you can do about it. | Software cannot be patented although it does have copyright. Hardware can be the subject of a patent, however, that would not cover any software aspects such as the programming built into a PROM. While it is possible to render any software into an integrated circuit, practically, anything simple enough to make this feasible is probably too simple to patent. | It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation. | From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end. | There is no IP in ideas! There is copyright in writing it down - they can't use your exact words without permission. However, sending it to them in the form of a suggestion would give them a pretty much unassailable argument that you have given them an implicit licence. You can patent an invention (not an idea), claim IP in a trade mark (also, not an idea), register a design (again, not an idea) and hold copyright in an artistic work (once more, not an idea). They are required to keep confidences but offering them a suggestion probably doesn't count as supplying confidential information. I can see no risk in acting on customer suggestions. Hence, the idea to raise prices can be acted on or not at the discretion of the company. | I want to use a couple of lines from "What is life?" by Erwin Schrödinger as quote on the front of my thesis. Would i need permission for that form publisher or would that be convered in fair use? There are close cases of fair use, but this is not one of them. This is unequivocally and clearly fair use. It is a brief excerpt of a much larger body of work, it is for non-commercial use by a student, and it is for educational and academic purposes (presumably to advance science). Also do i need to attribute the quote properly Yes. This is necessary both because of the moral rights of the author under E.U. copyright law (assuming that works by Erwin Schrödinger are still in copyright), and for reasons of academic ethical considerations. It is still in copyright, because he died on January 4, 1961, which is 58 years ago. So, in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 50 years (the minimum required by the Berne Convention) this is out of copyright, but in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 70 years (e.g. Germany), the copyright is still in force until January 4, 2031. Also, even if the work were out of copyright, as a matter of academic integrity, you would be required to attribute the quote in an academic thesis in any case. Quoting someone without attribution in academic work is considered plagiarism, and could result in your thesis being stricken and also in your degree being revoked in a serious case. Government ministers in the E.U. have been forced to resign over plagiarism in their academic work as students in recent years. This is taken much more seriously in Europe than it is in the U.S. |
Copyright and trademark issues with variation on an existing game Suppose someone markets a variation on the well-established board game of Monopoly. The variation includes a game board that looks like the Monopoly board but has several extra squares for players to land on, with various novel consequences of landing on those squares. It is called "New Monopoly". They write an instruction booklet that says "The rules are the same as the rules for Monopoly, with the following changes and additions....". (These changes and additions are designed to make good use of the extra squares). The instruction booklet also contains some arguments for why New Monopoly is a better game than the old Monopoly. The question: How much of the above would need to be adjusted to avoid a copyright/trademark violation (in the United States)? Would it help, for example, to change the name so that it doesn't include the word Monopoly? Or to substantially alter the appearance of the board (in ways that don't affect the actual play of the game)? Or to avoid mentioning the existing game of Monopoly in the instruction booklet? Or to avoid mentioning the existing game of Monopoly in the marketing materials? Or anything else? Or is this unavoidably a copyright violation? | There would be both copyright and trademark issues here. See U.S. Trademark Law - USPTO for law adn rules of practice related to US trademarks. See 17 USC for US copyright law. Trademark "Monopoly" is, I understand, protected as a trademark for a board game. It is currently owned by Hasbro. Any name which would be likely to confuse reasonable people into falsely thinking that the new game was authored or approved by the makers of the game Monopoly, or came from those makers would be trademark infringement (unless done by permission). However, a name can allude to another name as long as no market confusion nor any dilution results. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1066 a mark which is "likely when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the applicant to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive." may be grounds for an interference which can prevent registration of the newer mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 provides that: (a) (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (a) (1) (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (a) (1) (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. ... (c) Dilution by Blurring; Dilution by Tarnishment.-- (c) (1) Injunctive relief.--Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury. (c) (2) Definitions.--(A) For purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (c) (2) (A) (1) (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties. (c) (2) (A) (1) (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark. (c) (2) (A) (1) (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. (c) (2) (A) (1) (iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. (c) (2) (B) For purposes of paragraph (1), `dilution by blurring' is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark. In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (c) (2) (B) (i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. (c) (2) (B) (ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark. (c) (2) (B) (iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark. (c) (2) (B) (iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. (c) (2) (B) (v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous mark. (c) (2) (B) (vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. The word "Monopoly" as applied to games surely counts as a "famous martk" an so one must avoid confusion as well as "Dilution by Blurring". A game called "New Monopoly" is obviously intended to refer or allude to the existing game. Moreover it seems "intended to create an association with the famous mark" Such a mark might well constitute Dilution by Blurring. It might be wise to choose a name that is not as similar to the trademarked game, and is not as clearly and directly associated with the existing game. It might be wise to consult an experienced trademark lawyer as to whether any such name was close enough to an existing mark, particularly a famous one, to run a risk of a dilution or an infringement action. One should note that a clear disclaimer, stating that a game is not affiliate with an existing game (or other product), and is not a product of that game's owners, nor approved or sponsored by those owners, can help avoid an infringement or dilution action. Previous Suit According to the Wikipedia article, "Monopoly (game)" (citations omitted): Economics professor Ralph Anspach published Anti-Monopoly in 1973, and was sued for trademark infringement by Parker Brothers in 1974. The case went to trial in 1976. Anspach won on appeals in 1979, as the 9th Circuit Court determined that the trademark Monopoly was generic and therefore unenforceable. The United States Supreme Court declined to hear the case, allowing the appellate court ruling to stand. This decision was overturned by the passage of Public Law 98-620 in 1984. With that law in place, Parker Brothers and its parent company, Hasbro, continue to hold valid trademarks for the game Monopoly. However, Anti-Monopoly was exempted from the law and Anspach later reached a settlement with Hasbro and markets his game under license from them Copyright The concepts and procedures of a game, the so-called "game mechanics" cannot be protected by copyright. Specifically 17 USC 102(b) provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. So having a game in which tokens representing players move around a board, buying and selling properties, paying and collecting rents, and so on, is not protected by copyright. The artwork of any of the various editions of Monopoly would be protected by copyright, and may not be copied or imitated without permission. The layout of the board might be protected, depending on how original it is judged to be. However, the original version on Monopoly called The landlord's Game dates from 1903, and any copyright in it has expired. Only new, original elements first published in 1925 or later would still be protected by copyright. Most of the layout elements are probably now in the public domain. Visual elements of modern editions may well still be under copyright. Conclusion Creation a new game that has some resemblance to Monopoly can probably be done without infringing any IP rights, but care would need to be taken to make it visually distinctive from any protected edition of the game. A name thatr was not similar enough to the existign name to involved "blurring" the existing trademark would need to be chosen. I am doubtful if "New Monopoly" is sufficiently distinctive. | If Alice, Bob, and Cassandra are working on the program and releasing it as a joint work, the copyright statement should reflect it: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice, Bob, Cassandra If, on the other hand, Bob and Cassandra are taking advantage of the "modify" clause of the MIT license to create derivative works, the copyright statements are required by the license to be separate: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice Copyright (c) 2017 Bob Copyright (c) 2017 Cassandra | No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder. | Don't get hung up on unauthorized resale. That only prohibits unauthorized resale. Authorized resale is ok. From http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1854-copyright-infringement-first-sale-doctrine: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). Since the first sale doctrine never protects a defendant who makes unauthorized reproductions of a copyrighted work, the first sale doctrine cannot be a successful defense in cases that allege infringing reproduction. | Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe. | There are now 2 works. An original, abandoned work, and a new, derivative work. The original creator owns the copyright over the original, and the new person owns copyright over the derivative he created. In your scenario, it will be the new creator, who will have the right to sue, if the gpl of the new work has been infringed | The "Beholder" was originally invented as part of AD&D (2nd edition IIRC) and copyrighted by TSR (Gary Gygax and associates, essentially). WotC bought TSR and all its assets, including copyrights. There were at least two other RPGs that tried to use Beholders and other original creatures from the Monster Manual of D&D and dropped them after a cease and desist order from the copyright holders. I believe one was from TSR, and one from WotC after they purchased TSR. To the best of my knowledge there was no actual copyright suit, so the validity of the copyright was never tested in court, but it is probably valid. Merely calling a creature a "Beholder" is not enough to violate the copyright, there would need to be actual copying of the description, or a sufficiently detailed similarity to make the use an infringement. That is always a matter of judgement, ultimately for a court in a copyright suit (or an appeals court). So, while all the possibilities mentioned in the answer by @Dale M are valid, it is additional possible that the version used by HOMM3 is not sufficiently close to the one copyrighted as part of AD&D for a copyright claim to prevail, or the WotC fears that it would not prevail, and so does not spend the money to try. | is contract text itself subject to copyright? What are my options? It largely depends on the originality of your contract. C & J Management Corp. v. Anderson, 707 F.Supp.2d 858, 862 (2009) points to multiple references against preclusion of "a copyrightable interest in a contract". But you would need to prove that your competitor copied "original elements" of your contract including "a minimum degree of creativity and originality required to support a valid copyright". See Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (1973). Your post provides no information that would help identifying or ruling out this issue in your matter. Without realizing, you might have paid dearly for boilerplate language that your lawyer copied from somewhere else. Indeed, there is so much regurgitation and copy/pasting in the legal "profession" (judges included, as is notorious in judicial opinions they release and in the similarities --verbatim-- among the procedure law of many, many U.S. jurisdictions). That regurgitation is not bad in and of itself, though, since what matters is the expeditious administration of justice and the protection of your rights, rather than obtaining creative expressions authored by some lawyer. You might end up wasting valuable energy and money if you went after the competitor for something like this without first assessing the extent of originality in your contract. Focus instead on the much more detrimental fact that your competitor "plays dirty in general". |
Could Alex Jones' lawyer have claimed back the data he should have produced in discovery? As I understand it from the news and some blogs: Alex Jones and his lawyers were asked during discovery to provide any message from his cellphone that did mention the Sandy Hook massacre. He claimed he did not have any and he did not produce any. Then his lawyer provided the plaintiffs' lawyer with some electronic documents. But it seems that he botched it and gave way more information than he intended to. The plaintiffs' lawyer warned Jones' lawyer about that. Jones' lawyer had ten days to formally acknowledge the transfer was a mistake, and to ask the plaintiffs' lawyer to ignore and delete the data. Jones' lawyer failed to do anything. Ten days after the error was notified to Jones' lawyer, and due to the lack of answer, the plaintiffs' lawyer was entitled to use all that was provided to him. That data included the record from Jones' phone, showing that he had messages related to the Sandy Hook massacre that he had failed to disclose. My question is: if the plaintiffs' lawyer had noticed those messages (that should have been delivered to him more than a year ago), could he have kept them and used them in trial even if Jones' lawyer had requested him to delete the data transferred to him? Or would a request from Jones' lawyer have prevented him from doing that? | This is a civil case in Texas. See Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 193.3(d) and guidance. In the current PDF May 1 2022 those are on pages 199 and 121 respectively and I reproduce them below. My understanding is that defense counsel (D) could have asserted privilege when Plaintiffs' counsel (P) originally told him about the link. In doing so, D would have identified the inadvertently produced material and the privilege asserted. Then P would be obliged to promptly return (or delete as it's digital) that material and any copies. Inevitably in this case P would object to the claim of privilege over any material potentially or apparently 'responsive' to discovery (e.g. a folder called "digital copy of defendant's phone" or texts mentioning keywords). The judge would hear from both parties and make a ruling on the material. In reality, D did not do that. Also, D made no contemporaneous objections to P's request to admit particular material in court (note P did not request the admission of the entire trove, only particular pieces of it). Instead, the day after the "Perry Mason moment", D filed an 'emergency motion of protection' and a request for a mistrial. The judge denied both. D asked for another ten days to review the material. The judge said no to ten days but said D could have a D a day to make a start and then they could discuss whether more were needed. She said she would not make a blanket protection order over the entire trove without knowledge of what was in it. hearing here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKbAmNwbiMk Incidentally, P claimed there was an earlier inadvertent production of some other material and in relation to that material rule 193.3(d) was followed by both parties. (from 7mins in that clip.) Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) Privilege not waived by production. A party who produces material or information without intending to waive a claim of privilege does not waive that claim under these rules or the Rules of Evidence if - within ten days or a shorter time ordered by the court, after the producing party actually discovers that such production was made - the producing party amends the response, identifying the material or information produced and stating the privilege asserted. If the producing party thus amends the response to assert a privilege, any party who has obtained the specific material or information must promptly return the specified material or information and any copies pending any ruling by the court denying the privilege. (guidance) Rule 193.3(d) is a new provision that allows a party to assert a claim of privilege to material or information produced inadvertently without intending to waive the privilege. The provision is commonly used in complex cases to reduce costs and risks in large document Page 122 productions. The focus is on the intent to waive the privilege, not the intent to produce the material or information. A party who fails to diligently screen documents before producing them does not waive a claim of privilege. This rule is thus broader than Tex. R. Evid. 511 and overturns Granada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1992), to the extent the two conflict. The ten-day period (which may be shortened by the court) allowed for an amended response does not run from the production of the material or information but from the party’s first awareness of the mistake. To avoid complications at trial, a party may identify prior to trial the documents intended to be offered, thereby triggering the obligation to assert any overlooked privilege under this rule. A trial court may also order this procedure. This rule imposes no duty to supplement or amend deposition testimony. The only duty to supplement deposition testimony is provided in Rule 195.6. Any party can request a hearing in which the court will resolve issues brought up in objections or withholding statements. The party seeking to avoid discovery has the burden of proving the objection or privilege. | Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service. | If there's a reason to believe that your machine has data that would be relevant to a lawsuit, then yes, it is subject to inspection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: A party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: ... any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. So if there's a lawsuit where there becomes a question about what you downloaded from the network, then it's quite plausible that your device could be demanded or subpoenaed. But that's not the same thing as "forfeiting" your device. The normal procedure in such a case would be that the agency's lawyers would notify you of the demand, and you would take your device to an ESI expert, who would make a digital image of the device's hard drive. The parties would then fight about what portions of that image they are allowed to access, but you would have your device again while that was going on. | The tort for this kind of activity is called public disclosure of private facts, and almost every U.S. state recognizes that this tort is invalid under the First Amendment in the absence of a legal duty not to disclose of the type existing between an attorney and client, or a psychotherapist and a patient, or a contractual non-disclosure agreement, that does not exist between roommates. There is nothing illegal about your roommate's conduct. Your best move at this point is to take responsibility for your own conduct, to repent and to convince the world that you're doing your best to get on the straight and narrow going forward. If your former roommate insisted on payment for not disclosing the information, that would be extortion, but there is nothing wrong with going ahead and disseminating it without trying to obtain something of value from you for not doing so. | There's also the matter of admitting its over is not admitting he lost. Trump could be saying privately that he thinks all possible attempts to contest were blocked, but that since almost all were blocked for non-evidentiary reasons, he can still hold that had the cases progressed to the evidentiary portion the outcomes would have been different. From an apolitical example, just because someone cannot be tried because of statute of limitations, doesn't mean they didn't do the crime... just that the prosecution didn't charge them in a timely manner. The prosecutor, upon getting the decision from the judge that the trial won't even happen, could say to himself or a client "It's all over" while still believing they had the guy they accused dead to rights for the crime. There is further issues with the Politico report that could negate this as evidence of Mens Rea (the first matter is for some reason the link to the report is not working for me, so pardon my ignorance of the details in the article). I'm supposing that Donald Trump did not tell the reporter this story himself, but rather a likely unnamed source that is close to Trump. Here the problem in court would be a matter of evidence (Trump would say he never said this... Politico can't refute that claim by saying we know a guy who says you did... the guy who said Trump said it could testify, but as of yet, we don't have any identity at this stage in the game... the burden of proof is on those who say Donald Trump said something that He himself says he never said or doesn't recall saying. The net result is that the statement attributed to Donald Trump would not be evidence to Mens Rea in any prosectuion right now because there is no specific person attributing the hearsay statement to Trump when Trump denies saying it (it is not hearsay to introduce statements agains opposition's intrest at trial, but the testimony to such evidence needs to be made by a person who was privy to the statement when it happened (they don't need to be the party that the comment was made to... just had to have a valid way of hearing it first hand). With all verbal statements, the larger context also applies, so access to the larger conversation as well as Trump's state of mind in the moment he said it to help infer ultimate meaning. Did Trump think he actually lost because he accepted the results OR did he think lost because he was cheated and denied a chance to be heard in court or have his evidence considered beyond pretrial determinations? The quote could be said in either context and mean totally different things as evidence to the two specific crimes you accuse him of. It's not something to dismiss off hand, but at this stage it is also not a smoking gun. Remember the classic Twilight Zone episode "To Serve Man" and that a single lone statement can have multiple meanings... assuming the most appealing meaning can have disasterous results when the statement is put into a broader context. | My impression, and the plausible explanation in the absence of the actual facts, is that this was something that the attorney agreed to, in order to allow a skittish client to reveal information pursuant to a favorable plea agreement. The police probably insisted that the client be handcuffed to someone while doing this to prevent the client from fleeing. The attorney probably offered to do the job instead of a police officer, to be able to provide advice to his client and keep his client calm enough to do it, which might not have happened (sacrificing the favorable plea deal that the attorney negotiated) if someone else were in that role. | Revealing such information might be an example of an Invasion of Privacy tort, specifically "Disclosure of Private Facts". Not all US states recognize this tort. The Findlaw page on "What is Invasion of privacy" says: Public disclosure of private facts laws protect your right to keep the details of your private life from becoming public information. For example, publicizing facts about a person's health, sexual conduct, or financial troubles is likely an invasion of privacy. While state laws vary, the general elements of this tort are as follows: 1.The defendant publicized a matter regarding the private life of the plaintiff; 2.The publicized matter would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and 3.It is not of a legitimate concern to the public. To publicize a private matter, laws generally require that the private information is disseminated in such a way that it is substantially certain to become public knowledge A linked sub-page of the above says: Generally, disclosure to one or two people does not constitute a public disclosure unless there is an implication that the information should be spread around. The Digital Media law Project's page on "Publication of Private Facts" says much the same thing. The 1976 law review article "The First Amendment Privilege and Public Disclosure of Private Facts" by Samuel Soopper Discusses this tort in some detail, although it mostly focuses on publications by the news media where first amendment issues are in play. It seems as if such a tort case might be hard to bring because of the small number of people to whom the fact was disclosed. A claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress might fit such a situation, but this would depend on the specific facts of the case, and again, on the state where the issue would be tried. In any case, this would not be a criminal action, and a lawyer would have to be consulted to better determine if a civil action could be pursued. | Once you withdrew the complaint without prejudice, any statute of limitations benefit you obtained from filing the lawsuit evaporated. From a legal perspective, it is as if you never filed at all, except that the lawsuit that was filed proves that you had notice of the claim at the time you filed, so you cannot take advantage of any "discovery rule" that allows a statute of limitations to start running from the date that you knew or should have known of your right to file a lawsuit. In all likelihood, the statute of limitations has now run, although that would depend upon the jurisdiction in which it was filed. Some jurisdictions toll the statute of limitations during a period of minority, but that tolling might very well be insufficient to allow the claim to be filed 20 years later. |
Can a creditor refuse to accept a $2 FRN because he doesn't think they exist? Like all Federal Reserve Notes (FRNs, aka "bills" or "cash"), the $2 FRN is "legal tender for all debts, public and private." However, a lot of people don't know about them. If I owe someone $10, and all I have is five $2 bills, is it legal for him to refuse to accept them because he's sure that $2 bills don't exist and they must be counterfeit? Assume that for some reason, he can't just Google "$2 bill" and see that they're real. | If the requirement for the debt is that the debt be paid in US dollars, absent some other stipulation to the contrary, $2 bills are US dollars and would satisfy the debtors obligation. It's hard to envision a situation where one would go before a judge or magistrate to enforce one's right to pay a debt with a $2 bill, but I suppose that effort would be successful. A debt that is to be paid in US dollars can be paid in $2 bill increments. | Answering my own question after some more research (which I should have done in the first place). Yes, it's illegal both in the US and in the EU Many airlines do it anyway because they are desperate for cash and hoping that no government agency will enforce it. A trade group is actually lobbying to change the laws Airlines will do what they can to make you accept a voucher. Some create an incentive, some make it just extremely difficult to get refund or they will simply deny it. If you accept a voucher, you waive the right for a refund. Only realistic option is a charge back through the credit card but I haven't found any successful examples yet. Good overview articles: https://onemileatatime.com/flight-cancelled-refund/ https://viewfromthewing.com/airlines-are-breaking-the-law-by-refusing-refunds-for-cancelled-flights/ | As noted in your update, Cal. Civ. Code section 1947.3 says (a) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a landlord or a landlord's agent shall allow a tenant to pay rent and deposit of security by at least one form of payment that is neither cash nor electronic funds transfer. Paragraph 2 related to cases of recent bounced checks, and it sounds like you don't have that problem. From the personal finance angle, if you liked the convenience of the online service but don't trust the new ACH agent, your bank may have an "online bill pay" service where they can withdraw money at a designated time each month and send it. Chase has such a service, no charge, they do an electronic transfer if the payee accepts them and otherwise mail a paper check. | Is it legal to sell currency at a price lower than face value? Yes. In fact, to donate is the act of transferring for free the ownership of something. Outlawing a transaction that is less extreme than a donation would be inconsistent with the lawfulness of donations. A significant departure from the market exchange rate does not affect the validity of currency exchange. A "sale" of currency in terms of itself is not illegal, since the transaction can be viewed as a combination of two transactions performed instantaneously and involving the fiction of an intermediary currency. Offers of currency for less than face value also happen very often when transacting the bonds issued by a country's central bank. Any two parties can transact those bonds in secondary markets. The scenario you describe obviates redemption periods, fluctuation risks, and various formalities, but those differences are inconsequential from a legal standpoint. | An oral contract is (usually) entirely legally binding (exceptions include things like land sales). Written notes do not change that. The important thing about nearly contemporaneous notes is that if the contract runs into difficulty and you need to litigate, they are likely to be accepted by a court as good evidence of what was agreed. They will be much more difficult for the other party to challenge later (they can be challenged now of course - which is part of why they are considered good evidence of what was agreed). | Yes, there is a reasonableness limit, and this is especially true in consumer transactions. If you were given an estimate and the final bill is a lot more than what you were expecting, you can dispute it. The final price should be ‘reasonable’. The law doesn’t say what counts as reasonable, so you’ll have to agree it between you. You should consider: the estimate you agreed to [if there was one] any changes, and why they happened anything that happened that was beyond the control of the trader, like bad weather or the cost of materials going up https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/consumer/getting-home-improvements-done/problem-with-home-improvements/ When it comes to work itself, the act states that a tradesman or professional has a 'duty of care' towards you and your property. Any standard or price you agree must be honoured. But if it isn't agreed in advance the work must be done to a reasonable standard, at a reasonable cost, and within a reasonable time. So if you haven't fixed a price, you don't have to pay a ridiculously high bill. All you have to pay is what you consider 'reasonable' and invite them to sue you for the rest. Be careful though, in some circumstances when you are withholding payment you may have a claim made against you by a supplier if you are in breach of contract. What's a reasonable amount would be what similar tradesmen would have charged for the job. So get a few quotations. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/1fdlwC9xzyxjCpWMlsCGG3j/supply-of-services NB that article refers to The Supply of Goods & Services Act 1982, which was partially superseded by the Consumer Rights Act 2015. | Based on the advice from @user6726, here's how I disputed the charge. First, I called FedEx customer service. They declined to waive the fee, and informed me that if I didn't pay, it would go to collections. So, I waited a few months and let the collection agency send me their version of the bill. Then, I sent the following reply (paraphrased) to the collection agency, by registered mail. On date, we received a letter from your agency demanding a payment for Federal Express Canada Co. I am writing this letter to dispute this debt, as I do not believe that we owe it. The debt claimed by Federal Express Canada appears to be related to FedEx invoice n, consisting of a Clearance Entry Fee of $X. I called FedEx on date to dispute this fee. It appears that they have decided to proceed with demanding payment anyway. The facts of the case are as follows: In month, we received an unsolicited birthday gift from a relative in the United States, which FedEx left at our doorstep, with no signature required, and no indication that accepting the package would incur an obligation to FedEx. As the value of the gift did not exceed 60 CAD, the package was admitted into Canada duty free. The Clearance Entry Fee is a fee imposed by FedEx, not on behalf of any government agency. “Clearance Entry” is an “unsolicited good or service”, as defined by the BC Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Chapter 2, Section 11. We did not order the shipment of the package, and did not consent verbally or in writing to the “Clearance Entry” service claimed to have been provided by FedEx. Therefore, as provided in Section 12 of the Act, we have no obligation to FedEx, and FedEx has no cause of action against us. The burden of proof that the service was not unsolicited rests with FedEx, and until such proof is provided, this debt is void under BC law, and you, as a collector, must not collect or attempt to collect money from a person who is not liable for the debt. Based on Section 116 of the Act, I am requiring you to communicate with me only in writing, at the address given above. At this point, I expect that your next communication would either contain: Proof that we consented to the “Clearance Entry” service provided by FedEx, or A statement that the debt is invalid, and that we are discharged from any obligation to your agency or to Federal Express Canada in regards to this matter. In addition, please inform any credit reporting agencies to which you have reported this debt to, that this debt is currently in dispute. I will require proof that you have done this. It has been over two months since the collection agency received the letter, and we still have not heard from them. Evidently they have decided that it is not worthwhile to pursue this case. | are they allowed to immediately try to recover the debt or must they go to court first? They can try to recover the debt, either directly or through a debt collection agency. They do not have to go to court first; courts are for the resolution of a dispute and right now there isn't one. If the consumer disputes the debt (which they should do in writing) then the debt is held in abeyance until the dispute is resolved. While in this state debt collection must stop and the debt must be noted as disputed on any credit agency checks. Dispute resolution may be through negotiation, litigation, mediation, arbitration or a statutory mechanism (e.g. involving a government agency or ombudsman if applicable). If the supplier chooses litigation then they must go to the court and summons the consumer; stating the basis of their claim. The consumer is then entitled to mount a defence. |
Can a foreigner invoke the fifth amendment? Bob is a non-US citizen and is visiting the USA on a tourist visa. During his visit, he broke a US law. Law enforcement is unaware of that crime. While breaking the law, he is also a witness to some other crime. The circumstances make it such that Bob cannot testify to the second crime without self-incriminating. Can Bob invoke the 5th amendment to avoid self-incrimination? | Short Answer Bob is a non-US citizen and is visiting the USA on a tourist visa. . . . Can Bob invoke the 5th amendment to avoid self-incrimination? Yes. The 5th Amendment is a right applicable to all criminal defendants or potential criminal defendants, not only to U.S. citizens. In Sanchez-Llamas, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed U.S. Supreme Court precedents in place since 1896 holding (among other things) that: A foreign national detained on suspicion of crime, like anyone else in our country, enjoys under our system the protections of the Due Process Clause. Among other things, he is entitled to an attorney, and is protected against compelled self-incrimination. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896) ("[A]ll persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by" the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350 (2006). Some Narrow Exceptions To The General Rule Diplomats Immune From Criminal Prosecution This said, the 5th Amendment right not to be forced to incriminate oneself logically might not apply to certain foreign diplomats who are immune to criminal prosecutions in the U.S., since they cannot "self-incriminate" in the sense of making themselves subject to a U.S. criminal prosecution based upon the information that they disclose. But, I'm not aware of any case law addressing that point, only case law addressing other cases where the 5th Amendment right not to self-incriminate did not apply when the person seeking to invoked it was immune from prosecution for the crimes that the defendant might incriminate himself or herself of, for other reasons. Foreign Corporations Also, while the 5th Amendment states that it applies to "all persons", this is not a part of the constitution in which the definition of a "person" have been extended to apply to corporations and other entities. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the free speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting independent expenditures for political campaigns by corporations, including nonprofit corporations, labor unions, and other associations). Neither domestic corporations nor foreign corporations have a right to not to self-incriminate under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A corporation is not protected by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957). Why Is This Right Extended To Non-Citizens? The reasoning behind why the 5th Amendment protects foreigners as well as U.S. citizens is different in the case of federal officials and court cases than it is in state and local matters. Why Does This Apply To Non-Citizens In Federal Courts? This is directly true in federal criminal cases as a result of the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (and originally this applied only to federal court cases), which by its terms applies to all "persons". The 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states (with the pertinent language in bold): No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Why Does This Apply To Non-Citizens In State And Local Courts? In state and local courts in the U.s., this is true as a result of the 5th Amendment to the Bill of Rights being "incorporated" to apply to state and local governments via the 14th Amendment due process clause of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment which applies to "any person", rather than the original U.S. Constitution's or the 14th Amendment's privileges and immunities clause which apply only to U.S. citizens. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states (with the pertinent language in bold and in bold and italics, and the 14th Amendment privileges and immunities clause in italics only): All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states (with the privileges and immunities clause in italics and the repealed third clause of Article Iv, Section 2, related to returning fugitive slaves, omitted): The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. The decision to use the 14th Amendment due process clause rather than the 14th Amendment privileges and immunities clause, was made, in part, because the Slaughter House cases, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1874 before the incorporation doctrine had been developed, narrowly interpreted the privileges and immunities clause as something that applied to only a handful of "rights of federal citizenship.' Could The U.S. Supreme Court Change This Rule? The current Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court can change the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution prospectively, as they did recently and famously, for example, by overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (June 24, 2022) decision. So, it is also worth noting that U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, in a dissent in the case Saenz v. Roe (1999), has argued that the U.S. Supreme Court made a mistake to incorporate the Bill of Rights to the states via the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, rather than the 14th Amendment privileges and immunities clause, as a result of the much maligned Slaughter House cases. The Slaughter House cases were decided in a manner that minimized the effect of the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment in a manner that reflected their conservative resistance to the post-Civil War reforms of the Reconstruction era and the Civil War Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (i.e. the 13th to the 15th Amendments). But the Slaughter House cases nonetheless are still good law. This is because this precedent was too settled to be easily undone, and because other means had been developed to serve the purposes it was intended to serve when adopted, by the time that sentiment on the U.S. Supreme Court had changed to accept the demise of slavery, when the U.S. Supreme Court ended the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Justice Thomas argued in his dissent in Saenz v. Roe that the Bill of Rights should instead have been incorporated via the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment, and that the Slaughter House cases and the various cases establishing the incorporation doctrine as arising under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment should be overruled. If this had been done, it would have denied non-U.S. citizens in the United States the protections of the U.S. Bill of Rights in state and local courts, since the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment applies only to U.S. citizens. However, despite the minority views of Justice Thomas, this is unlikely to happen, because not enough other U.S. Supreme Court justices have shown any inclination to take this step, even now that Justice Thomas is part of a 6-3 very conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme Court that has been inclined to reverse other longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedents. Other Rights Of Non-Citizens Interrogated For Crimes Foreigners also have a right under U.S. treaties to consular assistance, under Section 36 of the Vienna Convention. But, unlike the 5th Amendment right, this right arising under U.S. treaties has only rarely been afforded an exclusionary rule type protection to foreign criminal defendants if it is denied, in the way that 5th and 6th Amendment violations of the rights are foreign criminal defendants are protected. In denying defendants exclusionary rule protections for violations of Section 36 of the Vienna Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), which addressed all of these issues, that since most Vienna Convention members to not provide an exclusionary rule remedy (something unique to U.S. law) to violations of this treaty right, that U.S. states were also not compelled to do so. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | Since there is no search or seizure involved in having a driver's license, requiring a person to update their address is not a violation of the 4th Amendment. It is also not "testifying against oneself in a criminal case", so it does not violate the 5th. As has been repeated many times, driving is a privilege and not a right, meaning that there is no fundamental constitutional right to drive. Strict scrutiny would not render the requirement to have a license unconstitutional, and it certainly would not invalidate the requirement to give a correct address and update that address as necessary. There may be issues regarding a requirement to produce identification, but there is no legal precedent for the idea that an ID law law and a federal "must show" statute would violate the 4th (that is not to say that the courts could not find there is such a basis if the question arises, but it has not yet been found). Since there is no national ID law, one can only conjecture what the outcome of judicial review would be, but if such a law survived strict scrutiny, it would be inconceivable that a portion of the law requiring you to keep your address current would fail such scrutiny. A curiosity search would still be barred. | This is a super complex question and no one really knows the answer yet. Orin Kerr is probably the leading scholar on this question, and he generally argues that forced decryption of one's own device is not a Fifth Amendment violation. As I understand it (and oversimplifying by a lot), one key piece of his position is that requiring you to put in your password is a statement about your knowledge of the password itself, not about the contents of the machine into which you are entering it. And because your knowledge of the password for your own devices is presumed, an exception for "foregone conclusions" would leave this compulsion unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. You can read one of his explanations here. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with that approach, but a California judge recently reached a conclusion similar to Kerr's. This will probably by a question for SCOTUS before too long. | It is allowed to introduce evidence that impeaches the credibility or reliability of a witness, which could include his previous 5 convictions for perjury. This does not constitute "character assassination", so I'm not sure what you mean by that. A felony conviction can be admissible (assuming he was not exonerated). There are limits; for example, evidence of religious belief would be inadmissible, likewise holding an unpopular political belief. The evidence has to be connected to the witness's honesty. | You can be extradited from Country A to Country B even if you are a citizen of neither. What matters is whether B can convince A to do it, which is typically on the basis of a treaty between them as well as provisions of both country's domestic criminal law. If you committed a crime in B, then fled to A, your nationality is relevant to the extent that: A might not extradite its own citizens, if you are a citizen of A A might have an agreement with C, if you are a citizen of C, that C should have the chance to proscute you instead of B. (This is the Petruhhin doctrine in the case where A and C are EU countries and B is not.) But you do not have to be a national of B in order for it to have jurisdiction over you in B's domestic criminal law - just as if you were still in B, they could arrest you in the normal way. They are thus entitled to request A's authorities to arrest you in A, and transfer you to B. If your alleged crime was not in B, then their claim over you has to be on the basis that their domestic criminal law allows prosecution extraterritorially. This was the case when B was Spain, A was the United Kingdom, and the criminal was former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet; while his status as a former head of state was relevant, as was whether the crimes were extraterritorial offences in the UK as well, his lack of Spanish nationality was not. A more topical example is B being the United States, A the United Kingdom, and the arrestee being Julian Assange, an Australian who is alleged to have committed various crimes under U.S. law (while not necessarily having been present in the U.S. at the time). While all extradition relationships are different, a common thread of the criminal law in general is that what matters is the circumstances at the time of the alleged acts. Retroactively making you a citizen of B may not be satisfactory to A, to the extent that A's criminal law disallows making anything illegal retroactively. The supposed nationality grant by B might trigger provision's of A's domestic extradition law concerning requirements of due process, lack of political interference, and so on, and block the action. But equally, renouncing your citizenship of B does not extinguish B's claim over you for acts you did while you were a citizen of B. This is again a feature of typical criminal law. | In the US, they would not be automatically prosecuted. The prosecutor would have to find out about the testimony, decide to prosecute, and go through all the normal processes they otherwise would, but they have an additional piece of evidence. Per the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution, a witness cannot be forced to answer a question that would incriminate them. If the question was objected to on this ground and the objection overruled, the witness' answer would not be admissible against that witness at trial, and the prosecutor would have to prove the case using other evidence. | Truth is a defense to defamation Bob must prove the truth of his statement if Rob sues - there is a reverse onus for this defense. Because this is a civil trial the burden is balance of probabilities. Provided Bob can prove Rob stole his bike he will win. A conviction for doing so is pretty good (but not necessarily conclusive) evidence. Absent that, Bob would need other evidence. Of course, if Bob has said that Rob was convicted of stealing the bike, he’s going to lose. |
Do corporations have any constitutional rights? An existing answer establishes fairly well that corporations in the United States do not have Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. That leads me to wonder, do corporations in the US have any Constitutional rights at all? For example, can the US Army lawfully quarter troops at a Holiday Inn somewhere in the USA in peacetime, against the will of the owner, on the basis that the owner is a corporation and thus not eligible for the Third Amendment right against quartering of troops in private homes? Similarly, could a US court inflict cruel and unusual punishment on a corporation or require it to pay excessive bail or fines on the basis that a corporation doesn't have Eighth Amendment rights? Similarly, could Congress provide a means to shut down a corporate-owned news broadcaster on the basis that only natural humans have the right to freedom of the press under the First Amendment? Similarly, would a warrantless search of a corporate facility be lawful on the basis that the Fourth Amendment only requires police to obtain a search warrant when investigating a natural human? If corporations have some Constitutional rights but lack others, which rights have they been found to have? To be clear, I know that corporations actually exercise many of these rights in fact every day. My question, then, is if the possession of these rights by corporations is purely statutory or if their rights actually flow from the Constitution in the same way that the rights of human beings do. For example, suppose Congress passes a law authorizing Federal agents to enter Disney facilities without a warrant, blow up the printing presses used to produce Marvel comics, broadcast religious propaganda on ESPN, construct housing for US Air Force personnel in Space Mountain, arbitrarily and summarily impose the most cruel and unusual penalties you can imagine, require the payment of nearly unimaginably excessive bail and fines, forbid them from submitting a petition for redress of grievances under penalty of catapult, and then sell the entire corporation into slavery without a qualifying conviction. Would that be Constitutional? | In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, SCOTUS held that A corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 and numerous preceding cases find that "the First Amendment applies to corporations". Corporations also enjoy the right to contract (protected by the Contract Clause), meaning that the government cannot willy-nilly invalidate a contract because one of the parties is a corporation, see Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518. (But, of course, any government can regulate any contract by process of law). In general, under 1 USC 1, In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise...the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals We know that corporations do not have the right to vote. Second Amendment corporate rights are district-specific at present: Seventh Circuit courts view firearms sellers like booksellers — as holders of constitutional rights. While gun sellers are subject to much stricter regulation than are booksellers, they are both protected by the Bill of Rights. Conversely, in the courts of the Fourth Circuit, gun sellers have no Second Amendment rights. Third Amendment rights are unknown. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 which is binding only in a few states, is the entirety of 3rd Amendment case law and does not enter the relevant legal territory. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, the court held that The Fourth Amendment protects a corporation and its officers from compulsory production of the corporate books and papers for use in a criminal proceeding against them when the information upon which the subpoenas were framed was derived by the Government through a previous unconstitutional search and seizure, planned and executed by its officials under color of a void writ, provided the defense of the Amendment be seasonably interposed, and not first raised as a collateral issue at the trial of the indictment. The article "A Corporation's Right to a Jury Trial under the Sixth Amendment", 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375 explores the question of Sixth Amendment rights of corporations esp. the right to trial by jury – the summary is that this has yet to be clearly determined. US v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934 finds such a right as does United States v. R. L. Polk and Co., 438 F.2d 377 A corporation does not have the same right not to incriminate itself as does a natural person, but it does enjoy the same rights as individuals to trial by jury. However, corporate trial-by-jury rights are buried deep in questions about the "seriousness" of the prosecution. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 held that "Petitioners are not entitled to a jury trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3692", but this is about a specific statute and a question of whether the offense is petty, and the broad constitutional question remains. The right to an attorney seems to be secure, see this opinion by Merrick Garland, and citations therein. | A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt. | In the US, rights are independent of "responsibilities". But, responsibilities is a very broad concept: some aspects of responsibility are encoded in law, others are not. You have an absolute legal obligation to not murder or steal, as defined by the law. Some people say you have a social responsibility to put others before your own interest: this may be legally true in certain contexts, especially fiduciary contexts where your broker is supposed to make decisions on your behalf that benefit you (regardless of personal effect on the broker). Contracts are another source of obligations – you gain a right (access to someone else's property) in exchange for something, which may include standards of behavior. You thus have a legal obligation on SE to not be hurtful in your postings (enforcement is via suspension, in the worst case). The rights spelled out in the Bill of Rights are about the government – it says what the government may not do, it isn't a source of permission for you to exercise your rights. Generally, the traditional US understanding of "rights" is that they are inherent in people and are not "granted" by the government, so the Bill of Rights is a codification of what that means. Therefore, (morally, intellectually) irresponsible speech is also protected. | Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.) | There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order. | The first amendment to the US constitution says: Congress shall make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; [...] This constitutional hurdle is a very high obstacle to preventing the media from publicly saying something that is detrimental to the interests of the US government. Giving people the freedom to say "our government is wrong" without being afraid of repercussions is the reason why this amendment exists. And yes, freedom of speech includes the freedom to be wrong. When someone makes false claims in public to sway public opinion, then it's the responsibility of their peers to point out those falsehoods and let people decide by themselves who to believe. The government can of course also engage in counter-speech, for example by holding a press conference where they address claims made about them and present their side of the debate. But it is not the job of the government to use force to suppress falsehoods, because the government can not be expected to be impartial in this matter. The government not suppressing public discourse is one thing which separates libertarian states like the United States from authoritarian states where uncomfortable speech is suppressed. There are a couple exceptions. But as long as Carlson doesn't make any statements which are defamatory, obscene, fraudulent, violate copyrights or explicitly incite physical violence, the government's hands are tied. | This page lists the highlights of case law regarding prior restraint and the First Amendment. Two pertinent cases are New York Times Co. v. United States, where the court held that despite the potential harm of publishing the revealed information, the prior restraint doctrine was more important (the government cannot prohibit speech before it happens). Reno v. ACLU affirms that even if a publication might cause harm to a class of people, that (limited) harm does not justify universally prohibiting the speech. There is no criminal penalty arising from the government censoring speech. A civil lawsuit – "section 1983" – is possible against an official who illegally attempts to suppress expression contra the First Amendment. The award might be just a dollar if the person so oppressed cannot prove actual damage. Technically, the sky is the limit, and it just depends on how outrageous the jury finds the government's action. If the government were to order suppression of opposition to its policies, we could easily be in the territory of world-record awards for violation of civil rights. | You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right. |
Can a state ban federal agents? Lets say the governor of FL decided to ban all federal agents. Does he have to power to enact something like that? Can he remove their law enforcement authority in the state? Can he force them to leave the state? Can he arrest any agent who decided to violate the governors orders? Are any Police/Sheriffs arresting the agents breaking the law? | 1-3: This would be prohibited under Article VI, paragraph 2 of the US Constitution, which provides that federal law, and the ability to enforce that law, has supremacy over state law. As summarized by Cornell Law, the Supremacy Clause: establishes that the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state laws, and even state constitutions. It prohibits states from interfering with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers... 4: Not legally; see above. 5: Yes, probably a lot of laws. Those charges could range anywhere from interfering with a federal investigation, wrongful imprisonment, assault, or kidnapping. I think it's important to point out that it is highly unlikely the situation would ever escalate to 4, let alone 5. The federal government is incredibly well resourced with regards to being able to move its law enforcement officers throughout the country. And that's not withstanding that the FBI and other agencies (CBP, TSA) are already stationed in any particular state. A non-zero number of those agents are also residents of the state they're stationed in, which would complicate things further. | I'll use California penal code 837 as an example, though most other states have similar statutes: A private person may arrest another: For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence... 839 says: Any person making an arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to aid him therein. Generally, someone making an arrest is allowed to use "reasonable force" to effect the arrest. The question then becomes, is the act of interrupting a football game a public offense? Once a fan at a football game enters the field, assuming it is a violation of the license granted to the fan, they are trespassing. These fans are often drunk when performing their midfield dance so that is another public offense for which they could be arrested. Once arrested, the interloper must be turned over as soon as possible to a magistrate or peace officer. The person making the arrest is always subject to being sued. It is a question for a trier of fact to determine if unreasonable force was used in effecting the arrest. My guess is that in most of these cases security simply ejects the exuberant fan from the premises and the fan never looks back. If a lawsuit were to be filed it would be based on unreasonable force being applied during the arrest. California penal code 240 defines assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." Certainly, one could be charged with assault in effecting a citizen's or private arrest but it would go back to the definition of reasonable force and what force was necessary to effect the arrest. If someone resisted arrest I think it more likely that that person could face an assault charge. | As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them. | What does it accomplish? It guarantees that all corporations doing business in New York can be served. (A company's having an agent for the service of process does not prohibit people from serving the corporation directly. The secretary may be "the agent upon which process may be served" but is not "the sole agent upon which process must be served." And besides, process need not be served on an agent; it can be served on the company itself, at its office or on one of its officers.) With this requirement, New York makes it impossible for a company to avoid service of process by closing or moving its offices, by sending its officers and employees out of state, or by making itself unavailable by any means. No matter what steps a company might take to avoid service of process, the process server can always resort to serving the company's agent: the Secretary of State. | What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation. | There is no constitutional provision specifically allowing the President to dismiss a state Governor for any reason. There is no constitutional provision specifically allowing the President to dissolve a state legislature. The US Federal Constitution requires the President to "take care that the laws be executed". Several relevant laws are contained in 10 U.S. Code Chapter 13 - INSURRECTION. Section 251 (renumbered from 240a) provides that: Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection. Section 252 provides that: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. Section 253 provides that: The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it— (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution. Section 254 provides that: Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time. Sections 251-254 of 10 USC in their current form all date from 1956, but are directly derived from the Insurrection Act of 1807. Under these laws the President has the right and duty to "take such measures as he considers necessary" to suppress any rebellion, which would include any proclaimed secession, including "using the militia or the armed forces" or any other available and effective methods. According to the Wikipedia article (linked above, citations omitted) the Insurrection Act: has been invoked throughout American history. In the 19th century, it was invoked during conflicts with Native Americans. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was invoked during labor conflicts. Later in the 20th century, it was used to enforce federally mandated desegregation, with Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy invoking the Act in opposition to the affected states' political leaders to enforce court-ordered desegregation. More recently, governors have requested and received support following looting in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. In addition 18 USC Chapter 115 deals with related issues, making rebellion, insurrection, or conspiracy to rebel crimes. Section 2383 provides that: Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Section 2384 provides that: If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. Under these various laws the President has power to use whatever means are required, including military force, to suppress and end any rebellion or insurrection, and arrest the perpetrators thereof. Anyone convicted by a court of insurrection is thereafter barred from elected office, federal ore state. The precedent of President Lincoln's actions at the start of the US Civil War is clear. However, the prospect of any current declaration of secession seems remote. Presumably a state could leave the US with consent of Congress, although this has never occurred and there is no specific Constitutional provision allowing it. Congress could pass further laws dealing with any actual or threatened secession, but the laws already existing seem sufficient, they give the President wide power to act in such cases. It was established by the US Supreme Court in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869) that secession is not legal, even if enacted by a state legislature, and specifically that the purported secession of Texas in 1861 did not legally remove it from the Union. No later court case or law has contradicted this, to the best of my knowledge. | Most secret service details are protection for heads of government/state and thus their details would be afforded Sovereign Immunity (Such as POTUS, VPOTUS, and First and Second Families) OR Diplomatic Immunity (visiting dignitaries and leaders of other nations). Typically there are more diplomatic ways to handle the cases in the latter. In the former case, thus far, it has not been handled. During visits, the traditional Executives and Families are usually closely guarded by the Service with additional law enforcement form local jurisdictions called in to aid in the protection, usually to secure routes the Motorcade will take to a designation (I speak from personal experience, POTUS coming to town is a nightmare on traffic). If they are speeding, they are typically doing so down a completely empty highway with police escort. From this point, most under of the Service would be monitored and controlled so closely, at least one Agent would notice if any protected was committing a crime and would have to write it up in a report. There is also considerable debate in legal circles if the President and Vice President could be arrested for a crime while in office, with the general acceptance being that they could not and would need to be impeached by congress. Secret Service will continue to protect former Presidents and Vice Presidents for life, along with their spouses and children up to a certain age. With all that in mind, it would not so much be that the Secret Service would prevent arrest of an individual under their protection so much as the Secret Service would be the arresting authority. As they are law enforcement agents under the Federal Government, they can legally arrest people and then hand them to the proper law enforcement agency to effect the arrest. This would mostly happen with candidates for office OR former presidents OR family at any point in time as the scenario described is a bit harder to make a legitimate arrest. In fact, the Secret Service does have arrest authority with one of the highest conviction rates of any Law Enforcement Agency in the Country. It's just most crimes they arrest have nothing to do with threats to those under their protection. The Secret Service is also charged with investigation of counterfeiting of US currency and they are very good at it. This was actually their original sole function in the U.S. government and they still exist under the Treasury Department to this day. At this point, if you're wondering how they got the job of protecting important people in the executive branch from that, well, it's simple. At the time of his assasination, the legislation to create the USSS was on Licoln's desk. At the time of their creation, the only other Federal Police services were the U.S. Park Police, the Postal Inspection Service, and the U.S. Marshals. The first two had specific jurisdictions and the Marshals were undermanned so the USSS was tasked with investigating all sorts of financial crimes and quickly became the most successful U.S. Law Enforcement Service. They were also the first U.S. Intelligence and Counterintelligence agency (though they no longer are part of the Intelligence Community) until the FBI took on those duties. So following the Assassination of William McKinley in 1901, Congress authorized them to take up full time Presidential Protection because at the time, they were pretty much doing everything else. | First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat. |
Is it false advertising to call a closed-source program "open"? IIRC, a court recently ruled that calling closed-source software "open-source" in marketing is false advertising. Does this apply to "open" on its own? For example, is the name of OpenVMS false advertising? My first thought when I saw the name was "this is going to be open-source," and I was quite surprised to see that it is proprietary. | The limits of "deceptive advertising" are determined by lawsuit. This note assembles a number of cases where names were or were not held to be per se deceptive ("Diet Coke" is not a deceptive name; self-certification of quality often is). A finding of deceptive advertising is founded on an intent to deceive, and is not based on whether consumers make false inferences. For instance, "natural" is puffery, but "organic" is has a specific and enforceable meaning under the law in the US, governed by USDA regulations. The historical intent behind the OpenVMS name name selection is to refer to a kind of computing, open system computing. It is consumer error to confuse open system with open source. | Being a "non-profit" organization, in the US at least, does not mean you don't make a profit. There are plenty of for-profit companies that don't make a profit. What it means is that you have filled out the paperwork with the IRS and other interested parties in your city, county, or state, that says your organization is a non-profit. That invokes certain rules as to where and how the funds you receive must be spent. It also relates to your purpose as an organization. If it's to "sell some software" then you likely don't qualify as a non-profit. If it's to reduce illiteracy in your community, that likely does. If you intend to pursue becoming a non-profit, you should consult a local attorney who is experienced in these matter so that you do it properly. I also caution you about using the term "non-profit" or "not-for-profit" or any variation of this as you may run afoul of various laws governing such organizations. Presenting yourself or your company as something that it's not is likely to cost you dearly. What you are describing is more commonly known as "shareware" where users pay for the product, usually software, if they want to. In some cases paid users get more functionality. How much users pay also falls into this category. | wouldn't this count as an unlawful clause in the license agreement, therefore, invalidating the entire contract? No. The excerpt of legislation you posted implies that the clause in the EULA is null and void --rather than illegal-- if your reason for reverse engineering meets the legislative criteria. For the clause to be illegal, the statute would have to outlaw clauses which prohibit the reverse engineering intended for achieving interoperability. The statute does not prohibit those clauses. Instead, it only authorizes you to ignore that clause, provided that your reason for doing so is to achieve interoperability. Lastly, an invalid clause does not invalidate the entire contract. Any portions of the contract which do not depend on the invalid clause retain their status of [being] binding and enforceable. | If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case. | The FCC has clarified their stance on this: ... were we mandating wholesale blocking of Open Source firmware modifications? We were not, but we agree that the guidance we provide to manufacturers must be crystal-clear to avoid confusion. So, today we released a revision to that guidance to clarify that our instructions were narrowly-focused on modifications that would take a device out of compliance. The revised guidance now more accurately reflects our intent in both the U-NII rules as well as our current rulemaking, and we hope it serves as a guidepost for the rules as we move from proposal to adoption. Essentially, Open Source firmware modifications are allowed, the modifications are disallowed are things like excessively increasing signal strength. | No. The GPL does not say 'pretend to make source code available'. The means by which the source code is made available must be equivalent to the means by which the compiled program is made available. Relevant clauses include (in version 3 of the GPL) clause 6, which says: You may [distribute your program in object form] provided that you also convey the machine-readable Corresponding Source under the terms of this License... The conveyance of source code must be in one of the prescribed ways. The one most relevant to the question (and which is illustrative of the issue at hand) is that in clause 6(d): [You may convey] the object code by offering access from a designated place (gratis or for a charge), and offer equivalent access to the Corresponding Source in the same way through the same place at no further charge. You need not require recipients to copy the Corresponding Source along with the object code. If the place to copy the object code is a network server, the Corresponding Source may be on a different server (operated by you or a third party) that supports equivalent copying facilities, provided you maintain clear directions next to the object code saying where to find the Corresponding Source. Regardless of what server hosts the Corresponding Source, you remain obligated to ensure that it is available for as long as needed to satisfy these requirements. The phrase 'equivalent access' means that, if you are only prepared to provide source code in an arbitrarily padded format over a very slow network link, then that is the only form in which you can provide the object code. So you will have no customers. Where you convey your software via other means such as on disk (the other subclauses of clause 6) there are similar requirements for equivalency. | If you develop a program yourself and it wasn't a work made for hire, then the program is yours to do with as you please. You hold the copyright to it. Many developers choose existing licencing arrangements or they can choose to create a license on their own, or using an attorney. And sometimes they choose to release their programs into the public domain. If you release it into the public domain, you are essentially giving up your copyright. The IDE (Integrated Development Environment) you used to develop your program does not dictate what licenses you can use. There are some existing licenses that others use (which you are free to use or NOT to use) give varying protections to you regarding what you are allowing others to do; right of others to copy, right of others to modify, right of others to distribute, rights to sub-licence, and so on. One of the licensing schemes is the GNU General Public License (GPL). But there are many others, too many to list here. | To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together). |
How has the “but for” test proven inadequate where two defendants jointly cause an injury that would have occurred even if only one of them had acted? Source: p 200, Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (2010, 2 ed) by Kenneth J. Vandevelde This “but for” test has proved inadequate where two defendants jointly cause an injury that would have occurred even if only one of them had acted. For example, if two men negligently discharge firearms, both of which fire fatal shots into the victim, in a lay sense of the term both men “caused” the injury. Yet by applying the “but for” test, neither man can be shown to have caused it. If the first man had not fired his weapon, the victim would still have been killed by the second shot. Thus, one cannot say that but for the first man’s negligence, the injury would not have occurred. The same reasoning exonerates the second man as well. [1.] The “but for” test, in other words, would absolve both gunmen of liability for the shooting. Accordingly, many courts have adopted a rule that provides an alternative definition of actual causation. Under this rule, a defendant’s breach of duty is considered the actual cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, even though the breach may not have been the “but for” cause. The outcome of applying this test to the shooting circumstances would be that either of the two gunmen would be considered the cause of the death. Why is 1 true? Why cannot both shooters be found liable for the shooting? | They both can be found liable, but not by using the but-for test. Suppose that person A and person B each independently negligently discharge firearms and that each on its own would be sufficient to kill person C. Is it true that, "but for the actions of A, C would still be alive?" No. Is it true that, "but for the actions of B, C would still be alive?" No. Using the but-for test would not be able to assign liability to either A or B. "But for" is not an obvious phrasing for non-native English speakers. It's the same as asking, "If it were not for the actions of A, would C still be alive?". However, courts and juries are not limited to using the but-for test for causation. See Corey v Havener, 182 Mass. 250 (1902): It makes no difference that [...] it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by each. If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both. | No. Double jeopardy would not apply. You can't be prosecuted twice for committing the same (or a lesser included crime) arising from the same incident twice. If you commit a new crime you can be prosecuted for that new offense, even if you were acquitted of committing a similar offense at a different time and place in the past. | This determination is largely a facts and circumstances specific test to be evaluated with little additional legal guidance by the judge or jury faced with evaluating the question (usually a judge in the way that the issue usually presents itself). Like many fairly vague legal standards, it leaves open the possibility that there will be inconsistent rulings on this question in circumstances presenting similar facts. | Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | You are quoting standards that are applicable during an appeal. So in this case, the defendant was brought to trial, was found guilty by a jury, and is now appealing that conviction. During that initial trial, the evidence was supposed to have been weighed neutrally. In an appeal, the appellate court is not attempting to re-litigate the entirety of the case. That would be costly and slow in addition to burdensome on witnesses that might have to be called again to testify. Instead, it defers to the trial court for things like the determination of facts. The standards you quote show that an appellate court is only going to overturn a lower court's verdict as insufficient if the lower court's ruling is manifestly unjust. The prosecution and the defense presented evidence on a particular element of the crime at trial. The jury determined that the prosecution met its burden, and proved the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court is not going to substitute its judgement for that of the jury particularly when the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of different witnesses that may not be possible from a simple text-based transcript. If the trial court convicted and the appeals court determines that the conviction was reasonable if the evidence was viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the prosecution, then the sufficiency standard would be met and the appeal would be denied. The appeals court would only overturn the verdict as insufficient if no reasonable juror could possibly have concluded that the state met its burden of proof given the evidence presented. | I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on. | The defense lawyer has the duty to do the best for his client. The client will be convicted if he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the lawyer can create a reasonable doubt and manages to free his client then he has done a good job. So yes, if the lawyer knows that some other person might have committed the crime, to the degree that it creates reasonable doubt, then the lawyer must raise this. Of course if it turns out that there is just some phantasist making wild accusations, that might not be helpful. |
Contract mentions an outdated law I want to keep it short. I signed a contract on 01/12/2021 that mentioned in the Terms and Conditions that they adhere to the 531/2012 law. This law is now outdated, it says No longer in force, Date of end of validity: 30/06/2022; Repealed by 32022R0612 . Latest consolidated version: 15/06/2017 The new version / repealed version is the 2022/612 law. This new version is not mentioned in my contract, as my contract was signed before that law as created. Question I have a dispute with this contract, with respect to how the other entity did not respect the conditions. This dispute is from 20/07/2022, so during a time in which the old law is no longer in force. Which of the two laws is now the one that the contract has to adhere to? | When an EU regulation or directive is replaced, the successor law will generally clarify that references to the old law should be interpreted as references to the successor law. That is also the case here. The old law is Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 The successor law is Regulation (EU) 2022/612 The successor law contains the following article: Article 23: Repeal Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 is repealed. References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex II. That annex provides a mapping between articles in both laws. So, if your contract references Regulation 531/2012, you can interpret that as a reference to Regulation 2022/612. If your contract mentions specific articles of the old regulation, you can use Annex II to find the corresponding articles in the new regulation. This does not mean that the new regulation is necessarily applicable in your case. You mention that the dispute “is” from a time when the new law applied. However, the question is not when the dispute was raised, but when the alleged breaches occurred. If the matter were to be laid before a court, the court would apply the old law for breaches while the old law was in force, and the new law for those breaches while the new law was in force. This could lead to the same or distinct results. I haven't read the laws in question, so it could also be that these regulations apply to the formation of contracts and not conduct during those contracts, so that the old law might remain in effect until one contractual period is over (e.g. if you have a yearly contract that will renew on 2022-12-01, the old regulation might be applicable until then). | You have read it: legally It doesn’t matter if you haven’t read it in fact. At law, you have. Therefore you cannot avoid obligations or consequences by saying “ I didn’t read it”. It’s an extension of the common law principle that if you affix your ‘mark’ to a document you were acknowledging that you understood it and would abide by it: even if your mark was an X because you were illiterate. There are protections. At common law an unconscionable term is unenforceable and may void the contract entirely. Additionally, many jurisdictions have passed legislation to make unfair contract terms unenforceable, particularly in contracts of adhesion. Further, consumer protection laws often have non-excludable warranties that operate in spite of the contract. | Let me start by saying that real estate contracts are some of the most heavily regulated contracts and details vary enormously by jurisdiction. That said ... To vary a contract, the contract must actually contain provisions that allow for it to be varied and variations must be in accordance with those. These sorts of clauses are common in long-term contracts (building, mining, logistics etc) but are less common (but not unknown) in transactional contracts like real estate sales. If the contract does not contain such provisions then it can only be varied by a collateral contract which has the same basic requirements of any contract - in this particular case, were you offered something in return for agreeing to delay settlement? If you weren't you do not have a collateral contract that varies the original contract. Notwithstanding, even though the other party delaying settlement from the 11th to the 18th is a breach of the contract by them, by agreeing to it you would be prevented from enforcing your rights under the contract by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This presumes that they actually settle by the 18th - if they don't all bets are off and you can enforce the rights you have from their breach by failing to settle on or before the 11th - just don't agree to any more extensions. What you remedies are will be detailed in the contract. These would normally include issuing a notice for them to settle by a given date - if they don't do that you can terminate the contract and keep the deposit. You could also sue for damages. Don't do any of this (or anything else) without getting legal advice first. Edit The OP has put in a comment a rather vital piece of information: there is a clause making settlement contingent on the buyer selling their condo. If the delay is in accordance with that clause then the vendor is stuck, even if settlement takes 10 years. | The parties to the contract have not changed; they are still the purchaser company and the scrap vendor. The obligations have not changed; they are presumably based on amounts of stock and monetary value. The only changes are in the name of one party and its ownership, so unless the contract permits termination for those reasons (not unheard of, if a contract has been intended to provide/avert support from/by a particular party or symbolism) the contract still stands with all its terms. A novation is not needed. | Such a right would only exist if the legislature has created it by some act. Insurance is excluded under the class of covered contracts under The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (see schedule 2), and The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. The only restriction on automatical renewal clauses under Consumer Rights Act 2015 is that the deadline for objecting to renewal cannot be unreasonably early (schedule 2, unfair terms); and in general, the terms may not be vague. Since there is no law restricting a contract from requiring written notice, or telephone notice, or whatever they demand, then it comes down to what the contract says. If it says "you must call", then you must call. | A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company. | A contract is binding if it has been agreed by both sides and is otherwise legal and freely entered into. A signature (handwritten or otherwise) is not required. However if a dispute arises, either party can use the presence of a signature as evidence that the contract was agreed to. The signature is evidence of the agreement, and the agreement is binding, not the signature. If your handwritten signature is on a contract that you have not agreed to you would need to explain to the court how this happened: "I was forced to at gunpoint" or "It wasn't written by me but by a forger", for example. The court would then have to decide, on the balance of probabilities if they believe you or not. It is much the same with digital signatures. The court has to decide if you made an agreement or not. If your digital signature appears on an electronic document that you haven't agreed to, you would need to explain to the court how that happened: "my key was stolen" would be your explanation. If the revocation came after the contract was signed, you would have a much weaker case than if it came before. But the court would need to weigh the balance of probabilities. But the "key" point here (pun absolutely intended) is that it is the agreement that is binding, and not the signature. If you agree to a contract (and indicate that agreement by digital signature using a key that you later revoke) then you are bound. If you don't agree to a contract (which is signed without your consent using a key stolen from you that you have revoked) then you are not bound. | Is a firm required to arbitrate disputes arising after the expiration of employment contract? The wording of this question is problematic. From your description it is doubtful that the contract truly expired at the end of the first year. It is valid for a contract to encompass multiple phases with different provisions specific to each phase. Providing that "[a]fter the first year the employee may continue working for the company, until terminated, as an at will employee" is different from expiration of the contract at the end of the first year. The contract simply outlined what happens before and after that point in time. The employer's allegation that the contract expired at the end of the first year is inconsistent with outlining in that same contract the nature of the parties' continued relation after the first year. Said nature of the employment relation should have been outlined in a separate contract in order to preempt an interpretation of there being one same/ongoing contract. The employer's allegation is vague and untenable also in a scenario where the employer terminates the employee within the first year. The employer's allegation seemingly implies that the employee's deadline for arbitration proceedings expires at the end of the first year. That would give the employer the opportunity to evade the arbitration clause by choosing a timing that de facto prevents its employee from enforcing the clause. Questions regarding arbitration are unanswerable without knowing the exact terms of the relevant clause(s). Just like the contract provides a transition from fixed term employment to at will employment, it is possible --but not necessarily the case-- that the arbitration provision is applicable only to some of the phases that the contract encompasses. |
What are common law cases "lost in the mists of time"? A respected user writes in another answer: Long-standing precedents whose origins are lost in the mists of time What are these long standing precedents, how are they known, and how can they be authoritatively understood, litigated, and ruled on, when they have been "lost in the mists of time"? What are some examples of these precedents? | Time immemorial is 1189 CE Do you know how many documents survive from 1189 CE? F#*k all, that’s how many. We don’t have the original case law because, quite simply, we don’t have the original case law. In any event, “time immemorial” is simply a legal fiction stating the date to which you had to be able to trace land ownership before you had indefeasibility of title. Common law goes back way beyond that and even way beyond the Norman conquest in 1066. At a certain point, it doesn’t matter. Things are done that way because things are done that way. For example, Pythagoras’ Rule (the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides) was not discovered by Pythagoras. It was known to both the Babylonians and Egyptians 1,000 years before Pythagoras was born yet it will likely be Pythagoras’ Rule for as long as the human race endures. | If the common law applies (i.e. there is no statute that changes it) then it depends on if the item was lost, mislaid or abandoned. The US has statute law dealing with lost money but that is not the question here. Property is generally deemed to have been lost if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did not intend to set it down, and where it is not likely to be found by the true owner. At common law, the finder of a lost item could claim the right to possess the item against any person except the true owner or any previous possessors. Property is generally deemed to have been mislaid or misplaced if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did intend to set it, but then simply forgot to pick it up again. For example, a wallet found in a shop lying on a counter near a cash register will likely be deemed misplaced rather than lost. Under common law principles, the finder of a misplaced object has a duty to turn it over to the owner of the premises, on the theory that the true owner is likely to return to that location to search for his misplaced item. If the true owner does not return within a reasonable time (which varies considerably depending on the circumstances), the property becomes that of the owner of the premises. Property is generally deemed to have been abandoned if it is found in a place where the true owner likely intended to leave it, but is in such a condition that it is apparent that he or she has no intention of returning to claim it. Abandoned property generally becomes the property of whoever should find it and take possession of it first, although some states have enacted statutes under which certain kinds of abandoned property – usually cars, wrecked ships and wrecked aircraft – escheat, meaning that they become the property of the state. For your specifics: If I purchase merchandise in a physical store, and then (accidentally or not) leave the merchandise at the store after I've paid for it, is the store allowed to resell that merchandise to another customer? This would be mislaid property and if they cannot find you and you do not return to claim it after a reasonable time (which would be different for a Mars bar and a Boeing 747) then it is theirs and they can do what they want with it: including sell it to someone else. How does this scenario differ from leaving personal items at the store that I purchased elsewhere? It doesn't. | Pretty much any time a contractual, statutory or case law precedent uses the word "reasonable" what it means is that the decision regarding what is and is not reasonable is vested in the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a U.K. landlord-tenant case) to decide on a case by case basis in light of all of the facts and circumstances presented at trial, rather something to be decided as a matter of law by an appellate court absent of extreme abuse of discretion by the judge in determining what is reasonable. Put yourself in the judge's shoes and consider the range of opinion that people who are judges in a case like this might have, and you have your answer. A reasonable amount of time balances out factors like the availability of repair contractors at a reasonable price, the magnitude of the repair, and the extent to which the repair impairs the habitability of the premises, and assumes a time frame that would apply if the landlord is diligent and trying to solve the problem in good faith. A reasonable time to fix a broken heating element is different in July than in January. If three different inspectors failed to determine the cause of the problem, that is going to work in favor of the landlord for a longer period of time. So will the significant extent of the damage (apparently). On the other hand, the fact that the repair rendered the premises completely uninhabitable argues for a shorter time period. Starting late to address an urgent problem could be breach, although it doesn't sound like this has happened here if some action has been taken that would seem to be reasonable under the circumstances and the results have been inconclusive about what to do. Unnecessary foot dragging could also be a fact in reasonableness, because ultimately the duty is to get the job done. There may also be a parallel duty of the landlord to provide a habitable premises and to compensate you for time when this is not provided, in addition to the duty to repair within a reasonable time. Asking to be paid for alternative accommodations while diagnosis and repairs are underway would be a logical demand to make before suing for a fairly small dollar amount in an ongoing lease. You would probably focus on failure to repair in a reasonable time more if you seek to terminate the lease entirely and rent elsewhere instead in the face of repair delays, hoping to avoid the duty to pay rent for the remainder of the lease term due to the landlord's breach of the duty to repair under the lease. | united-kingdom Yes. The landmark case in the UK is Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart, where the House of Lords*: established the principle that when primary legislation is ambiguous then, in certain circumstances, the court may refer to statements made in the House of Commons or House of Lords in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the legislation. Before this ruling, such an action would have been seen as a breach of parliamentary privilege *Strictly speaking, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which functioned as the UK's highest court before the creation of the Supreme Court. | This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification. | It is complicated to answer why a law is what it is. Judge Frank Esterbrook writes (in the forward to Reading Law by Scalia and Garner): Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it "intends" only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one's first preference. If some legislators say one thing and others something else, if some interest groups favor one outcome and others something different; how does the interpreter choose which path to follow? I will provide the historical background leading to the current fair use statute and case law, but take from it what you will as to why it is what it is. Fair use is a statutory defence provided by 17 USC 107. Its application is clearly demonstrated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Fair use was an "exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act". (Campbell) Courts had been finding exceptions for "fair abridgements" and other precursors to fair use as far back as under the Statute of Anne of 1710. (Campbell, citing William Patry's "The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law".) This doctrine worked its way into US case law in the nineteenth century. In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841)1, Justice Story distilled the essence of law and methodology from the earlier cases: "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." (Campbell) Folsom states: There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work. This early incorporation of fair use focused on whether something new was being created, or whether the "chief value" of the original work was being taken. This primary focus on transformativeness has stuck with with fair use doctrine until today. Campbell said (internal citations removed): The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation ("supplanting" the original), or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is "transformative". Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. Campbell also includes the following statement of rationale for why Congress included section 107: Congress meant § 107 "to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way" and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 62 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). There is no support for your separation of "parody, comment, and criticism " from "teaching, research, and news reporting", or that there are differing amounts of commercial use allowed for these types of work. The statute lists together "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research" as examples purposes. The statute requires that "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes" be considered in all fair use cases. There is also very little if any First Amendment rationale expressed for the fair use doctrine. The intersection of the First Amendment and copyright law is more clearly found in the idea/expression dichotomy. 1. Folsom v. Marsh full opinion text | (I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.) | The question somewhat misstates the concept of estoppel in a legal sense. Estoppel does not mean that one is prevented from changing one's opinion. Estoppel means that when one gives a third party cause to rely on one's position, by word or conduct, one cannot then adopt an altered position and use it to legally attack that third party. For example, if one has invited a person onto one's land, one cannot turn around and sue them for trespass. In the case in the question, the Board hired counsel to give them an opinion, which was given. Two years later, a contrary opinion was offered, along with a recommendation for action, which was not followed. No third party was induced to rely on either opinion to its detriment. No estoppel seems relevant. And by the way estoppel is an equitable defense that would be raised by the third party, not unlike the defense of "clean hands". If the board acted on the first advice to its detriment, and thinks that their counsel was negligent in not having gotten the advice correct the first time, they might possibly have a case for legal malpractice, but only if they can get experts (other lawyers) to say that their counsel was in fact negligent , and also prove that this did in fact harm them. If they didn't act on the advice, harms seems less likely, although the details would matter a lot. |
Confusion about USA export regulations regarding electronics I am an electronic hobbyist based in Canada. Recently I bought different Microcontroller development boards from Mouser.ca (a huge online electronics distributor based in Mansfield, Texas). This is mostly to satisfy my curiosity and to try out the different features offered by different companies and/or different model of microcontroller CPU cores. Out of 12 dev boards I bought, only one was export regulated under the U.S Export Administration Regulation (EAR). I did a bit of digging around and found that the listing for the product had an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) attached to it. The number in question is 5A002. I searched further and this correspond to: “END ITEMS,” “EQUIPMENT,” “ACCESSORIES,” “ATTACHMENTS,” “PARTS,” “COMPONENTS,” AND “SYSTEMS” with CRYPTOGRAPHIC “INFORMATION SECURITY” Source Indeed this device does have some cryptographic capabilities. From what I can tell from the datasheet here are the security/Cryptography features: Security and Encryption Arm® TrustZone® Up to three regions for the code flash Up to two regions for the data flash Up to three regions for the SRAM Individual secure or non-secure security attribution for each peripheral Now this is an optional feature common to all microcontrollers with an ARM-Cortex M-33 core. So I checked Microcontrollers from other companies with an ARM-Cortex M-33 core and implementing Arm TrustZone and to my surprise these were not export regulated. In fact, most of them are listed with a ECCN number of 5A992.C, now if I go back to the above document this means: Equipment not controlled by 5A002 .c – Commodities classified Mass Market – 740.17(b) Now for fun if I take 3 Microcontrollers from 3 different companies and compare them: R7FA4E10D2CFM#AA0 (From Renesas based in Japan) Cryptographic features Security and Encryption Arm® TrustZone® Up to three regions for the code flash Up to two regions for the data flash Up to three regions for the SRAM Individual secure or non-secure security attribution for each peripheral ECCN: 5A002 (Export Restricted) Note: Most of Renesas Microcontroller Offering is export restricted under 5A002 for some reason. ATSAMD51J20A-AUT (From Microchip based in the USA) Cryptographic Features One Advanced Encryption System (AES) with 256-bit key length and up to 2 MB/s data rate Five confidential modes of operation (ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR) Supports counter with CBC-MAC mode Galois Counter Mode (GCM) True Random Number Generator (TRNG) Public Key Cryptography Controller (PUKCC) and associated Classical Public Key Cryptography Library (PUKCL) RSA, DSA Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) ECC GF(2n), ECC GF(p) Integrity Check Module (ICM) based on Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA1, SHA224, SHA256), DMA assisted ECCN: 5A992.C (No export Control) Note: Seems to give much more cryptographic features than the above chip yet is not export controlled. LPC55S04JBD64E (From NXP based in the Netherlands) Cryptographic Features ARM TrustZone® enabled. AES-256 encryption/decryption engine with keys fed directly from PUF or a software supplied key > 3. Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA2) module supports secure boot with dedicated DMA controller. Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) using dedicated SRAM for silicon fingerprint. PUF can generate, store, and reconstruct key sizes from 64 to 4096 bits. Includes hardware for key extraction. True Random Number Generator (TRNG). 128 bit unique device serial number for identification (UUID). Secure GPIO. Code Watchdog for detecting code flow integrity. CASPER Crypto co-processor is provided to enable hardware acceleration for various functions required for certain asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, such as, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). ECCN: 5A992.C (No export Control) Note: Notice how this one also implements trust zone and is not exported controlled. It goes as far as including a Crypto co-processor and is still not export controlled. The question Is this a lack of expertise/training/knowledge from the people classifying these products into export categories or is there a valid reason for the difference? What makes the difference between a product classified into the 5A992.C category and the 5A002 category. This is really confusing to me. Shouldn't all these products be classified into the 5A002 category? Edit Just wanted to point out that I also posted this question in the Electrical Engineering Stack Exchange because I wanted to get the opinion of both people with a background in US laws and people with a background in Electrical Engineering/Electronics Procurement https://electronics.stackexchange.com/questions/630700/confusion-about-usa-export-restriction-regarding-electronics | It is hard to know with certainty why this distinction was made in this case. There is a fair amount of gamesmanship that goes into having a device classified as an administrative matter in dealings with a regulatory agency, since the details are technical and the language of the regulations is subject to differing interpretations. This is why attorneys in this area get paid the big bucks. I can't tell you precisely what went into each determination but the relevant regulations restated below, at least, gives you a sense of what the issues that can be fought over in those discussions can be. I suspect that the arguments probably involve whether or not evidence was presented to the relevant regulators by the manufacturers that particular items were or were not sold as "mass market encryption commodities", perhaps based upon sales data or information about how the different items are marketed. It could also be that the regulators a exercising discretion to "flex their regulatory muscles" less aggressively in the case of E.U. source products that could be sold directly outside of U.S. distributions channels anyway, entirely avoiding interfacing with the U..S. export control regime, in order to encourage commerce to be routed through U.S. companies instead. In contrast, the Japanese manufacturer may not have had the same direct distribution network available to it, or may not have had someone as skilled to advocate for it on this basis in the regulatory process. Relevant Legal Authority The legal authority that pertains to this question is set forth below, but even after reading all of it, it isn't manifestly clear why there is a difference so we are left to read between the lines as I have done above. The primary regulation is found here (the first seven pages are the ones applicable to this question). The introductory material for Category 5A002 states: Related Controls: (1) ECCN 5A002.a controls “components” providing the means or functions necessary for “information security.” All such “components” are presumptively “specially designed” and controlled by 5A002.a. (2) See USML Categories XI (including XI(b)) and XIII(b) (including XIII(b)(2)) for controls on systems, equipment, and components described in 5A002.d or .e that are subject to the ITAR. (3) For “satellite navigation system” receiving equipment containing or employing decryption see 7A005, and for related decryption “software” and “technology” see 7D005 and 7E001. (4) Noting that items may be controlled elsewhere on the CCL, examples of items not controlled by ECCN 5A002.a.4 include the following: (a) An automobile where the only ‘cryptography for data confidentiality’ having a ‘described security algorithm’ is performed by a Category 5 – Part 2 Note 3 eligible mobile telephone that is built into the car. In this case, secure phone communications support a non-primary function of the automobile but the mobile telephone (equipment), as a standalone item, is not controlled by ECCN 5A002 because it is excluded by the Cryptography Note (Note 3) (See ECCN 5A992.c). (b) An exercise bike with an embedded Category 5 – Part 2 Note 3 eligible web browser, where the only controlled cryptography is performed by the web browser. In this case, secure web browsing supports a non-primary function of the exercise bike but the web browser (“software”), as a standalone item, is not controlled by ECCN 5D002 because it is excluded by the Cryptography Note (Note 3) (See ECCN 5D992.c). (5) After classification or self-classification in accordance with § 740.17(b) of the EAR, mass market encryption commodities that meet eligibility requirements are released from “EI” and “NS” controls. These commodities are designated 5A992.c. Category 5A992.c, meanwhile, means "Equipment not controlled by 5A002" because it is one of the "Commodities classified as mass market encryption commodities in accordance with § 740.17(b) of the EAR." This states: (b) Classification request or self-classification. For certain products described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section that are self-classified, a self-classification report in accordance with paragraph (e)(3) of this section is required from specified exporters, reexporters and transferors; for products described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section that are classified by BIS via a CCATS, a self-classification report is not required. For products described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (3) of this section, a thirty-day (30-day) classification request is required in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section. An exporter, reexporter, or transferor may rely on the producer's self-classification (for products described in (b)(1), only) or CCATS for an encryption item eligible for export or reexport under License Exception ENC under paragraph (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section. Exporters are still required to comply with semi-annual sales reporting requirements under paragraph (e)(1) or (2) of this section, even if relying on a CCATS issued to a producer for specified encryption items described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3)(iii) of this section. Note to paragraph (b) introductory text: Mass market encryption software that would be considered publicly available under § 734.3(b)(3) of the EAR, and is authorized for export under this paragraph (b), remains subject to the EAR until all applicable classification or self-classification requirements set forth in this section are fulfilled. (1) Immediate authorization. This paragraph (b)(1) authorizes the exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of the associated commodities self-classified under ECCNs 5A002.a or 5B002, and equivalent or related software therefor classified under 5D002, except any such commodities, software, or components described in (b)(2) or (3) of this section, subject to submission of a self-classification report in accordance with § 740.17(e)(3) of the EAR. Items described in this paragraph (b)(1) that meet the criteria set forth in Note 3 to Category 5 - Part 2 of the Commerce Control List (the “mass market” note) are classified as ECCN 5A992.c or 5D992.c following self-classification or classification by BIS and are removed from “EI” and “NS” controls. (2) Classification request required. Thirty (30) days after the submission of a classification request with BIS in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and subject to the reporting requirements in paragraph (e) of this section, this paragraph under License Exception ENC authorizes certain exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of the items specified in paragraph (b)(2) and submitted for classification. Note to paragraph (b)(2) introductory text: Immediately after the classification request is submitted to BIS in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and subject to the reporting requirements in paragraph (e) of this section, this paragraph also authorizes exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of: All submitted encryption items described in this paragraph (b)(2), except “cryptanalytic items,” classified in ECCN 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a or c.3.a, or 5E002, to any end user located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part; Encryption source code as described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(B) to non-“government end users” in any country; “Cryptanalytic items,” classified in ECCN 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a or c.3.a, or 5E002, to non-“government end users,” only, located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part; and Items described in paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv)(A) of this section, to specified destinations and end users. (i) Cryptographic commodities, software, and components. License Exception ENC authorizes exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of the items in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section to “less sensitive government end users” and non- “government end users” located or headquartered in a country not listed in supplement no. 3 to this part, and the items in paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(B) through (H) to non “government end users” located or headquartered in a country not listed in supplement no. 3. (A) 'Network Infrastructure.' ' Network infrastructure' commodities and software, and components therefor, meeting any of the following with key lengths exceeding 80-bits for symmetric algorithms: (1) WAN, MAN, VPN, backhaul and long-haul. Aggregate encrypted WAN, MAN, VPN, backhaul or long-haul throughput (including communications through wireless network elements such as gateways, mobile switches, and controllers) equal to or greater than 250 Mbps; (2) [Reserved] (3) Satellite infrastructure. Transmission over satellite at data rates exceeding 10 Mbps; (4) Media gateways and other unified communications (UC) infrastructure, including Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. Media (voice/video/data) encryption or encrypted signaling to more than 2,500 endpoints, including centralized key management therefor; or (5) Terrestrial wireless infrastructure. Air interface coverage (e.g., through base stations, access points to mesh networks, and bridges) exceeding 1,000 meters, where any of the following applies: (i) Maximum transmission data rates exceeding 10 Mbps (at operating ranges beyond 1,000 meters); or (ii) Maximum number of concurrent full-duplex voice channels exceeding 30; Notes to paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A): The License Exception ENC eligibility restrictions of paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A)(3) (satellite infrastructure) and (b)(2)(i)(A)(5) (terrestrial wireless infrastructure) do not apply to satellite terminals or modems meeting all of the following: a. The encryption of data over satellite is exclusively from the user terminal to the gateway earth station, and limited to the air interface; and b. The items meet the requirements of the Cryptography Note (Note 3) in Category 5 - Part 2 of the Commerce Control List. 'Network infrastructure' (as applied to encryption items). A 'network infrastructure' commodity or software is any “end item,” commodity or “software” for providing one or more of the following types of communications:” (a) Wide Area Network (WAN); (b) Metropolitan Area Network (MAN); (c) Virtual Private Network (VPN); (d) Satellite; (e) Digital packet telephony/media (voice, video, data) over Internet protocol; (f) Cellular; or (g) Trunked. Note 1 to paragraph 2: 'Network infrastructure' end items are typically operated by, or for, one or more of the following types of end users: (1) Medium- or large- sized businesses or enterprises; (2) Governments; (3) Telecommunications service providers; or (4) Internet service providers. Note 2 to paragraph 2: Commodities, software, and components for the “cryptographic activation” of a 'network infrastructure' item are also considered 'network infrastructure' items. (B) Certain “encryption source code.” “Encryption source code” that is not publicly available as that term is used in § 742.15(b) of the EAR; (C) Customized items. Encryption software, commodities and components therefor, where any of the following applies: (1) Customized for government end users or end uses. The item has been designed, modified, adapted, or customized for “government end user(s);” or (2) Custom or changeable cryptography. The cryptographic functionality of the item has been designed or modified to customer specification or can be easily changed by the user; (D) Quantum cryptography. ECCN 5A002.c or 5D002 “quantum cryptography” commodities or software; (E) [Reserved] (F) Network penetration tools. Encryption commodities and software that provide penetration capabilities that are capable of attacking, denying, disrupting or otherwise impairing the use of cyber infrastructure or networks; (G) Public safety/first responder radio (private mobile radio (PMR)). Public safety/first responder radio (e.g., implementing Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) and/or Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International (APCO) Project 25 (P25) standards); (H) Specified cryptographic ultra-wideband and “spread spectrum” items. Encryption commodities and components therefor, classified under ECCNs 5A002.d or .e, and equivalent or related software therefor classified under ECCN 5D002. (ii) Cryptanalytic commodities and software. “ Cryptanalytic items” classified in ECCN 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a, or 5D002.c.3.a, to non- “government end users” located or headquartered in countries not listed in supplement no. 3 to this part. (iii) “Open cryptographic interface” items. Items that provide an “open cryptographic interface,” to any end user located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part. (iv) Specific encryption technology. Specific encryption technology as follows: (A) Technology for “non-standard cryptography.” Encryption technology classified under ECCN 5E002 for “non-standard cryptography,” to any end user located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part; (B) Other technology. Encryption technology classified under ECCN 5E002 except technology for “cryptanalytic items” classified in ECCN 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a or 5D002.c.3.a, “non-standard cryptography” or any “open cryptographic interface,” to any non-“government end user” located in a country not listed in Country Group D:1, E:1, or E:2 of supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR. Note to paragraph (b)(2): Commodities, components, and software classified under ECCNs 5A002.b or 5D002.b, for the “cryptographic activation” of commodities or software specified by this paragraph (b)(2) are also controlled under this paragraph (b)(2). (3) Classification request required for specified commodities, software, and components. Thirty (30) days after a classification request is submitted to BIS in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and subject to the reporting requirements in paragraph (e) of this section, this paragraph authorizes exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of the items submitted for classification, as further described in this paragraph (b)(3), to any end user, provided the item does not perform the functions, or otherwise meet the specifications, of any item described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Items described in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) or (iv) of this section that meet the criteria set forth in Note 3 to Category 5 - Part 2 of the CCL (the “mass market” note) are classified under ECCN 5A992.c or 5D992.c following classification by BIS. Note to introductory text of paragraph (b)(3): Immediately after the classification request is submitted to BIS in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and subject to the reporting requirements in paragraph (e) of this section, this paragraph also authorizes exports, reexports, transfers (in-country) of the items described in this paragraph (b)(3) to any end user located or headquartered in a country listed in supplement no. 3 to this part. (i) Non-“mass market” “components,” toolsets, and toolkits. Specified components classified under ECCN 5A002.a and equivalent or related software classified under ECCN 5D002 that do not meet the criteria set forth in Note 3 to Category 5 - Part 2 of the CCL (the “mass market” note) and are not described by paragraph (b)(2) or (b)(3)(ii) of this section, as follows: (A) Chips, chipsets, electronic assemblies and field programmable logic devices; (B) Cryptographic libraries, modules, development kits and toolkits, including for operating systems and cryptographic service providers (CSPs). (ii) “Non-standard cryptography” (by items not otherwise described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.) Encryption commodities, software and components not described by paragraph (b)(2) of this section, that provide or perform “non-standard cryptography” as defined in part 772 of the EAR. (iii) Advanced network vulnerability analysis and digital forensics. Encryption commodities and software not described by paragraph (b)(2) of this section, that provide or perform vulnerability analysis, network forensics, or computer forensics functions characterized by any of the following: (A) Automated network vulnerability analysis and response. Automated network analysis, visualization, or packet inspection for profiling network flow, network user or client behavior, or network structure/topology and adapting in real-time to the operating environment; or (B) Digital forensics and investigative tools. Items specified in ECCN 5A004.b, 5D002.a.3.b, or 5D002.c.3.b, see supplement no. 1 to part 774 Commerce Control List. (iv) “Cryptographic activation” commodities, components, and software. Commodities, components, and software classified under ECCNs 5A002.b or 5D002.b where the product or cryptographic functionality is not otherwise described in paragraphs (b)(2) or (b)(3)(i) of this section. The critical Note 3 is as follows: Note 3 to Category 5, Part 2 Note 3: Cryptography Note: ECCNs 5A002, 5A003, 5A004 and 5D002, do not control items as follows: a. Items meeting all of the following: Generally available to the public by being sold, without restriction, from stock at retail selling points by means of any of the following: a. Over-the-counter transactions; b. Mail order transactions; c. Electronic transactions; or d. Telephone call transactions; The cryptographic functionality cannot be easily changed by the user; Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier; and [RESERVED] When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon request, to the appropriate authority in the exporter’s country in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described in paragraphs 1. through 3. of this Note a.; b. Hardware components or ‘executable software’, of existing items described in paragraph a. of this Note, that have been designed for these existing items, and meeting all of the following: “Information security” is not the primary function or set of functions of the component or ‘executable software’; The component or ‘executable software’ does not change any cryptographic functionality of the existing items, or add new cryptographic functionality to the existing items; The feature set of the component or ‘executable software’ is fixed and is not designed or modified to customer specification; and When necessary, as determined by the appropriate authority in the exporter’s country, details of the component or ‘executable software’, and details of relevant end-items are accessible and will be provided to the authority upon request, in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described above. Technical Note: For the purpose of the Cryptography Note, ‘executable software’ means “software” in executable form, from an existing hardware component excluded from 5A002, 5A003 or 5A004 by the Cryptography Note. Note: ‘Executable software’ does not include complete binary images of the “software” running on an end-item. Note to the Cryptography Note: To meet paragraph a. of Note 3, all of the following must apply: a. The item is of potential interest to a wide range of individuals and businesses; and b. The price and information about the main functionality of the item are available before purchase without the need to consult the vendor or supplier. A simple price inquiry is not considered to be a consultation. In determining eligibility of paragraph a. of Note 3, BIS may take into account relevant factors such as quantity, price, required technical skill, existing sales channels, typical customers, typical use or any exclusionary practices of the supplier. N.B. to Note 3 (Cryptography Note): You must submit a classification request or self-classification report to BIS for mass market encryption commodities and software eligible for the Cryptography Note employing a key length greater than 64 bits for the symmetric algorithm (or, for commodities and software not implementing any symmetric algorithms, employing a key length greater than 768 bits for asymmetric algorithms or greater than 128 bits for elliptic curve algorithms) in accordance with the requirements of § 740.17(b) of the EAR in order to be released from the “EI” and “NS” controls of ECCN 5A002 or 5D002. | The key issue here is the unauthorized collection of video thumbnails, not the use of cloud services. Under GDPR, every personal data processing activity has one or more controllers who are responsible for the activity, and every such activity needs a “legal basis”. With such cameras, the operator will typically be a controller, since they determine the purposes for which this camera is used. In this scenario, the operators – as part of their responsibility to conduct the data processing activity in a GDPR-compliant manner – had disabled any cloud features provided by the camera manufacturer. Despite this configuration, the camera manufacturer collected thumbnails and uploaded them to servers under their control. So, we likely have two distinct issues at hand: the camera manufacturer misled its customers about the privacy settings of the cameras. This is not necessarily a GDPR issue by itself. the manufacturer performed data processing activities in contravention of various aspects of the GDPR. Relevant aspects of the GDPR that might have been violated: the manufacturer did not have an Art 6 GDPR legal basis for this processing activity, such as a “legitimate interest” the manufacturer did not provide information per Art 13 GDPR to the people being monitored this way even if the cloud-based thumbnail processing were intended, this could be a violation against the Art 25 obligation to ensure “data protection by design and by default” depending on how the cloud storage services were configured, there might be violations against the Art 28 responsibility to contractually bind such vendors as data processors, or against the Chapter V rules on international data transfers Different actors might have different remedies against this violations: buyers of the camera might have remedies under consumer protection and product liability laws against the manufacturer data subjects of the illegal processing activity have remedies under the GDPR they can exercise their data subject rights against the data controllers, such as erasure of the thumbnails. However, this will be difficult to exercise in practice since the manufacturer will not have identifying information, and would then be free from having to fulfil certain data subject requests per Art 11 GDPR. they can lodge a complaint with a responsible supervisory authority, which would be the data protection agency in their EU/EEA member state (or the ICO in the UK). The EDPS is irrelevant here, since it is only the internal supervision authority for EU institutions. The competent supervisory authorities can levy fines. they can sue the data controllers, both for compliance (e.g. deleting unauthorized thumbnails) and for damages, if any were suffered. However, immaterial damages awarded for GDPR violations are typically fairly low, if they are recognized by the court at all. the right to judicial remedy (sue the controllers in court) and to lodge a complaint are independent. They largely pursue different remedies. Both can be used to seek compliance, but only supervisory authorities can impose fines, and only direct lawsuits by the data subjects can seek damages. | It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable. | Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task. | Yes. The AusPat database is an excellent source for looking for Australian patents. I did a quick search for "card game" and came across 276 results fitting those keywords. Not all involve the classic generic-52-card-deck format, but some do. A good example - and one that seems similar to your idea - is "Modified blackjack game using non-standard blackjack card values", by Davinder Signh Sandhu. There's no direct link to it from AusPat.1 So yes, you can patent a card game in Australia. At the moment, I don't have enough information to answer your other two questions. 1 I found a similar American patent with more information, though I have no proof that the two are in similar formats. | Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use. | The short answer: No license is required in any U.S. jurisdiction to buy a firearm magazine. There are some jurisdictions that restrict the sale of "high-capacity" magazines to civilians. That's something that is changing often enough that any answer covering the U.S. will probably quickly be obsolete. Suffice it to say: If you can find it in a store there are no legal restrictions or conditions on purchasing it. Technically an "export" license might be required under ITAR to take magazines out of the country, but in practice this has not yet applied to individuals carrying low-tech small-arms accessories (in quantities reasonable for an individual's use). | The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed. |
Is a civilian punished if they commit crimes for criminals by force and not willingly? Problem: I'm writing a sci-fi book that involves an adult character, who is a normal and innocent civilian (United States, year 2191), who got caught spying on a group of powerful terrorists running a stealth operation in the facility that he worked in. Instead of being killed, the character is taken in by the terrorists and forced to work for them as a sort of civilian operative, who could collect and feed them information or assist in other operations. The character isn't doing this willingly, but he is 'convinced' when the terrorists take his son hostage. Throughout the next eight years, the character (not by his own will) commits several crimes, not violent or murderous but many treasonous. He is soon caught by authorities in Houston, Texas. However, the terrorists in question are a lot more evil and malicious, and it's possible that during those 8 years, the character had commit a crime that assisted the terrorists in, say, a murder or robbery of protected information. Question: Even though he was being forced to do so by terrorists, would the character be punished like any normal criminal committing these crimes? I need to know, because he agrees to help authorities put an end to the terrorist group. After they do, his son is released, and I want to implement an end to his character arc as a free, recovering man living with his son, unless his crimes call for imprisonment, of course. I'm very open to change this, if so. Note: I don't know a lot about law. :p | united-states Almost every U.S. jurisdiction (perhaps all of them) recognize the affirmative defense of "duress" to a criminal prosecution. The precise scope of what actions are sufficient to establish that duress is present vary. A credible threat that someone will kill you or your child is generally sufficient in every state that recognizes the defense. There is also a closely related defense known as "choice of evils." This said, eight years is a very long time and usually the defense of duress is available only if the threat was imminent or immediate. So, it is probably less likely than not that a finder of fact would conclude that it was impossible to seek to involve authorities in the situation, for all of the time in that eight year time period, without reasonably risking the threatened harm. Also, while you call his acts "treasonous", in reality the crime of treason is defined very narrowly in the U.S. Constitution to taking up arms against your country and providing aid and comfort to people who are doing so, and the fact pattern suggested probably does not constitute treason under U.S. law. Finally, while his circumstances only dubiously are sufficient to assert a defense of duress over the sustained eight year time period, this doesn't mean that authorities couldn't choose to refrain from prosecuting him, or that the couldn't seek only lesser charges with mitigating circumstances conceded in sentencing, in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Often this exercise of prosecutorial discretion would be conditioned upon cooperation in the case brought against other defendants in related cases. In an exceptional case, the pardon power could be invoked for relieve him from criminal liability as has been done in some past insurrections in U.S. history like the Whiskey Rebellion and the U.S. Civil War. Even treason is a pardonable offense at the federal level. At the federal level in the United States, the President can issue a pardon even if someone has not yet been convicted of the crime in question. england While I am not an expert on the exact details of English law, in general, it is harder to claim the defenses of "duress" and "choice of evils" under English criminal law than it is under the criminal laws of most U.S. jurisdictions. See here. | Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions. | IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed. | Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives. | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer. | You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished. | All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out. |
Rewriting math proof from a paywalled paper then posting it to website for free If I read a math proof in a paper that requires payment to read, is it legal to rewrite the proof with different words, phrasing, and order, then post the proof publicly in a website (with a citation)? Or we are forbidden from publicly sharing math proofs until the paper's copyright expires? | A proof can be protected by copyright. The underlying facts of math cannot. But if one has copied details of the order of the proof, or of the selection of theorems to use, and if several other choices would have been possible, then the new proof may constitute a trivially modified copy, or a derivative work, and in either case making of it might be copyright infringement. However, making and distributing a copy, even with no changes at all, for purposes of comment and criticism, might be fair use in the US, fair dealing in the UK or some other parts of the Commonwealth, or fall under an exception to copyright in other countries (these generally vary significantly by country). This is usually a very fact-driven question. | It infringes the copyright. It can easily be proved that both XOR1 and XOR2 derive from the source work by XOR-ing the streams with each other. It's just like any encrypted copy: it infringes the copyright, but only those who can decrypt it are in a position to know that it infringes the copyright. The posts on the forum are illegal because they infringe the copyright; it doesn't matter that they are derived works rather than the work itself, just as your drawing of a copyright-protected image infringes copyright because it is a derived work without being the work itself. | You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article. | Copyright Prominent at the bottom of the page is: © RealClearPolitics 2015 This is nice because it tells you who you have to approach for a licence. If it wasn't there the material would still be copyright you just wouldn't know who owned the copyright. Questions So: If I'm looking to build an app or write a book and I wish to use statistics, am I allowed to basically use their numbers as long as I cite where it is coming from? No, unless what you do constitutes fair use and I don't think it does. If I do make a profit from it, do I owe any royalties to the original scientists/surveyers? No, but you would owe whatever licence fee you negotiated with the copyright holder, ostensibly RealClearPolitics. Must I ask them for permission? Yes, unless you are OK with running the risk of being sued. Commentary I see books reference hundreds of studies all the time This is because they are generally protected by Academic Fair Use public polls should be open information to everyone The only public poll that I know of is an election and that information is available. What you are looking at is a private poll commissioned by and paid for by RealClearPolitics and it is their intellectual property; why should that "be open information to everyone"? commercial interests may be legally entangling Always | I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law. | "Mathematician" is not a legally regulated term, so there are no laws that would prohibit me from calling myself a mathematician (I am not one). I do know a tiny bit about number theory, set theory, formal language theory and logic, but mostly I know about African languages. If I have no shame, I can legally call myself a mathematician. My employing institution has no policy that regulates self-appellation. In fact it is very common for people to self-mislabel in the fashion that you describe. Many people claim to be "linguists" when they are actually "English teachers" or are "translators". However, if I were to claim to have a PhD from the Department of Mathematics at Yale University, that would be a false statement of fact, and potentially internally-actionable by the institution. My actual mathematician colleagues cannot sue me for damages (they have not been objectively harmed), but an institution could sack me for material misrepresentation of credentials (for which reason they might actually demand a copy of said credential). It is possible that a materially false statement of credential could be actionable as fraud, though I can't come up with a plausible scenario at the moment. | The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923. | Article 19 of Swiss copyright law says that "Published works may be used for private use" (emphasis added), though excludes computer programs from that exception. "Private use" is defined to include not only private use, it extends to use by friends and relatives, and in educational settings. But, para 3 say that except for personal use including that by friends and relatives, you cannot copy art, music, record performances, or copy substantially from works commercially available. (Confusing perhaps because the law refers to using versus copying). The law does not explicitly permit copying for personal use, but it does not prohibit it (whereas para 3 does explicitly prohibit other kinds of copying). Art. 20 then says that you do not have to pay for a copy made for personal use (para 1), but if you "use" a work in a private use context though not the personal use context defines in 19(1)(a), you have to pay. So the letters and numbers are there to allow you to distinguish whether it's legal to use, to copy, and whether you have to pay. This final sentence in Art. 19 Copies which are made by accessing works that are lawfully made available are neither subject to the restriction of private use under this Article nor are they included in the claims for remuneration under Article 20. is confusing. Pirate sites are not themselves legal in Switzerland, and a person who downloads from them is not accessing works that are lawfully made. But still, personal use is legal, copying in that context is legal, and no remuneration is owed, and the law does not restrict personal use copying to only legal sources. |
Can a state impose additional qualifications for Presidential candidates wishing to appear on the ballot? Suppose, for example, that Colorado wants to pass a law that bars convicted criminals from appearing on the Presidential ballot (so Colorado voters can't vote for a Presidential candidate who is convicted of a crime) Would the Presidential Qualifications Clause of the US constitution prohibit Colorado from passing this law? | It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional "qualification" on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow "register" as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean "anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born". The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree. | The US legal code regarding threatening a president is 18 U.S. Code § 871 - Threats against President and successors to the Presidency. The first clause defines how threatening the president is illegal. The second clause starts off by defining "President-elect": The terms “President-elect” and “Vice President-elect” as used in this section shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the offices of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained from the results of the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. So the key here is that they are the "the apparent successful candidates […] as ascertained from the results of the general elections." It doesn't define this phrase though, especially the word "apparent". It appears that the prosecutors in the case mentioned in the question are arguing that Donald Trump became the apparent President-elect when, after Election Day, voting results began coming in and he was projected to win 270 electoral votes. Given the amount of stock that most Americans seem to put into the media's coverage of who wins the election (and the fact that the person in question seems to have assumed he would be president), that's unlikely to be contested. | The Indiana constitution is phrased differently to the US constitution in such a way to exclude pre-emptive pardons: (Indiana) The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment (US constitution) he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. (my emphasis) The Indiana constitution explicitly states that the Governor may grant pardons after conviction and does not give the Governor the power to grant pardons before conviction. By contrast, the Supreme court has judged that the President may issue pardons after commission, that is after the offence has been committed, and potentially before the arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. They can't issue pardons for crimes not yet committed. The scope of pardons issued by the Governor is limited; this power is subject to regulation by law issued by the Legislature, and (if there is no regulation giving sole power of pardon to the president) the Legislature may form a council to review pardons. The council's advice and consent must be sought. In fact, the Legislature appoints the Parole Board to this role. So the Parole Board gives advice and consent to pardons issued by the Governor. In practice, therefore, the Parole Board makes these decisions, as Governors rarely refuse pardons recommended by the Board. Generally, though, pardons are rare, Mike Pence granted only three during his tenure as Governor. References: Constituion of Indiana Guide to pardons in Indiana | Article III, Section 2 of The Constitution requires that The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed Since the Idaho portion of Yellowstone is part of the state of Idaho and is not part of a non-state, ergo the trial shall be held in Idaho, according to The Constitution. One jurisdictional statute, 16 USC 24, says The Yellowstone National Park, as its boundaries now are defined, or as they may be hereafter defined or extended, shall be under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. All the laws applicable to places under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall have force and effect in said park. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to forbid the service in the park of any civil or criminal process of any court having jurisdiction in the States of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. All fugitives from justice taking refuge in said park shall be subject to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the State of Wyoming. So the crime would be a federal matter. I put emphasis on a sentence that doesn't have a straightforward interpretation. There is another jurisdictional statute 28 USC 131, the problematic one, which states: Wyoming and those portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in Montana and Idaho constitute one judicial district. Court shall be held at Casper, Cheyenne, Evanston, Lander, Jackson, and Sheridan. Therefore, the crime must be tried in Wyoming. Moreover, the judicial district of Wyoming also includes that unoccupied portion of the park in Idaho. This statute conflicts with Article III, Section 2, which requires court to be held in Idaho. Since The Constitution has precedence over federal statutes, the instruction to hold court in Wyoming is unconstitutional. The 6th Amendment does not pose a particular problem, with its requirement that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law since the jury could be of Idahoans, and transported to Wyoming – the 6th addresses the nature of the jury, not the location of the trial. It is an open question what the 6th Amendment refers to in talking of "state and district", since district is not defined at a constitutional level. The only district with constitutional stature is the District of Columbia, which is not a state, and therefore there could be no "state and district" if we mean "district, as specifically mentioned in The Constitution". The Judiciciary Act of 1789 first created federal judiciary districts, signed by Washington on September 24, 1789, and the 6th Amendment was passed by Congress the next day. It is reasonable to assume that this is what they meant by "district". 28 USC 131 does say that all of Wyoming plus a sliver of Idaho are a judicial district, so one could have a jury composed of citizens of Wyoming which satisfies the "jury of the district" requirement, but that would not satisfy the "jury of the state" requirement. If anyone lived in that area, those people could constitute a "jury of the state and district", but you would still have a clash between the statutory and constitutional requirements for venue. | The US Constitution doesn't say one way or the other how a state's representatives are to be chosen, so until this law was passed in 1841, a state could have all of their representatives elected at-large, without districts. It is only recently that SCOTUS has gotten involved in redistricting questions: here is a summary of leading redistricting rulings. A recurring theme in these rulings has been the Equal Protection Clause, where certain redistricting plans (or non-plans) were found to violate that clause (especially ordering a state to redistrict when it refused to do so with the result being that population changes diluted the vote of those living in certain districts). Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 held that The constitutional requirement in Art. I, § 2,that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" means that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's thus redistricting is a justiciable question, answerable with respect to the federal government's need to enforce the 14th Amendment. It is not necessary to amend the Constitution further to specify a means of enforcing that clause. | From Roberts' dissenting opinion: Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition. (The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.) In my opinion, this quote speaks as much to the second question as the first. Assume (hypothetically) for a moment that question one was not at issue. If a state defined marriage as only between opposite sexes, and the right to make a state change its definition of marriage is not in the Supreme Court's purview (in our hypo), then the state is as free to reject the validity of marriages abhorrent to its laws, performed elsewhere, as it is to deny the right to marry under its theory of marriage. | No. The Pardon Clause only extends the power to pardon "offenses against the United States," which essentially means that the president can only issue a pardon in a federal criminal case. A contract claim is civil rather than criminal, and governed by state law rather than federal, so the Pardon Clause would not affect the president's liability. | The ICERD would not apply to the natural born citizens clause by its own definitions. Part 1, Article 1, secs 2 and 3 read: This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality. |
Where is the line between an Assured Shorthold Tenancy and a more casual non-AST? Assured Shorthold Tenants have relatively strong protections from eviction. But when does one gain this status when in more casual arrangements particularly in which the (sub?) Landlord requires repossession of the premises are their own only home? Is there no weighing of relatively compelling interests between the two parties? Consider the several following scenarios: Tim rents an entire flat or alternatively a single bedroom through Airbnb for a week. (The landlord doesn't live in the same house.) Is he an AST? Suppose he rents it for a month, or two months. At what point does he become an AST with corresponding PFE? Larry goes to Berlin for a week-long holiday and sublets his HMO room on spare room.com to Theodore for the week. Upon returning Theodore declines to leave. Is s21 process required to evict him or do concepts of a protected intending occupier apply at the end of the agreed term? Does he then get a statutory periodic tenancy (SPT)? Now what if Larry instead goes away for one month or three months and sublets his room (or flat if it makes a difference) for those periods. Again at what stage does it become AST? Further, let us suppose that for Larry's fortnight holiday he collects a £300 deposit. Must this be accordingly protected given how casual the tenancy is? | All that matters is whether the tenancy falls within the statutory definition contained in the Housing Act 1988. Assured shorthold tenancies are subsets of assured tenancies, so first we need to look at the latter. 1. Is the tenancy an assured tenancy? Section 1(1)(a): tenant(s) must be individual(s). Section 1(1)(b): at least one of the tenants must occupy the dwelling-house as their only or principal home. Section 1(1)(c): the tenancy must not be excluded by in Section 1(2) or 1(6). Section 1(2) in turn refers to Part 1 of Schedule 1 which contains a list of exceptions. They are quite detailed but, briefly, the following are excluded: tenancies with high rateable values, tenancies at very low rents, business tenancies, licenced premises, agricultural tenancies, student accommodation provided by universities etc., holiday lets, tenancies with resident landlords, crown tenancies, some local authority lets. 2. Is the assured tenancy an assured shorthold tenancy? Section 19A: the tenancy must either have come into existence after Section 96 of the Housing Act 1996 came into force (the vast majority of cases) or it falls under Section 20. Section 19A: the tenancy does not fall within one of the exceptions in Schedule 2A. Turning to your scenarios: Tim rents an entire flat or alternatively a single bedroom through Airbnb for a week. (The landlord doesn't live in the same house.) Is he an AST? Not an AST; excluded by Schedule 1 as a holiday let. Suppose he rents it for a month, or two months. At what point does he become an AST with corresponding PFE? As long as it is a holiday let, it will not be an AST. It would only be an AST if it were Tim's only or principal home (and all the other criteria apply). There is no magical "point" at which it changes from one to the other; it's down to the reality of the facts. Larry goes to Berlin for a week-long holiday and sublets his HMO room on spare room.com to Theodore for the week. Upon returning Theodore declines to leave. This depends on the specifics of how it was let to Theodore. It sounds like a holiday let on the face of it though. Now what if Larry instead goes away for one month or three months and sublets his room (or flat if it makes a difference) for those periods. Again at what stage does it become AST? As above, it becomes an AST when all the criteria for an AST are met per the statutory definition. Further, let us suppose that for Larry's fortnight holiday he collects a £300 deposit. Must this be accordingly protected given how casual the tenancy is? Section 213(1) of the Housing Act 2004 only requires a deposit to be protected if the tenancy is a shorthold. | Often, evictions are bifurcated. An initial hearing determines all evidence necessary to determine if there is a default existing sufficient to justify an eviction, and if so, the eviction goes forward immediately despite the fact that not all issues in the case have been resolved. A later hearing resolved the precise dollar amount of any damages claim. If the grounds for eviction is non-payment of rent, and the amount of payments or the amount of obligations of the landlord that can be setoff against the rent due exceeds the amount of rent found to have not be paid, then it is a defense to an eviction in the initial possession phase. If the counterclaim is smaller than the amount of rent owed (or cannot for some reason be set off against the amount owed) then it is only at most, a setoff against a damages award in favor of the landlord. I'm have not researched, in particular, how this is handled in New Jersey, but I am providing this answer on the theory that some insight is better than nothing. For the purpose of this question assume the landlord does not dispute the tenants underlying claim. His only argument is that the tenant should counter sue and that it should not be raised as a defense for non payment / stop the eviction. If this is true, it is both an affirmative defense to the eviction claim and a basis for a counterclaim in most cases. The better practice would be to raise it both ways in the same lawsuit. But, if the counterclaim is not sufficient to overcome the claim that rent is owed and not paid in full, or triggers some other different alternative ground for an eviction (e.g., maybe the lease provides that application of a security deposit against rent owed is itself an event of default), then that wouldn't prevent an eviction. | Landlord-tenant law is an area that is heavily statute-based, jurisdiction-dependent, and far from uniform across the country. A complex, specific, multi-part question like this one is not going to get a simple answer. In general, though, I can clear up some of the confusion with a quick example. Let's say you abandon your lease, but as you do so, you write a letter to the landlord saying: "While I won't be living there any more, my friend's band needs a place to practice. They have agreed to pay half my rent if you let them play there 4 nights a week. They'll be starting on Tuesday at 11 PM: please have a set of keys waiting for them at the front desk." The landlord does not give your friends the keys. They re-key and clean the apartment and rent it two months later. Are you going to stand up in court and argue, with a straight face, that you should only be liable for half the rent for those two months because of the landlord's "failure to mitigate"? Again, jurisdictions differ, but the duty to mitigate is not absolute. If the landlord could rent out a $1,000/month apartment for $5 a month, it doesn't have to do that, and you can't make the Court take $5 a month off their damages if they refuse to do so. Also, you seem to be confused about what subleasing is. A sublessor owes duties to you; you still owe the duty to your landlord to get the rent paid. A sublease is an agreement between you and a third party to pay you rent. It does not affect your relationship with the landlord at all, unless it's a breach of your agreement with the landlord or of local law protecting the landlord from unauthorized subleasing. | I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right. | the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it. | Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony. | What's the legality of this situation? It's unlawful and you should seek support for it. That document you linked to appears to have resources that could help you, such as support lines and counselling centres, etc. Am I being discriminated against by these landlords(companies)? I would say so. It sounds like you're being discriminated against on grounds of race and ethnic origin. It appears to violate the General Equal Treatment Act. However, I do want to stress that there may be completely reasonable factors as to why landlords are rejecting your appointment requests. For example, it would not be discriminatory to refuse housing on the basis that you don't have the appropriate income, or you have a poor credit rating, or you don't have any previous rental references. It can be very difficult to prove discrimination if any of the above factors apply, since the landlord could simply cite one of those reasons instead. | Can a landlord (UK, English law) make a claim from a potential tenant who wants to back out of signing a Tenancy Agreement? No. Your description reflects that in this particular scenario there is no tenancy contract. The only actual contract relates to the holding deposit, and your description suggests that both parties fully complied with their obligations pursuant to that contract. Accordingly, neither party has a viable claim against the other. Regardless of whether verbal agreements are cognizable under UK tenancy law, the meeting of the minds you portray is that this tenancy ought to be formalized only by signing a contract. That supersedes customer's prior verbal expressions of intent about moving in. The landlord incurred expenses that either were covered by the customer's holding deposit or were unreasonable. An example of the latter is the fees "landlord has paid for the dates on the contract to be changed (repeatedly)", a task that any person can perform with a text editor at a negligible cost. Likewise, "turn[ing] down other potential tenants" is covered by the holding deposit the customer paid. As for taking "a detailed inventory", that is a task the landlord would perform with any potential tenant and which would render the same outcome regardless of who the tenant would be. The holding deposit must be associated to a deadline or holding period. Beyond that deadline, it is up to the landlord to grant customer's requests for postponement. But the landlord is not entitled to compensation for a risk he deliberately took without even requiring a [renewed] holding deposit. what's the situation if the tenant still claims they want to move in, but the landlord wants to withdraw because they no longer trusts the tenant's promises? That depends on the deadline associated to the holding deposit. Once the holding period has elapsed, the landlord is entitled to do with his property whatever he wants. The customer would have a claim only if (1) landlord withdraws prior to the deadline and (2) customer provably intended to move in. |
Can I request to delete an account with a government? This concerns my student loans repayment account which is managed by the gov.uk website. I have paid my loan back in full and have had a confirmatory letter stating this as well, as I wanted to ensure I have written proof. When on the phone with the student loan repayment hotline, they told me that I couldn't delete my account (there is no such option anywhere) and that they would keep the account for my lifetime, during which I have to keep my contact details up to date. I said I didn't want that, and the response was that if I want to take out a loan again, they would have all the information. I really, really disagree with this. I understand that the British government will probably have a track record of my student loan and this is fine; but I don't want to have a life-long account that I need to keep up to date with my home address, email, and two phone numbers. I have read GDPR guides on how to request erasure, but I don't really feel this applies- I want to have my account deleted, not the track record of the loan and repayment. Also, all the guides keep talking about companies. Do governments count as companies? Probably not, I presume. What can I do? | In order to process data (which includes storing data), a data controller must establish one or more of the lawful bases contained at Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR. Briefly, those are: a) Consent of the data subject b) Necessary for performance of a contract with the data subject c) Necessary for compliance with a legal obligation d) Necessary to protect vital interests of data subject or another person e) Necessary for public interest or exercise of official authority vested in the controller f) Necessary for controller's legitimate interests Clearly a) and d) don't apply. As you've settled the debt, it seems unlikely to me that b) or f) apply. That leaves c) and e). A common example under c) would be a requirement by Companies House or HMRC to keep accounting records for a certain period of time. Some public bodies may also find it necessary, under e), to retain records which they need to be able to carry out their other functions. It seems highly unlikely to me that either of these would justify retention for your "lifetime" however. I would start by sending them a written demand to have your data erased under Article 17(1). Make sure you also specifically request that they provide you with all the information (and in particular the purposes of the processing) under Article 15(1), and that, in the event that they refuse to erase your data, they explain the reasons why pursuant to Article 12(4). Their response on these points will be helpful in establishing whether there is a lawful basis. Your next step after that is either to complain to the ICO or to apply to court for a compliance order under Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The former is free while the latter is not and carries risks of cost if you are unsuccessful. If you opt for one of these steps, make sure you cite the relevant provisions of the GDPR and explain why you think there is no lawful basis for the data retention (including by referencing any response you received from them). "I have read GDPR guides on how to request erasure, but I don't really feel this applies- I want to have my account deleted, not the track record of the loan and repayment" It doesn't matter whether we are talking about your account or your track record. What matters is whether the account constitutes personal data, which it almost certainly does, per the definition at Article 4(1): "‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;" | By which law I am enforced to share my personal details (such as my full name) on forum publicly to on-line people which I even don't know (when commenting on random posts)? Contract Law. Google have made it a term of the contract that you use your full name. You can: contact Google and negotiate a change to that term, accept that term, choose not to enter the contract. so I can enforce on my privacy rights without removing my Google Plus account? As a person subject to UK law, your privacy rights involve limiting who and in what circumstances Google can divulge personal private information to. Your name is not personal private information; things like your medical history and bank balance are. Aside from that, you do not have a right to privacy. Anything you do or say that is visible or audible from a public place (like the internet) or a private place where the person in control of that place does not insist on your privacy (i.e. almost everywhere that you are not in control of) is public! | The GDPR has a fairly broad concept of personal data: any information that relates to an identifiable person. This is far more than directly identifiable information! The concept of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. So indirectly linkable information can still be personal data. In your example, that ID can be easily re-identified with a particular person if you know who the secretary was between 2012 and 2014. It is quite likely that there are members in the club with this knowledge, or that this information can be gained from public sources like newspaper reports. Thus, you should assume that your member IDs are at most pseudonyms, but not anonymous. They are likely still personal data. However, it doesn't necessarily follow that you would have to erase everything. Art 17 comes with lots of caveats and exceptions. For example, if you are processing this personal data under a legitimate interest, and someone requests erasure, you might have overriding grounds to continue processing anyway. E.g. such a legitimate interest could involve security or auditability purposes. There might also be such a legitimate interest for keeping some history for the club, but there would have to be a decision based on the individual circumstances. Furthermore, you can of course retain data e.g. due to a legal obligation, or when this information is necessary for the establishment of or defence against legal claims. I understand your desire to keep some data around. Instead of asking “do I have to delete this?” it might be more productive to consider “under which legal basis can I keep this?”. I think you might have a legitimate interest, but you'd have to carry out a balancing test between the various interests and rights. A really problematic approach would be to hold on to de-identified data in the belief that it no longer were personal data. Such a belief is usually mistaken. True anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is really hard, in particular because you would also have to prevent indirect identification, also by other actors than yourself. There are theoretical models that can help with anonymization, e.g. with k-anonymization methods you'd ensure that there are no unique records in the DB. But this can be tricky to apply correctly, so I'd recommend to only treat aggregate statistics as truly anonymous. In 2012, the ICO has published an anonymization code of practice (PDF). It is no longer up to date with the current legal environment (in particular since the GDPR has expanded the concept of identifiability), but it provides a good overview of both the difficulties of preventing re-identification and an overview of potential solutions. | It is not different. But one company can decide to approach compliance differently from another. Here, TomTom has chosen a fairly safe/conservative interpretation, whereas Google and Apple decided that more data collection is appropriate. A “find my device” style functionality appears to be entirely unproblematic if the user books that particular service (regardless of whether the service is paid or gratis) and provides consent for the location data collection. The legal basis for such a service could then be Art 6(1)(a) consent or Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract to which the data subject is party. Personally, I believe that Google is not sufficiently transparent about how Find My Device works, but that TomTom could provide a compliant service if they wanted to. That TomTom doesn't offer this service primarily shows that they don't think developing this service is worth it. Wiping a remote device is unrelated to this issue and doesn't seem to provide GDPR challenges. At least in a business context, remote wiping may be an appropriate security measure and may then even be mandated by the GDPR (e.g. see Art 24 or Art 32). | Yes, in england-and-wales the Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced 'Unexplained Wealth Orders', which compel the respondent to provide a statement: (a) setting out the nature and extent of the respondent’s interest in the property in respect of which the order is made, (b) explaining how the respondent obtained the property (including, in particular, how any costs incurred in obtaining it were met), (c) where the property is held by the trustees of a settlement, setting out such details of the settlement as may be specified in the order, and (d) setting out such other information in connection with the property as may be so specified. There a few requirements set out in section 362B, for example, the property must have value of over £50,000; there should be "reasonable grounds" for suspicion that the respondent would have been unable to obtain the property using their lawfully obtained income; the respondent or their connections must have either been involved in serious or organised crime, or be a politically exposed person, and so on. If the respondent refuses to make such a statement, the police may apply for a Civil Recovery Order to confiscate the property, with the property in question "presumed to be recoverable property" (section 362C(2)). Giving false information in such a statement is a criminal offence. | It’s personal data ... but why do you think you can change it for free? It’s clearly personal data because it can be demonstrably linked to you, both within and outside Blizzard’s database. Presumably, you consented Blizzard having it or they have some other legitimate basis for having it. So far, this is all GDPR compliant. You have a right to be forgotten, so you can ask Blizzard to delete your account. You have a right to confirm the information is correct. And that’s it. They can charge you a fee to change your user name just like your government can charge you a fee to change your real name. | Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A. | These documents constitute personal data and - in principle - you, as the subject, have the right to get a copy of them by issuing a "subject access request". The controller shall provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing. For any further copies requested by the data subject, the controller may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs. Where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise requested by the data subject, the information shall be provided in a commonly used electronic form. (Art. 15 (3) GDPR) GDPR applies to controllers of any kind, including government organisations. The subject access request can usually be a simple email. The ICO has a template for this: https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/your-right-of-access/ (but keep it simple, you can literally just ask for "all personal data" they have on you; no need to speculate on what kind of data they may have). The subject access request is sent to the actual controller, but if you don't get a response to your request after 30 days, you can file a complaint with the supervisory authority (see here for Germany; note that federal institutions are supervised by the BFDI, not the data protection authorities of the Länder). Also note that you may have to go through some trouble to be properly authenticated by the controller. They do need to be certain that you are the data subject. There are also reasons why a controller can refuse to provide some or all of the information (e.g. if your request is clearly excessive or unfounded, if it's impossible to comply without violating another data subject's rights), but I would be surprised if any of those applied in your case. Your rights can also be restricted depending on the legal basis for processing. This includes rights that are illogical as well as some that provide special protection for processors: You can't object to processing based on consent (but you can revoke your consent), fulfilment of contract (but you can cancel your contract), a legal obligation on the part of the processor, or a vital interest (but you still have the right to erasure) Your right to portability and right to erasure does not apply if processing is based on a legal obligation or a public task (justice, parliamentary or government functions, statutory functions etc.) your right to portability also doesn't apply if processing is based on vital interest (e.g to protect someone's life) or legitimate interest of the processor. It is possible that processing all or some of your data was based on the performance of a public task, in which case they will refuse your request. |
I think schools are not keeping to the new cost cutting regs on school uniforms I have a discrepancy with my child's school because the new statutory guidance states that if schools use branded items they must be clear why it is needed. My Child's school requires logo on the trousers, jumper and blazer. 3 logos seems excessive to me, I wrote emails and had no response. These uniforms are more expensive than if getting non branded items from a non school wear shop and the school only gives two options of supplier to purchase from. When informing the school, the only response I had was over the phone and it seemed wrong, they told me it doesn't apply to academies, however I spoke to DfE who said it does apply to academies. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cost-of-school-uniforms/cost-of-school-uniforms This means the following actions need to happen before parents seek to purchase or acquire uniform items in summer 2022: changes to the uniform policy which do not fit with these exceptions, such as removing an unnecessary branded item Is this a common problem across schools and what can I do to push my son's school into following these new legislations? | Firstly, we need to correct some of the terminology in your question. While you are right that what you have linked to is "statutory guidance", that is not the same as "new legislations". Legislation means law passed by Parliament, while guidance can be issued by any body authorised to do so by legislation. Guidance may or may not be legally binding depending on what the underlying legislation says. In this case, the guidance is made under Section 551A(1) of the Education Act 1996. Section 551A(3) provides: "The appropriate authority of a relevant school must have regard to guidance issued under this section when developing and implementing a school uniform policy for the school." This means that the guidance is not legally binding in the sense that the school authority is not obliged to do what the guidance says. However, the authority is legally obliged to "have regard" to it. This means they must consider it and take it into account when reaching a decision. They can depart from the guidance but in that case they should be able to explain and justify their reasons for doing so. A challenge would need to be by way of judicial review and you would need to establish that they failed to have regard to the guidance. A strongly worded letter pointing out their legal obligation under the Act, together with a threat of judicial review proceedings, may be enough for them to take you seriously without actually needing to go to court. | It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin A medical condition like an allergy is not necessarily a physical disability. The school is arguably fulfilling its obligations under WHS legislation by banning nut products if that is what a risk assessment indicates. It may also be necessary to ban milk products if that is required for your daughter's safety. If (and I do not know) nuts pose a greater risk than milk then banning the former and not the latter may be perfectly justified. Ask to see the risk assessment. | I emailed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the USA asking this and received the reply: "There is nothing to prevent you from marketing antiques in the UK while present in the US." I also contacted a relevant US attorney and received: "There’s nothing in your question which would implicate Colorado or US law. If you're a UK citizen, and the sale is happening in the UK while you're in the US, then the US has anything to do with it. So as long as the UK doesn’t have any problem with it, the US will not." So I would conclude this question fairly answered. | For the same reason that states require doctors to be licensed Surely, if I want an unqualified, unlicensed surgeon (or a person that says they’re a surgeon) to crack open my cranium and poke my brain, that’s up to me? There is no doubt that requiring people to attend medical school for half a decade and then spending a similar period as an intern and a resident is a large barrier to entry compared to handing high school graduates a scalpel and a bone saw and telling them to learn on the job. The same applies to engineers, lawyers, plumbers, electricians, builders etc. I mean if a building falls down because the engineer or builder didn’t know what they were doing, it can’t kill that many people, can it? Even drivers for that matter - it’s a large cost to individuals and businesses to learn to drive, pass a test, maintain a license and a relatively clean record, register a car, keep it roadworthy etc. Surely it would be simpler to let anyone drive anything and if they cause someone harm, like dying, for that individual to seek redress through the courts? We’ll, there’s a reason why states mandate things and it’s economic rather than legal. When people don’t trust each other transaction costs go up. These costs are usually borne by the consumer as the suppliers engage in a “race to the bottom” - whoever provides the worst service at the lowest cost wins. Further, these costs are borne unevenly - most consumers are fine, some are very severely damaged; possibly with no real redress. By imposing minimum standards, the state places these costs in the hands of the people who are best positioned to manage them - the supplier. Once a user has given their data to the supplier they have no control over it. Therefore the economical optimal solution to maximize economy-wide output is to make the supplier legally responsible for managing the data in accordance with minimum standards. Extraterritoriality In an ideal world, there would be universal privacy standards. There would also be universal standards for training doctors and engineers. But there aren’t. Therefore, countries and states impose their own standards on organizations that operate within their jurisdiction. The threshold for the GDPR (and most other privacy laws) is whether you are targeting users within their jurisdiction. If so, they have the power under international law to assert sovereignty even if you are located elsewhere. A state has power where it says it has power. Otherwise, you could plan a terrorist attack on the USA from the UK and not have to fear prosecution. That’s what extradition treaties and honoring other nation’s civil judgements is all about. A website or similar platform operates in each and every jurisdiction it is accessible from. Like a surgeon with unlimited plane tickets. Therefore, it must comply with the law in each and every jurisdiction it’s operating in. Countries have adopted one of 2 solutions - China’s is to simply block all external sites, everyone else has said you can operate here but you have to follow our rules, just like every other business has to. Now, you may not like this but there is no doubt they have the legal power to do it. | As @DavidSupportsMonica says, you can't go back in time to fix the problem. As a rule regulators are more interested in obtaining compliance than throwing the book. There are no sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences, but most convictions lead to a fine. However HSE Policy is that enforcement should be proportionate to the degree of non-compliance and the level of risk created. 5.2 In our dealings with duty holders, we will ensure that our enforcement action is proportionate to the health and safety risks and to the seriousness of any breach of the law. This includes any actual or potential harm arising from any breach, and the economic impact of the action taken. 5.4 Applying the principle of proportionality means that our inspectors should take particular account of how far duty holders have fallen short of what the law requires and the extent of the risks created An annual inspection that was overdue by one day is a very minor failing, and the principle of proportionality means that you are most likely to get verbal advice not to let it happen again. You say "if anything happens", presumably meaning if there is an actual incident or serious risk, such as a fire or CO poisoning. Its true that in such a case they will certainly want to look at your records, but the proportionality rule still applies. They would need to be able to make a causal link between your failing and the actual incident to make any more of it, which wouldn't be the case here. | england Quite the opposite; although playing cards are not specifically mentioned, gambling education is actively encouraged in schools: but through the support of charities and the voluntary sector - not by statute. The key players are: PSHE Association (standing forPersonal, Social, Health and Economic) who, in partnership with BeGambleAware have a host of educational material, including the: Gambling prevention education handbook GamCare alongside YGAM and Fast Forward (from Scotland) and in line with PSHE Association guidance launched the Gambling Education Framework, that: provides a set of evidence-based principles to deliver effective gambling education for anyone who works with young people (aged 7 to 24) in a paid or voluntary capacity across a variety of formal and informal settings, including schools in England. Although tagged united-states, I have answered according to the LawSE Help Centre: "we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]" | The statement ABCGym refuses to refund payment it accepted for membership to a gym ABCGym closed. ABCGym has substituted an inferior-to-me option. could certainly be considered as defamatory. However, in the US and many other countries, truth would be a valid defense, if the person making the statement could prove that the statement is true. I don't see how it could be construed as solicitation. If worn on a shirt into ABC, the management could surely ask the wearer to remove it. If that request is refused, they could ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer has a valid membership, then it would depend on the exact terms of the membership contract, and provisions of local law, whether ABC could insist that the wearer leave, or have the wearer arrested for trespass should the wearer refuse. Any regulations incorporated by reference into the contract would also matter. At least in the US. walking back and forth on a public sidewalk just outside ABC's door, wearing such a shirt or carrying a classic picket sign with such a message would be pretty clearly legal, provided that others are not unduly obstructed, and no valid local ordinance is violated. In the wear-the-shirt-inside case, if the wearer refuses to remove the shirt or leave, the management would probably call law enforcement. LE will not want to decide whether wearer has the legal right to remain in the club wearing the shirt. They will probably ask the wearer to leave. If the wearer protests that s/he has a valid membership and thus a contractual right to stay, who knows what they would do. If they still ask the wearer to leave, the wearer would be wise to comply and perhaps take legal action to enforce his or her membership rights, which will depend on the contract details as mentioned above. A lawyer would probably be very helpful if the wearer wants to take that route. The wearer would be wise to remain polite and appear calm, not yelling or using epithets. | Trademarks protect against consumer confusion. Ask yourself if a consumer seeing that image with the "studio" portion removed might think that the altered image represents the same company as the original image. Of course, the answer will be "yes." But in the end it also depends on how the trademark is used. You've used the original image in the question; have you violated the trademark? No. Do you violate Tesco's trademark when you say "I went shopping at Tesco"? No. Do you violate their trademark when you sell food using the name "Tesco"? Yes. A distinctive graphic design such as this will also be protected by copyright, so you will also have to consider whether your intended use infringes copyright. |
in E&W, what is the "pre-action protocol"? In Statutes of limitations and the pre-action protocol (PAP) it is stated that the "pre-action protocol (PAP) must be completed before a case is brought to court in England-and-Wales. Just what is the "pre-action protocol" in E&W, when is it required, and how long does it typically take? | The pre-action protocols are part of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) which governs proceedings in the County Court, High Court, and Court of Appeal (see Rule 2.1). They set out what the parties should do before initiating proceedings in court. Being practice directions, they are not rules, but you ignore them at your peril; failing to do so will not affect the outcome of your case but can have cost implications or, in the most severe cases, result in sanctions (see paragraphs 13 - 15 here). There is a general pre-action protocol and a set of specific pre-action protocols for particular types of cases. If there is a specific protocol for your case, you follow that, otherwise you follow the general one (see paragraph 2). The full list of specific pre-action protocols can be found here. Note that there is another list contained within the general pre-action protocol at paragraph 18 but this list is not complete. This is rather unfortunate because paragraph 18 contains the phrase "the table sets out the protocols currently in force" and, below the table, "Updated: Wednesday, 6 April 2022" (which implies, incorrectly, that any older protocols not appearing in the table are not currently in force). I suggest using the first list. "How long does it typically take?" This varies depending on the protocol being followed. See for example paragraph 6 of the general protocol which, without being prescriptive, suggests that a reasonable time for a defendant to respond to a pre-action letter is 14 days in a simple case and 3 months in a complex one. "pre-action protocol (PAP) must be completed before a case is brought to court in England-and-Wales" This is incorrect. Per paragraph 17 of the general pre-action protocol, if you are close to the limitation period, you can start proceedings and then apply for a stay to give you time to comply with the protocol. | As @DavidSupportsMonica says, you can't go back in time to fix the problem. As a rule regulators are more interested in obtaining compliance than throwing the book. There are no sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences, but most convictions lead to a fine. However HSE Policy is that enforcement should be proportionate to the degree of non-compliance and the level of risk created. 5.2 In our dealings with duty holders, we will ensure that our enforcement action is proportionate to the health and safety risks and to the seriousness of any breach of the law. This includes any actual or potential harm arising from any breach, and the economic impact of the action taken. 5.4 Applying the principle of proportionality means that our inspectors should take particular account of how far duty holders have fallen short of what the law requires and the extent of the risks created An annual inspection that was overdue by one day is a very minor failing, and the principle of proportionality means that you are most likely to get verbal advice not to let it happen again. You say "if anything happens", presumably meaning if there is an actual incident or serious risk, such as a fire or CO poisoning. Its true that in such a case they will certainly want to look at your records, but the proportionality rule still applies. They would need to be able to make a causal link between your failing and the actual incident to make any more of it, which wouldn't be the case here. | canada The Crown's duty to disclose all materials and information, inculpatory or exculpatory, unless clearly irrelevant, does not extend to Crown "work product." The "work product" privilege means that "notes and materials that involve the thought process and strategic or tactical considerations of Crown counsel in the preparation and presentation of its case" are not within the mandatory disclosure requirements. See Dudley v. British Columbia, 2016 BCCA 328. However, the Crown will present its case first. It will present an opening statement laying out the theory of the case and explain the relevance of the evidence it will be presenting. It will call all of its evidence first and then close its case before the defence presents its case. Also, [t]he Crown must not be allowed to change the case it has presented once the accused has begun to answer the Crown’s case R. v. G. (S.G.), [1997] 2 SCR 716, at para 38 | There isn't an automatic exclusion rule for all forms of improperly acquired evidence in the UK. I can't find the exact quote but there was a judgement from a senior court that said in terms: "it's not the court's job to discipline the police but to see that justice is done." However, judges have the discretion to disallow individual pieces of evidence if they think the interests of justice require it. Section 78 (1) of PACE (1984) has: In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. Senior judges have been reluctant to lay down general guidelines, holding the trial judge best placed to make these decisions (although of course, subject to appeal). The foundational principle is the accused's right to a fair trial, so in principle one could appeal to the ECtHR under Article 6. However it generally takes a similar line to courts in the UK: It is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence - for example, unlawfully obtained evidence - may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. PACE Section 78(2) is: Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence. The general principle in 78 (1) does not override specific prohibitions: for instance, intercept evidence is never admissable under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. | Here's what would likely happen in general: the plaintiff would seek a prejudgment attachment before they even get to trial (here's an example of Civil Procedure Rules outlining prejudgment attachment). Note: there must be a state statute existent in your jurisdiction to even seek this remedy. Generally, prejudgment attachments start in the form of a writ from the requesting plaintiff. That document must confirm (usually) that there is a suit for damages, ID the property to be attached, etc. Usually they are approved specifically in cases where the defendant is moving property out of the state or is fraudulently getting rid of property or hiding property in order to avoid paying a debt. Some states have different laws respecting if and how much notice a defendant is entitled to receive. Also, the enforcement of such writs must be in line with Due Process requirements - here, that in order to issue a prejudgment attachment while the defendant is unaware of the prejudgment attachment is only constitutional when there are "exigent circumstances." You tagged Massachusetts, so check here for the relevant Mass. Gen. Laws. Even better, check Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1 (Attachment) and 4.2 (Trustee Process). | england-and-wales In England and Wales, with the exception of private prosecutions, complainants don't 'press' (or drop) charges. There are several public authorities that can prosecute criminal offences but generally we talk about circumstances that involve the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). When a crime is reported to the police the police investigate. When the police complete their investigation they refer the case and send the evidence to the CPS. (A minor offence such as low value shoplifting can be handled by the police, although if the case goes to court it must be reviewed by the CPS before the first hearing.) Generally the CPS decides whether to prosecute based on 'the Full Code Test'. In short: "Is there enough evidence against the suspect to provide a realistic prospect of conviction?" "Is it in the public interest to prosecute?" (In urgent situations the CPS might decide it's necessary to decide based on 'the Threshold Test'.) The CPS prosecutes on behalf of the Crown, not the complainant. A criminal case is named along the lines of Rex/Regina or R. v Alex, not Bob v Alex. Sometimes it may be difficult to proceed with prosecution if a complainant (or witness) decides not to cooperate or sometimes the CPS might decide not to prosecute because of the complainant's circumstances. But the CPS is allowed to prosecute without the complainant's approval or cooperation. Under the Victims' Right to Review Scheme, in some circumstances a complainant can seek a review of a CPS decision not to prosecute or decision to stop a prosecution. | The common law rule was that to inherit you have to outlive the decedent from whom you are inheriting, and that the inheritance would pass to your estate if you died before distribution was made. Statutes in some jurisdictions provide that someone must survive for a longer period than that to be eligible to inherit, often five days, in order to simplify the factual issues in the common situation of a joint accident. Pennsylvania is one such state. But a will or trust can deviate from the default rule, and in U.S. practice, driven by federal estate tax laws, it isn't uncommon to require someone to survive the decedent by at least six months to inherit from them under an instrument. In this case, where more than a year has passed since the death, the inheritance would not lapse for these reasons. It also isn't uncommon for a trust, either established during life, or established at death, to provide that distributions from the trust are made at the discretion of the trustee and to require in those cases that the person receiving the distribution also be living at the time of the distribution. These trusts also typically contain specific provisions that spell out the rights of a beneficiary who dies before the trust is fully distributed. | This appears to be covered by the Norway Criminal Procedures Code, of which an English version can be found here. Chapter 10 deals with witnesses. Here are some relevant sections: § 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court. There follow a number of exceptions (spousal privilege, attorney-client privilege, state secrets, etc). None of them seem to apply to your example. § 115. The court may decide that a witness who fails to attend or who leaves the place of sitting without a valid reason shall be brought before the same or a subsequent sitting of the court. In special cases the court may decide that a witness shall be detained in custody until he can be examined. § 128. Before the examination the president of the court shall admonish the witnesses to tell the whole truth without concealing anything. He shall inform the witnesses of the liability consequent on giving false evidence or making a false affirmation. § 137. If a witness refuses to give evidence after being ordered to do so by a legally enforceable court order, the court may by a new order decide that the witness shall be kept in custody until he fulfils his obligation. Nevertheless a witness may not be kept in custody for more than three months altogether in the same case or in another case relating to the same matter. So effectively, if the witness fails to show up voluntarily, he can be brought in forcibly. He can be ordered to testify, and if he refuses, he can be held in custody (probably a jail) for up to three months. However, the authority to compel testimony is limited to courts; the police cannot compel statements from witnesses. § 230. The police may take statements from suspected persons, witnesses and experts but may not order any person to make a statement. So in your example, it appears that the witnesses would be free to refuse to speak to the police. However, if the case came to trial, they could be ordered to testify, and could be held in custody if they refused. |
How to conserve digital proof? There is some statement, put in digital form on the internet, wich I would like to conserve. The issue is its not available freely but rather after a login,so Internet Archive isn't an Option. How do I conserve this statement and its source in a way that its authenticity can be proven? | Take screenshots, film a video of you taking the screenshots and saying what you are doing and when. For utmost reliability have witnesses standing by. | You do not have to. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove that you made the threat. Reasonable doubt exists in the circumstances that you describe, that there are no logs of who accessed what when and how. Your attorney may have to introduce expert witnesses who can explain how it is possible that text from your computer can end up on a web page, and they can testify that there are many ways that data can be entered into the database, only a few of which actually involve you. | The text and content (including all diagrams and illustrations) of the 1847 work (and of any other work published in 1847) are in the public domain in the US and everywhere in the world. You may freely use them verbatim or in any modified form that you wish. You are not even legally required to credit your source, although not to do so would be unethical, in my view. The version by Nicholas Rougeux that is linked to in the question has the licensing statement: Posters and website design are copyright Nicholas Rougeux. All other content and diagrams are under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0). This will not apply to any content copied from the 1847 version, of course. You may use any of the new content and diagrams so released, or make and use derivative works based on those elements, provided that you comply with the CC BY-SA 4.0 license. This has a number of provisions, but the major ones are that you must release your work under the same license, must acknowledge your source work, and must not impose any additional conditions or restrictions on users of your derived work. These are spelled out in sections 3.a and 3.b of the license (linked above). Please read the full terms if you intend to use this license. If this procedure will satisfy your purpose, you do not need any further permission from Nicholas Rougeux, nor to pay any fees or royalties to him. If you do not choose to place your work under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, then you must not use the diagrams from Rougeux's version, nor modified versions directly based on them, nor an overall design clearly and directly based on the original design of that version, unless you secure permission from Rougeux (or the current copyright holder of Rougeux's version, whoever that may be). Given that Rougeux chose to release under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, he may well be unwilling to grant permission under a different license, but that is his choice to make. Exception: in the US, you may use content from the Rougeux version to the limited extent permitted by fair use. This is not likely to cover the use of all or a large number of diagrams, particularly for a competing version of the same base work. Without specific information on how much content you would be using from that version, and how similar it would be to the original, no one can reliably determine if fair use would apply or not, but fair use is most likely to apply when a strictly limited amount of content is reused, and particularly when it is used for a different purpose than the original. Also, fair use is a strictly US legal content, and a work that might be held to be fair use by a US court might be considered an infringement by the courts of some other counties. Other countries have their own exceptions to copyright which are different in scope and terms from fair use. Many of them are significantly narrower. Note that a work posted to the internet is in effect published in all countries, and a copyright holder might choose to sue in any country s/he pleases. US courts might well enforce such a judgement even if it would not have been the judgement of a US court. Rogeux (or any other creator of a new edition) can have no copyright in elements already present in Byrne's 1847 work. Any similarity to Rogeux's work that is because of a similarity to Byrne's 1847 work is not copyright infringement. But any new elements introduced by Rogeux (or anyone else), including the manner of adding interactivity to a diagram, may well be protected by copyright (although the idea of having an interactive version of the diagram will not be). Any new or significantly modified text or diagrams introduced in a later version will be protected. As to any other versions of the 1847 "Byrne's Euclid" that may have been published, the publishers gain no copyright over the original 1847 work or any of its elements, including text, diagrams, or color scheme. Provided you do not use any original content newly introduced in such editions, you do not need to secure any permission from, or pay any fee to, the copyright holders of such editions. However, you may not use any such original content, or modified versions clearly based on such original content, without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use, applies. All that I said above about fair use would then apply. A copyright holder may grant or refuse permission to use a protected work or create a derivative work on any terms that s/he chooses, and charge any fee or royalty rate s/he thinks proper. Lack of response to a request for permission must be treated as if the response was "No". | Recipes themselves are not protectable as intellectual property and a meal made with a recipe is, therefore, not a derivative work (because the meal is not derivative of the particular expression of the recipe which is entitled to protection). The precise expression of a recipe on a printed page is protectable, but that is all. Ideally, you wouldn't read or display the source of the recipe in your video. As the U.S. Copyright Registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) explains: How do I protect my recipe? A mere listing of ingredients is not protected under copyright law. However, where a recipe or formula is accompanied by substantial literary expression in the form of an explanation or directions, or when there is a collection of recipes as in a cookbook, there may be a basis for copyright protection. Note that if you have secret ingredients to a recipe that you do not wish to be revealed, you should not submit your recipe for registration, because applications and deposit copies are public records. See Circular 33, Works Not Protected by Copyright. Fashion designs have the same status. This is basically a legacy of a time when cooking and fashion design was done primarily at home by women in their households in the non-monetary economy and upper middle class men who served a judges and legislators didn't consider these ideas significant or economically meaningful enough to warrant legal protection. | StackExchange probably has no obligation to continue to provide the content, however StackExchange probably cannot stop copies from continuing to be used, reproduced, etc. from the Terms of Service (click on Legal below): You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. Bold added by me. The content is licensed to SE, unlike some sites where you transfer ownership of content to the site. SE can continue to use your data, but you still own the copyright. They can't limit your use of your own content, because you remain the owner. SE cannot use your content in a way that violates the Creative Commons Share Alike License, but I don't see any limitations on how SE makes your work available, including to a limited audience. They could, for example, probably move to a paid model because there are no commercial exclusions (unlike the Creative Commons non-commercial variations of the license). You could post a copy of SE content elsewhere, as long as you adhere to the requirements: In the event that You post or otherwise use Subscriber Content outside of the Network or Services, with the exception of content entirely created by You, You agree that You will follow the attribution rules of the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license as follows: You will ensure that any such use of Subscriber Content visually displays or otherwise indicates the source of the Subscriber Content as coming from the Stack Exchange Network. This requirement is satisfied with a discreet text blurb, or some other unobtrusive but clear visual indication. You will ensure that any such Internet use of Subscriber Content includes a hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site on the Network (e.g., https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) You will ensure that any such use of Subscriber Content visually display or otherwise clearly indicate the author names for every question and answer so used. You will ensure that any such Internet use of Subscriber Content Hyperlink each author name directly back to his or her user profile page on the source site on the Network (e.g., https://stackoverflow.com/users/12345/username), directly to the Stack Exchange domain, in standard HTML (i.e. not through a Tinyurl or other such indirect hyperlink, form of obfuscation or redirection), without any “nofollow” command or any other such means of avoiding detection by search engines, and visible even with JavaScript disabled. Making a complete copy of SE would seem to be within the terms of the license, as long as all the requirements for attributing, linking, etc are met, so you could mitigate the risk of the SE material going away in that manner. | I believe in truth, justice and equality for all What I get is something else. Nobody cares what you believe: what can you prove? And what can they prove? They say they posted you this letter. You say you never received it. If it goes to court they will submit evidence about how their internal letter generation and postal system works, this either will or will not convince the court on the balance of probabilities that the letter was posted. If it does convince the court, you will provide evidence of how you deal with incoming mail and that it never arrived, this will either convince the court that the postal service did or did not deliver the letter to you. Then you’ll know who wins. As to your allegations of fraud: never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by incompetence- theirs, the postal service or yours. | I believe in this regard there is a legitimate interest to not delete this information. You would have to perform a legitimate interest assessment, but for us (with private repositories) the reason would be to ensure that if in the future any malicious or illegal code was found that was knowingly committed to a repository there is trail and a way of understanding who did it. | Copyright never protects ideas or processes, it only protects expression: words, images, and sounds, some of which may describe ideas. But when a work is nothing more than a translation of an idea into words, with no independent originality -- when almost anyone would use more or less the same way to describe the idea, then the work will not be protected by copyright at all, as it is not considered an "original work". Computer code that implements an algorithm often falls under this rule. It is my belief that the code shown in the linked SE thread would fall under this rule, and would not be protected by copyright at all. If this is correct, then anyone may share such a program with no copyright concern. |
What are the most relevant metrics for rating lawyers? Different fields have different metrics that are used among equals to rate themselves. For example, amongst scientists, the h-index (a researcher has h-index = x if he has at least x peer reviewed articles with at least x citations), among fund managers it is capital under management. What metrics are most useful for lawyers? | There is considerable doubt as to the value of both h-index and amount of capital, under management as indices of the quality or competence of a professional. The h-index says more about the frequency of publication than it does about the real significance of those publications.{1} The amount of capitol under management says more about the quality of the fund's advertising than anything else. The rate of return, compared with other funds in the same area and with similar goal is perhaps more useful. In any case, there is no similar objective or even semi-objective measure for a lawyer that I know of. For a litigator, the ratio of wins to losses has some value, but some cases are much easier to win than others, and a lawyer that takes only easy cases may not have a high reputation. Beyond that, the collective view of the lawyer's peers has value, but is quite subjective and not easy to measure. Notes {1} See the essay "Tolkien's Academic Reputation Now" by Tom Shippey, collected in Shippey's Roots and Branches, for a case where a relatively low h-index would be found for a person with a very high continuing academic reputation is spite of a comparatively small lifetime academic output. There are other cases where a single influential publication effectively cements a scientific reputation. Crick and Watson's paper revealing the structure of DNA is an example. | Different courts have different practices, but I believe the general practice is for plaintiffs to use exhibit numbers, and for defendants to use exhibit letters. As with most procedural questions, the final decision belongs to the judge. The repetition in letters comes in when you get to the end of the alphabet. After you've used A-Z, you go to AA, BB, CC ... ZZ, then AAA, BBB, CCC, and so on. | There is no "correct" way unless there is a binding set of rules for writing case names, and no such rules exist. There is no "best" way without reference to some set of preferences. If you're trying to save keystrokes, the first is best; if you're trying to fill as much space as possible, the last is best. If the question is, "How do American lawyers write court case names," the most widely accepted reference would be The Bluebook, which would render the case as Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org. If the question is, "How do American journalists write court case names," the most widely accepted reference would the the AP Stylebook, which would render the case as "Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization." | "Legal problem" is too vague to be included. "Investigation" needs a bit of refining; "lawsuit" is relatively simple (as long as you mean "actual lawsuit" not "idea that maybe we could sue"). There is no central list of all lawsuits against a given party, but you could theoretically check every jurisdiction to see if there is a lawsuit. That's a really big list, maybe in the millions if you want to be complete. You can use ordinary Google search to find announced lawsuits, typically by government agencies. Finding investigations is even more difficult: you will not be able to determine what investigations I am conducting. Even determining the existence of investigations by police including e.g. the FBI is hard to do. A government attorney is the one most likely to reveal that they are investigating some party with the intent to sue them. Again, you can't get a complete list, you can use Google to get an indication of who has announced an investigation (your results will generally not say whether the investigation was closed, unless you pursue that question as well). | Although it's difficult to find exact numbers on class action settlements, there are some studies that suggest that the settlements are often of little value to plaintiffs. A Mayer-Brown paper was only able to obtain data on six settlements - in these cases, claims rates were 0.000006%, 0.33%, 1.5%, 9.66% and 12%. The same paper found that in one case of an $8 million settlement fund made available to 13,500 members, counsel received $5.5 million. Appendices A and B of this paper provide further examples where class action settlements are either a negligible amount, or benefited a negligible number of class members. Although the scope of this paper is somewhat narrow, its findings suggest that it is representative of many class actions. | It is possible that a free online contract is superior to one specifically written for your situation, and it is possible that the opposite is true. It is more likely that a curated paid contract is superior, if (a) it is drafted by an attorney who is experienced and specializing in that area, (b) you discuss your goals with the attorney, (c) the issue is complex and jurisdiction-specific. It is more likely that the free contract is superior if (a) the attorney you hire doesn't listen to you, (b) doesn't know the area (e.g. specializes in DUI cases and has never touched a contract), (c) if there is already a well worked-out standard contract form (leases and real estate sales contracts come to mind), (d) deals with a very stable area of law where there is negligible state-to-state difference and (e) isn't powered by ChatGPT. | Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581. | how would this differ between say ArXiv which is open access, and a publication that is pay-only, like Elsevier or Nature? It wouldn't. But if the equation is the creation of the author of some publication, as in the author is expressing some unique mathematical expression, obviously the publication should be referenced. But is referencing enough? Are there additional rights one must obtain from the publication and/or author in order to show this content? Laws of nature, including purported laws of nature, are not protected by copyright. So, usually, key equations in an academic paper aren't protected by copyright law. Referencing the work is important as a matter of academic ethics, but is legally irrelevant. Copying of exposition by the author beyond laws of nature is permitted as fair use if it is limited to quotations necessary for academic discussion and criticism, but copying of an entire work would not be permissible fair use in most cases and would constitute copyright infringement. Of course, there is a large gray area between those extremes. |
Why is equality under the law, the ideal? Shouldn't high ranking government and military officials be given greater benefit of the doubt, trust, etc.? I've always found the concept of 'equality under the law' to be self-contradictory in any society when there are very clear hierarchies in the same society, with explicit privileges granted as one ascends the hierarchy. This seems to also be the default state of any complex society. Conversely, it seems logistically and practically impossible for any sizeable government or military force to function if everyone were literally treated equality. The higher the rank the greater the authority must be attached to it in order for them to handle the commensurate increase in responsibility. Which translates to greater benefit of the doubt, credibility, trust, privileges, etc... It seems intuitively obvious that this must translate, to some extent, over to the legal system. So why is equality under the law, the ideal? | Why should they? If a person is accused of a crime, say murder, why should more evidence be needed to convict them if they are a high ranking government official than if they are just an ordinary person? Why should their trial be conducted differently? If convicted, why should their punishment be different? Yes, you can run societies that way and people have and do but it isn’t very fair is it? Equality before the law does not imply any other sort of equality People high up in the government have more power and authority than others but if they are alleged to have broken the law they are treated the same as anybody else. | Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes. | Because the courts or the legislature decide they have them There is no doubt that both the courts and the legislature in common law countries have the ability to find, create, or extend rights and this has been done in the past. This is, in fact, where legal rights were created. The US Bill of Rights was created by the people in 1791. If the people in 2191 want to grant rights to AIs then they can do this. This is legally possible. Whether it's a good idea is a matter of philosophy and politics. | There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order. | You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific. | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings. | If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked. |
Is it legal to create a corporation for no reason? Suppose a group of friends randomly decide to start a corporation and do nothing but have meetings and file paperwork, because they enjoy meetings and paperwork. While this isn't something most people would want to do "just for fun", is it legal? | A business must be incorporated for a legal purpose (reason), and that reason must be stated when the business is registered; but that purpose can be to be incorporated and exist as a business. It's common for businesses to be registered "for the purpose of conducting lawful business." | On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article. | Short Answer No. An AI cannot own a company. Artificial intelligences are not legal persons. The law recognizes human beings and legally recognized entities as persons. It does not recognize AIs or for that matter non-human species as persons except in a handful of jurisdictions that recognize, for example, some select rivers as legal persons (e.g. New Zealand). Approximate Alternatives Something close would be possible, however. It is possible to establish a non-profit corporation without owners, or to establish a non-profit entity that is not a corporation (often called a "foundation") that has no owners. These entities are required to have humans who serve on a board of directors. But, the nonprofit entity or foundation could have bylaws that delegate decision making responsibility on all or many matters to an AI, in much the way that decision making responsibility of all or many matters might be delegated to the CEO of a nonprofit corporation. While the AI can't own anything and indeed, to the contrary, would be owned by the entity, the AI's actions could cause the entity to earn income, to acquire and dispose of property, and to participate in lawsuits. And, while most non-profit entities and foundations are designed to have charitable purposes in order to garner tax benefits, there are many kinds of non-profits that exist for non-charitable purposes (e.g. country clubs, stock exchanges, HOAs and political organizations). If an AI was vested with management of most key parts of an entity's operations, that entity had no owners, and its board of directors was relatively docile, this would come reasonably close, in practice, to what an AI owned entity would look like. How The Law Could Be Changed Indeed, one plausible form of organization for the AI would be as a political organization which could be devoted to the purpose of reforming the law to give AIs personhood status. If one U.S. state did so, for example, this would allow all AIs to use that state's law to form entities owned by them, that could operate in any U.S. state, since geographic constraints do not really apply to AIs. And, it doesn't take that much money to lobby a single state to adopt a law if there is no obvious constituency to oppose the adoption of the law. Analogous Historical Precedents There are deep historical precedents for allowing people who were not legally allowed to own property to manage businesses. In the Roman Empire, the practice of having a slave operate a business or venture or transaction as an agent of the slave's owner was well recognized. This was also true, to a much narrower extent and much less frequently, under American chattel slavery. In the medieval and early modern era in Europe and in the post-colonial regimes in the Americas, it was not uncommon in jurisdictions that did nt otherwise recognize the right of a married woman to own property or to be recognized as a legal person in a court to be allowed to manage her husband's affairs on his behalf in his absence as his delegate agent to do so (often for long periods of time, for example, when the husband was away at war, and for entire fiefdoms for which the aristocratic husband was the lord). European law also recognized the concept that when a royal or noble title was inherited by an oldest son due to the death of his father, when the son was just a child, that the mother could serve a regent for the son and manage the affairs of the jurisdiction associated with the son's title, even though the mother was not legally permitted to hold that title in her own right. | Get a corporate lawyer. The standard practice is to create two LLCs (usually in Delaware, which offers some of the best protections): A holding company owned by the individuals, and an operating company, owned by the holding company. If done correctly (which is why you need a lawyer to review the creation and operating agreements) it is nearly impossible for an adversary to follow the operating company back to the individuals without a compelling legal reason ordered by a court. | It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions. | You are mistaken: The U.S. governments (both federal, and states that impose income tax) assert a right to tax both: Income earned within their jurisdiction (e.g., "on their soil"), and Income earned by citizens (or residents, in the case of states). So it is perfectly legal for a resident U.S. citizen to operate a foreign business entity, earn profit, pay himself, and even bank the money overseas. However, a resident in such a situation would be in violation of tax law if he failed to report his interest in the foreign entity and his earnings, as prescribed by the IRS, on his tax filings. | You don’t need a company to run a business As an individual (sole-trader) you can operate a business, hire employees and contractors and do everything else a business does. The purpose of a company is to separate and protect your personal assets from your business assets. As a sole-trader you are personally responsible for all the liabilities of the business - if it goes bust, you go bust. If the business is operated by a company, then, providing you and the company follow the law, your personal assets are not at risk if the company becomes insolvent. | It is not legal in the case of a company. They must also accept communications by post. In the UK, "a company must at all times have a registered office to which all communications and notices may be addressed." (s 86, Companies Act 2006). It must display the address of its registered office on its website, business letters, and order forms (r 25, Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business (Names and Trading Disclosures) Regulations 2015). It must also disclose the address to you if you ask for it in writing (r 27). A failure to do either of these is a criminal offence (r 28). As a practical matter you can also look up the address yourself on the Companies House register if you know the name or registered number of the company. The company must provide you with its registered name on all forms of business correspondence (r 24) (this is a wider definition than that for disclosure of its registered office address). A company cannot rely on the fact that the registered office address it has given to Companies House is out of date. It must continue to accept communications at any address on the register for 14 days after it notifies Companies House of any change. (s 87, Companies Act 2006). |
Is it legal to extract digital game copies from a game console to emulate/backup/mod the game? I have a Nintendo Switch with some digital games installed on it. I want to extract, decrypt, mod and play the games on my PC using an open-source emulator, while still being able to play them on my Switch (when nobody is using my PC). This is not to publish/distribute the games (which I know is illegal), just for personal use. | There's a big difference between the two things Physical media backups These are legal. If you own, say, an NES cartridge of Super Mario Bros., then it is generally considered legal for you to download the software into a ROM and play it on an emulator elsewhere. The DMCA permits you to make backup copies of software (emphasis mine) Copyright law permits you to make one copy of your computer software for the purpose of archiving the software in case it is damaged or lost. In order to make a copy, you must own a valid copy of the software and must destroy or transfer your backup copy if you ever decide to sell, transfer or give away your original valid copy. It is not legal to sell a backup copy of software unless you are selling it along with the original. Nintendo Switch Online The largest problem with making a copy of the NSO ROM is you don't own any physical media. And per the Nintendo Account Terms of Service Subject to the terms of this Agreement, Nintendo grants you a non-exclusive, non-transferable, revocable license to use the Nintendo Account Services solely for your personal and non commercial use. You are not allowed to lease, rent, sublicense, publish, copy, modify, adapt, translate, reverse engineer, decompile or disassemble all or any portion of the Nintendo Account Services without Nintendo's written consent, or unless otherwise expressly permitted by applicable law. And later As part of the Nintendo Account Services, Nintendo or third parties may make certain digital content or items available to you ("Digital Items"). If you buy or acquire any Digital Items, you obtain a limited license (as set forth in Section 2) to use such Digital Items in connection with the Nintendo Account Services. Other than this limited license, you have no right or title in or to Digital Items. In other words, you're paying Nintendo a subscription fee to access a copy of the game they will provide. If you stop paying, the license to play it goes away. In general, it is not legal for you to copy software you have no direct ownership of. | TLDR: it's illegal to BUY it. It's illegal to USE it. Know your suppliers. That's certainly an interesting question, in light of how the market has changed in recent years, particularly due to Amazon/eBay, but even moreso due to Amazon Fulfillment and competitors. Over on diy.se, this is a constant vexation, because we see people buy crud like this all the time, and they need help installing it. And we find it's illegal to install, not even safe, and needs to be sent back in lieu of listed product. The advanced nations do have a highly effective apparatus for screening and blocking dangerous goods. However, these protections are geared toward bricks-and-mortar retail. Can you count on something bought at Wickes, Redoute or Home Depot? By and large, yes. Is it legal to export it to you? Yes, for all practical purposes. The people selling it are in an unreachable bastion in a foreign country that would not cooperate with their extradition, and would interfere with investigation. The government knows perfectly well that the stuff is complete crud, and doing so aligns with its national policies of raising hard currency and building industrial capacity, while harming the capacity of other nations. Is it legal for the item to be listed on Amazon or eBay? Amazon and eBay say "Yes". Their position is that they are merely a platform which connects buyers and sellers. They surely have excellent lawyers. Amazon is more like eBay than you might realize. Amazon opened their retail site to third party sellers. Third parties can sign up as additional sellers of a particular SKU, or write their own product listings. Since Amazon's behavior has been unchallenged, the answer seems to be "yes". Is it legal for Amazon to bring it into their warehousing systems? Amazon also opened their warehousing system to third party use. That can be for companies that don't sell on Amazon... or it can be for companies that do both Amazon and off-Amazon sales; in the latter case you order elsewhere but Amazon fulfills (ships) the item. When a company both sells the item on Amazon and it ships from an Amazon warehouse, it qualifies for "Prime" shipping where Amazon offers that. Amazon also offers "Commingling" for established SKUs. The idea is that if you have widgets in the Madrid warehouse, and I have widgets in a Warsaw warehouse... and a Madrid customer buys mine - why not ship them yours since they are all the same? I get credit for the sale and Amazon "owes you one". When you get a sale in Madrid, Amazon has one in Barcelona so they ship that one to your customer. Commingling is great, but what happens when I inject a pallet full of those SKUs - and they're counterfeits? Amazon doesn't know the difference, and your Warsaw customer gets my counterfeit. So do Amazon's Berlin and Wroclaw customers. Amazon ships them around the network to balance the warehouses, and now my counterfeit has contaminated the supply. I'm sitting in China. Whatcha gonna do about it? Again, Amazon has top lawyers, who have surely done their diligence. Still, the program is ambitious, and e-commerce giants break the law all the time with their ambitions. In the US, there's the "Express Shipment" rule, which allows small orders ($800 or less) with no duty and an informal entry process. So they ship to Mexican warehouses, and then bring the items over by the truckload. Wait, how can a truckload be less than $800? Because they don't bring it over until there's an end-user customer order, and they argue "these are for individual customers". This qualifies them to breeze through customs, bypassing the quality and safety controls that prevent Home Depot from doing the exact same thing with a truckload that hasn't found customers yet. Is it legal for you (as the end consumer) to import it? No. The rules for Conformité Européenne are that the importer is responsible. When you as an end customer buy mail-order from China, you are the importer. Under EU law, if you bring a CE-marked item into the EU, you are responsible for meeting the CE design standards, and doing in-house lab testing to affirm the performance of the product. By having the CE mark on the thing you imported, you are attesting to having done that. Further, the various nations may require that a certified independent testing lab verify your testing and claims. This was historically done by national testing labs like BSI, TUV, CSA or UL. However by treaty they are largely cross-recognized: US OSHA keeps a canonical list of "Nationally (by USA) Recognized Testing Labs" (NRTLs) that every other agency and many other countries defer to. Big Clive is probably fine, since Clive's purpose is public ridicule, not usage. Is it legal for you to install it in your house? Oh, heck no. Every nation has rules as to what certifications equipment must meet to legally be installed in a building's electrical system. For instance North America's El NEC, widely adopted or copied, has 110.2: 110.2 Approval. The conductors [wires] and equipment required or permitted by this Code shall be acceptable only if approved. "Approved" means by competent testing labs; i.e. OSHA's list of NRTLs. So no, you can't install non-approved equipment in any jurisdiction with a similar rule (and you pretty much need such a rule for inspections to have any teeth). | That is going to depend on the details of exactly who does what, and how much is written down. It will also depend on the agreements between the people involved, which may well be verbal or implied. I don't know of any actual cases where such a dispute came to a copyright lawsuit. As copyright suits largely deal with financial harms and damages, and in most individual game there is little or no financial impact, a suit might be unlikely in most cases. But lets look at some possibilities. In the typical case, the game organizer or DM creates a setting and outline for a series of sessions. This is likely to include maps, descriptions of rooms or locations, descriptions of artifacts, descriptions of non-player characters, locations and types of monsters and other hazards, and other such background. This is probably mostly or fully written down (which includes being recorded on some sort of computer file.) It is therefore protected by copyright, and the initial owner of that copyright is its creator, probably the DM. (In some cases the DM uses a published "module" and makes only limited changes, in which case the DM would only hold copyright on those changes, if anything.) Then the players create characters, in a process that may be supervised by the DM, and possibly participated in by other players. Each player would probably hold copyright to the description of his or her own character, but the DM or other players might be considered to be co-authors of that, depending on their degree of participation. Then the players start having playing sessions, each player controlling the actions of a character (or perhaps more than one), and the DM more-or-less controlling the rest of the world, guided by the pre-created maps and descriptions. Some of those will be shared with the players, or modified (partial) versions of them will be. Events of the sessions may or may not be written down (or otherwise preserved in a tangible form). If they are not, there is no copyright on them. If they are, there is a copyright, and all the players and the DM are probably co-authors. Now lets look and agreements and ownership. The DM probably owns his or her notes, S/he has at least permitted players to use any that have been revealed to the players. The group has probably agreed (implicitly) to co-create the adventure as it happens. There probably are no written agreements about any of this. If a dispute arises, the DM is legally free to withhold the campaign notes, maps, etc that have not been shared with the players. Whether s/he can legally demand that the players not further use the parts of the setting that had been previously revealed is not so clear. It would depend on what the agreement between the DM and the players said; on, in effect, what license the DM had granted to the players. And since there was probably no written agreement, and quite likely not even an explicit verbal agreement, it would depend on what a court found they had agreed on by implication, based on their actions, and the usual customs of such groups. Sorting that out would be loads of fun. It might involve significant legal fees. The DM is unlikely to hold any exclusive copyright on the previous events of the campaign. Most likely everyone who participates would be a co-author of those. Unless there is a specific agreement to the contrary, any co-author of any shared work has the right to use, and license the use of, the shared work, although s/he must account to the others for any profits. The DM certainly has no legal right to forbid the same group from playing together with a different DM (absent a very improbable contract giving such a right). The DM can only control the maps and notes s/he created independently. If a professional DM is involved, as a comment mentions is possible, it might be more likely that an explicit wri9tten contract between the players and the DM will have been agreed to, If so, its terms will control, whatever they are, unless they are somehow contrary to law. Such a pro DM might be more defensive of copyrights, but would not have any more rights than any DM, except as a specific contract might have provided them. I doubt that the courts will see many actual lawsuits over such issues. | Obviously you may end up voiding warranties, losing on-going support from the manufacturer, or there may be a contract you agreed to stating that you won't do it, but assuming none of that is relevant (e.g. a salvaged Tesla doesn't get support/warranty anyway) is there any law preventing you from modifying your property to remove the limits placed on it? This assumes away one of the biggest issues, which is doing this is almost certainly a breach of contract unless the contract term is void as against public policy (which it probably isn't). So, the manufacturer can sue you for money damages probably equal to the difference in value between the limited and unlimited hardware in the marketplace. The manufacturer might also be able to obtain an injunction against this practice, which could result in the incarceration of someone who knowingly violated this court order for contempt of court, once an injunction is secured from a court to enforce the contract. There is also an anti-hacking statute in the United States, whose plain language appears to prohibit taking actions that override a digital system's security features. Unlocking these hardware features would appear to violate this statute. This is part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and is codified at United States Code Title 17, Section 1201. As Wikipedia explains: 17 U.S.C. 1201 is often known as the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. These provisions changed the remedies for the circumvention of copy-prevention systems (also called "technical protection measures") and required that all analog video recorders have support for a specific form of copy prevention created by Macrovision (now Rovi Corporation) built in, giving Macrovision an effective monopoly on the analog video-recording copy-prevention market. The section contains a number of specific limitations and exemptions, for such things as government research and reverse engineering in specified situations. Although, section 1201(c) of the title stated that the section does not change the underlying substantive copyright infringement rights, remedies, or defenses, it did not make those defenses available in circumvention actions. The section does not include a fair use exemption from criminality nor a scienter requirement, so criminal liability could attach to even unintended circumvention for legitimate purposes. The statute is quite lengthy and full of technical definitions and narrow exceptions and exceptions to exceptions to the general rule. These legal issues have mostly gained media attention in the context of farmers who seek to hack into the built in software of their farm machinery in order to repair it where the manufacturing companies have not cooperated. There have been legislative fixes proposed that would make these prohibition void as against public policy for some specific purposes like doing repairs. There have also been efforts to characterize this kind of business practice as an anti-trust violation. But, none of that legislation has passed in the United States, to the best of my knowledge and belief. But, I am not aware of any high profile legal precedent that has addressed this point but I wouldn't rule out the possibility that there is one. The closest case I could find on point (from the High Court in Australia) is Stevens v. Sony, which holds "that a device allowing PlayStations to play games with a different region code did not violate the anti-circumvention laws, because the mechanism in the PlayStation did not directly prevent the infringement of copyright." I am not personally familiar with non-U.S. law on this topic. Wikipedia reviews some of the applicable law in the E.U. and Australia. According to this Wikipedia entry, pursuant to European Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of May 22, 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, E.U. member nations must adopt domestic anti-circumvention statutes that meet certain minimum E.U. standards set forth in the directive. Also according to the same Wikipedia entry: "Australia prohibits circumvention of "access control technical protection measures" in Section 116 of the Copyright Act." In Australia, "Penalties for violation of the anti-circumvention laws include an injunction, monetary damages, and destruction of enabling devices." | If you do, can you build/run it without being bound by said license? No, you cannot. Because there is no way to "build/run" it without making a copy. You copy the sourcecode, before you can run your compiler. That is the copy you are making, not copying the file that results from this process. A valid question might be, are you bound by the license? Well, that is up for lawyers and a court to decide, but in all countries I know, copyright is automatic for anything worth copying. And the copyright holder can grant licenses to people to allow things. So arguing you are not bound by a specific license would mean you would argue that you are bound by the legal default, which in most countries is "You cannot copy that. At all. Unless you have explicit permission". That argument would sound like "I stole all 10, because the offer of buy-one-get-one-free was not legally binding". Maybe it wasn't. But that doesn't mean you get to do something unrelated illegal instead. Now, there are many exceptions for "personal use". You can sing any song in the shower. I would assume you can compile any program there, too. You just cannot use that program for anything worthwhile, the same way you cannot record your song in the shower and sell it. | As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum). | No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.) | Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability. |
Can I use Google Cloud text-to-speech to create and monetize an audiobook from a public domain book? I have text for a book in the public domain. I use Google Cloud speech-to-text to convert the book into an audio format. Can I distribute/monetize the resulting audiobook as I wish? Previous question seems to indicate I can: Can I use the sound files, generated by the Google Cloud Text-to-Speech freely? and see https://cloud.google.com/terms/ Section 5.1 However, Section 5.e.2 here (https://developers.google.com/terms) appears to say I cannot do this. | Apparently Such Files May be Distributes or Sold Section 5.e of the Google APIs Terms of Service reads: e. Prohibitions on Content Unless expressly permitted by the content owner or by applicable law, you will not, and will not permit your end users or others acting on your behalf to, do the following with content returned from the APIs: Scrape, build databases, or otherwise create permanent copies of such content, or keep cached copies longer than permitted by the cache header; Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of, sell, lease, lend, convey, distribute, publicly display, or sublicense to any third party; Misrepresent the source or ownership; or Remove, obscure, or alter any copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights notices; or falsify or delete any author attributions, legal notices, or other labels of the origin or source of material It might seem that 5.e.2 prohibits the suggested use. But if the text is in fact in the public domain,"applicable law" (that is, copyright law) permits you, or anyone, to "Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of" or otherwise use the content. Thus 5.e.2 does not apply. Points 3 and 4 would seem to indicate that the source, including title and author information, must be included or preserved in the output files, but seems to be the only relevant restriction that applies. Response to Comment A comment by user Brian Drake questions the theory of this answer, stating: The most you can say is that copyright law does not prohibit certain conduct (and even that is not clear: just because the text is in the public domain does not necessarily mean that the audio is in the public domain); this does not mean that copyright law expressly permits that conduct. US Copyright law does not define what constitutes the public domain. Rather it defines what is protected by copyright, and specifies some cases in whch a work is not protected. (For nexample, 17 USC 105 provides tht works of the US Federal Government are not protected.) Anything not included in the protection of copyright is in the public domain. This has been confirmed by many cour cases and legal writings. Law generally follows the rule "Anything not forbidden is allowed." Audio as Derivitive Work An audio recording of a person reading a text aloud would be a derivative work of that text, and would normally have its own copyright, if created lawfully. (If the recording was of a text protected by copyright, made without permission and outside of fair use, it was not made lawfully and the infringer has no copyright in the recording at all.) But US courts have held that a work created by a mechanical or automatic process, including many computer programs, is not an "original work of authorship" and thus is not protected by copyright at all, and is thus in the Public Domain. The case of the "Monkey Selfie" is on point. ("Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, § 313.2" (PDF). United States Copyright Office. 22 December 2014. p. 22. "To qualify as a work of 'authorship' a work must be created by a human being.... Works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. The Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants." Moreover, if the audio were protected by copyright, it would presumably be owned by the person who ran the program, and 17 USC 106 specifically grants the copyright owner permission to distribute copies. Sources The Wikipedia article "Public Domain" reads in relevant part (citations omitted): The public domain consists of all the creative work to which no exclusive intellectual property rights apply. Those rights may have expired,[1] been forfeited, expressly waived, or may be inapplicable. ... As rights vary by country and jurisdiction, a work may be subject to rights in one country and be in the public domain in another. Some rights depend on registrations on a country-by-country basis, and the absence of registration in a particular country, if required, gives rise to public-domain status for a work in that country. ... Definitions of the boundaries of the public domain in relation to copyright, or intellectual property more generally, regard the public domain as a negative space; that is, it consists of works that are no longer in copyright term or were never protected by copyright law. According to James Boyle this definition underlines common usage of the term public domain and equates the public domain to public property and works in copyright to private property. However, the usage of the term public domain can be more granular, including for example uses of works in copyright permitted by copyright exceptions. Such a definition regards work in copyright as private property subject to fair-use rights and limitation on ownership *"How Can I Use Copyright-Free Works (in the Public Domain)?" by Nolo Press reads: Copyright law gives creators certain exclusive rights. These rights include the exclusive ability to copy, distribute, and perform the copyrighted work. But copyright is not infinite. Rather, it provides copyright holders with protections for a limited duration. When a work becomes available for use without permission from a copyright owner, it is said to be "in the public domain." Most works enter the public domain because their copyrights have expired. The Legal Information Institute (LII) article "public domain" reads: The public domain includes every creative work that is no longer protected by a copyright, trademark, or patent. Creative works that are no longer protected are owned by the general public rather than the original creator. As such, the work is free to be copied, performed, or otherwise used by anyone. "Copyright and Scholarship: Public Domain" from Boston College Libraries reads in relevant part: "Public domain" works are not protected by copyright. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. An important caveat regarding public domain material is that collections, new editions, and derivative works of public domain material may all be protected by copyright. With collections, an author could collect public domain works in a book or display them on a website, and the collection as a whole could be protected by copyright, even though individual works within it are not. *"Welcome to the Public Domain" (Stanford libraries) reads in relevant part: The term “public domain” refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. Wikipedia article "Monkey selfie copyright dispute" *"A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos" (AP) reads in relevant part: A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos, a federal judge said Wednesday. U.S. District Judge William Orrick said in federal court in San Francisco that "while Congress and the president can extend the protection of law to animals as well as humans, there is no indication that they did so in the Copyright Act." *NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, People forthe Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., v. DAVID JOHN SLATER; BLURB, INC., ; WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD." (Ninth Circuit full opinion April 23, 2018 No. 16-15469, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04324-WHO) reads in part: We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court | Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video. | The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work. | Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties. | Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test. | It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable. | Although you aren't interested in the TOS, you should be. You are not allowed to make any copy of other people's stuff without permission. The TOS is how you get permission. First, the author uploads his material to You Tube, because he has an account and the TOS associated with the account specifies the license that he grants to You Tube and the world – same thing with Stack Exchange. The TOS says (roughly) "when you upload stuff, you give permission for others to access your stuff using the You Tube interface". Content-consumers likewise are allowed to stream content using their interface, but not generally download. (The license terms changes over time – previously there were more license types). Specifically, You are not allowed to: access, reproduce, download, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, alter, modify or otherwise use any part of the Service or any Content except: (a) as expressly authorized by the Service; or (b) with prior written permission from YouTube and, if applicable, the respective rights holders; and they don't expressly authorize ordinary download, you have to use their interface. You might also directly contact the author of the work in question and negotiate a deal where you can directly acquire a license from the rights-owner. But if you want to access the material via You Tube, you have to do it in a way that is permitted, and You Tube says that you're not permitted to download. Any "copying without permission" is infringement. | Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use". |
Is it legal to own a photo of someone and spread it around without their permission? Backstory: My friends has a picture of me, which I asked him to delete and not show to people multiple times, but he keeps it and shows it to people no matter how many times I ask him not to. Is it legal to do that? More Info: I am the original poster, I just uploaded as a guest, so here's more detail: I am from England, I'm a minor (but so is the other person). By showing it to people, I meant sending them a copy. The picture is not intimate. | Copyright The photographer, not the subject(s) own the copyright in the picture. So, unless this was a selfie, you have no rights in the picture. Privacy If the photo was taken in circumstances where a reasonable person would expect privacy, then revealing it to others might be a tort of privacy breach. In most common law jurisdictions this area of the law is undeveloped. However, if the photo was taken from a public place (even if you were in a private place), or with your permission, this doesn’t apply. Intimate images In some jurisdictions, the distribution of intimate images without the permission of the subject is a crime. Intimate does not include a photo that is merely embarrassing. Bullying This is probably bullying behaviour but bullying per se is generally not illegal. It might be illegal if the bullying is motivated by a protected characteristic (race, age, gender, sexuality etc.) but that usually requires a context - employment, public accommodation etc. it might also be illegal hate speech even outside such an institutional framework. Similarly, within an institutional context like a workplace or school there might be policies around bullying; these might have the force of law but are probably quasi-contractural matters. However, a private person doing it because they don’t like you and want to humiliate or embarrass you is probably not doing anything illegal. | Posting such a pic and statement may give grounds for a lawsuit, but probably not Overview That is going to depend very much on the the jurisdiction, and on the specific facts. If the statement that the pictured person owes a debt is false, this may be a case of defamation, but that was explored thoroughly in Can you post a picture in your business to embarrass or defame a customer? and its answers. See FindLaw's page "What Is Invasion of Privacy?" for an overview of the classic privacy torts. See also this page quoting the Restatement (2nd) of Torts, § 652 See further the Wikipedia article "Privacy laws of the United States" which gives a history of the four torts. Note that not all US states recognize all, or indeed any, of the privacy torts. Nor do all non-US jurisdictions. In some places these torts have been recognized, or blocked, by legislation, in others by court decision. And in the US they are limited by the federal First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Right of Publicity,aka Appropriation There is, in general, no right to privacy in one's physical appearance under any of the standard privacy torts, except that if one's likeness is being used to advertise something, or imply sponsorship or approval of a commercial product, many jurisdictions protect a right of publicity (sometimes called the tort of Appropriation of Name or Likeness). But here it does not appear that the image is being used to advertise or promote or sponsor anything, so that would not apply. Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion The tort of Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion would only apply if the picture were taken on someone's private premises or somewhere else there the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Otherwise it would not apply, there is no general right to privacy for a picture taken in public. Private Facts The tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts could possibly apply if the fact of the unpaid debt had been carefully kept secret, and if its disclosure would be highly offensie to a reasonable person. But nothing that is a matter of public record can be the subject of such a suit anywhere in the US, because under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) publication of facts derived from public records is protected under the first and fourteenth amendments, even against a specific state law granting protection. This will obviously not apply outside the US. False Light If the statement of the debt were true, but in some significant way misleading, the tort of False Light might apply. This is described by the Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 652E as: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in a reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. Note that the standard of (b) above is the same as the "Actual Malice" standard for defamation cases where the plaintiff is a public figure. False light cases are in many ways similer to defamation cases, and some jurisdictions have treated themn as identical tro defamation, while otrhrs do not recognize them at all. Nothing in the facts stated in the question would imply a false light claim, but more context might possibly support such a claim,. Conclusion Nothing in the question clearly indicates that any privacy-based tort would apply, but the facts are stated it a very brief way in the question. Further context and detail might clarify the answer one way or the other. This answer is largely based onunited-states law, althoguh some of it will apply elsewhere. | Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data | Working a mobile car cleaner now, my manager asked me to take some pictures before cleaning and after clearing, privacy issue of the car owner California law creates an expectation of consent for taking photographs of people for purposes of commercial distribution of the image to the public. California Civil Code § 3344. But, absent copyright or design patent issues (which would only very rarely come up since most people don't own the copyrights or patents to the designs of their cars, and the owner of the copyrights generally grants an implied license for the owners of the cars to display the copyrighted or patented designs), there is no parallel requirement of consent for taking photographs of things. Furthermore there is no common law expectation of privacy in anything that someone you do business with must necessarily see with their own eyes. So, if you must see the car to clean it, then taking photographs before and after the work is done does not violate any expectation of privacy to which the customer has not implicitly consented and does not violate any California or federal statute. Better practice would be for the business to explicitly have the customers consent in writing to the photographs, to remove all doubt. But the implied consent to having someone see your car when they are cleaning it would be unreasonable to deny in almost all circumstances. A company might voluntarily have an agreement to keep any photographs taken confidential and to have its employees sign non-disclosure agreements not to reveal what they see while working. If it did, this would create a legally enforceable expectation of privacy for the customer. For some VIP clients, this contractually enforceable discretion might be something that would induce them to pay a higher price for the same services. But those kind of protections are not the default standards of law that apply in the absence of an agreement. And, even then, taking photographs for purposes of internal use only would probably not violate an agreement of this kind. The work still requires that people inside the business, including remote supervisors, be able to see the cars to do their work. | Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company. | The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission. | One big hole in any scheme that relies on copyright is that it could not preclude people talking about the previous content or talking about you. This is well established First Amendment law. For example, see Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which holds that except in rare judicially established exceptions (relating to military information, obscenity, and inciting acts of violence), government censorship is unconstitutional. Thus, no statutory scheme could be used to prevent third parties who happened to have seen the material while it was freely available from re-iterating what they had seen, or talking about it, or talking about the author (you). People could even reproduce portions of the published content. Some types of reproduction would be protected as fair use in the US, especially if the reproduction is for the purpose of criticism. (17 USC 107, and this previous Law.SE answer) The closest approach would be to protect your work as trade secret, making sure that anyone that you share it with agrees to non-disclosure. But, if you "publish unique content under this pseudonym" there is no way to "arbitrarily or wholly revoke discussion about that content". If the cat gets out of the bag, while you may have remedies against the person who violated the non-disclosure agreement, you would not be able to prevent third-party discussion or reproduction. | The answer depends in part what venue you're talking about, e.g. Reddit, Facebook etc. The details are revealed somewhere in the Terms of Service for that venue. The general pattern is that you are allowed to use that venue, provides you grant permission for the service to do what they do with your content. You cannot legally send them a take-down notice for your stuff, because a take-down notice requires you to say that the stuff was posted without your permission (and that is false – and you can be punished for making that statement). There could be a venue where they do not hold you to an irrevocable license, in which case you could revoke that permission (but not Reddit: you granted them a "royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, unrestricted, worldwide license to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, or publicly display your user content in any medium and for any purpose, including commercial purposes, and to authorize others to do so"). I've seen a site that actually asserts ownership of user-contributed content (I don't know if their TOS ended up being litigated) – if is not at all hard to write a TOS that includes transfer of copyright, rather than granting of a license. The only hard parts are (1) figuring out what you want in terms of permission to use and (2) whether your answer to (1) means nobody will use your service. SE and Reddit TOS probably are as close as you need to get for what you describe. |
Who drafts or publishes the Civil Procedure Rules, and what is their legal status? Are they a form of statute that get periodic parliamentary passage/assent? Or a form of secondary legislation? Or is the root of their forcefulness more in the authority of the courts under common law? | At the time of writing, there 642 various UK Procedure Rules and amendments. These are all secondary legislation (discussed here). Taking the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 as an example, these Rules are made under primary legislation found at section 69 of the Courts Act 2003: 69 Criminal Procedure Rules (1)There are to be rules of court (to be called “Criminal Procedure Rules”) governing the practice and procedure to be followed in the criminal courts. (2)Criminal Procedure Rules are to be made by a committee known as the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. (3)The power to make Criminal Procedure Rules includes power to make different provision for different cases or different areas, including different provision— (a)for a specified court or description of courts, or (b)for specified descriptions of proceedings or a specified jurisdiction. (4)Any power to make Criminal Procedure Rules is to be exercised with a view to securing that— (a)the criminal justice system is accessible, fair and efficient, and (b)the rules are both simple and simply expressed | Any society that makes rules will make rules that generally favor the people in power. Police are an essential component of a system that is built to maintain power for the people who are powerful, and there are few incentives for politicians, prosecutors or judges to punish them for maintaining order, even when they do so in ways that most people would think are not civil. Anyone involved in creating the law therefore builds systems to protect themselves -- and each other -- from accountability. The police fail to meaningfully investigate themselves, the legislature erects barriers to accountability (Sec. 614.022, for instance), and the courts routinely provide them immunity for their wrongdoing. So yes, there is a difference in how our legal system treats law enforcement and how it treats everyone else. I don't know anyone with any experience in the law who would even try to pretend otherwise. | This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know. | This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer. | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | It is purely ceremonial. The tendency in modern jurisprudence is towards the practical and away from legalisms and technicalities. Even if a judge used a gavel in some way inappropriately, it would be unlikely to have any legal significance for anyone but the judge. An argument based on gavel misuse would fall into the "fringe-on-the-flag" category of legal arguments (yes, there are people who think that the court's powers are determined entirely by the fringe on the courhouse flag). The gavel is a traditional trapping of a common law courtroom, but has no legal significance. | This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling. | You are confusing a few concepts. One is the distinction between what are known as "common law" jurisdictions derived from the English legal system, and "civil law" jurisdictions derived from one of the continental European legal systems that is ultimately derived from Roman law. Another is the distinction between determining the meaning of ambiguous legislation, which all courts do by definition, and the power of judicial review, which overturns legislation which is invalid for some reason rather than merely trying to interpret an ambiguous provision. Ambiguous means "unclear" or "capable of being interpreted in more than one way" and every time every court encounters unclear legislation it must decide what it means, even if it is not invalidated. In contrast, some judiciaries that have the power of judicial review and those that do not. Judiciaries that can declare a law to be invalid have the power of judicial review. Judiciaries that cannot declare a law to be invalid do not have the power of judicial review. Every state and federal U.S. Court at every level (not just the U.S. Supreme Court) has the power and obligation to declare that a law violated the U.S. Constitution. In many countries, no court, or only a "constitutional court" has the power to make declare legislation to be invalid by exercising judicial review. Every time that a legislature passes a statute on a subject covered by common law (i.e. judge-made law derived from case decisions that serve as precedents), it shrinks the scope of common law relative to statutes. And, in principle, almost all of the common law could be replaced by statutes without all that much difficulty. But, in civil law countries, statutes are frequently comprehensive and are the sole source of legal authority about their subject matter superseding all case law, while in common law countries, statutes are often piecemeal tweaks to a common law background that is assumed by the statute. For example, every civil law country would have a comprehensive statute setting forth the principles of contract law, while a typical common law jurisdiction might have a statute that declares that certain contracts must be in writing but does not comprehensively set forth the law of contracts in all circumstances. There are some features of civil law countries, such as the absence of jury trials, which cannot be constitutionally changed to the civil law system, even in jurisdictions such a Puerto Rico and Louisiana in the United States which have civil law roots prior to joining the U.S. (at least in criminal cases and in the federal courts). The power of judicial review (i.e. the power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional and void) is also inherent in the U.S. Constitutional system of government and could not be removed without a constitutional amendment. There are common law countries, e.g., England, which did not historically have the power of judicial review, which was an innovation for a common law countries such as the United States when it was first invoked. (For what it is worth, India goes one step further; its Supreme Court asserts and exercises the right to declare portions of its own constitution to be unconstitutional.) There are other aspects of civil law legal systems which would probably also be declared unconstitutional in the United States as well, such as the lack of a prohibition on the introduction of hearsay evidence in criminal trials which violates a provision of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights known as the "confrontation clause." It is unclear to me whether the principle that case law precedents have binding legal effect in future cases, which is part of the common law system that is absent in the civil law system, has a constitutional dimension or could be displaced by law. But, most aspects of a civil law legal system could be adopted in the United States if the relevant legislatures so desired. Indeed, many aspects of the U.S. legal system have moved in that direction. For example, only a handful of U.S. states now recognize the concept of a "common law crime". Almost all states now only allow criminal sanctions for crimes codified by statute, which was not the case at the time of the American Revolution, when few crimes were codified. Obviously, with a constitutional amendment, almost any change to the U.S. legal system is possible. |
Coat checks warning I got into a debate with a friend about the disclaimer you see on coat checks, parking lot tickets, and other similar "contracts." There is often text printed on the back of the tickets you receive. Something along the line of, "We are not responsible for loss or damage." As I understand, that is not legally binding. When using their service, they are expected to provide a safe environment and if loss or damage occurs, they are responsible, regardless of the words on the ticket. I expect this might vary from state to state, but is there a consensus? | This is called a bailment. There is a pretty general outcome. First, I will discuss bailments. To get to the meat of the answer skip down to the horizontal break. Here is some info from a Maryland case. I omitted citations and added emphasis. Danner v. Int'l Freight Sys. of Washington, LLC (D. Md., 2012) Maryland is a state which may honor the fine print. There are three types of bailments, the most common one is the type you are asking about, the bailment for mutual benefit. (You watch my coat, I give you a few dollars. As opposed to, "Hey will you watch my computer while I go to the bathroom?) A bailment relationship can arise in a variety of ways. In modern usage, there are three general categories of bailments: (1) for the sole benefit of the bailor; (2) for the sole benefit of the bailee; and (3) for the mutual benefit of both. The property should be returned in the same condition as it was delivered. A reasonable standard of care applies. When the subject matter of a mutual bailment for hire is delivered by the bailor to the bailee, it must be returned by the bailee in substantially the same condition ordinary wear and tear excepted. Put another way, the bailee in accepting possession of the bailed property assumes the duty of exercising reasonable care in protecting it. If the property is damaged, the bailee (the person holding the coat) is automatically found to have failed to take reasonable care. They need to explain the damage and how it was not their fault. Then the bailor (the guy who owns the coat) needs to explain why, in spite of the excuses, the bailee is the one responsible. When the bailed chattel is either not returned or returned in a damaged condition without legal excuse, a prima facie case of lack of due care or negligence is made out. It is then the duty of the bailee to go forward with proof that the loss or injury was occasioned by a cause which excuses the bailee, thereby providing a complete defense as the bailee is not an insurer. The bailor is then, by reason of his burden of proof, required to overcome this defense by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the bailee failed to use ordinary care and diligence to safeguard the bailor's property, and that failure to perform his duty caused the loss to the bailor. So the bailee is responsible for negligence, but is not an insurer. As long as they provide the care that an ordinary person would provide in keeping their own coat, they are not responsible. A bailee may be liable for negligence, but is not strictly liable for loss of bailed property. This is because a bailee for hire is not an insurer of the safety of the property entrusted to its care, but . . . owes only such care as persons of common prudence in their own situation and business usually use in the custody and keeping of similar property belonging to themselves. Another case, this one from Washington, tells us a little about limiting liability. Eifler v. Shurgard Capital Management Corp., 861 P.2d 1071, (Wash.App. Div. 2, 1993) Again, internal quotes omitted and emphasis added. These are the guys who do not honor the fine print. The case tells us that the bailee, if the bailee is a professional bailee, cannot limit liability. A professional bailee is one (1) whose principal business is to act as bailee, and (2) who deals with the public on a uniform rather than individual basis. When a bailment for mutual benefit is also a professional bailment, public policy will not permit the bailee to limit his or her liability for negligence. The court cites a popular leading California Supreme Court case (Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92 (1963)) and provides a "test to be applied in determining whether exculpatory agreements violate public policy" - in other words, if that fine print gets thrown out. The more of these elements that are true about the situation, the harder it is for the fine print to cover the bailee's ass: 1) Service to the public, perhaps even necessary to some 2) Offers the service to pretty much any customer 3) The bailee has a position of bargaining power by virtue of the service offering 4) Standard exculpatory language, take it or leave it 5) No option to pay more money for better protection 6) Property is placed under the control of the bailee Bottom line is that if the state follows this model, the fine print is not enforceable. Thus, the attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards. As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents. | I make a copy of any important receipt printed on thermal paper, since the terms of many sellers and manufacturers require receipts for disputes. But I'm not aware of any law that says they have to make it convenient to maintain a receipt or other proof of purchase. However, when a company makes their terms unclear, unexpected, or difficult to comply with it seems there is often a lawyer ready to step up and file a class action lawsuit. Here's one archive to give you an idea of what companies will settle. In the United States the FTC is also empowered by law to "protect consumers," which means that if "disappearing" receipts become a widespread problem for consumers they could take action on the government's authority: The Federal Trade Commission Act is the primary statute of the Commission. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the organization, business, practices, and management of entities engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative recommendations to Congress. Given the above, I wouldn't be surprised to see either a class-action lawsuit or FTC rule that requires retailers to provide "durable" receipts, or some convenient substitute. | Your question isn't quite as simple as it sounds; some civil cases are tried before juries, and though a judge can give directions to a jury to give a particular verdict, they are not always required to obey; there are eighteenth-century English cases on the point that established that principle for most related jurisdictions. But your last sentence does have a simple answer: No. A judge usually takes an oath on assuming office, to administer the law without fear or favour. That means he will investigate the relevant law (with the assistance of the parties' lawyers), and enforce what it says. "This law would be unfair to the customer, so I will ignore it" would be just as bad as "The mechanic threatened to hit me with a wrench, so I find for him". Of course, most jurisdictions do have overriding principles of fairness; it may be that this contract term was not shown to the customer, so is not enforceable, or it may be that it is contrary to public policy to be uncertain what repairs will cost. But unless there is an explicit legal reason, the judge will have to find for the mechanic. It would be neither improper nor unusual for the judgment to include the sentence "This result is clearly unfair to the customer, and I urge the legislature to look at closing the loophole; nevertheless, the law is clear, and I find the customer must pay the increased price." | In Austria they have a law about "Kreditschädigung" (website from the Austrian government, "credit damage") translated by Google as: Because of credit damage, a person is liable to prosecution if he or she asserts incorrect facts and thereby harms or endangers the credit, the acquisition or professional advancement of another person. A prison sentence of up to six months or a fine of up to 360 daily rates is provided for the offense of credit damage. If you setup a webpage which lists things which might harm somebody's business, you have to proof that every single claim you make is correct (not just your individual experience). So if you have solid proof for each of your claims of your Q&A, you might win a probable law suite. The way you wrote it, it might be difficult to proof because it seems to be your personal experience. See also here for details. (in German). | No. If the person who reviews the contract is in fact a lawyer, and does the review in his or her capacity as a lawyer so that there is in fact an attorney-client relationship, the lawyer would be subject to malpractice liability if the review failed to meet the required standard of care. This generally means that the lawyer made errors that no reasonably careful attorney would make. It would also require proof of loss caused directly by the negligent legal advice. See the Wikipedia article on Legal Malpractice. If the person reviewing the contract is not a lawyer, or there is clearly no attorney-client relationship, there is probably no liability (although there might be a case for unlicensed practice of law, depending on the jurisdiction). A lawyer might be able to use a written disclaimer to indicate that there is not an attorney-client relationship, but I am not at all sure of that. I am not addressing the issue of why a lawyer would be willing to provide such advice for free, nor the ethics of asking for such free advice, as mentioned in the comment by @Studoku above. If a lawyer is willing to give such free advice, that is his or her decision. This answer assumes US law, since no jurisdiction is stated in the question or comments. Details may depend on the specific state. Laws elsewhere will likely be roughly similar, but may not be. This answer is not to be construed as legal advice, but merely as a general opinion on the state of the law, for educational purposes. | If you are in the habit of paying people just because they ask you to, then I say you owe me $500 - if you want to pay I'll send you my wire transfer details. This is a facetious way of making a very simple point: You don't owe people money just because they say you do. If someone claims to be owed money by you, the legal onus is for them to prove both their legal entitlement and the amount. Normally, people agree that they owe money and that's enough, however, if the debtor disputes the debt then the creditor has to prove that it is owed: the debtor does not have to prove that it isn't. Their legal basis must come from either a contract or the tort of trespass. For the former they must prove that a contract exists and that you breached a term of it. For the latter they must prove that you committed the tort. In both cases, they are only entitled to recover their costs (including loss of profit) that your actions caused. As they are not a government they have no right to punish you with a fine: if they are asking for more than damages then this is a penalty and void. I am unaware of the consumer protection laws in Canada but presuming they are similar to Australia - a disputed debt is not a debt. It only becomes a debt when the dispute is resolved, usually by agreement or a court. Only actual debts can have enforcement action taken including such things as being pursued by a collection agency or being recorded by a credit reporting agency. In short: this is a scam. In 2012 I went through a similar process. This is the letter I sent: We are the registered operator of motor vehicle XXXXX and have received your letter dated 6/6/2012 for payment of car parking penalty number XXXXX that you allege we incurred on 6/4/2011. To the extent that we entered into a contract with you, which is denied, please take this letter to constitute a written appeal in accordance with the appeal process described on your website and/or in your documentation. We dispute incurring the alleged debt and we dispute entering into any contract with you. We will defend any action brought against us. You must cease all efforts to collect this alleged debt whilst it remains in dispute, in compliance with National, ACCC and NSW laws and guidelines. Except as specifically outlined herein, we are requesting that you cease all contact with us about the alleged debt. Any further contact should be strictly in conformity with the ACCC Debt Collection Guidelines (refer http://tinyurl.com/parking-01). Your contact with us should be limited to: acknowledging our letter and providing us with any documentation that we have requested informing us that you have ceased collection efforts on the alleged debt stating that you are taking a specific action in relation to the debt such as commencing court proceedings (note that you can only threaten court proceedings if you intend to start them otherwise you are in breach of the guidelines - refer page 33 "you must not threaten legal action if the start of proceedings is not possible, or not under consideration, or you do not have instructions to start proceedings"). You must also advise any debt collectors or lawyers you have collecting this debt to stop. If you or your agents continue to attempt to collect this alleged debt, we will complain in writing to the ACCC, to NSW Fair Trading, and to the car park owner (and if we receive a further letter from your lawyers, we will complain to the Legal Services Commissioner in the lawyer's home state). Please send us within 7 days: Confirmation of whether or not you still hold us responsible for this alleged debt. If you still hold us responsible, we require you to properly articulate the facts and matters on which your claim is based. Please forward us the following particulars: A copy of the contract we are alleged to have entered into. Photographs of any signs that need to be read in conjunction with the alleged contract. Details of the actual offence you are claiming. e.g. failure to buy ticket, expired ticket, parking in no-standing etc. As well as the usual particulars of date, time, precise location with the car park and other facts and matters giving rise to the alleged breach of agreement. An itemised breakdown of the debt you are claiming and details on how it was calculated. Show separately legal costs, court costs, administration costs, costs associated with identifying us as the car owner, patrolling costs and a breakdown of any other costs not already mentioned. Pursuant to the Privacy Act, a copy of all photos you have of our car and/or us. Indicate the date each photo was taken and the name of the person who took the photo. And forward us any other data that you hold on us that the Privacy Act requires you to disclose. The basis on which you allege that we ware a party to the agreement alleged to exist; Proof that the alleged debt was incurred by us. The name(s) of any lawyers or solicitors who received payments pursuant to any clause in your terms and conditions. Please show the amounts and dates on which these costs were incurred, and the dates when these payments were made. Please itemise the work that such lawyers or solicitors performed for you, and indicate which clause in your terms and conditions allows you to hold us liable for such payments. A copy of any agreement that the car parking company has with the owner of the car park which covers the handling of disputes and appeals. Indicate the amount of money the car park company would have been paid had we entered into the alleged agreement with it, and if the alleged terms and conditions had been followed to the company's satisfaction. (In other words, how much money do you normally receive for a car to park in your car park for the period of time we are alleged to have parked there for). The contact name, postal address, and phone number of each of the following: the car park owner, the car park manager, and the car park operator. A copy of your Appeal handing procedure. As well as setting out what factors are taken into account, state who is the judge or arbitrator and whether they are independent and any other relevant factors to the Appeal. In addition, please give us disclosure of any arguments being put by yourselves on this matter in the Appeal so that we might reply to any new issues which are raised. If you decide to dismiss our appeal, please send us the full reasoning in relation to each of the specific points raised in our letter. The name and address of the person you allege was driving our car at the time you allege our car was parked in your car park. If you are alleging an agent authorised by us was driving our car, please confirm this in your response and forward us a copy of the agency agreement, along with the name and address of the agent. We put you on notice that should you continue this claim, we will issue an application, seeking orders that: Any request for a statutory declaration or request from you to prove in anyway that we do not owe this debt is misleading or deceptive conduct, because you are not a government agency and that the burden of proof rests with you as the person who claims the alleged debt. The amount claimed pursuant to the alleged contract amounts to a penalty and therefore void at common law. Alternatively, the amount claimed is claimed pursuant to a consumer contract within the meaning of the Australian Consumer Law and that the amount claimed is an unfair term within the meaning of section 23 of the ACL and, accordingly, is void. Finally, this debt remains in dispute until we advise you in writing that we owe this debt. I received one further piece of correspondence which didn't address any of the things I asked for and which I ignored and that was the end of the matter. | Are you at fault for the fact that Car C read ended you? Close call. A jury could go either way. Can this accident which is now appearing on your insurance be disputed as Car A did not report anything? Essentially I'm just wondering what the odds are that this can removed from Car A's record. I think that it is unlikely that the situation you suggest would happen, even though anything is possible. Usually there needs to be a claim of actual damage for an insurance company to treat it as an accident. The usual rule is "no harm, no foul" (unless someone is cited for a traffic violation). Insurance company accident records are not regulated to the same extent as say, credit reports. You could threaten to sue the company for negligent misrepresentation, or the driver of Car C for defamation, in order to try to get this statement removed, but those would be hard cases to win since you are at least arguably at fault and fault is to some extent a matter of opinion. It would be much easier to win a suit like that if the accident didn't happen at all. Here, it would be undisputed that an accident happened at a particular time and place involving certain cars and drivers, and the dispute is only over who was at fault. | There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf |
Is it legal to collect reviews/ratings about specific profession people from and show it on website? There are websites which show reviews, ratings, scores about companies (restaurants, hotels, etc.). Is it legal to show specific employee/service provider/professional like doctor or other profession full name and reviews about him publicly - does it need permission? What about GDPR, right to be forgotten and other legal considerations? | That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money. | The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you. | Is it actually necessary for businesses (such as a Small Town News USA Inc) that do not reside in EU to care about GDPR? Only if they offer goods/services to or monitor behavior of people in the EU (Art. 3(2)). Note that: having a commerce-oriented website that is accessible to EU residents does not by itself constitute offering goods or services in the EU. Rather, a business must show intent to draw EU customers, for example, by using a local language or currency. If it is then how (and by whom) would compliance be audited and/or enforced? Supervisory Authorities will care of it. | The people on the show would be considered public figures, so if there was information that the fictitious writing was actually based on/about them, defamation must be proven to a different standard for public figures. Public figures, including officeholders and candidates, actors or musicians successful enough to be held in "the public eye," have to show that the defamation was made with malicious intent, which is a greater burden than defamation for the average person. Also, damages may be limited to actual (special) damages unless there is actual malice. Special damages being lost income or some other quantifiable measure of loss. If one cannot tell who it (the fictional story) is about because the name is changed, then Fox, or whomever, couldn't sue anyway because they need standing, which they wouldn't have if you called the person X, unless the story was so exact that it is obvious who you are talking about. For instance, the show Law and Order is often based on famous stories in the news, or criminal cases they dig up. Those fictional story lines often add or delete details. The case may be more or less damaging to the actual person it was based on. However, they make a statement before the show airs that says something like "Any similarity to real people or events is strictly coincidental. This show is not based on any real person or event, but is a work of fiction." If I were going to make a fictional account of a big network show, I would use some sort of disclosure like that to be safe. That said, if the statements or storyline is less damaging than the facts themselves, as revealed on the show, it isn't defamatory at all: Defamation necessarily must include the act of making untrue statements about another that damage their reputation. If it doesn't damage their "good character or reputation," than it's not defamatory. Keep in mind, however, that what you may consider less or more damaging may not be the same view held by the person it's loosely based on. That is why I'd use the disclosure. As to the question "would it protect you against a lawsuit?", if you mean would it protect you from being sued, the answer is always, anyone can sue file a lawsuit. That doesn't mean they'll win but it still means you have to defend. It may likely protect you in your defense. | Yes. It is legal for them to do so. Also, they are often required, by their insurers and lawyers, if not as a matter of law, to maintain them for seven years in most cases, so that the information is available if a lawsuit arises from any of their dealings with you (e.g. if they receive notice of a lawsuit involving a Zipcar you were allegedly using or had under your control at the time of an accident, or if there is a class action lawsuit over alleged breach of contract or consumer laws involving their charges to you). There are virtually no circumstances, with the possible exception of certain credit card account information, when someone has a duty to destroy records maintained about you under U.S. law. In this particular instance, everything on your driver's license is a matter of public record in any case, so your privacy interest is reduced for this reason as well. | In the United States, the main statute governing the use of health care information is HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. HIPAA and its related statutes and regulations detail what you can and can't do with medical information. You can't always collect it; if you do, you can't always share it, and you can't always delete it. This is a complex field of law and it's easy to screw up in a way that would cause big, serious, company-destroying, job-ending problems for everyone involved. To put this another way: this is absolutely, positively, not something you want to get advice on from strangers on the internet. You don't just need a lawyer; you need a HIPAA specialist--or the equivalent in whatever other countries you plan to operate in--before you push anything out to real-life patients, especially children. | You are responsible for what data is being processed by your website. When you embed third party components on your website (e.g. iframes, scripts), you are at least jointly responsible with the third party providing these components. You are only responsible for what happens on the website (i.e. what processing is under your control), not for what the third party provider does with collected data on their services. However, note that information will be transferred to Google's servers regardless of whether the visitor has a Google account! The Fashion ID case is relevant case law establishing and explaining these points. Since you are (jointly) responsible, you need a legal basis for collecting personal data through the tracking snippet and sharing it with the third party (here Google). For example, the legal basis could be a legitimate interest, or could be consent. A legitimate interest requires that you balance this interests against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject (the site visitor). If the data subject wouldn't reasonably expect this tracking, you cannot rely on a legitimate interest. Consent can always work, except that it is a freely given, informed opt-in – likely unsuitable for conversion tracking. Which legal basis to use is primarily your responsibility. You argue that the tracking snippet does not collect personal data. However, this argument is not well supported. Under the GDPR, personal data does not only include directly identifying information such as an email address, but also any information “relating” to an identifiable person. Identification includes the ability to single out someone, e.g. by a browser fingerprint. For purposes of conversion tracking, Google will clearly try to collect data that allows the visitor to be singled out, thus collecting personal data. Furthermore, specific kinds of information are regulated by the ePrivacy directive. This includes “traffic data” and “information stored on a terminal device”, regardless of whether this information is personal data under the GDPR. Under ePrivacy, such information can only be used as strictly necessary to provide the service requested by the user (and conversion tracking is not strictly necessary), or when the user gives their consent. Depending on what information is collected by the tracking snippet and on whether you are subject to ePrivacy, you would have to collect consent anyway. There is also the issue that Google Ads is an US-based service, and transferring data to the US is largely illegal since the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The US do not provide an adequate level of data protection, so that transfers would require additional safeguards. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) for Controller to Controller transfers are not sufficient by itself. Of course those extra safeguards are effectively impossible to implement and no one is doing this correctly, but it's worth considering that there is additional legal risk. Explicit consent can provide a legal basis for transfers even to a country with inadequate protections, but that mechanism is intended for occasional transfers. In conclusion: you have wrongly concluded that no personal data would be involved you are jointly responsible with Google for whatever data is processed by the conversion tracking snippet you need a legal basis for sharing this data with Google legitimate interest may be sufficient, depending on what data is involved (consider ePrivacy) and depending on the result of your legitimate interest balancing test alternatively, you may require every visitors consent to track their conversions – unlikely to result in good data additionally, such use of Google Ads may run into issues around international transfers due to the Schrems II ruling this kind of stuff is difficult, and no one is really doing this correctly :/ | That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure. |
Ammending / restating a Living Revocable Trust Imagine a person has setup a living revocable trust. If the trust is amended you would need to keep both the original trust documents and the amendment. (Correct me if I am wrong about this?) Now imagine there is a second amendment which restates the entire trust. At this point can you throw away the original trust document and the first amendment to the trust? | If an amendment restates the entire trust, I have been told by an attorney that you can throw away the original trust documents because they are no longer valid. Note: I am not an attorney. I do not have any formal training is law so my answer is not reliable. | No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons? | Living Wills A "living will" which is a "pull the plug" document that isn't customized to an individual's preferences (probably 95%+ done by lawyers are not customized anyway) through a service like LegalZoom is probably fine, although doing it yourself you don't get the same guidance about how to use it in practice and are more likely to screw up the formal execution of the document (e.g. not having the proper witnesses and notary observe the execution, or signing in the wrong place, etc.). But this document is usually prepared by a lawyer at little or no extra cost when you have your last will and testament done, so the cost of not screwing up the execution of it isn't great. And, lawyer drafted documents are less likely to be contested in practice, even when a non-lawyer on paper does everything right. Someone who does their own living will also often doesn't realize the important of also having medical powers of attorney and durable powers of attorney for property which are also necessary. Simple Wills A "simple will" is quite another matter. First, I've never met a layperson who doesn't think that they need no more than a "simple will" when in fact they often do, either because they are affluent, or have a blended family, or need testamentary trusts to manage property for children or young adults or black sheep or for tax purposes or because some family members are non-citizens. In general, a lot of the value of having a lawyer do the work comes from the lawyer's ability to spot issues that are exceptional and take you out of the "simple will" solution by itself. Often an issue spotted can result in larger monetary savings or a much smoother probate process. For example, a lawyer can identify cases where a probate proceeding in more than one state is likely to be required and suggest steps to avoid that expensive result. Second, many non-lawyers have a very hard time thinking about all possibilities. They do fine thinking about what rules make sense if everybody alive today is still alive when you die and you own what you own now when you die, but have a very hard time thinking about what would be appropriate if people predecease them or if their assets change substantially. Lawyers are much better at working through what is sensible in all of these possibilities, many of which won't happen, but some of which will happen. This matters because a will never expires unless it is expressly revoked. I've probated wills drafted during WWII in basic training (as required) before the decedent went off to war and never amended over the next 60 years, and it is very hard to be that thoughtful when you are doing it yourself. Third, it is very common for non-lawyers to use language that isn't obviously ambiguous or otherwise problematic until you are forced to apply it in practice. Estate planning lawyers are much more aware of these traps in the "moving parts" of an estate plan and of the possibilities that need to be provided for. To give one example, suppose that you leave your second wife your house, and leave the remainder of your estate to your children (her stepchildren). It is very easy to say this in a way that does not make clear whether she takes the house subject to the mortgage, or if the mortgage is a debt to be paid before the remainder of the estate is distributed to the children. Similar issues often come up in relation to tax elections and allocation of tax debts among heirs. Providing for the disposition of pets is another thing that few non-lawyers manage to do well. Lawyers, in contrast, generally draft in a manner that avoids these ambiguities and sets forth rules that are sensible, fair and will work in practice. The issues are even more fraught if businesses or investment real estate is involved. And, non-lawyers (even sophisticated, affluent business people) routinely fail to grasp that a Will only governs assets which don't have beneficiary designations and is subject to forced marital share and minimum family inheritance laws that act by operation of law as well as other "gap filling" presumptions that modify the literal meaning of certain kinds of language in a Will. Finally, screwing up the execution of a Will is very common, while lawyer drafted wills are much less likely to be contested. In my twenty years of experience as a lawyer who does estate planning as part of his practice and teaches lawyers, financial planners and paralegals about the topic, I find that the increased litigation costs associated with a do it yourself will (on average) is about ten times as large as the savings associated with doing it yourself. Sure, one time in three or four or five, somebody does their own will and doesn't screw it up and it all goes fine, but a majority of the time, do it yourself will drafters do something that would be considered malpractice if a lawyer did it. Pay lawyers now, or pay lawyers more later. Honestly, if all you need is a "simple will" and you are not willing to spend the $500-$2,000 to have a lawyer draft appropriate documents, and help you execute them, you are probably better off doing nothing at all and dying intestate (i.e. without a will so that the default provisions of the law apply), which often isn't a horrible result in a plain vanilla, unblended nuclear family that isn't particularly affluent. | The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas. | The situation is that Executive Order 2020-33 is no more, and a new order, 2020-68 exists. The old orders to stay home are now copied under this order, but it may be necessary for her to re-issue (a subset of) the orders so that they are pursuant to #68 and not #33 (live by the technicality, die by the technicality). If she does not do that quickly, I expect there to be legal challenges. The law (30-403) doesn't say that orders issued pursuant to a declaration of a state of disaster expire when the authorizing declaration expires, but one can reasonably infer that that is what the legislature had in mind when this law was passed. But that is a matter for the courts to decide. Deference to the executive, which is the usual way that courts operate, would favor an interpretation where saying "All previous orders that rested on Executive Order 2020-33 now rest on this order" counts as re-issuing the same orders with a new number in the text. The law does not say that the circumstances authorizing an emergency order have to be completely different. Perhaps the legislature will revise the law in the future, but it is what it is right now. | The problem is that the Constitution does not provide a freestanding right to "self-determination," to self-defense, or to bodily integrity. To the extent the courts recognize any of these as implied rights, they are subject to balancing against other rights or governmental authority. Analogizing to the Second Amendment can be helpful. There's a lot of gray area in Second Amendment law, but it's pretty clear that I have a right to keep a knife on my bedstand, but not to build a nuclear arsenal in your backyard. Why not? Because you have a right to keep people off your property, and because the government has an interest in protecting its citizens, infrastructure, and natural resources from the risks associated with my incompetent exercise of my Second Amendment rights. So what interests are at stake in the abortion question? Roe held that women have a right to privacy that protects access to abortion, but it also recognized that the government has an interest in protecting potential life. The question was how to balance the privacy interest against the interest in protecting potential life. Roe said the woman's rights generally outweigh the government's interests up until the point of viability, at which point the government's interests begin to outweigh the woman's privacy interests. But Dobbs appears poised to change that by saying that the woman's right to privacy does not exist at all. Dobbs likewise rejects the idea that the right to due process or any other constitutional right protects the right to abortion. Therefore, it concludes, a woman has no rights that can outweigh the state's interest in protecting the potential life she is carrying. Dobbs also recognizes -- but does not take a position on -- the argument that a fetus is actually a person itself. If a legislature were to adopt that position, and the courts were to accept it, we would find ourselves in a position where whatever rights a woman has to self-determination and bodily integrity would have to be balanced against the fetus's rights to self-determination and bodily integrity. | 1911-1913 very shady time in USA political history. They could amend the Constitution to make a law Constitutional. There's nothing shady about that in the least. In fact, it is the point of constitutional amendments: to provide a mechanism to change the constitution when it prohibits something that an overwhelming majority of people -- well, of congress and of state legislatures -- think should be allowed. A constitutional amendment can reverse the provisions of Article I; it can reverse a constitutional ruling by a court (or at least reverse the ruling's effect); and it can certainly overcome arguments by Jefferson and Jackson, which have very little legal weight if any. Wasn't the whole point of the revolutionary war ... It doesn't matter what the point of the war was. What matters is that the constitution controls what the government can and can't do, and the constitution can change. The constitution countenanced slavery until it didn't. The constitution required senators to be chosen by state legislatures until it didn't. The constitution forbade income tax until it didn't. | Sounds like you aren't sharing the same definition of living document A prenup is simply a contract, and most contracts are "fixed" at the time of their formation: the rights and obligations of each party are defined for all time (or for as long as the contract lasts). This is not what I and I suspect you, would understand to be a living document. However, some contracts contain terms that allow their terms to be varied - either by agreement or unilaterally. That sort of contract would be a living document. Notwithstanding, any contract can be varied or replaced with a new contract until by agreement of all parties as long as the contract is still on foot. Your lawyer may be thinking of the prenup in this way, and, at a stretch, that would make it a living document. Your lawyer's advice is sound - your circumstances have changed, and you should at least look at the prenup to decide if you are still happy with its terms in light of your new circumstances. That's a review. It most definitely "is what it is", but if "what it is" doesn't suit your relationship's current status, you can, with the agreement of your partner, change "what it is". Without reviewing it, you can't make an informed decision if the current agreement even makes sense in the light of the present. It may be that you're perfectly happy with "what it is", or that you're unhappy but trying to change it would make you more unhappy, or that discussing it like adults with your partner and deciding to change or not change is a good or bad idea. But you can't know unless you do the review first. |
What's the difference between a police report and a signed complaint? (in US/IL/CA) (apropos Highland Park mass shooting) I'm listening to today's "Democracy Now" (6July2022) and apropos the Highland Park mass shooting, it shows a spokesman for the sheriff's office stating: [The shooter] said he was going to kill everyone and ... police removed 16 knives, a dagger and a sword... There was no probable cause to arrest. There were no complaints that were signed by any of the victims. What does this part mean? I've made police reports, including for battery, and I've never been informed of or given an opportunity to sign anything. What is the import of and procedure for signed complaints? Interested in the law in the US, and in IL and CA in particular.) | In my opinion, the news report is mischaracterizing the situation, either because the person who provided the information was confused or sloppy, or because the reporter was confused (it is impossible to tell on its face). Probable cause to arrest can, and often does, arise from an oral statement of a witness to a police officer, even if a witness refuses to back their oral statement to a police officer with a written one. And, in the narrow and strict sense, a complaint is a court document, usually signed by a prosecutor, commencing criminal legal proceedings against a criminal defendant (in lieu of an indictment, or pending the issuance of an indictment). A complaint in this narrow and strict sense would not usually be signed by an ordinary citizen witness to a crime. Sometimes, however, the word "complaint" is used in a broader, non-technical sense to refer either to any report made to police complaining about misconduct by someone, or in a different technical sense to refer to a written and signed report made by a witness to the police. It is likely that what really happened is that after receiving an oral report that the individual had threatened people, none of the witnesses who provided this oral report was willing to sign a document summarizing their oral report of being threatened for the police (perhaps out of fear of retaliation by the accused person, or out of a desire not to harm the accused person's long term future prospects). Then, the police department, as a matter of department policy (rather than any requirement imposed by law), declined to pursue a criminal case based upon the threats, when no one was willing to publicly and in writing commit to their oral reports, because they would need a testifying witness in a later court case. | Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out. | It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch. | These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges. | So the most obvious is that the U.S. Miranda Rights specifically mention right to legal counsel and right to state provided legal counsel (Public Defenders) if you cannot afford legal counsel (Contrary to some opinions, these guys are very good at their job... it's just that they are also very over worked and private industry pays better). While the right exists in the U.K., the U.K. version of the required reading of rights only speaks to right against self-incrimination, which, if you want a difference is a good place to look. In the self-incrimination clauses, the U.K. and U.S. versions are very different. The U.K. right is a qualified right where as the U.S. is an absolute or unqualified right. This is a distinction which sounds silly upfront but is very serious in how things will transpire. Suppose that you are arrested for the murder of your spouse. You definitely did not do and the "one armed man" definitely did. Either way, you remain silent during interrogation. At trial, your defense is "It wasn't me it was the one armed man" and you intend to present evidence of this. In the U.S. this would be permitted, no further questions asked (or at the least, defeated by other means unrelated to you giving the cops the cold shoulder). In the U.K., this would be first be challenged by the prosecution with "Why didn't you say this when you were arrested?" and your silence on this matter will be used against you. In fact, asking that challenge in the U.S. is very inappropriate, as was recently seen in the Kyle Rittenhouse trial, where the Prosecution did ask that up front to Rittenhouse, prompting a scolding from the judge out of view from the jury. The reason for this is that in the UK there are more strict rules placed on cops during interrogation than there are in the U.S. (In the former, cops cannot lie to you about the facts of the case and they cannot interrupt your statements to them once you start to respond. This is par for the course in the U.S. for cops. In fact, in the U.S., shouting "It was the one armed man" on arrest can do more damage than just shutting up until you're before a judge and jury since that lets the prosecution use the implausibility of a one armed man against you (in both nations, statements that are against your interest do not violate hearsay rules, thus, the cops will only use such a statement against you... it's your job to prove it true or at least plausible enough to make a jury doubt the cops are right.). Also note that this is England and Wales jurisdictions only. Scotland, having its own legal system, retains the right against self-incrimination as an absolute right. Also a big obvious one but the read rights would not be called the "Miranda Rights" by the police or legal community (it may be, by the crooks they are arresting who have no clue that the TV version might be the U.S. one since it's more likely to get shown there than on U.K. TV.). In the U.K. they would be called "Standard Cautions" or "Reading the rights". The U.S. name derives from the SCOTUS case Miranda v. Arizona which was the ground-breaking case that made this required by all police when interrogating a suspect. Additionally, each state has their own version, which generally reads the same way (they explain your 5th and 6th Amendment rights to silence and an attorney) and may vary on asking if you choose to waive the rights upon receiving an affirmative answer that the rights were understood ("With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?" is the proper phrasing). They also are read from cards (business card to index card sized) where the right is printed in English and Spanish and the suspect must sign it as part of acknowledging that their rights were read. | It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common. | I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state. | Your attorney can help you answer those questions, if necessary. Generally, you cannot know for certain. Mass. criminal procedure rule 6 covers arrest warrants – the Superior court can issue an arrest warrant. That warrant must be "signed" by the issuing official, will have the name or other reasonable means of identifying the subject, and the offense charged. An electronic signature is a signature. If the arresting officer does not have the warrant at the time of arrest, the arrest may proceed anyhow, and if he has the warrant, he shall on request show it to the defendant as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant on him, he shall inform the defendant that a warrant has been issued. There is no practical way to look at a warrant and determine that is is a real warrant as opposed to a fake document created by thugs. There is no statute under which a person can resist arrest until they are satisfied that the arrest is by a legitimate officer and that the document was properly issued by the court. If there was no proper warrant, the arrest will probably be found unlawful and you will be set free until a proper warrant is issued. It would be unlawful for thugs to take you (impersonating an officer is a crime), and that is as far as the law goes. Ch. 267 of Massachusetts General Laws lays out the law regarding warrants, and those laws focus on the conditions for legally issuing a warrant, not for convincing a person that a warrant, search or arrest is legitimate. You may certainly attempt to confirm that the warrant and officer are real, but you cannot resist the search or arrest if you are not satisfied. |
Why can Disney sue you for a photo of a Disney tshirt on your website? My wife sews things and she likes to put photos of her creations on her blog. Now we found, that people received cease-and-desist warnings (with a 1000€ charge) for putting photos of clothing on their websites, that contain for example Disney characters (also happened for other brands IPs). To be clear: there are companies that license these images by the IP owners and print them on fabric. People bought this fabric and sewed clothes from it. Now these people get in trouble for posting photos of the clothes, they created. How can that be, if the IP owner licensed these motives to the company? Can this also happen if I post a photo of a shirt with a disney print, I bought in a store? If not, where is the difference? | The IP was licensed to a company to allow people to put it on their shirts as part of a hobby. It did not license anyone to sell shirts with those prints already applied on them, least of all a third party. That is, Disney licensed a company to sell prints for sewing on shirts, not shirts. When you moved into the shirt market, you are competing with Disney for a different licensed product. Disney may offer a shirt with the same image of Mickey Mouse on it (or may wish to in the future) and you are competing and with copyrighted characters to boot. This wouldn't happen if you were to walk into a Disney Store, buy a shirt, and later sell it on a second hand market as you have legally purchased a shirt with a print on it (as opposed to selling a shirtless print with a shirt on it for profit). Even if the shirt fetches a higher bidding price on EBay because it is a collector's item as Disney is in the market of selling brand new never worn Disney shirts and does not want to be in the market of second hand Disney shirts that some guy may have sweated in. Furthermore, if you are posting the picture wearing the new shirt with the sewing print applied, but not with the intention to sell the shirt, but say, discuss the consumer experience of using Disney's product, then it also wouldn't count as here you are giving an opinion on the quality of Disney's merchandise, which may affect sales, but is not competitively selling a similar product. For example, if I have a blog that reviews movies and I say "Avengers: Infinity War was better than Avengers: Endgame", I'm not selling Endgame, but stating my subjective opinion on the film and that it wasn't the best foot forward compared to a similarly offered product. Product Reviews (in the United States) fall under a specific subset of protection against IP rights claims called Fair Use, which allows for a new product to be produced using copyrighted property so long as the product is material changed (for example, I'm if it was IP theft, I would have to sell the Endgame film in full. But since Disney is selling a movie and I am selling a review of the movie, we are not competing in the same market space). Fair Use is considered an affirmative defense, which means that the defense must meet a burden of proof in its claim. Affirmative Defenses essentially are Defenses where you in part agree with the claim, but the dispute is on the context in which the action took place. Without showing evidence that the circumstances of the action are not such that make it unlawful, such defense would basically be pleading guilty. Suppose then you are accused of taking a cookie for the cookie jar. Ordinarily, the person making the claim would have to show it's not you and could never be someone else, thus your defense would be that maybe Jane stole them. Or the evidence hinges on proving "WHO unlawfully took the Cookies From the Cookie Jar?" In an Affirmative Defense, you would answer the charge by questioning by saying that both you and the complaint against you agree to a statement "You TOOK the cookies from the cookie jar" but have disagreements on his statement that "You UNLAWFULLY took the cookies from the cookie jar." because your mother gave you permission to have a cookie and have evidence to support that. In many copyright cases that could be Fair Use, there is nothing stopping Disney from making the claim, so Disney can still file a suit and hope that their army of lawyers scares people into stopping even if you could have a valid fair use, as that is a burden you must prove. Of the three possible outcomes for the suit, either the matter is settled quietly outside of the courts and does not make case law, Or the courts find in favor of Disney OR Find against Disney. Disney wins in two of these outcomes, including the settlement of complying with a cease and desist notice (which is not a lawsuit, but a threat of a lawsuit should the practice continue) as you are doing what they want and a settlement will still show Disney will sue to other potential violators where as a losing case will create binding law (in common law systems, like the U.S.) that could limit Disney, but even then the victory is Pyrrhic at best as Disney can usually afford legal fees incurred where as you are less likely to be able to afford to see a case all the way through to a favorable outcome. Thus Disney will sue in cases it would likely loses as they gamble that the threat of the financial impact of reaching a decision in a court is something that will scare you into stopping. This is especially true on some websites like Youtube which would be threatened with suits for hosting a third party video and until very recently (2016 or 17) Youtube would give into the copyright holders despite a valid Fair Use claim existing. These practices can be defeated if one can argue in a court that Disney is doing this unfavorable fair use (called and anti-SLAPP) but this relies on the defense having knowledge of the law and the time to press the matter... ceasing is much easier and cost effective. | As far as I am aware both these answers are incorrect, but as I am not a lawyer let me quote the World Intellectual Property Organization (part of the UN): Photos of trademarks Unlike copyright law, trademark law as such does not restrict the use of a trademark in a photograph. What it does forbid is the use of a trademark in a way that can cause confusion regarding the affiliation of the trademark owner to the image. If consumers are likely to mistakenly believe that the trademark owner sponsored a photograph, then there may be trademark infringement. For example, if a Nike logo was visible on the t-shirt worn by the boy in our photo-shoot scenario, this could be seen as an attempt to appropriate consumer goodwill associated with the Nike trademark. So, caution is required if photographing someone wearing or consuming a trademarked product. Source: IP and Business: Using Photographs of Copyrighted Works and Trademarks (emphasis mine) So the basic idea is that if the Washington Redskins would not want to be associated with the Biden campaign, they could file a lawsuit claiming that the photo suggests there might be an affiliation between the campaign and the sport organization. In other words, the question one has to ask is: Is there a chance we might benefit in any way from the goodwill associated with the trademark? The way it was explained in a copyright course1 I watched was that: you don't need to worry about a McDonald's in the background of your photo you need to be careful where you use a general photo of a specific McDonald's and taking a photo of a political candidate in front of a McDonald's is not acceptable without permission2 The verdict The biden campaign claimed that A campaign aide told Fox News the logo was removed from the photo because it is "copyrighted" and claimed that such a step is "a very common practice on campaigns." To my knowledge that are no actual copyright concerns here, but - just like with the aforementioned course - trademark matters often get covered in the same setting as copyright laws, so I have a very easy time believing that this is 'a very common practice on campaigns'. It's incredibly unlikely that for this specific photo the Washington Redskins would have actually claimed that Biden was benefiting from the goodwill associated with their brand (especially considering all the controversy surrounding them), but it's a completely believable general policy. The interesting thing is that they didn't care as much about postings on social media compared to more traditional channels, but this is in line with what I have seen in many companies and organizations. 1 - This course was trying to generalize international law in a way that content producers won't get in trouble anywhere rather than exclusively explain US law. 2 - The example didn't use a 'political candidate' explicitly, but something along the lines of a recognizable public figure who is not just getting a burger | Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected. | Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue. | Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html | A character can not be copyrighted. Only a work (picture, text, movie etc.) featuring that character can. However, a character can be registred as a trademark (more specifically, its name and its appearance). | A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases. | This overstates the case. A company must pursue infringements, arguably even when it isn't economically sensible in isolation to do so, to prevent its trademark from being diluted. But, that isn't the case "when it's blatantly obvious that there is no infringement." There is no benefit from pursuing cases that aren't even colorable infringements. The notion is similar to adverse possession. If you let someone openly use your real property without your permission, eventually, the squatter becomes its legal owner. Also, as in the case of adverse possession, an alternative to suing someone for infringing is to make their permission non-infringing by writing them a letter expressly authorizing them to use your mark. Permissive, licensed use does not dilute a trademark. |
How did balance of probabilities come to be called preponderance of the evidence in the US? The civil standard of proof is rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt" (what criminal standards of proof are called in both England and the US), either the balance of probabilities or a preponderance of the evidence depending if you are in the UK or US. When and how did American lawyers come to call this concept which appears to be semantically identical something different? | This article may be helpful. The development of a distinct, lower standard of proof for civil cases comes after the US came into existence, thus the expressions were developed independently, after the doctrine itself started to develop. Various expressions are used, often with different implications that could lead to fixing a specific expression to a definite doctrine, for instance "greater weight of the evidence", "more likely than not" as well as the contender expressions. Earliest expressions of the principle in question include Edward Wynne Eunomus (1768) Wherever a verdict is given, the Plaintiff at least must give evidence to maintain his Declaration: where evidence is produced on both sides, the verdict is given for the Plaintiff or Defendant, according to the superior weight of evidence. Richards Wooddeson's 1777 formulation is In causes concerning civil rights and property, that side must prevail, in favor of which probability preponderates: but the (a) humanity of our law never esteems the turn of the balance sufficient to convict a man of any, especially a capital, crime. For it requires a very strong and irrefragable presumption of guilt to justify the infliction of the severer human punishments In Delaware (1801) in the case State v. Crocker, 2 Del. Cas. 150, the doctrine is "named", preponderance of evidence: In civil cases a preponderance of evidence is sufficient for you to convict; in criminal, you should have proof You can find "balance of probabilities" in a UK case Head v. Head (1823). The origin of the construction "balance of probabilities" is philosophy and theology, whereas "preponderance of evidence" is a more-distinctly legal expression. Since the underlying ideas were developed separately in the US and England, it is not surprising that different expressions were attached to the doctrine. | The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff (except for counterclaims brought by the defendant against the plaintiff). In your example, the businessman has to prove that he did not rape her. | Some jurisdictions codify maxims, many do not, but these maxims still exist. Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no one can take advantage of his own wrong) is a generally recognized principle of equity, broadly connected to the principle "who comes into equity must come with clean hands" and the covenant of good faith. Some civil law countries (e.g. France) recognizes Nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans (no one can be heard to invoke his own turpitude). | As I understand it, legal procedure in Common Law jurisdictions (e.g. the UK) is primarily based on evidence given by a person. Paperwork exists to verify that someone has not misremembered something, but even when you have paperwork you need to have someone testify that this is the right paperwork and it hasn't been forged. A piece of paper on its own means nothing. In practice of course the two sides will agree to accept routine matters rather than dragging lots of third parties (e.g. the post office employees) into court to no point. In the case of a letter where you need to prove it was received, the sender will testify that they sent the letter and that the copy they have introduced into evidence is a true copy. The proof of delivery merely shows that the item wasn't lost in the post. If one party testifies that they sent a letter and the other testifies that they merely received an empty envelope then someone is lying, which is a crime meriting further investigation. | A legal paper published in a peer reviewed journal is not science. Universities have faculties of Law and Science because they are not the same thing. while both disciplines use the terms ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘proof’ they do not mean the same thing. Notwithstanding, the law has already disproved science - see the Catholic Church v Galileo and the Heliocentric model of the Solar System. Yet NASA still uses it to send spacecraft to Pluto - possibly because engineering is neither science nor law. | The concept of "innocent until proven guilty" is inherent in our constitutional protections for due process. As far as I know, the Supreme Court first formally recognized it as a rule in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 458-59 (1895): Now the presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty. In other words, this presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created. The key phrase -- for purposes of your question -- is "sufficient evidence." At a criminal trial, sufficient evidence consists of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on “all the essential elements of guilt” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). But if the government wants to lock up a defendant pending trial, the question is not whether the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, but rather whether he poses a danger to the community and can be trusted to appear for trial. 18 U.S. Code § 3142(e)(1). And on those questions, he retains the presumption of innocence, but the government's burden of proof when arguing otherwise is substantially lower. The courts recognize both the potential of fleeing from the court and the prevention of additional crimes as legitimate bases for pretrial detention. In cases like Avenatti's, where the government is seeking pretrial detention because the defendant is a danger to the community, it needs to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S. Code § 3142(f)(2). However, if the government is seeking to hold the defendant because it does not believe he will appear for trial, it need only prove its case on that question by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986) (“For detention to be proper, the government had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably assure Martir's attendance at trial.”). As a side note, I'd agree with some of the answers that in practice, the bond system is regularly abused to the point that its underlying principles become unrecognizable. My answer is meant only to address the actual legal rules your question implicates. | It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment—specifically the ratio—that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today) | You appear to be conflating two different legal concepts: evidence and proof. evidence something that furnishes proof: testimony; specifically: something legally submitted to a tribunal to ascertain the truth of a matter proof the cogency of evidence that compels acceptance by the mind of a truth or a fact So evidence is presented to a tribunal who will then decide if that evidence meets the required burden of proof. In a civil matter the burden of proof is met on the preponderance of evidence (in a criminal matter the burden is beyond reasonable doubt) and the onus of proof rests with the person making the allegation. Preponderance is based on the more convincing evidence and its probable truth or accuracy, and not on the amount of evidence. Thus, one clearly knowledgeable witness may provide a preponderance of evidence over a dozen witnesses with hazy testimony, or a signed agreement with definite terms may outweigh opinions or speculation about what the parties intended. Certified mail is evidence (very strong evidence) that something was mailed and delivered. It is, as you rightly point out not evidence of what it contained. So let's follow through with your IRS hypothetical: No Certified Mail The IRS alledges that you did not file your tax return - they have the burden of proof. As evidence, they put forward an affidavit that no return was filed. You put forward an affidavit that you did file a return. The judge considers the evidence and (probably) gives more veracity to the IRS's affidavit than yours - the IRS have met their burden of proof. Certified Mail 1 The IRS alledges that you did not file your tax return - they have the burden of proof. As evidence, they put forward an affidavit that no return was filed. You put forward an affidavit that you did file a return and the proof of delivery from the USPS. The judge considers the evidence and (probably) considers that the IRS has recieved something from you: if it wasn't a tax return then they were in a position to give evidence as to what it was, and they didn't - given that it is the IRS that is obliged to prove that what they receieved wasn't a tax return, the IRS have not met their burden of proof. Certified Mail 2 The IRS alledges that you did not file your tax return - they have the burden of proof. As evidence, they put forward an affidavit that no return was filed but they did recieve an envelope stuffed with newspaper clippings and here they are. You put forward an affidavit that you did file a return and the proof of delivery from the USPS and you have no idea how they changed from a tax return to newspaper clippings in transit. The judge considers the evidence and (probably) gives more veracity to the IRS's affidavit than yours - the IRS have met their burden of proof. |
Tenancies and the GDPR If Tim the tenant and Larry the landlord enter into a tenancy, then do either of them become a data controller of the others name and address? Does the landlord as the "provider" of the housing have greater burdens of propriety in handling tenants' personal data than vice versa? More broadly, do any two parties entering into mutual contract assume compliance burdens under the GDPR, and is the case especially so with respect to something so ubiquitous as tenancies? | Anyone who processes personal data using electronic means or with some filing system is a data controller, as long as they fall within the GDPR's territorial scope, they're not doing the processing on behalf of another data controller, and they're not only doing the processing for purely personal or household purposes. In todays world, it's almost certain that electronic means are involved. And establishing a rental contract generally involves some personal data. We can also assume that both parties are in the UK, and that both are acting on their own behalf. So this leaves the household exception. Larry the landlord will not be covered by the household exception since they're using the personal data for a business purpose. Larry is a data controller. If Tim the tenant is renting a place to live in himself, he's probably acting for purely personal or household purposes and would not be a data controller. If Tim the tenant is renting space for his office, for a church, or for a chessclub in which he is a member, he's no longer acting for purely personal or household means. Depending on context, Tim or Tim's organization may be a data controller. The ICO's guidance on controllers and processors has a checklist “Are we a controller?” that lists common factors establishing controllership. On another page, they write: Wherever personal data is used for purposes other than personal or household processing, the organisation behind it is a controller. Personal or household processing means the personal data you’d usually have in your home, such as family photo albums, friends’ addresses and notes on the fridge, none of which would be covered by data protection laws unless there was another connection to a professional or commercial activity. | The bouncer is employed (or (sub)contracted) by the owner/lessee of premises - someone with the right to evict persons from their private property per the common law rights to exclusive use of one's property. When the bouncer evicts you, they are exercising this right on behalf of and as the agent for the owner, who could do it, but instead has assigned limited agency to the bouncer to do that for them. Entrance to (and remaining on) a property may be authorised and revoked at any time - at the time that consent is not given or is withdrawn, you become a trespasser and the police may be called upon to forcibly remove you from the premises. For example, I can have a party at my house, but if I don't like someone, I'm entitled to ask them to leave. I could also ask a friend to ask that person to leave, if I didn't want to do it myself. Note that bouncers aren't empowered to physically evict anyone except for the general right to use reasonable and proportionate force. For instance, someone that was just standing around in the nightclub probably couldn't be physically thrown out, but someone who was causing harm to themselves or others could be restrained or repelled as appropriate (and if restrained, you'd need to be very careful to do so in the course of effecting a citizen's arrest, otherwise you'd probably be committing false imprisonment). There may be statutory provisions that bestow additional rights and responsibilities upon bouncers, but this is the basic premise. I'm fairly certain that this would apply in all Australian jurisdictions; probably in all common law jurisdictions. | Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline. | My interpretation of the GDPR when it comes to a contact form is as long as your privacy notice states that what data you collect in the contact form and what legal basis that data is used for you are fine. Someone submitting a contact form in my opinion is their consent to reply back to them regarding the data in which they have submitted. Another good clause to have in your privacy policy is to basically state if the user submits information about another natural person that they have consent from that natural person for that data and what it would be used for. The internet is the internet. People have been trolling it for years. People have also submitted false information for years. The best a business can do is simply outline what their site does, what data is collected and what it will be used for. That along with what legal basis it’s processed for and following it makes you GDPR compliant in that regard. As to withdrawing consent and the rights given by the GDPR that’s all specific to what infustructure a business has in place. As a developer I know the headaches of the GDPR. Most of it resides in the fact data is not centralized and thus can’t easily be retrieved, modified, or removed. Once you’ve tackled that aspect providing the user their rights under GDPR isn’t to far off. | The critical part is the nature of the relationship between you, the website provider, and the provider of the material you embed. If the embed-provider acts as your data processor, then things are generally fine. The GDPR does not really distinguish between personal data processing activities that you perform yourself versus activities that you've outsourced to third parties. However, you would remain responsible for compliance. This also means that per Art 28 GDPR, you will need a contract with that embed-provider (sometimes called a “Data Processing Agreement”, DPA). This contract stipulates that the processor will only use the personal data as instructed by you, but not for their own purposes. With the Google Fonts case, it must be highlighted that Google does not act as a processor for this service. Google does not offer a DPA that covers the Fonts CDN. While Google promises that it doesn't use the personal data collected in this context in any nefarious way, there are zero contractual guarantees for website providers. So we have to consider the scenario when the embed-provider is an independent data controller. We as the website provider have no control over what the embed-provider does with the collected data, our control only extends to whether or not we cause the website to disclose data to that third party. But this is still processing as personal data (see also the CJEU Fashion ID case), and we need a legal basis for this data sharing. In the Google Fonts case, the court in Munich found that there was no legal basis for using Google's CDN. There was no consent, no contractual necessity, and no necessity for a legitimate interest. After all, these fonts could all be self-hosted. (Technical remark: and given how modern browsers enforce cache isolation and provide HTTP/2, serving fonts from your main domain is probably faster anyway). Consent management services will typically act as your data processor. You don't need a legal basis for “sharing” data with them, because the processing remains under your control. As far as the GDPR is concerned, loading a script from your processor's servers is equivalent to loading a script from your own servers (which you're probably hosting via a another data processor anyway). Sometimes, the necessary data processing agreement is already part of the standard terms of service, sometimes it's a separate document that has to be signed. Figuring this out is your responsibility as the data controller, before deploying the service. Art 6 GDPR doesn't say that you always need consent. It says that you need a legal basis, for which paragraph 1 enumerates six choices. For a lot of use cases, a “legitimate interest” will be appropriate, though it requires a balancing test. Sometimes, other laws mandate that you use a particular legal basis. For example, the ePrivacy Directive says that you must get GDPR-consent when accessing or storing information on the user's device (such as cookies), unless that access/storage is strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user. | It seems that A is the data controller and X is a data processor who processes personal data on behalf of A, and will only use the data as instructed by A. This will be formalized by a contract/data processing agreement per Art 28 GDPR, which is probably meant here by a “order processing contract”. The Art 33 GDPR responsibility to notify the supervisory authority in the event of a data breach lies solely with the data controller A, not the processor X. However, the processor X is required to notify the controller A “without undue delay”. | No GDPR applies to people (not just citizens) who are in the EU. It has no applicability if both parties are not in the EU. | Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario. |
How can one reliably find out if there is an open UK arrest warrant or inquiry about them, without visiting a police station? Can police lie about it? 101 is the united-kingdom's non-emergency police phone number. Would they ever lead you to believe when asking outright on the phone whether you have any warrants or circulations that all is well when that wasn't actually the case? More broadly, what is the legality of police lying to people while on duty in the UK? Update (on behalf of OP) Its been suggested in comments, that this may be a useful alternative phrasing of the question to add here: "I want to find out if there is a UK arrest warrant, wanted status, or open inquiry of any kind on police records, about me. Apart from physically visiting a police station with ID, is there a safe or easy way to get this information? (And also, can those I ask, deceive me about it?)" The original question title was : "If one calls 101 (police line) and asks if one is wanted or has an open arrest warrant in the UK, could the line operator conceivably deceive them?" | The role of the 101 call handlers is to assist with enquiries and to progress reports of non-emergency incidents - not deceive. They are not (usually) police officers do not (routinely) have access to PNC. Even if they did, they are under no obligation to divulge potentially operationally-sensitive and/or personal information over the phone; especially as the caller's identity cannot be verified. In response to comments and the OP edit on 09/03/2022... The police will not confirm if you are wanted on warrant over the phone. You must attend your local police station and bring some form of identification with you such as a passport, driving licence or birth certificate. Source1 You can find your local police force here 1A random example taken from one of the 43 territorial police forces in england-and-wales | You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on. | In most jurisdictions a peace officer can arrest anyone they have: a warrant to arrest probable cause to arrest, that is, a reasonable belief that that person has committed a crime They (and others) will conduct investigations to determine if they believe they can secure a conviction. If they do they will lay charges and justice will steer it's majestic course to conviction or acquittal. | No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that. | It's illegal if the intent is to deceive. Under S50(1) of the Police Act 1996: Any person who with intent to deceive impersonates a member of a police force or special constable, or makes any statement or does any act calculated falsely to suggest that he is such a member or constable, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. Their intent would need to be proven. It will be fact-specific; in some cases far easier to prove than in others. The criminal justice system is overburdened and underfunded so it is no surprise that these trolling videos are given no priority whatsoever. Further complicating the matter is the need to correctly identify the individual to prosecute. Doing so would require a fair amount of police time, time that could perhaps be spent on more urgent priorities given the relative lack of harm these videos are doing compared to more serious crimes. However, in this video (Would You Help a Police Officer Having An Asthma Attack?) an S50(2) offence would seem to have been committed by the actor wearing the police clothing: Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. It does appear that both offences are being committed in these various videos, and the only reason people aren't being prosecuted is practical: there are more serious crimes to focus on, and the police would need to identify who exactly committed this crime--given these all happened at least two years ago, it would be challenging to say the least. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. Under S5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, wasting police time is a criminal offence. Bringing proceedings in court requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) since those proceedings could have a chilling effect on the propensity of the public to report genuine matters to the police in the future. It is likely that while "wasteful employment" of police time was caused by these people, so committing the offence, it is likely viewed simply as "part and parcel" of the job and the officer likely didn't spend any time at all investigating the confessions (depending on their nature). Of course, even if the officer did spend time investigating the false confessions, the DPP would need to give their consent so unless the person has a demonstrated history of doing this (that would stand up in court) or the time wasted was of a particularly serious nature (e.g. the man who falsely claimed to be the Yorkshire Ripper), it seems unlikely consent would be granted. | Neither with or without a warrant, if the confession is all there is. For a felony, the question is whether there is probable cause (4th Amendment). This is true whether the police arrest you, or they get a warrant – the difference being that in the latter case the warrant is issued by a guy with much greater knowledge of what constitutes probable cause. The question then would be whether a confession alone constitutes probable cause. There is a venerable rule, the corpus delecti rule (300+ years old) that requires there to be independent evidence of a crime, the point of this rule being to to prevent mentally ill people from being convicted of a crime that never even happened. Under that rule, a confession alone would not be probable cause (but a confession and a bloody glove could be). This article reports that at the federal level and in 10 states, there is a lower bar of mere "corroboration" without the need to argue that there was an actual crime. Exemplifying this relaxing of the traditional rule, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, the court held that "[a]n accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required". However, "[t]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti" and "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". In such jurisdictions, courts take a "totality of circumstances" approach focusing on whether the confession is trustworthy. | Yes. The police have the power to seize your phone as evidence under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Terrorism Act 2000. There are no caveats or defined circumstances other than having a reasonable belief that the data on the phone forms evidence against you. They do not require a warrant to access your phone, and many police forces in the UK are using commercially available software to bypass password/PIN protection on your phone 1. In the event you do not provide your password/thumbprint/facial scan/PIN to officers to unlock your phone, you can be served with a Section 49 Notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) which compels you to provide that information. Failure to do so can lead to a conviction under Section 53 RIPA, in addition to any other offences you may be charged with. | Does said police department have any obligation to ID, investigate and detain / arrest the false caller? No. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 (2005). Usually, police do investigate, but that is a matter of department policy and political expectations, not a legal obligation to do so. |
GDPR and hotlinked images: are they allowed? By opening this question, you have automatically sent some data to some random website on the internet, the website hosting the above picture. What data? This is the data that is usually sent: Your IP A cookie The URL you are visiting (the URL of this question) Your user-agent (typically including OS version, browser version, etc.) The time when you first saw this picture (header: if-modified-since) This can definitely be personal data according to the GDPR, and in practice in most cases it is. ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; That data is sent somewhere automatically. Did you see any privacy policies? Did you accept anything? No, you don't know how that data will be used. Of course it could be sent to a stupid random website, that will never use it for anything. Or it could be sent to a big corporation, or to a content delivery network, or any website that is big enough to be able to track you with this data, because they have a lot of services (or just hotlinked images) around spread all over the web. Note: the data is actually sent to Imgur, which I believe would definitely be able to track you, given the huge amount of pictures on the internet that link to them. I've always seen people mainly worried about third-party assets (Google Analytics or Facebook buttons, etc.), some also began to worry about Google Fonts (that's a third-party asset too actually), but I don't think anybody ever brought up the issue of hotlinked images. That's third-party stuff. And communities like this one are basically allowing users to embed third party assets. Who's responsible for this? Is it the user's fault, because they should always make sure the image source complies with the GDPR? I doubt it. The website owner's fault (Stackexchange), because they should not allow hotlinking? I'd say yeah, probably. Or the third-party website's fault, for not complying with the GDPR? I'd say no, for all we know they could be based in a country that doesn't even know what the GDPR is. So my conclusion is that hotlinking should be treated like loading a third-party asset, and if the website owner cannot check the privacy policies of every hotlinked image (for example because it would be impossible in a community like this one), then unsupervised hotlinking should be disabled because the GDPR does not allow it. Am I wrong? | You don't need to get consent to comply with GDPR Lawfulness of processing Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Sending a http request to a website falls under 6(1)(f). | The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is processing the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data. You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not necessarily a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have no other basis for data processing, you have to delete. Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to actively contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult. But consider that the news media can process some data about some people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time. | Yes, you can use such eye tracking if you obtain consent in a suitable manner. But obtaining consent is going to be very difficult for you. The processing activity in question occurs within the context of an EU establishment of the data controller. Thus, GDPR applies regardless of where the data subjects are located. Under GDPR, any processing activity needs a clear purpose and a legal basis. Typical legal bases are necessity for performing a contract with the data subject, legal obligations, a legitimate interest, or consent. Conditions for consent are listed in Art 7 GDPR. Once your have a purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can collect the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. For example, let's assume that the purpose is a scientific study for which gaze tracking is necessary. The study's subjects can be informed about the context of the study, about how the data will be used, and can then be asked for consent for proceeding. Of course, participation in the study is only possible when consent is given. This is perfectly fine as far as the GDPR is concerned. But things might be more difficult when data is used for a different purpose, for example in order to track user interests in a web shop. You do have a legitimate interest in optimizing the website, but this interest likely doesn't outweigh the user's privacy interests. Legitimate interest always requires a careful balancing test. If the user cannot reasonably expect the data collection to happen, that is an indication that consent would be a better legal basis than legitimate interest. Accessing a camera feed means accessing information stored on the end user's device. Per the ePrivacy directive, this requires consent regardless of whether the information in question is personal data. Cookies, mouse pointer tracking, or eye tracking with a camera are all equivalent in this regard. Consent must be specific, informed, and freely given. It is an unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes, and must involve some clear statement or affirmative action. Prior to starting the eye tracking, you must provide sufficient information about what is happening, and must make it possible to easily decline consent. You cannot bundle unrelated consent together (e.g. eye tracking consent + cookie consent). You cannot make access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. E.g. a web shop does not need camera access, but an augmented reality does. Still, consent must be specific so consent for AR purposes can probably not be used to authorize eye tracking, which might need separate consent. Browsers do not grant camera access by default, and instead show a permission dialogue where the user can allow access or block further requests. This permission dialogue cannot replace your compliance obligations such as providing the necessary information so that the user can make an informed choice. Since GDPR requires that consent is freely given and can be declined, you might find it difficult to convince anyone to give consent to this fairly invasive tracking procedure. You might be able to incentivize consent e.g. with small discounts on a web shop, but the incentive must remain small enough that there really is a free choice between giving or declining consent. The EDPB has issued guidelines that are relevant to your scenario. These guidelines are not law, but are well-reasoned official interpretations that are frequently cited by courts. Guidelines 05/2020 on consent Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices Practically speaking, I doubt you will find eye tracking to be useful. First, you can likely achieve your purposes through less invasive means. Recall that the GDPR only allows you to process the minimum data necessary to achieve a purpose. Second, eye tracking is difficult for technical reasons. Bad lighting and weird angles make it difficult to obtain a useful feed. Cameras might be in different positions relative to the browser window, so that the eye tracking would have to be calibrated before acquiring data. Eye tracking typically involves processing the video feed on the user's device, but this is computationally expensive that will make the website unusable on lower-end devices, in particular mobile devices. And of course, many PCs don't have a camera in the first place. | First of all, although the GDPR is stated to apply to any site which processes the data of any person who is in the EU, it is not clear how a site not located in the EU, does not business in the EU, and does not primarily target EU residents as its audience can be required to comply with the GDPR. To the best of my knowledge, no such case has yet been brought, much less decided. There has also been some debate on whether an IP address constitutes Personal Data under the GDPR, and if it always does so, or only under particular conditions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that (under the predecessor Directive 95/46/EC) that a dynamic IP address was personal data. But in that case the web site was run by the German Federal Government, which surely has wider scope for getting info from a German ISP than a small private US web activist does. There is not yet any case law that I know of on the applicability of the GDPR to IP addresses in any case at all similar to the one in the question. Joe would in my view be wise to at least learn that logs are being kept, and post a disclosure of this on the site. Whether Joe needs to do more than that is less than clear at this time. | Simply use a cookie to store consent. First consider the opposite. If a user does not agree to store cookies, a cookie is the only way to remember this, as you want to avoid a new pop-up on every page-load. Because this use of a cookie is functional, you don't need permission to store that cookie. You seem have the impression that you have to prove towards the ICO if someone has provided consent. However I think it would be sufficient if you can demonstrate how your website works technically. In particular whether consent is handled properly. You might need to create screenshots or a screencast to do so. Add new proof after each major update of your website. Storing consent server-side would violate the data minimization principle of the GDPR I think. In particular because you would need to do something to be able to identify users. That would violate Art. 11(1) GDPR: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Notice it is possible to configure google analytics in a way so you don't need any consent. See my answer to this question. Just IP anonymization is not sufficient. | Can you anonymise people It is valid to anonymise the data of people, instead of deleting all of the records. The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Source As long as the person is not identifiable, then you do not need to treat the data as personal under the GDPR. You do have to inform a person once they are no longer identifiable, and be able to identify them if they provide the missing information: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. Source The articles covered by this are: 15 - Right of Access 16 - Right to rectification 17 - Right to erasure 18 - Right to restrict processing 19 - Right to be informed 20 - Right to data portability | First of all, in a GDPR contest, the process described is not strong anonymization. It may be hard for an outsider to go from the stored record to any PII, it is much easier for an outsider to "single out" an individual. This means that given a known individual, one can determine whether that person is among those listed in the records, or can determine this to a significant degree of probability. For this only the algorithm and the rotating salts are needed, one need not break the hash. Note also that the GDPR specifies that if a person can be singled out with the assistance of the site operator the data is not considered anonymized. Thus this data needs a lawful basis under the GDPR, and the various other GDPR requirement all apply. However, even if the data were totally anonymized, and say just added to a count of users with this or that User Agent, the process of reading local data (including but not limited to cookies) itself requires informed consent, and so a cookie banner or other interaction with similar info under the e-Privacy directive (EPD). The EPD, being a directive and not a regulation, must be implemented by national laws, and the exact provisions in those laws may differ somewhat from country to country. But I believe that all of them require consent before any local data is read. | Is it GDPR compliant that I can't access the account that I created and the personal data that I shared because "I haven't completed their internal pre-qualification process"? Article 15 defines a “Right of access to the data subject” but it's difficult to see how this could be construed as a right to log into a specific website. Common sense suggests this would be a very bad idea. If they are willing to provide the data through another means (say a report or data dump of some sort), the obligation would seem to be met. In fact, article 15(3) even states that data controllers should merely provide the information in a “commonly used electronic form” (i.e. not necessarily through access to their systems or whatever form they are using internally for the processing). Have you asked for that and would you be satisfied by that resolution? Is it GDPR compliant that their answer to my deletion request is "We will delete the data..." The text of article 17 (right to erasure) explicitly specifies that such a request must be honored without “undue delay”. Article 12, which defines some of the modalities for the rights to access, rectification or erasure by the data subject, also provides that controllers shall “provide information on action taken on a request […] without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request”. You haven't provided any time frame and I don't think there is anything wrong with acknowledging the request by promising they “will” do it but in light of article 12, it seems you would indeed be entitled to know once they have actually taken further action. However, you implied you might want to access the data first and it's not clear to me whether you explicitly invoked the GDPR in earlier communications. So I would clarify and reiterate my request (access or erasure) and ask them for explicit confirmation once it has been satisfied. |
Are internet forum posts considered personal data under GDPR? GDPR defines "personal data" as any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; By that definition, it sounds like anything a user writes on a website that requires registration (even if with only an email and a password) is to be considered personal data, even if that data is meant to be public like in the case of internet forum posts, even if the post content is just a simple opinion, thought, or story. Is this correct? Or are there any specific cases where forum posts might not be treated as personal data? | In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization. | The California CCPA, Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (CDPA), and the Colorado Privacy Act (CPA) all use definitions of "personal information" (PI) very similar to that used by the GDPR, and the arguments which have been applied to classify an IP address as Personal Data under the GDPR could logically be used under each of those laws. For example this official page gives the CCPA definition as: Personal information is information that identifies, relates to, or could reasonably be linked with you or your household. For example, it could include your name, social security number, email address, records of products purchased, internet browsing history, geolocation data, fingerprints, and inferences from other personal information that could create a profile about your preferences and characteristics. Note that IP addresses are not specifically mentioned, nor are "online identifiers" a key term under the GDPR. But an IP address often provides geolocation data, which is mentioned. The April 2020 article "Are IP addresses 'personal information' under CCPA?" from The Privacy Advisor by IAPP says: For many businesses, the collection of IP addresses provides multiple benefits from monitoring website traffic to advertising, tracking and deterring malicious activity. But are IP addresses “reasonably capable” of being associated with or “linked” to an individual or household? If not, do they still “relate[] to” or “describe” a consumer or household? These questions are critical to address, because if IP addresses are considered to be “personal information,” then businesses may find themselves subject to additional obligations under the CCPA or forced to rethink how they handle IP addresses as part of their online business. ... The CCPA’s definition of personal information expressly contemplates including IP addresses. An IP address alone may not allow a business to identify a particular consumer or household; however, in many — if not most — cases, an ISP can link an IP address with a name, home address, phone number, email address and even payment information. ... ... On Feb. 10, the California attorney general issued its first set of modifications to its proposed CCPA regulations. These modifications included the following guidance: [I]f a business collects the IP addresses of visitors to its websites but does not link the IP address to any particular consumer or household, and could not reasonably link the IP address with a particular consumer or household, then the IP address would not be ‘personal information. The article goes on to explore the implications of that proposed regulation, saying: In other words, if the business did not link the IP address to a consumer or household, and the business could not reasonably link the IP address with a particular consumer or household, the IP address would not be personal information. This interpretation aligns with the reality that even if businesses wished to link IP addresses to individuals or households, many would lack the information needed to do so themselves and would be unlikely to succeed in compelling an ISP to do so for them However, the regulation quoted above was removed in the March 2020 draft of the proposed regulations and did not appear in the (PDF) Final Regulations, issued in August 2020. The IAPP article goes on to discuss the ECJ case Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland in which the Court held that IP addresses were personal information in that instance. The article mentions that: Ultimately, the court held the website provider had the means likely reasonably to tie dynamic IP addresses back to individuals because it had legal means for compelling ISPs to do so. Therefore, it held that dynamic IP addresses collected by a publicly accessible website constituted personal data “in relation to that provider.” What the article does not specifically mention, and several other published comments relying on the Breyer decision do not discuss was that in that particular case the website was operated by the government of Germany, which has legal powers to require any ISP operating in Germany to disclose IP assignments. That means that in that particular case IP addresses were potentially linkable by the Data Controller of the site, in ways which would not be available to a non-government site. There does not seem to have been an official decision under any of these laws, including the GDPR, as to whether an IP address is PI for an ordinary business site. The downloadable Privacy Law Comparison matrix compares various aspects of the CCPA, CDPA, CPA, and the GDPR, including their definitions of PI. In short it is not clear to what extant any of the other privacy laws mentioned in the question or in this answer treat an IP address as personal information (PI), particularly when the site is not operated by a government agency, and has no right to compel an ISP to provide data linking an IP address to a specific user. Future litigation may well clarify this. | If you merely provide software for your client to use, you are not processing personal data on behalf of the client. But if you have access to systems that store personal data, then you must consider the GDPR. Or more accurately: your client must consider the GDPR. Under what legal basis can they give you access to the data in these systems? The easiest way to solve this is indeed if you act as the client's processor. Processor status is never the default, but requires a binding contract with the data controller. This contract will require you to only process personal data as explicitly instructed by the client, and may require you to take certain security measures as a precaution. Without such a contract you aren't a data processor, but possibly a data controller of your own (with all the compliance obligations that implies). | The GDPR doesn't generally distinguish public from non-public personal data. If you have a good reason to contact the professor, do send them an email. GDPR does not prevent this. If you're sending this email for “purely personal or household purposes”, then GDPR doesn't apply anyway. There are rules in the ePrivacy Directive against unsolicited emails, but these specifically relate to emails for direct marketing purposes. A company is not allowed to send out spam marketing, regardless of whether they obtained the email address from a public data source. Companies can send email marketing to their own existing customers, or to people who have given consent. Consent is defined in a fairly restrictive way (as a specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes), so that mere publication of an email address cannot be interpreted as consent to receive marketing from a particular company. | Is it GDPR compliant that I can't access the account that I created and the personal data that I shared because "I haven't completed their internal pre-qualification process"? Article 15 defines a “Right of access to the data subject” but it's difficult to see how this could be construed as a right to log into a specific website. Common sense suggests this would be a very bad idea. If they are willing to provide the data through another means (say a report or data dump of some sort), the obligation would seem to be met. In fact, article 15(3) even states that data controllers should merely provide the information in a “commonly used electronic form” (i.e. not necessarily through access to their systems or whatever form they are using internally for the processing). Have you asked for that and would you be satisfied by that resolution? Is it GDPR compliant that their answer to my deletion request is "We will delete the data..." The text of article 17 (right to erasure) explicitly specifies that such a request must be honored without “undue delay”. Article 12, which defines some of the modalities for the rights to access, rectification or erasure by the data subject, also provides that controllers shall “provide information on action taken on a request […] without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request”. You haven't provided any time frame and I don't think there is anything wrong with acknowledging the request by promising they “will” do it but in light of article 12, it seems you would indeed be entitled to know once they have actually taken further action. However, you implied you might want to access the data first and it's not clear to me whether you explicitly invoked the GDPR in earlier communications. So I would clarify and reiterate my request (access or erasure) and ask them for explicit confirmation once it has been satisfied. | No, GDPR does not apply here — but other laws might . The General Data Protection Regulation only concerns itself with the following: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. per Article 2. Furthermore, there is a specific exemption (Art. 2 (2)(c)) which would seem to apply to you (emphasis mine): This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; (b) by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU; (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; (d) by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. You are sharing the conversation in a purely personal capacity and are not processing it wholly or partly through automated means nor are you intending it to form part of a filing system. Additionally, depending on the contents of the conversation and what you share, there may not be any personal data involved at all. For example, if you only share the messages themselves (and they don't contain any personal data that could identify someone) and censor/black out any names or photographs/avatars from the senders. Either way, GDPR does not appear to apply to you in this context. However, it appears that Article 18.1 of the Spanish Constitution grants the right to "personal and family privacy", as does the Organic Act 1/982 on Civil Protection of the Right to Honour, Personal and Family Privacy, and Self-Image. It's possible that, depending on the contents of the conversation, the other party involved in the conversation may have a case for action against you in the civil or criminal courts (for example, if the information invades their privacy or is defamatory in some way) if you share the contents of the conversation with someone else. I am not familiar with Spanish law so cannot comment further on this matter. | Generating a list of all possible numbers doesn't sound like it would constitute personal data any more than listing all dates for the last hundred years as a "possible date of birth" would. However, the moment anyone linked even one of the numbers with any other personal data - for example a name - they would be bound by GDPR and would need to show a Lawful Basis for processing the data. [If you linked your own name you could presumably argue Consent, but anyone else's would need to have an associated Lawful Basis.] | There is no requirement about "data" in the GDPR, so provided this is just "data", no. An empty form with fields for personal data contains no personal data. On the other hand, if the form is filled in by the user with personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4), and you receive a copy of the filled in form and process these personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4) - then the answer is: Yes. However, if you do not process the personal data (i.e. the form is just printed out on paper and filled in with a pen, and nobody except the data subject has access to the piece of paper with the filled in form - then the answer again is "no"). |
When can a lawyer choose what to work on? Must they think they have a chance at success? I used to work for a very large company had it's own legal division. If the company wanted to sue someone but the lawyers didn't think they had a good chance to win, must the lawyers still work to accomplish this? I am part of a union where many members' work has been heavily affected by COVID. The members' views and opinions are very divided. Where I live there certainly has been talk that some unions may be sued for failing to protect their members against employer COVID policies. My union hired a team of lawyers who they have a long standing relationship with. They were tasked to review legalities of employer COVID policies. I think they called these lawyers "outside counsel", does this mean they are not part of the same organization so (in theory) their advice and position is objective and neutral? The principal lawyer said that members are free to consult legal council of their own choosing and no retribution would happen for it. A member had hired a lawyer with an opposing view to the union's lawyers. Would this other lawyer necessarily have to agree with this view or believe there is a chance at success (e.g. proving it's illegal discrimination to have a COVID policy in the workplace)? | I think they called these lawyers "outside counsel", does this mean they are not part of the same organization so (in theory) their advice and position is objective and neutral? Not really. The economics of the arrangement are different, but outside counsel is not more or less objective and neutral, in theory at least, than in house counsel. Outside counsel and in house counsel owe essentially the same duties in the context of a lawyer-client relationship to the client (in this case, the union), although, in practice, outside counsel with evaluate those duties and that relationship in the context of a single one off assignment, while in house counsel will evaluate those duties with a much richer understanding of the underlying facts of a matter and the larger context in which it is playing out. A lawyer's duty is to advance the objectives of the client, and those objective are largely within the province of the client and not the lawyer, although a lawyer has greater latitude in exercise discretion regarding the means by which this objective is achieved. For example, a client could legitimately say that it wants to bring a lawsuit arising out of an incident it was involved in, but the lawyer would usually decide which court it was filed in, what specific legal claims were asserted, and so on. [If] the lawyers didn't think they had a good chance to win, must the lawyers still work to accomplish this? There are a few boundary lines, short of resigning or withdrawing from representation when not legally or ethically required to do so, because the lawyer simply doesn't want to do it. First, the lawyer isn't allowed to bring groundless, frivolous, or vexatious litigation, or otherwise engage in unethical conduct (e.g. fraud), even if the client wants to do so. Second, if a lawyer with an organization as a client (like a union) believes that someone within the organization, possibly with some authority, is about to engage in illegal activity that will hurt the organization, the lawyer has a duty to speak up (internally) about this conduct and urge the client representative not to break the law, if necessary, going up as high in the management or governance of the company as necessary (e.g. up to the highest governing board or CEO) to blow the whistle on this conduct internally within the organization, and to resign if the lawyer can't otherwise avoid being involved in illegal conduct by representatives of the organization. Third, the lawyer must counsel the client representative in a manner sufficient to make the client's decision to pursue a court of action that is unlikely to win, but is not groundless, frivolous, vexatious, or illegal, an informed decision. But, if the client decides to go forward with a course of action or objective after making an informed decision to do so with information provided by the lawyer, the lawyer has to do his or her best to carry out the decision of the client even if it would not have been the decision that the lawyer would have made. The lawyer is still an agent of the client, carrying out the client's wishes, not an entirely independent free actor. A member had hired a lawyer with an opposing view to the union's lawyers. Would this other lawyer necessarily have to agree with this view or believe there is a chance at success (e.g. proving it's illegal discrimination to have a COVID policy in the workplace)? Again, no. Lawyers don't have to agree personally with the positions that they take on behalf of their clients, so long as those positions are not groundless, frivolous, or vexatious litigation, and the lawyer's work does not otherwise engage in unethical conduct (e.g. fraud), it isn't improper for the lawyer to do that. To provide some context for why these rules are the case, keep in mind that lawyers are in the business, primarily, of dealing with situations in which there are potential ambiguities or uncertainties in the law. Lawyers, judges, and courts recognize that the law and language are pliable and subject to interpretation and application to a set of facts and that it is very frequently (although not always) possible to make legitimate arguments for different interpretations of it. And, it is hard, in advance, to know which of multiple different interpretations will wind up being found to be correct (with many legal issues in a case often never having those ambiguities resolved in that case because some other factor ends up making the ambiguous issues irrelevant). Lawyers exist to make sure that every legitimate interpretation that benefits a represented party involved in an interaction to which the law applies is given fair consideration, with someone else generally making the final decision about what to do. | Article 640 of the Italian Penal Code under the heading "Crimes against property by fraud" begins (via Google Translate): Anyone who, by artifice or deceit, by misleading someone, procures an unfair profit to himself... And the article (cited by the OP in a comment) says the suspect... ...worked in the health sector and had been suspended from his job because he had refused to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The jab is mandatory for all health workers. So, it seems the allegation is that he intended to "profit" by gaining a COVID-19 vaccine certificate and therefore unjust employment after attempting to use the silicone patch to deceive the health worker. Edit following @jkej's comment observing that the alleged unfair profit was never actually procured. The more likely charge - depending on the actual evidence - would seem to fall under Article 56 which begins under the heading Crime Attempted (again via Google Translate): Whoever carries out suitable acts, directed in an unequivocal way to commit a crime, is liable for an attempted crime, if the action is not carried out or the event does not occur. | Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court. | Choice of law (also called conflict of laws) arises when a legal dispute occurs across legal boundaries. For example, suppose I live in New York, and sign a contract to buy computers from you, a company headquartered in California. If we have a dispute about the contract, we need to decide which state's law and which courts (and juries) will be used to resolve the dispute. The law that applies to our dispute is called the applicable or governing law. In many cases, it doesn’t matter which law or court we use. But in some cases, it matters a lot. For example, the California law may be friendlier to customers, or a jury in New York may be friendlier to me than to a California companies. Since we know that the choice of law and court may matter, we may specify in the contract which laws and courts will be used to resolve any disputes. (These may not be the same. The contract could say that our case will be heard in the SDNY using CA law.) The clause that says which laws apply, and which courts will apply them, is called a governing or applicable law clause. Here’s an example many of us have used, probably without realizing it: APPLICABLE LAW By using any Amazon Service, you agree that the Federal Arbitration Act, applicable federal law, and the laws of the state of Washington, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Conditions of Use and any dispute of any sort that might arise between you and Amazon. | Disclaimer: I am not familiar with US law, so this answer is from a general perspective. It should apply in most jurisdictions, though. Are there any laws or regulations which I can use to convince a hospital's billing department to talk to me, despite the fact that they have a clear policy otherwise? No, I don't think so. A company or organization is generally free to decide for themselves who will or will not communicate with you - I don't think there is any law giving you a right to choose. How would this even work? What if the people you ask to talk to are overworked, on vacation or just not qualified? However - you do have another, more important right: To be considered valid, a bill must provide credible evidence that the charges are justified. You cannot just ask someone to give you money, you must actually provide a reason why you are owed money. In this case, this means the hospital must send you a bill that you can understand and verify. To get this: First, stop bugging them over the phone. Once a point is reached where legal action seems likely (like in your case), any information you get is only really useful to you when in writing. So do everything in writing. It's fine to talk to them if it helps solve the problem - but insist on getting things in writing afterwards. The first thing you need to write is a formal letter that you refuse to accept the bill, because you cannot verify it. Outline in details what parts you cannot understand/verify, and ask for the information you need (such as what the codes mean). Once you have received a satisfatory explanation of the bill (which may take multiple letters), you go through it with a fine comb, and dispute any items that you think are unjustified. You may need the help of a lawyer to exercise these steps, but in principle you can probably do it on your own, too. Whether you get a lawyer is ultimately a trade-off (making a mistake may cost you money, but hiring a lawyer costs money, too). A first consultation with a lawyer is probably not too costly (ask first!), and may help you to decide whether you need more assistance. | If no such challenge has occurred to this day, who could potentially have a standing to bring it to court? Beside ohwilleke's points, such a challenge would only seem viable if the imposed timeframe for finding new job (60 days) was practically not sufficient to secure one for a person eligible for a H1B visa. These visas are not granted to random people most of which would struggle to find a job in the US. They are granted to qualified specialty occupation holders — taking into account the market demand for particular occupations/skills. The expectation is that H1B visa holders should not have trouble finding jobs and, if fired, should be able to secure a new job in a matter of few weeks. If they cannot do so it means they are not in demand, which means they no longer fit the visa grant criteria and therefore should leave. With the above in mind, "the power to coerce workers" is legally just bargaining power, not threat or force. The workers are welcome to accept offered conditions, or take chance to find better ones in 60 days if they think they are skilled and demanded enough. And if they do not think that, they should not be in the country on H1B visa in the first place. | When they start giving legal advice ... unless your PA is a lawyer. In a nutshell, legal advice has the following characteristics: Requires legal knowledge, skill, education and judgment Applies specific law to a particular set of circumstances Affects someone's legal rights or responsibilities Creates rights and responsibilities in the advice-giver Unlike legal information - such as information posted on a street sign - legal advice proposes a specific course of action a client should take. For instance, it's the difference between telling someone what to do (legal advice) as opposed to how to do it (legal information). For your specific questions Can they research the CC&Rs, Bylaws or other such states, federal statues to help me better understand the letter? Researching and even summarising is not legal advice. If they give opinions on what you should do as a result of that research it is legal advice. Can they write up a response letter that I would look at and approve ... Yes ... or if minor enough they could just respond? It depends on what's involved. If it is a purely factual response ("Is this your car?") then this is ok. If it is legal advocacy, it isn't. Putting aside the legalities; how does your PA feel about you suing them if they stuff any of this up? If I was your PA, I wouldn't be acting as your agent without an indemnity. | As I understand it, the legal distinction here is: Whose choice was it that you not continue in your job? If the company was prepared to offer you an extension, until you told them that you were not interested, you are leaving of your own free will, and would not be entitled to redundancy rights. If your employer did not extend the contract when you would have been willing to continue, that is either a redundancy, or a dismissal of another kind. If you were dismissed for valid cause, you have no redundancy rights. if you were let go because of a lack of work, or because the employer decided not to have anyone doing that job, that I gather would be redundancy. |
Warrants and avoiding jail Is there a way to take care of a warrant without being arrested if there is an amount attached to the warrant for unpaid fine? | It depends on the jurisdiction and a lot of other factors you haven't addressed. In the United States, though, there are many circumstances where one could pay the fine and then simply appear in court to ask for the warrant to be lifted. The smart play, of course, is to hire a lawyer to handle it. | Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch. | Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No. | Police have discretion in the enforcement of the law Which is to say, police get to decide which crimes they make arrests for, which they handle with warnings, which they report and which they ignore. This applies whether they are in uniform, undercover or off-duty. If they abuse this discretion then they are liable to disciplinary action. If they apply it corruptly or otherwise illegally then they are liable to criminal sanction. | This violation of KRS 511.080, criminal trespass in the third degree, is a "violation", which results in a fine not more than $250. The fine shall not be imposed if he is indigent pursuant to KRS Chapter 31. | Texas law on parking offenses is Ch. 682 of the Transportation code. After you work through the sections on creating ordinances and having a hearing, we get to enforcement in §682.010 – you have been ordered, at the hearing, to pay a fine. Enforcement can be by (1) impounding the vehicle if the offender has committed three or more vehicle parking or stopping offenses in a calendar year; (2) placing a device on the vehicle that prohibits movement of the motor vehicle; (3) imposing an additional fine if the original fine is not paid within a specified time; (4) denying issuance of or revoking a parking or operating permit, as applicable; or (5) filing an action to collect the fine, cost, or fee in a court of competent jurisdiction. (b) An action to collect a fine, cost, or fee under Subsection (a)(5) must be brought: (1) in the name of the municipality served by the hearing officer; and (2) in a county in which all or part of that municipality is located. The first 4 options do not require further legal process, they just do it (small claims court cannot order seizure of a vehicle). To get money from you, they have to go to court, and it can be any court in that county. The Houston ordinance does not add anything beyond saying what kind of parking is forbidden and what the fine is. Texas law doesn't go beyond saying "court of competent jurisdiction". Small claims court functions to make a basic legal determination that a party owes money, but that determination has already been made in the case of a traffic fine. Enforcement would be obtained through justice court. | No If the police want to arrest you your legal obligation is to submit and, if the arrest was a violation of your rights, pursue a legal remedy afterwards. You do not have a right to resist an arrest even if that arrest is without legal basis. "Resisting arrest" is a specific crime with a specific definition. For example, in new-south-wales it is in s546c of the Crimes Act 1900 and it says: Any person who resists or hinders or incites any person to assault, resist or hinder a police officer in the execution of his or her duty shall be liable on conviction before the Local Court to imprisonment for 12 months or to a fine of 10 penalty units, or both. If you are charged with resisting arrest the state needs to prove each element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If they can't do that the charge will be dismissed. If they can prove it then you may have a defence to resisting arrest if: you did not know that the person was a police officer or you did not know that you were being arrested if the police officer was not acting lawfully. However, a police officer will be acting lawfully even if the arrest is subsequently found to be unlawful provided they are acting in good faith and without malice. Suspecting you of committing a crime even if you didn’t makes it lawful to arrest you. | If A reasonably suspects that B committed a felony, A may arrest B, which means that A may also use reasonable force to detain B. They can also arrest for a misdemeanor committed in their presence, if it constituted a breach of peace. It is, of course, up to A to be correct that the act is a felony or a breach of peace, and to know what is reasonable force. If your arrest is in fact not lawful, you may be sued (battery or false imprisonment) or prosecuted (battery or unlawful imprisonment). Punching a person in the shoulder is the felony of battery, and direct observation creates highly reasonable suspicion. In such circumstances, anyone could have arrested the child. Unlike a police arrest, a citizen is not required to Mirandize an arrested suspect. This memo summarizes citizens arrest law including case law for Washington state. The right to perform citizen's arrest is statutorily recognized as a defense under RCW 9A.16.020 The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: ...(2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody |
Removal of Content under creative commons I wrote content for 2 years on a website licensed under creative commons license CC-SA-BY 3.0. The community has become increasingly toxic and abusive and I no longer wished to be affiliated with the project. Upon requesting that my content be removed from the site the admin refused claiming that it was community property, before the owner claimed that I didnt write it and that he can do anything he wants with it according to creative commons. Is there legal action I can take to have my content removed from the site? I have drafts to prove that I am in fact the original author. | You can't Under clause 7(b) of the CC-SA-BY 3.0 the licence is irrevocable providing that the licensee complies with its terms. However, ... It appears that your work is part of a Collection (as defined and under clause 4(a), the licensee has this obligation: If You create a Collection, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the Collection any credit as required by Section 4(c), as requested. While you cannot have your work removed, you can have the attribution removed so that no one knows that it is your work - this would seem to meet your desire of having no association with the website. "To the extent practicable" should include anonymising you. As a bonus, if they don't do this "to the extent practicable" then they are in breach of the licence and it's automatically revoked - you can then proceed with DCMA takedown notices and/or sue for copyright breach. | The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923. | You are not supposed to "explain" anything. See this site: http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/responding-dmca-takedown-notice-targeting-your-content What you have to do is to state, under penalty of perjury, that you have a good faith belief that your material was wrongly removed. That's it. Nothing more, nothing less. Google (or whoever the host is) doesn't care and shouldn't care about the actual copyright situation, only whether you supplied a counter notice where you state that your material was wrongly removed. Now Google should reinstate your app (however, since nobody can force them to host your app at all, I suspect they can remove it at any time for any reason), and whoever put in the DMCA claim can then go and sue you for copyright infringement. If they do, you can use as a defence that they could have and should have a DMCA notice to you. The whole DMCA is about your host, here: Google, to remove itself from any copyright infringement case. By following the rules for a proper notice and proper counter notice, they achieve that. And then the matter is between the complainant and you. | It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting". | Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need. | Am I as the user of this site in any way liable if the music turns out to violate copyright? Yes. In a similar way to if I give you “permission” to take my neighbour’s car. Only worse. Because stealing requires intent - you have to mean to do it - while copyright violation is strict liability - if you do it, you’re guilty. If the user that uploaded the item did not have the authority to give the site permission then the site does not have permission and neither do you. If you take reasonable precautions such as performing a reverse image source and verifying that the item appears to be owned by the same person everywhere and, perhaps, reaching out to them then your violation will be an “innocent” infringement which mitigates but does not eliminate damages. The only way to be sure with copyright is to know the provenance of the copyright/licences back to the original creator. | Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this. | You can design whatever this system is (leaving aside jurisdictions without First Amendment-like law that lets you design to your hearts content), the problem comes in implementing. The main legal question is whether you are operating a website. A website operator has to comply with various laws that require them to remove content. For example, if you operate a website that allows users to distribute content that they upload, they can distribute copyright-protected content, and you can be held liable for copyright infringement. DMCA in the US provides a way for you to not get sued, but you have to be able to remove putatively infringing content, so you could get sued if you can't remove illegal content. This may also include legal troubles over e.g. defamatory content where a plaintiff gets a court order to remove the content – you can't plead "I can't it down" if the court orders you to do so. Napster was sued for copyright infringement and racketeering for facilitating law-breaking by others ("secondary infringement"), and in MGM v. Grokster the Supreme Court annonced the general principle that One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses Grokster's problems arose because they clearly intended the software to be used to violate copyright law, whereas it is unlikely that Github will get sued because it is possible to use the platform illegally. So it really matters exactly what this "platform" is and what your relationship to the platform is. Describing a system is generally not illegal, realizing and maintaining one can easily be. |
Lawyer says bumping software’s minor version would cost $2k to “refile” copyright paperwork. Is this typical? I work at a small company as a software engineer. I have very little knowledge of copyright law, so forgive me for my naïveté. Recently, my company started filing paperwork and handing over several versions of our application’s source code to a lawyer so that we can… I don’t know, be protected by filing for a copyright? I am not directly involved with the copyright discussions, so my understanding is all secondhand. Our software uses a 4-part version number: {major}.{minor}.{autogenerated}.{autogenerated} The major version is pretty locked in at “2”, while the minor gets manually bumped periodically when new significant features get added. We were told by the lawyer that if we bump from “2.4…” to “2.5…” that they would have to refile the copyright or whatever, and that just doesn’t quite pass the smell test to me. Is the copyright really that fragile? Do all companies have to pay $2k (what the lawyer quoted us) to refile anytime they want to bump their minor version numbers? Just wondering if y’all can tell me if this is the norm or if we should push back/not worry about “refiling”. | The cost of filing a copyright for an updated filing would generally be the same as the original one. The amount of work isn't much different and there are good reasons why every new version of software sold on a large volume commercial basis should always have a new copyright registration for a new version of the software, which are essentially the same reasons you copyright the original version of the software in the first place. As noted by @DavidSiegel in a comment: A work is protected the moment it is "fixed in tangible form", but one cannot sue for infringement unless the work is already registered under 17 USC 411. Statutory damages, often important, are not available unless the work is registered before the infringement occurs, or within 3 months of publication, under 17 USC 412. $2,000 is on the high side for the work in the Colorado market where I do most of my work, but it isn't unheard of or terribly beyond the norm. I can think of at least five plausible and defensible reasons for a fairly high charge for a fairly simple job. This said, sometimes people just charge more than the going rate for work for no good reason, and in a free market, people are allowed to do that, at the risk that someone will go to the competition instead at some point. One reason: value billing Many lawyers do that kind of work on a flat fee basis, spreading the significant costs they incur in putting together an efficient system over many cases. They can do the work efficiently but want to charge a rate competitive only with lawyers who aren't so efficient and have to figure things out from scratch each time. A second possible reasons: diseconomies of scale Part of what may be going on is that if you have a big bureaucratic law firm, there are significant firm wide costs to every new matter (which, for example, has to be cleared through a conflict check firm-wide and involves quite a few administrative set up costs), especially if the firm charges high hourly rates. In firms with those kinds of economics, even a project that only takes two hours at $400+ per attorney hour to do the core legal work, would be hard for the firm to make a profit on, because there might easily be $1,200 in anticipated setup and shut down, and tail case monitoring costs. While some of those costs could, in theory, be streamlined when doing repeat work like the job suggested in the question, large or high cost bureaucratic firms aren't necessarily bothered to provide discounts in those circumstances to repeat customers because they see that kind of job as nickel and dime work that distracts them from working on their core competency of high-end big litigation cases, and big transactions like mergers of medium and large sized companies. It would probably be possible for a small, more nimble firm that doesn't see this kind of job as a distraction to get the fee for this down to $500-$1000. This cost issue with small transactional matters is one of the reasons that it is quite common to see the intellectual property department of large firms break off from the large firm bureaucracy (I recall it taking immense efforts just to requisition new office supplies when I worked in one because there was so much red tape involved), to form vastly smaller "boutique" intellectual property speciality law firms (e.g. 5-25 lawyers breaking off from a 100-500+ lawyer law firm) to prevent that kind of cost creep for smaller matters. The economics of high end intellectual property transactional work is different than a lot of big law firm work because a lot of intellectual property transactional work is high volume, low dollar transactions for repeat clients, which makes the friction associated with big law firm bureaucracies outweigh their benefits. A third possible reason: price for this job doesn't matter much in the context of a larger attorney-client relationship On the other hand, if you have a big company that normally uses a big inefficient law firm for its work (since most of its legal work involves life or death of the company grade issues where winning is much more important than keeping legal fees to a minimum), and it has a low volume of intellectual property filings, it may be more efficient for that big company to simply pay a bit more than it could if it really tries to get its costs down to a bare minimum, to just continue to use its regular law firm for this bit of work. The cost of vetting an alternative law firm may not be worth it for a big company. Bidding out the small project might save a few thousand dollars a year of legal fees, but if the big company normally has hundreds of thousands of dollars a year of legal fees anyway, this may not be a big deal for that big company client. A fourth possible reason: a bigger ability to make malpractice right Also, keep in mind that if the software has very high economic value, a big part of your $2000 flat legal fee for the work may be paying for the malpractice policy to make the client whole in the unlikely but inevitable event for a screwed up filing that has high stakes to the client in the rare cases where it happens. For example, I recall a malpractice case my office once handled where a big firm failed to file a key document in the real estate records resulting in a $20 million dollar mortgage losing its priority when the borrower default on the loan made by the client due to a miscommunication between a junior lawyer and a paralegal over who was going to get that job done that resulted in neither person doing it. This resulted in an immense loss to the client (they only recovered about $2 million and would have recovered the full amount if this document had been filed on time as the law firm agreed it would). It doesn't happen often, but it happens. In the same vein, if your software product generates $20 million a year in revenues and a small, lower charging firm screws up in a way that materially impairs the copyright protection available for that product (e.g. causing statutory damages to be unavailable when large statutory damages would otherwise almost surely have been awarded), a small law firm's malpractice policy and the responsible lawyer's assets may not even begin to cover the harm done, but a big law firm's malpractice policy, which is far more expensive and makes everything that the big law firm does much more expensive to clients, might easily be able to cover that loss. A fifth possible reason: the lawyer is reluctant to do the work An alternative explanation is that the lawyer could do the work, but isn't really bothered to do it unless its very lucrative, since the lawyer sees it as a distraction or just doesn't like you as a client. If this is the reason, then the lawyer is setting a high charge to encourage you to go elsewhere, without saying anything that would cause you to lose face or that would damage the long term lawyer-client relationship in a future case that is bigger or more in the usual vein of the work that the lawyer is looking to do going forward. | You probably own the copyright, since this wasn't an explicit part of your job. However, there may be other legal reasons which preclude you from using them anyway; copyright isn't all there is. Since you are in the middle of an active dispute, you should consult an actual lawyer (which I am certainly not) for legal advice. | You'll want to read the actual licenses yourself and understand what is required. If you don't understand, then you'll want to consult an attorney. But neither of these licenses are all that complex in my opinion. MIT: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Apache 2.0: Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You meet the following conditions: (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices stating that You changed the files; and (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution notices from the Source form of the Work, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works; and (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or, within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed as modifying the License. Nowhere does either license require you to publish your application's source code, even if your application is directly based on the original code. | If you aren't including those libraries, then yes because it's entirely your own work. If you are publishing those libraries, then no because their licenses will limit how you can do that. GPL's and MIT's main features are restricting how you can distribute software that includes the licensed code, and they don't allow the "do whatever you want" of public domain. | No-ish, it is not. The relevant sticking point would be in their DMCA takedown notice, where they have to follow 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A) and include in their notice (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. The key here is having a "good faith belief". There is a credible scenario where a company A could file multiple notices for the actually same material B posted by the exact same person C, where the person has the right to post that material, and do so in good faith. If A was not able to locate evidence of the permission to C, then they would shift the burden of proof to C – "good faith belief" doesn't mean that they have to be right, just that they have to actually think they are. If C also uses the name D, A would not be able to determine that the work was licensed to D based on the fact (once they know that) that it is licensed to C. DMCA abuse is not an permanently open escape hatch. 17 USC 512(4) states Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The ruling judge found that "Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright". The appeal court drew on precedent and dictionary to fill in gaps w.r.t. "good faith belief", that the person should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations In this case, the abuser was flagrantly abusing the takedown system, and there is some reason to believe that in the instant case, the abuser had actual knowledge of non-infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America provides an alternative outcome. In this case, Rossi operated a website that appeared (note the word appear) to offer free downloads of movies, and the rights-holder MCAA filed a takedown notice. In fact, it did not offer any such downloads, but MCAA's investigation stopped prematurely. This court held that "good faith belief" is subjective, so Rossi did not prevail. It is no doubt crucial that Rossi actually counted on his customers thinking that you could get actual downloads of protected material. Whether or not a DMCA abuse suit would succeed would depend very much on the factual details of why the material is not infringing, and how easily the rights-holder could know that there was no infringement. | The lack of a copyright notice is irrelevant, what matters is whether permission is granted. The material cannot be copied, except if the copyright holder grants you permission to copy. However, you might be able to create something legal and satisfactory on your own, because the underlying ideas are not protected. By way of analogy, you cannot copy the Turbo Pascal Numeric Methods library without permission, but you can study the logic of a module and write your own FFT routine. The status of something as "declaring code" is entirely irrelevant to the court's decision in Google v. Oracle. What is relevant to the court's finding of fair use is that the content constituted 0.4 percent of the entire API, and the fact that the copied lines of code are inextricably bound to other lines of code that are accessed by programmers, allowing programmers to bring their skills to a new environment. The court found that he amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose. | If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract. | Sure, you can. But if you, from the US, contract with and pay someone outside the US and then use the results of that effort - the reverse-engineered code, either directly in violation of copyright or to find workarounds - within the US, you may not be culpable in a criminal sense (depending on different jurisdictions and trade/IP agreements), but you certainly would be liable in a civil sense. If the US based software developer (I assume a US-based software company, as you said "outside the US") tracks you down, they can open a civil action against you for any damages they want to claim, including theft of IP, loss of profits, EULA violations, and on and on, because you posses and are using reverse engineered code. How much money do you have to lose? |
Is Indiana Handgun Permit Valid, If I'm no Longer a Resident? Indiana offers a lifetime handgun permit to Indiana residents, per IC 35-47-2-4 (a)(2): Licenses to carry handguns shall be either qualified or unlimited, and are valid for ... the life of the individual receiving the license in the case of a lifetime license. However, I can not find any indication of the validity of the permit (and therefore its reciprocity with other states) if the resident relocates out of Indiana. The closest I can find is IC 35-47-2-3(g)(4)(B): ...a lifetime license is automatically revoked if the license holder does not remain a proper person. However, I do not believe that "Indiana Residency" is a requirement of being a proper person, as it is not mentioned in the definition of "Proper Person" at IC 35-47-1-7 ...So that leaves me at a loss. Do those holding a Lifetime Indiana Handgun Permit retain said permit, even after Indiana Residency? | There doesn't seem to be any indication I could find that your Indiana license would expire or be revoked. That said, that question is likely moot for your purposes per the comment you left. Your Indiana permit is no longer valid in Florida if you have been a Florida resident for 91 days or more. Florida handgun license reciprocity is covered by S 790.015 and applies to non-residents. Individuals who establish residency in Florida and have a license from another state have 90 days to acquire a Florida license (emphasis mine): (3) If the resident of another state who is the holder of a valid license to carry a concealed weapon or concealed firearm issued in another state establishes legal residence in this state by: (a) Registering to vote; (b) Making a statement of domicile pursuant to s. 222.17; or (c) Filing for homestead tax exemption on property in this state, the license shall remain in effect for 90 days following the date on which the holder of the license establishes legal state residence | While Colorado does issue driver's licenses to homeless individuals, as you identified in your question, you need the help of a homeless shelter. I can see from your questions that you're reluctant to seek help from family, friends, or a shelter; however, I do not see a lawful way around Colorado's residency requirement without their assistance. Under C.R.S. § 42-2-107(1)(a)(II), the DMV cannot issue a driver's license "until [it] verifies all facts relative to such applicant's right to receive an instruction permit or minor driver's or driver's license including the age, identity, and residency of the applicant." Here is a link to Colorado's statutes. Unfortunately, I can't link to the specific provision cited above. The administrative rules further explain what is required for the department to verify residency. The regulations also talk about the exception for homeless people and specifically state that "Proof of residency documents are waived, if an applicant provides a letter on letterhead, signed by the director of a homeless shelter, certifying that the individual is homeless and stays at the shelter." 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 204- 30:16-2.12. Under the law and applicable registration, you cannot give a PO Box as your residence. You must give an actual address that you are supposed to be residing at. I don't know your individual circumstances; however, you might find it easier to stay at a friends house long enough to get your driver's license. Hope this is helpful to you. | German asylum law is codified in the "Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet" (English translation: "Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory Residence Act"), or short AufenthG. The paragraphs in this answer all apply to this law unless noted otherwise. This is a very, very long and complex law and the explanations here are grossly oversimplified. I am not a lawyer. This is all my personal interpretation of the laws as a layman. When you want to know it exactly, please read the full law or ask a lawyer to explain it. A foreigner who requests asylum in Germany has permission to stay in the country until their request for asylum has been processed (§25). When the request is denied (for example, because they come from a country considered safe or because there is insufficient evidence that they are in danger in their home-country), they become illegal immigrants and will have to leave the country as soon as possible (§50), if necessary by force (§58). The foreigner can even be imprisoned until a deportation is possible (§62). When the request is accepted, they get a time-limited permission to stay in the country for up to 3 years (§26) which can be extended for another 2 years afterwards. During that extension process it is reconfirmed if they still are in danger in their home-country. When the situation has changed, the extension might not get granted and they have to leave the country. When the asylum extension was granted, the refugee can apply for a permanent settlement permit. Such a permit allows the foreigner to stay in Germany indefinitely. However, this does not make them a German citizen yet. To become a German citizen with full access to social security, a German passport, voting rights etc., a foreigner needs not only a permanent settlement permit but also to go through the process of "Einbürgerung" (naturalization) according to § 10 Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality Act). There are several personal requirements for this, like living in Germany for several years, having a permanent employment, not committing any crimes and also passing a written citizenship test. | This area of law is dependent on affirmative defenses that states may choose to provide. I found two law review articles that present the situations in Georgia and Indiana.1, 2 Georgia Georgia Code 16-3-23 provides a defense for the occupant in this situation. Epstein argues that this statute is somewhat ambiguous but it most likely even applies when the occupant only has a reasonable belief that the entry is unlawful (i.e. the entry doesn't have to actually be unlawful).1 Indiana Indiana Code 35-41-3-2 provides a similar defense. The Indiana Legislature enacted 35-41-3-2 in response to a court decision that did not allow a jury to consider self-defense to an unlawful police entry. Patterson analyzes Indiana's statute and comes to the same conclusion as Epstein did about Georgia's: "the statute allows an individual to use force on a reasonable belief that a police official is unlawfully entering their home".2 Policy conflict Both Epstein and Patterson note the policy conflict that arises when states allow both no-knock warrants and affirmative defenses when an occupant reasonably believes an entry may be unlawful. They both suggest that states with such defenses available remove the permission for no-knock entries. 1. Epstein, Dimitri (2009) "Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-Knock Raids by Police," Georgia State University Law Review: Vol. 26: Iss. 2, Article 5. 2. Patterson, C. (2014) "Don't Forget to Knock: Eliminating the Tension Between Indiana's Self Defense Statute and No-Knock Warrants," Ind. L. Rev., 47, 621. | The law upheld by the decision is a New York law, and thus only applies in the state of New York. Its current text reads in relevant part: No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the state who is... Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education permitting such employment. The citizenship requirements of this subdivision shall not apply to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed whose immigration status is that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and who would otherwise be eligible to serve as a teacher, or to apply for or receive permanent certification as a teacher, but for the foregoing requirements of this subdivision. The last sentence of that will no longer be effective starting Nov 30 2022. So, this law only says they are prohibited in New York public schools. And even then, they are allowed if they are applying to be a citizen, if they are hired pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education, or (until 2022) if they are a lawful permanent resident of the US. Other states may have other laws, of course. | What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense. | There are no rules against private sales of firearms in Arizona. If you (or your mother) own the guns, you can sell them to anyone you like unless you have reason to believe they are a prohibited possessor. There is no legal requirement for you to validate their identity. There is no limit on the number of guns you can sell to one person. A bill of sale is optional. You don't need a lawyer and, honestly, I'm not sure what a lawyer would do to help you sell a gun. The laws, being what they are, lead some to conclude that this must be how prohibited possessors get their guns. It's not. Most "illegal" guns are bought through straw purchases in which a person with a clean record buys a gun for someone who is not legally allowed to own one. You can work through a licensed dealer if it makes you feel better. If you don't want to use a dealer, you can simply require that a buyer have a concealed carry license as evidence that they are not a prohibited possessor. The CCW is not a surefire way to guarantee anything though. Personally, I would transact a private party sale with individuals via a dealer. You're in AZ. There is no shortage of gun buyers! At the risk of breaking site rules, you can also list guns online. For example, www.gunbroker.com is a popular site and follows an eBay-style bid structure (I have no affiliation to them). This model ensures that you get market price for the gun rather than trusting that a dealer is going to give you a fair price (they won't; they make their money buying cheap and selling at market rate). | Any parent may leave a child in the care of another responsible person. There is no special license required. The parent may use sound judgement in selecting the caretaker. Nor does a caretaker even have to be an adult -- teens are often used as baby sitters. If a reasonable parent would have known that a particular person was not a safe caretaker, then selecting that person might be negligence or child endangerment. Nor is there any legal requirement in most US states that a child be under anyone's direct supervision at all times. See "Free range parenting". Again, if in particular circumstances a reasonable parent should know that supervision is needed, failure to provide it might be child neglect or endangerment. Some US states set minimum ages for children to be unsupervised. NJ is not one, to the best of my understanding. |
What does it mean that I must "immediately reimburse Owner for the cost of any insurance policy Owner obtains for the Apartment"? On the lease I am considering signing, it says in section 32 D: Tenant shall immediately reimburse Owner for the cost of any insurance policy Owner obtains for the Apartment, including but not limited to insurance for Owner’s furniture or furnishings in the Apartment. This is part of the Standard Form of Apartment Lease issued by the Real Estate Board of New York. https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/279367eb/files/uploaded/2019_FM_Lease.pdf Does this mean that every renter in New York is subject to immediately owing their building's owner some arbitrarily large sum of money for wallpaper insurance? | The lease requires you to get liability insurance and to insure your own property. If you don't, (para D) one of the owner's options is to get the insurance for you. Then after taking out the insurance that you are required to have, you shall reimburse owner for the insurance that he took out for your benefit. "Reimburse" means "pay back what he paid for you", which means that it is not an arbitrary sum. It is for the kinds of insurance you are required by the lease to have, and not wallpaper insurance. The only people who have to do this are renters who have leases with terms like this, not necessarily every renter in NY. | In Virginia there is a distinction between a tenant and an authorized occupant. An authorized occupant is a person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit with the consent of the landlord, but who has not signed the rental agreement and therefore does not have the financial obligations as a tenant under the rental agreement. A tenant is a person entitled only under the terms of a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others and shall include roomer. There is a third category, guest or invitee which means a person, other than the tenant or person authorized by the landlord to occupy the premises, who has the permission of the tenant to visit but not to occupy the premises. Such people who live there would not be invitees. Clearly, you can have others living with you who are not on the lease, if the landlord agrees. The landlord's main concern regarding credit rating is probably financial responsibility, and if you qualify, having people live with you who have low or no credit rating is unlikely to make any difference. There may be other concerns, such as background checks or increases utility costs). Virginia law does not specifically allow "unauthorized occupants", i.e. occupants not approved by the landlord, nor does it specifically disallow such occupants. Leases often include a provision that addresses this matter, prohibiting unauthorized occupants. Supposing that the lease is silent on the matter (not likely) and the landlord wanted to compel the other occupants to leave, the procedure would be to tell the tenant that the unauthorized occupants must leave. Then if you do not comply (do not get them to move out), the landlord could start the procedure of evicting the lot of you, and the question would be whether the court would find that you have a right to let unauthorized other people live with you. I can't find any applicable case law, but it is unlikely that the court would find such a right. Tenants have special statutory rights, as do authorized occupants under the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. A court would not find that the rights of an authorized occupant extend to an unauthorized occupant, which means that the landlord's rights as property owner are dispositive of the matter. | It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst. | Can a landlord keep a security deposit if my apartment rental application is approved, but I back out of signing the lease? That can't be legal, right? No. That is a violation of California CIV 1950.5. Although 1950.5(b) reflects that one of the permissible purposes of a security deposit is "to reimburse the landlord for costs associated with processing a new tenant", item (e) limits that amount "as [is] reasonably necessary for the purposes specified in subdivision(b)". A deposit of 1.5 times the monthly rent clearly is excessive for "processing a new tenant", let alone processing an applicant who never became a tenant because no lease agreement was entered. All other permissible uses of security deposit are inapplicable in your matter. Furthermore, if the landlord required a separate payment for the application, then your application fee satisfies the provision in 1950.5(b). This means that the landlord has the obligation to reimburse you 100% of the security deposit. | Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law. | I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right. | No, for two reasons. First, your question seems to assume that the current level of (1) vacancy, and (2) rent, will continue unchanged for the indefinite future. A lot of people thought that in 1989, and 2000, and 2007, just before the last three Bay Area housing crashes. The purpose of a long-term lease is to create certainty for the lessor. As the lessee, you are on the hook for whatever damages you cause by breaking the lease. As you say, right now, the complex will probably be able to mitigate fairly easily. That will change next time the market crashes. If you break the lease, you're gambling that it's still 1987...but there's a chance it's 1989 instead. If it is, you are on the hook, because the landlord exchanged a lower rent for certainty. Second, you're thinking about what the landlord will be able to prove in court. This is almost never the most helpful thing to be thinking in a situation like this. If you get to the point where your lawyer is having to stand up in court and argue about the reasonableness of the landlord's efforts, you've already spent more than two weeks' rent (even at Bay Area prices) paying the lawyer. Realistically, if the landlord says it took six weeks to rent, and sends you a bill for six weeks, the cheapest thing for you to do will, probably, be to pay it. | This would be pointless and wouldn't work. Eviction due to defaulting on rent requires the landlord to give 3 business days notice, in writing. This must include a method by which the tenant can settle their debt. Either the landlord would be forced to accept a payment or this would not be valid. Source Additionally, in this case, there is nothing stopping you physically handing an envelope of cash to the landlord as they live upstairs. However, there is no reason for your landlord to do this. If your landlord hates you that much it would be far easier for them to simply give you 60 days notice and terminate your tenancy that way. |
Was Alex Jones's attorney handing over phone-record evidence a "mishap" or required by law? CNN reports on Alex Jones's case regarding Sandy Hook as follows: Jones, who was the sole witness for the defense during the trial, did not fare well Wednesday as he was cross-examined by the plaintiffs' attorney, Mark Bankston. In a remarkable moment, Bankston disclosed to Jones and the court that he had recently acquired evidence proving Jones had lied when he claimed during the discovery process that he had never texted about the 2012 Sandy Hook shooting. Bankston said that Jones' attorney had, in an apparent mishap, sent him two years of cell phone records that included every text message Jones had sent. Oliver Darcy, Sandy Hook family attorney exposes Alex Jones' dishonesty during brutal cross-examination, CNN, 3 Aug 2022. I could be completely wrong, but my understanding is that, during discovery, Jones's attorney is (probably) required by law to hand over the cell phone records. Thus CNN's phrasing "an apparent mishap" seems bizarre to me: Jones's attorney was just obeying the law. Question: Was Alex Jones's attorney handing over phone-record evidence a "mishap" or required by law? | Was Alex Jones's attorney handing over phone-record evidence a "mishap" or required by law? The discovery phase, which concluded before the trial began, required Alex Jones to provide texts and emails mentioning Sandy Hook (among other things). He did not provide any and testified in writing and in court he could find none. On August 3rd 2022, day seven of the trial, plaintiffs' attorney Mark Bankston claimed he had obtained from Jones's attorneys a digital copy of Jones's cellphone on which there were texts and emails that mentioned Sandy Hook. He said this copy was mistakenly provided to him. Whether accidental or deliberate, this copy or its texts and emails mentioning Sandy Hook were not provided during discovery. Judge Gamble told the jury about the digital copy, "we don't know whether it was on accident or on purpose... but what we do know is that it wasn't properly turned over when it should have been." https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=7658 A video clip of the part of the hearing in question, when Bankston begins asking Jones about the texts. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tpnSCIak5A8. Or this timestamp in a longer clip https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=6821. Mark Bankston for the plaintiffs, addressing Jones: "Your attorneys messed up and sent me a digital copy of your entire cellphone, with every text message you sent for the past two years. And, when informed, did not take any steps to identify it as privileged or protected in any way, and as of two days ago it fell free and clear into my possession. And that is how I know you lied to me when you said you didn't have text messages about Sandy Hook." The above quote begins 5mins into the first clip or this timestamp in the longer clip https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=6830). After the texts, Bankston asked questions about emails not being turned over... Jones had sworn he didn't even use email. Bankston showed him emails that appeared to be written by Jones. "I must have dictated them" said Jones. Judge Gamble told the jury about the digital copy, "we don't know it was on accident or on purpose, but what we do know is it wasn't properly turned over when it should have been." https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=7665 Bankston told journalist Dan Solomon the phone copy was put in a Dropbox the parties were using to exchange materials. Bankston did not believe it was put there deliberately and notified Jones's attorneys. Apparently Jones's attorneys did not respond. Under Texas law they had ten days to assert privilege or say the material was put there by mistake, Rule 193.3(d) - as of August 3rd Bankston was legally free to read and use the material. (There is some gossip online about what was supposedly heard on 'hot mic' between Reynal and Bankston, I haven't heard it myself and have no timestamps or clips. I do think I heard Jones, after leaving the witness box, ask Reynal "they got my text messages?") [edit] Incidentally, this isn't the first time that Jones / his attorneys failed to comply with discovery orders in relation to these Sandy Hook cases - a number of sanctions and default judgements have gone against him for that. Indeed this damages phase is the result of the default judgment against him in September 2021 for failing to comply with discovery: "The Court find that Defendants unreasonably and vexatiously failed to comply with their discovery duties. The Court finds that Defendants' failure to comply with discovery in this case is greatly aggravated by Defendants' consistent pattern of discovery abuse throughout the other similar cases pending before this Court." [edit 2] On August 4th 2022 Jones's attorneys have filed an emergency motion that seems to settle the issue of whether the provision of all the material was a "mishap": they say it was "inadvertently" supplied. text of the motion They claim they promptly informed plaintiffs' attorneys about the mistake but the latter used the material anyway in violation of privilege, procedure and the court's protective order. Now Twitter lawyers are arguing about whether the language used by the defence was adequate to engage the rules mentioned above. But this doesn't seem to resolve the issue of why the material demanded for discovery was not supplied for discovery or why Jones testifed he could not find such material. Judge Gamble denied the request for a blanket protective order to seal the record of the text messages and denied the motion for mistrial. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKbAmNwbiMk | user6726's answer about civil action is good, as you appear to have lots of evidence that document-based in terms of bank records, etc. And media shaming would work; but you could be sued in retaliation, even if you're right. But try calling a prosecutor - such as a county attorney - rather than an arm of law enforcement. The police are always overworked and can be reluctant to try and put a case together for the local prosecutor. Contacting a county attorney is free and doesn't require you to get a lawyer, and it can be a surprisingly effective tactic against a criminal. A phone call or a detailed letter to the county attorney for the person's county of residence that explains the criminal activity may be the key to getting some movement in the situation. You have lots of hard evidence to hand the attorney about an individual who is committing fraud, and that evidence may make simply make the case for the attorney, as it is documented evidence they can immediately verify and use, either at the county level, or be passed to the district (state) prosecutor. A loss of $4000 is significant, and may be a felony in that state. But the "$6,000 in products that were not shipped" is intent on the criminals' part and is not a loss to you. If it is a county with a large population, the attorney will have many assistants who may have time to pursue the case. An attorney for a small county may be looking for an easy case. And who knows? The attorney's office may already know the person - if it's a county with a small population, or if that person already has a criminal history (which you could research yourself in that county's records) - and that makes the case even easier for the attorney. | Defamation of public figures is governed by the "actual malice" standard: the person making the statement must either have known that it was false at the time they said it, or must have been acting with reckless disregard for the truth (meaning they had serious doubts that the statement was true at the time they said it). The First Amendment bars a public figure from winning a libel suit unless they demonstrate that the defendant fell in one of those categories, because any lesser requirement would discourage people from speaking on topics of public concern for fear that they might say something wrong and be sued for it. The standard was first applied for public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan, and later cases have extended it to public figures in general. If someone genuinely thinks Obama was born in Kenya, it is not libel for them to say that. Even though you could argue that any reasonable person should know that's wrong, it's not enough -- the defendant had to have known it was wrong or seriously doubted it. Even if your sole basis for claiming he was a gay prostitute is that you heard a rumor from a friend, if you actually believed them, you can say he was. You aren't required to check Clinton's book to verify a quote before repeating it; if you read it on a website and had no reason to think they were lying, you can say that the quote was in there. It is extremely difficult for a public figure in the United States to win a defamation lawsuit. This is the system working as designed; a public figure who wants to correct lies being told about them can put out the correct information (which is easier for them than for most people), which is preferable to government action (and libel judgments are government action, because they involve a government officer ordering you to pay someone else money and/or do and/or not do something). | Generally they don't. If the conversation was made while there was a third person present, the person can be a witness at trial. Unless the witness is impeached, the witness's statement may be sufficient for you to meet your burden of proof to show the statement was made, because the burden is just a preponderance of evidence in most civil cases. Note that, the existence of a statement is not sufficient to prove breach of privacy. The context surrounding the statement is important. If you intend to record communications from the landlord in the future, please check with your jurisdiction's laws regarding recording of communications. Many jurisdictions (such as California) only permit a private communication to be recorded when all parties give consent. Not only an illegally recorded conversation is inadmissible as evidence (with the exception to rebut a witness), it is also a crime to do so. Some other jurisdictions in USA allows one party to record the conversation without obtaining consent from the other party. | You do not have to. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove that you made the threat. Reasonable doubt exists in the circumstances that you describe, that there are no logs of who accessed what when and how. Your attorney may have to introduce expert witnesses who can explain how it is possible that text from your computer can end up on a web page, and they can testify that there are many ways that data can be entered into the database, only a few of which actually involve you. | This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider. | The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se. | There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all. |
Under GDPR, does blurhash of a profile picture count as personal data Suppose I have a web service where users can have a profile page with name and picture. Blurhash is a technology that allows me to create a significantly blurred representation of an image, as a placeholder or thumbnail for the actual image. Suppose I store the blurhash for each profile picture in my web service's database. Then, if a user requests via GDPR full deletion of their data from my web service, would I be required to delete also their profile picture blurhash? This might overlap with copyright law, and I would like to know if a blurhash is a "derivative work" and thus is my (the company running the web service) creation, not the user's creation. Here is an example of a blurhash. The original image (a public domain picture from Unsplash): Here is the blurhash code: +GFO+E4n5S~p4n%MRjE101R+-URjt7xu%Laet7ofoeR+xuD*R*n%RQt6n%kCs.tQM{of And here is the blurhash image: | From the GDPR's definitions: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; This blurred image would be "information relating to an identified ... natural person (‘data subject’)." It does not matter whether the person can be identified using the information in question. Therefore, the answer to your question Under GDPR, does blurhash of a profile picture count as personal data is yes. | The GDPR has a fairly broad concept of personal data: any information that relates to an identifiable person. This is far more than directly identifiable information! The concept of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. So indirectly linkable information can still be personal data. In your example, that ID can be easily re-identified with a particular person if you know who the secretary was between 2012 and 2014. It is quite likely that there are members in the club with this knowledge, or that this information can be gained from public sources like newspaper reports. Thus, you should assume that your member IDs are at most pseudonyms, but not anonymous. They are likely still personal data. However, it doesn't necessarily follow that you would have to erase everything. Art 17 comes with lots of caveats and exceptions. For example, if you are processing this personal data under a legitimate interest, and someone requests erasure, you might have overriding grounds to continue processing anyway. E.g. such a legitimate interest could involve security or auditability purposes. There might also be such a legitimate interest for keeping some history for the club, but there would have to be a decision based on the individual circumstances. Furthermore, you can of course retain data e.g. due to a legal obligation, or when this information is necessary for the establishment of or defence against legal claims. I understand your desire to keep some data around. Instead of asking “do I have to delete this?” it might be more productive to consider “under which legal basis can I keep this?”. I think you might have a legitimate interest, but you'd have to carry out a balancing test between the various interests and rights. A really problematic approach would be to hold on to de-identified data in the belief that it no longer were personal data. Such a belief is usually mistaken. True anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is really hard, in particular because you would also have to prevent indirect identification, also by other actors than yourself. There are theoretical models that can help with anonymization, e.g. with k-anonymization methods you'd ensure that there are no unique records in the DB. But this can be tricky to apply correctly, so I'd recommend to only treat aggregate statistics as truly anonymous. In 2012, the ICO has published an anonymization code of practice (PDF). It is no longer up to date with the current legal environment (in particular since the GDPR has expanded the concept of identifiability), but it provides a good overview of both the difficulties of preventing re-identification and an overview of potential solutions. | There are a number of misconceptions here. GDPR does not generally impose blanket bans, but things get dicey if you're using data in a way that is not strictly necessary. Consent (freely given opt-in) is a way to continue nevertheless. A website without ads, tracking, or potentially tracking embedded content can probably work without having to ask for consent. Under the GDPR, every processing of personal data needs a purpose. This purpose must be covered by a legal basis. Some processing might be legally mandated or required by a contract with the data subject. It's also possible to base processing on a legitimate interest, but this requires a balancing test that also considers the data subject's rights and interests. As a last resort, consent can be an appropriate legal basis, but this comes with additional restrictions. Once you have a clear purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can process the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. Sometimes, laws prescribe a particular legal basis. This is the case for cookies. You can use cookies (and similar technologies that access information on the end user's device) as strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user. If you go beyond that, the ePrivacy Directive says you must obtain consent first. So for example, session cookies, shopping carts, or cookies that remember a “dark mode” preference are all perfectly fine because they are strictly necessary for something the user is trying to do. Also, you can use cookies to remember if the user gave or declined consent. On the other hand, analytics or tracking cookies are not necessary and require consent. If a website embeds third party content, this discloses personal data such as IP addresses to the third party. This disclosure requires a legal basis, most likely consent. There is case law about this regarding Facebook Like buttons on a page (→ Fashion ID case) but the same principle can be generalized to embedded Tweets or Youtube videos, images, or JavaScript files. A common way to handle this is to replace the embedded content with a placeholder, and to only load the embed once the user gives consent. But not all other domains or services are “third party” in the sense of the GDPR. When you engage a company to act as a data processor on your behalf, they are contractually bound to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. The GDPR allows you to outsource processing activities such as serving web content, as long as you have a suitable contract in place. Such “data processing agreements” are common for hosting providers or CDNs. When consent is to be used as a legal basis, it's important to consider the various conditions that the GDPR imposes (see Art 7 GDPR). The core principle is that consent must be freely given. You cannot make access to a site conditional on consent, so a naïve cookie wall or captive portal will be non-compliant. It's fine to force a choice, but “no” MUST be valid and possible. That consent is freely given also means that you must provide enough context for the user to make an informed decision, that the user must give consent through an unambiguous, affirmative action (consent is never the default), and that consent must be specific for a particular purpose (you can't bundle unrelated purposes). That is why modern consent management tools have multiple layers of information and allow the user to give consent for individual purposes (e.g. yes to analytics but no to ad personalization). In your particular context, you could proceed as follows: Figure out what kind of external content you're currently including. Can you enter into a data processing agreement with the external providers? If so, sign that. Can you host the content locally? This can be an easy solution except for video streams. Careful: copyright concerns might make this impossible. Can you replace the content with placeholders that only load if and when the user gives consent? That way, the rest of your site remains accessible without annoying consent walls. If the third party content is an unavoidable and essential part of your page, use an interstitial to inform the user of the risks before they proceed. | Earlier this year, the Internet lawyer Arnoud Engelfriet wrote a blog post about exactly this topic. As it is written in Dutch, I will summarize it here: As you also said, deleting posts breaks the flow of the archived conversation and it makes your archive incomplete. This is a problem for the freedom of expression and information. But Art. 17(3) GDPR includes an exception to the right of erasure for this situation. So posts do not need to be deleted. However, profiles are not included in this exception. So they must be removed, but they can be pseudonymized. For example replace the username with user89432, and remove all details from the profile. If other posts contain the nick of the author of an anonymized post, that is considered an journalistic, academic artistic or literary expression, so Art. 85 GDPR would apply, so the right of erasure does not apply to that. Bottom line: you only have to pseudonymize the account, if that person wants to be removed from the forum. | The conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. As for it being legal for website operators to log the IP-addresses of visitors, this is covered by the following paragraph (also pointed out by phoog in a comment). The paragraph says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) You are not the only web site that logs IP addresses for the purpose of security. Every web site I've ever worked on - from those controlled by large corporations to tiny NGOs - do this. This security practice will not be impacted by the GDPR (if it were, I am sure we would have heard about it by now). there is the EU cookie law too If your website are going to be accessible to European citizens and not only accessible by your friends and familiy, you have to comply with the EU cookie directive of 2002 (a exemption for "personal websites" does not exist). | A public key is private data - the fact that its a public key is neither here nor there, its data owned by the user and not necessarily in the public domain (I have keypairs for which the public key is only known by myself, for example). For a subject access request, you must give the user all data you hold about them, subject to certain restrictions laid out in the GDPR - in your case, this would be the IP addresses, public keys, encrypted data and anything else involved in identifying their devices for transferring the files. You dont need to decrypt the encrypted data if that is something you cannot do or would not normally do in the course of holding it during a transfer - to you, the encrypted data is what you hold. If you hold the means to decrypt the data, that means (private key for example) would also be included in the subject access requests response, but in your case you say you dont hold that, so there you go. Remember to include information from things like logs etc in your response. | From Article 4 of the GDPR: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The fact that you can use the ID in your database, along with the value returned by the cookie you set to identify the user makes it personal data. The favorite colour is information relating to an individual. The fact that it is connected to the cookie ID means that it is personal data. | Since the Steam ID contains or may contain enough information for it to be possible to link your account to you as a physical person, it would definitely be considered "personal data" according to Article 4 of the GDPR. However, by agreeing to the DOTA2 terms of service, you have given consent for them to show your information to other players (or at least that is included in most terms of service I have read for other games. I have not read the one for DOTA2 specifically). Replays are an interesting corner case. If download of replays are only possible for other players or if the wording of the ToS says that you consent to displaying your user ID to anybody, that would mean that they would have covered their bases. As long as they comply with other parts of GDPR, like "the right to erasure" (Article 17) that is. If the API is accessible to anyone and not covered by the ToS you might have a case. If you only want to remove the traceability between you and the replays, you can always evoke Article 17 and delete your account. |
In which European countries is illegal to publicly state an opinion that in the US would be protected by the first amendment? I often heard that the US are somehow exceptional in the freedom of speech that they provide to their citizens via the first amendment. However, I never saw an actual comparison with, say, European countries. My question is: In which European country, is it illegal (for a citizen of that European country) to publicly state an opinion that in the US would be protected the first amendment? Is there somewhere a list with such comparison? | Almost every European nation has a "hate speech" law that makes the use of offensive bigoted words of phrases illegal. The U.S. does not have any such laws, and the First Amendment makes such laws unconstitutional. The closest the U.S. can get are laws criminalizing "Hate Crimes" which are ordinary crimes which were motivated in part or in whole by the victim's actual or perceived protected class status. Other specific examples as mentioned in comments, are that Germany has strict laws about advocacy of Nazi ideology. This is completely legal in the United States. Nazi ideology is not popular in the U.S. by any means, but it's allowed to be advocated for because of the strong Freedom of Speech Laws in the United States. In other regards, while U.S. Law is fairly similar to U.K. Law (you have to get into weeds about the differences), it is way more difficult to sue for defamation in U.S. than in the U.K. For starters, the U.S. has the "Public Person" rule which requires that any defamation about a person who is largely known to the public (politicians and celebrities largely) must prove Actual Malice Or Reckless Disregard for the Truth (I.E. You didn't even do the basic research into the statement) in order to prove defamation. But there's also the matter of the burden of proof. In the U.K. the speaker of the alleged defamation must prove in court that the statement was not defamatory. In the U.S., all legal challenges to are "protected speech" until proven otherwise in a court of law. This means that even with the "Public Person" rule set aside, the statement's original speaker need not prove that their speech is truthful, and the burden's on the accuser of defamation to prove it. Edit: Additional Info based on comments, but "Protected Speech" is a legal term used in the U.S. that defines speech that is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States as opposed to commercial speech, which is speech used to make advertise or to further commerce and is restricted, and unprotected speech, which is speech that can land one in trouble. While the list of types of speech is long, every form of speech restriction is very very narrowly tailored. "Hate Speech", which would be the utterance of words or phrases that can be offensive to people of a protected class (a characteristic that is beyond the individuals control). "Hate Crimes" are not necessarily spoken during the commission of the crime, but rather can be charged in addition to the crime. Suppose a serial killer was killing people of a certain race, this is not enough for police to go on because most serial killers target victims that meet a physical description (same skin color, same hair color, same gender). Once the killer is captured, police search his apartment and find a manifesto where the killer admits that he is selecting his target because he believes people of this protected class are subhuman and thus his superior nature gives him the right to kill them, this would show that the killings were motivated out of hatred, and thus qualify as a hate crime. The way he phrases this may be purely academic and use in offensive language OR it could be laden with all manner of crass slurs. It doesn't matter... what he said is protected speech but what he did is... well... to quote Guardians of the Galaxy... is "murder... on of the worst crimes of all. So also illegal." Hate crimes criminalize crimes that are motivated by hatred... they do not criminalize speech that is hateful. | Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.) | germany In Germany, taking pictures - and publishing them - is legal, if they're taken from public areas, from the general perspective of a passer-by, and if the picture doesn't make individual persons recognizable. (There are some restrictions about making persons recognizable; if you take a picture of a monument or other building that would typically be photographed by tourists, and if the topic of the picture is clearly the monument, not a random bystander, then it's OK to publish even if the bystander's face is visible. But that doesn't work for individual's houses). Still, Street View got into trouble because their cameras are mounted on roofs of a car, in a height of 2.5-3 meters, so they violated the "perspective of a passer-by" rule. To return to the example of "bathroom", the camera could well be able to see you nude when a passer-by would only be able to see a small portion of the ceiling next to the window. Because of this, and because many Germans were uneasy with seeing their houses on the internet, as a condition to permit Street View at all, the German government insisted on allowing people to request their house to be removed; in 2010, approximately 250000 people made use of that (source: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11595495). Because of the high resistance against Street View in Germany, Google published what they had in 2011, but stopped collecting more images. This is explained in https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/germany-street-view/, which also explains some of the reasons why Germans are so heavily biased for privacy. | There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law. | The government is prohibited by the first amendment from creating a law which gives preference to one religion over another. Banning entry to persons of one or more religions would do this. | There are lots of times when it's illegal to lie. Among them: impersonating a federal agent (18 USC 912) lying to a federal agent (18 USC 1001); health care fraud (18 USC 1035 and 1347); mail fraud (18 USC 1341); wire fraud (18 USC 1343); perjury (18 USC 1623); False Claims Act (31 USC 3729-33); and libel and slander (common law). But you're right that these laws are all at least theoretically in conflict with the First Amendment rule that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." So why are some of them upheld against a First Amendment challenge while others are struck down? The Supreme Court explained its rationale a few years ago in U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). That case dealt with a federal statute making it illegal to falsely claim that you had won any medal that Congress had authorized to be awarded to the armed forces. The federal government said that false speech had no value and therefore was not protected, pointing to cases upholding laws like the ones listed above where the Court had used similar descriptions. But the Court rejected that argument, noting that the cases where it has upheld laws limiting false speech dealt with "defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement": In those decisions the falsity of the speech at issue was not irrelevant to our analysis, but neither was it determinative. The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection. Our prior decisions have not confronted a measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more. Even when considering some instances of defamation and fraud, moreover, the Court has been careful to instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment. The statement must be a knowing or reckless falsehood. So that sort of gives you an organizing principle. It's not really a philosophical distinction, and meeting it doesn't mean that the lie is illegal, just that it may be outlawed. tl;dr: The First Amendment usually does not protect false statements when they are: made knowingly; and made with some corrupt purpose. | Almost certainly, there is no such right. It's illegal under 18 USC 831 to possess "nuclear material" without specific authorization. 18 USC 832 forbids the possession of a "radiological weapon". If there is intent to use the device to cause death, serious bodily injury, or damage to property or the environment, that's also a violation of 18 USC 2332i. I don't think these laws have been explicitly tested against the Second Amendment, but related cases suggest they would hold up (if the challenge wasn't simply dismissed as frivolous). The Second Amendment doesn't grant a blanket right to own weapons. Federal law, 18 USC 922 (o) makes it unlawful to own a "machinegun" (as defined in the statute), and in the case of Hollis v. Lynch, the Fifth Circuit held that this law was constitutional, because, as they said, the Second Amendment only protects weapons that are in "common use [...] for lawful purposes like self-defense." This case doesn't seem to have been appealed further, but the reasoning cited by the Fifth Circuit comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in D.C. v. Heller. If machineguns aren't in "common use", and therefore not protected, surely the same would apply to nuclear weapons. | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. |
Barring legal fees — why does one lone junior barrister (for each party) appear, in a minority of some UK Supreme Court cases? In most UKSC cases, at least 1 QC and 1 junior barrister appear for each party to the case. Often, multiple QC's and multiple juniors appear. But I have stumbled on exceptions like Mathieson v SSWP [2015] UKSC 47, where Respondent was represented by merely a junior barrister. But he, Tim Buley, became QC in 2019. Her Majesty's Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 (10 May 2021), where each litigant is represented by merely a junior barrister. Nate Eldredge sussed out that the Applicant's barrister became QC in 2022. Just edit this post, if you know of other such UKSC cases. Rule out legal costs and fees as a reason. Obviously, SSWP and Her Majesty’s Attorney General are wealthy enough to instruct QC's. And these cases can't simply be easier! If a case were straightforward, it would never have been litigated or appealed up to the UKSC, or been permitted by the UKSC to appeal! | I think the answer is that, despite the wording in the question, this case is simply easier. Note that the Attorney General is listed as the applicant, rather than the appellant. The case is a straightforward action for contempt of court but since the court in question is the Supreme Court, it heard the case itself (although with a different set of judges). | There is no answer to the question, as presented. The criminal law differs in various respects in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland: one cannot speak of 'UK law', because criminal procedure is really very different in the three separate jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the rules of criminal procedure are what govern the issue raised in the question, rather than the substantive laws relating to the various charges which might be brought; and while the substantive laws in England and Scotland are often fairly similar, the procedures are usually very dissimilar. In a trial at the Old Bailey, in London, a Jury has no role in the criminal procedure: once empanelled it performs its usual function of deciding the facts of the case, based upon the evidence presented, but it has no role in determining what charges are preferred against the accused (this is decided by a different court at a much earlier procedural stage), and the jury has no power to alter the charges on the indictment. Only the prosecution can decide what charges are made against an accused person. And if an amendment to the indictment is thought to be appropriate, only the prosecuting barrister can make such a change. If the case has come-on for trial, the permission of the Judge must usually be obtained to any alteration in the charges. The Judge might object to an attempt to add a charge carrying a more severe penalty at a late stage in the proceedings (as the case may of course have already taken many months to reach the Old Bailey). He will often be more accommodating to an application to reduce the charges, to a lesser offence, particularly if accompanied by an undertaking not to proceed on a more serious charge - e.g. due to a lack of evidence supporting it. Where several charges are brought in the alternative, then the jury has a function, since it can then convict of a lesser charge if the evidence on a more serious one does not satisfy it. But it cannot ask for the charges to be altered: the jury represents the layman, and jurymen are inevitably not legally qualified (at one time, being legally qualified was an automatic disqualification from serving on a jury). So the jury is assumed to be incapable of understanding the fine distinctions between different offences, and has no role whatsoever in deciding which offences shall be included on the indictment. Even the Barrister representing the accused has no role in determining which charges his client will face: that is purely a function of the Crown Prosecutor's office, and once the trial has come-on at the Bailey only the prosecuting Barrister and the Judge truly have a role in making any necessary amendments. The function of defending Counsel is to strike a plea-bargain, if he can, and where the opportunity arises: which is to say, if he can persuade his client to plead guilty to a minor charge (whether or not on the indictment), and can also persuade the prosecutor not to proceed on the more serious charge(s) on the indictment. A Judge will not usually object to a legally-represented defendant applying, by consent (i.e. through the prosecutor), to amend the indictment in order to enter a plea of guilty. He might refuse, if the accused has no legal representation, but not otherwise. The short answer, therefore, is that in England and Wales a defendant cannot be convicted on a charge that is not listed on the indictment, but a jury can convict of any charge on the indictment if the judge asks the jury to retire and consider a verdict - but the case may not get so far as that, if a plea-bargain is struck. There are rare occasions where a judge might withdraw a charge, if he desires, by directing the jury to acquit on that particular charge, but this only occurs if he considers that any conviction on that charge would be positively unsafe in all the circumstances of the case. | You should do one of two things. Either (1) fire your lawyer and obtain competent counsel, or (2) demand that he pay for the "second opinion" (in actuality, co-counsel or a consultant) if he is unfit to offer a proper opinion on the case. I am unfamiliar with the bar rules in Canada, however I am willing to bet they require one be competent to the prosecute the case they take. In the U.S. in all jurisdictions, the bar rules demand that an attorney not take a case unless he is competent to prosecute it. If he is not, he has a duty to either decline the case, or to find competent assistance to bring the case to closure. Unless your lawyer told you at the outset that he can only represent your defense and not your counterclaim, then he needs to be able to advise you about both issues. You should not be responsible for obtaining a second opinion. Most lawyers would not want their client seeking a second opinion as it reflects poorly on their ability competently practice. The fact that this guy has the gall to ask you to get one is unacceptable. As an example: I recently had a case that was within my practice area. During discovery I realized there was a substantial ERISA issue. This is a very specialized area of law that I am not very adept at dealing with as it is a complex regulatory scheme I don't deal with regularly. So...once I spotted this, I contacted an colleague who specializes in ERISA, who told me what I needed to argue, and gave me a primer on the area of ERISA law that I needed to be adept at. If I didn't have a friend who worked in this area, I would've had to get a co-counsel (at my own expense) by either splitting my fee, or by hiring him as a consultant but being personally responsible for the cost. If I didn't think that would be cost effective (i.e., the value of the case was not big enough to justify me hiring a consultant) then I would've had to tell the client that an issue arose that I was not competent to deal with and that he needed someone who specialized in that area (the problem is that people who do ERISA law aren't litigators traditionally) and had the ability to litigate. Or, give him the opportunity to say, "No, I want you to be trial counsel and we will hire him as the ERISA guy." In that case, the client would be responsible for the cost of the second attorney (otherwise I would just withdraw), but I couldn't demand this. What your lawyer is doing is trying to get you to ensure he does't get it wrong, and that is not OK. | You will almost certainly be sued For a small amount like this they would use junior lawyers and while the suit may take a while I’d be surprised if a lawyer spent a week all up on such a simple case. Say 40h at $200 = $8,000 which, when they win, you have to pay. Bargain. | There isn't a difference. The terminology in England and Wales that means the same thing is "litigant in person", with the source of these Latin phrases have abandoned them in favor of plain English terminology. The variation of usage, however, does not necessarily break down on a federal v. state court basis. Pro se is the majority usage, but the variation is more regional, within state courts, than it is a federal v. state divide. California and Michigan, for example, use both terms and use them interchangeably. If there is a historical reason for the variation in terminology, I haven't groked it. Incidentally, there was historically a subtle distinction between the two concepts related to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court that has long since become obsolete (more than a century ago), but which movements such as the "sovereign person" movement errantly believe has great legal importance to the power of a court over them. | This is explained at paragraphs 2-4 of the decision you link. There were two proceedings: a claim in the county court and an application to the Tribunal. The county court claim was transferred to the Tribunal to be consolidated with the application, and they were to be heard together. (Although, technically there should be no literal "transfer" or "consolidation"; the claim is always a county court claim, separate from the tribunal application. It is just that the matters are heard at the same occasion by inviting a tribunal judge to sit in their capacity as a county court judge. See commentary on City, University of London v. Vodafone Limited (2020).) In that circumstance, Judge Nicol was sitting as both a tribunal judge and as a county court judge. This is possible because: On 22 April 2014, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 Sch.9(1) para. 4 was brought into force, providing that judges of the First-tier Tribunal are judges of the county court and therefore able to exercise the jurisdiction of the county court, providing that a claim form has been issued and the matter has been listed for hearing by them. Stephen Jourdan, K.C., "FTT Judges sitting as judges of the county court" (January 2019) See also this previous Q&A where this was explained. | united-states The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutional right to self-representation in Faretta v California, but in Godinez v. Moran, the court injected the logically prior question of competence, rejecting a mixed-bag approach to competence. The court held that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted. While States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose them. The specific issue in this case is competence to plead guilty. In Indiana v. Edwards, the court stated that there is no absolute right to self-representation if one is competent to stand trial. It is held that The Constitution does not forbid States from insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. One conclusion to be drawn from this is that states may but are not required to insist on a specific competence to self-represent, so there can be multiple standards of competence. Second, the Edwards court put the issue more in the realm of questions of insanity, where the limit imposed on a technical minor would have to be a substantial finding of incompetence, and not just a statutory declaration that anyone below the age of 18 is ipso facto incompetent to legally defend themselves but they can be competent to stand trial. In Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, the court further held that nothing "requires a State to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction". This study indicates that individual states have not eagerly cleared the path to minor self-representation, noting that "Many states permit waiver by a juvenile after cursory inquiry by the court", but "Others require that the juvenile consult with a parent, lawyer or other adult". Nevertheless, "waiver of counsel is, almost without exception, connected to an 'admission,' or guilty plea", simply asserting that "Juveniles do not represent themselves at trial", and what minors waive is the right to trial. There is a lack of relevant case law citations in this study, in that no ruling is cited where the court affirms that minors are automatically incompetent to represent themselves in a criminal trial. The specifics of the qualifier "almost without exception" would be very relevant to this question. | In appellate cases, the party appealing is called the "petitioner", and the other party is called the "respondent". These cases are listed Petitioner v. Respondent. In your example, Twombly was the original plaintiff, and Bell was the defendant in a class-action. This initial action would have been referred to as Twombly v. Bell. The case was dismissed by the trial court. Twombly appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. This action would have been still been called Twombly v. Bell, since Twombly was the party petitioning for the appeal. The 2nd Circuit agreed with Twombly, and reversed the district court's decision. Bell, then on the losing side, decided to appeal to the US Supreme Court. Because Bell was the petitioner in this action, Bell gets listed first. |
Is it legal (in USA) to charge for scraped (public) datasets? I recently came across ScrapeHero which publicly sells scraped datasets of various kinds. Store locations, product lists etc. Example: IKEA USA locations. Is it fully OK in USA to simply state that The data on this data store is gathered from one or more public sources.We do not claim ownership or copyrights for the data, we only charge for the effort required to gather, clean and structure the data". I don't doubt that the information is public, but still it's money being made on other people's information. And nowhere is the source listed. As per example of IKEA, the store locations are available in exactly same format by a simple URL. Note: I am not from USA (so do not have knowledge in details of the legality of this) - and I have no affiliation to said online store. Just wondering. | united-states Facts are not copyrightable. Assuming Scrapehero collected these facts in a legal manner and assuming the source of these facts does not contain copyrighted (protected) material, then selling such a collection may be legal. Of particular relevance is Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co.. Here, Feist Publications copied Rural's phone directory into Feist's own phone directory. The supreme court found that Rural's phone directory was not copyrightable and thus not protected. Of course, this cuts both ways. Assuming Scrapehero did not inject creativity into the data, nothing stops a recipient of such data from distributing it themselves. In practice, this probably isn't a concern for Scrapehero. This answer is US-specific. Some countries recognize Database Rights, which may prevent such activity. | As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine. | You would first have to find out if publishing a book was "for commercial purposes". I can write a book and publish it as a hobby. Next you check if there is any copyright infringement. It doesn't sound like there is. Using your website as a tool to create these diagrams doesn't give you copyright unless the result contains your own copyrighted work. So at best there is a violation of your terms and conditions for your website. You can sue about that, but might have to specify damages. If you allow commercial use say for a fee of $1,000, that would give you grounds to claim damages. Or if someone used your website so excessively that it costs you money, that would be damages. | Probably not. There are potential problems on the levels of copyright, data protection, and the Youtube terms of service. You should assume that comments are typically covered by copyright. You do not have a license to these comments, only YouTube does. Therefore, YouTube can show the comments but you can't copy them – just like YouTube can stream your videos but others can't download them and host them on their own websites. To cover the copyright angle, you'd either need to obtain a license from the commenters, or get a sub-license from YouTube, or identify a suitable copyright exception. The comments are personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, so that your processing of these comments (including mere storage) would be subject to GDPR as well. You need a legal basis for processing personal data. Which legal basis is suitable would depend on the purpose of processing, and on your relationship with the commenters. Potentially applicable legal bases in this context: you have a contract with the commenters that requires you to show the comments on your website. For example, I could see such a contract if there were a “featured comment” perk for a Patreon subscription. But this is not going to fly with random commenters. you have a legitimate interest (LI) that allows the processing. A LI requires that you conduct a balancing test where you weigh this interest against the commenter's rights. This is very specific to the purposes for which you want to show the comments. However, a LI will generally only apply if you have an existing relationship with the commenters, making it possible for them to expect that this processing will occur – unlikely if you'll be scraping comments from YouTube. you have obtained consent from the data subject. Consent must be specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous – you can't obtain consent by writing “by commenting under this video you consent to XXX” in the video description. Regardless of legal basis, you would have to inform the commenters under Art 14 GDPR when you scrape their comments from the platform. Finally, consider the platform terms of service. I have not read the YouTube ToS recently, so I don't know what their specific conditions are. But in general, such ToS will not allow you to scrape content from their platform in order to host it somewhere else. The ToS might allow certain actions like embedding a link/iframe to such videos on other sites, without allowing other actions such as copying other user's content to your site. | I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy. | Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion. | If it was illegal to make the entire copy, it is illegal to copy half the file. See also, e.g., Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) In response to the question of whether moving it to someone else's servers makes a difference: it is the act of copying, not the possession of the copy, that is the violation of copyright law. As for the copy a service assists someone to make, contributory liability would be the issue. You don't need to be the person making the copies to be contributing to the infringement--material contribution to the copying process and knowledge of infringement run a serious risk of creating contributory liability. If seriously considering such a service as a business model someone would need to consult a copyright expert with technical knowledge or pay counsel with technical knowledge for a good bit of time to do some research. There are major civil and criminal consequences if the industry or the government decides to go after a service doing this, so legal expenses would be a significant and important cost of doing business that would significantly increase barriers to entry. In addition, the service would likely be in violation of its agreement with storage vendors, who would want to minimize their legal exposure and might well discontinue the service when they learned what it was doing. | a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days. |
What would happen if qualified immunity is ended across the United States? There is a growing movement to eliminate qualified immunity for Police officers in the United States. What would happen from a legal perspective if this actually happened? Can officers be personally sued? Can officers be personally sued for cases prior to the elimination of the QI? Would police be required to have liability insurance in case they violate someones rights? How does this affect case law moving forward? | As a legal matter, very little would change, other than the fact that more cases would proceed through the normal stages of civil litigation. Many cases that would have been dismissed at the Rule 12 or Rule 56 stage would instead proceed to discovery or trial. This also means that the body of civil-rights case law would grow considerably. Right now, because courts already know that a right is not "clearly established" (the second prong of the QI inquiry), they will often refuse to consider whether an officer's actions were unconstitutional (the first prong of the QI inquiry). This has retarded the development of case law in these areas, but that problem could largely be cured with the end of qualified immunity. The end of qualified immunity wouldn't change a plaintiff's ability to sue officers personally. Even with qualified immunity, plaintiffs can and do sue officers personally. Qualified immunity lets some officers off the hook, but many officers nonetheless remain exposed to liability even after attempting to invoke it. Ending qualified immunity would merely increase -- albeit substantially -- the number of officers who can be held personally liable. That wouldn't mean that the officers would personally be required to carry insurance, though. A state or city could impose that requirement, but generally speaking, there's no such obligation. Instead, their employers typically carry their own insurance policies or are self-insured, and those policies cover claims against the officers working for the employer. | How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent. | Even within the United States, this would depend upon the jurisdiction involved. Some jurisdictions recognize a legal privilege of a journalist to keep confidential sources secret (also called a "reporter's privilege"), while others do not. There is a split of authority on the question within the various circuits of the U.S. federal court system, and there is also a split of authority between different U.S. states. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all held that a qualified reporter's privilege exists. In the recent case of U.S. v. Sterling, the Fourth expressly denied a reporter's privilege exists. Furthermore, forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes called shield laws protecting journalists' anonymous sources. Three U.S. Court of Appeals circuits, the 6th, the 7th and the Federal Circuit, do not have any controlling case law on the subject. Ten U.S. states do not have shield laws protecting journalists' anonymous sources. The U.S. Department of Justice, as a matter of policy, seeks to compel journalists to disclose their anonymous sources only under specified conditions where the need is great, but this policy is not a defense available to a journalist in a case brought by the U.S. government. In the absence of a legal privilege, the journalist could be incarcerated until the information is disclosed or the need for the information is moot, for contempt of court. Quite a few journalists in the United States, faced with that choice, have opted to be incarcerated rather than to reveal a source. If the subpoena is upheld, even if the face of a good faith effort of the journalist to quash the subpoena on the basis of a legal privilege or other grounds, if the journalist does comply with the subpoena, the breach of the non-disclosure contract is legally excused and cannot be a ground for the journalist to be legally liable to the informant. | When you say "blanket immunity," I assume you're talking about transactional immunity -- the witness cannot ever be prosecuted for any crimes they testified about. This immunity is actually broader than that required by the US Constitution (although some states do require it). However, if it's provided, it absolutely covers crimes connected to what John is accused of. One very common use of immunity is to give a co-conspirator immunity to testify against another co-conspirator being charged with conspiracy. If transactional immunity wouldn't cover that conspiracy charge, it would pretty much defeat the purpose. | You are not obliged to say anything to a police officer during a traffic stop, in fact you are generally better off staying silent. This is your Fifth Amendment right to silence. The only exception to this is that the officer could ask for your name and you are obliged to give it under Arizona Laws 13-2412, but the answer to that is language-independent and is usually already answered with your driver's license in a traffic stop. If you did choose to communicate only in German, this may have the effect of frustrating the officer's investigation but if you only make truthful statements in German it is unlikely to be obstruction of their investigation. Arizona Laws 13-2409 is I believe the relevant section (emphasis mine): A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if the person commits the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. In general, a law that required you to give answers to a police officer during an investigation in English if you understand English and have waived your right to silence would violate your First Amendment right to free speech (as it is in effect "forced speech"). However, you would need to be careful not to tell the police officer that you do not understand English if that is not true, as it could be misrepresentation. Police officer training likely includes instructions for detaining someone that cannot understand them and the police can detain you and wait for an interpreter to continue their investigation if they determine that is necessary. You may actually be shooting yourself in the foot by doing this, because the time it takes for them to get an interpreter likely extends the amount of time the detainment can last while remaining "reasonable," so you may be waiting by the side of the road longer than you would have if you had simply told the officer that you were invoking your right to silence and followed the officer's instructions without speaking. As an aside, as more people are educated on their rights via the Internet and understand why they should always invoke their right to silence when detained, police officers will get more used to people they pull over immediately and politely telling them that they are going to invoke their right to silence. I doubt most police officers will hold it against you as long as you are otherwise cooperative and don't yell at them or berate them. | The federal precedential case on using deadly force against a fleeing suspect is Tennessee v. Garner: The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. This case does not generally prohibit using deadly force to arrest someone who is fleeing in a vehicle, as vehicles are deadly weapons. A person fleeing police in a car poses a threat to pursuing officers and the general public so it is up to local policy and the officers on scene to weigh the risk of public harm against the interest of taking suspects alive and the risk of attempting to use deadly force against them. However, most if not all police departments do not allow the use of deadly force merely because someone is fleeing in a vehicle and also prohibit using firearms against a vehicle in this way, and at least according to the LA Times this is true of the Long Beach Police Department as well: According to a use-of-force policy from Long Beach Unified’s school safety office, officers are not permitted to fire at a moving vehicle. Firearms may be discharged only when reasonably necessary and justified under the circumstances, such as self-defense and the protection of others, the policy states. The policy also bars shooting at fleeing suspects. | Washington v. Davis held that if a law or other action (in this case, a Verbal Skill Test as part of D.C. police hiring practices) is not necessarily unconstitutional if it results in discriminatory outcome. In order to be actionable against the state, one must prove that the law was intended to discriminate from the creation of the law. Your quoted source is in fact wrong and your number 2 option is the correct summation of the quote. Only laws that are purposefully discriminatory are unconstitutional. | england-and-wales Initially, one should comply with the officer's instructions as he has the power under statutory Stop & Search powers to detain someone for the purpose of the search (discussed here). Failure to do so may be an offence. If, subsequently, one considers the search and detention was unlawful, the first port of call is to lodge a complaint with the relevant police force who - depending on the circumstances - may escalate the complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct IOPC. You can complain directly to the police/other organisation (see ‘Who can I complain about?’ below for a list of the other organisations) or via the IOPC. If you complain via the IOPC, your complaint will be sent direct to the organisation involved. They will assess your complaint and contact you about how it will be handled. The IOPC will not be involved with this initial assessment of your complaint. If the complaint is found to be valid, then any offence committed by not complying with the office would (in all probability) be overturned on appeal. As well as any compensation awarded by the court, the Chief Constable may consider making an ex gratia payment (mentioned here). Note that there is no obligation to do anything if the interaction falls within the Stop & Account provisions. |
LSAT question HELP NEEDED please explain the answer. i chose option c but the answer is option e | please explain the answer. i chose option c but the answer is option e Option C is wrong because it excludes the possibility that most students might have received exactly a B minus. The question permits dividing the group in two subsets. One is {students | grade < B_minus} and the other is its complement {students | grade >= B_minus}. Option C is in terms of the set {students | grade > B_minus} whereas option E is in terms of the set {students | grade >= B_minus}. Only the latter matches the description. | There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case. | The second statement is completely independent of the first. This is to certify that X is pursuing a Minor specialization in our department**.**[PERIOD] The courses offered by our department that have been taken by X are as follows:[...] As long as both of these statements are true, it is not deceptive, therefore not fraudulent. | The entire purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to say that this contract is the agreement, and anything previously negotiated is not part of the agreement. I don't know why they would fail to include that in the contract. | 'Have you been drinking?' isn't a question with a strictly defined legal meaning. It's the opening gambit in a conversation intended to assess whether it's worth proceeding to a sobriety test. And that's it. Further linguistic analysis is pointless. | Some portions of your inquiry are confusing, as in "I insisted that we were going to continue to send money to the mortgage company if we don’t understand what the fees are for". It is unclear why you would continue to send money without understanding the reason for fees, especially since you purportedly sent "the complete payoff" already. What is an appropriate response to an email from a lawyer that says she’s going to withdraw from my case, because I would like to understand the additional fees and charges my mortgage company is charging (over and beyond the plan payment/payoff)? Rather than replying to the lawyer's email, it is more important that you timely file in court a response (with 2 or 3 copies) to her motion to withdraw and that you attend the court hearing (if any is scheduled). Don't forget to also mail your attorney a copy of your response. In the response, you will need to argue that your lawyer's refusal to adequately address your inquiries is in violation of the rules of "professional" conduct (with which attorneys are supposed to comply). By granting the attorney's motion, the court would improperly release her from pending obligations she has with respect to you. For instance, Rule 1.4 of Michigan RPC states: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and comply promptly with reasonable requests for information. [...] (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. (note: other jurisdictions in the U.S. have equivalent rules, so you will need to refer to their corresponding label) By pushing you to pay another $850 without actually explaining you the details of the "settlement" with mortgage company's counsel, your lawyer clearly is failing her duty to reasonably inform you of the matter for which you retained her. Therefore, your response should substantiate that a granting of the attorney's motion to withdraw ought to be conditioned on the fulfillment of her obligation to provide you with reasonably sufficient information which you as her client are entitled to obtain. It will help if you attach to your motion & brief an exhibit showing that the mortgage company actually directed you to inquire of your lawyer the clarification(s) you are pursuing. Once you take care of that issue, I encourage you to seriously assess (and proceed accordingly) whether your attorney's misconduct merits being reported with the entity in charge of disciplining lawyers for their legal malpractice. If I were knowledgeable of bankruptcy law, I would be happy to address your first question. I can only suggest you to do some research on leagle.com to become acquainted with how courts decide bankruptcy issues. Be sure to set parameter "Search By Court" to "Federal Bankruptcy Court". | Law SE is not for direct legal advice. You're in the middle of a contract dispute that has turned acrimonious and need to find legal help. Google for free or low cost legal aid in your area. If this "point person" has mentioned a lawyer or made legal threats, you do need legal help. | Is there any way I can defend myself against penalties when mistakes are made in my favor? Another option, in a similar vein to your suggestions, is to make a contemporaneous record of the conversations. Then send an email* to the public official detailing what was said and agreed, along with a request that they reply with any observations or amendments within a certain time frame. That way you have a date-stamped document properly addressed to the other party to use as evidence or leverage. *or a recorded delivery letter etc |
The next door condominium HOA refuses to cut back 20'-30' high bushes that blocks my view. What action can I take to have them cut back these bushes These enormous fast-growing thorn-covered bushes are in places 4' feet over my property line. Besides being up to 30' high, they block my view of the horizon and foothills. My HOA has contacted the condominium's HOA on several occasions and they outright refuse to do anything about this issue. There has been a 'red flag' fire warning for our general area and I believe these bushes also present a fire hazard. Six months ago, I paid a landscape company $300 to cut back the bushes by 5'. Is there anything I can do at this point? Thank you, jim | You can trim bushes at your property line, as you have done. There is little hope for forcing a neighbor to cut more radically on their side. It is possible that a fire ordinance could be an issue, so it the bushes are a credible fire-related threat to property, the fire department might intervene (your belief that the bushes pose a threat is countered by their presumed belief that there is no threat). There may be local plant-height ordinance, but perhaps bushes are restricted by local regulations, so check whether they are in violation there (a rather remote possibility). Finally, there could be view-protecting ordinances or CCRs, but again those are rare. | This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law. | You can do everything that follows the legal rules: It does follow the building allocation for the lot (which most likely reads: Parking lot of lot XYZ, preventing reallocation into other lots) It follows local laws (which might or might not prescribe that condos have to provide a parking space per condo, preventing tearing it up) AND you must find the other party that actually owns the lot willing to part with the lot and sign you over the lot with the rights to modify the land. So while technically you might be legally allowed to get ownership, it seems unlikely just from an economical standpoint: the condo leaser will most decidedly not want to make his condos unattractive (by not providing parking), break the law (by not providing parking) and he might not want to sell the condos together with the building and you have no legal leverage at all to force him to do that. | Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough). | Here is a document from the city, which says p. 16 that Oakland does not have an Ordinance or Regulation restricting the amount of rent a master tenant charges a subtenant. This assumes that subletting is not prohibited by the lease. | Desuetude is the Latin word. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desuetude Typically there is more to it than just that there was no enforcement for a while. It usually occurs when prosecutors agree not to prosecute and judges don't punish or punish harshly for it. Normally an HOA is just rules for your apartment building and not actual laws so it would not apply there. | Check with the local fire station. You will probably be required to get a permit for a large fire, but firefighters are sometime interested in participating in burns of condemned buildings because they can get training from it. | I am sympathetic to your problem but there is probably not a legal solution: at least not an easy or cheap one. To help you clarify a whole mish-mash of issues I will address each of your points. frequently calls false noise complaints on neighbors resulting in police action. If the person genuinely believes that these complaints are valid, even if they do not end up being substantiated, he is within his rights to make such complaints. If you can document an ongoing pattern of unproven complaints this might amount to harassment and you could then seek a court order that he stop the harassing behaviour. However, if even a few of these complaints are proven this would become much harder. stands in front of the building in a menacing way as people enter/exit. He is entitled to stand wherever he likes in whatever "way" he likes. This is only an issue if the person entering/exiting has a reasonable fear that he will he will visit actual harm upon them, o, of course, if he actually does visit physical harm upon them. If so, then this is assault and can be reported to the police or be the basis of a civil action. hates black people. So, he's a bigot - this is not actually illegal. Discriminating against someone on the basis that they are black is illegal, hating them on that basis isn't. hates Middle Eastern people and Muslims. Ditto. constantly pounds on the floor/walls/ceilings. It can't be "constantly" - it might be often or even frequently, if you intent to take legal action hyperbolic language is not going to aid your case. To make a real complaint about this you would need to diarise each occurrence. Notwithstanding, unless he is damaging someone else's property or is violating a noise ordinance this is not illegal. screams curses at children. Clearly reprehensible behaviour: not clearly illegal. Unless this is assault (see above) or qualifies as offensive behavior under the criminal code wherever you are (unlikely) then he can scream whatever he wants at whoever he likes. Again, a pattern of such behavior may constitute harassment. Continues to park in handicap parking despite not being handicap, and receiving very expensive parking tickets. This is illegal and he is being punished for it. Unfortunately the expression Don't do the crime, if you can't do the time. has a corollary: if you are willing and able to take the punishment then you do as much crime as you want. And to add to the list, I suspect he's been putting nails in my car tire, always on the same tire, on the inside wall of the tire; I just replaced my 5th tire in 3 months. This is a crime. If you can get evidence to prove it then you can report him to the police and/or sue him for the damage. You have stated in your comments that you will be asking another question specifically about filming him, so I won't address this here. Is there some sort of legal incentive I've not clearly communicated to management to evict him? That depends on if any of his actions are actually grounds for terminating his lease and, if they are, the landlord wants to do so. A remote landlord who is getting his rent on time and not having their property damaged has no incentive to evict a tenant: no matter how annoying they are to others. It is possible, that you have a case for breaking your lease and/or suing your landlord for damages as you are not getting "quiet enjoyment" of the property. A suit along those lines may resolve the matter because either you or he will be evicted. Consult a lawyer. If he actually is insane, what sort of liability for his actions does he have? The same as anybody else. Liability for civil wrongs is an objective test of what a reasonable person would be liable for: it is not based on the specific characteristics of the person. |
Using different source code for binary releases If a company released source code for software and released a corresponding binary release that uses different code, are they obligated to give acknowledgement that they used different source code? What if the company secretly included unwanted (like trackers, malware, cryptocurrency miners, etc.)? Will anyone ever be able to discover that? and what should happen to the company? I hope I get an answer which can be understood anyone who develops or uses open source software without having to study law. | If it is open source code, then usually the requirement is that you produce the source code for the software that you release. Exactly for the software that you release. For example if you took open source software X, and added feature Y, and distributed the combined software outside your company, anyone can request the source code for X including Y. Handing them the source code for X only wouldn't meet the open source requirements. Now all this is not illegal, but it means the copyright holder of X could sue you for copyright infringement. They will do that if they have enough reasons to do so. So let's say you are continuously developing your software and occasional hand out your compiled software. Say you built versions 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 of the software, you gave versions 100 and 103 to customers, and anyone asking for the source code is given the source code for the latest, slightly improved version 104. The copyright holder of X might sue you but: 1. They wouldn't know you are doing this. 2. A judge might side with you and decide that newer, improved source code is good enough (I don't know this, but it seems not unreasonable). 3. The copyright holder might decide that they don't want to sue you for this because you are close enough to meeting the requirements. | Yes, this could become an issue Trademark infringement occurs when you use another’s trademark in a way that could cause confusion to the consumer. Is it possible that people will be confused that your company produced a game of the same name? Yes. Is that trademark infringement? Possibly. Would a company like Bethesda take you to court to find out? Possibly. Can you avoid this risk by choosing a different name? Yes. Does this cost anything? No, as a new business your ‘brand’ has zero value right now. Should you choose a new name? Well, it’s your business - make a business decision. | Yes, you do. But you should not base your claim primarily on copyright, but just on the license contract you agreed to. It's typically much easier to prove that a party did not fulfill its part of a sales contract (here: Pay the agreed amount) than to prove violation of a copyright you own. Also, you then only need to sue one guy, and not care about every platform your game might be hosted on. This is particularly difficult here, since they have not done anything wrong. It's not their fault that the publisher didn't properly pay the programmer. They (very likely) got their copy of the game legally. For details, you should consult a lawyer. We can't give you detailed legal advice. | Sources of Liability Liability can come from: Statute law Contract law Common law Statute Law There may be (almost certainly are) laws in the jurisdiction where Joes Cheap Carnival are operating relating to Work Health and Safety. In general, these laws will impose a non-delegable duty (i.e. one you cant get out of) to comply with certain minimum standards. If operating your software as instructed with reasonable assumptions gives results that lead to an unsafe design then you would be liable in both cases. Contract Law If you are selling this software then you can limit your liability in any way you like providing that the limitation is not unlawful. For example, under Australian Consumer Law (which covers B2B transactions up to AUD$40,000 - how much are you selling for?) you have a non-excludable warranty that the software is fit-for-purpose; so, again, if operating your software as instructed with reasonable assumptions gives results that lead to an unsafe design then you would be liable in both cases. Common Law Only parties to a contract can take action under a contract; anyone you owe a duty of care to can sue your for negligence. A person injured by a machine your software helped design need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; it would be hard to argue you didn't, You breached that duty; the software was not "fit-for-purpose", There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your software there would have been no loss, There was a legal (proximate) cause; you may be able to raise something here, if your software was used incorrectly by an engineer, your breach may be too distant Harm; the person must suffer real loss. The only plausible advantage of making your software open source is that you are showing a greater amount of care by allowing your algorithms to be sort-of peer reviewed. This is not a legal shield I would really like to depend on. TL;DR Nothing can stop someone suing you - if they want to sue you they can sue you. Your best defence to a lawsuit is to demonstrate that you did everything a reasonable person could do without the benefit of hindsight Do you really think publishing your code is "everything a reasonable person could do"? You would be far better off: Taking out professional indemnity insurance Validating you algorithms thoroughly Engaging an independent third-party to validate your algorithms Developing proper and thorough testing procedure for your software Testing it in-house Engaging an independent third-party to test it Thoroughly documenting your software including all the assumptions along with the domains where they are valid and invalid. | The GPL that covers the OpenJDK certainly allows you to write and distribute your own Java implementation. On that point, your reading is absolutely correct. However, if that implementation is a derivative work of the OpenJDK, then the GPL requires you to make your derivative implementation available under the GPL as well, per the GPL's copyleft rules. If you follow the rules of the GPL, you can do exactly what you propose. Note that the Supreme Court ruling in Oracle v. Google found that using only API structure and names, without copying any underlying implementation, constitutes fair use, and therefore doesn't require copyright permission. If you hold your implementation to that standard and use/look at only interfaces while authoring your new implementation, then your new work is broadly allowed under copyright law, so you do not need to rely on the GPL's permissions (and therefore neither do you need to follow its requirements). Google didn't want to have to abide by the terms of the GPL, probably because due to concerns that the any GPL terms that applied to their Java implementation might also apply to other components of their system, which they wished to keep closed-source. In other words, if Google had claimed their acquired their right to use the APIs under the GPL, then they would have been required to put potentially the entire operating system under the GPL, which they had not done nor wished to do. For this case, the GPL has been largely ignored because Google has not followed the requirements of GPL in licensing their Java implementation (and operating system that uses it), so there's no point in Google trying to claim that their right to use the API came from the GPL. Furthermore, Google claimed that they didn't use any of Oracle's copyrighted material, so it's not possible for them to say their use of Oracle's material was licensed under the GPL, as they claim there was no use whatsoever, licensed or otherwise. This is explained at length on fosspatents.com's article "Q&A on the Dec. 4 Oracle v. Google Android-Java copyright hearing before the Federal Circuit": 2. Q: Does this litigation involve Google's rights to use certain Java code under an open source license? A: No. Google could have incorporated Java into Android on open source terms, but chose to eschew the GNU General Public License (GPL) because of its "copyleft" feature. [...] If Google had ever claimed in this litigation that Android's incorporation of Java was authorized under the GPL, this would have been inconsistent with its claim that it didn't use any copyrightable material (you can only license something, on whatever terms, if it's protected) and, far more importantly, a blatant violation of Rule 11 (truthful pleading standard) resulting in sanctions for Google and its counsel. The GPL affords you four freedoms: it allows you to use software without paying for it (freedom 0), to modify its source code as you please (freedom 1), to redistribute copies (freedom 2), and to distribute your modified versions to others (freedom 3). But once you exercise freedom 3, you're subjected to the copyleft rule: you must make your modified version available under the GPL. As a result, Google would have had to publish Android under the GPL. But it did not. [...] [...]Google seeks to exercise as much control over Android as possible. If Android had to be released under the GPL (and only under the GPL, or at least a compatible copyleft license), Google would have a hard time keeping a growing number of core Android components like its Mail and Map clients or even the new on-screen keyboard (again, more about that in the next section) closed -- and Google's hardware partners would have to release their proprietary enhancements such as Samsung's Touchwiz and HTC Sense under the GPL, which would run counter to their objective of differentiation because their competitors could then use the same code. | No LLC or corporate entity exists around or in relation to SoftDAO. That's a bad thing, not a good thing, to those involved. Mr. Founder is obviously liable. When he wrote the DAO, he intended that it compete with IncumbentCo, and thus almost certainly intended that the software would violate the patent. And it doesn't matter that he's not the majority owner - he's still a part owner, meaning he's profiting from the infringement. Furthermore, he promoted the scheme, and according to 35 U.S. Code § 271(b), "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." Mr. Large, and any other identifiable part owner, is liable. Mr. Large did not commit a crime himself and generally is a good citizen. Good for him. But lots of people get sued that never committed a crime. Suing Mr. Large is like suing an Enron shareholder for owning Enron shares. Typically we do not sue shareholders. But he isn't a shareholder, and that's critical. If you want the benefits of a publicly traded company, you need to actually make a publicly traded company. Mr. Large is being unfairly targeted simply because he is a public figure with association with the project due to the Fortune Magazine article. Yes, he's being sued because of the article, but so what? It's like saying the police unfairly targeted you for an underage drinking citation because you were dumb enough to post yourself on Facebook. That argument won't fly in court. IncumbentCo can pick who they want to sue. It is nearly impossible to prove that Mr. Large is the 30th largest owner of SoftCoin. Court warrant allowed the Court to find some of Mr. Large's public keys on the SoftCoin blockchain, but the blockchain says he is actually only the 100th largest owner now. It doesn't matter. He's a part owner, by his own admission and by the blockchain evidence. The developers are also liable, also potentially for the whole amount. They created software that infringed a valid patent, and profited from it. If they can't shut it down, they can't shut it down, but they're going to be paying. I'm thinking this is a case where joint and several liability applies; IncumbentCo can go after any particular one of the owners and developers for the entire amount if they feel like it, and then it would be up to that person to then sue anyone else he thinks is partially liable. If Mr. Large is a billionaire and could pay the entire judgement himself, they might just do that. They'd probably go after Mr. Founder for as much as they thought they could get out of him, though. The users are also liable, since the law provides that using a patented invention without authority is infringing. But they're only liable for their one copy, and IncumbentCo may not bother with them, at least initially. However, the SoftDAO owns no assets No, but IncumbentCo is going to seek injunctions against selling SoftCoins or running the software. Could some people slip through the cracks? Sure. People infringe copyright all the time online, and only some get caught. You could easily imagine someone selling pirated software in exchange for cryptocurrency. This would be little different. | Yes, you can fork it - but you can’t use it GitHub explain what’s a public deposit with no licence means here. If you find software that doesn’t have a license, that generally means you have no permission from the creators of the software to use, modify, or share the software. Although a code host such as GitHub may allow you to view and fork the code, this does not imply that you are permitted to use, modify, or share the software for any purpose. Your options: Ask the maintainers nicely to add a license. Unless the software includes strong indications to the contrary, lack of a license is probably an oversight. If the software is hosted on a site like GitHub, open an issue requesting a license and include a link to this site. If you’re bold and it’s fairly obvious what license is most appropriate, open a pull request to add a license – see “suggest this license” in the sidebar of the page for each license on this site (e.g., MIT). Don’t use the software. Find or create an alternative that is under an open source license. Negotiate a private license. Bring your lawyer. | You don't have to, but you probably want to for a couple of reasons: It's courteous, and in the spirit of open source It's someone else's work, and you're using it. The least you can probably say is "thank you." It will also probably help you stay in the clear: since you're using software in binary form, where the notice isn't immediately accessible, then by providing a copy of the license, you respect that licensing term in another way. It tells your users what's up with the program Let's admit it, having the license accessible to the users tells them what's in the program and so on. It's another way of providing attribution, like I listed in the first reason above. Many apps, desktop and mobile, have a screen or panel to indicate the projects and licenses that they use. They don't have to be straight in the user's face, they can be a little button in the "About" screen of the program. To answer a little confusion: the binaries are still a derived form from that source code. Analyse the heading: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. The software is still there, it's just there in a different form, a compiled form. Therefore, the copyright and permission notice should probably stick around, even if it's just a file somewhere. |
At what point does something become theft? Let's say Bob enters a store and he only needs to pick up a few small items. The store provides shopping carts but he doesn't use one. He grabs the small items he needs and to transport them to the register in the front he puts them in the small pocket of his hoodie. As he's walking to the register, a loss prevention person stops them and accuses Bob of theft. He says "We have you on camera stuff your hoodie with stuff". He explains that he was simply carrying the items in his hoodie to the front register. The loss prevention agent doesn't allow him to go to the register and forces Bob into the back room until the police arrives. Did Bob commit a theft? | The crime of theft generally requires two elements - taking control of property, and the intent to deprive the rightful owner of it. If Bob had no intent to leave without paying, he may lack the intent often required for theft. In the scenario described, it's possible Bob has not committed theft, but his actions may indeed constitute theft depending on the jurisdiction. As pointed out in the comments, some jurisdictions codify the concealment of merchandise as prima facie presumption of an intention to steal, or may even codify the act of concealment itself as a crime. There are some shoplifting laws statues that specifically call out "willful concealment", which does not require leaving the premises of a store to have committed a crime - merely concealing the item may be a crime in itself, although perhaps not the crime of "theft". Whether a court would find Bob guilty of theft will depend on a number of factors, depending if there is leeway in inferring intent, and how that intent is inferred. If Bob's actions are found to be sufficiently inconsistent with the behavior of someone who truly intended to pay, the court may find him guilty. If a reasonable person would infer a lack of intent to pay from Bob's actions, he may be found guilty. | Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away. | There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses. | This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't | If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime. | I can’t think of any laws against pretending to commit a crime, per se. For example, undercover police officers often pretend to buy or sell illicit goods, to see who will take them up on the offer. However, pretending to commit some crimes could be a crime. if you intentionally pretend to be violent or unstable, and this “puts another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact,” that could be common assault. | You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment. | "Necessity" is a defense against criminal prosecution in many jurisdictions. However, what counts as "necessary" is situation dependent. The essence of an action being "necessary" is an action is necessary if there is no other means of preventing a crime. In your scenario, there are many non-criminal alternative means of preventing the theft, such as calling the police, moving your car, or locking it, so stealing a person's car is not necessary. The conclusion that a crime "will be committed, but for..." also has to be clearly supported by reason. |
What are the _vertical_ limits of a country's (or other entity's) territory? The examples deal with the US, but I'd also be curious about similar laws relating to other countries. Imagine there is an underground cave or tunnel whose entrance is in Sonora, Mexico, but which extends underground to pass under the territory of Arizona, United States. Now imagine that a woman enters the cave or tunnel and knowingly walks into the part that is under Arizona. Assuming she is not a US citizen, LPR or visa holder, has she illegally entered the country? If she commits a crime while in that area, would a court in Arizona have jurisdiction to try her for it? What about a court in Sonora? If she gives birth to a child while in that area, would the child be a US citizen by jus soli ? Would it be a Mexican citizen? Now imagine that instead of an underground passage, any of the events occurs in one of the following situations: She has jumped across the border line, but has not yet landed (okay, hard to imagine a child being born in this short of a time, but surely a crime could be committed while in the air) She is in an airplane crossing the airspace over Arizona She is an astronaut on the International Space Station, which happens to pass over Arizona in its orbit. If there is any difference between the "jumping", "airplane", and "space station" answers, why? Is there a specific altitude at which territorial jurisdiction expires? | Down - to the centre of the Earth. In a practical sense, 10km or so. Up - to the edge of space. Assuming she is not a US citizen, LPR or visa holder, has she illegally entered the country? Has she entered the country? Yes. Is this illegal? Well, presuming it is not a place "designated by immigration officers" for entry? Yes, irrespective of any residency or visas she holds. Only US citizens may enter at other than designated crossing places. If she commits a crime while in that area, would a court in Arizona have jurisdiction to try her for it? Yes. What about a court in Sonora? Maybe. It depends on if the crime triggers some form of extraterritorial Mexican jurisdiction. If she gives birth to a child while in that area, would the child be a US citizen by jus soli ? Yes. Would it be a Mexican citizen? If the mother or father is a Mexican, yes. Also, if the person is born on a Mexican-registered vessel or aircraft which seems unlikely in the circumstances. She has jumped across the border line, but has not yet landed (okay, hard to imagine a child being born in this short of a time, but surely a crime could be committed while in the air) Same answers apply. She is in an airplane crossing the airspace over Arizona What is the nationality of the airplane? Is this a commercial or private flight? Is its source or destination in the US, Mexico, both or neither? Has she passed through any nation's immigration? She is an astronaut on the International Space Station, which happens to pass over Arizona in its orbit. The ISS is subject to it's own treaties - it depends on her nationality and what part of the ISS she is in at the time. | It’s legal under Ukrainian law for foreign nationals to join their defense forces Indeed, this is so common it may be considered the default position internationally: the US, UK, France, and Australia just to name a few all allow this. Generally, it’s usually legal for a citizen to join the army of a foreign state. It is usually not legal to fight for a non-state actor this is where fighters for ISIS are in trouble. Where issues arise is if they take up arms against the country of their citizenship. That’s called treason and it usually attracts the most severe punishment available: death or life imprisonment typically. So, as long as you aren’t Russian and are not from one of the few countries that prohibits foreign military service, there are no legal issues. | Yes. A multi-nation citizen who has US citizenship has equal US citizenship with every other citizen; therefore the answer to this binary question is "Yes". The citizenship(s) of anyone who does not have US citizenship is irrelevant to this question; thus, the answer to this binary question is "No". Yes. The main point here is to determine if you have the relevant documents and permissions to be legally present in the US. If you are a US citizen, a) this makes the process easier for you and b) avoids any possible issues if evidence is found of citizenship from another country, which will make immigration think that A) you are not a US citizen and b) you lied to them. Most people have only a single citizenship. That is the default mindset of immigration. There's no downside for you to inform them; there may be additional difficulties, delays, and scrutiny if you do not. If you are not a US citizen, most of the same applies. Additionally, lying (even by omission) can be grounds to have your legal status revoked. In summary, if you have the legal right to be in the US (e.g. US citizen, legal resident) being fully honest cannot hurt you, and can make the process smoother. If you have legal permission to be in the US, being fully honest will help prevent that permission from being revoked. | National territory It depends on the nation. Some countries or jurisdictions have specific laws about meteorites, like the Western Australia Museum Act 1969, ss. 43-45, which provides that meteorites are Crown property (there are many meteorites in the Nullarbor Plain). Absent any specific rule like this, meteorites are likely to be treated in any of the following ways - It's a rock. Mineral rights (which often go along with ownership of the land in general, but can be separately assigned) may apply to meteorites on the grounds (haha) that they are rocks which can be treated as part of the land on which they fell. There may be special law vesting certain kinds of mineral finds in the State, should you be dealing with a meteorite made of gold, for example. Mineral law is a specialist topic even within national law, so the exact answer here may depend on a lot of factors - what the thing is made of, whether it's above ground or not, etc. - but the probable starting point is that rocks from space are no different in law from the rocks that were already there. It's an object that has no clear owner. There are longstanding principles for "unowned things" in civil and common law systems, typically applying to wild animals or other things that are naturally occurring and not part of the land as such. If a meteorite is "res nullius" in this sense, then it might belong to the finder or to the landowner, depending on exactly which flavor of legal tradition is followed. It's a valuable find. There are similar rules about "treasure trove", for example in the United Kingdom which gives rights to the Crown. But a meteorite would not be classed as treasure in the UK, because it is an "unworked natural object". Other jurisdictions might draw these boundaries differently. It's an object of scientific importance. A meteorite might be classed as "cultural property" within the meaning of the U.N. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970 , as transposed into local law. The Convention covers "rare collections and specimens of [...] minerals", and objects of paleontological or archaeological interest. This could affect somebody's ability to export or destroy the object (for the latter, see also the 2003 UNESCO Declaration which includes "cultural heritage linked to a natural site"). National law might contain its own similar provisions. International waters and the poles The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Part XI governs mineral exploitation in "the Area", meaning the part of the seabed that does not belong to any nation. Activities of this kind are meant to be under the auspices of the International Seabed Authority, which has copious rules about application and approval, navigation, environmental controls, and so on - subject to the Convention principle of treating the seabed as "the common heritage of mankind". This Area includes the North Pole. The South Pole is part of the area covered by the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991, which provides in its Article 7 that Any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited. In practice, as in international law generally, States might do all sorts of other things. But this is the broad legal position. It might be that States would agree a special regime applicable to the totally unprecedented circumstances, or that it would be a free-for-all. Again, I'm assuming that the applicable principles for digging up a space rock for commercial purposes are the same as for other kinds of rock. There is international law about space rocks when they are in space, and about human-made objects when they crash down to Earth, but seemingly no special provision for meteorites. | Probably not. There is an unenumerated constitutional "right to travel" (which has been recognized in case law, and has not yet been judicially overruled) and there is also a concept called the "dormant commerce clause" which prohibits legislation by a state that interferes with the ability of people to engage in interstate commerce even if Congress has passed no relevant legislation. There could also be a privileges and immunities clause argument arising under the original 1789 constitution and not the 14th Amendment to that document privileges and immunities clause, which affords people from outside a state the same rights as people in a state. Also, citizens of a state are defined as its residents, so a state only has jurisdiction over someone as a citizen for so long as they reside there. I was born in Georgia, for example, but haven't lived there since I was six years old, so I am not a citizen of Georgia. The proposed Texas law bears some similarity to the Mann Act of 1910 which prohibits transporting people across state lines for the purposes of prostitution (to slightly oversimplify). But the Mann Act is a federal law, not a state law. The proposed Texas law also bears some similarity to the infamous Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which required free states to respect the slave status of people treated as slaves in a slave state under the slave state's law by returning fugitive slaves to their out of state masters, when the slave escaped across state lines. But, this was also a federal law and reflect the greater extraterritorial force of contracts and property rights created under state law compared to the extraterritorial force of the police powers of a state government. There are constitutional provisions requiring states to honor each other's rulings as well, most notably the requirement to extradite felons, and the full faith and credit clause that requires states to honor the court judgments and government determinations of status (e.g. marriage certificates) of other states in most circumstances. But, I don't think that you get there in a case regulating the conduct of a state resident outside the state, or in a case where you want to criminalize assisting someone in the state to leave the state for a particular purpose. Neither of these examples, however, involve state laws. Generally, penalties for doing something across state lines need to be established by federal, rather than state, laws. This said, the issue has not been litigated in this particular context yet, and the legal theories implicated and structure of those lines in fine particulars could matter. States have only rarely tried to regulate the conduct of their residents outside their own states and have even less frequently been successful in doing so. | With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Applicable Law States have jurisdiction both over crimes that are committed in the state and over crimes that cause harm in a state. The classic law school example is a murder committed by shooting someone with a gun across a state line. Both the state where the gun is fired and the state where the person is shot have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction generally requires a purposeful act directed at someone or something in the state where the harm is suffered in most cases. But that isn't a hard and fast rule of constitutional law in other contexts, and there are few cases on point. I would consider this to be an open question. Certainly, however, the mere fact that the victim of a crime is transported to another state for medical treatment, where that victim then dies from causes relate to the crime, does not give the state where the death ultimately occurs in the hospital jurisdiction over the offense. Double Jeopardy Indeed, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not prohibit both states from independently convicting and punishing the same defendant for the same crime in this situation under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. As background, the Colorado Supreme Court decided a dual sovereignty double jeopardy case today. Application To Facts (The application to the facts has been revised upon closer examination of them.) The line about "Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada," is confusing because she was in California before and isn't described as ever being in Nevada. I presume that "still in California" was really meant. Mr. Y could be charged (at least) in Nevada or New Jersey from which the continuing course of communications was sent (undue emphasis on the final communication is probably inappropriate), and Wyoming, to which the bulk of the communications were directed and where the bulk of the harm was suffered. California and Nebraska do not seem to be places to which the communications were really directed or where the greatest harm was suffered. Momentary presence in Nebraska air space is probably insufficient. There are also a set of statutes that specifically address crimes committed during an airplane flight (see also here) that has been discussed in other answers at this website. To the extent that this is treated as a homicide committed while in flight, 49 USC § 46506, might also allow for a federal criminal prosecution. I'm not sure that this is really a crime committed in flight, however, as it involved a course of conduct. A single email or a single moment of death doesn't really capture it. It is more analogous to a poisoning taking place in many doses over a period of time. Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? No. First Amendment considerations do apply to crimes involving communications between people that are not false, but if there is sufficient intent to cause suicide or other harm, the First Amendment yields to other considerations. The freedom of speech is not absolute. The exact place that the line is drawn is a matter of ongoing litigation. This specific issue is explored in depth in Clay Calvert, "The First Amendment and Speech Urging Suicide: Lessons from the Case of Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand Brandenburg Application" 94 Tulane Law Review 79 (November 2019). This article is responsive to that case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). The article explains in its introduction that: In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender based on her urging Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem." In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her no refuge.' | All countries (and some sub-national jurisdictions) have extraterritorial jurisdiction The U.S. Criminal Code asserts the following items to fall within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, much of which is extraterritorial in nature: The high seas and any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, including any vessels owned by US persons that are travelling on them Any US vessel travelling on the Great Lakes, connecting waters or the Saint Lawrence River (where that river forms part of the Canada–United States border) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof Any island claimed under the Guano Islands Act Any US aircraft flying over waters in the same manner as US vessels Any US spacecraft when in flight Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States Any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States Offenses committed by or against a national of the United States in diplomatic missions, consulates, military and other missions, together with related residences, outside the US International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act The US is actually pretty narrow in its assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption against extraterritoriality. So US laws have to explicitly assert a claim of extraterritoriality. Contrast this with, say, France where the Code pénal asserts general jurisdiction over crimes by, or against, the country's citizens, no matter where they may have occurred. Crimes perpetrated from foreign jurisdictions Notwithstanding, a crime can be perpetrated in a country without the perpetrator ever having been in that country. Hacking of computer systems is an obvious example. However, almost all criminal codes include a crime similar to "Attempted X" or "Conspiracy to commit X" which clearly don't require a physical presence. Terrorist attacks are often planned in third-party countries by a group, only a small number of whom actually go the country to commit the actual attack but all of them have committed a crime under that county's jurisdiction. Extradition Any country (A) may request extradition from any other country (B) where A asserts that it has a case to bring against the individual. No country can demand extradition. B will decide whether to grant the request subject to its own law on the matter and the provisions of any extradition treaty that may be in place between A and B. Dual Criminality A crime committed in country A may engage the jurisdiction country B. If so, country A gets first crack at prosecution. Country A might decide not to prosecute, might prosecute and fail or might prosecute and succeed. Notwithstanding the outcome country B can decide to prosecute as well. Usually if the defendant has been prosecuted by country A (win or lose), country B will not prosecute. A specific example An Australian engages in sex with a French-American child in the US embassy in Rome, Italy. Italy has jurisdiction because the crime was committed in Italy. The US has jurisdiction because the offence was committed against a US national in a US diplomatic mission. France has jurisdiction because the victim was French. Australia has jurisdiction because sex crimes against minors by Australians are prosecutable in Australia. The perpetrator flees to the UK (with whom all four countries have extradition treaties) where they are arrested - the UK government (courts and foreign minister) will decide if and to whom the perpetrator will be extradited (probably Italy). After they are prosecuted there (and serve any sentence) any of the other three may request extradition. And so on. | Normally, an alleged offence of this sort that crosses jurisdictional boundaries will be deemed to have been committed where the defendant is located at the time of the offence regardless of where they live - as it is they who do the actus reus at the relevant time. In india, the venue is determined by section 177 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial. Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However, there is any doubt which is the appropriate venue section 178 will apply: Place of inquiry or trial. (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed, partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence, is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Also, note the provisions of section 462: Proceedings in wrong place. No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceedings in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub- division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. |
Starting a Tech Company: Should I rename and reuse my existing C-Corp, or form a new one? I have a delaware-based C-Corp formed some years ago, still in good standing, that I used to create a tech startup (never raised any funding, or generated any revenue) which I have put on hold for now. I'm starting a new tech-startup; should I form a new C-Corp, or should I rename the old C-Corp used for my previous company, and use that for the new company? I didn't file for my R&D tax credits, but I can get some still (you can file 3 years in retrospect for the expenses I incurred), because we had expenses. Also the Qualified Small Business Stock (QSBS) favors companies that have been around for more than 5 years when they are sold. So that's why I'm thinking of re-using an old C-corp rather than forming a new one. Thanks, bye! | Better to start fresh. From an investor's perspective, an old C-corp inherently leaves open questions over whether there are any skeletons in the closet and the dollar cost and effort involved is trivial. | It does mean that you cannot reuse any parts of the source code, even small simple ones. You would have to rebuild the code from scratch. There is a significant chance that the code would be "substantially similar" to the code that you were hired to build, also that if anybody else were to write a bubble sort or 24-to-am/pm conversion routine, it would look the same, where even variable names (which should describe function) are the same or very similar. In case of an infringement lawsuit, you would have to defend yourself by showing that there are only a few ways to code a given function. Copyright protects only the "expression", not the abstract idea. A linked list is an idea, which can't be protected by copyright; same with recursion, pointers, stacks, object-oriented programming... Anything that involves copy and paste is infringement. If you re-read the copyrighted code and then try to reconstruct it, you probably crossed the infringement line. If you remember the problems and solutions and accidentally write somewhat similar code, that is probably on the safe side. From the perspective of the programmer not wanting to always reinvent the wheel, it would be most useful to make a distinction in the contract between "the essentials of the customer's program" versus "incidental utility work". The difficulty will arise in saying specifically what is essential vs. incidental. For instance, I know that if I were to hire you to develop a speech-recognition system, low-level audio-acquisition and encoding would not be essential to my purpose, whereas DSP parsing routines would be the center of my interest. The programmer would then want to retain recycling rights to all non-essential code. | On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article. | It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also. | Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.) | File as a partnership for the return for the calendar year of her death. File on Schedule C as a sole proprietorship in subsequent years. Generally there is nothing to formally terminate. Unless there are licenses to do business involved, no formal notification of change of entity type is necessary. Since a partnership is a pass-through business, the tax characteristics from year to year carry automatically through your individual returns (just one return with no ambiguities if you filed jointly as widows and widowers are allowed to file a final joint return after the death of their spouse). | B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B & C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B & C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B & C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B & C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B & C; they’ve done what they’re required to do. | If the details of your implementation are not disclosed by the previous patent, and more generally, if they are novel and non-obvious in light of the entire body of prior art (including the previous patent), then you could obtain a patent whose claims are limited to implementations that include (some of) those details. That said, your patent would not exclude the coverage of the previous patent—it is possible for something to be covered by the claims of multiple patents, even patents with different owners. If your implementation is a method that includes every step of a claim of the previous patent, then performing your implementation would still infringe that patent (regardless of the existence of your own patent or patent application). Analogously, if it is a device that includes all of the elements of a claim of the previous patent, it would infringe. Of course, the other patent may not be valid, and so you could seek to invalidate it if desired (but this can involve lengthy & expensive legal proceedings). |
Must a law be broken for a court to hear the case? An agreement between a union and association has expired. Though it had been renewed for many years an impasse has been reached and lockouts have happened. The union has taken the association to court for negotiating in bad faith. They claim they want an opt out clause which allegedly would give them the choice as to when the agreement applies to them. Would such a contract be enforceable if one party gets to decide when it applies to them? Both sides claim the other is spreading disinformation which is destabilizing the industry and will cause work to go to other jurisdictions/countries. When do courts hear a case and issue orders? Is it only when a law is alleged to have been broken? Is it technically breaking a law to negotiate in bad faith? If a company is doing something to cause wide spread economic damage would a court order them to stop? | Short Answer Must a law be broken for a court to hear the case? Generally speaking a union or management group involved in a labor dispute has to allege that the other side did something that entitled them to some sort of relief under the applicable labor laws and any surviving provisions of the collective bargaining agreement of the parties. But an adjudicator can only extremely rarely impose the economic terms of a new collective bargaining agreement, and then generally only after the parties have been ordered to participate in mediation and failure to produce a collective bargaining agreement. The far more common resolution of a failure to reach a new collective bargaining agreement is to allow a strike or lockout to continue until an agreement is reached. But, in rare circumstances, typically when a strike is not permitted for public policy reasons, a third-party arbitrator can sometimes impose economic terms for a new collective bargaining agreement when efforts to negotiation new terms fail. This said, different subjects of labor disputes, and different kinds of employment (in industry or occupational type) are often handled differently from each other. Canada has at least twenty-one different labor boards or tribunals to handle different kinds of labor disputes, each with its own separate authorizing statute. Long Answer There Is More Than One Set Of Labor Laws In Canada Labor law is a somewhat tricky thing that doesn't always follow general principles of contract law. There is considerable statutory guidance in this area that is not present in ordinary contract law, and it isn't entirely one size fits all. In particular, the labor laws that apply to public sector unions are different from those that apply to private sector unions, and there are some industries and occupations that are regulated differently than others in the union-management relations area. For example, the actions that janitors at a private medical facility may legally take in a labor dispute are different from the actions that doctor-employees at a private medical facility may take, which are different again from the actions that military personnel in a government owned and run military hospital may take. Special rules and forums are also often implicated if the employer is in the midst of a bankruptcy. The main details regarding these categories of laws are discussed under the last heading of this answer. The exact extent of a labor board or tribunals' authority depends upon the nature of the dispute, whether the dispute is public sector or private sector, and if the dispute is in the private sector, whether it involves one of the 10% of so of private sector unionized employers that are governed by special federal laws that apply to critical or pervasively multi-province or international industries. There Are Several Main Kinds Of Union-Management Disagreements When a collective bargaining agreement is or was in place between a recognized union and an employer unit as defined under the applicable labor laws (which are not always defined in the same way in every union, with factories, for example, usually organized on a work place basis, but the movie industry, in contrast, usually organized on an industrywide basis), there are several of kinds of disputes that can arise. Disputes Over Future Contract Terms One kind of dispute is a dispute over what the economic terms of a future collective bargaining agreement. Usually, in the context of private sector employees that aren't subject to any special rules, the decision making authority will not impose particular economic terms on either side, although it might order the union and management to mediate their dispute with a labor law mediator selected in a method provided by the old collective bargaining agreement or by law. If a mediation order has been entered, there could conceivably be a violation of that mediation order arising from failing to negotiate in good faith, but failing to negotiate in good faith usually involves failing to listen to what the mediator and/or the other side has to say for a reasonable amount of time, or failing to present any opening offer in the negotiation that the other side could accept if it wanted to, or presenting an offer so absurd (e.g. a $1000 dollar an hour minimum wage of entry level janitors in 2022) that it amounts to not making an offer at all. But generally speaking, unless some special circumstances (e.g. public employees or critical essential employees of some kind defined by statute) are involved a court won't impose economic terms on either party and won't consider a mere failure to compromise meaningfully from an initial stance after hearing out the other side to constitute bad faith negotiation. The law applicable to collective bargaining in Canada (as of April 2008) is reviewed here. Unfair Labor Practice Disputes The other kind of dispute between a union and the management group that it is dealing with, is that one side or the other has engaged in something that is defined by law as an unfair labor practice. For example, in Canada (although the same conduct would usually be ignored by authorities in China or France) if union members kidnap the labor negotiators for the management team and detail them in a windowless room without access to the outside world, that would probably constitute an unfair labor practice by the union, while a management action to hire goons to intimate the union members, or informants to spy in the inner discussions of the union negotiators would probably constitute an unfair labor practice on the management side. Obviously, I've presented some very extreme examples, and the interplay of what does or does not constitute an unfair labor practice in light of the relevant statutes and case law is arcane to the point of being byzantine in practice, with lots of legal guidance and lots of room for lawyers for both sides to disagree over how to apply the law to the facts. Also, some of these disputes may be defined as criminal conduct to be handled by criminal prosecutors, rather than in the labor law context, or may be handled in parallel in both forums. The authority deciding the matter can consider allegations of unfair labor practices and impose sanctions or issue court orders accordingly, if there are. Disputes Over Contract Implementation There is also a third kind of dispute, over how a collective bargaining agreement that is in place should be implied in practice to incidents involving particular workers or to particular employer policies. For example, there might be a dispute over whether a particular employee was properly fired for good cause, or over whether a proposed fringe benefits plan is consistent with the collective bargaining agreements terms. These are frequently hired by an agreed panel of arbitrators that handles all of the disputes that arise over the term of a collective bargaining agreement. But this kind of dispute is really beyond the scope of the question. Disputes Between Union Members And Unions Over Union Operations Another kind of dispute sometimes handled in a labor law forum in accordance with union-management laws is a dispute that arises between one or more union members and their own union (e.g. a disputed election of union officers). See, e.g. here (reviewing the substantive law that applies, while largely glossing over the procedural side of these disputes). But this also appears to be beyond the scope of the question. Who Is Authorized To Resolve Or Address Particular Disputes? I have avoided using the term "court" in lieu of the "authority deciding the question" because I am not familiar enough with the procedural side of Canadian labor law to know who this authority is, and that is something that is likely to vary based upon the kind of employer involved, the nature of the dispute, and the stage of the process that the dispute adjudication process for the dispute has reached. At least in the first instance, these kinds of disputes are almost never handled by ordinary courts that handle non-union related civil or criminal matters, unless an unfair labor practices dispute simultaneously constitutes a criminal offense that is prosecuted like any other crime. There are at least twenty-one labor boards or tribunals in Canada. One for the federal public sector, one or more for national private sector essential industries at the federal level, one for all private and public sector workers in Quebec, and a respective public sector and private sector body in each of the other nine provinces. These boards or tribunals handle labor disputes in the first instance and possibly an initial review of a delegated hearing officer's decision, but at some point their decisions are appealable by some process to one or more provincial courts in the case of the at least nineteen provincial level labor boards or tribunals, and ultimately to the Canadian Supreme Court, and to one of more federal courts (and at a minimum ultimately to the Canadian Supreme Court) in the case of the two ore more federal labor boards or tribunals. It is also conceivable in at least some cases that the union and management could agree, either post-dispute, or in some cases even pre-dispute under the previous expired collective bargaining agreement, to have matters that they set forth as the subject-matter subject to this treatment, resolved by a panel of private arbitrators rather than the usual labor labor tribunals or boards. The particular forum that applies to a particular kind of labor law dispute in Canada doesn't really change, however, the basic sketchy outline of the substantive Canadian labor law described above that applies to whomever is the adjudicator between the union and management in a particular labor dispute. The article on collective bargain cited above states: In Canada collective bargaining is shaped by a tight statutory structure used to regulate almost every aspect of of the union-manangement relationship. Such legislation closely regulates the formation of the collective bargaining relationship, governs the conduct and timing of the bargaining process, places restrictions on economic conflict, and may, in some cases, mandate certain terms of the collective agreement. The legislation confers broad administrative powers on labour relations boards or tribunals, which play a major role in the application of the legislation (Carter 1995). Labour tribunals regulate both management and union activity and may restrain some forms of employer interference with union organizing and bargaining activity as well as the untimely use of economic sanctions by trade unions. Unlike the United States, the labour relations jurisdiction of the Canadian federal government is much more extensive than that of the state governments. Legislative authority in Canada is divided among eleven different jurisdictions, ten provincial and one federal. As a result of various court interpretations of the Canadian Consitution, the jurisdiction of the federal government has been restricted to undertakings falling within its specific legislative authority and to conduct falling within its criminal law power. Due to the constitutional division of legislative authority, most private sector employees in Canada fall under the jurisdiction of the labour laws of the province in which they work. Approximately 90% of private sector workers are provincially regulated.In addition to workers employed in manufacturing, mining (excluding uranium), forest products industries, construction, service industries, and local transportation, employees of provincial and local government are covered by provincial jurisdiction. Although the federal government’s labour relations jurisdiction covers a relatively small percentage of private sector employees, these include workers in a number of important areas of the economy including: interprovincial or international air, rail shipping and trucking operations; broadcasting, banks, uranium mines, and grain elevator operations. All federal public sector employees fall within federal jurisdiction but are covered by a different collective bargaining statute than federal private sector employees. The article then continues to explain that: In 1967, the Public Services Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) was passed, creating a new and distinctive collective bargaining structure for employees of the federal government and providing for arbitration or the conciliation/strike route as its final dispute resolution mechanism. The PSSRA granted collective bargaining rights to workers in federal departments, a number of federal agencies for which the Treasury Board is the designated employer, and a number of government agencies or separate employers who administer their own labour relations programs. Since the passage of this legislation, all provincial governments have given their public servants the right to collectively bargain, including the right to strike in some jurisdictions and arbitration in others. In Quebec, all workers, private, public and parapublic, come under the Quebec Labour Code. In Manitoba and Prince Edward Island, public servants are granted the right to collective bargaining through their respective civil service statutes. The remaining seven provinces have special public-sector labour relations statutes, which grant the right to collective bargaining. Since the middle of the 1970s, the public sector has become the most highly unionized segment of the Canadian economy. Collective bargaining has been extended to cover not only workers in the public sector employed by federal, provincial and municipal governments, but workers in the parapublic sector not directly employed by governments, but rather by organizations extensively supported by government funding—this includes teachers, health-care workers, police officers and firefighters. The evolution of the collective bargaining process, which now includes public sector workers in health care, education, government services, has affected not only the way public services are provided but has also contributed to higher levels of taxation and forced the re-definition of the meaning of public services. For example, in Quebec, publicly funded religious schools operated on something akin to U.S. voucher systems are subject to its labor laws which are more or less similar between private sector and public sector unions and are dealt with by a single tribunal with any distinctions between the two treating unions at these schools as public sector, rather than private sector unions. | Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened. | Because breaking the law is not breach of contract (Necessarily). Were you to use the model to 3D-print a gun and rob banks with it, without this clause, you have not broken the contract. That would mean that the provider could neither sue you for any damages the use of their model in your crime spree might have caused them, nor can they legally terminate the licence with you. | I am not a lawyer: If they sue you it will probably be for fraud, then the DA will investigate and can easily find out who you are. If they can prove that you signed the contract is another story. If the clause in the contract is valid yet another. Getting a lawyer might be wise, especially if your visa depends on a clean legal record. Have you talked to them yet? If you can afford it, you or your new company could pay off he months salary to the old company. In my opinion it's fair, they probably turned down a lot of other applicants an will either need to search again or find a good temp to replace you. Think there was something that you cannot quit a contract before it starts, but another option would be to start working for them and then realizing during the test period that it's a bad match. However, best lawyer up! Search for "Kündigung vor Beschäftigungsbeginn" (Cancellation before the start of employment) Quick google suggests that they might be right if they have it in the contract, but the lawyer will know for sure. Look for someone who does "Arbeitsrecht". | It sounds to me like the parties made proposals with an intent to draw them up and formalize them but didn't intend to form binding agreements. The first agreement sounds vague. The second was committed to writing, suggesting that the written deal was to be the real agreement, and not executed. In the last case, it doesn't appear that there was an agreement because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term, which was the price. Going to court is expensive. It is expensive whether this is litigating underlying disputes or trying to enforce an alleged oral settlement that is disputed. Also, settlement discussions that don't result in a resolution are not admissible as evidence in court. Making a deal would be nice, but Dave's concept of what constitutes a deal seems to be out of touch with reality. | Yes Yes Yes However, these are pretty standard contract terms. Many, many terms survive the end of the substantive agreement. For example, terms with respect to ongoing confidentiality, dispute resolution, warranties, termination itself etc. The second is so common it actually has a named legal doctrine: reading down. In the absence of such a clause, if the contract inadvertently exceeds what the law allows, it preserves the contract rather than leaving both parties without contractural protection. | This depends on your employment agreement, if any, with the organization, and on the company's contract with the organization. You can quit your job with the organization, giving whatever notice your contract provides. The company can end its contract on whatever terms that contract permits. Most service contracts specify a fixed term, with renewal possible or in some cases automatic if notice to end the contract is not given by some specified date before the renewal date. But many other arrangements are possible. If no term is specified in the contract, and there is no provision for how much notice is required, then the company should give "reasonable" notice, which will probably be in line with the norms and customs of the industry involved in the relevant country. The specific law of that country may or may not provide a required minimum notice period. The contract between the company and the organization might provide that they would not hire any employees or recent ex-employees of the organization without consent for some period, perhaps a year. If there is such a provision it must be complied with unless it is not enforceable under the law of the jurisdiction. Different jurisdictions have very different attitudes toward such contract provisions. If such a provision were violated, and it was enforceable in the jurisdiction, the company would be liable for damages if the organization choose to enforce its contract. The contract between you and the organization might include a provision that you not leave to become employed (within some time limit) by one of the organization's customers, or perhaps by one you had worked with. If there is such a provision, it might or might not be enforceable in your jurisdiction. If it is enforceable, you must comply or be liable for damages. Even if there are no contract provisions preventing such employment of you by the company, you must not without permission take with you and use for the company's benefit any confidential information that is the property of the organization and is not already known to the company through legitimate means. If you do, both you and the company might be liable for damages under trade secret law. In the absence of any enforceable contractual provisions, and if no confidential information is taken by you, there should be no legal problems. The moral issues I am in no position to offer an opinion on, and are off-topic here anyway. If you were to quit, and the company were to then seek to break its contract because, in your absence the organization could not provide proper service, and you were then to accept employment with they company, and if further the company had known of your plans, both you and the company might be liable for damages to the organization, depending non the details of the law in your jurisdiction. This could be a tort of "interference with a contractual relation" or something of the sort. You should be very careful in agreeing to any such procedure. If there is a question as to whether a provision of a contract between the organization and either you or the company in enforceable, or whether a provision prohibits you leaving the organization to be employed by the company, that would need to be addressed by a lawyer who knows this area of the law in your jurisdiction, and the specifics of the contract, or eventually by a court. It is out of scope for this forum. Nothing in this situation will be a problem if the organization agrees to whatever is done. All possible problems occur only if it does not agree, and claims to have a legal right to prevent it or seek damages. | Do I have any recourse for invalidating all or part of the contract? No. There is a presumption in contract law that when a contract is reduced to writing then what that writing says is what the parties agreed. Also, if you signed it, then you are legally stating: I read it, I understand it and I agree to it - don't sign things you don't understand. If your lawyer has produced something you don't understand then have them redraft it until you do. Would a successful suit against the lawyer for malpractice or negligence make any difference? No. A suit against you lawyer may get you damages from your lawyer but it will not affect the rights of third-parties. What is best practice for avoiding flawed contracts like this in the first place? Read and understand the contract. Educate yourself enough in the law so that you can do this. Your lawyer is there to give you professional advice; you are there to make your own decisions. |
Can the same person be charged multiple times for the same crime? An example of this is, let's say someone is accused of animal cruelty (misdemeanor) and has 10 animals involved, would it be fair to charge this person with 10 counts of cruelty to animals? Even though it is from the same incident and a first offense? Wouldn't this be double Jeopardy? Especially if the sentence stacks among charges, like for example let's say each charge carries a sentence of 3 months probation, would it be fair to charge the same person (all from the same incident) with 10 counts of cruelty to animals and have a maximum sentence of 30 months probation? To be clear, in my state the "cruelty to animals" charge is very vague and no animals need to be dead or hurt for the state to prosecute. | A person who commits one act of animal cruelty against each of ten dogs (Ace, Biscuit, Coco etc) could be prosecuted for ten charges (or 'counts') of animal cruelty. This is because each act is a distinct offence. (The person who commmits ten acts of animal cruelty against one dog, or five acts against two dogs, etc, could be prosecuted for ten counts of animal cruelty too.) That is not double jeopardy. Double jeopardy is a procedural defence to being tried for a second or subsequent time for a particular act. If a person was tried and acquitted of being cruel to Ace on a given occasion, generally they can't be tried again for being cruel to Ace on that occasion. They can be tried for another occasion of cruelty to Ace. | Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law. | Yes. This is treated as time served as several media accounts of sentencing hearings in these cases have demonstrated. See, e.g., this account in The Atlantic magazine, and this one in the newspaper USA Today, and this one in the newspaper the Houston Chronicle. I also saw a similar account in the L.A. Times but can't provide a link because my non-subscription access limit has been exceeded. | Assuming that the above can be established by admissible evidence, that sounds like a case for first degree murder, and probably various other crimes as well. In some jurisdictions there is a specific crime of "Murder for hire" which might also apply if available on the jurisdiction where this occurred. A comment mentions a possible insanity defense. That is going to depend on detailed facts not included in the question, but might be possible. | How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent. | Is it true that I cannot buy a puppy and smash it deliberately for my perverse amusement (regardless of whether it's in front of them or not)? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? Is it true that I cannot buy a cow or a pig and throw it into a woodchipper similarly for my perverse amusement? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? You can't do either of these things. Every state has some sort of law banning cruelty to animals. For example, in Colorado, the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals are codified at Sections 18-9-201 to 18-9-209, Colorado Revised Statutes. The core language of the statute is codified at Section 18-9-202(1)-(1.5) (as of July 1, 2014) which states (in language that is not atypical nationally) that: (1)(a) A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence ovedrives, overloads, overworks, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beats, allows to be housed in a manner that results in chronic or repeated serious physical harm, carries or confines in or upon any vehicles in a cruel or reckless manner, engages in a sexual act with an animal, or otherwise mistreats or neglects any animal, or causes or procures it to be done, or having the charge or custody or ay animal, fails to provide it with proper food, drink or protection from weather consistent with the species, breed, and type of animal involved, or abandons an animal. (1)(b) Any person who intentionally abandons a dog or cat commits the offense of cruelty to animals. (1.5)(a) A person who commits cruelty to animals if he or she recklessly or with criminal negligence tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(b) A person commits aggravated cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(c) A person commits cruelty to a service animal if he or she violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section with respect to a service animal . . . whether the service animal is on duty or not on duty. The rest of the statute mostly spells out sentences and other remedies and definitions applicable to these offenses. For what it is worth, the laws against cruelty to animals, and the now obsolete laws prohibiting cruelty to slaves that existed when slavery was legal in the U.S., were quite similar. So, yes, an animal (pet or otherwise, there is almost no formal legal distinction between pets and non-pets, even though in practice, people evaluate what is cruel to a pet and to a farm animal differently) is property. Yes, someone who owns an animal may intentionally kill it or maim it, or have someone acting at the owner's instructions do so. But, an owner must do so humanely under the circumstances and must do so for a good reason (such as for food, to put down a sick or injured or dangerous animal, or for experimental research). Ranking states is a bit difficult. There are some states that have felony cruelty to animals statutes and some that don't. I don't have the time to look for an exhaustive survey of the law state by state (one summary is here). There are some states that are quite specific (like Colorado) and others that are more general in language. Idaho has an express provision that killing animals that are harrying livestock is an acceptable reason. Some of the difference boils down to how the law is applied in practice, rather than to the language of the statutes on the books. The overall gist of the statutes, however, is pretty similar: don't be cruel in how you do it, and don't harm animals if you don't have a good reason for doing so. There is also a lot of conduct (for example, separating mothers and young children, amputating body parts such as claws or tails or reproductive organs without consent, or confining and leashing them) that would cause emotional harm to animals and which would be grave human rights abuses, that is not prohibited as cruelty to animals. Similarly, there are many farming practices that are accepted as not violating these laws like the process of creating veal or foie gras that could be characterized as cruel but are accepted as not violating the laws against cruelty to animals. To a great extent, these exceptions, which are rarely codified, are simply a matter of custom and practice and tradition, rather than having any well reasoned logical derivation from statutory language. | You don't specify a jurisdiction but taking the US as an example, yes you could be charged with 2nd Degree Murder - you intended to harm them but not specifically to kill them: A second situation that constitutes second-degree murder is where the perpetrator intends only to cause serious bodily harm but knows that death could result from the act. For example, in the situation above, instead of shooting Bill, Adam grabs a shovel and whacks Bill in the head with all his strength. While Adam didn't specifically intend to kill Bill when he hit him, he did intend to strike him with the shovel knowing that such a blow to the head carried with it a distinct possibility of death. Adam killing Bill in this way would be classified as murder in the second degree. In English law you'd be facing charges for Voluntary Manslaughter | One wouldn't be able to make a claim about a driving record without it being testimony. Testimony will be challenged during cross examination. The prosecutor won't be able to bring up prior bad acts (such as previous speeding tickets) but will most certainly be allowed to rebut any claim of no prior bad acts made by a defendant. When the defendant claims a spotless driving record the defendant is introducing character or a character trait into the trial. Once introduced by the defendant the prosecutor will be allowed to challenge the credibility of that statement and, therefore, the credibility of the witness. Imagine the following interaction: Defendant: I have a spotless driving record. Prosecutor: Are you saying you've never been issued a traffic ticket? Defendant: Um, Uh, well... When a defendant goes to court they are facing a specific charge. The prosecutor will present evidence that supports that charge and it is up to the defendant and his attorneys to sow reasonable doubt within the jury, or at least one juror. By presenting character, the defendant may appear to be saying either, "Hey, it was my first time let me off," or, "I've never done it before so I couldn't have done it this time." Either way, it probably won't create reasonable doubt in the juror's mind about the specific charge they're weighing and it has the potential to open a can of worms that would be unfavorable to the defendant. |
Is it really possible to use Google Analytics without consent, and if so, why exactly? I'm asking about the GDPR and the European Union. Lots of websites claim that it is possible to use Google Analytics without asking for the user's consent. Even some answers here suggest that it is possible. You just need to change some settings in Google Analytics: anonymize IPs, turn off "data sharing", whatever that is or whatever it means. But does this really make Google Analytics complaint with the GDPR without the user's consent? Is that guaranteed anywhere? I might be wrong, but I somehow get the feeling that this is just a "suggestion", to make things probably "better", but there might not be a valid legal explanation for this. Basically the only way you can avoid consent in this case is by having a "legitimate interest", which in any case must be "reasonably expected" by the data subject (which means it can't be something totally unrelated, for example). The user can expect it is your legitimate interest to get some statistics on the traffic and the way the website is used. Other kinds of processing are probably not expected, and not to be considered "legitimate interests". So Google should probably not do anything with the Google Analytics data, except for providing the website owner with some innocent statistics. Now, is this guaranteed anywhere in Google privacy policies, in a way that makes it compliant with the GDPR? So what I'm asking is: is it really possible to use Google Analytics on a website without user consent, and if so, what exactly makes it complaint? Changing some settings might be a good idea but not be enough, unless there's something that guarantees that's enough. | Update: On 1 October 2019 the CJEU ruled in Case C‑673/17 (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband vs. Planet49 GmbH) that cookies require explicit consent regardless of personal data is being processed. (Where the exceptions don't apply). (paragraphs 68-70 of the ruling). That does probably invalidate my answer below. However, because I have based my answer on information provided by the Dutch DPA, I will not update my answer until that DPA has responded on this. Basically, your thoughts are all correct. The Dutch DPA (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens) has written a manual how to use Google Analytics compliant with the GDPR without having to ask for consent. But unfortunately it is not available in English. Based on Art. 28 GDPR, you need a Data Processing Amendment with google. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data processing amendment Open it Accept it Click Save Anonymize your visitors IP Address. A full IP address is considered personal data. It is possible to remove the last octet before it is processed by google. Add { ‘anonymize_ip’: true } to the tracking code on your website Create a screenshot of the change, so you can prove later at which date you made this change. Disable Data Sharing with google. By default Google uses the data for 5 different purposes. Each of them would require consent from the visitor of your website. So you need to switch that off. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data sharing settings Uncheck all checkboxes (Google producs & services, Benchmarking, Technical support, Account specialists and access for sales experts) Click Save Disable Data Collection for Advertising. This has to be disabled at a different location, for the same reason as the previous step. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Tracking info Choose Data collection Turn off these two options (remarketing and advertising reporting) Click Save Disable the User-ID feature. This is probably turned off by default. But it is important to keep it turned off. So you need to verify this. Open the settings menu from Google Analytics Choose Property settings Choose Trackinginfo Choose User-ID Disable it Click Save Even though you don't need consent to use Google Analytics, you still need to inform your users, for example by adding a few lines to your privacy policy explaining: You are using Google Analytics cookies. You have a data processing agreement with google. You have enabled IP anonymization/masking. You have disabled data sharing. You are not using any other google services in combination with Google Analytics. The Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens still recommends to offer an opt-out for Google Analytics, but it would not be required. As the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens is a DPA as defined in chapter 6 of the GDPR, you have to assume their advice really is GDPR complaint. In the past they also had performed other investigations to the privacy policies of google. | This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy. | That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal. | How can I truly say that I 'consent' to data collection and processing when I am coerced, so to speak, by the threat of failing my courses if I do not use this novel software? There is no need for you to "consent". Consent is just one of the reasons that allows a data processor to collect your data. There are other reasons that allows the data processor to capture your data. In this case, it seems of application the "legitimate interest clause", as it is in your university's legitimate interest to capture your activity in order to evaluate you. Of course, that covers only the data collected that is relevant to that interest. They will certainly capture your identity and your answers, they may log your sessions and may try to gather some data to detect if you are somehow cheating, but they would not be allowed to check which are your favorite pornhub videos because that is not relevant for the university's legitimate interest. Art. 6 of the GDPR states: Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. This page also provides some in-depth analysis | GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls. | For land ownership records and other similar scenarios such as business directors, the requirement for these to be public will be in legislation rather than a contract - this provides the legal basis, see GDPR Article 6(1c). Additionally when government departments are doing it they also have 6(1e) as lawful basis: "1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: ... (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; ... (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" -- GDPR, Article 6(1c,e). I'm not familiar enough with the specific legislation that will apply here but pretty sure this will be the case, and having said this you may well find public registries also become less public going forward. The reason ICANN has come under fire, is partly because under GDPR privacy is a protected fundamental right and therefore to comply personal data should be kept private by default and privacy never something you would be required to pay extra for. Any contract ICANN have in place with their registrars will not override legislation, it is in fact the other way around. "2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons." -- GDPR, Article 25(2). This doesn't stop ICANN from maintaining a register of domain name owners (registrants), but it does mean they can't just publish all records upon request to anyone anymore - whether people will be granted access to personal data will now depend on if they have a lawful basis for this, and in these cases their processing of the personal data will be limited to those purposes. Being nosey doesn't count! "When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract." -- GDPR, Article 7 (4) - Conditions for consent. What this means essentially, is that if the consent is conditional for the contract it will not be treated as freely given, and therefore not valid - it will no longer be acceptable to contractually bind the provision of a product or service with consent to publish personal data or any other form of processing such as marketing mailing lists. Looking now at the specific points you have raised: "GDPR article 6 allows for processing of personal data on a contractual basis (section 1b)" Whilst this is true, this is only part of it - it doesn't allow for unlimited processing for any purpose and sharing it with any people, if you look at Article 5(b) it states that the information is collected for specific explicit legitimate purposes. Each purpose requires its own legal basis and needs to be compatible with the principles of GDPR. Without consent, ICANN currently does not have a legal basis to make the WHOIS records public for EU citizens and should have adopted some technical controls to require them to opt-in if they wish to be included in the public register. They're coming under fire for non-compliance having been given 2 years to prepare and change their systems/processes. "processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;" Again whilst this is true, not all processing is necessary for the performance of a contract. In the same way people must give consent to receive marketing communications, they must freely give consent for their information to be shared/published (separate to the contract for provision of service) in the absence of other lawful basis for this processing. "Also section 1c, processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;" There is no legislation which requires them to publish the personal data of domain name registrants. In this paragraph 'legal obligations' refers to those required by legislation (i.e. statutory obligations), not contracts (or non-statutory obligations) which are covered under Article 6(1b). "And finally section 1e, processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" ICANN has no official government-assigned authority, and publishing the personal data globally is not in the interests of the data subject's or others' welfare or well-being - this is what is meant by 'public interest'. As far as I can see what ICANN are actually doing to comply seems to be accepted by the European Data Protection Board, they are only 'under fire' as you say because they are late in doing so. The deadline was 25th May 2018 and they had 2 years to prepare like all other organisations. | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | The second inferred question is "How does Twitter conform to GDPR?" See the Twitter GDPR FAQ for details on if Twitter is a data controller or a data processor, how Twitter complies with the legal requirements for transferring data, etc. Re: the original question regarding scraping and distributing Twitter data: Read Twitter's Twitter Terms of Service, which is a legally binding contract for use of their service. By using Twitter (or accessing Twitter without an account), you agree to that contract. Twitter very clearly states what they allow as legal uses of their service; pertaining to scraping and selling and/or sharing data: You also agree not to misuse our Services, for example, by... (iii) access or search or attempt to access or search the Services by any means (automated or otherwise) other than through our currently available, published interfaces that are provided by Twitter (and only pursuant to the applicable terms and conditions), unless you have been specifically allowed to do so in a separate agreement with Twitter (NOTE: crawling the Services is permissible if done in accordance with the provisions of the robots.txt file, however, scraping the Services without the prior consent of Twitter is expressly prohibited); ... If you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Services or Content on the Services, you must use the interfaces and instructions we provide, except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided for (developers) So you can scrape Twitter with prior consent, or scrape according to the robots.txt file, which shows Twitter's limits on what you can scrape. If you don't follow the TOS, you risk Twitter taking legal (civil, possibly criminal, according to jurisdiction) action against you. |
Is it against the law to sell Bitcoin at a flea market? I think this would be a cool side gig and I have some ideas about how to make Bitcoin more accessible to the general public. But I don't want to break the law either. These would be normal flea markets where vendors pay $20 for a booth and then sell their wares. Is there an authority I can ask? Do I need a special license? | Since sales are in dollar and the OP does not specify a jurisdiction, I will assume Washington state US. You may need a business license, depending on the municipality. There are various permits required for sale of certain wares, such as food, explosives or poisons, but otherwise no special municipal permits are required. A state money transmitter license is required, and there are a number of bond and auditing requirements that also have to be obeyed. The state has a website which implies the pertinent restrictions, but does not actually explain them or how to comply: you would need to hire a lawyer to determine what you have to to to be legal. Those restrictions are not limited to flea markets, they regulate all bitcoin sales in the state, including internet and yard sale. | How come this is viable? Because it’s legal. What if people use their service to commit crimes? What if people use a Ford in a bank holdup? Or a Glock in a murder? Or the US Postal Service in a Nigerian letter scam? If the goods or services are legal and not provided for an obviously illegal purpose, nothing happens. | Purchasing a lot that contained the keys does not provide any rights to access the locks that those keys would open. What someone who did this would be charged with would vary by both location and also by prosecutorial discretion. The only exception in this scenario would be if the storage locker contained the deed to the property in question. | Illegal to write? No. Notwithstanding the First Amendment which would almost certainly make a law prohibiting it illegal, writing such things is an essential part of an IT security professional’s toolkit. You can’t protect against worms if you don’t know how they work. Illegal to distribute on an unauthorised computer? Absolutely. This would be a clear breach of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. | You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them. | Note, Washington State Senate Bill 5061 seeks to block certain "untracable" firearms without a serial number. This relates in part to "3D printable" guns, but the act of milling of a 80% lower (in Washington) could be a violation, if and when it passes. But it appears the bill hasn't been made a law yet... Is Washington specific news this issue what drives the question? Federally, the ATF web site says: Receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a "firearm" are not subject to regulation under the GCA. The ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, "castings" or "machined bodies" in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid and un-machined have not reached the "stage of manufacture" which would result in the classification of a firearm per the GCA. But this gets a bit technical. For further risk mitigation, the Texan could mitigate any risk related to both Federal and Washington state law by shipping it to a federal firearms licensee (FFL) in Washington as if it were a firearm, per ATM instructions which say (in part): Generally, for a person to lawfully transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person who resides out of State, the firearm must be shipped to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) within the recipient’s State of residence. He or she may then receive the firearm from the FFL upon completion of an ATF Form 4473 and a NICS background check. That FFL is then responsible for ensuring the transaction properly conducted in the state of Washington, including federal and state requirements. The FFL I contacted only charged $25.00 (plus collecting the state sales tax). Form 4473 was easy enough; only about one page for me to fill out. Of course, I've got a clean record, so going through channels isn't a problem for me, it took less than an hour. The FFL confirmed for me that it wasn't necessary for something like an antique musket, which legally isn't a firearm by the federal defeinitions. In my case the sender was a nervous "trust" lawyer who wasn't sure, hired yet another lawyer to advise him. The FFL didn't charge me anything for receiving that musket. | united-states The license won't let you sell the .stl file. Probably you have created a derivative work, which means you can't sell it without a copyright license (and the CC-A-NC won't do). If it were licensed under CC-A you could sell it without problems (you'd have to give attribution, of course). You could also sell it under the CC-A-SA, but once you do you have no control over the result -- anyone you sold it to could give it to someone else under the terms of the license. This could work, though, if it were (say) a commission and you only expected to sell one copy. I don't know what the situation would be with the physical objects printed under any of these licenses. | I think the concerns are more economic than legal, although legal concerns are sometimes present. You don't want people to trash the place. You want there to be an "authority figure" whose presence encourages order, deal with unexpected situations, and whom people who aren't tech savvy feel comfortable dealing with, and it can create a better customer service relationship. It really depends on the nature of the premises. There is not a one size fits all rule. There are situations where one doesn't have someone on the premises. There are bank vestibules with automatic teller machines in them. There are coin entry bathroom/shower facilities. There are self-storage facilities that work like that. There are deeply rural places with low traffic that rely on an honor system rather than trying to monitor use (e.g. some campsites). There are AirBnB type rentals. The are car repair shops with after hours drop off boxes. On the other hand, there are some situations where it is pretty much inconceivable that you wouldn't have someone one site monitoring the situation. I'm pretty sure that you have to have someone on premises for a pub. I'm sure it is necessary in places where you have unaccompanied minors (at a minimum, as a practical reality for liability purposes). There aren't many medical services that can be provided in that format (although there might be a few). |
Do I forfeit my own copyright if I incorporate CC ShareAlike sources within my original artwork? I'm an illustrator and I've created an original work for commercial publication/sale that incorporates part of a photograph I sourced from Wikicommons. The photo in question has a “Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International” license. (For context: The image is a photograph of a starry night sky, which I’ve composited into my original illustration as a background texture.) Does the ShareAlike license mean that my new, original work would have to give up its copyrighted status to agree with the CC license of the incorporated image? And that my original work cannot now be copyright because of the rights mismatch? I'm a bit confused by the terms of ShareAlike: do I understand correctly that it requires subsequent creators/remixers to license those derived/remixed works with a ShareAlike license? I’m very happy to co-credit the photographer, but if using part of the image means I’d forfeit the copyright of my work, then I’d rather remove/replace the element. | If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA? | Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright. | Arguably, no one owns the copyright in the general case. This is a similar case to a previous question I've answered. In short, the US has a statutory provision which bars infringing derivatives from gaining copyright. In this particular case, it's helpful to take a look at what the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to say. While evaluating transformativeness, they did not declare Warhol's works to be derivatives, but left that possibility open and stated it was closer to being a derivative than transformative fair use: Nonetheless, although we do not conclude that the Prince Series works are necessarily derivative works as a matter of law, they are much closer to presenting the same work in a different form, that form being a high-contrast screenprint, than they are to being works that make a transformative use of the original. That Warhol's prints might have no copyright attached to them does not mean that anyone can use them though – they are still very much based on Goldsmith's photo and the underlying copyright to the original still belongs to Goldsmith. This could well mean that Goldsmith would be able to use the Warhol prints as if she owned its copyrights. Update: The Supreme Court has now affirmed, albeit on a narrow appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal which dropped the issue that this question is about. Only the first fair use factor of transformativeness was challenged by the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF). Additionally, and more important for this question is that only a single use was ruled on: the licensing of one of the prints by AWF for a 2016 magazine article reprint following Prince's death. This is because Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Here's where I realize I missed a key distinguishing fact in the case: There was indeed a narrow license for use of the photo for "artist reference" in relation to an article to be published in a 1984 Vanity Fair issue. In effect, due to the license, the (probable) derivative could be considered non-infringing1. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the use in the 2016 issue was not fair (given there was no license for use beyond the 1984 article, AWF had to rely on a fair use defense). In other words, the Warhol prints as a whole are not necessarily infringing derivatives2, rather, the specific use in the 2016 article was affirmed to be infringing. In particular, I'd like to highlight the following from court: The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fair when used for one purpose but not another. The full license text is not in any of the court decisions, so it's impossible for us to know for sure, but the portions that are quoted lead me to believe the license is vaguely worded. In particular, its in the realm of possibility that only the single derivative used on the 1984 article was licensed, but I would argue its reasonable to expect an artist to try multiple derivatives given a license for "artist reference." This could potentially have been of some consequence as the print used in the 2016 article is not the same as the one used in the 1984 article. But since this case was initiated in district court by the AWF seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement, my understanding of the matter is that once the case is passed back to the district court, it will enter in that declaration given Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Take this with a grain of salt, I'm not very well-versed in trial procedure. | If I draw something, having been inspired by looking at some other thing, you are not copying that thing. If you carefully copy something even if you are also deliberately changing features of the original, then you are copying. Copyright law gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to make copies. There is a difference between copying music and visual art in this respect, since music can be reduced to a small set of specific symbols, so "being inspired by" a musical work is often found to be infringement. The difficult part is legally distinguishing "making a copy" versus "being inspired by". The courts use a subjective test of "substantial similarity" to decide if there has been copying. the case of Mannion v. Coors. "Pose" is an element that is considered in assessing similarity: the question the court would ask (itself) is whether such a pose could ever have come from elsewhere (such as, your own creative efforts). | What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea. | Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either. | In the US, at least, facts - like the speed of light, the name of a dinosaur or the moons of Jupiter - are not copyrightable. But the words or pictures, designs and original work used to express and present those facts in books, websites and other publications by individuals and publishers are copyrightable. (Original work doesn't need to be published to be copyrighted; it is copyrighted at the moment of creation.) See How can "factual" intellectual property be protected? Plagiarism can be copyright infringement; it's copying and presenting work of someone else's as your own. But not all copyright infringement is plagiarism in the sense that someone is claiming others' work as their own: if you're selling a T-shirt with an unlicensed design, you're not really claiming the design is yours; you're just trying to make money. If you use all or part of an image or a quote or a song from a copyrighted source in your own work, you need permission and attribute the source. Or, you have to decide if the amount of the copyrighted material you are using might be Fair Use and you don't need permission. But decisions on what might constitute Fair Use are ultimately decided in court, because that's where can you end up when a person or a publisher sues you for alleged copyright infringement. | The only potential problem would be if CC-BY-SA and CC BY-SA (and other variants) come to refer to two different things. There is a problem that in any spelling, "cc by sa" is informal shorthand for a class of licenses. One of them is here: it looks to me like they "officially" call it the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 license. Here is another version. The existing practice of referring to CC licenses is very problematic, because there are multiple versions, and without a link to the specific version, a person can't know what they are being bound by. This is an example of a real ambiguity. There is (at least presently) no difference between CC-BY-SA, CC by-SA, or any other variants. CC-BY and CC-SA, on the other hand refer to different things. Problems only arise when it's not possible to objectively figure out what a licensor was referring to. |
GDPR - What's classed as an opt in for Google Analytics cookie and do I need to do it? I'm wondering if anyone can shed any light on this for me please. I've been doing alot of research about GDPR lately and how it is going to effect my websites using Google Analytics. From what I can understand, any website which uses Google Analytics needs to first get the users consent before storing a cookie on their browser? I have implemented this in a cookie notice when the user first goes to the site and by default no tracking is enabled. Once they click agree, the page reloads with Analytics tracking. However, since I have implemented this onto my websites the drop in traffic is huge and really makes it hard to optimise and understand how the website is performing. My question is, Is it ok if in my cookie notice text said something like this.. 'By clicking agree or continuing to use this site you agree to our privacy policy' This way if they completely ignore the notice (which a lot of people do) and navigate to another page, then at least I am able to track more visits. Is this still considered clear consent? | Update: On 1 October 2019 the CJEU ruled in Case C‑673/17 (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband vs. Planet49 GmbH) that cookies require explicit consent regardless of personal data is being processed. (Where the exceptions don't apply). (paragraphs 68-70 of the ruling). That does probably invalidate my answer below. However, because I have based my answer on information provided by the Dutch DPA, I will not update my answer until that DPA has responded on this. 'By clicking agree or continuing to use this site you agree to our privacy policy' Neither of theses options is considered clear consent. Continuing to use the site, is implied consent, which is not sufficient. Also it does not give you the option to reject. Clicking agree to agree the privacy policy is not specific enough. You must offer a separate opt-in box for everything for which you need consent. The privacy policy is just a text in which you explain your privacy policy. It is not a contract which needs agreement. Also keep in mind that withdrawal of consent must be as easy as giving it. So you must be able to return to the settings and change them. Having said that, it is possible to configure Google Analytics in a way you don't need consent; Accept the Data Processing Amendment Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data processing amendment Accept it Click Save Disable Data Sharing Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Scroll down to the data sharing settings Uncheck all checkboxex Click Save Disable Data Collection for Advertising Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Choose Property settings Choose Tracking info Choose Data collection Turn off these two options Click Save Disable the User-ID feature Go to Admin Choose Account Settings Choose Property settings Choose Trackinginfo Choose User-ID Turn off these options Click Save Anonymize your visitors IP Address Add { ‘anonymize_ip’: true } to the tracking code on your website Even though you don't need consent, you still need to add a few lines to your privacy policy: You are using Google Analytics cookies. You have a data processing agreement with google. You have enabled IP anonymization/masking. You have disabled data sharing. You are not using any other google services in combination with Google Analytics. The Dutch DPA has a more complete manual, but unfortunately it is not available in English. | Yes, a site may check for a cookie indicating past consent before prompting for consent to read and store cookies When people speak of the "Cookie law" they usually mean the ePrivacy Directive, (ePD) more formally the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC. The full text of the directive is here First of all, being a directive and not a regulation, the ePD is not itself legally binding. Instead it instructs the legislatures of member states to implement it, which they generally have done. So the actual binding law is the law of a particular country, which could vary from the wording of the directive. However, in this case, my understanding is that the implementations do not vary significantly. An updated and revised ePrivacy Regulation (ePR) has been proposed, which would replace the ePD and complement the GDPR. But there has been dispute over the proposed terms of the ePR, and it has not yet been passed. Article 5 section (3) of the ePD reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. Notice that this covers both writing (storing) and reading (gaining access to) cookies and other information stored on a user's device. Cookies ar one form of such locally stored information (LSI). Note that the GDPR, which replaces Directive 95/46/EC, is used to define "consent" in the ePD. In general, one must have consent to read or store, and consent must be sought only when the user has been given "clear and comprehensive information ... about the purpose" of the stored information. The relevant exception for this question is that information (including cookies) which is "strictly necessary" to provide a service specifically requested by the user. Here the user has requested access to the web site, and may have previously agreed to accept cookies. The site must prompt for consent if the user has not previously consented (and the site will store cookies not strictly needed), and should not if the user has. Therefore, it is strictly necessary to check for and read if present a cookie indicating that such consent has previously been granted. If such a cookie is not found, no consent has been granted. Strictly required LSI should not have a dual purpose where one purpose is not strictly needed. For example, an "I accept cookies" cookie should not also be used for tracking. That should be done (if at all) with a separate cookie, and only after consent is received. Note that there should be an easily found and easily used method or link on the site (preferably on each page of the site) to review the purposes of stored or accessed LSI, and to withdraw previous consent. If consent is withdrawn, the cookie indicating that consent has been granted should be erased, as should any cookies or other LSI not strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user. Keep in mind that the legal distinction is not between cookies that contain "technical" information and those that do not. That is not relevant. Nor is the distinction between cookies that might be used to identify a person and those that do not. The legal distinction is between cookies (or other LSI) that are strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user, and all other LSI. Strictly needed LSI does not require consent, all other LSI does. For example, a random string, used to determine the number of unique visitors, but not linked to any identifying info about the user, does not help to identify an individual user. But it is not strictly needed, so it can only be stored with consent. Data that are associated with an identifiable natural person (human being, not a firm or organization), are governed by the GDPR (where it applies). There must be a lawful basis for processing such data, which includes reading them from LSI, and storing them. Consent is one of the six possible bases for such processing, but consent need not be obtained if another lawful basis applies. When consent is the basis, it must be easily withdrawn by the user. Note that this applies to all data (PI) that is associated with a person, not just data that can readily be used to identify the person (PII). Note that other workflows are also lawful. For one example, if a site is a strictly membership site, it could prompt for a login before reading or storing any LSI, and then read previous preferences stored on the server by that user to determine whether consent for cookies has been granted. Conclusion A cookie indicating that consent to access and store cookies hs previously been given by a particular user can lawfully be read before a user is prompted for consent, under the ePD and its implementing laws. | No. That is spelled out pretty clear in Article 11. In fact, if you want follow accepted data minimisation principles (and you should), you should not log anything about cookies at your or a third party's website. | The GDPR as such puts obligations on the Data Controller (DC), that is the person or firm or other entity who determines the purposes for which data is processed. The entity that hires the developer and operates the web site is responsible for compliance with the GDPR and other laws and regulations, such as the e-privacy directive and its implementing laws. However, it is highly likely that in commissioning a web site the DC would specify that it be designed to aid compliance with the GDPR and other relevant laws, and if the developer did not do that it might be a breach of contract. Indeed, even if GDPR-friendliness was not explicitly required by the contract between the developer and the DC, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose would probably apply. A designer who, knowing the site is to be hosted and operated within the EU, failed to design it to facilitate GDPR compliance might well be in violation of those warranties. But that would depend on the specifics of Italian law. But note that GDPR compliance is not a matter of web site design, but of the ongoing practices of the operation of the site. There are various ways to comply with the GDPR, no specific technology or design need be used. The DC must so operate the site as to comply. If the DC fails to do that, penalties could be imposed on the DC, not on the developer. | Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG. | It doesn’t make you exempt from the GDPR if that’s what you’re asking The hash you produce is linked to one (or a small number) of computers and it therefore serves as an ID number. Because that ID number is linked to the owner of the computer it is personal information and if you are collecting it, you must comply with the requirements of the GDPR - valid legal reason, deletion when no longer required, deletion on request, data security etc. | Is it GDPR compliant that I can't access the account that I created and the personal data that I shared because "I haven't completed their internal pre-qualification process"? Article 15 defines a “Right of access to the data subject” but it's difficult to see how this could be construed as a right to log into a specific website. Common sense suggests this would be a very bad idea. If they are willing to provide the data through another means (say a report or data dump of some sort), the obligation would seem to be met. In fact, article 15(3) even states that data controllers should merely provide the information in a “commonly used electronic form” (i.e. not necessarily through access to their systems or whatever form they are using internally for the processing). Have you asked for that and would you be satisfied by that resolution? Is it GDPR compliant that their answer to my deletion request is "We will delete the data..." The text of article 17 (right to erasure) explicitly specifies that such a request must be honored without “undue delay”. Article 12, which defines some of the modalities for the rights to access, rectification or erasure by the data subject, also provides that controllers shall “provide information on action taken on a request […] without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request”. You haven't provided any time frame and I don't think there is anything wrong with acknowledging the request by promising they “will” do it but in light of article 12, it seems you would indeed be entitled to know once they have actually taken further action. However, you implied you might want to access the data first and it's not clear to me whether you explicitly invoked the GDPR in earlier communications. So I would clarify and reiterate my request (access or erasure) and ask them for explicit confirmation once it has been satisfied. | The scope of the GDPR is entered when personal data is being processed in a structured manner. Personal data is any information relating to identifiable data subjects (definition in Art 4(1)). "Peter attended the meeting on the 14th" is personal data. "That woman with the blue handbag said she wanted to return on the 25th" is personal data. However, aggregate statistics do not relate to individuals, and are typically not personal data. "On the 14th, we had 25 attendees" is not personal data. Not all use of personal data is within the scope of the GDPR. For example, the GDPR would not apply if two organizers talk about who attended the meeting. However, Art 2(1) says the GDPR applies when personal data is processed wholly or partially with automated means (e.g. computers, smartphones), or forms a filing system or is intended for a filing system (e.g. keeping notes on attendees, keeping attendance lists) If GDPR applies, the organization would be responsible for ensuring compliance with its rules and principles, summarized in Art 5. Primarily, this means: having a clear purpose for processing selecting a suitable Art 6 legal basis for that purpose (e.g. consent or a legitimate interest) only processing the minimum data necessary for achieving that purpose determining and implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance and security of the processing activities preparing for data subject rights, in particular by providing an Art 13 privacy notice when collecting data from the data subjects There are of course some complexities in the details. When the legal basis is "consent" (opt-in), the organization would have to ensure that this consent was freely given and sufficiently informed. Per Art 7(4), consent would not be freely given if that consent was a condition for access to the meeting. Using "legitimate interest" (opt-out) can be more flexible, but it requires performing a balancing test to show that the legitimate interest isn't outweighed by the data subjects' interests, rights, and freedoms. Roughly, relying on a legitimate interest is appropriate when the data subjects can reasonably expect the processing activity to occur. Regarding point 1, keeping general counts and aggregate statistics about attendees is probably OK since it wouldn't be personal data. If you are very conscientious about this, you could round all counts and use categories like "0-4 attendees, 5-9 attendees" for each facet, which makes it more difficult to make inferences about individuals. But the fundamental point is that all your data should relate to attendees as a whole, never to individuals. Regarding point 2 and 3, this is a question of legal basis. Since you gather names through informal conversations, I think that attendees would be weirded out if they learned that you kept detailed records on their attendance. So I think that you probably wouldn't have a legitimate interest here. However, being upfront with this and offering an opt-out could change this. On the aspect of keeping detailed notes on data from informal conversations, I'd like to point out H&M's EUR 35 million fine back in 2020 (summary on GDPRHub.eu). In a callcenter, managers used to have conversations with employees. These conversations touched on anything from vacation experiences to health problems, marriage problems, and religious beliefs. All of that is fine. What was not fine is that the managers went full Stasi and kept detailed notes about all of this on a shared drive and used that information for management decisions. This went on until a configuration error made those files accessible to all employees. This violated all the points in the basic compliance process outlined above: the records had no clear purpose, no suitable legal basis, contained way more data than necessary (and even Art 9 special categories of data like information on health or religious beliefs which have extra protection), did not have appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized access, and did not fulfill data subject rights like the Art 13 right to be informed. In case this non-profit is a church or religious organization that had its own comprehensive data protection rules before the GDPR came into force in 2018, those can continue to apply per Art 91. This could probably address some issues of legal basis, but cannot circumvent the GDPR's general principles. |
Tow truck company claim they towed my tractor trailer but I have a video of them getting into truck and driving it, what are my options? Background story, After making my last delivery on friday night I parked my truck with trailer on a plaza lot where my friend has a decent size restaurant, I was parked right behind his unit. On Sunday 1pm I went go to get some stuff from the truck and it was gone. After looking around I found small label with towing company information. At 3pm on Sunday I was at their lot getting my vehicle, I got into the vehicle and saw that it wasnt the same as I left and the dash cam that is attached to windshield was ripped off and swinging on the power cable. I asked the guy why they got into my vehicle and his response was that they need to disconnect the trailer from truck and tow the two pieces separately and then connect them back again at the lot. They billed me 1500 for the towing and service which they only wanted cash and didn't accept any card. I got the truck paid full amount in cash and have a receipt from them with all the info and charges. The owner (friend) of the restaurant showed me a video of them getting to my vehicle and driving off the plaza lot making a left turn into the main road at 2am Sunday morning. There is no tow truck in the video or someone disconnecting the trailer. You can clearly see a guy with something in his hand opening a door and 10 minutes later backing up and driving away and then a red pickup following him. What are my options here? Can tow company drive my vehicle to their lot themselves? What laws are they breaking? What should I do? | From a comment on the question: They did damage the trailer door and headlight is smashed This seems like the best thing to focus on, especially if you can show that it was not damaged before they towed it. The unusual method of towing (with video evidence) may be a factor in whether they are considered negligent. If the damage to the door looks like they caused it directly by breaking in, that would also help your case. You also asked in your comment if you should go to the police or to a lawyer first. Might as well go to the lawyer and see what they tell you to do. I'm not sure what the police would do if there is no clear crime that has been committed. (The lawyer should have better advice about whether/why to go to the police.) | Here is a link to the relevant Texas Statute: Title 7, Subtitle C, Chapter 545, Subchapter A: Sec. 545.351. MAXIMUM SPEED REQUIREMENT. (a) An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing. Combine that with: Sec. 545.352. PRIMA FACIE SPEED LIMITS. (a) A speed in excess of the limits established by Subsection (b) or under another provision of this subchapter is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful. This section mentions, as an example, among other points: (2) except as provided by Subdivision (4), 70 miles per hour on a highway numbered by this state or the United States outside an urban district, including a farm-to-market or ranch-to-market road; What this means is that if you are driving over 70 miles per hour on a type of highway mentioned in (2) above then you are, by legal definition, driving at a speed that is greater than is reasonable and prudent. When you are cited for speeding you are not charged for driving at a specific speed in an area posted at another speed. You are cited for violating a broader law, such as in Texas, driving in an unreasonable or imprudent manner. The mention of the speed is merely a recordation of the facts that support the state's case against you. Let's take the proposal to demonstrate the speed is too low to its logical conclusion. You plead not guilty and it comes out during testimony that you weren't driving 80 but really 85. The judge will still find you guilty of the underlying charge as the facts in the case still support that finding. I have personally witnessed mistakes in tickets result in dismissal. Those mistakes have, however, been related to other facts about the case though: time of day, date of offense, etc. I've also witnessed people attempt to claim a lower but still illegal speed. For example, "I wasn't going 85 I was only going 80." These resulted in findings of guilt. | My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here. | There's a good answer in this thread by Trap_Door_Spiders Assuming the car was really stolen, not "stolen" in the sense my friend borrowed it and never gave it back, you could absolutely recover the car. The reason you could, is because you can't steal your own property. Theft is very specifically the taking of ANOTHER's property. Here the property and the title to it has remained with you, because it was stolen. A thief never gets title in stolen property--it's called a void title. A void title is no rights at all as compared to a voidable title which has no rights against the true owner, unless you are subsequent transferee for value without notice (Bona Fide Purchaser). Now we can even take this slightly further. Imagine our thief stole your car and now sold it to Hapless John and all the remaining facts are the same, can you still take the car? Yes, because title in property tracks from the seller of the property. You can only over transfer as good a title as you have in the property. So thief has a void title. When he sold Hapless John the car he transferred a void title, which is no interest at all. So when you see the car and take it back, Hapless John calls the police and reports it stolen too. As long as you could demonstrate it was stolen first, that's the end of the issue. Hapless John has to go find the thief and get his money from thief. Now obviously this all assumes you see the car on say a street or whatever. If you saw it saw it in a driveway, you could end up being charged with trespass unless your state privileges the recovery of stolen property by peaceable means. You still wouldn't be liable for theft, because of the void title, but you can get the other charges. All that said, you are better off having the police come and assist you. If you are even slightly wrong you get hit with the full force of the consequences. It's better just to have a police officer come and assist from a criminal liability stand point. | You should file a complaint with the police. If you complain to the police then they might do something. If you don't complain then they certainly won't. Are food trucks licensed? You might try complaining to the license authority. However go to the police first because the licence authority are unlikely to do anything without a police complaint. Even being just another statistic helps increase the pressure for action on the wider issue of racism in society. If all else fails you can just post the incident on YouTube and see what happens. Its an unreliable method of enforcement and can backfire, but it has been known for international embarrassment to kick reluctant authorities into action. | We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately. | Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations. | Canadian law defines "theft" thus: Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent (to deprive the owner, pledge as security, mess it up) In this case, you accepted what seemed to be an offer of a free pizza, so if you took and consumed the pizza you did so with a colorable claim of right and without fraud. Perhaps you misunderstood, but it is not a crime to misunderstand another person's intent. They could sue you for the cost of the pizza (assuming that you took it and did not pay), in which case the question would be whether whatever they said to you could reasonably be interpreted as an offer of a free pizza (if not, pay for the pizza). As an advertising stunt, this would not be unusual. However, if they fix the pizza but then demand money before handing over the pizza, you now know that you have no right to the pizza (if you abscond with the pizza in that circumstance, it would be theft). You may of course pay for the pizza, but you can also not pay and not take the pizza. Again, they could sue you, and in this case your defense would be that there was no contract (no agreement). An important question would be how reasonable it is to believe that you were offered a free pizza. People are offered "free" steak dinners all the time (at the cost of sitting through a sales pitch), so that is a reasonable belief. If a Lexus yacht salesman appears to be offering you a free $5M yacht, it is not reasonable to think that this is an ordinary advertising stunt, if you're not a celebrity. |
Must a work be "essential" for fair use to apply? In comments on this answer (now moved to chat) user supercat wrote: While there seems to be a belief that use of short clips is automatically fair use, a key requirement of fair use is that the reproduced material serve some legitimate purpose which could not be served without it. If one is doing a video about the way [a] landscape photographer balances light and shadow, showing one of his photos of Seattle would serve a purpose that could not be served by substituting a Creative Commons photo of that city. If, however, one is doing a video about Seattle, the CC photo would be a perfectly usable substitute, and thus use of the photo by a professional landscape photographer would not be subject to the same fair use protections. This claimed requirement that for a use of a work to constitute fair use in US law the work must serve some legitimate purpose "which could not be served without it" is not present in 17 USC 107. So if it is correct as a matter of law, it must be imposed via caselaw, that the the decisions of US Federa courts in copyright infringement cases where fair use has been raised as a defense. Is such a rule present in caselaw? | The claim seems novel, so I looked at several sources, including several recent cases where fair use has been upheld. Rozier In Easter Unlimited Inc v. Rozier, 18-CV-06637 (KAM) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2021) the defendant arranged for creation of a cartoon image of himself wearing the copyrighted mask used in the movie Scream. This was found to be fair use, largely on the ground of the transformative nature of the use changing the purpose from evoking horror to a humorous reference to a horrifying movie. Rozier had originally considered using a representation of the hockey mask work by the character Jason in the Friday the 13th series of films. “Rozier and his management team decided that the clothing line would feature the name “Scary Terry, ” as well as a cartoon drawing of Rozier accompanied by a mask associated with a serial killer from popular horror.” Easter Unlimited, Inc. v. Rozier, 18-CV-06637 (KAM), 42 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2021) at page 42 It would seem that the Jason mask would have satisfied the purpose as well as the "Scream" mask. Nothing in the fair use analysis (section C of the opinion, starting at page 31) refereed to a need (to establish fair use) for the work appropriated to serve a legitimate purpose which could not be served without it or any similar concept. This simply was not part of the fair use analysis. Further the opinion states, at page 17: “Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense, meaning “intent or knowledge is not an element of infringement.” Fitzgerald Publ'g. Co. v. Baylor Publ'g. Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1986). ” Easter Unlimited, Inc. v. Rozier, 18-CV-06637 (KAM), 17 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2021) This seems to dispose of the de minims exception suggested by supercat's comments cited in the question. McGucken In McGucken v. Pub Ocean Ltd. 2:20-cv-01923-RGK-AS, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153361 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2021) The district court found fair use. The Copyright office's fair use index summarized the case, writing: Key Facts: Plaintiff Elliot McGucken photographs landscapes and seascapes, which he posts to his public Instagram account. Twelve of McGucken’s Instagram posts depict photographs he took of an ephemeral lake in Death Valley (the “Photographs”). On April 15, 2019, Defendant Pub Ocean Limited (“Pub Ocean”) published McGucken’s Photographs to five websites owned by Pub Ocean as part of an article written by a freelance writer titled “A Massive Lake Has Just Materialized in the Middle of One of the Hottest Places on Earth.” The article contained ten of the Photographs, with credit to McGucken and a link to his Instagram page, as well as several photos that were not McGucken’s and commentary on the conditions in Death Valley, the Sahara, and other natural phenomenon. McGucken brought an action for copyright infringement and moved for summary judgment, asserting Pub Ocean’s use did not constitute fair use. Issue: Whether including photographs posted on social media in a news article to illustrate the subject of the photograph is fair use when accompanied by commentary. Holding: The court concluded that Pub Ocean’s use of McGucken’s Photographs was fair use. The first factor, the purpose and character of the use, favored fair use because Pub Ocean’s use of the Photographs was transformative because the article included discussion of facts and commentary that provided context for the Photographs and included other photographs as well. The transformative nature of the use reduced the importance of the commercial purpose factor. The court held the second factor, the nature of the work, disfavored fair use as McGucken’s works, although previously published, are highly creative. The court found the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the work used, favored fair use. The court concluded that, despite displaying the “heart” of the Photographs, the article expressed ideas “beyond what Plaintiff expressed in his photographs,” rendering the amount of McGucken’s copyrighted images “insubstantial in context.” The fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the work, favored fair use because Pub Ocean’s transformative use “mut[ed] the degree of market substitution.” The court also noted that McGucken licensed the Photographs to other publications after Pub Ocean published its article, which indicated that Pub Ocean’s use did not usurp or destroy the market for the Photographs. Note that other photos of the same temporary lake would have fulfilled the legitimate purpose of news reporting, and there seems to have been no allegation that these particular images were essential to this purpose, but the court still found fair use. DMCA Subpoena to YouTube In In re DMCA Section 512(h) Subpoena to YouTube (Google, Inc.) United States District Court for the Southern District of New York January 18, 2022, Decided; January 18, 2022, Filed 7:18-mc-00268 (NSR) the district court considered a motion to quash a subpoena because a claimed infringement was alleged by the defendant to be fair use. In this case a person using a pseudonym created and posted to YouTube stop-action videos of characters represented by Lego constructions watching and reacting to substantial excerpts from a video published by the Watchtower Bible Society (publishing arm of the Jehovah's Witnesses). Watchtower claimed that this was copyright infringement, and obtained a subpoena to force YouTube to reveal the identity of the maker of the video. The unnamed maker sought to cancel (quash) the subpoena, claiming that the video made fair use of the videos published by Watchtower, so no infringement action could possibly succeed, and that Watchtower had no legitimate reason to obtain his identity, and wished only to harass and discredit him for having questioned its teachings. (The allegedly infringing video expresses disagreement with, and attempts to ridicule, the teachings expressed in the Watchtower video.) The district court found the allegedly infringing video to be fair use, and duly quashed the subpoena. Note that the unnamed maker could have used any of several other videos by Watchtower for a similar purpose, there was apparently noting unique to the particular video that was appropriated in part which was essential to the maker's use, nor did the court so much as mention any such unique aspect essential to the maker's purpose as being important to a finding of fair use. Excessive Use As this answer bv Accumulation correctly points out, when a defendant uses more of the sourc work than is required to fulfill the purpose of the use, that weighs against a finding of fair use. But this is not an absolute bar to fair use (or anything close to one), as the rule proposed by user supercat would be. In several cases I have read court opinions that say, in effect "The defendant used more of the source work than was needed, adn that weighs against fair use, but the degree of transformativeness present outweighs that, so we find this to be a fair use." Thwe rule suggested by suoercat would not allow such findings. Excessive use leans against fair use, but is in no way dispositive. Conclusion I searched for any court case or law review paper which mentioned any such doctrine, and read through the fair use analysis in several recent court decisions in which fair use was found. I did not find any mention of the idea that fair use requires that the source work must be essential to the alleged infringer's legitimate purposes, and that those purposes could not be fulfilled by some other work, including perhaps a work available under a permissive license or in the public domain. I conclude that there is not, and never has been, any such requirement in US copyright law to successfully assert fair use. | It is still making a copy, and thus an infringement of copyright unless an exception, such as fair use or fair dealing, applies. But if in fact it is never distributed, the copyright owner will never hear of it, and thus will never sue. Remember that copyright infringement is, in all but a few extreme cases, a tort and not a crime. The basic law for the united-states is 17 USC 106. This grants to the copyright owner ... the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; subject to various limitations, particularly those in 17 USC 107 where [tag:fair_use] is defined, as much as it is in statute. However, in 37 CFR § 201.40 an exemption to the anti-circumvention provision has been declared by the Librarian of Congress has determined, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(C) and (D), that noninfringing uses by persons who are users of [certain] works are, or are likely to be, adversely affected. This includes Motion pictures (including television shows and videos), as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101, where the motion picture is lawfully made and acquired on a DVD protected by the Content Scramble System, on a Blu-ray disc protected by the Advanced Access Content System, or via a digital transmission protected by a technological measure, and the person engaging in circumvention under paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section reasonably believes that non-circumventing alternatives are unable to produce the required level of high-quality content, or the circumvention is undertaken using screen-capture technology that appears to be offered to the public as enabling the reproduction of motion pictures after content has been lawfully acquired and decrypted, where circumvention is undertaken solely in order to make use of short portions of the motion pictures It is not so clear that it includews entire films for personal use. | From the perspective of US law: Scenario 1: Removing the watermark is perfectly legal, obviously. You own the copyright. Scenario 2: Abandonware is not really a thing in the US when it comes to copyright (and the Wikipedia article you linked says this.) Even if the company went out of business, the copyright almost certainly went to somebody - the former owners, the creditors, etc. As far as the Internet Archive goes, they are taking advantage of an exemption in the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions, along with the copyright exemption found in 17 USC § 108. But both of these exemptions require you to be a "library or archive" to take advantage of them, and you are not a library or archive, so you cannot take advantage of either. As a practical matter, if the software is really abandoned it's unlikely that anyone will actually come after you for infringement, but that's not quite the same as it being legal - you could be on the hook for up to $150,000 in statutory damages per work infringed, if the owner does sue you. You could attempt to claim fair use, of course. If the image is abandoned you might get a favorable result on factor 4 of the fair use test (the effect on the market for the original) since there's no market if nobody can find the owner. But it would depend on the other factors; that alone wouldn't get you fair use. Scenario 3: I'm not sure where you get the idea that downloading a copyrighted image to your desktop is somehow protected. It isn't automatically legal to save a copy of something just because it's on the Internet. And the existence of a watermark may indicate that someone wanted to prevent the file from being copied. The website containing the image will likely have terms of use, which may indicate whether or not you're allowed to make a copy. For example, Stack Exchange's TOS says in part: Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content. | Making and sharing and using subtitles for movies is not legal. It is copyright infringement. I paint this statement with a very broad brush. The movies are copyrighted (they are original and fixed in tangible form). (17 U.S. Code § 102(a)) 17 U.S. Code § 106(2) provides that the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to prepare and to authorize to preparation of derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S. Code § 101 defines derivative work as a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.... So we have established that the copyright holder has exclusive rights to authorize translations, but this exclusive right is limited by fair use. 17 U.S. Code § 107 provides some examples of fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research If these subtitle files are not used for a fair use purpose (the examples cited are examples only, not an exhaustive list) then translation is infringement. If the files are used for one of the fair use purposes then § 107 also gives us the factors to determine whether that particular use is fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. | The Organization Does Not Own the Copyright As you were clearly not an employee of the organization, and did not have a specific contract with them, this was not a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH). Therefore, the copyright initially belonged to the author, in this case the programmer, that is you. That being so, it would require a written document to transfer the copyright to another during your lifetime. In future there should be a written agreement in such a case, spelling out just what rights are to be retained by whom. It can save lots of trouble. The organization would have an implied license to use the software. The terms of this would be defined by the conduct of the parties, and might be a matter of dispute. Probably there would be a non-exclusive license without any fee or ending date. Probably there would be no license to distribute to others unless you explicitly grant one. Specific US Laws 17 USC 101 defines a WFH: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. (emphasis added) 17 USC 201 provides that: (a) Initial Ownership. — Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work. (b) Works Made for Hire. — In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. ... (d) Transfer of Ownership.— (d) (1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession. (d) (2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title. 17 USC 204 provides that: (a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent. | My opinion is that the copying of a single API endpoint, "run" that takes a function as an argument is not infringement. I can think of several lines of argument that get to this same conclusion: Originality: It doesn't exhibit the modicum of creativity required by the originality test. (Feist) Short phrases doctrine: It is a short word or phrase, which both the copyright office (Copyright Office Circular, 37 CFR 202.1) and courts (e.g. Hutchins v. Zoll) have declared ineligible for copyright. Merger: The merger doctrine allows reuse of an expression if it is one of only a very few number of ways of expressing an idea. I can't think of many other ways to express a function intended to run a function other than with the verb "run". Scènes à faire: It is not infringement to use an expression if it has become standard, stock, or common in a particular setting. Naming a function "run" is common in the programming community. Any one of these alone would be enough to rule out copyright infringement by taking this individual component of Excel's API. Note: Whether merger and scènes à faire are part of the originality/copyrightability analysis or part of the infringement analysis is not uniform across circuits. For example, the 6th circuit considers both merger and scènes à faire part of the copyrightability analysis. But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat them as part of the infringement analysis and in the 9th circuit, they are affirmative defenses. | No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and "fall" on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria. | You are in breach of Copyright. Plain and simple. Certain websites allow you to use the website content as long as a link is made, but the website must clearly state that. You may also use a tiny portion of the content if it falls under Fair Use, where "Fair Use" does not mean "I want to". The best thing to do is not to do it. You can't copy anybody's work without consent. If you're thinking about Google specifically then they offer multiple APIs so that you can use their content in a wide variety of ways. |
Did Google illegitimately unpublish my app from the store? And can I sue them? I have an app with lots of downloads and 4.8* reviews on the Play Store for over the last 2 years. In the last update we submitted they decided to check the Privacy-URL as well. This URL was temporary offline due to website maintenance. The reaction for google was to not only reject our app update but also to take the existing app offline (unpublish?). No grace period, no questions ask, just point blank removal from the store. I fixed this issue within minutes after getting informed about the removed from the store and submitted a new App binary to get a new review going. Normally the reviews process in 1 day, this time it's approaching a week now. All this time our app is still offline. At the moment we're getting lots of questions from potential new customers that can't find our app since we're approach a week of being unpublished. My question: is it legitimate for Google to remove your app from the store without grace period when your privacy policy URL can't be reached? To me this seems like a crazy practice, especially if you consider that they are only checking these URL's during an app update review, and then removing your EXISTING app from the store. I e-mailed Google appeal board this to get clarification on this lightly taken desicion to take our company down. Hello, Can you tell me what is the official procedure for removing out of the play store. So for some reason the reviewing employee couldn't access the privacy policy and decided, without any grace period or any question asked, to remove the app from the store completely. This happened twice already. Can you imagine how frustrating this is to a start-up that tries to build a winning app? To be off-line, getting lots of questions from users? Or has Google become this kind of organization that can't reflect on their own practices anymore and we have to deal with Google as a unpredictable black box that can decide to remove your app for any reason at any time without even asking a question? Could you please really respond to this, and more importantly escalate this to management, because I really think this is a big 'sin' and it happened 2 times to me already. This never happened to us with Apple by the way where our app is listed as well. Since my app is in review now which can take up to 7 days, can you at least make sure my last version of the app is back in the stores ASAP, that is removed for NO reason? I just hope to get clarification if this is a common practice or that this was a mistake from an employee, I hope it's the latter one and appropriate actions are taken towards the employee. You can't take out business whenever you want. There reply just stunned me. I have no words. Thanks for your reply. We can process an app deletion only if the app meets all of the following criteria: App must be in good standing (not rejected, removed, or suspended) App must have 0 lifetime installs App must not be in review App must be unpublished for 24 hours As the status of your app is “pending”, we are not able to delete com.kiter at this time. Please let me know if you have any other questions or concerns about the Play Console. Instead of responding to my complaint/concerns they are sarcastically interpreting my question as if I'm asking to get my app completely deleted. So yes, Google has become this company where detached robot people are executing boring jobs, not giving a single shit about their actual customers. My question, is Google in the wrong here and can I sue them with good chances for illegitimate app removal + the financial impact of that on our company? | No, they did not. Yes, you can sue them but you won’t win You agreed that they could do this in clause 8.3 of your contract: If Google becomes aware and determines in its sole discretion that a Product or any portion thereof (a) violates any applicable law; (b) violates this Agreement, applicable policies, or other terms of service, as may be updated by Google from time to time; (c) violates terms of distribution agreements with device manufacturers and Authorized Providers; or (d) creates potential liability for, or may have an adverse impact on, Google or Authorized Providers (for example, if a Product has an adverse economic, reputational or security-related impact); then Google may reject, remove, suspend, limit the visibility of a Product on Google Play, or reclassify the Product from Google Play or from Devices. The power to determine if your app does this lies solely with Google. "Sole discretion" is a term of art which is no obligation on Google to act reasonably. Indeed, they may act arbitrarily - that is, they do not have to treat you the same as anyone else nor do they have to offer you procedural fairness/natural justice/due process. It also removes any obligation on Google to act in good faith. However, they may not act in bad faith - that is, they cannot act maliciously. So, unless they are deliberately persecuting you, then if they decide you broke the rules then you broke the rules. | Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual. | You Own The Code To answer your question on whether or not it is copyright infringement: Yes, you do own the rights to the written code but posting it on Github gives Github the right to store, archive, parse, and display Your Content, and make incidental copies, as necessary to provide the Service, including improving the Service over time. This license includes the right to do things like copy it to our database and make backups; show it to you and other users; parse it into a search index or otherwise analyze it on our servers; share it with other users; and perform it. To simply put it, no matter what license you use, you give GitHub the right to host your code and to use your code to improve their products and features. This license does not grant GitHub the right to sell Your Content. It also does not grant GitHub the right to otherwise distribute or use Your Content outside of our provision of the Service, except that as part of the right to archive your Content. So with respect to code that’s already on GitHub, I think the answer to the question of copyright infringement is fairly straightforward. Things aren’t quite as clear-cut in a scenario where Copilot is trained on code that is hosted outside of GitHub. In that situation, the copyright infringement question would hinge largely on the concept of fair use. If Copilot is being trained on code outside of GitHub, we accept that at least some of what they’re looking at is copyrightable work. So, the question then becomes if it’s fair use. Now, you ultimately can’t conclude definitively that something is fair use until you go to court and a judge agrees with your assessment. But I think there’s a strong case to be made that Copilot’s use of code is very transformative, a point which would favor the fair use argument. There is precedent for this sort of situation. Take the case of Google Books, for example. Google scanned millions of books, provided people who were doing research with the ability to search the book, and provided the user a small snippet of the text that the user was searching for in the book itself. The court did in fact find that was fair use. The use was very transformative. It allowed people to search millions of books. It didn’t substitute for the book itself. It didn’t really take away anything from the copyright holders; in fact, it made it easier for readers to access the work and actually opened a broader market for book authors. And, it was a huge value add on top of the copyrighted corpus. In the latter scenario, a lot depends on the thoroughness and the length of Copilot’s suggestions. The more complex and lengthy the suggestion, the more likely it has some sort of copyrightable expression. If a suggestion is short enough, the fact that it repeats something in someone else’s code may not make it copyrightable expression. There’s also the question of whether what’s being produced is actually a copy of what’s in the corpus. That’s a little unclear right now. GitHub reports that Copilot is mostly producing brand-new material, only regurgitating copies of learned code 0.1% of the time. But, we have seen certain examples online of the suggestions and those suggestions include fairly large amounts of code and code that clearly is being copied because it even includes comments from the original source code. | From what I can see on the USPTO registry, "tweet" is still not trademarked for the purposes you're talking about. Twitter has been working to secure that trademark, but I can't find any record of them having actually secured it. Just the same, I'd predict that using it will get you at least a cease-and-desist letter, and possibly a lawsuit. Whether you'd win that case seems to be a very open question, but that presumes you have the resources to litigate. | Hosting copyrighted material on your servers is probably a bad idea, but software that changes how such material is displayed is likely fine – and there already are tools doing similar things. For example, the news publisher Axel Springer sued adblocker maker Eyeo for copyright infringement in Germany in 2021, since the adblocker manipulates the contents of a web page. This was rejected by the court. (See summary by The Register which also provides US context, summary by Eyeo, actual ruling (in German)). Core argument in that case was that adblockers do not distribute protected works, and do not create derivate works of the website. They merely change how the website is interpreted by a browser. However, the details here are dependent on German copyright law and on the specific capabilities used by adblockers – it might not generalize to other scenarios. Some browsers (e.g. Safari, Firefox) offer a reading mode that strips out all website contents except the main content, and then displays it in a more legible fashion. This strips out all navigation, sidebars, ads, and so on. So far, I don't think this kind of functionality has been challenged. This existing reading mode sounds quite similar to the reformatting tool you're envisaging. There are similar tools available in many programming languages, such as the Arc90 readability project (software, archived website), which is in turn inspired by the Instapaper app. Read-it-later apps like Instapaper and Pocket do involve a bit of a grey zone though, since they involve server-side storage of articles. | The agreement linked in the question seems to be or to purport to be, for a non-final, non-production version of the board. I have seen such agreements used, both for hardware and software, used when beta-test versions of products are being distributed to those who agree to do such testing, often in exchange for a reduced price on the final product, or an early look. I have also seen similar language used when an evaluation version of a product is provided free, or at a much reduced price. In such a use, it would be a reasonable contract, it seem to me, and I see no reason why if it were agreed to by both parties in such a situation, it would not be binding. Often such agreements also include a non-disclosure aspect, but this one does not seem to do so. I cannot see how such an agreement could be made applicable automatically, without both parties having chosen to agree to it, and indicated this by signing, clicking, or in some other positive way. I doubt that it could be made automatically applicable, on an "by using this product you agree" basis. I don't know of any physical consumer product, or appliance, sold with such an agreement in ordinary commerce. I am not sure what would happen if a manufacturer wanted to require all purchasers to sign such an agreement. I don't know if it would be binding. I would think that the purchaser's rights under the First Sale doctrice, could be modified by a valid contract agreed to by the purchaser. I do not think that they could simply be revoked by a contract of adhesion, which the purchaser had no choice to decline before making the purchase. As the OP says this was not signed or agreed to in any way, I can't see how it binds the OP. | If there is a trade mark and if Polaroid owns it and if you infringed it then yes they can force you to remove it. In addition, they could sue you for either damages (i.e. what they lost because of your infringement) or an account of profits (i.e. what you made because of your infringement). That is what trade mark law is for! If the trade mark is registered then this is trivially easy for them to demonstrate. If it is unregistered then it becomes a question of if the mark is clearly recognisable as Polaroid's; IMO they could probably show that it is - those particular border dimensions were distinctive of Polaroid instant cameras for many years. If you want to republish the app, you could probably avoid trade mark issues by allowing users to set the dimensions of the photograph and border, the colour of the border and the location of the caption. | An app(lication program) is software run on the end-users machine. That does not fall under the GDPR. Any processing (including storage) you do on user data has to be compliant with the GDPR. Allows a user to authenticate via e.g. Facebook and stores some basic data (optional) Authentication via Facebook leaves GDPR compliance to Facebook (AFAIK). It would be a good idea to provide alternative authentication methods, such as Google and an "own account" user name and password so that the user doesn't have to share information with a multinational company in order to use your service. The "basic data" will need to be processed according to the GDPR. As long as the "optional" part is "opt in" (i.e. the user needs to at least click on something) then this means you have permission to process that data. Providing this "basic data" as a JSON or CSV file should meet data portability requirements. Allows a user to upload a GPX file (a route or some other activity) Stores the above file to Google's database Allows the user to analyze that file. Since the user is actively choosing to upload each file you have permission to do this. You should make it clear in your privacy policy that the data will be held by Google. Doing so should not be a problem as Google has set up the legal framework to do this under the GDPR. You don't have to store the information encrypted, but you should use encryption (e.g. HTTPS) for any data transmission. Allowing the user to analyse the file is not an issue; either the user is doing it on their own machine (GDPR irrelevant) or you are doing it under user instruction (meaning you have consent). Since the user has uploaded GPX files they already have data portability on those files. You should tell your users that while you will employ best endeavours you don't promise to keep their files accessible and they should maintain their own private copies. That way if your entire database gets corrupted they can't blame you for loss of data. Finally, make sure there is a "Close my account and delete all my data" option. |
Does Google have a right to block our app for trademark use? In a recent app store update, we've included in our description the names of several brands that we support through functionality in our app. Some if not all of these names are trademarked in the United States, where our company operates. Google is blocking us from using the names of these brands in our app description on the grounds of trademark violation and a less clear "violation of Policy Coverage" which says that use of popular brands is "considered" when developing a risk profile for a particular app or category of apps. In the US, there is a concept of "nominative fair use", a legal doctrine which I understand supports the notion of using trademarks to refer to things which otherwise would be impossible to refer to without their trademark name. We've explained our reasoning in an appeals process but Google isn't budging. Given that Google is running a duopolistic walled garden marketplace, it seems unreasonable that they would not follow US legal precedent. It's not like we can simply walk away from Google Play, as it's virtually the only way to have users install our app. By contrast, Apple has no such reservations about trademark use in the same manner on their App Store. Is there anything we can do? Google allows us to submit paperwork which supports our use of trademarks with permission from the trademark holders. In our case this would be exceptionally arduous. Is there perhaps any other proof of rights we could provide which upholds the legality of our trademark usage? | It's Google's system. You have no "rights" other than those they grant you by contract. You are free to move to another platform if you can find one you prefer. You can ask Google how you can satisfy their policy. That's it. | I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies. | Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely. | copyright will cover the names and graphics of games The names of games are not protected by copyright, nor by patent. The names could be protected by trademark. Note that trademarks are specific to a country: what is trademarked in one country may well not be in another. Almost all countries have a way to search their trademark registries, often online. However in some countries, including the US, use of a name in commerce will confer some protection even without registration. What will be considered a "mechanic"? for example MTG have specific mana system, if someone will be creating a game with same idea but will refer to it with other names such as "Ember" instead of "Fire" will it violate the patent? Game mechanics are not protected by copyright. This includes all the procedures and rules of the game. The text used to express those rules may be protected, but often it is not if it is the most obvious way to describe the mechanics. For example, in chess there are different pieces with different moves. That could not be protected by copyright, even if chess were a new game. In bridge the winner of each trick leads to the next. That could not be protected by copyright either, even if bridge were a new game (and contact bridge is just new enough that it could in theory be under copyright still). How do i know if certain patents are applied and when they expire? Most games are not protected by patent, but some are. Patents, like trademarks, are specific to a country. Each country has a way to search its list of active patents. Note that patents have a strict tiem limit, and they normally cannot be extended or renewed. I believe that the limit of a patent is currently 20 years in most countries. (It used to be 17 years in the US.) If a game is patented in Country X and someone is printing the same game but with different art and names in country Y, will the one who print in country Y could be exposed to a lawsuit? Unless the game is also patented in country Y, there will be no grounds for an infringement lawsuit inn Y. But importing the game into X may be patent infringement, and could expose the importer to a suit. | Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright. | If you form an LLC, and then someone later obtains a registered trademark in the same name, the registered trademark would be enforceable everywhere except in the markets and places where the LLC developed common law trademark rights prior to their registration. Your LLC formation would also put a bump in the road in their trademark application. You can, of course, do both, although it is unclear to me why you feel such urgency in the likelihood of an infringement, which suggests that there may be relevant facts that aren't revealed by your post. | As usual with trademarks, the key question is "will reasonable people be confused about the source or affiliations of the product or service". Trademarks are, as you already know, limited to a particular industry or area of business, in general. Displaying user videos is not exactly the same thing as a particular popular song, but they just might be close enough for some consumer confusion tom occur. Whether reasonable people are in fact confused into thinking that the app is in some way sponsored by the makers of the song is a question of fact. A trademark suit would probably need to present some sort of evidence that confusion had occurred or was likely. It also may make a difference whether "Tik Tok" has been registered as a trademark. In the US, registration gets greater protection than mere use. (In some countries there is no protection without registration.) It is also possible that the app has already licensed the rights to the term from the trademark owner for the song. This would avoid a potential suit. It is also worth noting that the term "Tik Tok" is not original with the song. It dates back, in that spelling, to at least the "Oz" books by L. Frank Baum and others Tik-Tok of Oz dates from 1914, and the character of the Tik-Tok from the book Ozma of Oz (1907). Terms that are not original coinages are less strongly protected in trademark law, and the app could claim to be alluding to the Oz character, not the more recent song. A comment by ub3rst4r says that: the term "Tik Tok" is registered as a trademark in the USA by "Bytedance Ltd" (which is the company that operates the app). If that is correct, the US Patent and Trademark office (PTO) came to at least a preliminary conclusion that this trademark did not infringe anyone else's trademark. That doesn't meant that an infringement suit is doomed, but it would make any such suit harder and less likely. It seems that, as described in this news story a company selling watchs under the name "Tic Tok" was sent a cease and desist letter on behalf of the singer Kesha Sebert. The firm responded by filing a suit for a declaratory judgement. The case is Wimo Labs LLC v. Kesha Sebert, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:11-cv-02978. However, google does not show any resolution of this case, one way or the other. This was brought to my attention in a comment by StephanS. As this docket record shows, the case was dismissed by agreement without prejudice, apparently after a settlement (as stated in the comment by user muru). Thus there was no ruling on the merits of the case. | While not categorically illegal, there is a risk that using a trademark in an email name is something that is being done with a purpose to defraud people into thinking that you are affiliated with that company (and indeed, such emails are frequently used for that purpose as are misleading domain names). So, while it isn't outright forbidden, it is generally unwise. |
Getting paid by mistake after leaving a company? Pretend someone worked at a company and was paid monthly. A month after leaving they are paid their severance, and should not receive any payment in the future. A month later, they are contacted by the finance department, apologising that they were paid in error, and kindly asked to send the money back. What would happen if this money was not returned? The only results I found online state that the company would take it back from any future payments, however in the scenario above this person has left the company and therefore would not have any future payments. Edit: I decided to do the right (and by the looks of the replies) legal thing and return the money, after checking with the CEO. They admit to a computer problem on their end, and apologised. I might have misread some comments/answers, so just to clarify - this payment was made a month after my severance pay when I was not expecting any further wage payments from the company. | What would happen if this money was not returned? The former employee would, based on the given circumstances, be guilty of theft contrary to section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: (1) A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it... Section 5 defines "Belonging to another" to include: (4)Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration [...] an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds. Setion 4 states that: (1)“Property” includes money... Although there are statutory defences to theft, at section 2, to acting dishonestly they are not satisfied in this scenario: (1)A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— (a)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or (b)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or (c)(except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if he appropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps. A very similar set of circumstances arose in the case A-G Ref (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182 The defendant, a police woman, received an overpayment in her wages by mistake. She had noticed that she had received more than she was entitled to but did not say anything to her employer. She did not withdraw any of the money from her bank account. The trial judge directed the jury to acquit. The Attorney General referred a question to the Court of Appeal. Held: [by the Court of Appeal] It was possible for a theft conviction to arise where the defendant had not withdrawn the money. There was a legal obligation to return the money received by mistake. | What legal options do I have here? It depends on how much you are owed. If it is less than $5000 (in a city court) you can sue them in small claims. If it is more than that, you'll have to sue them in a different court. Do I have a claim to salary if I quit? Yes, absolutely. You quitting does not relieve the business of its obligation to pay you for work you have already performed. In some states, they may also be required to pay you for accrued leave (sick/vacation time). You should not have to work for a company that does not pay you, we got rid of slavery a long time ago. I'm nearly positive I would not have a claim to the 100% discretionary bonus. Maybe, maybe not. This depends on your contract and what you've been told. If you were told (in writing) that you would be given $X amount for a bonus for work performed in 2018, the bonus may no longer be discretionary because the company obligated themselves to pay it via a promise. Bonuses may be harder to argue in court, but if you have sufficient documentation that you were promised this bonus then you may have a claim to it. If you do decide to go to court with this, gather up as much documentation as you can before quitting, print it out and save it to bring to court or to your lawyer. Make sure to get as much as possible, for example if it is an email, get the whole chain, as much of the headers as possible, etc. If you have voicemails, see if you can save them or record them for later. Do not wait too long, have a lawyer draft up a demand letter the moment you quit outlining exactly everything you are owed, including the bonus, vacation, sick days, etc. Deliver this via certified mail. Don't let them say "well we'll get you taken care of next week/month/pay day". There are statutes of limitations (I don't know what they are for NYC) but you should be making an effort to collect, not waiting on them. After you quit, they don't have an incentive to pay you anymore (even though they are legally obligated to). | Your tax advisor was legally correct, but perhaps not very savvy. Unfortunately, the best way to resolve this sort of situation is to avoid it: You should have insisted your employer stop withholding for PA as soon as you moved out of state. Once someone else has possession of your money the burden is on you to get it back, and the burden can be (practically) quite high before it runs afoul of any serious laws. The fact is that your filings are correct, and the PA Department of Revenue is being ridiculous. If they can't be satisfied with reasonable and adequate evidence backing your return you can file administrative appeals at little cost in hopes of reaching a more reasonable agent. However, if I were in this situation, since NC's tax rate is higher, I would just amend my NC return to claim a credit for taxes paid (even though erroneously) to another state. (This takes advantage of our federalist system and your state citizenship and puts the burden on NC to collect the "correct" difference from PA if they care enough. You also don't have to fight for the actual return of money with your new state because presumably you will owe them taxes again this year, and if they haven't returned what you claim you're owed then you just deduct it from what you owe this year.) | Yes. Technically, it would probably not be a claim for lost wages (which are usually awarded when someone injures you in a way that leaves you unable to work) but rather a claim for breach of contract. In that case, you would seek damages equal to the wages that you would have reasonably expected to earn. Keep in mind, though, that before making an award of contract damages, a court may expect to see proof that you've attempted to mitigate your damages, meaning that you tried to find work to replace the work that was promised. If you were promised a $100,000 apprenticeship, for instance, and you found a $75,000 apprenticeship, you would be eligible for the difference: $25,000 in damages. If you make reasonable efforts to find work but are unsuccessful, you'd be eligible for the full $100,000. If you make no efforts to mitigate, a court may deny damages altogether, or award "nominal" damages, which usually means $1. | No. It's the retailer's responsibility to give you your money back. From s14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: (2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality. (2A) For the purposes of this Act, goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances. (2B) For the purposes of this Act, the quality of goods includes their state and condition and the following (among others) are in appropriate cases aspects of the quality of goods— (a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied, (b) appearance and finish, (c) freedom from minor defects, (d) safety, and (e) durability. If your goods are faulty after a month and a half, it would appear that the goods are not of satisfactory quality as they lack durability - s14(2B)(e) above. The Sale of Goods act is very clear that your contract is with the seller. You have the right to terminate that contract, because s14 is always a condition if you're a consumer. Furthermore, the seller cannot exclude liability for breach of any terms regarding the quality of goods, and specifically, they can't exclude themselves from liability under s14 of the Sale of Goods Act. All of this is found in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. So the answer is: you appear to have a reasonable case for returning the goods to the retailer, and they are required, by law, to give you their money back. If you sent the goods back to the manufacturer, those rights shouldn't be affected, on the basis that UCTA states that those rights cannot be excluded. (Disclaimer: this shouldn't be taken as legal advice, merely advice given peer to peer. In your situation, that's what I would argue myself.) | Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful. | No, they are not obliged to take you back early As you say in your TL;DR you arranged 4 months leave and your employer no doubt made arrangements to deal with your absence. Now, you want to return early; they are not obliged to allow you to do so just as you would not be obliged to do so if they wanted you to cut your leave short. No doubt the current pandemic has changed the situation and in its absence, they might have been more willing to have you back early. But then, you wouldn't want to be coming back early. Your employment status is that you are employed and on leave. Subject to the details of your employment contract; there is nothing stopping you taking another job - there is a huge demand for logistics workers particularly in the health sector at the moment; much of it unskilled work. dIf you want to be unemployed, you can always resign. | I infer from the use of the past tense "worked" that you no longer work for the company in question. Also, from the fact that you are wondering whether there might be negative consequences, I infer that you do not have permission to use the systems in question. The specific consequences will depend on where the company and its computers are located, as well as on the nature of the systems you log in to and on what you do with those systems, but it's certainly possible to receive a penalty of several years' imprisonment. The fact that you created the system in question makes no difference. |
How has sneak-and-peak warrants been constitutionally defended? There was a famous scene in the Sopranos where Tony Soprano got his house broken into by law "enforcement" with a sneak-and-peak warrant. I for many years thought this was fiction but it is not. How has this been defended constitutionally? It seems just like a grievous way in which so called "law enforcement" removes all the safe-guards ordinary citizens have in regards to warrants. I don't see how the government has the right to plant listening devices in your home. This sounds very draconian. | A person has no protection against a valid warrant The fourth amendment is crystal clear on what it protects and what it doesn’t: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Courts usually find probable cause when there is a reasonable basis for believing that a crime may have been committed (for an arrest) or when evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched (for a search). Tony’s a gangster and the police went to a judge and laid out their “reasonable basis for believing” that a sneak-and-peek would get evidence of a crime. The judge believed them and issued the warrant. | Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained. | The answer is somewhat similar to the "corollary" question, in that this wouldn't be the only information taken into account at a motion to suppress and one would need know why the officer requested (in your scenario demanded) to search you in the first place. There are scenarios whereby he could search you without benefit of a warrant. Was he chasing you from a crime scene? Were you attempting to flee? Did he see something illegal before demanding the search that may have made it legal despite you thinking it not? The analysis is different if you are in the car versus in your house. That said, regardless of where, a consent search is just not likely to happen in this way. In your car, the officer has the right to take your keys to "secure the scene," or if there is a reasonable suspicion that you may attempt to flee. Typically, the officer will say "turn off your car" without taking your keys. Despite what's typical, though, they certainly can take your keys if circumstances make it necessary and that (the mere taking of keys) does not constitute a search. Keep in mind that the police can search a car without a warrant in a number of circumstances, without your consent, that would not be available to them with a dwelling. Courts will typically give police much more latitude to search a vehicle than a home. Under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement, individuals have less of an expectation of privacy when driving a car and there is also a much greater chance of losing the evidence in a car vs. a dwelling, since it's mobile. Generally, the police can search your car if: You have given the officer consent (in this scenario you've not – unless you hand them the keys without protesting – and then this would be considered implied consent); The officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in your car; The officer reasonably believes a search is necessary for their own protection (e.g., they can search for a weapon, if they have reasonable suspicion); You have been arrested and the search is related to that arrest (such as for drunk driving or for drugs, they can search for alcohol or drugs). There are tons of contextually specific rules that dictate when each of these situations is OK, and when they're not, as well as where they can search under what scenarios. It is not a one size fits all analysis. In fact, warrantless and consent searches may be some of the most variable analyses criminal attorneys and judges undertake to explore. The law on these topics is voluminous. Searching your car after you've given the officer the keys, assuming there was no basis and you actually said "you're not consenting," can result in suppression, but not necessarily as the fight is a lot tougher when it comes to a car. (E.g., if you said no earlier, but then handed the cop the keys later without renewing the objection, this could be considered an implied consent.) Similar to the other question, there is also going to be a whole other side to the story, with evidence aside from your testimony dictating what the ruling will be. A dwelling is different from a car, although your question makes some assumptions here that I would find very hard to see happening in real life (having represented both police, municipalities, and defendants to criminal searches).... It would be highly unlikely for an officer to threaten to break in like this ... especially in a dwelling where neighbors and passersby can see what's happening and would not only watch, but would probably video it. This is not to suggest that threats and actual wrongdoing doesn't happen, it's just not typically in this way. Police know the law. They rarely do things so blatantly unlawful that not only will nearly ensure that any evidence is inadmissible, but (in a case like this) where they will also probably lose their job. Short of a pursuit where the police are chasing someone into a house, I have never heard of a forced entry in a situation like you're describing. While we don't know the circumstances leading to the encounter, I am assuming that the search isn't pursuant to a chase, since you're having a discussion with the officer and if you're chased from the scene of a crime and run into your house, they're coming in. They are not having discussions. However, since we don't know what the circumstances are that lead to you being approached in the first place, it's difficult to analyze whether he has the right to enter warrantlessly. What we do know is that with a dwelling, it is much less likely to be lawful. As with the other question, the analysis as to whether consent was given or not is far from simple. Suspects are much less likely to give consent to search a dwelling as they are a car, and if they do, the search is often limited to a certain area, so chances of suppression are much better. That said, others will often give consent to the police when requested of them (spouses, kids, landlords, hotel owners, etc). Just imagine ... there are literally thousands of warrantless searches done every single year in the U.S., nearly all of which are alleged to be based on some form of consent. Assume every one of those people has a lawyer; that means nearly every one of those cases is arguing the consent was bad, some way, some how. Duress is one of the most common arguments when someone gives permission; either explicitly (like what you are proposing), implicitly (they came with 10 grimacing cops, so the guy thought he didn't have a choice). Most of the time, however, there is no duress, people just simply didn't know they can say no, or they think the cops won't find what they're hiding. Cops can do a lot of things to get you to allow for a warrantless search. They can even lie to people to get them to consent, and officers are not required to notify the suspect that he has a right to refuse to consent (however, telling the suspect they have the right to refuse is helpful to rebut the coercion argument). In United States v. Mendenhall, "The fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive." Keep in mind, a big part of the reason why these scenarios are unlikely is not just that the police can find a way in that won't be so challengeable, if they really can't get a legitimate warrant and need to find a deleterious way in. It's also because 9 in 10 times when a police officer does a consent search, the suspect signs a consent form. That's not to say that people don't get coerced or get searched due to duress, they do. But typically not in so blatant a way. There are shades of grey in most of these cases. So, to answer whether you can get the search suppressed if it leads to an arrest under these facts; the only answer that is definite, is that nobody can be sure. If consent searches, their exceptions, and all ways the evidence gets in and the evidence is kept out interests you ... read these two law review articles. There are probably 200 cases footnoted between them! http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/MaclinT011508.pdf http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-6-Sutherland.pdf | So my answer depends heavily on a clarification. Are the Police Suspicious or do they have a warrant? This is a big difference in the two behaviors as the former is not a thing, from a strictly legal perspective, and the police should not be harrassing Bob, who doesn't want to talk to them, when they should be making calls to get a warrant (If the police think Bob is being disorderly, they will arrest him and Bob should zip it, get an attorney down to the station, and let the Lawyer yell at the cops... and the judge... and the prosecutor and whoever else... If it's the latter case, they don't need to ask Bob to have Bob come outside... they can kick in the door and arrest Bob or remove him as part of executing the warrant. That's why you have them. In the situation as described, it reads like there was some crime in the area and the police think Bob may have some knowledge about it (he need not have done it, they could be looking for a witness). Bob does not have to say anything to the cops as per his rights against self-incrimination, so Bob tells them he does not wish to speak to them, possibly in an irksome manner and the Police won't take no for an answer. Perhaps they really think Bob might be the criminal... this doesn't necessary mean they have evidence to arrest Bob on. Perhaps Bob was identified by a guy off of security camera footage... maybe it was Bob, or maybe it was Bob's evil twin he never knew about and Bob's been home all night Keeping Up With The Kardassians (anyone knows Bob knows he can't stand going a week without knowing what Kim and Kanye are doing). Either way, it could be enough for a search warrant but just wanting to talk without a warrant, Bob can refuse and they need to respect that. Again, it's probably a bad faith arrest, but the street is not the place to have that fight... save it for the courts. | Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.) | The answer by @A.fm. isn't wrong, but it also is unduly optimistic. In my experience, in real life, people are more likely to lie when they are under oath than when they are not under oath, and law enforcement officers tend to be particularly good at lying on the stand because they testify frequently in court cases. In almost all places in the United States (and most foreign jurisdictions), in a pure battle of credibility in the eyes of a judge or jury between a law enforcement officer and an individual citizen charged with a crime, the law enforcement officer's account is going to be found to be more credible (beyond a reasonable doubt) about 90% of the time or more, unless you have a majority-minority jury or an outlier extremely liberal judge or the law enforcement officer has a personal involvement in the case (e.g. it involves a family member of the officer). The likelihood that it will be resolved one way or the other does depend significantly on race and social class, however. The credibility imbalance is still great and favors law enforcement, but not as extreme, when it is between an unrelated third-party witness and a law enforcement officer. In the absence of hard evidence or a law enforcement insider witness willing to testify in your favor, it is almost impossible to win a credibility contest in a case like the ones you suggest. One important step an attorney can take, however, is to seek discovery on any prior instance in which the testifying officer has been disciplined for untruthfulness or had his testimony in court found to be untruthful. This will usually be fruitless, but levels the playing field to closer to 50-50 if you get lucky and received such evidence. Such a request also provides a means of collateral attack on a conviction if the law enforcement officer has a history of untruthfulness that wasn't disclosed by the prosecution after such a request is made by a defense lawyer. So, what does protect you? Mostly the desire of the bosses of law enforcement officers (who are ultimately politicians, mostly local politicians in the United States) to see the law enforced in a non-corrupt manner and the fear of a law enforcement officer that he or she might be found to have lied using physical evidence unknown to him at the time (like a secret recording of an interaction). Law enforcement officers usually don't have much to gain from lying (although this equation changes a law when police department can receive assets seized in civil forfeitures that they are involved in) and usually they want people who are "bad guys" to be in jail to protect "good guys" although they aren't always very concerned about the means by which they achieve these ends. Of course, "usually" is a weasel word here and there are many exceptions that crop up in real life (e.g. when police have engaged in misconduct and want to protect themselves from the consequences of that misconduct). The other obvious solution (so common that in certain eras of U.S. history there were travel guides targeted at African-American motorists to help they carry out this approach) is to avoid places with police who have historically been corrupt. The United States has a uniquely bottom heavy law enforcement structure. Something on the order of 95% of law enforcement officers are employed by local governments or are otherwise tightly constricted geographically (e.g. rangers in national or state parks). And, even the small number of state law enforcement officers are heavily concentrated doing traffic enforcement on major state and federal highways. Similarly, lots of federal law enforcement agencies are broken up into geographic divisions some of which are known to be more corrupt than others (e.g. there is more corruption in the border patrol on parts of the border with Mexico than on most of the border with Canada). So, if you want to avoid the risk of encountering bad cops, stay away from places that are known to have bad cops. The solution may seem like a "cop out" (sorry, pun intended), but it is actually a pretty unique feature of the American law enforcement system. Most countries (e.g. the U.K., South Korea, Russia, Japan, Spain, Mexico, France) have a much more centralized law enforcement bureaucracy, which is fine when the people are the top are scrupulously non-corrupt, but which also makes it much easier for the rot of corruption to become geographically widespread and hence unavoidable from the point of view of an individual citizen. In contrast, in the U.S., even in the most corrupt of times (e.g. the Prohibition era), there are almost always many jurisdictions where law enforcement is not corrupt and corrupting the entirely system is much more difficult than in most countries. | How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small. | A warrant is required: you cannot just bust into a home because the owner died. Nothing that you describe resembles the kind of emergency situation that allows a warrantless search. In order to get a warrant, you have to have a good enough reason. Suppose that campus police found a suspicious object at the scene which was evidence of a crime and which had an identifiable connection to his home. Campus police might get a warrant to search the home, to find evidence related to the possiblity that this was a murder. That evidence could be evidence that he had uncovered a terrorist plot to bomb Needles CA, and he was killed because of that. His home computer might contain records of contact between him and the terrorists: so the judge might grant a warrant. The FBI might also go to a federal court for a warrant for a different suspected crime, for example a planned bombing of Needles. Since this involves national security, this could be a FISA court, which is a secret court for surveilling foreign spies in the US. The daughter has the (apparent) authority to consent to a search – police are not required to inquire very deeply into a person's authority to consent to a search. If she doesn't consent, the police of the FBI might have probable cause for a warrant – it has to be an articulable reason, not just a mystical intuition (TV cop shows notwithstanding) that there must have been a crime and the house has evidence of the crime. |
My bank sold a local branch to another bank, including my accounts, without my permission. Is that legal? My bank sold a local branch to another bank (in the state of Wisconsin, United States of America), including my accounts, without my permission. My first knowledge of it was that my debit card was declined. Calling my local branch during business hours only got an answering machine under the new bank's name. I went home, checked 8 months or so of envelopes from the bank, and saw zero pertinent information. Today I finally got through to a human at my old bank's customer service. Their position: you are no longer a customer, we don't have your accounts. Would you like the new bank's customer service number? And, yes, I got middle-sized envelopes from my "new owner" twice over the last month. I didn't open them, just as I don't open the offers from other banks that I'm not a member of, insurance companies I have no policies with, car repair scams, etc. So, how is any of this legal? There is another branch of my old bank about as far from me as my new one. There are branches all over the state I could have used. Why can't I keep using any of them? When I set up my accounts I had to sign papers: I have signed no papers with this new bank, why do they have a right to my accounts? Not to mention my personal information, which presumably has now been transferred without my permission to a third party that I have never seen a privacy policy for, all without my permission. | Contracts are transferrable The default rule is that the rights and obligations that one person holds under a contract (your original bank) can be transferred to any other person (your new bank). This is only not the case where the contract is one for personal services (e.g. an employment contract) or where the contract explicitly proscribes or otherwise limits it. For example, if I run a dog walking business and you contract with me to walk your dog on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays for 6 months then, at any time, I can transfer my obligation to walk the dog and my right to be paid by you for doing so to anyone else. I can do this by subcontracting (in which case the rights and obligations are still mine - I'm just using someone else to fulfil them), or by selling individual contracts (which is how debt collection businesses operate), or by selling the entire business. It would be completely normal that the contracts you agreed to when you opened your accounts would allow the bank to sell them. Check the terms and conditions. | The bank has made you an offer to contract with you: you can accept that offer by signing it and sending it back unamended. You can make the bank a counter-offer by amending the document, signing it and sending it to them for their consideration and acceptance or rejection. With a bank, I would count on rejection. Basically, if you don't like the terms, find another bank or do without the card. | In most cases, there is no direct legal recourse for such a withdrawal. Money in a joint account is co-owned, and any account holder may withdraw any of it for any lawful purpose. As the article "What is a joint bank account?" from Bankrate.com states: The money in joint accounts belongs to both owners. Either person can withdraw or spend the money at will — even if they weren’t the one to deposit the funds. The bank makes no distinction between money deposited by one person or the other, making a joint account useful for handling shared expenses. But a joint bank account should only be opened with someone whom you trust, since that person has equal control over the account’s funds. If the account holders have a contract or legal agreement that controls what money can be withdrawn and for what purposes, then a violation of such an agreement might be a cause for legal action. But merely opening a joint account does not create such an agreement nor imply it. | Can a bank sue someone that starts a bank run that destroys the bank? No (assuming, of course, as is the usual case, that the person who starts the bank run is not engaged in perpetrating a defamatory falsehood). Most bank runs are, and certainly the Silicon Valley Bank bank run was, based upon wide disclosure of a true fact. In the case of SVB, the bank run was triggered by the fact that its balance sheets failed to reflect the true value of fixed nominal rate bonds that it held as assets. In the usual case, a lawsuit also isn't a very helpful option to a bank that suffers a bank run. In the case of SVB, the bank had a book value (which is often a fair measure of a bank's value since its assets are so monetized) of $34 billion which was reduced to a pittance by the run on it. Even if someone who started a run on the bank had a moderately high net worth of $3.4 million that could be collected in a money judgment, that would cover a mere 0.01% of the loss to the bank, and there would be serious issues over the causation of any loss (i.e. how much of the losses suffered bound to occur sooner or later anyway due to causes unrelated to someone who triggered a panic). Another fine point of procedure is that when a bank becomes insolvent, it is promptly taken over by the FDIC or similar regulatory agency, which installs a receiver. This makes it effectively impossible for the bank itself to sue anyone. If the bank would otherwise have had a right to sue, the receiver for the bank would have the right to sue rather than the bank itself. But, this subtly while not irrelevant, doesn't capture the core reason for the question. | It is legal and quite common. Your choice as consumer is at the point of selecting insurance company. If you dislike ES enough, that would be a reason to select a different insurance company. It would be surprising if your ES contract disallows pharmacy pick-up, but even if it did, that would also be legal. This does not mean that the government doesn't have the power to break up Express Scripts, under anti-trust laws. There is no clear rule regarding how successful a company can be in attracting customers. | Essentially, if there is no written agreement or receipt of payment, the only records that exist will be in the payment itself. If it was paid by cash, there's probably no recourse without additional facts. However, if it was paid electronically, then even if there's no narration (description) that claims that the payment was for rent, it is still possible that you would be able to file a summons requiring the recipient bank to produce the information relating to the entity that holds the account the money was sent to. The information they have may be limited, but generally this would include: Name Address Date of birth (for natural persons) Phone number The above information is typically required under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist funding legislation. Additionally, if it was paid electronically, the regularity of the payments and the regular amounts may be persuasive. Finally, it's not proof, but you can swear an affidavit or a statutory declaration attesting to the truth of your assertions, but without additional evidence (the aforementioned transaction information), it doesn't really hold weight on its own. | My guess is the answer to this question is going to be in your lease. You likely signed a lease that agreed that you would pay accept this practice and spelled out what ever rights you have to challenge the billings. My guess is they are as limited as the courts will allow in Florida. And the only way to ensure access to those records would be to get the court to compel they provide you with the records. Perusal of the Water codes in Florida does not appear to directly engage this practice(I could have missed it). However it appears that there is code regulating the management of electrical limits the billing to no more than the actual costs to the customer of record(probably your real estate management company.) According the the NCSL (This refers to electrical service. I am assuming there is similar language used elsewhere for plumbing, or that the intent of the law is uniformity of these codes in all utility billings. Where individual metering is not required and master metering is used in lieu thereof, reasonable apportionment methods, including submetering may be used by the customer of record or the owner of such facility solely for the purpose of allocating the cost of the electricity billed by the utility. The term “cost” as used herein means only those charges specifically authorized by the electric utility's tariff, including but not limited to the customer, energy, demand, fuel, conservation, capacity and environmental charges made by the electric utility plus applicable taxes and fees to the customer of record responsible for the master meter payments. The term does not include late payment charges, returned check charges, the cost of the customer-owned distribution system behind the master meter, the customer of record's cost of billing the individual units, and other such costs. Any fees or charges collected by a customer of record for electricity billed to the customer's account by the utility, whether based on the use of submetering or any other allocation method, shall be determined in a manner which reimburses the customer of record for no more than the customer's actual cost of electricity. Each utility shall develop a standard policy governing the provisions of submetering as provided for herein. Such policy shall be filed by each utility as part of its tariffs. The policy shall have uniform application and shall be nondiscriminatory (Fla. Administrative Code §25-6.049). Now here is where the 3rd party comes in. The 3rd party is the one levying fees for the management on your landlord. Granted if you follow the strings ill bet you find that the billing company is owned by the same company that owns your rental management firm. So your landlord can collect no more than what it costs to provide you with the service, but part of providing the service is employing this 3rd party utility management firm. | You are not bound by any contract. You bought a physical good that the seller was barred from selling outside of the listed countries by his supplier. You did not enter a contract with the seller's supplier. Let's look the stream of commerce: Supplier of the item (Printing press) offers it. Sale with a sales limiting contract to resellers. Sale by reseller to customer without limiting contract. The first sale doctrine says, that without a form of contract, the rights of the supplier are exhausted in step 2. Even with a contract limiting the reseller's rights, step 3 exhausts any right the supplier has in the item, unless he too explicitly signs a contract. Selling an item in normal commerce is not satisfying this requirement. There already were no rights in the physical copy of the book when whoever bought the book first sold it to the second-hand seller you bought it from, and there can't be any more rights in the selling of this book gained by the original supplier unless he bought the book back from you. |
When a person intentionally misrepresents items to a self-checkout machine to save money, what crime is being committed? There are plenty of ways that people "trick" self-checkout machines into giving them discounts. Some popular ways include: When the machine asks what item is being weighed, intentionally choosing a cheaper item. When the machine asks for quantity, intentionally underrepresenting the quantity chosen. Using the barcode of a cheaper item and placing a more expensive item in the basket. Using online applications to generate fraudulent manufacturer discount coupon barcodes, and feed them to the machine as legitimate coupons. What is the actual crime and/or tort being committed when people do this? | Yes, a crime is committed as is a tort. The exact crime would vary from state to state. The most common description of this crime and tort would be "fraud" but the way that criminal conduct is allocated between particular offenses in states varies considerable. Theft (in jurisdictions where it is broadly defined) and shoplifting (in jurisdictions where it is a distinct offense) would be two other plausible offenses. | Theoretically you could, but that's highly unlikely if what you say is all there is to it. The prosecutor would have to have good evidence that you had a criminal intent, for example intended to make off with the goods. You could even attach a note of explanation to overcome any suspicion of criminal intent. | There are two issues, one is the legal issue of whether what you are doing is a crime, and the other is the evidentiary issue of proving that that is what happened. If you take the phone home with the intention of keeping it ('finders keepers') then you have committed larceny (sometimes called 'theft', sometimes correctly). This specific type is called 'larceny by finding'. If you take the phone home with the intention of finding the owner then you have not committed larceny because you have not committed the mental element ('mens rea') of the offence: you don't intend to permanently deprive the owner of their rights. However, and this is the evidentiary issue, if hypothetically you were found in possession of the phone then the police might not believe your explanation and a court might well convict you of larceny. P.S. Firefox has marked 'evidentiary' as a spelling error and suggested 'penitentiary' instead. :s | De minimis only applies when you are actually dealing with the law, that is, someone ends up in court. I am unaware of any jurisdiction which makes it a crime to "mishandle" food waste. Usually, a company is granted a monopoly over waste management for residences in a certain jurisdiction, the government vaguely indicates what the service is supposed to do (sometimes because the recipient of the waste is a government-run waste facility), then the service communicates to customers what their policies will be. The use of "should" in such communications does not imply "legally and enforceably must". The waste management business has a contract with the individual to provide specified services, which may for example "imply" that you are not allowed to throw yard waste in regular trash. If your trash contains a leaf of grass, that might technically be contrary to their policy, but the possibilities of a consequence for the individual depends on what is in the contract. It is possible that a surcharge can be added to a bill, but typically this only happens in the case of egregious and repeated violations, with multiple prior notices. | The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them. | As a concrete example, consider Missouri v. Coleman, where Coleman handed a teller a plastic bag and said "I need you to do me a favor. Put the money in this bag", and later as the manager approached, said "Ma'am, stop where you are and don't move any farther". Coleman was convicted of second degree robbery: but the appeals court found that he had not acted forcibly, so his conviction was overturned. Instead, the court entered a conviction for the lesser offense of stealing which is when one Appropriates property or services of another with the purpose to deprive him or her thereof, either without his or her consent or by means of deceit or coercion The act may also be termed "theft", as in Washington state. The thief is acting deceptively and thereby gaining control over property. | No. Theft is, in most jurisdiction, an action by which the offender takes another person's property with the intent to permanently deprive them of it. The clerk isn't taking any property from the store, and she doesn't have any intent to deprive the store of anything. She is therefore not guilty of theft. If she were doing this intentionally -- either in league with the customer or even without the customer knowing -- she could likely be held liable for the theft, either on a conspiracy theory or perhaps an innocent-agency theory. The lack of criminal liability of course does not mean that there can be no accountability. The employer is free to terminate the employee, and it will have different options -- depending on jurisdiction -- to recover the value of the uncharged printers, perhaps by docking her paycheck or through a negligence action. | It's illegal if the intent is to deceive. Under S50(1) of the Police Act 1996: Any person who with intent to deceive impersonates a member of a police force or special constable, or makes any statement or does any act calculated falsely to suggest that he is such a member or constable, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. Their intent would need to be proven. It will be fact-specific; in some cases far easier to prove than in others. The criminal justice system is overburdened and underfunded so it is no surprise that these trolling videos are given no priority whatsoever. Further complicating the matter is the need to correctly identify the individual to prosecute. Doing so would require a fair amount of police time, time that could perhaps be spent on more urgent priorities given the relative lack of harm these videos are doing compared to more serious crimes. However, in this video (Would You Help a Police Officer Having An Asthma Attack?) an S50(2) offence would seem to have been committed by the actor wearing the police clothing: Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. It does appear that both offences are being committed in these various videos, and the only reason people aren't being prosecuted is practical: there are more serious crimes to focus on, and the police would need to identify who exactly committed this crime--given these all happened at least two years ago, it would be challenging to say the least. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. Under S5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, wasting police time is a criminal offence. Bringing proceedings in court requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) since those proceedings could have a chilling effect on the propensity of the public to report genuine matters to the police in the future. It is likely that while "wasteful employment" of police time was caused by these people, so committing the offence, it is likely viewed simply as "part and parcel" of the job and the officer likely didn't spend any time at all investigating the confessions (depending on their nature). Of course, even if the officer did spend time investigating the false confessions, the DPP would need to give their consent so unless the person has a demonstrated history of doing this (that would stand up in court) or the time wasted was of a particularly serious nature (e.g. the man who falsely claimed to be the Yorkshire Ripper), it seems unlikely consent would be granted. |
Why would a savvy, skillful lawyer refuse to apply to be a Queen’s Counsel in England and Wales? Assume that a lawyer is shrewd and skilled enough, has even been regarded and touted to be a future QC, and can swimmingly afford the application fee. In England and Wales, solicitors have become, and can apply to be, QCs. Still, why would such a lawyer deliberately not apply to be a QC? What are the disadvantages of being appointed QC? Normally, lawyers can raise their hourly ratess upon being QCs. But lawyers can still reduce their hourly rates. I am NOT asking about Canadian QC's which are appointed, and cannot be applied for. Or Australian SC's which only barristers can apply for. | There are several reasons why a person might not want to apply for appointment as Queen's Counsel. The most obvious one is that an applicant can never be sure that their application will be successful. A savvy and skillful lawyer might prefer not to participate in the system, rather than submit themselves for evaluation and perhaps, suffer a loss of face when their application is refused. The application itself requires significant effort and consultation with other lawyers who support it, and would not be undertaken by someone who was not highly motivated to achieve the appointment and confident of a reasonable chance of success. Another reason is that Queen's Counsel are normally briefed to appear on unusually important and complex cases, often with the assistance of junior counsel, by clients who are willing and able to pay the high fees which Queen's Counsel are expected and able to charge. Thus, appointment as Queen's Counsel will change the nature of a barrister's practice. Even if Queen's Counsel agree to work at discounted rates in some cases, they will be expected to refuse, and will not be offered, briefs that are appropriate for junior counsel. An experienced lawyer might prefer to continue their successful practice as a solicitor or junior barrister, rather than seeking recognition as a leader of the profession, who would be expected to spend more time supervising complex litigation and delegating work to junior counsel. A final reason is that a lawyer may have political objections to the practice of appointing eminent lawyers as Queen's Counsel. They may have republican sentiments and support the office of Senior Counsel which exists in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Or, they may object to the role of the State in bestowing an honorific title, which is a public privilege that can be exploited for private financial benefit, on an elite group of lawyers who already enjoy significant social privileges. | Whether any person, provided that they are in full legal capacity (not a minor, not incapacitated etc.), needs a lawyer, is to be decided by that person. Even criminal defendants can be self-represented if they've got the balls for it — the law does not impose a requirement to have a lawyer when the person does not want it. Considerations as to whether to have a lawyer are very fact-specific and person-specific. Assuming that Steve is not literate in law, it would probably be good idea for him to get a lawyer before answering any questions. The facts are such that it is not totally impossible that he may be charged, especially if he inadvertently says something not in his favor, or otherwise says something favorable to McRobberface. | I assume you are talking about this case: FORIS GFS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD vs THEVAMANOGARI MANIVEL. For that amount, most people would be willing to break the law to keep it, and good advice what to do would be “ask a lawyer”. Needs citation. I certainly wouldn't: a) I think taking money that I know doesn't belong to me is wrong, b) even if I didn't believe that, the amount is so large the bank will certainly eventually come after it. The amount is so large I won't credibly be able to claim an innocent mistake. Simply hiding the money won't work, since the bank will be able to demonstrate that the money was deposited in my account, and I did withdraw it. I would be required to make restitution. This is exactly what happened to the defendant in the above case: they split up the money among friends and bought a house. The house is now being sold by the court, with the proceeds used to reimburse the plaintiffs. Would a lawyer be allowed to give me legal advice to help me keeping this money, for example by giving 500,000 each to twenty reliable friends, moving to Panama, or whatever would allow me to keep and spend the money? (Not asking whether two strategies that I came up with in ten seconds would actually work). Especially if it is advice if the form “X is illegal, but you can get away with it”. No. For example, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer states: (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. That's just a suggested ethical standard, but most countries will have something along those lines. Note also that in the US there is also a "Crime-Fraud" exception to attorney-client confidentiality. If a lawyer assists a client in carrying out a criminal or fraudulent scheme then their communications are no longer privileged and can be subpoenaed and introduced as evidence in court. | The question has a false premise: the law does not require defendants to pay for counsel. The right to counsel can be waived. However, the fact that court-appointed counsel are provided only to indigent defendants does seem at odds with the text of the Sixth Amendment. I will explain why the right is limited by reviewing the cases and historical background. Original meaning of the Sixth Amendment Part of the answer is that the Sixth Amendment was (probably) not originally intended to create a right to court-appointed counsel at all. Rather, it reversed the historical rule that people accused of felonies were denied representation even if they could afford it. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), at pp 60–69: Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest ... Historically and in practice, in our own country, at least, [the right to a hearing] has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right. See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), at p 370: There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense. Basis of the modern rule As noted in the question, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) is the leading case on this area of law today, but the modern rule was more precisely and recently stated in Scott, at pp 373–374: We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. Note that the rule is not derived directly from the Sixth Amendment (at least insofar as it applies to the States). The Bill of Rights did not apply to the States before the Civil War: Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). After the Reconstruction Amendments, through the process of incorporation, the Supreme Court began to accept that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause could entrench substantive rights against the States. The modern rule recognises that any person who is unable to afford a lawyer and who is sentenced to imprisonment without legal representation has been deprived of their liberty without due process of law. It does not establish an absolute right to legal representation. In Scott, after noting that the modern rule went beyond what was guaranteed by the text of the Sixth Amendment (understood in its historical context), the Court held that it did not extend to an indigent defendant who was fined for a petty theft. At p 373, the Court offered the following practical justification for limiting the rule: [W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger – that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment – is eminently sound, and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel. Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States. An unconstitutional taking? The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The concept of "taking for public use" is another one that's hard to pin down at the margins, but there's a good summary of the cases available in the section on When Property is Taken in the Constitution Annotated: The older cases proceeded on the basis that the requirement of just compensation for property taken for public use referred only to "direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power." Accordingly, a variety of consequential injuries were held not to constitute takings ... Nor was government held liable for the extra expense which the property owner must obligate in order to ward off the consequence of the governmental action ... But the Court also decided long ago that land can be "taken" in the constitutional sense by physical invasion or occupation by the government, as occurs when the government floods land permanently or recurrently. A later formulation was that "[p]roperty is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in course of time." I am not aware of any case in which it was argued that the need to pay for one's own legal representation amounted to a taking for public use. It is certainly a far cry from the compulsory acquisition of land. But perhaps in a case where the defendant is acquitted, or proven innocent, a takings argument could be run by analogy with the cases dealing with innocent people who suffered loss as a result of police execution of search warrants. See Everyone Benefits, Everyone Pays: Does the Fifth Amendment Mandate Compensation When Property is Damaged During the Course of Police Activities? 9 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 277 (2000) for more about these cases. | A lawyer is obligated to protect his client's interests and to carry out his client's directions in these matters. Not doing so would violate multiple ethical rules applicable to lawyers. Some of the relevant provisions of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct which are the template for every state's ethical rules (some with local variation) are: Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. (b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities. (c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent. (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Rule 1.13 Organization as Client (a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents. (b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if (1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization. (d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. (e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. (f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. (g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law; (2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged. (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client; (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; (3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; (4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; (5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists. (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation. (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. Rule 2.1 Advisor In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation. A lawyer is certainly within his rights, and indeed his duty, to inform a client that his proposed course of action is unwise, and can withdraw from representing the client. But, in general, in a transactional matter, unless the proposed conduct constitutes a crime or fraud, the lawyer may not defy a client's directions. Of course, while there are general rules in the law, there are also almost always fact specific exceptions to those rules. For example, while ordinarily, writing a tough contract when dealing with a minority counterparty would not be a crime or fraud. But, if an easy contract was used with all non-minority counterparties, but not with minority counterparties and the client's instruction was intended to discriminate on the basis of race, it might very well be unlawful or even a crime, in some circumstances to do so, which would alter the lawyer's obligations. Even then, however, a lawyer would almost never be authorized to affirmatively draft a contract contrary to the client's instructions as opposed with declining to do that work at all. | The case that you mentioned isn't an example of what you're talking about. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. No, they are claiming that Shamima Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. According to section 5 of Bangladesh's Citizenship Act 1951, a child born abroad to a Bangladeshi citizen father is automatically ("shall be") a Bangladeshi citizen by descent at birth. (Mothers were allowed to pass on citizenship after 2009, but that was after Begum was born.) Note that registration at a Bangladeshi consulate within 1 year of birth is only necessary in the case where the father is a Bangladeshi citizen by descent. I believe Begum's father was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise by descent, in which case no registration or other action is necessary for her to be a Bangladeshi citizen at birth. It doesn't matter that she has never been to Bangladesh nor does it matter that she never claimed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. There were two men of Bangladeshi descent in a separate case who successfully fought their revocation of British citizenship, but the difference between their cases and Begum's case was that they were over 21, which she was under 21 at the time of revocation. Section 14 of Bangladeshi's Citizenship Act provides that someone with dual citizenship automatically loses Bangladeshi citizenship if they don't renounce their other citizenship, but this provision doesn't apply to those under 21. So these two men had Bangladeshi citizenship too, while they were under 21, but they lost it when they turned 21, before their supposed revocation of British citizenship, whereas for Begum, she hadn't lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the time of the revocation of her British citizenship, because she hadn't turned 21. (Perhaps you got the idea of "claiming" of citizenship from some report that one can "claim" Bangladeshi citizenship by descent while under 21, and these men failed to claim it, but Begum can still "claim" it. But if you read the text of the law, that is clearly not the case. For a child born to a father who was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise than by descent, there is no "claim" of citizenship -- it is automatic and involuntary at birth.) As to your question, there are no universal restrictions to how a country can grant or take away citizenship. There is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which countries may voluntarily join, but only a minority of countries of the world are party to the convention. Article 8 of the Convention does prohibit countries that are party to the Convention from depriving someone's citizenship if it would "render him stateless", though there are several exceptions including if the citizenship was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The language seems to require that the person already have another citizenship, not just have the ability to acquire one, though I am not sure how much leeway countries have to interpret this. In the case of the UK, it is a party to the Convention, and it has largely implemented the provisions of the Convention in its domestic law. With respect to deprivation of citizenship, section 40 subsection (4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 prohibits a deprivation order if the Secretary "is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless." (Subsection (4A) has a looser restriction where British citizens by naturalization can be deprived of citizenship if the Secretary believes that the person is able to become the national of another country. I am not sure whether this is compatible with the Convention. In any case, this is not relevant to Begum's case as she was not a British citizen by naturalization.) So if the UK were to try to deprive citizenship of a British citizen otherwise than by naturalization like Begum, not on the basis that the person already has another citizenship but on the basis that they are "eligible" to "claim" one (which as I described above I do not believe is the case for Begum; I am talking hypothetically if such a case were to arise), that can already be challenged as a violation of British law, in British courts, without considering the UK's obligations under the Convention. If it's another country that's a party to the Convention, but their law expressly allows deprivation of citizenship for being "eligible" to acquire another citizenship even though the person doesn't have one (including, perhaps, British citizens by naturalization deprived citizenship under section 40(4A)), and a person in that situation is deprived of citizenship, they don't really have any recourse. A private party cannot "sue" a country over any violations of the Convention in an international court. | You should do one of two things. Either (1) fire your lawyer and obtain competent counsel, or (2) demand that he pay for the "second opinion" (in actuality, co-counsel or a consultant) if he is unfit to offer a proper opinion on the case. I am unfamiliar with the bar rules in Canada, however I am willing to bet they require one be competent to the prosecute the case they take. In the U.S. in all jurisdictions, the bar rules demand that an attorney not take a case unless he is competent to prosecute it. If he is not, he has a duty to either decline the case, or to find competent assistance to bring the case to closure. Unless your lawyer told you at the outset that he can only represent your defense and not your counterclaim, then he needs to be able to advise you about both issues. You should not be responsible for obtaining a second opinion. Most lawyers would not want their client seeking a second opinion as it reflects poorly on their ability competently practice. The fact that this guy has the gall to ask you to get one is unacceptable. As an example: I recently had a case that was within my practice area. During discovery I realized there was a substantial ERISA issue. This is a very specialized area of law that I am not very adept at dealing with as it is a complex regulatory scheme I don't deal with regularly. So...once I spotted this, I contacted an colleague who specializes in ERISA, who told me what I needed to argue, and gave me a primer on the area of ERISA law that I needed to be adept at. If I didn't have a friend who worked in this area, I would've had to get a co-counsel (at my own expense) by either splitting my fee, or by hiring him as a consultant but being personally responsible for the cost. If I didn't think that would be cost effective (i.e., the value of the case was not big enough to justify me hiring a consultant) then I would've had to tell the client that an issue arose that I was not competent to deal with and that he needed someone who specialized in that area (the problem is that people who do ERISA law aren't litigators traditionally) and had the ability to litigate. Or, give him the opportunity to say, "No, I want you to be trial counsel and we will hire him as the ERISA guy." In that case, the client would be responsible for the cost of the second attorney (otherwise I would just withdraw), but I couldn't demand this. What your lawyer is doing is trying to get you to ensure he does't get it wrong, and that is not OK. | Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals. |
"Find my device" and GDPR compliance Google and Apple both offer a "Find my Device" service which allows to track or even remotely wipe a stolen device. Yet some companies claim that tracking stolen devices is not a legitimate business reason under GDPR, e.g. TomTom: EU Data Protection legislation states that companies are only allowed to record and keep personally identifiable information (such as GPS tracks and traces linked to a particular device) if there is a valid business reason for doing this. Since TomTom does not have such a business reason, we have made sure that our data processing operation does not maintain information regarding user-, or device locations in identifiable form. That means we cannot track a specific user or a specific device. How is tracking a stolen GPS different from tracking a stolen phone? | It is not different. But one company can decide to approach compliance differently from another. Here, TomTom has chosen a fairly safe/conservative interpretation, whereas Google and Apple decided that more data collection is appropriate. A “find my device” style functionality appears to be entirely unproblematic if the user books that particular service (regardless of whether the service is paid or gratis) and provides consent for the location data collection. The legal basis for such a service could then be Art 6(1)(a) consent or Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract to which the data subject is party. Personally, I believe that Google is not sufficiently transparent about how Find My Device works, but that TomTom could provide a compliant service if they wanted to. That TomTom doesn't offer this service primarily shows that they don't think developing this service is worth it. Wiping a remote device is unrelated to this issue and doesn't seem to provide GDPR challenges. At least in a business context, remote wiping may be an appropriate security measure and may then even be mandated by the GDPR (e.g. see Art 24 or Art 32). | a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days. | Is it GDPR compliant that I can't access the account that I created and the personal data that I shared because "I haven't completed their internal pre-qualification process"? Article 15 defines a “Right of access to the data subject” but it's difficult to see how this could be construed as a right to log into a specific website. Common sense suggests this would be a very bad idea. If they are willing to provide the data through another means (say a report or data dump of some sort), the obligation would seem to be met. In fact, article 15(3) even states that data controllers should merely provide the information in a “commonly used electronic form” (i.e. not necessarily through access to their systems or whatever form they are using internally for the processing). Have you asked for that and would you be satisfied by that resolution? Is it GDPR compliant that their answer to my deletion request is "We will delete the data..." The text of article 17 (right to erasure) explicitly specifies that such a request must be honored without “undue delay”. Article 12, which defines some of the modalities for the rights to access, rectification or erasure by the data subject, also provides that controllers shall “provide information on action taken on a request […] without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request”. You haven't provided any time frame and I don't think there is anything wrong with acknowledging the request by promising they “will” do it but in light of article 12, it seems you would indeed be entitled to know once they have actually taken further action. However, you implied you might want to access the data first and it's not clear to me whether you explicitly invoked the GDPR in earlier communications. So I would clarify and reiterate my request (access or erasure) and ask them for explicit confirmation once it has been satisfied. | There are a number of misconceptions in this question. Firstly, the regulatory environment did not drastically change when the GDPR came into force in 2018. Previously, each EU member state had its own laws implementing the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive. The GDPR harmonizes these laws, and replaces them with a single EU-wide law. However, the GDPR is largely identical with the DPD. In particular, both laws have the same definition of a controller. Secondly, the data controller is not a position to be designated, like a Data Protection Officer would be. A controller is whoever – alone or jointly with others – determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data. Whether someone can decide the purposes of processing is a matter of fact, not a matter of formalities. There can be more than one controller. Most likely, the institution hosting the research group is the controller. For individual researchers, the important aspect would be to demonstrate that they've fully complied with their institution's procedures at all times – that they acted as agents of the controller, not as controllers of their own. The institution might have a more difficult time mounting the defense if its technical and organizational measures were inadequate. For example, keeping an unattended server running for five years without security updates borders on gross negligence – so there should have been a procedure so that each system has a clear point of contact who is responsible for administrating the system. The controller should also have inventoried its systems and processing activities at the latest in preparation of GDPR, e.g. for an Art 30 record of processing activities. Your question suggests that no one could be at fault because no one did anything, but inaction and failure to fulfil responsibilities can also be a violation of law. If the institution wasn't convinced that this server was GDPR-compliant, the correct approach would have been to shut the server down, not to continue the processing of personal data. Of course, the controller may be able to demonstrate that this breach of GDPR was very minor, for example because the personal data was pseudonymized and because other technical measures (like firewalls) would have prevented unauthorized access. | Of course it is illegal. You are attempting to access somebody's data without their knowledge and certainly without their consent. In the U.K. it is a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Serious Crimes Act 2015. The clue here should be in the term Serious Crimes. The Human Rights Act, and indeed the ECHR, should never come into it unless it was state sponsored or corporate spying. And even then certain states have given themselves Orwellian totalitarian authority to do as they please. | There is nothing preventing the OP's "subject" from making a Subject Access Request in these circumstances From the British Transport Police's Privacy Notice page, under the heading "How we use personal data": This privacy notice explains: ... the rights individuals have when we process their personal data. ... Right of Access: You can request access to the personal data we hold about you free of charge. You can request access to the personal data we hold about you using the contact details in this privacy notice. ... We collect personal data from a variety of sources, including: ... sound and visual images (e.g. from body worn cameras, CCTV, or facial recognition software); ... our own CCTV systems and body worn cameras. There's more detail in the link, which I have not replicated here to save space and avoid unnecessary "noise", but the above should cover the relevant points raised by the OP | The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case. | First, "I've seen some people say it is legal to do so but I want a second opinion." This is not a legal opinion. This is only in response to the question "Can you use (TM) on a product that is not Trademarked"? Second, you did not specify a jurisdiction. Since you mentioned Apple, I will assume USA. tl/dr: Yes, you can used the TM mark and no, it is not fraudulent. In the USA, there are three "trademark" symbols, (R), (TM), and (SM). (R) - (Registered) The federal registration symbol. This may be used only once the mark is actually registered in the USPTO. It my not be used while the application is pending. (TM) - (Trademark) / (SM) - (Service Mark) - According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office: If you claim rights to use a mark, you may use the "TM" (trademark) or "SM" (service mark) designation to alert the public to your claim of a "common-law" mark. No registration is necessary to use a "TM" or "SM" symbol and you may continue to use these symbols even if the USPTO refuses to register your mark. Those symbols put people on notice that you claim rights in the mark, although common law doesn't give you all the rights and benefits of federal registration. |
Can a store detective search my bag without my consent? If I am approached by a store detective and accused of stealing something can they search my bag without my consent? Or putting this another way, can I insist that any search be done by the police and refuse to cooperate until the police arrive? I'm specifically interested in the situation in the UK, though the situation in other countries may be of interest to other site members. I should emphasise this is a purely hypothetical question and I'm asking out of curiosity rather than any need for legal advice. | I can't find any specific laws or cases in the United Kingdom. In Australia, bag searches must be consensual - shopkeepers and even security staff have no power to search your person or belongings. It is for this reason that you will often be asked by security staff to open your bag, and move belongings around inside that may obstruct their view. If they attempt to force you to surrender your bags for search by physical force or by intimidation, you may be entitled to bring a claim for the tort of assault and/or battery. You need only prove that these occurred, without actual loss or damage. In any case, they do not have the power to arrest or detain you unless they believe you have committed a crime, and in those circumstances, only reasonable force may be used. You are under no obligation to remain in the store. If they detain you against your will and you are later found not to have shoplifted, you may be entitled to bring a claim for the tort of false imprisonment, which is, again, actionable per se (you need not actually show damages) and serves to vindicate a person's right to liberty. | When the suspect is being arrested for this indictable only offence, are the police allowed to then arrest the suspect for the summary only offences too whilst the police are still inside of the suspect's house? YES, as long as the arresting officer suspects an offence has been committed and believes the arrest is necessary for any of the reasons given in s.24 PACE summarised here Could a suspect have those summary only offences thrown out of court? NO. There may be other reasons to offer no evidence at trial, but being arrested for a summary only offence in the circumstances described is not one of them. | The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home. | was the idea that all searches and seizures, reasonable or otherwise, require a warrant? No. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This means that unreasonable searches are prohibited. A prohibited search can't require a warrant because the search is prohibited. If a warrant was issued for an unreasonable search then the warrant was issued in error. | I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen. | Loss prevention officers are just security guards employed by the owners or management to regulate patrons or customers in compliance with the terms and conditions of the store. They have no special powers or no more powers than the average person. They may be able to arrest and or detain someone however this is usually limited to a 'caught red-handed' scenario, ie they have to be a witness to it. Upon arrest they must only use reasonable force, they can't assault you. The force must be reasonable no matter what regardless of guilt. They don't have powers of search and thus any search must be consented to, you have the right to refuse a search or questioning but that may mean you have to leave the premises. | The security guard, acting for the (now former) owner of the property doesn't know the new ownership of the property and asks for evidence Bob now owns the property. The security guard is free to ask. Bob cannot produce a receipt for his purchase of the property. The security guard asks which checkout Bob used, so that the security guard can check its records for the transaction. Bob doesn't know specifically and says the checkout was one of three. The security guard asks Bob to remain while each of the three checkouts is checked until Bob's transaction is discovered (or not). The security guard is free to ask. Bob is legally free to leave with his property but the security guard may think he has reasonable grounds for suspicion of shoplifting and decide to try to detain Bob on suspicion of shoplifting until the ownership of the property is established. As any member of the public, the security guard may use "as much force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large." (s3 Criminal Law Act 1967) Bob is also free to leave without his property. In this case, as there could be no grounds for suspicion of shoplifting, only attempted shoplifting, it seems unlikely that any force would be reasonable. Of course, depending on retailer policy the security guard may be allowed to ban Bob from the premises if Bob doesn't cooperate. https://www.inbrief.co.uk/employees/being-a-security-guard/ | So, lets say for argument's sake the search is illegal (we'll discuss scenario later). Is the murder weapon inadmissible? No. Evidence seized in an illegal search is inadmissible for use in court, as to allow it would reward the state for breaking the law. At time of arrest it's still evidence and depending on what other evidence comes out might not be inadmissible (More on this later). If the knife is the only thing linking the driver to the murder, then it's inadmissible. What would happen to the driver, who was most likely the murderer? At this stage, the driver might be arrested and charged... inadmissibility is a matter for pre-trial motions, which takes place after the cop made the search. Whether the guy is a murder or not, he is a suspect who has been accused. Can the police arrest him, and investigate him with the hope of finding other evidence that would be enough to sentence him for the murder, despite the inadmissibility of the actual weapon? This all takes place before the inadmissibility of evidence is declared, so they certainly could investigate the guy, cuff him, read him his rights, book him, Danno, and put him in jail to help build their case. HOWEVER, if the knife is the only thing linking the man to the crime, then all of this becomes what's called "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree". Because the knife was used as the sole evidence to secure search warrants against the suspect, and should the knife become inadmissible, anything that resulted from the execution of the warrants is itself inadmissible. is the murderer in practice immune from being charged for this case, since the weapon cannot be tied to him? Not entirely. Rarely is a murder weapon needed to secure a conviction. Not only that, but while the search is illegal, there is an exception called "Inevitable Discovery" which holds that evidence seized illegally initially may still be admissible if the cops can show that the legally obtained evidence would have led to the knife. Suppose they had CCTV footage and captured the man entering the area of the scene and found out he had a connection to the victim, and got a warrant that would have included his car... that would mean the knife is admissible even if the search was illegal. If the weapon is considered inadmissible, is it returned to the suspect? If yes, would it also be returned even if it is of a type that the suspect is not legally allowed to own? Yes to both, though when it would be returned is subject to possible use in other investigations. Additionally, while I don't know of any knife ban laws in the U.S., there are examples of contraband seized by arrest for a different offense was not returned when the initial offense was overturned on appeal, meaning the contraband evidence was no longer validly seized and thus that half of the case was overturned... but the defendant wasn't returned his drugs. Is the weapon permanently inadmissible for all future, or could it be used in a later court proceeding? No. I'm starting to suspect I know the TV show and episode that inspired this question, but the search violated suspect 1's rights and thus was inadmissible for his trial. However, if a second suspect was discovered as the evidence was developed, and the investigation lead to the knife (say... suspect 2 had access to suspect 1's car... like say... through his job at a car wash that suspect 1 was patronizing... and planted the knife in suspect 1's car to frame him) then the knife is admissible because of inevitable discovery rule. Now, the TV Show I alluded too, and you'll forgive me as it's been a while, the events were that the cop pulled over suspect 1 for a valid reason (busted tail light, intentionally done by suspect 2 to get attention) and saw the knife on the backseat of the car, which is not a violation of search and seizure rules. The bloody knife was in plain view and gave probable cause to arrest and search the entirety of the car. If you leave evidence in a place where the officer can see it, they can seize it in a car at least. Places like the glove box, under the seats, or the trunk would properly hide it and not allow the officer to search the car, but through the windows is just fine. |
In what cases has the High Court of Australia held a federal law unconstitutional and invalid? The High Court of Australia has the power of judicial review of legislation, including federal legislation made by the Parliament of Australia, for conformity with the Constitution of Australia, and therefore the court may declare any law unconstitutional and invalid. Is there a list of cases in which the High Court of Australia has used this power and declared a federal law invalid? | Judicial review As always, Inigo Montoya, is correct - declaring a law unconstitutional is not judicial review in Australia, although it may be a consequence of a judicial review. Judicial review is the power of the courts (the judiciary) to review decisions of executive government e.g. a decision of a council in a development application or the decision of the Minister in an immigration case. Of course, in American English, which is not the kind the High Court of Australia uses, judicial review does mean what you think it means - so you’re only wrong in most of the World rather than all of it. Unconstitutionality The High Court of Australia, like all common law courts, cannot veto legislation nor does it give advisory opinions. It exists only to decide controversies between litigants or in criminal cases, either as part of its original jurisdiction or as the final appellate court (since 1975) for all Federal, State and Territory law. In deciding a case it can decide that Parliament has exceeded its Constitutional power and deem legislation ultra vires. This Parliament House web page gives the following representative list: Petroleum and Minerals Authority case—The High Court ruled that the passage of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill through Parliament had not satisfied the provisions of section 57 of the Constitution and was consequently not a bill upon which the joint sitting of 1974 could properly deliberate and vote, and thus that it was not a valid law of the Commonwealth. McKinlay’s case—The High Court held that (1) sections 19, 24 and 25 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, as amended, did not contravene section 24 of the Constitution and (2) whilst sections 3, 4 and 12(a) of the Representation Act 1905, as amended, remained in their present form, the Representation Act was not a valid law by which the Parliament otherwise provides within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 24 of the Constitution. McKellar’s case—The High Court held that a purported amendment to section 10 of the Representation Act 1905, contained in the Representation Act 1964, was invalid because it offended the precepts of proportionality and the nexus with the size of the Senate as required by section 24 of the Constitution. Postal allowance case—The High Court held that the operation of section 4 of the Parliamentary Allowances Act 1952 and provisions of the Remuneration Tribunals Act 1973 denied the existence of an executive power to increase the level of a postal allowance—a ministerial decision to increase the allowance was thus held to be invalid. Roach’s case—The High Court found in 2007 that amendments to section 93 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, to remove the entitlement to vote from all persons serving a sentence of imprisonment, were invalid, being inconsistent with the system of representative democracy established by the Constitution. Rowe’s case—During the 2010 general election campaign, the High Court declared invalid amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 which had reduced the time available for updating the electoral rolls after the issue of writs. Cases involving Commonwealth expenditure—in Combet (2005) the High Court rejected arguments that the broad terms of statements in an Appropriation Act were such that the Parliament could not be said to have authorised certain expenditure. The effect was that it was recognised as a matter for the Parliament, and not the courts, to determine the level of detail in such provisions. In Pape (2009) the Court held that a parliamentary appropriation was a prerequisite for the lawful availability of money for expenditure, but not in itself authority for expenditure; and that authority for Commonwealth expenditure must be found in the executive power or in legislation under a head of power in the Constitution. In this case the Court upheld the validity of the Tax Bonus for Working Australians Act (No. 2) 2009, but in Williams (2012) and Williams (No. 2) (2014) the Court held that the Commonwealth did not have the power to make payments under funding agreements (in this instance in relation to school chaplaincy) without the legislative authority to do so. | Both civil law and common law have civil codes, so that isn't the difference. It is common in civil law jurisdictions for these to be called civil codes and consolidated into the great big book of law. In common law jurisdictions, the civil code is scattered through legislation, regulation, administrative and case law and often not consolidated although, each piece of legislation typically deals with only one (or a related number) of topics. Adversarial vs Inquisitorial In a common law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to decide the dispute that the parties have brought to the court based solely on the arguments and evidence that they make. A judge who seeks their own evidence or decides the case based on a law the parties have not argued is making a mistake. The judge is free to say to the parties "But what about xyz law?" and let them make an argument about that but they would be denying the parties natural justice if they decided the case on xyz law if that law was not argued. In civil law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to find out the truth. They have inquisitorial power and decide the case based on all the evidence, the law that was argued and their own knowledge of the law. Precedence In common law jurisdictions, the cases decided by the courts are just as much the law of the land as the acts passed by parliament. When a court hands down a decision on a certain fact pattern, then all courts lower in the hierarchy must make the same decision when presented by a similar fact pattern. These are binding precedents. In addition, decisions of same level or lower courts (where not actually the ones being appealed) as well as decisions in "parallel" jurisdictions are persuasive precedents. A parallel jurisdiction is anything where the law is close enough that it makes sense to use it: Australian courts will tend to look first to other Australian states, then to England & Wales, Canada, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries then the United States of America and then to civil law jurisdictions. There is nothing nativist in this, it is just that these are the jurisdictions where the laws are "closest" to one another: partly because the courts have historically done this (which tends to lock the common law together), partly because there has been governmental will in creating harmonized laws in Australia (i.e. enacted in each state and territory but essentially the same law - often word for word) and partly because parliaments, when drafting legislation, nick ideas from other parliaments. If the Supreme Court of Western Australia has made a decision on a similar fact pattern under a similar law, a District Court judge in New South Wales had better have some damn good reasons for deciding this case differently but they wouldn't automatically be wrong if they did. However, if the precedent had been set in the Supreme Court of New South Wales than the District Court judge would be wrong to decide differently. Naturally, a lot of argument in common law courts is about why the facts of this case are sufficiently similar/distinct that the precedent should/shouldn't apply. Also, common law judgments emphasize the reasoning that led the judge from the evidence to the conclusion and include detailed analysis of the case each party presented - this is because they need to be understandable to a wide audience. Court hierarchy can be quite complex, this is the one for NSW, Australia: In a civil law jurisdiction, courts are not bound by the rules of precedence - each judgement is a first principles analysis of the facts and the law. This is not to say that civil law judges do not use other judgments in their analysis but they are not required to do so. Broadly speaking, the common law approach promotes consistency, the civil law approach promotes individualized justice. | Marbury V. Madison did not establish judicial review. It was simply the first case where that power was used. It was clearly spelled out in The Federalist #78 that this power would exist in the new constitution, and those who voted to ratify it understood, or should have understood, that it would exist. All that Marbury V. Madison decided was that the Supreme court did not have original jurisdiction to issue Writs of Mandamus That could be overturned, or the constitution could be amended to grant such jurisdiction to SCOTUS. That would not have any major effects on the US judicial system as far as I can tell. I suppose that the constitution could be amended so as to deny the power of judicial review to the courts. But I think the resulting system would be potentially unstable, and this would require a far more fundamental change than simply "overruling Marbury V. Madison" As #78 of The Federalist said: By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. (emphasis added) The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. . . . [W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental. . . . [W]henever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former. | No. Under U.S. Jurisprudence, any vagueness in a criminal law must be given an interpretation favorable to the people, rather than the government, since the government had the opportunity to make their intentions clear when drafting the law. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution has what is called the "Vagueness Doctrine" which renders vague laws at any level of government to be unenforceable (Found in the 5th and 14th Amendment as an interpretation of the Due Process clauses). The quickest way to overturn the court's ruling is for a legislature to pass an amended law that defines the vague terms in terms that are better understood and can give the courts a proper interpretation of what should happen, however, no one who was charged under the law can be recharged under the new definition. | The quickest way to get the text of Australian judgements is through AustLII. Reading the citation Parties: Tame v New South Wales In this case, the parties are (Clare Janet) Tame and (the State of) New South Wales. Year: [2002] or (2002) There is a subtle distinction between the above years: in brackets [] is generally (but not always) the year that the judgement was made, which may or may not be the year that the case was reported, which appears in parentheses (). This case was both decided in, and reported in this law report, in 2002. Court HCA Where the citation includes brackets - [] - the abbreviation that follows is the unique court identifier of the court where the judgement occurred. This case was decided in the High Court of Australia. For a list of courts and abbreviations, see AustLII's table of Australian case law. This is called a medium-neutral citation. Some reports are organised by year - unfortunately, there is no pattern to this - and they will have the year in brackets also. If more than one volume of a report of this kind is produced in this year, the volume number will appear between the year and the abbreviation as below. Report number and series 211 CLR Where the year appears in parentheses - () - and a number, then an abbreviation follows, these are the volume and abbreviation of the law report. In this case, it is the 221st volume of the Commonwealth Law Reports. Pinpoint reference Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 The final number is the pinpoint reference. In a medium-neutral citation, this is the judgement number - the nth judgement that year. In all other cases, it is the page on which the judgement commences in the law report. Authorised and authoritative law reports All law reports are authoritative and can be employed in court, however the authorised law reports of a court are the official law reports - there is only one for each court. Judgements that highlight a novelty or a particular point of law are generally reported in the authorised law report. How to use a citation The practical upshot of this is that AustLII provides LawCite, which is a free case citator - you can search for cases. All you need is either: The year, court abbreviation, and judgement number, or The volume, report abbreviation, and page number In the above examples, these would be 2002 HCA 35, and 211 CLR 317 ... respectively. This is referred to in the citator as the citation (which is confusing because the entire thing is a citation). LawCite provides, for your convenience, a table of: Cases that cite the case your case, Law reform reports referring to your case, Law journals referring to your case Legislation cited in the case your case, and Cases and articles cited in your case. These are extremely useful in finding related cases during your research. | Short Answer Yes, Supreme Court decisions apply everywhere right away. (Unless the decision says it doesn't.) No, we do not have to wait until new laws are passed. Explanation Judicial Review Marbury v. Madison (1803) established the principle of judicial review under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. This allows the court[s] to interpret laws passed by legislatures. And this is the basis for applying the ruling everywhere (in the U.S.) immediately. From Marbury at 178: if a law be in opposition to the Constitution [...] the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. [...] the Constitution of the United States confirms [...] that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. Judicial Restraint (Nominally) courts either interpret or invalidate existing law. In the former case, the law will persist (with the new clarity added by the decision). In the latter, the law will be struck as unconstitutional and, therefore, no longer exist. | Do I correctly understand that Federal employees, notably including the Armed Forces, pledge their duty first to the Constitution of the United States and only secondarily to carry out legal orders? And that they have no legal obligation to execute an illegal order? What process allows a subordinate to defy an illegal order if a superior gives the order? What legal protection does the subordinate have? All officers of the United States government (and for that matter also all officers of state and local governments) including soldiers in the armed forces are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Members of the armed forces are not only allowed to disregard illegal orders, they are obligated to not carry out illegal orders. Operationally, disobeying an order due to the fact that it is unconstitutional is a defense to an effort to fire or discipline a federal government civil service employee who may only be fired for good cause after due process. In the military, the issue would usually present itself in the form of a defense in a court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Of course, it would hardly be unprecedented for someone's firing from a job that was unlawful, or for a wrongful court-martial conviction, to be upheld on appeal. Suppose the Congress holds someone in contempt. The Congress, as I understand it, goes to a court to enforce the contempt charge. The court turns to Federal law enforcement to bring action. What if the President directs Federal law enforcement to ignore the court order? What if law enforcement complies with the President? The U.S. Justice Department is charged with bringing contempt of Congress cases at the request of Congress. But, an attorney retained by Congress could probably bring such an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia if the U.S. Justice Department refused to do so. Contempt may be civil or criminal, and unlike ordinary criminal charges (felonies can only be brought based upon grand jury indictments and grand juries are controlled by prosecutors) either civil or criminal contempt charges can be brought by a non-governmental employee attorney. The established practice is to seek contempt sanctions against the lowest level employee who has the authority to take the action requested, or to seek contempt sanctions against everyone from that lowest level employee up through the chain of command to the responsible cabinet officer. The President is generally not named as a party against whom contempt charges are sought. Defiance of the law in the face of a binding and immediately effective court order would be a constitutional crisis and you would need to move to the realm of politics and political realities, and away from the realm of what the law says that people should or should not do, to meaningfully predict how a constitutional crisis turns out. The law assumes that all government officials will obey a lawful court order duly enforced. If government law enforcement officers start defying court orders, then there is a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, the vast majority of law enforcement officers in the United States are civil servants who aren't beholden personally to the President. They were appointed on a merit basis, they are civil servants who can't be fired without good cause and due process, they are in agencies that have an institutional culture of obeying court orders. The civil servants with more seniority (and basically all senior military officers in the U.S. military) have served under multiple Presidents of different political parties. The number of political appointees supervising them is fairly modest. Likewise, most federal judges at any given time were appointed by prior Presidents and even judges appointed by a current President will not infrequently rule against the federal government when the facts and law demand that they do so. There is less politics and there is more unity in interpretation of the law among federal judges and federal law enforcement and legal officials than is generally assumed by more cynical members of the general public. Suppose Congress orders fines. What is to be done if no one will enforce the fines? A court can order that the fines be paid out of the U.S. Treasury. The order itself can have the force of law without the cooperation of any U.S. Treasury official. Sustained defiance of such a court order would lead to a constitutional crisis. Same scenario as 1 but this time it’s impeachment and conviction: the President defies any action to remove him. What if the President simply barricades himself in the White House and orders security and military personnel to protect him? Is there a protocol in the U.S. military hierarchy to deal with this scenario? This has never actually happened, of course, so it is hypothetical. The Treasury Department, General Services Administration and Secretary of State (and all other government officials) should revoke privileges that the President has by virtue of being President and provide them to the new acting President (realistically, in the simple scenario presented, current Vice President Pence). The military should stay out of it, but should immediately start treating acting President Pence, and not the impeached incumbent as the Commander-in-Chief. U.S. military forces are indoctrinated on the Presidential succession and it is unlikely that many military officers would disregard a Presidential impeachment. The Secret Service should stop defending the former President except in an ex-President capacity. In theory, one could imagine acting President Pence bringing an eviction action in the local courts of the District of Columbia just as one would with any holdover tenant. Since the local courts in D.C. are federal, this doesn't present the federalism problems that it would if the same thing were done in a state court with respect to federal real estate, and U.S. marshals would evict him and his family like anyone else. The trickier situation in terms of creating a constitutional crisis, honestly, is really one where the President is clearly and blatantly defying the law and court orders, but the U.S. Senate refuses to convict the President in an impeachment proceeding out of partisan bias. What should common citizens do if any of these scenarios play out? Whatever they want, in a lawful manner. Ultimately, this would be a matter for federal government officials (elected and appointed alike) to figure out. | Indian Constitution provides for a Federal government in which power of states and centres are clearly enunciated. If there is a dispute over any issue Supreme Court can decide whether State government is correct, or whether Central government is correct. Any law of Parliament affects the entire population of India, and so all states are affected by that law. If any state government considers that the law is not as per constitutional norms, it can easily go to the Supreme Court for decision. So, the observation of the Supreme Court that a state is bound by the law of Parliament, is incorrect. If an individual can file such a case, a state is also entitled to file it. The Supreme Court should decide it on the basis of merit. So I think the observation of Supreme Court in this case is not correct. |
Could one house of Congress completely shut down the other house by passing a large number of frivolous bills? Suppose that for some reason, the House of Representatives wants to stop the Senate from doing anything. Could they accomplish that by passing hundreds of frivolous bills, so the Senate would be stuck wasting time voting on those bills? Of course, the House couldn't do anything else during this time either. In other words, can one house of Congress run a denial of service attack against the other house by flooding them with bills? | No, because neither House nor Senate is obliged to consider each and every bill brought to it. | Yes, explicitly. It even laid out the procedure and method (i.e. on equal footing) of these new states. Specifically, Article IV, Section 3, the "Admissions Clause": New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. Note that many of the things in your quoted section are forbidden to the States, but are explicitly granted to the Federal Government (in various sections). So it's not "this shall not be done", but rather "the individual states shall not do these things; Federal Government shall be the only one to do these things if they can, as else where they may be banned from doing so". | No, it can't unilaterally scrap such schemes Immigration is a shared competence between the Union and Member States under Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This means that the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, it is predicated on a triad: the Commission (proposer of legislation), Parliament (co-decision maker), and the Council of the European Union (co-decision maker). The Parliament would not be able to propose and enact legislation scrapping the schemes by itself. The matter of proposing legislation would fall to the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. Such a proposal would go before the Parliament and the Council of the European Union for a "co-decision". Either side may amend, accept, or reject the proposal. While the Parliament may accept any proposed legislation from the Commission, the Council is unlikely to agree. This is because the Council is comprised of government ministers from each Member State. In the matter of immigration, it is likely that the Home Affairs minister of each Member State would meet as the Council to consider the proposed legislation. Given the obvious conflict of interest for each "golden visa" scheme, it seems unlikely that the Council would agree to curtail or scrap the system given the advantages it provides that Member State, and the need to be "competitive" with other Member States (even though such competition should not really exist, to ensure the harmony of the Union). Therefore, the Council would likely reject the proposed legislation and assuming the subsequent conciliation committee cannot get both the Parliament and the Council to agree on the matter, the proposal will be abandoned. | can it be construed as a violation of 66F clause 2 if we try to circumvent the rate limit even though the information is on public domain? No, unless the element of intent to threaten [...] or strike terror can be proved. I'm assuming that by "clause 2" you mean the excerpt you posted. Although circumventing the limit of API calls sounds in "exceeding authorised access" and might even lead to DOS, it does not imply an intent to threaten the security/sovereignty/etc. or strike terror. The statute is premised on such intent. The fact that the information(packets) is(are) on public domain is irrelevant. For instance, an intent to strike terror and/or actually causing a DOS can involve [targeting] a public domain. | Mr. Comey answered this in his testimony. LANKFORD: Okay. Fair enough. If the president wanted to stop an investigation, how would he do that? Knowing it is an ongoing criminal investigation or counterintelligence investigation, would that be a matter of going to you, you perceive, and say, you make it stop because he doesn't have the authority to stop it? How would the president make an ongoing investigation stop? COMEY: I'm not a legal scholar, but as a legal matter, the president is the head of the executive branch and could direct, in theory, we have important norms against this, but could anyone be investigative or not. I think he has the legal authority. All of us ultimately report in the executive branch to the president. LANKFORD: Would that be to you, or the attorney general or who? COMEY: I suppose he could if he wanted to issue a direct order could do it anyway. Through the attorney general or issue it directly to me. This issue also came up in United States v Texas. The obligation to refrain from interference with the FBI is a norm, not a legal requirement. And, like many executive powers, an act that is sometimes legally permitted can become illegal given an improper motive. It is also possible for Congress to find legal acts to be untenably corrupt. | The law works in the opposite direction of what you seem to be imagining. State courts generally have jurisdiction to hear lawsuits based on federal law, even without "authorization" from Congress. It is therefore perfectly normal to see lawsuits under Section 1983 , the Privacy Protection Act, or the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Protection Act being litigated in state court. Instead, when Congress authorizes a private right of action, it includes explicit language when it does not want cases heard in state court. This is the case with copyright, patent, and bankruptcy litigation, for example. | You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right. | The First Amendment says that the government cannot pass law restricting speech. It does not say that everyone is compelled to take actions that enable others to speak. The First Amendment would tend to work against your plan, because Congress generally can't pass a law to force people to "speak" in a certain way, and Congress cannot pass a law forcing you to provide your soapbox to your opponents. As an expressive matter, Google is expressing its right to "speak" in a particular manner, one that happens to not agree with how Apple talks (which is their right). However, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution is widely invoked as a means of compelling businesses to do something. If the government has a compelling interest in a certain end, Congress might pass a law that forces companies to do something. The political part, which you'd have to undertake, is persuading Congress that... the government has a compelling interest in [fill in the blank] w.r.t. phones, or computers, or what-have-you. Congress sometimes leaves such matters to the market, so that a competing company that unifies all communication could have a competitive advantage and could be more successful than a company that was more proprietary (although, at a certain point that advantage becomes a disadvantage and anti-trust actions take place). It's just a matter of persuading enough Congressmen to pass an appropriate law that does what you want done. By reference to the Commerce Clause, other considerations of constitutional rights can usually be finessed, although Google and Apple's First Amendment rights can't trivially be swept away by saying "effecting interstate commerce". |
In INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i), what does "other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" mean? INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i) states that Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who— (I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to section 1254a(e) of this title) prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 1225(b)(1) of this title or section 1229a of this title, and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal, or (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible. There are two ways to interpret "other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence". It could mean (1) that a lawful permanent resident who is returning to the US cannot be found inadmissible under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i), or (2) any departure or removal from the United States while a lawful permanent resident does not trigger an INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i) bar. (1) seems to be the most straightforward interpretation based on the plain wording of the statute. Plus, in some rare cases, it is possible for a person to obtain LPR status through a route to which 212(a)(9)(B)(i) bars, by statute, do not apply; and presumably such a person, after having obtained LPR status, has no restrictions on their ability to travel in and out of the US compared with any other LPR. It would seem bizarre and absurd to reject (1). We can easily think of a hypothetical scenario that tests (2). A tourist entered the United States on January 1, 2016. Their period of authorized stay expired on July 1, 2016. They remained in the US unlawfully. Then, on August 1, 2017 (i.e., after more than a year of unlawful presence), they married a US citizen and applied for adjustment of status. This was granted on September 3, 2018. On December 21, 2018, they travelled outside the US for the first time since their arrival for a brief vacation, and returned to the US without incident (see (1)). Eventually, at some point in 2021, they stayed outside the US for too long, and, having abandoned their US residence, decided to submit Form I-407 to avoid any complications with returning to the US. Now, in 2022, they decide to try to move back to the US with their spouse. The US citizen spouse submits a new I-130, and the noncitizen spouse applies for an immigrant visa. What will happen? Will the consular officer notify them that due to their previous period of unlawful presence, they are inadmissible until December 21, 2028? My hunch is that in the above scenario, the person is not considered inadmissible until December 21, 2028 because their departure from the United States after accruing more than 1 year of unlawful presence occurred while they were an LPR. In other words I think interpretation (2) is correct, but (1) is also correct: INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i) does not make LPRs inadmissible, nor is it triggered by any departure of a noncitizen while they hold LPR status. However I have not been able to find any relevant case law. | I think that the plain meaning points to (1). The "other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" modifies who "is admissible", in the present tense, i.e. at the time of seeking admission. It doesn't modify the departure. Also, if it were (2), there would be weird issues like, if the departure doesn't count as a departure for the purposes of this section, then what about the unlawful presence? Does it stay accrued until a future departure, or does it just get wiped clean with no consequences? If it stays accrued, then in some cases it may be worse than interpretation (1), because interpretation (1) starts the 10-year period earlier while it doesn't affect you while you are a permanent resident, so that if you lose your permanent residency in the future the ban will be over earlier. The only case I know where a departure doesn't count as a departure for the purposes of this ban is when you leave on a grant of Advance Parole, as ruled by the BIA decision in Matter of Arrabally. But the reasoning in that case was that Advance Parole was specifically granted to allow the person to travel abroad an preserve their eligibility for Adjustment of Status, which a ban would defeat. But this reasoning wouldn't really apply to the case in this question, because permanent residency isn't specifically granted for travel abroad, and a returning permanent resident isn't subject to this ban anyway, so interpreting it as a departure doesn't defeat the maintenance of permanent residency. The issue you are asking about is rare. In most cases, when people become permanent residents, they stay permanent residents or naturalize to become US citizens, in which case they do not have to worry about this ban after becoming permanent residents. Only if they lose permanent residency would this question come up. I am not aware of any guidance or case law regarding this case. | Did the President have to commute or pardon the Russians in US prisons, or is there an existing statutory basis for releasing some prisoners? As far as American law is concerned, in this particular case, it was a "simple" deportation. The defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to time served, based on submissions from the prosecutors and the defendants, which are usually followed by the judge. Alternatively, if the judge had sentenced someone to real prison terms, a commutation may be required. If they want, the prosecutors can also withdraw the charges before sentencing. Obama commuted Iranian citizens in a spy swap deal. In another Iran-USA prisoners exchange, charges were dropped for Masoud Soleimani. Then as "free" men and women who are foreign nationals, they can still be inadmissible to the United States and be deportable aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S. Code § 1182 - Inadmissible aliens, § 1227 - Deportable aliens). In this case, there are so many potential grounds to choose from: conviction of a crime of moral turpitude, misrepresentation, national security, foreign policy, etc. The Secretary of State can also revoke their visas at the Secretary's discretion and make their presence unlawful. They have the right to contest deportation if they are considered "free" as far as the criminal law is considered. But, they usually want to go home. The US may choose to prosecute them for other potential crimes if they contest. Then if they are deportable and there is no stay on the proceedings due to judicial or administrative intervention, they can be removed from the United States. Is there a formal agreement in international law between the US and UK? I do not believe the United Kingdom was involved directly to the exchange itself. The prisoner swap was done in Vienna. Agreement needs to be obtained from the Austrian government regarding entry conditions etc. UK revoked Anna Chapman's British citizenship. Igor Sutyagin and Sergei Skripal moved to UK. But those are not really international matters legally. The UK alone determines how its citizenship works and who can enter and stay in the UK. | According to Wikipedia's article Diplomatic Mission: Contrary to popular belief, most diplomatic missions do not enjoy full extraterritorial status and – in those cases – are not sovereign territory of the represented state. Rather, the premises of diplomatic missions usually remain under the jurisdiction of the host state while being afforded special privileges (such as immunity from most local laws) by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Diplomats themselves still retain full diplomatic immunity, and (as an adherent to the Vienna Convention) the host country may not enter the premises of the mission without permission of the represented country, even to put out a fire. (Supporting citations omitted) According to its article on Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations key provisions include: Article 22. The premises of a diplomatic mission, such as an embassy, are inviolable and must not be entered by the host country except by permission of the head of the mission. Furthermore, the host country must protect the mission from intrusion or damage. The host country must never search the premises, nor seize its documents or property. Article 29. Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. They are immune from civil or criminal prosecution, though the sending country may waive this right under Article 32. However, people who are not diplomats do not have automatic protection from arrest, and the idea that an embasy is the "soil" of the country it represents is largely obsolete. See This stack exchange politics question. So if Turkey were to obtain custody of people it accused of doing the killing, and if those people were not accredited diplomats, it could try them under Turkish law. Whether any of that is likely to happen is another question. | Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination. | Short answer: You find a country who is willing to recognize you as stateless, and issue you travel papers. At that point you can enter the U.S. by applying for a visa. The USA really does not want to create stateless people. They are laboring diplomatically to eradicate statelessness. As such, the State Department will want to see that you are secure in another country's citizenship before they will repudiate your US citizenship. Otherwise, they are very reluctant. The State Department will insist you do the repudiation in a foreign country at a US embassy. If you want to become stateless with your feet in the United States, you'll likely have a legal fight on your hands. Regardless, it will cost you $2300 in filing fees (plus, all your back taxes) :) At that point, you become the problem of the foreign country. You aren't anyone to the USA, and you have to apply for a visa just like anyone else. When a stated person enters the US, immigration's pivotal concern is whether you'll leave the US consistent with the terms of your visa, i.e. return to your country of citizenship. Being stateless increases this risk, and being a USA expat increases that risk further, since you are so familiar and comfortable in the US. If you found yourself in the kind of piccadillo that would qualify a foreigner for refugee or asylum status, the US would consider it just the same as others, since those statuses include right of residency. Some countries manufacture stateless people, e.g. Syria will not grant citizenship to a non-Muslim born there. | Typically in extraditions, the treaties will only allow for extraditions if both nations have a similar crime and similar punishment for that crime. In this case, there maybe some pause for Australia to grant an extradition as Australia no longer has the death penalty for any crime, so it could be that while the new crime the defendant is being sought for is Escape from Incarceration related (that's a yes in both countries), technically the punishment for an escaped Death Row Inmate is the Death Penalty. Australia can't extradite for any crime where death penalty is on the line, but the requesting nation can say they will give a more lighter sentance that is more compliant with the requested nation's own laws. However, since it is Death for another crime that Austrilia never had jurisdiction over, it complicates matters. There is precidence for procedural reasons for refusing to extradite. For example, while the U.S. and Italy have an extradition treaty and both view murder in the same light, the U.S. refused the extradition of a citizen who was wanted for a murder in Italy that she was previously aquitted of, but new evidnce was uncovered. Because it is illegal for the state to try a person twice for the same crime in the U.S., the U.S. declined the extradition treaty. Some additional notes, extradited persons can only be tried for crimes that they were extradited for, so there is an argument that Australia would refuse unless Indonesia promises to commute the Drug Trafficking sentence to Life Imprisonment | Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization. | We do not have a law requiring you to renounce citizenships that you might hold, like the Nationality Law. I am not sure what you mean saying that renouncement is processed only within the Japanese legal system -- that is how it is everywhere, and there is no international authority or clearing house that handles citizenship renunciations. The effect of renouncing Japanese citizenship would be that you are then no longer a citizen of Japan: I can't find an explicit law prohibiting an exclusively-Japanese citizen from renouncing his citizenship and becoming stateless. A dual citizen would then be exclusively a citizen if "the other country", thus you would become strictly an Iranian citizen. According to the Civil Code of Iran you would be an Iranian citizen under clause 2 of Article 976. Article 977 allows accept a different citizenship but that would not apply if you have an Iranian father (and I guess does not actually get rid of your Iranian citizenship). Article 988 sets conditions for Iranians to abandon their nationality: you must be 25 or older, have renounced all property rights in Iran by transfer to Iranian nationals, have done your military service, and, have approval of the Council of Ministers. So yeah, not possible. Article 14 of the Japanese Nationality Law requires you to "choose either of the nationalities" before reaching 22, and furthermore Choice of Japanese nationality shall be made either by depriving himself or herself of the foreign nationality or by the declaration provided for in the Family Registration Law in which he or she swears that he or she chooses to be a Japanese national and that he or she renounces the foreign nationality (hereinafter referred to as “declaration of choice ”) Article 16 says "A Japanese national who has made the declaration of choice shall endeavour to deprive himself or herself of the foreign nationality". The bold part above seems to resolve that paradox, although that is based on a US-style interpretation of law and working from a translation of the law. That is, the requirement is that you try, not that you succeed (which is impossible in the case of a person with an Iranian father). There would be an effect in the US. If you renounce Japanese citizenship, you're strictly an Iranian national, and that has one consequence. What is not clear is whether the US recognizes, in any way, a renunciation which Iran doesn't recognize. This case features a person with renounced Iranian citizenship (he is also a US citizen), who was approved for a security clearance based in part on his renounciation. This gives some indication that the US does not care that Iran makes renunciation next to impossible. This is of course just for informational purposes and calls for an immigration attorney if it really matters. |
What does "residence of temporary character" mean The protective covenants and restrictions section on the deed of a house has a clause stating: No trailer, basement, garage, barn, or other outbuildings erected on this property shall at any time be used as a residence temporarily or permanently, nor shall any residence of a temporary character be permitted. What exactly is "residence of a temporary character" in this context? Does this clause restrict the owner of the house from making it a rental property or an AirBNB home? | There isn't enough information to give a reliable answer in the abstract. It is a hard concept for lots of people to understand, but words don't have the same meaning in every context. Law is not physics or chemistry. Words that mean one thing in a particular instrument or statute could mean another thing somewhere else, even if exactly the same words are used. More context would be helpful in determining a meaning. It could be a reference to a type of use, like AirBnB or other short term rentals (e.g. use as a hotel or hostel). It could also be a reference to a type of building that is not permanent such as tents, RVs, or other non-permanent structures intended for residential occupancy. Usually, a look at what the adjacent and framing language of the covenants say would clarify the intent as would some sense of the kind of structures built or intended to be built in the vicinity. It also isn't clear from context if the emphasis is on "residential" (e.g. in a property with a storage facility included), or on "temporary" (e.g. in a posh suburb). | A lien is used to prevent sale of a property until a debt is paid. This has nothing to do with priority over a mortgage. The HOA agreed to release the lien for some payment. The negotiation of that payment doesn't matter to the new buyer. Once the lien is released, then it is no longer listed with the county on the property, so the property can now be sold. The former lienholder cannot now apply a new lien to the property because the new owner is not a debtor to the former lienholder. This would be a terrible way to manage property sales, and no mortgage company would allow a mortgage for a property that could not be sold in case of foreclosure, which is likely why the mortgage holder was a private individual. It is possible for a new owner to take on existing liens, but this would be clearly spelled out in purchase documents. There should be a statement on the title search results that no liens exist. | There are several House rules and laws that prohibit Members from using their time on the floor or in committee meetings for campaign activities, including rallies. These prohibitions are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the House Ethics Manual, on "Campaign Activity." The general rule covering which resources can be used for campaigns is simple: "official resources of the House must...be used for the performance of official business of the House..., and may not be used for campaign or political purposes." p. 123 The "basic principle" underlying this rule is also simple: "government funds should not be spent to help incumbents gain reelection." p. 123 The ban extends to the use of "House buildings, rooms and offices – including district offices." Since these are "supported with official funds," they "are considered official resources," and, "as a general rule, they may not be used for the conduct of campaign or political activities, and...are not to be used for events that are campaign or political in nature..." p. 127. These rules obviously prohibit members from using the floor or committee meetings for campaign rallies. The House rules also prohibit using tv footage of "House floor...or committee proceedings" in "partisan political campaign material to promote or oppose the candidacy of any person for public office." p. 128. It is also a federal crime to solicit campaign contributions while on government property. In many cases, it is relatively easy to tell when these laws and rules have been broken. Either the Senator called a donor from her office, or she didn't; either she held a campaign rally or she didn't. But in other cases, it may not be so easy to tell when these laws have been broken. For example, suppose a Member throws in several partisan soundbites while speaking on the floor, hoping to make the nightly news. Could this be considered using the House floor for "political purposes"? | Of course she is living with you. Clothes, toothbrush, cooking and eating, sleeping, I suppose breakfast as well, that's living with you. And it's not illegal, but it is apparently in breach of your leasing contract. I'd study your contract carefully to see what the consequences are if she is living for you for more than 14 days. | The usual default rule is that a purchaser is bound to honor a lease on the same terms as the previous owner, and that purchase agreements are subject to existing valid leases. However, the Ontario Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (S.o. 2006, chapter 17) section 49 (2) says: If a landlord who is an owner as defined in clause (a) or (b) of the definition of “owner” in subsection 1 (1) of the Condominium Act, 1998 owns a unit, as defined in subsection 1 (1) of that Act, that is a rental unit and has entered into an agreement of purchase and sale of the unit, the landlord may, on behalf of the purchaser, give the tenant of the unit a notice terminating the tenancy, if the purchaser in good faith requires possession of the unit for the purpose of residential occupation by, (a) the purchaser; (b) the purchaser’s spouse; (c) a child or parent of the purchaser or the purchaser’s spouse; or (d) a person who provides or will provide care services to the purchaser, the purchaser’s spouse, or a child or parent of the purchaser or the purchaser’s spouse, if the person receiving the care services resides or will reside in the building, related group of buildings, mobile home park or land lease community in which the rental unit is located. 2006, c. 17, s. 49 (2). I take that to mean that IF the purchaser intends to reside in the unit (or have one of the people in (2)(a)-(d) reside there), then and only then, you can be given notice to leave. Acceding to par (3) of the same section the notice must be at least 60 days, and must be to the end of a rental period (probably a month), and that 60 days may not start until after the landlord has actually signed a sales agreement for the unit. And the landlord can only do this if the new owner has specifically indicated a requirement for possession of the unit as a residence, not to rent to someone else. You may want to seek out a tenants assistance organization, or possibly a lawyer, since it sounds as if the landlord is going beyond what the law permits. EDIT: As to showing the unit, section 26(3) of the same act provides that: Entry to show rental unit to prospective tenants (3) A landlord may enter the rental unit without written notice to show the unit to prospective tenants if, (a) the landlord and tenant have agreed that the tenancy will be terminated or one of them has given notice of termination to the other; (b) the landlord enters the unit between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.; and (c) before entering, the landlord informs or makes a reasonable effort to inform the tenant of the intention to do so. 2006, c. 17, s. 26 (3). and section 27 (2) and 27 (3) further provide that: (2) A landlord or, with the written authorization of a landlord, a broker or salesperson registered under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, may enter a rental unit in accordance with written notice given to the tenant at least 24 hours before the time of entry to allow a potential purchaser to view the rental unit. 2006, c. 17, s. 27 (2). (3) The written notice under subsection (1) or (2) shall specify the reason for entry, the day of entry and a time of entry between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. 2006, c. 17, s. 27 (3). So it seems that the landlord may show the unit to prospective purchasers during reasonable hours. However another provision says that the landlord may not interfere with your "quiet enjoyment" of the premises, so the frequency of showing probably must be reasonable. | Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed. | A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws. | The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.