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A deceased signed a car loan on behalf of a relative with poor credit- what happens? Albert signed a car loan on behalf of his son, Bob as Bob had poor credit. Bob drove the car and paid the repayments, though was not mentioned on the loan. Albert dies. What rights does the bank have at this point. Can they repossess the car? What are Bob's options if he wants to keep the car? Can he offer to take on the loan? If the bank doesn't want this to happen, can he force them? What is the executor of the estate to do? The executor is concerned that the bank will repossess the car, and then pay the car off with the sale of his fathers house.	When a debtor dies, with the debt outstanding, the debt enters default. The estate has to solve the outstanding debt before paying out any inheritances: The estate can and does pay up. This outstanding debt of the estate is gone, the car is paid off, and enters the estate as a value to be distributed as the will or rules dictate. The estate doesn't pay up, nobody refinances the car. The car is not part of the estate and can't be inherited. The debt is in default, and the car will be repossessed by the bank, together with any other securities for the car. The items/money repossessed leave the estate before any item can be distributed. The estate does not pay up, but one of the inheritors discusses with the bank to refinance the car. The car never enters the estate. The refinancing person now has a contract with the bank about a car loan. The debt leaves the estate by virtue of being no longer in the name of the deceased, its obligation was taken up by the refinancer. It's up to the bank to agree or deny. Many loan contracts contain a clause for the case of debtors dying.	The physical cash in the bank is not your property, at least not in US law (according to Scalia). It becomes your property when the withdrawal is performed by some means specified in your contract. A deposit gives you a contractual right to demand money from the bank. Bank robbery is a crime. Having money deposited with the bank doesn't change that. The only possible chance a robber has at trial is jury nullification. I haven't found records for that in Lebanon, but it does have jury trials. Impartial review classifies Lebanon's justice system as somewhat corrupt, but generally compliant with the basic principles. So it might be possible to get away with it at trial, but a very long shot.	You may contact a towing company; they will ask who you are, and will politely inform you that since you aren't the property owner, they aren't authorized to take someone else's car that is trespassing on the property. [Addendum] The first step in unraveling the legalities of the situation is seeing that only the property owner can give permission to enter (park) on the property. That permission can be rescinded, but only by the owner. The owner seems to have given permission and has stated in advance some conditions under which permission might be rescinded. The towing company could be called (by the owner) to act as the agent for the owner and remove the offending vehicle; but the towing company cannot just up an do this on their own. If they were to spontaneously tow a vehicle without officially acting on behalf of the owner, they would be liable for damages, owing to their having torted some guy's chattels. So the company will want to know that they are protected, in acting as the agent of the property owner. One way to do that is to verify that the person calling the towing company is the owner. Another would be to get the caller to swear that they are the owner and indemnify them against damages, in case they get sued. That pound of cure is more costly and annoying than the ounce of prevention of making sure that you're towing a car with proper authorization, so it's unlikely that they would just tow the car on your say-so. You might try suing the complex owner for some kind of breach of contract, if you think you have a contractual right to a parking space and they are negligent in doing what's necessary to meet your contractual right. The lease says "we may...", not "we will", so they haven't promised to absolutely enforce this rule. Or, of course, you could call the manager and mention that there's still a problem.	Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.	If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail.	What would be the best course of action now? It has been six months with no communication from him or his estate lawyer, and no will has been filed with the court. Since it's not entering probate, is there any guarantee that he has to faithfully execute the conditions of the will at all or notify any of the beneficiaries? Without probate, can he simply choose to not execute the will? A will has no effect or validity until it is admitted to probate. You can't do anything with a will outside a probate proceeding. Usually state law requires that a will that is in someone's possession be lodged with the court, whether or not they plan on opening up a probate estate, but this requirement is widely ignored. Unlike a will, a trust can be administered without court supervision, without being admitted to probate, although usually, the trust is required to file a notice of its existence with the court if it has become irrevocable (a requirement that is also widely ignored). The trustee of a trust has a fiduciary duty to administer the trust in accordance with its terms and to keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about it. Again, sometimes the notice to the beneficiaries is overlooked. Also, it wouldn't be unusual for someone to inaccurately say that a will provided that a certain thing happen, when, in fact, that was a provision in a trust. People are sloppy in ordinary conversation about the distinctions between wills and trusts. If a trust was drafted to avoid probate, the will is probably just a "pour over will" which states that if there is any property that is not in the trust as her death that it is hereby transferred to the trust. Normally, a person would not have both a trust designed to avoid probate and a will with substantive provisions at the same time. If you suspect that you know who the trustee is, the first step would be to write a formal letter that you can prove was sent and received (e.g. via certified mail or FedEx), asking if there is a trust, and if there is one, if you are a beneficiary of that trust, and asking for the trust agreement (or at least the parts of it pertinent to you status as beneficiary). If the person that you suspect is trustee is a trustee, he has a legal duty to let you know these things (which doesn't mean that he necessarily will do so). If you fail to receive cooperation or a response after this initial inquiry, you may need to hire counsel to attempt to obtain this information through the courts.	As Polygnome points out in the comments, the first step is to determine who owns the original copyright on your mother's work now. This will be her heirs. If you are the sole heir then no problem. If the copyright was explicitly left to you in her will, also no problem. If there are multiple heirs and no explicit assignment of the copyright, then problem. The copyright will probably be considered part of the chattels of the estate (i.e. everything except real estate). If those are allocated fractionally (e.g. half each to two siblings) then the copyright probably followed that principle, unless you have already come to some agreement about it. If you are on good terms with the siblings then the best bet is to just make a deal for their part of the copyright. You could just ask them to sign it over to you, or you could cut them in for a percentage of future royalties. That makes the situation 100% clear, and any publisher is going to require 100% clarity before they consider offering a contract. Once you have the whole copyright you can go ahead and register. I've looked through the registration process and it doesn't actually ask about derivative works. What it wants to know is whether you own the copyright, and who were the authors (including works for hire). So just fill it in on that basis.	united-states Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts. You should hire an attorney for a few hundred dollars, so the job is done right. Even if you do nothing and your children do nothing, your children are not obligated to pay your debts out of anything other than your own assets at death, unless they have personally guaranteed those debts. And, if they have personally guaranteed those debts, you can't release them, only the creditor can do that. If your children owe debts to you, you can release them from those debts. But, you should hire an attorney to do so in order to avoid ambiguity. The biggest question would normally be whether or not the discharge of debts owed by your children to you should count in the process of dividing up the assets you have left after the debts you owe to third-parties at death, or not.
Perjury on Petition grounds for dismissal? In a family court matter, a petitioner for more support funds completed a form, signed it (perjury?) certifying he was a resident in a county he does not live in. Is the readily provable false statement grounds for dismissal? The state is New York, and I am not a party to the action. I am curious how to attack this type of situation. I could not find anything in Siegel's New York Practice. In summary, the application form (Petition) and applicant statement is impeached by their testimony on the form, under penalty of perjury. (I am not certain that the penalty of perjury statement is appropriate on such a form, but that is a different matter.) Certainly one could attack the credibility of the applicant, but I am curious if such an issue is more fundamental than that.	Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected.	It depends partly on where you are. If you're in the foreign country and they have a law compelling you to answer any questions asked by their government or some company, they you have to answer the question. Whether lying has any legal repercussions depends on the laws of the country, so you'd have to narrow it down a bit. If you're in the US, the only context where you can be compelled to answer a question is when ordered to do so in court (giving testimony), and you have 5th Amendment immunity from being forced to testify against yourself. If you are granted immunity from prosecution, then they can compel you to testify (answer the question). If a foreign entity asks you whether you are a US citizen, you can decline to answer. You can also make up any answer you want, and generally not run afoul of US law (though you could run into problems in that country). There are state and federal laws about making false statements in official investigations, which would not be applicable to what you describe. There is no general law that says you must always tell the truth. However, making a false statement could be part of the crime of fraud, so it would depend on the context of your statement, i.e. are you misrepresenting your citizenship in order to get something of value. In light of the topical update, again there may be country-specific penalties in country for lying about citizenship, and tax evasion is against the law here, which is true whether or not you lie. FATCA specifies a duty to disclose (sect. 6038d), which is not tied to truthful reporting of citizenship (in other words, there is no point in lying to the bank because non-reporting is still a crime). But: this law probably brings the lie with the scope of 18 USC 1001 ("Martha's Law"), which makes it a crime to conceal a material fact "in any matter within the jurisdiction of ...the United States". This means and has been held to mean not just that you can't lie to federal officers, you can't lie to anyone who reports your information to the federal government. FATCA also says "we don't care if it's a crime to report being an American in that country", so inconveniences certainly are not a defense.	A sample visa application is provided here. On p. 80, it warns that the submission of an application that contains false or misleading information may result in permanent refusal of a visa or denial of entry, and that all declarations are unsworn declarations made under perjury of penalty, 28 USC 1746 the penalty being specified as a fine and up to 5 years prison in 18 USC 1621.	There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.	To what degree are such emails admissible in court as evidence, and what weight do they carry? Your own statement, when offered by you as evidence, is hearsay, unless it comes within an exception to that rule. Recorded recollection might be one of the better exceptions. There is also a chance that you could get it in as a business record of the company if you were using a company email account and the company stores all of its email communications. The documents also sometimes come in to provide fair context for a conversation with a party-opponent's statements that are admissible. It appears that Canada does not follow the modern British rule (which repealed the hearsay rule in civil cases in 1995), which if it were available, would come in without any difficulty at all. But, Canada does have what it calls a "principled exception" (which is somewhat broader than the parallel U.S. residual hearsay exception) that is generally available if the document can be shown to be reliable and there is an unavailable witness, or if there proponent of the document can show that it is reliable and necessary for other reasons. Even if the document itself is not admissible since it is hearsay, you could still testify as to what the boss said from your own recollection, and then have your lawyer ask you why you are sure that this is what was said. You would answer that you contemporaneously wrote a confirming letter to the boss spelling out what was said and you reviewed it to refresh your recollection before testifying at the hearing or trial. These kinds of confirming letters are used quite frequently in business and employment litigation. And, in my experience, these statements tend to be surprisingly effective and persuasive, because, while they do not foreclose the possibility that the person writing it was lying or inaccurate in the confirming email account, it does rule out the possibility that you forgot exactly what was said, and you provided the boss with an opportunity to dispute you which the boss didn't feel an obligation to correct. If one party has a coherent account in confirming emails of what was said, and the other party is trying to remember what happened a year or two earlier without notes from the witness stand, the person with the coherent, documented account is almost always going to come across as more credible unless the other side can show that your confirming emails are not infrequently gross misrepresentations of what really occurred. (I've also dealt with witnesses like that now and then.)	If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.	Appeal proofing decisions is a common practice of trial judges (and even intermediate appellate court judges and state supreme court judges) well known to practitioners and even discussed by law professors in class at times, but I'd have a hard time coming up with a reference where it was discussed. There is probably a law review article that discusses the practice somewhere. It also comes in several versions. One is to make copious findings of fact (especially on credibility) that are hard to reverse on appeal. A judicial finding that someone had an intent to defraud another party based upon his demeanor when he testified about that issue can overcome all sorts of technical objections to a claim in a lawsuit on a more strict liability basis like breach of contract. Another is to give a "soon to lose" party everything he wants procedurally, even when he isn't entitled to it so he can't appeal on procedural grounds. For example, a court might admit otherwise inadmissible evidence over the objection of the other party and then rule against the party seeking to admit that evidence anyway on the merits. Lawyers often assume that this is happening when a judge starts making blatantly incorrect rulings on procedural issues against them repeatedly in an otherwise strong case in a bench trial. A third is to provide an alternative holding that reaches the same conclusion in case for a different legal reason in the event that an appellate court does not agree with the primary holding. A fourth (mostly limited to appellate contexts) is to decide a case on grounds that make the case uninteresting to review on further appeal (e.g. finding that a factual conclusion is supported by evidence in the record, or that an issue wasn't preserved adequately in a trial court) or beyond the jurisdiction of other courts (e.g. deciding a case based upon state law so that the U.S. Supreme Court won't review it).	My understanding is that defendants in Britain have to prove statements true by the preponderance of evidence, whereas in the U.S. the standard of evidence is "compelling" (a lower standard). This is not the case. Preponderance of the evidence can still be the burden of proof in the United States (in a civil libel case, although it must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal libel case). But, the difference is in what has to be proved. In Britain, it appears to be necessary to show that the statements are true in order to prevail. In the U.S., it is merely necessary to show in a case like this one (because it involves a matter of public concern) that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false, or with reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the statements made. A factual basis for believing the statements made to be true is a defense if the basis is at all reasonable, and is a complete defense if the factual basis for making the statement is disclosed and that is true or believed to be true by the speaker. It is not necessary for the statements to actually be true under U.S. law in a case such as this one, although actual truth is also a defense, which is not the case in all circumstances in U.K. law, and was not the case under the historical common law. Historically, defamation claims could be brought for statements critical of the monarch, for statements pointing out the natural infirmities of someone for example by mocking a person with low IQ, or for speaking ill of the dead. Furthermore, the U.S. has a variety of doctrines that make it hard to find that a false statement was made in the first place. For example, statements of opinion are not actionable and many of the alleged falsehoods in the McLibel case would be considered to be statements of opinion in U.S. law rather than statements of fact. Similarly, U.S. law does not require that statements be literally true, and instead recognizes that a defendant may have been engaged in using hyperbole, or may have gotten the gist of the accusation right even though strictly speaking the exact statement made is not technically true (e.g. someone might say that a company paid a "penalty" when it actually paid a settlement amount in a lawsuit seeking a penalty or paid an amount representing compensatory damages only rather than a penalty amount). In the same vein, it must be clear from the context of the statement that the person making it intended it to be received as a truthful account and not a mere parody or satire which was intended to be understood as false. For example, I couldn't sue someone who made a knowingly false statement that I assassinated King George V, who died several decades before I was born, or that I was telepathically controlling my uncle because I had a space alien parasite in my spine. Those claims are so absurd that they would be inferred to intended to be fictional on their face. Certain kinds of falsehoods (e.g. lying about one's military record in a a political campaign) are simply not actionable as a matter of law, no matter what, as the harm is not concrete enough. There is not, however, necessarily a defense under U.S. law to defamation liability if the defendant said many things that were true, but something else that would be defamatory in isolation. For example, even if everything else were true, if the defendant had also stated that the CEO of the Plaintiff was convicted of leading a Nazi concentration camp and killed millions of people, which would have been possible given the CEO's age, knowing perfectly well that the person with a similar name to the CEO who did so was someone else who died an untimely death decades ago, that statement might be defamatory and actionable (at least by the CEO personally and probably by the company if it was alleged that he was hired despite the fact that the company was aware of this circumstance).
Do you have the right to demand that a doctor stops injecting a vaccine into your body halfway into the process? There is a peculiar situation right now where the Oxford vaccine is suspected to be more efficient if the first dose is a half-dose: About 3,000 participants were given the half dose and then a full dose four weeks later, and this regime appeared to provide the most protection or efficacy in the trial - around 90%. In the larger group of nearly 9,000 volunteers, who were given two full doses also four weeks apart, efficacy was 62%. But lets say the regulators go ahead and approve the "two full doses" vaccine for distribution to the public, as the half-dose option didn't get enough volunteers. Sometime in March, I walk into CVS for my COVID vaccine appointment and a doctor/nurse is waiting for me with a plunger. Do I have the legal right to do one of the following? Instruct the nurse in advance that I would like to receive just a half-dose Wait until the plunger is half-way down, then yell STOP or yank my arm to prevent the full shot from being injected In this situation my goal would be to receive the "half dose and then a full dose" and I'm curious to understand how I could do this without violating any laws.	You can request in advance that you get only a half-dose: there is certainly no law prohibiting making a request. They may refuse or they may agree. If they refuse, you can go elsewhere, but you cannot compel them to do what you ask for, given current law. You can also yell anything you want, or flail about however you want, at your peril. You could seriously hurt yourself by jumping around, and you would not be able to sue them for your stupid actions. Nor could you sue them for assault, since to get the ball rolling, you have to consent to getting the shot. Although consent can be withdrawn, there is the practical matter that you almost certainly cannot effectively communicate withdrawal of consent in the time needed to finish administering the job. If it took 5 minutes to administer the shot, you might be able to say "I changed my mind", and they would be required to end the treatment, against medical advice.	No rights are absolute. In particular, Charter s. 1 specifies rights are "subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Generally speaking, when rights are infringed the courts will consider it a justifiable infringement if it serves a substantial purpose while proportionate, rational and minimally infringing (Oakes test, though there's a heap of subsequent case law refining the test). While the exact order text isn't yet available, determining constitutionality would typically be a detailed analysis a judge would have to perform after hearing arguments from parties to a case (I assume the order will eventually be published here). In my own opinion, I would imagine such an order without appropriate medical exemption would be unconstitutional. It would seem to be disproportionate to deny freedom of movement to a presumably very small number of persons who could do little to remedy their medical condition. As a similar example from another province, a Quebec court ruled that a Covid-19 curfew requiring people to remain inside at night would not apply to homeless people due to discriminatory and disproportionate effect. Assuming the order to be similar in nature to existing BC orders on gatherings and mask-wearing, I would imagine lack of religious exceptions to be constitutional, as those orders have already been challenged and upheld against religious objections (though I believe appeals are still possible). The nature of the identified infringements against religious groups was considered reasonably proportionate, rational and minimal enough when weighed against the legitimate governmental need to contain the spread of Covid-19. P.S. The Canadian Bill of Rights has in practice been largely superseded by the Charter. Furthermore, it is completely inapplicable here as it is a federal statute with no effect on provincial matters.	Parents have a legal obligation to care for their minor children: it is illegal to harm a child through action or inaction. State law and associated welfare programs are complex: you can start here. If surgery is medically necessary, her insurance should cover it. If her parent do not have medical insurance, they still have the obligation of care; though various governmental programs may alleviate the problem, such as the state medical assistance program. The parents may therefore be in violation of the law, and anyone may report this to DSHS (specifically through Child Protective Services). This obligation terminates when the child turns 18 (assuming that someone does not petition for adult guardianship). Legislation is not crystal clear as far as what constitutes "injury of a child ...under circumstances which cause harm to the child's health". CPS has no authority to compel parents to pay for a medical treatment, but they can go to the courts on behalf of the child. At that point, it's hard to say what the court would order. For example, if the parents are capable of providing medical insurance and just willfully chose to not cover their child, the court could order them to get insurance. It is virtually guaranteed that the courts would not order the immediate amputation of the child's feet, and there would be no legal basis for ordering the parents to pay for the procedure in a decade, after the child is an adult. However, if you are suggesting that there is an immediate treatment (which the parents have opted to not provide, hence the prospects of later amputation), then it is reasonably likely that the courts would order the parents to provide for the treatment (if it would be possible for them; otherwise, the state may intervene and provide for the treatment).	As I understand it there is no obligation to 'triage' SARs or keep data 'just-in-case' that would otherwise be deleted as a matter of routine. Can we amend or delete data following receipt of a SAR? It is our view that a SAR relates to the data you held at the time you received the request. However, in many cases, routine use of the data may result in it being amended or even deleted while you are dealing with the request. So it is reasonable for you to supply the information you hold when you respond, even if this is different to what you held when you received the request. However, it is not acceptable to amend or delete the data if you would not otherwise have done so. Under the DPA 2018, it is an offence to make any amendment with the intention of preventing its disclosure. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/right-of-access/how-do-we-find-and-retrieve-the-relevant-information/	united-statestexas In the US, it depends on the consent-to-treat laws of the state. In Washington, under RCW 9.02.100, everybody has a right to reproductive privacy (be it contraceptives or abortions). Under the federal HIPAA privacy rule, the minor requesting contraceptives would therefore be "the individual", which means that disclosure to others requires consent from the patient. Given the supremacy clause, that's all she wrote for Washington. The majority of states similarly allow 16 year olds to request contraceptives. Texas Family Code §32.003 spells out the conditions where a minor can consent to their own medical treatment, which does not include the situation you describe, therefore parental consent would be required (which clearly implies parental notification). Furthermore, that law also says (d) A licensed physician, dentist, or psychologist may, with or without the consent of a child who is a patient, advise the parents, managing conservator, or guardian of the child of the treatment given to or needed by the child. Therefore in Texas there is no prohibition against informing the parent(s). (Note that in the Texas Family Code, "child" is a synonym for "minor", so this also applies to teenagers, not just small children.) Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 is an important ruling regarding the rights of minors to make their own decisions regarding contraception, but it does not go so far as to declare that minors have a constitutional right to give consent to the requisite medical examination.	In the UK sodium thiopental is a controlled substance, it is licensed for use as a general anaesthetic (and I think it has other medical purposes). Your quoted passages refer to the so-called 'export ban'. Following campaigning by, among others, Alistair Carmichael MP and Reprieve, the UK Government prohibited export of the drug without authorisation. In applying for an export licence for the drug you must persuade the Government that it is not intended for use in capital punishment. The campaigners sought to prevent exports of drugs used in lethal injections. Previously the Government had said it would not ban exports of sodium thiopental because it is a medicine with legitimate medical purposes and in any case could be obtained from other countries, e.g. (in the particular case below) Austria, so a ban would make no difference to the USA's supply but it would harm UK business. Nevertheless the Government maintained its opposition to the death penalty in all circumstances. That decision was challenged by judicial review - the claimants said the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills had "acted unlawfully in refusing to exercise his powers under the Export Control Act 2002 to make an order prohibiting its export to the United States". If I understand correctly the judicial review failed on two of the three grounds and decision was deferred on the last ground; subsequently the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, changed his mind as it had emerged the export's purpose was solely for use in lethal injections and the Government had after all committed to oppose the death penalty. The Queen (on the application of Zagorski and Baze) Claimants - v - Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and Archimedes Pharma UK Ltd EWHC 3110 (Admin)[2010] http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2010/3110.html https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-bans-export-of-lethal-injection-drugs-to-the-us	Presumably you consented to have an x-ray. It is a reasonable assumption that it was not your intention to simply be given the films without interpretation by a radiologist. If that was your intention then the obligation would be on you to make that clear since it is so far from ordinary practice that no reasonable person could know that. To use your analogy it would be like you asking to have your window washed but not wanting to have the soapy water rinsed off afterwards (assuming these were separately billable services). Further, rights and obligations under contracts are transferable by default. So it is perfectly legitimate for the lab to outsource the radiography without having to ask you.	In Texas, as in most of the US, the law is "Employment at Will". This means that an employer is free to fire people at any time, for any reason, or none, as long as it is not for one of the few reason forbidden by law, such as racial or age discrimination. Hourly employees are entitled to overtime pay in such cases, but "exempt" employees are not. Nor are they entitled to comp-time as a matter of law, that is at the option of the employer. (The question seems to imply that the employee in question was "exempt" but does not actually say so.) The only really effective recourse against that sort of "death march" is to quit and find a better job, or to threaten to do so while they still need you, unless the conditions return to acceptable ones. I have heard of people in such a situation who "get sick" every day at 5:30pm, because local law forbid requiring ill employees to work. But that is pretty much inviting an arduous and possibly expensive administrative and/or legal battle, and will depend on the specifics of the state/local law. In any case, it is too late for the person in question to try that. On the facts as stated, there might be a valid claim of age discrimination. But additional facts would be needed to establish this, and it would be in my view unwise to try it without consulting a good employment lawyer. Such a lawyer could advise exactly what must be proved and how, and what the probable chances of any recovery would be.
How can auto sale contract be breached Customer goes to a dealership in Texas to buy a used car. Car is test driven and customer likes it. Customer makes agreement to buy the car, and they settle on a price. Customer signs a deal with a trade, and pays the down payment. Customer then expects to take delivery of the car. Dealership says they need to put a part on the car. They say they can have the care ready the next day. I ask why and what is the part but the salesman can't tell me. Or won't tell me. I say ok and intend to come back the next day to get the car. They tell me they 'ordered' the part and it won't be in until 5 days later and they expect me to be able to pick up the car after it's installed 6 days later. I tell them no, I want the car now and I'll bring it back to let them install it when the part comes in. They say 'no it might be a liability to them if they release the car and there's an accident.' I say - wait - you were letting people (myself included) test drive the car at highway speeds and you didn't think it was a liability and now you just don't want to release the car. I told them I'm paying 15 dollars a day in interest on the car, and you're refusing to deliver my car to me. I consider that a breach of contract. So I want to void the deal. Give me my down payment back. They want to keep the car but keep me bound to the contract. Is that legal? It should be my car and my decision as to whether or not I want to drive the car while waiting for a part. Not theirs. And they won't even tell me what part they ordered and want to put on my car. I've researched it and Texas law doesn't seem to really have many laws requiring a 'cooling off' period. See: Contract Date Vs Date of Possession Any recourse?	There is a reasonable chance that the amount that you are borrowing and paying interest on is through a third party, so the dealer can't just waive the interest for the period when they are fixing the car. Legal responses would include canceling the sale, and suing for damages. The problem with suing for damages is that this isn't costing you an extra $15/day (the loan gets paid off at a fixed time, regardless of how much you get to actually drive the car). It would be a considerable stretch to argue that you were deprived of a week's worth of enjoyment for the car because of the wrongful acts of the dealer, and should be compensated. Your attorney would be in a good position to tell you, based on the facts and Texas law, whether that approach would be futile. The legality of the situation primarily depends on what the contract says. It is likely that the contract has clauses that maximally disclaim responsibility to the maximum extent allowed by law. There will be some clause that says something about taking delivery of the car, so you can check whether they have breached the contract on that point: it is possible that there is some escape hatch like "as soon as possible, upon receipt of payment". It seems pretty clear that they concealed a material fact, in order to induce you to buy the car. For example, the manufacturer may have installed a defective veblitzer which had to be replaced, and a reasonable person would not buy a car with a defective veblitzer, thus the veblitzer is a material fact. Or: the veblitzer may have been damaged in a flood. The fact that the car is, by their representation, not safe to drive in its current state, the mind of fact that would push most people into the "no thanks" category. To pursue the fraud angle, you need to be more specific about the defective part in your complaint. The only way to force them to reveal the nature of the missing part is to sue them and compel disclosure of the relevant facts during discovery. Again, your attorney would deal with this. You should bear in mind that if the sale is simply cancelled, you may not be able to recover the loan application or processing fee, and the trade-in will no doubt have been sold, so you can't get the old car back. There are laws against deceptive trade practices which might be applicable, depending on whether they said anything deceptive in their disseminated advertising. Section 17.46 may be applicable, if they patched the car together temporarily with a counterfeit veblitzer.	Your question isn't quite as simple as it sounds; some civil cases are tried before juries, and though a judge can give directions to a jury to give a particular verdict, they are not always required to obey; there are eighteenth-century English cases on the point that established that principle for most related jurisdictions. But your last sentence does have a simple answer: No. A judge usually takes an oath on assuming office, to administer the law without fear or favour. That means he will investigate the relevant law (with the assistance of the parties' lawyers), and enforce what it says. "This law would be unfair to the customer, so I will ignore it" would be just as bad as "The mechanic threatened to hit me with a wrench, so I find for him". Of course, most jurisdictions do have overriding principles of fairness; it may be that this contract term was not shown to the customer, so is not enforceable, or it may be that it is contrary to public policy to be uncertain what repairs will cost. But unless there is an explicit legal reason, the judge will have to find for the mechanic. It would be neither improper nor unusual for the judgment to include the sentence "This result is clearly unfair to the customer, and I urge the legislature to look at closing the loophole; nevertheless, the law is clear, and I find the customer must pay the increased price."	None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim.	Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them.	No, because you are affecting the car's value by selling its parts. The car is collateral to the loan, so if you don't make the payments, the lender has the right to repossess and resell it to recoup their money. If they are unable to recover at least the outstanding balance of the loan through resale, you will be on the hook for the difference. This is called a "deficiency balance". Simply having possession of something isn't adequate basis to decide you can do whatever you want with it. You have physical possession, but the lender is the first lien holder on the title until the loan is satisfied.	You didn't consent to being ripped off. You did however fail to grasp the terms under which you were permitted to park on their property, and you failed to pursue an alternative (such as looking for change; using a credit card). It is possible that you should have known that this was a no-change-given machine, since one can often see that there is no mechanism on these machines whereby you can actually get change. However, if you have clear proof that you owed $6 and you paid $10, then 4 of those dollars are properly yours, and there is a reasonable chance that you could prevail in a suit against them. There is even a greater chance that they would refund the difference, just as a sensible business practice. "Exact change" is legal and can even be the law, especially in government-run transportation systems.	The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them.	What you're talking about is a liquidated-damages clause, where the contract explicitly spells out the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach. The law will vary some from state to state, but these clauses are generally enforceable. Some courts limit their use to cases where calculating the damages resulting from the breach would be impossible or impractical. But in the United States, along with all other common law jurisdictions, courts generally agree that if the liquidated-damages clause appears to penalize the breach instead of simply compensating for it, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 17 Cal.4th 970, 977 (Cal. 1998) (“A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.”) The trillion-dollar damages clause "bears no reasonable relationship" to the damages that would actually result from a breach of a software license, so you can safely expect a court to refuse to enforce it, and limit you to whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Even if you were to drastically reduce it to "all the money you have, and then some," "all the money you have," "half the money you have," or even " "1 percent of all the money you have," the language still makes clear that the contract is not aimed at compensating for the breach, but rather penalizing the breaching party. In the end, what you're talking about isn't going to work, because contract law is generally less concerned with penalizing people than with making them whole.
Can I sell a handpainted large scale 3D model of a copyrighted 2D concept art? The art in question is https://www.instagram.com/p/CIfsO2ZD7Rj/ . I Think the concept artist, Jean Giraud, is dead as of 2012.Who owns the rights? I also wanted to do a real life size sculpture of this piece: https://www.instagram.com/p/CIeJL-ljk4a/ .Does anyone own the rights of this second painting?	This would be considered a derivative work, which is not peritted without permission. Copyright duration varies by country but is at least the lifetime of the author plus 50 years. In France, it is 70 so Giraud's work becomes public domain in 2082. The second piece is public domain and therefore fine.	I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead.	Under US law, and I believe under the laws of most countries, each of the various photographs of the apple would be protected by copyright. Thew initial owner would be the photographer, or perhaps the photographer's employer, in each case. Copyright protects expression, including both words and image. It does not protect ideas. The idea of an apple is not protected. The specific representation of a particular apple would be. If the painter imitates the specific feature of the apple shown in the photographs, to the extent that the painting is a derivative work of one or more of the photos, then the painter needs the permission of the copyright holder(s). Without that permission, creating the painting is infringement of copyright. However, if the painter merely took the general idea of an apple, and created a new expression of that idea, without using any of the specifics of the photos, there there would be no infringement. If the photos were instead images of an imaginary thing, perhaps a dragon, or some invented machine of building perhaps, with the images created by perhaps a compute animation program, or by photographing a model, the legal rules would be the same. If the painter simply used the idea from the photos, there is no infringement. If the painter used sufficient specific detail so that the painting is a derivative work, then permission is required. Exactly how much detail must be used for a work to be considered "derivative" is a matter of judgement -- ultimately the judgement of a court if the matter is disputed. There is no clear bright line making that distinction. That C has commissioned the painter T to create the painting is not relevant, unless C is the copyright owner of the photos, or has secured permission from the copyright owner(s). If C validly grants permission, then there is no copyright issue even if the painting is a derivative work. It does not matter what technique or technical means T uses to create the painting. T may use a brush, a pallet knife, a toy car, drips of paint, or a compute drafting program. If, by whatever means, T creates a derivative work, then permission is needed or else it is an act of infringement merely to create the work. If the work is not derivative, then no permission is needed. Copyright law applies no matter what specific technique the creator of an image uses, provided that human creativity is involved.	The Copyright Act provides the freedom of panorama for certain works displayed in public in Canada but limits it to buildings, sculptures or "work of artistic craftsmanship" and do not apply to paintings and generally other two-dimensional works. 32.2 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright ... (b) for any person to reproduce, in a painting, drawing, engraving, photograph or cinematographic work (i) an architectural work, provided the copy is not in the nature of an architectural drawing or plan, or (ii) a sculpture or work of artistic craftsmanship or a cast or model of a sculpture or work of artistic craftsmanship, that is permanently situated in a public place or building However, taking a photo or even posting it may not be illegal if it is for private non-commercial purposes. Taking a photo of a painting in a public space for private purposes without dissemination is not an infringement in Canada, even if the painting is the main subject. The Act (section 29.22) explicitly allows reproduction of works for private non-commercial purposes as long as the reproduction is based on an legal copy, the reproduction is not given away to others and no DRM measures were circumvented. If a new work of creative nature is created by your photograph (i.e. the photo is not simply a substantial copy of the painting), another non-commercial exception may be applicable. Section 29.21 allows an individual to use an existing work [...], which has been [..] made available to the public, in the creation of a new work [...] in which copyright subsists and for the individual [...] to authorize an intermediary to disseminate it [...]" provided certain conditions are fulfilled (non-commercial purpose, legal copy, source is acknowledged, no substantial adverse impact on artist's ability to gain benefits from their works). This section is explicitly created to allow individuals to post user-generated contents on social media that incorporates parts of protected works (e.g. incidental background music or many memes in general).	You can make a derivative work if: the original is not under copyright, you are the copyright owner, you hold a licence from the copyright owner that says you can, or your usage is fair use or fair dealing as applicable. For your proposal, the image is copyright, you don’t own it, you don’t have a licence and what you propose is neither fair use nor fair dealing. You can’t do it and you can be sued if you do.	Titles can't be copyrighted. Meta-data like #2 aren't copyrighted. Not sure if the MPAA could protect its ratings, but I can't find anywhere that it has asserted restrictions on the use of those. If the list of "Similar works" is not somebody else's intellectual property then there's no problem. (If it is I'm not certain what protection it could be eligible for.)	Any adapted work derived from a work used under a CC-BY-SA licnese must be distributed, if at all, under a compatible license. The question is whether a large work incorporating a much smaller work is said to be "based on" that work. The CC-BY-SA 4.0 legal text does not use "include" or "incorporate" or any similar term to define an adapted work, instead it says: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. If including a single work makes your book Adapted Materiel, than you must either release the book under the same license, or else not rely on the CC license. I am not at all sure if such use would make the book Adapted Materiel. If the content could be quoted (perhaps only in part) based on fair use or fair dealing or a similar theory, you would not be relaying on the license. But whether such use is legitimate is always a very fact-bound question, which will depend on various specific facts. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for a summary of US fair use principles. If the materiel you want to use would not qualify under fair use (or whatever similar principle applies in your jurisdiction), and the book would be considered Adapted Material, then you would have to omit it or put the book under the CC license. I see in The CC case law page the statement that: The atlas was a compilation not a derivative work, so did not need to be licensed under the SA term, Which might apply to your book. If it does, you would not need to place the book under a CC license. Update: On reading CC's detailed wiki page on Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC I find the statement that Use of a whole work is suggestive of a "compilation" rather than a derivative work subject to the ND/SA terms. attributed to the US District court (DC district) that decided this case in 2014. If that decision were followed, it would seem that the book would not be considered a derivative work and while proper attribution must be provided, and the applicable license must be indicated, the book itself need not be released under CC-BY-SA.	Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.
What is the exact breach and remedy in the following situation? On the 20th of the "previous" month, a tenant signs a lease with a landlord for an apartment, to be occupied on the 1st of the following month, or immediately thereafter. The lease "warrants and represents" that the apartment will be broom clean, and fit for habitation on the first of the following month. The tenant observes that the apartment is not "broom clean" because there is a lot of waste on the floor, and it is not "fit for habitation" because it is infested with rats, cockroaches, etc. The landlord said, "yes, I know, but we have ten days until the first of the month, and the apartment will be ready by then." Come of the first of the month, the tenant wants to move in, but the landlord has not fixed the apartment, which is still dirty and "infested." That is to say, the landlord has not "made good" on the lease terms. Given that the key condition was a "representation and warranty" is the landlord "merely" guilty of breach of contract, or something more serious like fraud? And in any event, what are the tenant's likely rights if s/he goes to court?	There is no fraud for breach of contract That is, except in highly exceptional circumstances where the guilty party acted deceptively and dishonestly to obtain a benefit or cause harm - the landlord must have knowingly never intended to make good on their promise rather than simply failing to do so. There is a difference between a warranty and a representation The key difference between a representation and a warranty is the remedy available to the receiving party. A Representation is a statement of fact which is relied on by the receiving party and induces them to enter into the contract. It is normally before the contract, but may be repeated in the contract as well. A party may claim misrepresentation where a false representation has been made. They may be entitled to rescind the contract, which means that the contract would be set aside and the receiving party may also be entitled to damages to put them back into the position they would have been had the contract never been entered into. A warranty is a statement of fact contained in the contract. If it is not true the receiving party has a claim for breach of contract. If it is a fundamental breach the receiving party may have the right to terminate the contact in addition to a claim for damages. However, unlike a claim for misrepresentation, the contract is not undone. As tis is expressly both, the tenant has the choice of which remedy to peruse - void the contract and seek damages for misrepresentation or affirm (or attempt to terminate - it’s not clear that this breach is egregious enough to justify that) and seek damages.	I don't know Canadian rental law, but as a general rule in civil cases you don't get to play Perry Mason and bring in evidence at the last minute. If you have evidence that the landlord broke the law then disclose it immediately and use it to pressure him into settling. His later lies to you are less important than the fact that he broke the law in the first place. However you can certainly testify about what he said as evidence that he has acted in bad faith.	Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law.	We can assume there was a meeting of the minds when the contract was drafted, and both parties expected payments to me made based on product usage. Plaintiff alleges that this did not happen. Thus plaintiff is indeed alleging that the contract was breached. Now plaintiff alleges that defendant broke the contract, while defendant counters that plaintiff broke the contract. "[T]o be determined by tracking software" is woefully ambiguous. The court will want to know which party drafted the contract, as disputes arising from ambiguity are often resolved in favor of the non-drafting party.	It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.	Short Answer Generally, a landlord could validly have a term in a lease requiring the tenants collectively to indemnify the landlord for any fine, penalty, or expense arising from the conduct of the tenants, their licensees or invitees. If there is such a term, your only remedy may be to sue the co-tenant engaged in misconduct for contribution. When Can Landlords Be Indemnified? Usually, a provision indemnifying the landlord against the landlord's own intentional acts, reckless acts, willful and wanton acts, gross negligence, or bad faith is void as against public policy, but a provision indemnifying a landlord for the act of another for which the landlord has only vicarious liability as a landowner, and for strict liability offenses and torts, is usually valid. The municipal fine in question appears to be one for which the landlord has only vicarious liability will not proof that the landlord or even an agent of the landlord who is not an agent of a tenant took that act to impose liability. There is a split of authority over when the tenant may be held responsible for (either by waiving liability or indemnifying the landlord) for merely simple negligence by the landlord or an agent of the landlord who is not an agent of the tenant. Some states allow it. Some do not. Many allow it in some cases (e.g. private party landlords), but not in others (e.g. public entities). A 50 state survey of the law of indemnification in the U.S. with statutory and case law citations can be found here. There is no indication, however, in this OP that the landlord engaged in any conduct that caused the landlord to incur the fine. The conduct was apparently engaged in by one of your fellow tenants. This Is Not A Prohibited Contractual Penalty In general, a private contract may not impose an arbitrary penalty or fine that does not meet the standards necessary to be considered a form of liquidated damages. But, indemnification of a third-party imposed penalty or fine, does not violate the public policy against having such penalties or fines imposed by a private contract. An indemnification provision is a compensatory contractual provision as between the landlord and the tenant, not a fine or penalty created by the contract. Many government imposed penalties or fines, however, do require that the person fined engaged in an intentional act, or reckless act, or willful or wanton act, or grossly negligent act, or engaged in bad faith conduct that cannot be indemnified by a tenant. But that does not appear to be the case in the OP. Collective Responsibility Lease Terms Are Usually Valid More generally, a lease may impose collective responsibility on all co-tenants combined. This is the default rule when all tenants are on a single lease. But it is unlikely that it would violate public policy even if applied to multiple tenants in the same building or complex with separate leases. Partnerships and joint ventures allow joint and several liability, and the circumstances, e.g. units that are part of a single HOA or co-operative apartments, often do so implicitly, so public policy arguments against this kind of much less common arrangement are weak. Anywhere that joint and several liability is permitted, a fortiori, proportionate liability should also be permitted. The Necessity Of A Lease Term For These Remedies Furthermore, none of these obligations can arise unless the lease says that these remedies are available to the landlord. If the lease doesn't create the obligation to indemnify the landlord for trash bagging fines on a joint and several or proportionate basis with tenants on other leases in the same building or complex, then the landlord can't impose this amount upon you. I've interpreted the language below from the OP to mean that; Part of my lease agreement is to cooperate in keeping the communal trash area tidy. But, in the absence of lease language to the contrary specifying a broader remedy, the landlord can only impose liability on you for personally (or through your guests) for failing to do so. Remedies Against Co-Tenants Your remedy, if you are blameless and know who is at fault, would be to seek compensation in the form of contribution from the at fault party in small claims court from an offending co-tenant, or via a cross-claim against a co-defendant if the landlord brought suit to enforce the term against the tenants.	In any legal dealing, there is always some risk. The signature constitutes definitive proof that you have a contract, but you still have a contract, because you have mutual acceptance. A far-fetched scenario is that the lessor could allege that they did not agree to the terms of he contract with you (perhaps claiming that you obtained a blank contract form from them and filled in details, but they didn't agree to those details). However, if they allow you to move in, that is sufficient constructive evidence of a contract, so they could not argue "We didn't agree to this". The main risk would be your lack of proof that they ever agreed to lease the place to you (no emails, no texts, no witnesses, no legally-recorded conversations). There may be specific state laws about providing a copy of the rental agreement, such as this California law, where they must provide a copy to the tenant within 15 days of execution by the tenant. This provides a collection of relevant state laws, though you may have to dig a bit because this is a hook into all of the laws about leases and not just about providing copies.	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.
What standing does one state have to determine if another state(s)' implementation of their own constitution violates the federal constitution? Background Various media outlets have been reporting on the notoriety and expansiveness of State of Texas vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, etc.. This lawsuit alleges the following: • Non-legislative actors’ purported amendments to States’ duly enacted election laws, in violation of the Electors Clause’s vesting State legislatures with plenary authority regarding the appointment of presidential electors. • Intrastate differences in the treatment of voters, with more favorable allotted to voters – whether lawful or unlawful – in areas administered by local government under Democrat control and with populations with higher ratios of Democrat voters than other areas of Defendant States. • The appearance of voting irregularities in the Defendant States that would be consistent with the unconstitutional relaxation of ballot-integrity protections in those States' election laws Issue While the Supreme Court does have original jurisdiction over suits between two or more states, this suit seems to state that the way other states allegedly failed to follow their own state law in turn led to these states not following federal law. There do exist cases where the Supreme Court invalidates certain state laws, but I do not see a successful case where a state invalidates another state's law on the basis of the other state's law violating the U.S. constitution. Rather the cases I cited with two or more states seem to be with contractual disputes as opposed to one state saying that another state's law is wrong. This leads me to question... Question Can one state appeal a suit to the supreme court about the validity of a different states' state law in relation to the federal constitution?	The direct answer is "no" and the indirect answer is "yes", that is, your way of putting the matter diverges significantly from how the Bill of Complain puts the matter. The claim is that the defendant states violated the Electors Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas claims that there is an injury in fact, citing various SCOTUS rulings e.g. Wesberry v. Sanders which says that No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined See the argument in the brief for more legal rhetoric. There can be no question that one state can sue another; equally clearly, the plaintiff must show actual harm and not just annoyance. New Jersey v. New York is a case involving a question of equity, not the federal constitution, but there is no legal principle to the effect that one state cannot sue over a constitutional harm rather than an equitable harm. See the brief p. 65 ff. The court does not require that there be exact precedential analogs (otherwise, Roe v. Wade would have turned out differently), what's required is simply that there be reasonable logical steps: SCOTUS gets to decide what is reasonable (or it can decline to decide).	No. As a superior sovereign, the United States can sue states in federal court without restriction. I’m not sure if that would apply in state court, but the federal government doesn’t generally file cases in state court to begin with. States can also sue each other in federal court, having waived their immunity to lawsuits brought by other states when they agreed to Article III of the Constitution (although Congress has said that these lawsuits must be filed directly in the Supreme Court).	Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.	Diversity of citizenship concerns parties to an action. In the given circumstances, Party B is a witness, not a party. That is, whether A sues C or vice versa, neither would name B as a defendant. The determination of diversity jurisdiction occurs in the initial stages of the suit. Because A and C are citizens of the same state, there is no diversity of citizenship. Similarly, if Bob and Alice sign a contract when they live in different states, but then one moves to the other's state, and then a controversy arises under the contract, there is no diversity of citizenship. For reference, 28 USC 1332(a): (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between— (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an action between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same State; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.	Every court in the United States from municipal traffic court to a state court to a U.S. District Court has both the right and the obligation to consider claims of unconstitutionality just like any other legal question that a case presents. Contrary to popular misconception, constitutional law issues are not the exclusive province of the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, constitutional issues are only ruled upon in the first instance in the U.S. Supreme Court (or even in a direct appeal from a trial court to the U.S. Supreme Court) in rare and isolated cases. Usually, at least one trial court judge and at least three appellate court judges, and often more appellate court judges, have ruled upon a constitutional issue before the U.S. Supreme Court considers it. This is just as true in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, which have legal systems based upon the civil law legal system, as it is in other U.S. jurisdictions, which have a common law legal system. There is usually only one difference between a case in which the constitutionality of a statute is called into question and one in which it is not. When the constitutionality of a statute is called into question, many state and federal rules of civil procedure require or permit the attorney general of the state whose statute's constitutionality (or the U.S. attorney general when a federal law's constitutionality is at issue) to be joined as a party for the purpose of litigating that issue. This allows the court to receive arguments on the constitutional issue from the public's perspective as well as the perspectives of the parties. A few states also provide that appeals from trial court decisions finding that a statute is unconstitutional are directly to the state supreme court, rather than to the intermediate court of appeals as they would usually be in those states. Notably, the distinct treatment of constitutional issues in many civil law systems is not inherently a part of the civil law system. Constitutional courts are mostly a post-World War II constitutional innovation in the countries where they are found. For example, the "law-screen" doctrine and the existence of a constitutional court in France, is much younger than core of the rest of the civil law system in France, which invented the civil law system in its modern form more than two hundred years ago. Neither France, at the time Louisiana adopted its civil law legal system through the time of the Louisiana Purchase, nor Spain at the time that Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States after the Spanish-American war, had constitutional courts. Footnote Regarding Treaties Also, it is worth remarking that in Europe and much of the rest of the world, the function of protecting individual rights against government authority in a way that is entrenched so that it is not easily overcome by domestic legislation of a current political regime is accomplished through international treaties, rather than only through entrenched rights in a constitution as they are in the United States. Although even then, in many European countries, ordinary courts apply only domestic law and the country in question has to adopt domestic law to conform to the treaties. This treaty mechanism is not very effective in the U.S., because in the U.S., unlike most countries, an ordinary domestic law can override an earlier adopted and ratified international treaty.	This depends on how far along you're waiting for court rulings to set in, and if you count laws of Congress passed under the 13th amendment's enforcement clause. There were quite a lot of things that got ruled as violations of the 13th and 14th amendments (mostly the 14th), but many were not ruled or legislated that way for decades. Some were even ruled to have an essentially opposite effect of what the current (overturning) precedents do. "Separate but equal" was challenged on 13th amendment grounds, but was upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and wasn't overturned, on 14th amendment grounds, until 58 years later in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Your particular situation sounds like peonage, which was outlawed by Congress in 1867 via the enforcement clause. This law specifically banned "the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise." However, peonage cases continued to make their way into the courts for more than 40 years thereafter, such as Clyatt v. United States (1905)— which ruled that peonage was involuntary servitude— and Bailey v. Alabama (1911). These cases affirmed that the 13th amendment abolished not just chattel slavery but essentially all forms of involuntary or indentured servitude (except as punishment for a crime). Though exactly what qualifies as "involuntary servitude" is still something courts decide on a case-by-case basis; the draft doesn't, nor does mandatory community service to graduate high school.	No. There is only one U.S. Supreme Court case mentioning the 25th Amendment at all, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 713 (1974), and it only does so in passing, as part of a discussion of changing trends in ballot access law, citing it as evidence of "an enlarged demand for an expansion of political opportunity." Although none of them do much to actually interpret it, either, there are a few circuit-court opinions citing the 25th Amendment: Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 782 F.3d 520, 529 (9th Cir. 2015); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 208 (6th Cir. 1996); Estate of Rockefeller v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1985).	The US Supreme Court only has jurisdiction in federal matters. So if someone is suing under federal law, or there is a constitutional question, the Supreme Court is the place to go for a definitive answer. However, states have their own laws. The Supreme Court cannot tell New York that it must apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it is neither a matter of federal law nor a constitutional matter. New York is free to make its own laws on the subject, and the New York courts are free to interpret those laws as they see fit. In fact, federal courts are required to defer to New York's interpretation if New York's laws apply to the case, even if the case is in federal court for some reason (like diversity of parties.) See the Erie doctrine (which, coincidentally, involves yet another case about railroad injuries.)
Is there anything preventing me from digitizing old magazines (pre-1920) for free? I have a growing collection of publications like Scientific American, Ladies Home Journal, and other magazines that are still in print today. Plus old books for publishers that no longer exist. They are all from prior to 1920. I'd like to digitize them so they are freely available to view online, and so people can search through them. Is there anything legally that would prevent me from doing this? I have read through this question and it sounds like the answer will be 'yes, it's not allowed'. Furthermore, does that fact that a magazine is no longer in print (McCalls magazine for example) have any bearing on the copyright?	If they are public domain, you can copy them The relevant terms in the USA are: Works created before 1978 For works published or registered before 1978, the maximum copyright duration is 95 years from the date of publication, if copyright was renewed during the 28th year following publication. So, anything published in or before 1924 is definitely public domain. On 1 January 2021, things published in 1925 enter the public domain, 1 January 2022, 1926, and so on. Anything not renewed in its 28th year is also public domain - check the US copyright register. Trade mark infringement Irrespective of copyright, any trademarks (such as the names of ongoing publications like “Scientific American”) still exist and must be used in compliance with trade mark law.	First of all, this is probably a poor idea even if it is legal. Verse, and song lyrics, are notoriously hard to translate well, and make poor examples for language learning, They tend to employ metaphor, allusive language, and idiom heavily, and will in many cases distort the sense of the language for the sake of rhyme, meter, or other auditory effects. But suppose you still want to go ahead. The developer of such an app could use songs old enough to be in the public domain. "The Star-spangled Banner' for example is not protected by copyright. Neither is the French national anthem, the La Marseillaise. Most well-known songs published before 1900 will not be under copyright. But more recent songs will almost surely be protected. The use of a line or two from a song might well be permitted under fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in those countries that recognize this exception to copyright). Use of the entire lyrics of any given song would be more questionable. The use for educational purposes would tend to favor the applicability of any such exception, but the availability of the whole lyric (or even a major part) might serve as a replacement for the original, and harm the market for the original. No one can ever be sure in advance if a given use will be ruled to be a fair use. That determination depends heavily on the specific facts of each case. It would avoid risk to use songs that are out of copyright, or short sections of songs, if songs are to be used at all.	The resulting figure could surely be covered by copyright, if it is original. A new set of folds to make a known figure might not be separately protectable under US law. In this news story A court in Japan is said to have held that: the folding instructions are indeed a copyrightable subject matter, because (i) the author’s selection of 10 out of 32 folding steps were subject to alternative modes of expression; (ii) the author’s folding instructions, including the organization of the diagrams, the texts, and the drawings, had elements of “style”; (iii) taken in its entirety, one admittedly found room for creative expression (Tokyo District Court Opinion: Case No. Heisei 23 (2011) (Wa) 18968 (Tokyo D.Ct., May 20, 2011). But it further held that the particular diagram displayed was not an infringement of the claimed source. In this tech dirt podcast a suit over an artwork derived from a folding pattern is reported. Tech dirt thinks it is an obvious case of fair use. The British Origami society says: The issue of how the laws of copyright affect origami diagrams and models is an important one. Groups such as the Origami Artists and Creators are working towards an internationally agreed set of guidelines. Dr. Robert Lang has presented his interpretation on his website. Until a common statement is agreed, we refer people to the terms in our constitution. (1) The Society and its Members shall respect all copyrights, registered trademarks and registered designs in all models, designs, diagrams, photographs, books and writings and shall observe the laws of copyright, registered trademarks, registered designs and patents and all other provisions relating to intellectual property which are applicable in all the separate countries throughout the World. (2) This article shall apply to all models, designs, diagrams, photographs, books and writings whether existing in writing or print on paper or any other hard copy or existing in electronic form, photocopy or microfiche in libraries, public or private archives or on the internet or on recorded discs or tapes of any kind or in any other kind of electronic record and whether made commercially or otherwise publicly or made privately. (3) Before reproducing any model, drawing, photograph or text contained in any publication, a member of the Society shall obtain the consent of the copyright owner before publication. (4) As a matter of courtesy, whether or not required to do so by law, the Society and its Members shall give proper acknowledgement to the original author of any model, design or diagram demonstrated or reproduced in any manner. Origami USA says that: OrigamiUSA is very concerned about protecting and respecting the rights of origami artists, authors, and diagrammers. While "traditional" origami models are in the public domain, the vast majority of published origami designs are of recent authorship and therefore cannot be published or used commercially without obtaining permission from their creators and/or diagrammers. It seems that few suits on origami copyright have been filed, and then appealed to where opinions are published and thus accessible to a non-professional's search.	The Soviet Union generally had no copyright treaties with the western world before 1973. So, anything before then is public domain. The USSR had a policy of public domain and considered anything published to be the property of the "people", including anything published in the west. Even for works produced after 1973, they would have to be registered for copyright in the United States to claim a copyright here.	They are claiming copyright protection so you cannot copy it unless fair dealing exemptions apply. However, there is no copyright in facts - only in they way facts are presented. If you present them in a different way ...	The text of an ancient manuscript would indeed not be covered by copyright. A translation into a modern language normally would be protected by copyright. (Unless it is purely a machine or algorithmic translation.) The formatting of a publication could ber protected by copyright, but only if it includes some significantly original element. (In the US, and in many but not all other countries, only original works or original aspects of works may be protected by copyright. Thus where the copyright is for format the format must include an original element or elements.) If the format was a normal one for the type of publication, ther would be no original content to protect, and so no copyright at all. A work alleged to infringe a copyright on the format would need to be shown to have copied an original element or elements of the prior publication's format.	Wikipedia, at least the English-language edition of Wikipedia, takes the position that what applies to it is US copyright law. Under that law, anything published in 1924 is now in the public domain, and anything published first in the US, or simultaneously in the US and another country with no copyright notice prior to 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act) was never protected by copyright, but was in the public domain from the date of publication. See "Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States". Beyond that, the statement quotes would seem to be, in effect, a license permitting free but non-commercial use. That alone would not normally permit Wikipedia use, except under a claim of fair use. So Wikipedia use would be based on the date of publication, or the absence of a copyright notice, or both. As a long-term Wikipedia editor, I am confident that the images described would be usable in Wikipedia articles. They might or might not be up-loadable to Wikimedia commons, but I think they would be. The question of US Federal Government authorship is a distraction, this work would be in the public domain if the US Govt had no role in creating it.	The images and text are copyright (if they are). What Google does with them is fair use/dealing. It works like this: if Google's bot can find them then you (the owner) have put them on the World Wide Web presumably because you want people to see them, effectively you have put them on public display. Google is assisting you in that endeavour by enabling people who are looking for what you are displaying to find it. Their use of your material enhances its value to you which is a rock solid defence. If you don't want your stuff on public display then a) don't put it on a public part of the web - there are plenty of private cloud storage facilities or B) stick a file in your website that tells bots not to index it.
Would Multiple Coupons Stack or Apply Sequentially? There is an episode of The Office where Michael gives a business five "10% off" coupons and forgets to write "Coupons cannot be combined." In the episode, the business claims they can use the coupons for 50% off. But that got me thinking, even if you forgot to write "Coupons cannot be combined," is there an argument that the coupons would have to be used sequentially rather than stacking them? In other words, instead of saying the discount is 10+10+10+10+10=50%, could you argue that the end price should actually be 90% X 90% X 90% X 90% X 90% = 59%, for a discount of 41%? Can you "stack" coupons as in the episode, or do they have to be applied one at a time?	"10% off" would be taken to mean "... from the original price" unless otherwise specified, even to someone well aware of geometric growth. Given that there are a number of loyalty saver schemes that stack percentage discounts additively, and that schemes disallowing stacked discounts make this clear, a reasonable person would expect that in the absence of such specification, they can stack the discounts as described in the question.	No If the price advertised is not honoured by the business and you are asked to pay a higher price, you do not have an automatic right to buy the item at the special offer or sale price. As long as the shop or business tells you before you pay that the higher price applies, you have the option to either buy it at the higher price or decide not to. However, the shop or business may be in breach of consumer law in relation to misleading advertising. The prosecution (or not) of the misleading advertising is the government’s task, not yours. This is a common formulation across Common Law jurisdictions as it a codification of the historic common law position. An advertised price is not an offer capable of acceptance, it is an invitation to treat. That is, it is an invitation for you to make them an offer and the price that is likely to be accepted. It is overlaid with later developments in consumer protection surrounding false advertising and misleading and deceptive conduct.	If you are in Florida, the notion that this is "the only store around" is simply not accurate. I doubt that there is any place in Florida that is not within 15-20 miles of at least two stores. In any case, the store is within its rights to ban you from the store even if you acted lawfully.	Can a business put whatever they want into a contract? No. There are some things a business cannot put into a contract. But I don't see anything stopping them from putting this into a contract. It's not reasonable to assume that you have to cancel before the 20th every month. It's not reasonable to assume that - except there's no assumption needed. The contract states it flat out. You are most likely stuck paying. Requiring cancellation about 10 days in advance of the month doesn't seem like it would be an unconscionable clause. (Requiring cancellation 10 months in advance would be a different story.) Michigan law does say the following is prohibited: Taking advantage of the consumer's inability reasonably to protect his or her interests by reason of disability, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of an agreement presented by the other party to the transaction who knows or reasonably should know of the consumer's inability. But I doubt that applies in your case. It also prohibits: Gross discrepancies between the oral representations of the seller and the written agreement covering the same transaction or failure of the other party to the transaction to provide the promised benefits. So if you were promised you could cancel at any time without notice or penalty, but you later found out the contract said differently, this law may apply.	If you were to seek legal recourse for breach of contract (their Terms and Conditions), the best outcome you could hope for would be "making whole", and since they have already offered this a court could award you what the retailer already offered, but make legal costs on both sides the plaintiff's liability (ie. you), since you could have taken the offer and avoided court. The Terms and Conditions associated with the discount code mean that you won't be able to return the gift cards for cash. It will be argued that by using the code, you agreed to those terms and conditions. The second paragraph of their reply looks like an attempt to scare you, but it has legal merit. By using the unauthorised code you could be considered to have made false representation when you entered into the contract. This could render the contract void, and if they could demonstrate it had been done deliberately to gain money it could meet the threshold for fraud (which is what the police would possibly investigate : if it can be shown that you were aware the discount code didn't apply to you it would constitute making "a false representation ... to make a gain for himself" [sub-paragraphs 1-5, paragraph 2 of the Fraud Act 2006]). You may be able to argue that the voucher websites misled you (though it sounds like you, I and the retailer already know that's not true), but since the retailer has offered to repay what you paid there are unlikely to be any damages - and, unless the voucher site took commission from your transaction, a contract between you and the voucher sites would be difficult (possibly impossible) to establish. In the circumstances, returning what you originally paid is a good offer.	This question sounds to me like there is an inferred intent of the person giving the invoice to manipulate their value added tax rate due to the misclassification, and then an unrelated issue related to an overly high charge for the services which are basically independent. Is the classification of the job material in some way to either of those issues in a non-obvious way that you haven't clarified in your question? I will answer on the assumption that it is not, because at first glance, it is hard to see why this would matter with respect to either issue. A CVR listing is sort of half way between a U.S. Secretary of State company listing and a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission company listing with more than just bare bones contact information but less than a full fledged public company's disclosure statement. The fact that the company's business type classification is not a precise match for the kind of work that they did for you on this job is not obviously material to either what VAT taxes would be due (which usually depends upon the particular kinds of goods and services involved in the transaction) or the rate that a company can charge for a particular kind of work done. The fact that a company is classified in one category that describes the overall enterprise doesn't mean that every last thing done by the company must precisely fit that description. The mismatch could also conceivably be nothing more than a clerical error made by somebody preparing the CVR listing, in which case, again, the answer is "so what?" Therefore, as far as I can tell from the limited information in the question, this is just an immaterial error with no relevance to any of the likely disputes that you might have in this case. Usually, an immaterial error in a public record or invoice would not be a ground to object the amount that a company charged for the work, nor would it be something that would be appropriate to complain about in any way that would bring you an advantage that I can see in this transaction. This doesn't mean that you don't potentially have grounds to object to the invoice and dispute the higher than expected charges. But, bringing up the issue of the CVR code doesn't appear to add anything to your rights in this dispute. This said, I can certainly imagine circumstance where the wrong CVR code could be a hint that something else really is amiss. For example, suppose that you need a license to do a cleaning job since it involves environmental hazards and waste disposal, but you don't need a license to do management consulting, because who cares if someone is stupid enough to take your bad management advice. In that situation, the company might be misclassified because it doesn't have and perhaps cannot get for some reason, the business license that it needs to do the cleaning job. Charging for services while not having the proper business license might very well be illegal and a ground not to pay, and the error in the CVR filing might actually be an attempt to circumvent this problem. But, that kind of possibility relies upon pure speculation and without more facts there is no good reason to assume that something nefarious is going on here.	The fact that the terms and conditions do not mention the word "disable" is significant, but not in the way you seem to think. You state: "...the merchant's T&C which does not explicitly allow the merchant to charge a fee for a disabled account". However, this doesn't mean that the merchant needs to explicitly state that they may. What it actually means is that the merchant does not recognize the term "disable" in the context of terminating the service contract. (Did they use stop, terminate, delete, eliminate, fall into disuse, log off, etc. or any other similar expressions?) You haven't defined what "disable" means, but perhaps it is more like a "pause" in service for which payment is still required? (Like having the post office hold your mail vs terminating all deliveries.) What you need to do is to read the section of the T&Cs that deals with terminating service and payment, understand what is required, and execute the procedures they describe. Whatever words they use, do that. If you have done all the steps and can prove it then you have a case against them, otherwise you are arguing semantics and interpretation... As to the title question, it does not appear that any "law" has been broken, this is just a contractual misunderstanding. P.S. This is the reason why I always set up payments through my bank to "push" money to vendors rather than authorizing them to "pull" money from me. When I am done I notify them and stop paying. I don't need to ask them to please stop taking it from me.	Canadian law defines "theft" thus: Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent (to deprive the owner, pledge as security, mess it up) In this case, you accepted what seemed to be an offer of a free pizza, so if you took and consumed the pizza you did so with a colorable claim of right and without fraud. Perhaps you misunderstood, but it is not a crime to misunderstand another person's intent. They could sue you for the cost of the pizza (assuming that you took it and did not pay), in which case the question would be whether whatever they said to you could reasonably be interpreted as an offer of a free pizza (if not, pay for the pizza). As an advertising stunt, this would not be unusual. However, if they fix the pizza but then demand money before handing over the pizza, you now know that you have no right to the pizza (if you abscond with the pizza in that circumstance, it would be theft). You may of course pay for the pizza, but you can also not pay and not take the pizza. Again, they could sue you, and in this case your defense would be that there was no contract (no agreement). An important question would be how reasonable it is to believe that you were offered a free pizza. People are offered "free" steak dinners all the time (at the cost of sitting through a sales pitch), so that is a reasonable belief. If a Lexus yacht salesman appears to be offering you a free $5M yacht, it is not reasonable to think that this is an ordinary advertising stunt, if you're not a celebrity.
Who owns the rights to the questions on Stack Exchange? I asked a question here a year ago and this was removed. Who owns the rights to the question, and can it be republished? On what grounds could it have been removed?	This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.	Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.	It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement.	This is not (necessarily) copyright violation It's possible that Quora's usage falls within Fair Use. At the very least, the argument could be made. If it does, then there is nothing that Stack Exchange or the OP can do. Stack Exchange can choose not to protect their copyright Unlike trademarks, which lapse if not protected, copyright endures. Therefore Stack Exchange can pick and choose the copyright fights they want to get involved in and those they don't. If you have brought it to the attention of the copyright owner (or, in this case, licensee) and the copyright owner chooses not to act then you have done all you can and significantly more than you have to do. The OP has copyright I note that one of the examples is your question. As the copyright holder, you are free to issue a DCMA takedown notice on Quora if you feel your copyright has been violated.	There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses.	Given the clarification provided in the comments to the question, the company has a copyright in the material and as such is legally entitled to demand that you cease using it.	This is all outlined at Terms of Service - Stack Exchange When you ask a question, and/or comment on or answer a question, or otherwise participate on an SE site, you license your content to SE. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. In turn, (emphasis mine) Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how Subscriber may interpret or use the Content; or what actions Subscriber may take as a result of having been exposed to the Content. Much of the Content of the Network is provided by and is the responsibility of the user or subscriber who posted the Content. Stack Exchange does not monitor the Content of the Network and takes no responsibility for such Content. Subscriber releases Stack Exchange from all liability for Subscriber having acquired or not acquired Content through the Network. ... This doesn't mean someone can't sue you anyway, notwithstanding that disclaimer. Anyone can sue anyone in civil court. That's the way the system works. Someone could track you down and sue you for the (bad) advice you gave that cooked their Macbook, even though they got that advice on SE and SE states that SE is not responsible for any damages resulting from the use of the information. The TOS of all SE site(s) shows that anyone who uses SE sites is bound by this click-through agreement, even if they didn't read it. And that should suffice in a court if it gets that far. It should suffice for any attorney thinking of taking the case of someone who wants to sue you. Again, someone could sue you; but chances are really great that it will never go very far due to the legal nature of SE and your contributions. This SE site - Law SE - has more of a specialized TOS, as practicing law without a license is illegal, and giving legal information as a layperson (or even as an attorney, of which there are some who particpiate here) needs special terms; see the sidebar for this disclaimer and link: Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner. Communications on Law Stack Exchange are not privileged communications and do not create an attorney-client relationship. General Disclaimer - Law Stack Exchange So, if you do get sued by someone who cooked their Macbook by following your bad advice, you can ask about the lawsuit here on Law SE. But, unless your question is about general legal procedures, terms, case law, etc. (as outlined at What topics can I ask about here? - Law SE), your question will be closed because this site is not for giving specific legal advice in specific legal situations, especially active lawsuits. You will be advised to talk to an attorney.	Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center.
Does a voluntary release form with two signers which uses the wording of I instead of we release one if they do not sign? A few years ago a woman I was dating asked me to cosign on a loan for a vehicle. I did so, and all was fine for 2 years. Then after a bad breakup, she stopped making payments. The bank sent out a notice of voluntary surrender to both her and myself to be signed and sent back. I personally did not sign the form as one of the lines in the paper said "If the property does not sell for the total amount owed, I will be responsible for the unpaid amount." As I took this to mean that I alone would have to pay this back. (Nowhere in the letter did it state that there were cosigners or two parties involved) She, on the other hand, did sign the paper that was sent to her and return it to the bank. Several months later I have received word that I, as well as her, are being sued for the rest of the amount owed on the vehicle after the sale, which comes to a total of $4800. As I have not signed the release and she did, is she responsible for the amount owed? I have not only the original letter, but also the emails from the bank about the release and a recording of the bank manager telling me that she signed the form and I did not (I'm in Missouri, where one party can record their conversations.)	There is no significance to using the words "I" or "we", nor does it matter that you didn't sign the surrender paper (after al, you did not have possession of the vehicle and it is not yours to surrender). You will have gotten a notice, at the beginning of this process (when the loan was taken out) that provides information like this, in particular The creditor can collect this debt from you without first trying to collect from the borrower. The creditor can use the same collection methods against you that can be used against the borrower, including suing you or garnishing your wages. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your credit record. When you are a loan co-signer, that means the creditor can go after you and you alone to get the money. Since it seems the creditors are pursuing you both, that beats the alternative that you have to sue her to get anything. Since there is no question that money is owed, the point of the trial is to decide who pays it: it will be one or both of you, and it won't be that the bank has to take a loss. Your attorney's job is to argue that it should not be you (her attorney's job is to argue that it should be you). Your concern should be that it's too difficult to get the money from her, and easy to get the money from you, which is why you need to hire a good attorney.	This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code.	Yes The document is called an invoice and the customer has taken the clothing “on account”. Most businesses of any size outside the retail sector operate this way. Remember that you are effectively lending your customer money. What are the terms of this loan? What are you going to do when/if they don’t pay? You need to deal with this either in your sale contract or a separate credit contract.	There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already. If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website. If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time. Practicalities Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website. I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.	That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.	"Legal requirement" can and in this case simply means "it's what is required in order for us to be reasonably able to offer you this service", noting that it would be unreasonable for such a dangerous business to operate, when one moron slipping and suing them could put them out of business. It's a little surprising that you've never had to sign a waiver before, but there are quite a number of similar waivers out there, such as REI (Seattle), The Edge (Vt), Croc Center (Coeur d'Alene), YMCA (MI) and U. Nebraska. They all have in common the requirement of a signature (indicating that you've waived your right to sue them), birth date, date of signature. This is the bare minimum that's required to have a valid waiver, and more info would be better (to uniquely identify the customer out of the 1000 John Smith's in the state and 500,000 in the US). If you break yourself and try to sue, they will trot out the waiver to put an end to the suit. Name, address, phone number and birth date do a long ways towards proving that the person who signed the waiver is indeed you.	No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement").	A contract is binding if it has been agreed by both sides and is otherwise legal and freely entered into. A signature (handwritten or otherwise) is not required. However if a dispute arises, either party can use the presence of a signature as evidence that the contract was agreed to. The signature is evidence of the agreement, and the agreement is binding, not the signature. If your handwritten signature is on a contract that you have not agreed to you would need to explain to the court how this happened: "I was forced to at gunpoint" or "It wasn't written by me but by a forger", for example. The court would then have to decide, on the balance of probabilities if they believe you or not. It is much the same with digital signatures. The court has to decide if you made an agreement or not. If your digital signature appears on an electronic document that you haven't agreed to, you would need to explain to the court how that happened: "my key was stolen" would be your explanation. If the revocation came after the contract was signed, you would have a much weaker case than if it came before. But the court would need to weigh the balance of probabilities. But the "key" point here (pun absolutely intended) is that it is the agreement that is binding, and not the signature. If you agree to a contract (and indicate that agreement by digital signature using a key that you later revoke) then you are bound. If you don't agree to a contract (which is signed without your consent using a key stolen from you that you have revoked) then you are not bound.
Why am I given a contract for services instead of a contract for employment? I work at a UK university doing part-time teaching. I was looking into statutory sick pay recently, which I see can be claimed by someone on an employment contract. When I look at my contract with the university, I see that they have given me a contract for services. They explicitly state a couple of times in the contract that it is not a contract for employment. I can see why it would be advantageous for the University not to have to pay me sick pay when I'm ill. Are there any other reasons why they may have given me a contract for services instead of a contract for employment? Are there any potential positive aspects for me about having a contract for services? I had a look at a definition here, and it says that a contract for services is for "appointing a genuinely self-employed individual such as a consultant". Before looking at my contract more carefully in the last couple of days, I had always understood my relationship with the university to be as an employee. I can't see what about my job there makes me a "genuinely self-employed individual", apart from the fact that the university have chosen to define my role in that way. To me it feels disingenuous to have been given this contract for services instead of a contract for employment, and I suspect that the university have done this for the purpose of avoiding any benefits that come along with an employment contract such as statutory sick pay. Does anybody know if it is standard for UK universities to use contracts for services for their part-time teaching work? Is there any way that I could reasonably raise this with the university, or with my academic department, to try to be treated as an employee rather than self-employed? Maybe it would be best for me to speak to the teaching union?	You are probably an employee Answer these questions: Can you say “no” when the University offers you work? Or vice-versa, can they say “no” when you want to work? Can you subcontract the work? That is, can you hire someone to do what the University hired you to do? Do you control how and when you work? For example, when you break University rules are you subject to University discipline or is this treated as a breach of contract? Do you provide your own tools and equipment? Can you make a profit or loss (if you get paid by the hour the answer is “no”)? Do you take out your own public liability and/or professional indemnity insurance? If the answers to most of these questions are “no”, you’re an employee.	The statement "you don't need to put it in writing" is not an instruction, and should not be interpreted as on in lieu of other evidence (e.g. the follow-up question "you don't want to get fired, do you?"). It is, at best, a recognition that your concerns have already been noted (and at worst, a ham-handed threat). In the context of an at-will non-union position, it is legal for a boss to directly demand "take it or leave it, no back-talk allowed". The reduction in salary can't go below the statutory minimum, or otherwise circumvent any laws, but assuming that the new salary is per se legal, they can demand that you accept it and not argue. If this were a government position, there is a potential (but not guaranteed) First Amendment issue.	In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment.	Labor Code §70 states that (1) Where a trade union that is the bargaining agent for employees in a bargaining unit so requests, there shall be included in the collective agreement between the trade union and the employer of the employees a provision requiring the employer to deduct from the wages of each employee in the unit affected by the collective agreement, whether or not the employee is a member of the union, the amount of the regular union dues and to remit the amount to the trade union forthwith. so yes, it is legal to deduct union dues. There is no requirement to notify a prospective employee that they will be required to be a member of a union. The employer is required to inform you of deductions for taxes and union dues, under §254, when they pay you, which is why you know that you were a member of a union. That is what labor law gives you, but a union contract could impose other obligations on the employer. It is a matter of public record that a certain workplace is unionized, so you can find out, they just don't have to volunteer that information. There is no statutory limit on union dues, that is a matter set by the union.	There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term.	It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.	why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's "supra-provincial" equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications.	Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line).
What are my rights to have structures on my own land if I live off-grid? I have converted a shed into a home and have been living in it for the last 2 years. Recently, the county building officials said they are cutting power off to it because it is an illegal structure (which I did not realize when I moved in). If we live off grid, with our own power, septic and well, and we own the land, is there anything else the county or state can say or do about it? I have neighbors who live in similar or worse structures and nothing has been done to them. What are my rights in this situation? What am I allowed to do if I live off grid?	That will depend on state law, and possibly county or municipal law. Some states or localities can and do require a "certificate of occupancy" or some similar document certifying that a structure passes standards for human occupancy, and can and do prohibit living in a structure that does not pass. Others do not require a document but can condemn as unfit for human habitation a structure that does not meet minimum standards, and can order such a structure boarded upo or even demolished. What standards are applied, and what procedures must be followed, vary significantly depending on the state or locality. Additional info specific to North Carolina: A document from Charlotte NC gives its minimum housing code as: The current Minimum Housing Code for the City of Charlotte specifies the following: (a) At least one room in the dwelling shall contain not less than 150 feet. (b) A kitchen-dining room combination, if any, shall be not less than 100 square feet. (c) A first bedroom, if any, shall be not less than 100 square feet. (d) A second bedroom, if any, shall be not less than 70 square feet. (e) There shall be at least 70 square feet in each habitable room. (f) There shall be at least 150 square feet of floor space in habitable rooms for the first occupant in each swelling unit; at least 100 square feet for each of the next three occupants; and at least 50 square feet for each additional occupant over the number of four. (Children one year of age and under shall not be counted). (g) There shall be at least 80 square feet of bedroom floor space for the first occupant; at least 20 square feet for the second occupant; and at least 30 square feet for each occupant over the number of two. (Children one year of age and under shall not be counted). and goes on to say: 5.) What action can Code Enforcement take if occupancy standards are violated? There are two remedies to Minimum Housing Code violations as governed by the State Law. 1.) Repair, alter or improve the dwelling 2.) Vacate and close, and remove or demolish An order to repair for occupancy violations would suggest an expansion of the dwelling to support more occupants. An order to vacate, close and demolish must be approved by City Council as an ordinance before the city can implement that order. This only applies to the city of Charlotte, but is an example of the sort of regulations that might apply. The NC housing code says: The State of North Carolina does not have a comprehensive property maintenance code. The state’s Landlord and Tenant law (Chapter 42), however, imposes minimum generic maintenance obligations for rental property. Also, state law (Chapter 160A) empowers localities to adopt and enforce ordinances for dwellings that are “unfit for human habitation” due to conditions that render dwellings “unsafe” to residents ... Local Housing Ordinances North Carolina Chapter 160A empowers cities and counties to enact laws that provide for the repair, closing and demolition of dwellings found to be “unfit for human habitation” due to Housing Codes for North Carolina As of July 2008 See: www.healthyhomestraining.org Page 2 of 6 “dilapidation, defects increasing the hazards of fire, accidents or other calamities, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, or due to other conditions” that render the dwellings “unsafe or unsanitary, or dangerous or detrimental to the health, safety . . . [or] welfare of the residents.” § 160A-441. Localities also may enact ordinances for the “repair, closing or demolition of any abandoned structure” deemed to be “a health or safety hazard as a result of the attraction of insects or rodents, conditions creating a fire hazard, [or] dangerous conditions constituting a threat to children.” § 160A-441. Furthermore, this Chapter empowers localities to enact ordinances to require that every rental dwelling have a heating system so that at least one habitable room has a minimum temperature of 68 degrees Fahrenheit in winter. § 160A 443.1(a). Thus the applicable laws and regulations, if any, will depend on local enactments, and how they are enforced will depend on local rules and custom. It may be a good idea to consult a lawyer who knows these local laws and procedures to determine exactly what an owner's rights are in such a case.	Laws regarding billboards and advertising are very local in nature and are typically handled under city/county zoning ordinances. Start with calling your local county zoning office. They will tell you the city/county laws regarding your particular residential zoning overlay, if city or state laws supersede county laws, and recent changes in law that might matter and if the sign might be grandfathered. There can be different types of "residential" zoning and the city/county will tell you this; some allow limited commercial use and signage, and some don't. The housing subdivision you are in may also have covenants; you'll know if there are covenants if you received information when you bought property in that subdivision. 1,2,3,4,8: These depend on local laws. 5: Very generally speaking, land owners typically do not have absolute rights to land usage; that is the rationale behind zoning laws (among others, like health and public safety, building codes, national defense, etc.), because some types of land usage impact adjacent users and the general public. 6, 7: Potential consequences include fines and requirements to take the billboard down, but again, those possibilities are very localized. The size of the billboard could come into play; again, this will be very localized. Some signage may be grandfathered, too. In order for the city/county to look at the situation and possibly take action, you may have to file a written protest with the zoning office; they would help with the process. You may have to present your case at a public city council or county commission meeting, but that basically involves saying such and such is happening and you want the city/county attorney to look into relevant laws. It would help your case if you had a list of names of others in the area who are also unhappy about the billboard. I doubt you will need legal representation to lodge a protest, but if it comes to that, Google for free legal aid in your area. If the city/county attorney won't take action (which is possible, as this involves prosecutorial discretion as to if the city/county wants to press the issue with the landowner), you can look for free legal aid in your area and consider your options.	At common law, no. Statute law or the homeowner's rules may change this. At common law a neighbour is entitled to trim overhanging foliage up to the property line at their expense. Technically, they should place the cuttings on your property since you have ownership in the timber, again statutes often change this. However, if by trimming their side they make the tree unstable and it falls and causes damage then they have been negligent.	If you buy a large piece of land, closed to the public, then yes. You would need a license for your car to allow drivers to use it without hands on the wheel, or the driver will get arrested. But first you need a license that allows using the car on public roads at all. That’s what all the car manufacturers have to do. Requires for example crash tests, tests how polluting the car is, and so on.	Is there a way for us to prevent the sale of the house until they have moved the fence? For example, it seems that filing suit against the current owners doesn't necessarily prevent the sale, and that the suit would be pointless after the sale is complete. You can't prevent the sale, but if you file suit to adjudicate the boundary dispute and file what is called a "lis pendens" giving notice that the suit is filed in the real estate records, the buyer will taken subject to the lawsuit and realistically, won't close in the first place. The prospect of an impending sale is unlikely to be something that would cause the court to take expedited action or issue a temporary restraining order, because you can preserve your rights with a "lis pendens" which doesn't take a court order. The absolute minimum amount of time in which you could get a court order on the merits without a temporary restraining order is perhaps three to four months, which is almost surely too long to prevent a sale of a house. The suit isn't pointless after the sale is complete. You can still enforce the boundary against the new owner. And, often, a new owner, having no ego in the placement of the fence, might settle the case sooner than the old owner would have. But, better practice in terms of neighbor relations would be to file suit first, so that the new buyer, if the buyer goes forwards with the sale, is aware of the defect. The old owner is also more likely to have evidence useful in the lawsuit you bring. Short of filing suit, send a letter to the realtor and the neighboring property owner with a copy of the survey advising them of the problem. If you could somehow figure out who was handling the closing, you could tell them too. This will impose upon them a legal duty to advise the new buyer before closing, and if they fail to do so, they expose themselves to the risk of a fraud lawsuit from the new owner. But, while this is cheaper, it also presents a risk that they won't warn the buyer who will then not have notice and the risk of being sued for fraud may cause the seller and the seller's realtor to resist your suit more aggressively and to be less prone to settle it. If you wanted to be really aggressive, you could give the neighbor notice that the fence is over the line and that you will destroy it if the neighbor doesn't act, and then tear down the fence, which is strictly speaking within your rights if you can do so without a breach of the peace, because it is on your property. I wouldn't recommend this approach, however, as it could lead to violence or police involvement that depending on the policeman who isn't trained in real estate law, might get you arrested which is not good even if the charges are later dismissed.	The California Constitution gives you the right to privacy, but your neighbor also has the right to have cameras on his house. https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacy-laws That means that it is up to the courts to balance those rights. If you did go to court, the judge would have to look at the cameras and decide if they significantly violated your right to privacy in regard to audio and video. Just because the camera can see part or all of your yard doesn't make them illegal, because the neighbor has the right to record his property and may not be able to avoid recording your yard. If the cameras can be re-positioned to only see your neighbor's yard the judge might order that. You would have to show it would not violate his right to record while it substantially violates your right to privacy though. Audio is different because it can pick up conversations. California requires you to notify people when you record their conversations in a place where they would be expected to be private. If the camera is recording your conversations, that would be illegal.	While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit.	People make mistakes. My assessments come with information on how to dispute them, and if yours don't you should be able to get that information. File a dispute or whatever it is you do to challenge the assessment. Include the information about you being outside the district and not having he measure on your ballot. If you're just outside the district, you might have been mistakenly included. You'll either get a revised assessment or you'll be told that you have to pay the tax. You don't have a reasonable complaint unless and until your challenge is denied.
Do most people who take the stand at a trial not tell "the whole truth"? I should note beforehand that much of my legal "knowledge" is based off of TV shows and movies so some of my assumptions might be off. When you take the stand at a trial, you promise to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." But it seems like most witnesses do not tell the whole truth, at least right away. For example, lawyers often give certain lines of questioning to develop an argument. From what I understand, witnesses are encouraged to simply answer the questions asked and not say much more. But often there is a lot more nuance and a lot more additional evidence that could paint the story in a different light. If you are simply responding to a lawyer's line of questioning, and the lawyer's line of questioning is not complete, then your responses are not telling the whole truth. And because lawyers are usually representing one side or the other, they rarely give a complete line of questioning and only ask the questions that support their side of the case. Does this mean that most witnesses are not telling the whole truth?	First off, the concept of "the whole truth" is legally undefined. It cannot possibly mean "everything that you know that is connected to this question", since otherwise a witness would be required to drone on and on for hours. Second, there is no way to determine what percentage of witnesses are not "telling the whole truth". We can be fairly certain that when a guilty accused takes the stand, there is a good chance that he is not telling the whole truth, and the oath does not compel you to testify against yourself. Even if there was some clear legal definition of "the whole truth", there is typically no way to know what the actual facts are, to know if a witness failed to say something that was part of "the whole truth". The promise part of the oath is irrelevant, that is, the requirement is not to "keep your promise", it is to not perjure yourself. Every jurisdiction in the US has a statute that makes it a crime to commit perjury. At the federal level, the law is 18 USC 1621, which applies to anyone who has "taken an oath" promising to testify truly, and punishes the witness if he "willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true". The landmark ruling Bronston v. US, 409 US 352 clarified the obligation of witnesses vs. the duty of interrogators, when it comes to not providing information desired by the interrogator. The court ruled that the perjury statutes does not apply to a witness's answer that is literally true, but unresponsive, even assuming the witness intends to mislead his questioner by the answer, and even assuming the answer is arguably "false by negative implication." A perjury prosecution is not, in our adversary system, the primary safeguard against errant testimony; given the incongruity of an unresponsive answer, it is the questioner's burden to frame his interrogation acutely to elicit the precise information he seeks. This was a classical "not the whole truth" case. The exchange was as follows, where the accused was testifying in bankruptcy proceedings: Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston? A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever? A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich. The fact is that Bronston used to have a personal account in a Swiss Bank, which he did not reveal. His answer could be considered misleading because he only answered part of the question, as it pertained to the company (but not him personally). The crux of the court's ruling is that it is the responsibility of the attorney conducting the interrogation to notice that he did not answer the question asked, and to insist on a response that also covers personal accounts. This established the "literal truth" doctrine for perjury conviction: if what you say is literally true, the testimony is not perjurous. As a later court (DeZarn) commented, because a nonresponsive answer, by its nature, requires speculation by the fact-finder as to what the answer “implies”, there cannot be a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer is untruthful. Clinton successfully relied on this defense with respect to certain of his literally-true testimony. One tweak on this is US v. DeZarn, 157 F3d 1042, where a literal-truth defense was set forth but rejected by the court. The accused was asked about a party that was allegedly a fundraising event. His testimony was that it wasn't a fundraising event for the governor (in fact it was), and his defense came down to the fact that the prosecutor asked about a party in 1991, had earlier referred to it as a "Preakness Party" (which the governor had held previously), and asked about fundraising "at that activity". DeZarn's claim was that he thought the prosecutor was asking about a party in 1990 (which was a "Preakness Party", with no fundraising). The prosecutor was in error in previously calling it a "Preakness Party", but was correct in identifying that there was a party (with fundraising) at the governor's house, in 1991 time. The wording of DeZarn's testimony was, simply "I don't know... No... No": these are responses that have no literal truth value taken on their own, and can be judged only in relation to what question was asked (whereas Bronston's testimony was literally true on its own). DeZarn's conviction was upheld because he could not have been confused about which party was being referred to, and what the actual question was; moreover, in saying just "No", he gave no sign that his response was a partial answer to the question. The DeZarn court did not clarify matters, leaving it at the conclusion that a perjury inquiry which focuses only upon the precision of the question and ignores what the Defendant knew about the subject matter of the question at the time it was asked, misses the very point of perjury: that is, the Defendant's intent to testify falsely and, thereby, mislead his interrogators. This does not clearly distinguish DeZarn from Bronston, but that could be remedied by a more precise theory of the linguistic relationship between the question(s) asked and the literal answer – Bronston said enough that a reasonable person could detect that only part of the question was answered, whereas the testimony "No" gives no overt sign that the testifier had privately re-written the question to be something like "Was there fundraising at a Preakness Party in 1991", as opposed to "at that activity". The court relied on a subjective "sniff test" for distinguishing responsive from non-responsive testimony, so I would say that they simply did not draw the bright lines that could have been drawn (which would be based on better distinguishing "implies" versus "asserts").	I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).	A witness can only testify to what they witnessed That means their testimony can only be what they personally saw or heard (or, more rarely, touched, smelled and tasted). They cannot testify to the truth of what someone else told them (although they can testify that they were told it) - that’s called hearsay and it’s inadmissible. A witness cannot learn things after the event and testify to them.	can you hire a witness as your lawyer to exclude their testimony? That is pure fiction and misleading. Unfortunately scenes like that contribute to keep people ignorant about the law, which then makes it easier for courts to dissimulate their recurrent miscarriage of justice. But Purdue University v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797 (2014) is an example where the Indiana courts did the right thing, and is pertinent to your question. There, Purdue University first assigned an investigator in regard to plaintiff's grievance, and thereafter the University tried to withhold information under pretext that the investigator was also its lawyer and thus that the information was protected by the privilege. Because that person hitherto had been portrayed only as an independent investigator, the Indiana courts concluded that Purdue University was estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege (as well as the work-product doctrine). Thus, the guy in the film or series who said to be "screwed on Kardashian" reflects pure cluelessness about how the law supposedly operates. I have not seen the plot of that film or series, but the information that the friend-lawyer obtained prior to becoming O.J.'s attorney would not be protected by the privilege because it was not obtained in preparation for O.J.'s defense. If there were one star witness on the opposing side and they happened to be a lawyer, could you simply pay them off by hiring them as your lawyer? This question is somewhat unclear to me, but I will mention that lawyers have a duty to disclose to their potential or actual client any conflict of interests. The rules of so-called "professional conduct" discourage lawyers to ignore conflict of interests in that this conflict may impair their "services". And, as I explained previously, any information that a lawyer obtains as witness rather than as attorney in the matter is not protected by the privilege. Thus, as for If you committed a crime at a law-firm and everyone who witnessed it was a lawyer, is there any rule preventing you from just hiring all of them? the answer is: Nothing prevents the criminal from hiring all of them, but that information is not protected.	A self-represented person, as a practical matter, has no choice but to engage with the court when an oral argument is conducted. A person present in a courtroom likewise has an obligation to acknowledge a judge addressing them. Usually it wouldn't be contemptuous to fail to appear at oral arguments of a fully briefed matter (e.g. a motion for summary judgment, or an appeal), but it would generally be viewed negatively. One could respond to a question from the court with "I don't really have anything more to say, my brief speaks for itself." And, sometimes a court would leave it at that, but if the court insists there is really no other option than to clarify and explain yourself. Most often, this helps more than hurts a pro se party, although I've certainly seen cases with ghost written pleadings (which are authorized if disclosed in many jurisdictions) where this isn't the case. A fairly common tactic in civil litigation is the take a deposition of a party, or to call a party to the witness stand, and to ask them if they really want the relief that their filed legal documents says that they do, as a way to narrow the scope of the claims brought against the questioning lawyer's client. But, this is less of an issue with a pro se party when the person who drafted the legal documents and the person engaging in oral arguments are the same person. This can't be done in criminal litigation, but I could see a prosecutor trying to do something similar in oral argument, although usually in that context, the judge and not the prosecutor, is asking the questions.	It seems like the officer should have to present at least some kind of evidence that the alleged crime occurred. Testimony is evidence. Officers can and do abuse this, but courts tend to give them the benefit of the doubt, so they typically attribute greater weight and credibility to a police officer's testimony than to that of a defendant.	Your belief in the truth of a statement is of only limited value in a defamation suit. Saying that a person is incompetent in that person's profession can certainly be defamation, and may even be defamation per se, depending on the jurisdiction. If the person sues and the speaker asserts truth as a defense, the speaker may have to prove that the statement is true. Why would one need to say anything at all in such a situation? Whether such a statement was a factual statement or a statement of opinion would depend very much on the detailed circumstances. But it is at least possible that a suit might be filed and won on this fact pattern. See this answer for more on defamation under US law.	Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent?
Do you have to be engaged to be married to enter into prenup? To enter into prenuptial agreement, do you have to be engaged to be married? If jurisdiction matters, USA.	Well, it is hard to prove a negative, but the answer seems to be: No, you do not need to be engaged. For example, the article Prenuptial Agreements in the United States from the International Academy of Family Lawyers tries to give "an overview of this rather complex area of American family law and estate planning", yet contains not mention of engagement at all. If being engaged were relevant, it would likely be mentioned. Similarly, the "Frequently Asked Questions about Premarital Agreements" on lawhelp.org do not mention engagement. Also see Does being engaged (to be married) carry any legal significance? for information on where being engaged does or does not matter legally.	The legal solution is very simple. Under Philippine law (Title 1, Marriage, Article 2) No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. If you do not consent to the marriage during the ceremony, that is the end of the matter, you are not married. You can also refuse to apply for a license under article 11 (which requires your sworn application – refuse to swear). If your are threatened with violence, you can report this threat to the police, since not even your father is allowed to threaten to assault or kill you.	You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.	No. An engagement letter is a written confirmation that you have hired a lawyer which also sets forth the contractual obligations of the parties (i.e. the basis upon which attorneys' fees will be charged in the case). Instead of serving as an "estimate" or "approximate quote" of the fees to be charged, it is evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship and it sets forth the contractual terms of that relationship. Unless the engagement letter is for a fixed fee (which is uncommon but not unheard of), it only sets forth a method for determining what legal fees are owed and does not predict in advance what those fees will be. An engagement letter often does set forth a "retainer" amount that must be paid when the lawyer is hired, but a "retainer" is more akin to a security deposit on a lease than an estimate of what the total charges for the representation will be. Lawyers are required as a matter of professional ethics to put these things in writing. Of course, it wouldn't be improper for an engagement letter to include an estimate of the fees that will be charged in a representation as well as the other matters described above. But, that would be rather unusual. Firstly, since these people didn't even type my mobile number correctly, I'm uneasy about them drafting a legal agreement for me, where I wanted each and every clause to be thoroughly checked. I'm not confident of them being thorough. This certainly doesn't make a great first impression, although it reflects more on the quality of the office staff than on the legal acumen of the lawyers. I wouldn't blow a simple typo in writing a phone number out of proportion. How do I tell them that I do not need their services? Advise them by telephone, or better yet by letter, email or text, that you have decided not to retain their services. Does their sending of an engagement letter mean that I pay them for their time of drafting the letter? The firm probably could charge you, but it is customary not to charge for drafting an engagement letter. I wasn't expecting an engagement letter. I was expecting something like an ordinary email which said something like "this is our approximate hourly fee". Lawyers, as you might expect from their line of work, need to be more formal as a result of their legal ethics requirements, so this is very normal. The engagement letter constitutes a contract between the parties if the engagement is commenced. An informal communication, followed by a formal one, could lead to confusion over which one applies and could lead to mistakes where someone given an informal communication never received the required formal engagement letter. their hourly fees (which does not look reasonable to me) Lawyers are expensive, and good lawyers are worth it. The supply and demand issues are particularly intense in India because there are fewer lawyers there capita than in many other countries.	The idea is that, by default, we should assume the payment is a gift, unless we have specific evidence to suggest that it is offered in exchange for something. In the first case, the father-in-law has given no indication as to why he is giving her the money. It could be that he is indifferent to whether she remarries or not, and simply wants her to have a steady income in either case. He may be presuming that, if she remarries, her new husband will be able to provide for her, but until such time, he (the father-in-law) will pay her way. We certainly do not have evidence to show that he actually wants her to stay unmarried and is paying her for that purpose. In the second case, the father-in-law has given us more evidence. His words make it explicit that he does want her not to remarry, and that he is paying her in order to get her not to. Since he is clearly paying money with the intention of getting another party to do something (or in this case, to refrain from doing something), we understand it as a contract.	"become yours" - Which court are you in? The court of the schoolyard? If you're in real court, then You would need to sue, to quiet title When a bona-fide dispute as to ownership exists, a case can be brought before a judge to resolve ownership definitively. The axiom of a quiet title action is that you must notify all parties who could possibly have an interest. Really, notification is 7/8 of it, because by the time you arrive at a "quiet title" action, most likely they either lost interest or are gone. And the crux of "Notify" is that your efforts to notify the party are to the standards of the court. You are a hostile party, noting your interests are in conflict with theirs. (we must fairly assume they want their iPad back; you want to take the iPad). Thus, it is obvious you will prefer to fail in your efforts at contact, and you will do a bad job of it, possibly on purpose. Since parties in a lawsuit are responsible to serve all documents on each other, courts have very high standards for that. And these standards are tested and gamed all the time. I even had a clever plaintiff do it to me! (we were expecting both the appeal and the dis-service). The crux of document service is you hire a licensed, third-party independent process server. A process server is naturally good at skip-tracing (think "Dog: the Process Server") and is accustomed to finding people who are actively hiding. (because some people think they can avoid consequences by evading service. That's a loser's game generally.) So, when you show up in court and they aren't there, the judge will ask "did you serve them?" And then you say "yes", name the company, and if needed call the process server to the stand, and the server reads out of their notebook all the things they did to search for the counterparty.	It primarily depends on the title that you have to the house: are you "joint tenants with right of survivorship". This could have happened when you bought the house; it also could have been done after the fact in various ways. In that case, the house is outside of your wife's estate (which, under the circumstances, is divided between children and you). The lender might be confused about the status of the property, but they might be right, so the question is, what is your legal "interest" in the house, that is, does the title document say "tenants in common"? Assuming that the property is not recorded as JTWROS, then there are two matters to attend to. First, the lender may need to be satisfied, somehow, that they aren't taking a risk by refinancing when you aren't really the full owner. The second is clarifying actual ownership. Estates Code 201.0002-.003 govern intestate succession with a surviving spouse, where the dividing question is whether it is a community estate or not, which then implies shares for children. In that case, the children are part-owners, so you need their consent to e.g. sell the house (that is, this is a complication that needs to be fixed). Basically, you have to get a lawyer, and straighten this out.	What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.)
How do the US Supreme Court justices decide to deny an application for injunctive relief? On Dec 8 2020 the US Supreme Court denies Sen. Mike Lee's emergency application for injunctive relief to vacate the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision on Nov 25 2020. The US Supreme Court order to deny the application comes as "Order in pending case" containing one sentence: The application for injunctive relief presented to Justice Alito and by him referred to the Court is denied. This denial was reported by NPR, Wall Street Journal and CNN without specifying any details on HOW the decision was arrived at, whether all 9 justices voted, or whether the order itself implies a unanimous consent. For example, NPR only added: ... said the court's one-sentence order, which did not suggest any dissent among the nine justices. while WSJ only noted: The U.S. Supreme Court’s order came shortly after it finished receiving written legal arguments from the parties on Tuesday afternoon. and CNN noted: Tuesday's one-line order was issued with no noted dissents or comment from any of the nine justices. The Question: What is the official procedure / process that the US Supreme Court uses to deny an emergency application for injunctive relief like this? Do all 9 justices required to vote? Do other denials contain more details of the voting result in the order?	Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.	The question to be answered is "did the state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt", the answer to which should have no reasonable doubt. The interests of the defendant are sufficiently protected by the basic burden of proof requirement. The alternative that a single vote of not guilty exonerates the defendant would seriously hobble the interests of the people, and the alternative of automatic mistrial would make trials prohibitively expensive. The unanimity requirement does mean that in case of initial disagreement, parties have to re-think their positions, which is not a bad thing. The question of whethar a supermajority of guilty votes suffices for conviction was decided in a recent case, Ramos v. Louisiana, allowing conviction with a 10-2 vote. The court takes unanimity to be a basic common law right from the 14th century. Louisiana and Oregon had unconventional schemes allowing less than unanimous decisions: the reasoning behind the unanimity requirement is discussed extensively in that opinion. Since Alito, Roberts and Kagan dissented in part, the rationale for the other view is also spelled out.	Must/may the court give that instruction? No. It would be error for the court to give that instruction. The only privilege for which an adverse inference instruction is generally authorized in civil litigation is the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This is because when you invoke it, you are implicitly asserting that your testimony could be used against you, if you gave it, to show that you were guilty of a crime, and because a relevant question will be about events pertinent to the lawsuit. An adverse inference is also not allowed for invoking the 5th Amendment when you are a defendant in a criminal case because that would undermine its purpose in the the criminal justice system. An invocation of a marital privilege, in contrast, merely implies that you are married, which is not something that would normally and naturally suggest that you did something for which there is civil liability. One could probably imagine a fact pattern in which being married was a disputed issue that could give rise to liability (e.g. under the "family car doctrine"), of course, in which the invocation of the privilege would estop A from asserting a defense on the ground that he isn't married to A's wife (either at the time of the communication if the confidential communication privilege is raised, or at the time of the testimony, if the right to not testify against a spouse privilege is raised, as the case might be). Tricky cases would involve people who were unmarried at the time of the accident but subsequently married. But, outside very unusual facts, people generally don't deny that they are married in a lawsuit and then try to assert the marital privilege in a lawsuit. Does the answer change depending on whether it is the litigant or the spouse who invokes the privilege? No.	The local authority has indicated two things: It wishes to apply for an urgent interim care order. The application for this order should be dealt with at a hearing other than the case-management hearing. Therefore, the parties should talk about the following things, and their discussions should be focused on any order or direction that might be applied for: the purpose of the hearing; any directions that will be applied for; whether any part of the hearing will be contested; and the length of the hearing. The local authority shall inform the court in writing by 1.5.19.	It's complicated. Rule 53 states Except as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom. This is applicable not just to the Supreme Court, but to all federal courts. Rule 53 applies to criminal cases, not civil suits. Over time, Rule 53 has been expanded. It has changed from merely "photographs" to include television and related cameras. Furthermore, The Judicial Conference of the United States prohibits the televising, recording, and broadcasting of district trial (civil and criminal) court proceedings. Under conference policy, each court of appeals may permit television and other electronic media coverage of its proceedings. Only two of the 13 courts of appeals, the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, have chosen to do so. So courts have the ability to choose whether or not they want to have their proceedings broadcaster/televised. It is technically allowed in the Supreme Court by all other legislation . . . but the decision ultimately rests in the hands of the justices. In the 109th Congress, five bills appeared that would change existing rules, at some level: H.R. 1751 H.R. 2422 H.R. 4380 S. 829 S. 1768 H.R. 4380 and S. 1768 would apply to the Supreme Court; the others would apply to federal district and appellate courts. Both bills would make television coverage is mandatory, unless the justices collectively vote against it. So, once more, the power rests in the hands of the Court. H.R. 4380 is brief, and would be merely an addendum to Chapter 45 of title 28, United States Code. S. 1768 is also brief, and would amend the same statute. Title 28, in all its glory, can be found here (Chapter 45). The proposed additions are noticeably absent, as § 678 is not there. So, addressing some quotes from your question, Are there any reasons against cameras restricted to the Supreme Court, but that don't apply to courts that already allow cameras (such as the UK Supreme Court)? There are no special laws, no. To wit, does the allowance of cameras in other highest courts refute arguments against cameras in the Supreme Court of the United States? Nope. It's purely the decision of the Court. The rationale of the justices themselves against cameras is outside the scope of the law.	Which Supreme Court justices, present or historical, have ruled the most against intellectual property rights? In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of intellectual property rights, overturned more expansive rulings of the Federal Circuit, and overridden Patent and Trademark Office policies consistently. All but two the 26 U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the subject (pro or anti-IP holder) in the last 13 years (both in 2018) have either been unanimous or had only one dissenter (with no one consistent dissenting justices). The two 2018 cases with more than one dissenting justice, each involving the inter partes review of previously grated patents by the PTO under a new patent statute, implicate separation of powers and civil procedure issues that have historically been more controversial than pure intellectual property issues. Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group (2018) (7-2 with Gorsuch and Roberts dissenting) (upholding PTO invalidation of previously granted patents); SAS Institute v. INACU (2018) (5-4 with Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissenting)(expanding scope of PTO reconsideration of previously granted patents). Matal v. Tam (2017) (unanimous) (overturning PTO policy on offensive trademarks); Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. (2017) (unanimous) (weakening patent protections vis-a-vis biologically similar drugs to patented ones); Impressions Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. (2017) (7-1 Ginsberg joining the ruling in part and dissenting in part) (weakening rights of patent holders); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC (2017) (8-0) (overruling Federal Circuit by limiting venue in patent infringement cases); SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC (2017) (7-1 with Breyer dissenting) (disallowing laches defense to patent law claims); Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc. (2016) (unanimous) (limiting damages awards in multi-component products where only some components are infringing); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. (2014) (unanimous) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems (2014) (unanimous) (the Federal Circuit had set too high a standard for the recovery of attorneys' fees for frivolous patent prosecutions); Alice v. CLS Bank, Int'l. (2014) (unanimous) (limiting software patents); Medtronic v. Mirowski (2014) (unanimous) (burden of proof wrongly placed on someone other than the patent holder); Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) (unanimous) (invalidated patents on naturally occurring DNA sequences); Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012) (unanimous) (district court's factual findings made clear that drug monitoring device patent merely restated a law of nature and was invalid); Caraco v. Novo (2012) (unanimous) (alleged infringers right to bring counterclaims expanded); Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (2012) (unanimous) (first sale doctrine does not invalidate ban on reproducing crops grown with patented GMO seeds); Kappos v. Hyatt (2012) (unanimous)(expanding ability of applicant denied a patent to challenge the denial with additional evidence); Global-Tech v. SEB (2011) (8-1, Kennedy dissenting) (added knowledge of infringement element in claim for induced patent infringement); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership (2011) (unanimous) (presumption of validity of patent continues to apply during patent re-examination process conducted by PTO); Bilski v. Kappos (2009) (unanimous to reverse, complicated holding as to extent of new law)(limiting software patents); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (2008) (unanimous) (disavows Federal Circuit doctrines allowing patent holders to limit use of patented device after a first sale); KSR International v. Teleflex (2007) (unanimous) (expanding obviousness defense); MedImmune v. Genentech (2007) (8-1, Thomas dissenting) (allows for contests of patent validity without risking liability by infringing patent prior to legal ruling on question); Microsoft v. AT&T (2007) (7-1, Roberts dissenting) (U.S. patents laws don't have extraterritorial application); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006) (unanimous) (sets higher standard for obtaining injunctions once infringement is established); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (2005) (unanimous) (exemption from patent infringement applies to use of patented drugs for narrow purposes of research associated with FDA drug approval process).* Intellectual property issues have not been a partisan or ideological issue on the U.S. at any time in recent memory, and have not been a signature issue of any one justice relative to the other justices. Dissents in IP cases, where they have occurred have tended to be related to non-IP aspects of the cases.	The true answer is this is fundamentally unclear and ratification would definitely set up for a Supreme Court showdown. The Supreme Court would in my opinion need to resolve 3 issues: Are Congressionally imposed deadlines in resolutions proposing an amendment to the States for ratification binding? Does a state withdrawal of its ratification of an amendment annul its ratification of the amendment? Who decides when an amendment is ratified? For the first question this is perhaps the most unresolved question. Clearly if the deadline is imposed in the text of the amendment it is binding. For example, see the text of the 18th amendment, Section 3. What is not clear is what if any binding effect a deadline in the text of the resolution proposing an amendment has as to the validity of the proposed amendment. Article V makes no provision on such deadlines. In fact the most recent amendment ratified was submitted for ratification on September 25, 1789, but ratified May 5, 1992. In this instance the Archivist of the United States declared the amendment ratified, but Congress also acted to do so and several members scolded the Archivist for doing so before Congress acted. However, there was no resolution of who had to actually approve the ratification. For the second question there is absolutely no answer to this question except Coleman v. Miller which suggests this is a political question. This essentially means that the question should be resolved by Congress, not the courts. Lastly, for the third question see also my response to the first question. If Congress is indeed the ratifier, what happens if one Congress decides the amendment was not ratified, but a future one decides it was? Honestly, ratification of the ERA would open a whole can of worms and make it difficult to really resolve this issue. Probably the most direct method to force the Supreme Court to rule on this issue would be someone challenging their requirements to register with the Selective Service System.	In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.
Legal term for (novel?) technique -- "Use of Force", "Tactical Language", or for intel analysts -- if some police repeat some info on licence plates? TL;Dr: The legal issue may be that there is a need to name the law enforcement issue. Is it called "repeating license plates"? Is there a name for the activity, so normal people can describe the act? "NUMB3RS" (TV) does not address/talk about license plates, to my knowledge. Is it official business and been given an official name? Regarding "What is it called?", is it possible there is not an agreed/known/specific legal name for the method/technique? What is the name for repeating certain licence plates as a police method? What technique runs these repetitions of such information? Is it run by some legal argument for Use of Force, or is this what the PBS Interruptors documentary was about, er the local Motor Vehicles administration running the op all by itself which would be a joke that does not seem likely, maybe https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/546796/tactical-language-from-the-police-is-from-tactical-warfare-from-the-milit "Tactical Language", or just people learning another (probably old, to hex) way to swear? I am asking the technique if it is official, who leads the effort? I am not asking about how licence plates are made, I am asking about the use of repeating plates, which seems to be a (novel?) policing technique. For example, the selection of plates shown Exhibit A, Vehicle A, Vanity Plate "3037" with a "037" at 7 seconds in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=whXjR6zkEAY&t=7 Exhibit B, Vehicle B, Vanity Plate "3174" with a "317" at 13 seconds in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcTVV5so-oU&t=13 is REPEATED from I repeated "317" and "037" textually and with timestamps on my Facebook & Twitter public social network accounts, in reference to 37 (2016) about the deep/questionable stories of 37 official witness testimonies. Given the fairly unique pattern, I can reasonably doubt the statistical probability of any others with that issue/pattern. What is such repetition called? They're not the same vehicles but always the same plates with "37" every time. The deliberate meaning/intent/motive of their calculation in showing the plates for a reaction, what is the practice called? Is any law/organization specifically in charge of these specific ideas/maneuvers, or anyone (any department?) can switch plates at will? I am focused on finding the technique/law for such experiments. I think the issue I wish to describe is still difficult to word, the 17/317/037 triggering is experimental?	There is no such thing, legally, as "an attack on someone's writing". The only way in which any use of one person's writing by another could be the subject of legal action would be if it infringed copyright. But individual words, short phrases, and individual numbers are not subject to copyright protection. In theory such things might be protected as trademarks, but that would give protection only if they were being used "in trade", that is, to sell or advertise something, and then only if it is in the same industry or market. But a license plate is not selling anything. You may have assigned code meanings to particular numbers. Many people have done this before, using many different schemes or codes. It would be hard to demonstrate that a license plate is referring to your coded meaning and not to some other code. But even if the user admitted an intent to reference your use of a particular number, you have no legal cause of action. You might as well ignore such references, because you cannot do anything to prevent them. Plagiarism is not a crime, nor a tort when there is not copyright or trademark infringement, even if it is openly admitted. If you could prove harassment or some sort of stalking you might have a case, but nothing you have described (in the question or associated comments) comes close to that. If a police car actually hit yours intentionally or negligently you would clearly have a case, but the plate numbers would be no part of it. Response to recent comment: The source of authority (which is not the same thing as jurisdiction) to place license plate numbers on police cars is state MV laws and regulations. To the best of my understanding, such numbers are assigned automatically and sequentially, and have no reference whatever to anyone's blog or political statements. No evidence seems to be cited to show otherwise. The question asks What jurisdiction authorizes these reappropriations of my work/writing/speech? But no one authorizes tjhings that did not happen, and as far as i can see no appropriation occured. Jurisdictions, by the way, do not authorize things, people and organizations do. The question asserts: For my writing I coined "317" and "037" but no one can "coin" a number, and people use numbers in many ways. Use of a similar number on a license plate need not be a reference of any sort to a particular blog or writing.	"Police" that one would generally encounter in the US are local or state agencies, and the ordinary crimes you mentioned are matters of state law, so they would be reported to local or state police. (There are federal law enforcement agencies, but they only deal with specialized areas of federal law, and you wouldn't ordinarily encounter them in daily life.) On the other hand, immigration is a matter of federal law. The responsibilities of local or state police are governed by state law, and the federal government cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law. A specific state's law could potentially require state and local police to ask about people's immigration status and/or ask the federal government to check on the status of someone they suspect might be illegal. I believe a few red states have enacted, or are considering, such laws, though they usually deal with people stopped by police rather than people filing a report. Some of these laws have been challenged in court, and I am not sure which exact parts of which laws are still being implemented for each of those states. Most states do not have such laws.	I found an example of "is illegal" in RCW 78.52.467: "If the department believes that any oil, gas, or product is illegal...". There are some examples of "shall be illegal", e.g. RCW 39.84.050 "It shall be illegal for a director, officer, agent", where "illegal" is used predicatively. I tenatively conclude than the latter kind of use is less frequent that the adjectival use. Black's Law Dictionary 2nd Pocket ed does not include "illegal" except in some "illegal"+noun constructions, but it does list "unlawful" alone. "Unlawful" has been used since 1387 (J. Trevisa translation of Ranulf Higden Polychronicon), whereas "illegal" only goes back to 1626. Legal language tends to be very conservative, so the fact that "unlawful" got there first (aided no doubt by the fact that it is an Anglo-Saxon construction, not a medieval Latin borrowing) gives the term priority in legal usage. It sounds more legal to say "(un)lawful" that "(il)legal".	Special regimes For some kinds of questions there are special presumptions or forms of evidence that are specified by statute. For example, in Canada and the United States, registering a copyright creates presumptive proof that the copyright exists and is owned by the registrant. In Canada, breathalyzer results are conclusive proof of the blood alcohol concentration if certain conditions are met. Some of these regimes are not subject to challenge: they are legal facts even if they are not objectively true (e.g. the breathalyser results). Others create presumptions that can be overcome by contrary evidence (e.g. copyright ownership). The default: present relevant evidence, including testimonial evidence But outside of special regimes, you prove a fact by introducing evidence. The default is that all relevant evidence that bears on a material fact is admissible. Evidence is relevant when, if is were to be accepted, it would make the fact in issue more or less likely to be true. Evidence comes in many forms: testimony of the parties or witnesses, documentary evidence, physical evidence, expert opinion evidence. If you are wondering, "How do I prove X?" Ask yourself, why do you believe X? Or, how do you know X? Or, how has the event X left its mark on the world? Whatever has led you to believe X probably is the evidence that you would want to introduce to the court to help prove X. Perhaps you saw X: you can tell the court you saw X. Perhaps you took a photo of X: you can present that photo in court. Perhaps you have a receipt for X: you can show that receipt in court. Perhaps X is a proposition about your own actions: you can tell the court about those. Obtaining the evidence Evidence can be obtained from the other party during the discovery process, or from third-parties using subpoenas, subject to objections relating to relevance or privilege. Not all (potentially) relevant evidence is admissible However, some evidence will be inadmissible despite it being potentially relevant. I will only present a few categories, some very general and some more specific: hearsay (unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay exclusion), privileged material (unless it is a case-by-case privilege or a discretionary privilege and the person seeking to admit the evidence demonstrates to the judge that it should be admitted), sexual history evidence of a sexual assault complainant when it will be used to support an inference that the complainant is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge or is less worthy of belief (this is because it has been recognized as not relevant for this purpose), material that was obtained in contravention of the Charter and where the court has decided that the remedy for the Charter violation is exclusion of the evidence (in the United States, there is stricter, exclusionary rule), there are many more. There are also some meta-rules about the evidence that may be used to impugn a witness's credibility, themselves at trial to provide evidence, but for now I am leaving those out of this fairly summary answer. Weighing the evidence The trier of fact (the judge or a jury) then is to weigh all the admissible evidence, including by weighing the witness and party testimony according to its credibility and reliability after testing through cross-examination, to come to a conclusion on the ultimate question(s) at issue.	It's probably not a good idea to take action movies as authoritative sources on the law. The law that you're referring to is presumably the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) which says Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. There is an article on the act which reviews the pre-history of the act and subsequent congressional authorizations, and there have been many, e.g. the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1894, Espionage Act of 1917, 33 USC 3 pertaining to gunnery ranges, Fisheries and Conservation Management Act of 1976 and so on. The military police are authorized to enforce military law (though not civilian law), see article 7 of the UCMJ, authorized by Congress in Title 10. P. 167 of the article discusses limits on arrest and investigative powers: their powers pertain almost exclusively to the military.	I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)	The concept of law predates writing. "Law" refers not only to the system of rules, as your definition notes, but to the individual rules making up that system (for example, there is a law that prohibits theft). An act is, more generally than the definition you quote, a thing that is done (for example, someone who is discovered committing a crime can be said to have been "caught in the act.") This also does not depend on writing. In our literate times, however, when a legislature (or any body, such as a corporate board of directors), wants to achieve something, someone writes a description of a proposed result. When the body makes a formal decision to adopt the written document (by a vote, for example), it is deciding to do the thing described in the document; that is, it is deciding to act. Typically, for a legislature, the thing it's doing is to create, modify, or repeal a law. It's not very difficult to see how a document that describes a legislature's desire to act came to be called an act. In some contexts, however, it can also be called a law. So the word law can refer to the entire system (as in law school), to a particular act (as in the legislature passed a law today called the XYZ Act), or indeed to a particular rule or section of an act (as in the law in question is subparagraph 2(B)(ii)(b) of the XYZ Act). Law can also refer to case law, of course, or regulatory law, so we tend to use statutory law or statute to denote the laws created through the legislative process. In conclusion, the word "law" has several related meanings, so its use can be imprecise. When speaking about specific paragraphs, precision may be in order. In a case like this, where a paragraph create exceptions to rules laid out in a preceding paragraph, it doesn't make a lot of sense to describe each paragraph as a "law." The numbered items in statutory text can be called many things, and usually have different names depending on the level at which they are found. So I would not know whether these are sections, subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, or something else. If I were unable to find the correct terminology for (in this case) India, would probably use a generic term like "items."	An assault is carried out by a threat of bodily harm coupled with an apparent, present ability to cause the harm. There is no need for physical contact in an assault, all that is needed is the threat and the apparent, present ability. The drill sergeant was behaving in a threatening manner and had an apparent, present ability to cause harm; he was guilty of assault. Consensually engaging in a legal contact sport lacks the threat of bodily harm; that is to say that the bodily harm is a risk of the sport but it is not the object of it. Of course, an illegal sport where death or maiming is an inherent part would leave the participants open to assault (and battery) charges - you cannot agree to do illegal things. What is necessary to constitute the threat and the apparent means depends on the whole of the circumstances. A person throwing water when they had threatened the victim with acid is most certainly assault. Pointing a replica pistol at someone who doesn't know it is a replica constituted the threat and apparent means in one action.
How do you pronounce and hand-write the symbol §? How do you pronounce and write by hand the symbol §, which is used extensively in legal writing? And what do you call the symbol? For example, "#" is called the number symbol or hash. "&" is called "ampersand." Should I call it "the section symbol"?	It stands for section. As in "section 8 article b" or whatever.	This ultimately is a matter of Statutory Interpretation. One of the principles of statutory interpretation is that all words are interpreted in their context. For your example, that means we look at the title of 1464, "Broadcasting obscene language". From this it becomes apparent that radio is used in its common meaning of AM and FM radio broadcasts. Statutory interpretation is broader than that single rule, though. Legislative intent is another important factor, and that is rather effective in eliminating absurd arguments. Via the link above, from New Mexico's State Court: words have their ordinary meaning "as long as the ordinary meaning does not render the statute's application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust." In other words, absurdity is so bad that the court will prefer an alternative interpretation of the offending words.	Yes An American would spell it as “your honor,” but yes, this is how we refer to all judges. This is simply a custom that shows respect. There is no law or concrete fact I could cite that requires this; it is more of a “tradition.” But I have seen plenty of court proceedings (mostly on TV), and I can confirm that all judges, ranging from small claims court to the Supreme Court, are called “Your honor.” (The chief justice of the Supreme Court is sometimes addressed as “Chief Justice.”) Googling articles about courtroom etiquette also mostly leads to people who agree with this. Apparently, there are some countries where it is customary to say “my honor,” or even something else altogether. Sometimes people from these countries immigrate to the US and continue using their local terminology in a US court. Although every judge is different, my perception is that most judges try to be inclusive of other cultures, and if whatever term they use is intended as a sign of respect, most judges will usually just interpret it as it was intended.	It is legal to be wrong, it is legal to say false things in public (leaving out defamation), and it is legal to buy and manufacture signs that say false things. Moreover, the sign does not make a false statement, in that legal liability is distinct from moral responsibility. In fact, the sign helps to decrease their legal liability. Via this sign, you have been put on notice that the truck may spray a bit of gravel, so by following too closely, you are negligently contributing to the damage. This is what also underlies those disclaimer signs with "not responsible for theft from your auto". There is nothing "official in appearance" about this sign (a legal citation of a statute might have such an appearance).	This is actually required by german Law. Specifically § 623 BGB says: Die Beendigung von Arbeitsverhältnissen durch Kündigung oder Auflösungsvertrag bedürfen zu ihrer Wirksamkeit der Schriftform; die elektronische Form ist ausgeschlossen. Translation by me: Resignations and ending-contracts to end an employment are only valid in written form; an electronic form is not possible. The definition of the written form is in § 126 BGB. It basically says, that either a signature is needed or a notary has to vouch for it. So if you are actually employed under german law you have to send them a signed letter. How that letter arrives at the employer is not specified. I would imagine most resignation letters to be personally handed in.	Nope. 18 U.S. Code § 1028 - Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information (a) Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (c) of this section— (1) knowingly and without lawful authority produces an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification document; [...] (c) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that— (1) the identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document is or appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States or a sponsoring entity of an event designated as a special event of national significance or the document-making implement is designed or suited for making such an identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document; So you're 1) producing a false identification document that 2) appears to be issued by the United States. Whether you'd actually be prosecuted for this is something that I'm not qualified to answer.	This is fine. You can use initials, shortened names, common nicknames (Bob/Robert), omit middle names, and so forth without causing yourself any problems. Things can get more complicated if you sign by a name that is different from names that you normally use elsewhere - such as if you are called Christopher Smith and you sign as Donald Jones, having not used that name before - but there's no fundamental difference of principle. One example case is Scott v Soans [1802] 102 ER 539, where the defendant John Soans objected to the suit being made against "Jonathan otherwise John Soans". The Lord Chief Justice ruled that "Jonathan otherwise John" could be his name, and that if he'd signed a contract using that name then "what objection could be made to it?" There are several other similar cases from past centuries, some of which may no longer be reliable law since they turn on points of procedure that aren't relevant today, but the general thrust is that if you sign a contract under a certain name, then you can be sued under that name. (And you can sue other people using whatever name you like.) Mistakes in names can be corrected as part of the general process of contractual interpretation, called "rectification". This more often arises when dealing with company names, say when there are a half dozen closely linked companies with related names, and the issue is which one of them is actually meant to be named; there are some recent cases of this kind, such as Liberty Mercian Ltd v Cuddy Civil Engineering Ltd [2013] EWHC 2688 (TCC). Generally speaking, as Lord Denning said in Nittan v Solent Steel [1980] EWCA Civ J1023-4, We do not allow people to take advantage of a misnomer when everyone knows what was intended. Further, the doctrine of "estoppel by convention" means that if you sign a contract under whatever name, then act as if you were bound by the contract, you can't then wriggle out of it on the grounds that the name is not really your own. In Scots law, which includes certain doctrines imported from Roman civil law, there is a distinction between error in persona and error in nomine. The former means that you were mistaken about who your counterparty really was (such that you wouldn't have made the contract had you known the truth) and the latter means that you had the intended person but made a mistake about their name. The law of error in Scotland is not quite the same as in England and Wales, but in this case it gets to the same basic result: if you agreed on who was to be bound, that's what matters, regardless of the names used.	On a check, if the two amounts do not match, the written out amount should be considered correct. Section 3.114 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that: If an instrument contains contradictory terms, typewritten terms prevail over printed terms, handwritten terms prevail over both, and words prevail over numbers. So, you simply accept the check for the written out amount. DO NOT make changes to the document because that is fraudulent. If the amounts do not agree, you can't pick which one you want to use - you must use the written amount. If the written amount is incorrect, your only choice is to reject the check or accept it for the written amount (and bill for or refund the difference).
Is there such thing as reasonable expectation for delivery time? I ordered a chair from a store here in town. Delivery estimate according to the receipt is 10-12 weeks. The receipt says if I cancel the order I have to pay a 25% restocking fee. Twelve weeks has come and gone and the store doesn't know when the chair will arrive. Since 10-12 weeks is an estimate, I don't think I have a right to complain off the bat. But is there a reasonable, legal limit to how long I can be forced to wait before getting a full refund (or doing a charge-back and fighting in small claims court should they withhold the 25% restocking fee)? Obviously I can't be expected to wait forever (I've already paid) - how long should one be expected to wait before acting? Update: It is 1-2 weeks past the far end of the delivery time. I called the shop and they said that COVID has caused delays and they expect 4-6 weeks more "If I need a number, but we can't really know". I asked them if they'd still charge the restocking fee if I canceled the order and they said yes, they would still charge the 25%. Not sure how this fits in with the definition of "reasonable" given in the answers; I appreciate any further comments.	Yes there is If no estimate is provided, the reasonable time is 30 days. Findlaw's page on Shipping Goods and the 30-Day Rule says: If the business is unable to ship within the promised time or within 30 days, the merchant must promptly tell the customer by mail, telephone or email, and give a new shipping estimate and give the customer a chance to cancel their order and receive a full refund. This offer to cancel or accept the new shipping date must give the customer sufficient time to make a decision. In other words, you can't call to inform a customer you can't make a shipping time and then demand an immediate answer. If the 10-12 estimate has passed, and the merchant has not notified the customer "promptly", say withing a week, the customer is entitled to demand a full refund,m with no "restocking fee" and the FTC can enforce this. The FTC has wide ranging powers to enforce the 30-Day Rule. Businesses can be sued by the FTC for injunctive relief, damages of up to $16,000 per violation, and redress for the consumer. Additionally, state and local agencies can sue [a merchant] for violating consumer protection law And This FTC page says: The Rule requires that when you advertise merchandise, you must have a reasonable basis for stating or implying that you can ship within a certain time. If you make no shipment statement, you must have a reasonable basis for believing that you can ship within 30 days. That is why direct marketers sometimes call this the "30-day Rule." If, after taking the customer’s order, you learn that you cannot ship within the time you stated or within 30 days, you must seek the customer’s consent to the delayed shipment. If you cannot obtain the customer’s consent to the delay -- either because it is not a situation in which you are permitted to treat the customer’s silence as consent and the customer has not expressly consented to the delay, or because the customer has expressly refused to consent -- you must, without being asked, promptly refund all the money the customer paid you for the unshipped merchandise. ... When you learn that you cannot ship on time, you must decide whether you will ever be able to ship the order. If you decide that you cannot, you must promptly cancel the order and make a full refund. If you decide you can ship the order later, you must seek the customer’s consent to the delay. You may use whatever means you wish to do this -- such as the telephone, fax, mail, or email -- as long as you notify the customer of the delay reasonably quickly. The customer must have sufficient advance notification to make a meaningful decision to consent to the delay or cancel the order. The page goes into significant further detail on a merchant's obligations. All of this applies to "goods a customer orders from the seller by mail, telephone, fax, or on the Internet." It would not apply to goods ordered in person at the store.	If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back.	It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit.	He may be entitled to (part) of the deposit or he may owe you more money When you and he agreed you both entered a legally binding contract - you are obliged to sell the vehicle to him, he is obliged to buy the vehicle from you. The deposit is merely the first instalment of the payment for the vehicle with the balance being due on delivery. They are not refundable by default. He now wants to repudiate the contract and you have several options: you can refuse his repudiation and require him to complete the contract within a reasonable time. He probably won’t do this so when he doesn’t we move on to one of the other options. In essence, this is simply a warning shot that if he doesn’t complete the contract you will move on to item 2. you can accept the repudiation and sue for damages, these would include your lost rent, pro-rata of registration, insurance etc. from the time you would have sold to the time you do sell, any additional advertising, any difference in the price you ultimately get if it is lower than his offer etc. you can accept the repudiation in return for keeping the deposit in lieu of the actual damages. This in makes the deposit a liquidated damages amount and it must follow all the same rules, basically it must be a genuine pre-estimate of the damage you would suffer and not be so high that it amounts to a penalty. You can accept the repudiation and, as a gesture of goodwill, return some or all of the deposit.	Is there any consumer protection against the manufacturer repeatedly replacing items under warranty until the customer simply gives up? There are two implied warranties that people should knno about - fitness for a particular purpose and merchantabilty. You are concerned with merchantability. The implied warranty of merchantability basically says that goods are reasonably fit for the general purpose for which they are sold. If something keeps breaking it is not merchantable (generally). The warranty of merchantability is found in the Uniform Commerical Code and in Texas' Business and Commerce Code. Both at Section 2.314. You can read it, it is not very long, but one important part is, "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." This is an implied warranty, which means it is automatic unless disclaimed. Some states prohibit sellers from disclaiming implied warranties; Texas is not one of them (no surprise there). 2.316 is where we find out how to disclaim the warranty. This is how to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous 2.316 also says Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." So a buyer needs to see if the seller and the manufacturer both disclaimed the implied warranties. If so the buyer is going to be limited to the expressed warranties. If they did not disclaim then the remedy is to return the item and get the money back. So yeah, this is like a lemon law for stuff. There is a requirement that the seller be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind." That just means that the buyer didn't buy shoes at a car dealer. That it was the seller's business to sell the thing. A last note on this. Implied warranties differ from state to state as to who they can be applied against. 2-318 offers three options. Texas chose option 3 - which means that the courts decide if the buck stops at the retailer or if it extends to the manufacturer. This chapter does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their determination. In other words, unless the implied warranties were disclaimed by both the retailer and the manufacturer, the buyer can go after either for the refund. And what is cool1 is that a 2013 Texas Supreme Court case found that a buyer of a used engine has a claim against the manufacturer. MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows. This is different because some states require privity of contract - meaning that only the original buyer can exercise the warranty and they can only exercise against the seller. EDIT 2.316(c)(2) says when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him This basically says that if you know about the defect you waive the implied warranty. There are two ways to look at this. The first way is that the first defective item is the "the goods or the sample or model" that you have now inspected, so you now know about the defect, and if you buy another you are buying it with defects revealed which waives the warranty. The other way to look at it is that you do not know that the first one is representative of all the products so it is not until you get the second, or third, that the defect with the goods or the sample or model is representative of all the products, and that it is not until you have this knowledge that the defect is "revealed." In other words, it depends. 1Cool for consumers, not manufacturers.	Warranty is company policy. It could be considered part of the contract of sale, but it would still be what the company stated it - at time of purchase - to be. Unless the warranty lists accidental damage as being covered, it looks like the company are following their policy and fulfilling the contract. If you were looking for legal redress since accidental damage resulted from using the product as intended, you'd have more chance of success looking at unsatisfactory quality or the product being unsuitable for the intended purpose under Part 1 chapter 2 sections 9 and 10 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It's worth sticking to objective details (for example that the port broke, and that you had used the device as intended). The company are not assuming you broke it (anyone or anything could have caused the accidental damage), and they are not refusing a warranty repair as it appears that accidental damage is not covered by their warranty policy, so this is not one.	There is a reasonable chance that the amount that you are borrowing and paying interest on is through a third party, so the dealer can't just waive the interest for the period when they are fixing the car. Legal responses would include canceling the sale, and suing for damages. The problem with suing for damages is that this isn't costing you an extra $15/day (the loan gets paid off at a fixed time, regardless of how much you get to actually drive the car). It would be a considerable stretch to argue that you were deprived of a week's worth of enjoyment for the car because of the wrongful acts of the dealer, and should be compensated. Your attorney would be in a good position to tell you, based on the facts and Texas law, whether that approach would be futile. The legality of the situation primarily depends on what the contract says. It is likely that the contract has clauses that maximally disclaim responsibility to the maximum extent allowed by law. There will be some clause that says something about taking delivery of the car, so you can check whether they have breached the contract on that point: it is possible that there is some escape hatch like "as soon as possible, upon receipt of payment". It seems pretty clear that they concealed a material fact, in order to induce you to buy the car. For example, the manufacturer may have installed a defective veblitzer which had to be replaced, and a reasonable person would not buy a car with a defective veblitzer, thus the veblitzer is a material fact. Or: the veblitzer may have been damaged in a flood. The fact that the car is, by their representation, not safe to drive in its current state, the mind of fact that would push most people into the "no thanks" category. To pursue the fraud angle, you need to be more specific about the defective part in your complaint. The only way to force them to reveal the nature of the missing part is to sue them and compel disclosure of the relevant facts during discovery. Again, your attorney would deal with this. You should bear in mind that if the sale is simply cancelled, you may not be able to recover the loan application or processing fee, and the trade-in will no doubt have been sold, so you can't get the old car back. There are laws against deceptive trade practices which might be applicable, depending on whether they said anything deceptive in their disseminated advertising. Section 17.46 may be applicable, if they patched the car together temporarily with a counterfeit veblitzer.	You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.
Why aren't politicians personally liable for broken campaign promises? When a politician breaks a campaign promise, aren't there measurable damages to voters and donors? When a politician says something to make money, and doesn't do it, how is that different from fraud?	Because there is no duty to be honest Generally, there is no duty of honesty except in specific circumstances. These include: when under penalty of perjury when negotiating a contract when immediate and direct harm would result from dishonesty (e.g. telling someone it was safe to cross the road when it wasn’t) under most consumer protection laws, when engaged in trade or commerce (which politics isn’t) Definitions differ but fraud requires both dishonesty and deception to acquire property or money or to cause loss. A vote is not property or money. While donations involve money, they are gifts and are given without expectation of reciprocity.	It is common place for major official actions, not just checks but also, for example, governmental buildings, to note the politicians who implemented law or enacted them at the time. This practice is not forbidden by any law or election-related regulation. There is a strong political norm as a matter of political etiquette that checks from the government be signed by a senior official in the Treasury department or a state and local equivalent, such as the Secretary of Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Director of the Internal Revenue Service, rather than the President, Governor, or Mayor. But no one would have legal standing to challenge a violation of this political norm in court, because a person receiving a check naming the President as the signer has not suffered an actual injury.	There is currently no law requiring a candidate for US President to release tax records to appear on the ballot. Nor is there any law requiring the President to release such records after taking office. There are laws requiring members of congress, and other Federal officials, to make public some limited information about their finances. This is much less than the information that would be included in an income tax return. Congress could pass a law requiring candidates to release their returns, but it seems unlikely that the current Congress will do so. States have broad authority over Federal elections. A state could pass a law requiring a candidate to release his or her returns as a condition of appearing on the ballot. Such a law might be challenged on Due process grounds. This would be an untested legal area, so there is no telling how a court would rule on such a challenge to such a law. Congress, or an individual house of Congress, may subpoena almost any information in pursuit of its investigation function. Investigations must be related to possible legislation, meaning it must be related to a subject about which Congress has power to pass a law. But the relation can be rather remote, as long as the information might inform the judgement of members of congress in considering a possible law. There does not have to be an actual law under consideration. Investigations have been challenged, and in a few cases there have been court rulings that an investigation was not related to possible legislation, and so Congress was not allowed to enforce subpoenas on that subject, nor to compel testimony. But such rulings have been rare. Previous Presidents have asserted, under the name of "Executive privilege", a right not to disclose information, such as internal discussions within the executive branch. This is not explicitly specified by the US Constitution, nor by any law, but has been generally accepted, and in some cases supported by court rulings. No court has ever clearly defined the extent or limits of Executive privilege. A House committee issued a subpoena this year for President Trump's tax records, or some of them. I forget whether this was addressed to the IRS or to the Treasury Dept. This has been challenged in court, and the matter is still in court. I be3live that one of the grounds asserted against the subpoena was that it was not to look into tax issues, as specified in the law authorizing the subpoena. No one yet knows how that case will proceed. The NY State Attorney General is investigating allegations that the Trump Organization, and various individuals, violated NY law, including by falsely reporting campaign expenses and contributions. In pursuit of that investigation, he issued a subpoena for various records which he claims will reveal possible evidence of those illegal actions. He pretty learly has the authority to subpoena records which might be evidence in a criminal case. This subpoena has also been challenged, but seems pretty likely to be upheld. However the subpoena was as part of a Grand Jury investigation, and Grand Jury proceedings, including evidence obtained by subpoena, are by law secret unless an indictment and trial results. So even if the subpoena is upheld, this should not lead to the public release of the records, unless someone is put on trial for some crime, and the records are evidence in that case. Even then the judge can order the records not to be released to the public.	Yes, and no You can't legally destroy banknotes but you can destroy coins. You can't "fraudulently" alter coins but that's not what you were doing; you were doing a science experiment, not committing fraud. The law prohibits the destruction of "bank bill, draft, note, or other evidence of debt": a coin is none of those things. The first three are obvious, and evidence of debt is a written obligation such as "a promissory note, bond, negotiable instrument, a loan, credit, or similar agreement, or a monetary judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction"; not a coin. It's a bit of a historical anachronism because when these legal distinctions were made, coins had intrinsic value; they were actually made of gold or silver or some other precious metal. They were not tokens of value like banknotes and all the rest are; they were physical repositories of value. Of course, in many countries today, coins at the lower end of the scale actually contain more value in their metal than the face value of the coin while those at the upper end contain much less.	Article 640 of the Italian Penal Code under the heading "Crimes against property by fraud" begins (via Google Translate): Anyone who, by artifice or deceit, by misleading someone, procures an unfair profit to himself... And the article (cited by the OP in a comment) says the suspect... ...worked in the health sector and had been suspended from his job because he had refused to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The jab is mandatory for all health workers. So, it seems the allegation is that he intended to "profit" by gaining a COVID-19 vaccine certificate and therefore unjust employment after attempting to use the silicone patch to deceive the health worker. Edit following @jkej's comment observing that the alleged unfair profit was never actually procured. The more likely charge - depending on the actual evidence - would seem to fall under Article 56 which begins under the heading Crime Attempted (again via Google Translate): Whoever carries out suitable acts, directed in an unequivocal way to commit a crime, is liable for an attempted crime, if the action is not carried out or the event does not occur.	What crimes have been committed? The initial assault (hit) or theft (stole) by A. Bribery by A and the detective. Which parties are at fault or liable? See above. How could Party A sue faulty party or parties for described actions. Party A, as the perpetrator, can't sue anyone. Party B can sue party A for the assault or the theft as applicable. They have no cause of action on the bribery. The state can prosecute A for assault or theft and bribery. The state can prosecute the detective for bribery.	Social media platforms are not publishers under UK law (at present), as such, they are not legally responsible for the content they host providing that there is a mechanism for alerting them to infringing material and that, when alerted, they remove it. As to "why", that is a political question.	Does using the courts in this way violate any law other than the individual sanctions for improper suits? Not really. Such an organization would probably have to be classified as some form of non-profit other than a 501(c)(3) in most cases, however, since politically motivated litigation usually doesn't qualify as a charitable purpose. In particular, is there any way to go after the money being fundraised for an activity that seems on its face to be of fraudulent intent? (I.e. filing cases with 0 chances of winning just to be able to dupe people into thinking their money can be used to help win an unwinnable fight?) No really. If they took money and spent it on the personal benefit of people related to the founders that might be fraud. This is essentially what happened in a non-profit purportedly established to help pay for a border wall. But using the money for a stated purpose of the entities that outsiders see as futile is probably not fraud or a violation of state regulation of entities that are not for profit. If there was such a way, would it be the state or federal government pursuing the case, or could any private actors have standing? A state attorney general's office generally has broad supervisory standing to confirm that entities which are not "for profit" are conforming to state law and their governing documents. Donors might have private causes of action for fraud if there were fraudulent misrepresentations made to secure funding that both the state AG and the Justice Department could also enforce criminally. But, the conduct described does not appear to be fraudulent.
Licensing an idea to public? With my research, it looks like a patent doesn't really make much profit from it due to the high maintenance fee. So I'm thinking is it possible to license my idea to public (for free or way less money) so that anyone can integrate into their product while they can't register as their patent. Something like Creative Common for innovations. Is there such a method?	You are correct that it is quite expensive to patent something in U.S. law. Under U.S. patent law, once an idea is publicly published, if no one else has a patent application for the same idea that is pending, the idea enters the public domain and no one can obtain a patent of that idea. The publication become "prior art" with respect to any future patent application which cannot be protected by patent law. Of course, if you publish an invention which you discovered independently, that someone else already has a patent application pending for that will be approved the following week, the fact that you published it after the patent was applied for doesn't prevent the person with the pending patent application from having it approved. The term "invention" rather than "idea" is what I will use for the remainder of this answer, because there are many ideas which may not be patented, while the lion's share of patentable ideas are appropriately described as "inventions." But, understand that as used in this answer, the term "invention" is being used to refer to the concepts and ideas necessary to make the invention, and not to a particular instance of a product made using those concepts and ideas. When an invention is in the public domain, anyone can utilize the invention free of charge without a license. People who use the invention are not even required to acknowledge that you invented or discovered it. An invention is also not eligible to be patented if more than a year has elapsed since the first sale of a product using it. But, in that case, the invention can still be protected as a trade secret until it is voluntarily disclosed in some fashion to someone who is not subject to a non-disclosure agreement. (I say voluntary, because the fact that, for example, an unauthorized corporate spy sees the trade secret doesn't end the status of the invention as a trade secret.) Some inventions, are effectively publicly disclosed and published the moment that anyone looks at it closely. The patentable element of other inventions are invisible to an end user, or to observer of an end user. For example, if the invention involves something in the interior of a device, or the invention involves something not visible to the naked eye (e.g. a process for synthesizing an industrial chemical from other chemicals where the chemical formula of the ingredients and end result can't be determined without a microscope or analytical chemistry tests), merely showing someone a product made using the invention will not put it in the public domain. It is generally legal to reverse engineer or independently come up with an invention which is merely a trade secret. It is not legal to use a patented invention or process, even if it is not directly copied and is instead reverse engineered or independently discovered, during the lifetime of the patent. There is no straightforward way to put an invention into the public domain while retaining any right to acknowledgement that you invented it or otherwise exercise control through a licensing agreement without patenting it.	Under US copyright law, all works are protected by copyright except for US Government works. The concept of "public domain" is not legally well-defined, and is used colloquially to refer to government works, works whose protection has expired, works available to all, and works not copyrightable (such as scientific laws or old software). Under older copyright law, releasing a work without the copyright symbol effectively put the work in the public domain. One can simply say "I dedicate this work to the public domain", and that is typically taken to be enough. CC0 purports to do this (using more words). However, as far as I can tell, author rights under European law are so strong that it is simply impossible. Releasing works into the public law has to be consistent with other aspects of the law. If you grant an perpetual exclusive right to copy and distribute to a publisher, their right does not go away on your death (a right which they would not have with a real public domain work). A problem is that an author who makes such a dedication (a bare license) could revoke the license and reassert their copyright. They could be estopped from making that argument. As property, your heirs would inherit the copyright and could (try to) revoke the license. Presumably the courts would not allow them to pursue ostensive infringers. Nevertheless, your plan is neither trivial nor bullet-proof.	Am I correct to infer that content/data created by a US city have an open license (public domain if created by US city employees or open license if created by a contractor)? No. For example, Larimer County, Colorado created election administration software in-house rather than using an outside contractor to do so, and it would be lawful for it to license that software to other governments in a manner that helps recover its development costs. There is an issue over whether a city or state can copyright its municipal ordinances or statutes or regulations in a legally enforceable way when people have a legal duty to comply with them. Some courts have held that state statutes that are binding upon people can't be protected in that manner. Efforts of the West Corporation to protect its page numbering system that was widely used by courts to refer to public domain case opinions were mostly invalidated in litigation. An open question is that most municipal governments incorporate by reference in their ordinances Uniform Building Codes that are subject to private copyrights and are not terribly cheap to obtain copies of. Yet, every person doing construction work is bound to follow the enacted ordinance including the parts incorporated by reference.	When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.	Whenever there is a license to share things, the license creator wants the license to be widely used, but absolutely does not want slightly different licenses that could be used to trick people, or that just cause legal problems when used. Normal copyright law applies. And for the reasons above, the GPL license as an example allows you to copy the license verbatim but absolutely doesn’t allow you to make any modifications other than changing who is the person licensing a work. I would be curious what happens legally if someone licenses something with a sneakily modified copy of the GPL and then makes claims against a licensee who assumed it was the original GPL.	The terms transfer IP rights only for the New IP, meaning that Customer would own the new stuff. Developer will still own their old stuff, but Customer will have the right to use the old stuff, depending on the license terms. If the license is as in your link, then it is forever (but this is a stub, so I assume that the license will be more specific and possibly restrictive). You retain all your rights to old stuff, customer will not pay royalties for the old stuff, and they can transfer or extend the license, or part of the license, to others.	You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.	The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it.
Why was he put in prison but never got a criminal record? I watched this video about a dare devil climbing to the top of The Shard in London, before being cautioned by the police. The Shard later took out a private prosecution against him. I am confused though. Why was it a private prosecution, yet in the video he says it was a civil case, which resulted in him getting sentenced to six months, yet he never received a criminal record for his actions. I thought it was impossible to go to prison for a civil offence, and much less end up in a criminal court! I guess there is some trick that is only possible with private prosecutions? I was also under the impression that there was not a Law against what he did, especially as it was a simple trespass, he left without a struggle when the police came to avoid a breech of the peace etc... Especially when other YouTubers, such as Ally Law, frequently do similar actions and never get arrested. Lastly, how can one be given a caution and then punished again through a private prosecution, outside of a Civil court? Surely there is a Double Jeopardy protection against this? I thought I had a grip on the basics of Law before this video came to my attention!	He was jailed for breaching an injunction imposed on the Shard in 2018 which was intended to prevent anyone from climbing it, according to a news report from the Guardian at the time. The actual offence he committed was contempt of court which is a criminal offence. Double jeopardy does not apply here because the crime he was cautioned for was not the same crime he was prosecuted for. It appears there was no precedent set, prior to this private prosecution, about whether or not someone could be jailed for breaching an injunction in this manner, as opposed to merely being fined, etc. Obviously, since he has been jailed, people in the future will be reluctant to copy his behaviour and a deterrent has been set.	This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.	Yes The Prosecutor for the local jurisdiction could formally file charges. No complaint by Rock is legally required, and given the video evidence available, Rock's testimony might not be as essential as a victim's testimony often is. But if Rock were to testify that the fight was staged, and no real assault occurred, the case would probably fall apart. That would not be good for the prosecutor's reputation, and might well be a reason not to proceed without a clear statement from Rock. See also: "Pressing charges" - is it needed to bring a charge?	Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.	Many times. See pages 4 and onward here. The 11th circuit (which includes FL) recognizes sentencing manipulation but not sentencing entrapment. The one example from the 11th circuit in that document (US v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264) was an unsuccessful claim of sentence manipulation, but it shows the analysis that goes into deciding these types of claims. They say: While our Circuit does not recognize sentencing entrapment as a viable defense, we do recognize the outrageous government conduct defense, and we have considered sentencing manipulation as a viable defense. ... Ciszkowski, however, has not met his burden of establishing that the government's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to constitute sentencing factor manipulation. Government-created reverse sting operations are recognized and useful methods of law enforcement investigation. Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. The fact that law enforcement may provide drugs or guns essential to a willing and predisposed offender does not necessarily constitute misconduct. We have previously declined to find that the government engaged in prohibited sentencing factor manipulation in other similar contexts.	Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office.	RockApe's answer is correct but I think it would be better to explain what did happen: the officer is not compelling the suspect to buy the water, she is offering him the opportunity of avoiding arrest, thus if the suspect refuses to clean his mess, he will be arrested, but the charge will not be "he refused to buy water" but "they urinated where he was supposed not to" (however that translates into the English legal code). That arrest would not be a punishment for not buying the water, but for the urination. In this case, buying the water seems to have been the most immediate way of getting the water required to clean. If there was some other water source (for example a public fountain) the police officer could have allowed the suspect to get the water from there. Even if there was some public fountain and the police officer insisted in the accused buying the water, the situation would revert to 2 --> the suspect can simply refuse and he will not be punished for refusing.	First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat.
Born on a plane Pregnant woman gets on a plane in Vancouver British Columbia Canada. Gives birth over Nebraska. Lands in Maryland. What state does the birth certificate say the child is born in, and is the time of birth adjusted to that state's time zone?	Skyborn are a known phenomenon. Country Citizenship? Generally, the kid automatically gets citizenship from his mom (and father) through bloodline, so our skyborn on that plane is likely that citizenship(s). There are cases that can't grant a citizenship that way (among them: Vatican is only granted ex officio) The sky is also treated as an extension of the land below. If the country you fly over has Jus Soli, it grants citizenship to the baby born above it. The USA has Jus Soli in its 14th amendment, our skyborn baby has dual citizenship to whatever country the mom is from. And in case the plane is over unclaimed water - think a nonstop flight Vancouver-Tokyo by Lufthansa - maritime law applies: The airplane is registered somewhere and treated as territory of that land while over international water. Lufthansa is in Germany, so the kid is, on paper, born in Berlin Germany (as that is what Germany prescribes for air- or seaborn). Germany does not use the unrestricted jus soli but the first test is the bloodline to determine what's the kid's citizenship is, unless the kid would have no citizenship through bloodline. So, if any one parent is German, the child is German. jus soli applies mostly to children of someone who has a permanent residence permit for at least 3 years and has been in Germany for the last 8 years: then the kid is (also) German, even if that grants dual citizenship - till the child is 23 and has to choose one of its citizenships. However, if all known parents are stateless or can't grant the kid citizenship through their bloodline (Yes, that happens!), then the kid born on this international flight has the right to become a German citizen - but some rules still apply. Which City/District/State is responsible? Now, which state's office is responsible? That is even more tricky. Technically, OP's kid that is born in Nebraskan Airspace is a Nebraskan, so it should be a Nebraskan birth-certificate. But the general rule in maritime practice would be to file the papers in the next port the ship lands, that would be Maryland if applied to planes. For a german registered ship or plane (my Lufthansa example), the responsible municipality would be Berlin, unless another municipality is responsible. US State citizenship? And then, I thank hszmv for this US Addendum: It should be pointed out that in the U.S. state citizenship is based on primary residency and can be changed over time. I've personally been a Maryland citizen, a Florida Citizen, and a Maryland citizen for a second time in my life. Usually state citizenship denotes exclusively where your vote is cast. No state can restrict a U.S. citizen from taking up residence in that state per constitution. So the Nebraska vs. MD distinction is academic only... the kid could move to California for the rest of his life without much fanfare. So, as a result, let's assume the parents of the Skyborn actually live in New York. Then te kid gets registered as a New York Citizen, his place of birth is "Above Nebraska" (or the state's equivalent rule) on OP's hypothetical. The couple on the Lufthansa flight could ask to have Berlin (Germany) written into the record, as that is where the interior of all Lufthansa planes is to be considered under the law over international waters.	No You missed the flight. Thai is not responsible for your acts and omissions. As for the check in desk, they are often unmanned, however, Thai have an email address and a telephone number that is manned 24/7. I am surprised that you couldn’t find any Thai airlines staff in all of Bangkok airport given that it is their home base. This is precisely what travel insurance is for. Assuming that the fee was correctly charged under the contract terms in the relevant circumstances you have no right to have it waived. Thai might waive it gratuitously if you ask but they don’t have to.	This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.	There are two models for citizenship, by location of birth and by the nationality of the parent. The US chiefly follows the first model, which is why only your grandma's father is American, and your grandma is not. By the same logic, you are not. Countries like Spain are far more lenient, and do allow you to request Spanish citizenship if you can show any of your direct ancestors are Spanish. That's possible because each country can make its own laws within reason. The international norm is that everybody should get at least a citizenship at birth; statelessness should not happen.	Woman slaps fellow passenger on flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles, is convicted of assault in California. Ninth Circuit (panel): Wrong venue. She can only be prosecuted in the district over which the assault occurred. Ninth Circuit (en banc, over a dissent): Nonsense. Not only would that make it practically difficult to prosecute, the Framers couldn't possibly have intended the Venue and Vicinage Clauses to include the airspace over a state or district (had they foreseen metal tubes carrying people while hurtling through the sky at 600 miles per hour). Venue is proper where the plane lands and any state it traveled through; conviction affirmed. From here.	Can I choose to not register my child as a US citizen? No. Your child will be a US citizen regardless of whether you register anything, and (unless you have spent less than 5 years in the US, or less than 2 years after you turned 14) regardless of the place of birth, because (in that case) even if the child is born outside the US he or she will be a US citizen under 8 USC 1401(g). Can I register them with an 18yoa deadline for them to choose citizenship? No. Your child probably (depending on your wife's citizenship, and assuming birth in the US) will be a dual citizen from birth without the need or the ability to choose. On turning 18, the child will be able to renounce either citizenship, but will not be required to renounce US citizenship and will probably not be required to renounce the other citizenship either. (I am not familiar with all EU countries' citizenship laws, so the law of that country might have a requirement to choose, but there is no such requirement in the countries whose laws I am familiar with. If the other country is the Netherlands, the child will risk losing Dutch citizenship on turning 28 unless he or she takes steps to avoid that or unless the law changes.) As pointed out in a comment on Putvi's answer, if you successfully avoid letting the US know about your child's birth, you would be in the awkward position of needing to get a visa for the child if you ever want the child to leave and reenter the country. Otherwise, the child would be an illegal alien in the eyes of the US (this assumes you've managed to hide the child's place of birth). There is no process available to get visas in the US for (non-diplomatic) children born in the US, of course, because such children are citizens of the US.	I recognize your difficulty, and I'm not sure about the formal legality of it (which would go to the materiality of the alteration, which if material would probably be a presentation of a false document to a TSA officer). But more practically, when you present your boarding pass and ID to the TSA officer before going through security, their system checks your boarding pass against the boarding pass in the computer system. If those don't match, you are sent back to the ticketing desk. My wife and I had to do this on a recent trip simply because folding up our boarding passes to put them in my wallet caused smudging that was enough to cause the TSA system to conclude that our boarding passes weren't in the system. This also triggered heightened bag searches and pat down searches for both of us going through security the second time around. In your shoes, I'd try my chances with a TSA officer accepting the ID v. boarding pass mismatch with your brief explanation instead. Due to the limitations of airline software, discrepancies between IDs and boarding passes are common enough for reasons like the inability of airline software to handle two word surnames, very short surnames, hyphens, and apostrophes.	Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license."
If private citizens cannot sue when the grievance is common to all citizens, who is supposed to sue? Follow-up question to What does this sentence about Trump's lawsuits in Pennsylvania mean? The document cited by Nate Eldredge in the answer to that question says: Federal courts are not venues for plaintiffs to assert a bare right “to have the Government act in accordance with law.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126–27 (2014). When the alleged injury is undifferentiated and common to all members of the public, courts routinely dismiss such cases as “generalized grievances” that cannot support standing. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173–75 (1974). Such is the case here insofar as Plaintiffs, and specifically candidate Bognet, theorize their harm as the right to have government administered in compliance with the Elections Clause and Electors Clause. This seems to say that if the government does not act in accordance with law, private citizens cannot file suit to force it to do so. But if the government is not acting in accordance with law, presumably someone/something would be legally empowered to force the government to obey the law. What is that entity? What happens if that entity does not file suit? Offhand, the closest example that I can think of is when the UK government passed a bill that would break international law, but that is obviously different -- that case involved international law and the aggrieved country would presumably file a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice.	The general rule, in US courts, is that a person (or organization) can only sue if that person has actually been harmed in some way by the actions of the person or entity to be sued. This is called having standing. In some cases a law specifically grants standing more widely than the usual rule would. For example, some state elections laws grant standing to any voter to challenge certain kinds of procedural violations. In some countries there are special courts in which governmental actions (or inaction) alleged to be in violation of law can be challenged. In the US there is no such special court, such challenges are brought, if at all, in the form of ordinary lawsuits brought by individuals, groups, or organizations. Sometimes a person who has actually been injured by a governmental action must be found in order to mount a legal challenge to that action. There are other mechanisms than lawsuits which may be used to force compliance with law. An official who is acting improperly may be impeached, convicted, and removed from office. And non-compliance may be politically unpopular, and lead to a change of administration or to a legislator not being re-elected. But of course neither of those remedies always works. In some cases one part or agency of the government can sue another part or a specific official. The law may explicitly provide for this, or a court may declare such a suit to be permitted. In some cases there is apparently no way to force a legal settlement of a dispute. For example, the US Federal constitution has an "emoluments clause" which essentially says that the President shall not accept payments from foreign rulers or governments. It was apparently intended as a sort of anti-bribery provision. No US court has ever enforced it, and recent cases seem to suggest that impeachment is the only way to enforce it. (It seems that this is incorrect, and a better example is needed.) The current US system is imperfect (as is every other system I know of, although in different ways). The reason for the standing rule is that if everyone who felt that something wrong was being done, even if not to him or her personally, could sue, the courts would be totality overrun with such suits, and much of government would have no time to do anything but to defend such suits. That is because almost every governmental action offends or angers someone, even if it does not do that person measurable harm. Limiting suits to cases where the plaintiff has standing is a key method of keeping the system in check. The US doe3s not have any overriding monitor agency which can sue for any improper government action. If it did, who would keep that agency in its proper bounds?	At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.	This case was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, meaning that it’s a lawsuit between citizens of different states. In most cases, diversity jurisdiction requires “complete” diversity: every plaintiff has to be a citizen of a different state than every defendant. If one of 12 plaintiffs is a Maryland resident and one of 15 defendants is also a Maryland resident, that tiny overlap means the entire lawsuit is kicked back to state court. In this case, the defendants are an Ohio fraternity, an Illinois resident, a Wyoming company, and a person whose residence is unclear. Defendant Smith might be a Wyoming resident, a Utah resident, or a Washington resident. The plaintiffs aren’t sure. However, as long as the plaintiffs aren’t residents of any of those states, there’s complete diversity of citizenship. It doesn’t matter whether Doe II is from Alaska or Florida, just that she isn’t from the same state as any defendant.	Can you be trespassing on public property for no reason at all? Yes. When the government owns property, it can direct you to leave for any reason (even a legally invalid reason), and you are trespassing if you don't leave. When you are present on land you don't own with permission, but without a lease, you have a "license" to be there which is a contract-like right and is not a property right. A license doesn't give you the right to stay on the property over the objections of the owner or an agent of the owner. You might be able to receive money damages for an improper termination of your license to be present at the property (e.g. if you are told for no reason to leave a movie after paying for a ticket), but you don't have the right to simply stay there. If you stay there over the objections of the owner or the owner's agent, you are trespassing. The law applicable to government property owners and private property owners is basically the same in this regard. Realistically, on government property, furthermore, the standard by which the government employee may legally terminate your license to be there and exclude you from the property is low. Basically, it must merely not violate any constitutional right you may have, and you do not have a constitutional right to be present on government owned property, except in a quite narrow subset of cases (e.g. the "town square"). More exactly, you do not have a right to be on government property per se, but you can't be excluded from it for a constitutionally impermissible reason. The government gets to decide what parts of property it owns are available to the general public and for what content-neutral purposes. Thus, the right to be present on government owned "public" property (which doesn't include private areas of government owned property) can be subjected to reasonable and content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. For example, a town could legally decide that the town square is closed from midnight to eight a.m. every day. The quoted material from the case Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) cited in the answer by bdb484 is narrower than a plain reading out of context would suggest. In that quotation, the term "public place" is being used in a sense much more restrictive than in the broader sense of property that is merely government owned. It is referring to places where the government has expressly or implicitly allowed members of the general public to be present on land that it owns (as opposed, for example, to a government office area of a building, or a maintenance facility in a government owned park, or a conservation area in a government owned park). This narrow sense of the word resolves what would otherwise seem to be a contradiction in the law. But, the government has the authority to make something that once was a public place into a non-public place going forward. For example, historically, the Civic Center park in front of the capitol in Denver, Colorado has been a public place. But, the government can and did close it off to the public for many months for maintenance and out of public health concerns when heavy use of it by homeless people and drug dealers caused the premises to be seriously damaged and created a public health risk from it being used to dispose of dirty, used, injection-drug syringes, and for people to defecate. A Hypothetical Suppose that Chris is the sole librarian in one of the towns of College Corner, which is on the Ohio-Indiana border, which are in different time zones. In that capacity, Chris has the authority to set library policies including the hours of the library and the rules for its use without the approval of anyone else. Chris has a hot date at 5:30 p.m. But, at lunch time, Chris learned that the hot date was at 5:30 p.m. in Ohio and not an hour later at 5:30 p.m. in Indiana, but the library's official closing time is 5 p.m. in Indiana, because Ohio was observing daylight savings time, but Indian was not, at the time when this happened. Chris, as the sole government official in charge of the library, decides to close the library before its posted closing time at 4:00 p.m. Indiana time (5 p.m. Ohio time) in order to be able to make it to the hot date. Chris quietly asks everyone left in the library to leave at 4 p.m. Indiana time, and everyone but you does. But you, who are homeless, really want to stay the extra hour before getting out in the cold and finding a bridge to sleep under, so you refuse to leave saying that the library is still open until 5 p.m. Indiana time, as stated in its posted hours. Chris orders you to leave and warns you that he is calling the police to remove you if you don't do so voluntarily. The police arrive and restate the complaint of Chris. The police arrest you for trespassing and you are charged with this crime in the appropriate court by the appropriate prosecuting attorney. You had done nothing wrong whatsoever prior to being asked to leave and refusing to do so. But, Chris has not violated your constitutional rights by ordering you removed for some unconstitutional reason. Chris then goes on the hot date; it is love at first sight, and Chris gets married the next week. As an apology for putting you out for the sole convenience of Chris, Chris invites you to the wedding. Do you have a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge on the grounds that the librarian's actions were unconstitutional? No. You might have a "good faith claim of right" defense, however, to the criminal charges. Do you have a valid claim for money damages for a violation of your constitutional rights? No. Indeed, ordering you removed for "no reason" that has anything to do with your conduct, as in this case, is probably more likely to be legal and constitutional, than having you removed for "some reason" other than just "because I the librarian say so" that doesn't involve wrongdoing on your part. A Variation In The Hypothetical If instead, your were being ordered to leave the library because you were wearing an National Rifle Association cap (and the library didn't prohibit wearing caps), this affirmative reason, which is contrary to the First Amendment freedom of expression, would be a violation of your constitutional rights, which would definitely be a basis for a civil lawsuit against the librarian and police involved in you being arrested. I don't know the details of constitutional defenses in criminal law well enough to know if the violation of your constitutional rights would be a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge (or a failure to obey a police officer's order to leave charge) resulting from you failing to leave in that circumstance, and I can see legitimate arguments both ways. This is also a situation where the non-constitutional claim of right defense to a trespassing charge would be a strong one.	Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple \| Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”	I want to file a Federal criminal (not civil) complaint You can't. Only the US government can do that. https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case Individuals do not file criminal charges in U.S. district courts. A criminal proceeding is initiated by the government, usually through the U.S. attorney's office in coordination with a law enforcement agency. Allegations of criminal behavior should be brought to local police, the FBI, or other appropriate law enforcement agency. There is an analysis of the relevant law in the case of Smith v. Krieger, No. 09-1503 (10th Cir. 2010). In his second claim, [Smith] sought to prosecute crimes allegedly committed by the defendant judges against the United States. Mr. Smith claimed he had “inherent authority” to raise his first claim under “the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 51, ¶ 255. With respect to his second claim, he contended he was “authorized to prosecute crimes committed against the United States by virtue of his inherent authority as co-sovereign, pursuant to powers reserved under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and crimes committed against his person and/or property in particular.” [p.13-14] [...] Mr. Smith’s second claim fares no better than his first. Congress has by statute conferred the power to prosecute crimes in the name of the United States on the United States Attorney General and his delegates. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519. The long-standing view of the Supreme Court is that such power is exclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”) (emphasis added); id. at 694 (“Under the authority of Art. II, [§] 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. [§] 516.”); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) (“Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney . . . .”) (emphasis added). Therefore, as the district court concluded, Mr. Smith has no right to initiate a criminal prosecution in the name of the United States under the Ninth or Tenth Amendments, or otherwise. [p.19] Smith was fined $3000 for bringing this frivolous and "abusive" case (which included several other claims besides this one.) Also of note is the 1973 US Supreme Court case Linda R. S. v. Richard D.. Here, Linda R. S. took a slightly different route: in effect, she sought a court order requiring her local district attorney to prosecute Richard D. for a state crime. (Or rather, she sought to enjoin the district attorney from declining to prosecute him.) The Supreme Court ruled: The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). Although these cases arose in a somewhat different context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.	UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson, is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a "Presidential election" of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876, which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis: Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. "This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states," said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing arguments are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.	In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), the Supreme Court held that "there is no Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation." The Court was unanimous on this point. This means that right now, there is no way to sue for a damages remedy for First Amendment retaliation by federal officials. The majority said that "Congress, not the courts, is better suited to authorize such a damages remedy."
Can an API forbid caching of the data it provides? Not sure whether this is the best place for this kind of question, happy to move it if needed. I'm designing a web application that will make use of a (non-free) third-party API. Paying a monthly subscription fee would give me access to a certain amount of API requests per month, after which I'd have to pay a flat fee per individual request above the threshold. However, one thing that confuses me is that the company providing the service states in their terms and conditions that it's forbidden to cache user-requested data for longer than an hour, after which (and I'm quoting) I must delete my cache and refreshed the data via the API. Is this limitation enforceable? What if the end-user is the one caching the data on their end? I'd have no control over this at all... If it makes any difference, the information provided by the API is not proprietary, the only service they offer is an easy-to-use API and some extra functionality on how to query the underlying information.	Is this limitation enforceable? Sure it is; you agree to a TOS or EULA with the company to use the API, and that's a legally binding contract. If the contract stipulates limits to caching, that's enforceable in civil court by lawsuit (possibly criminal court, which will depend on jurisdiction). What if the end-user is the one caching the data on their end? If your end users might be caching, that's something you may need to outline in your own TOS/EULA to adhere to the API's stipulations. And, the API may not allow you to serve API data to your own users; read it and see. the information provided by the API is not proprietary,... That doesn't matter; you're using their API and service. If you don't like that, you need to write your own API or develop your own queries for the information. I'm designing a web application that will make use of a (non-free) third-party API. If that App is going to be distributed and used by others, talk to a lawyer about the API and have them write a TOS/EULA for your App; you run the risk of significant legal liability with a publicly distributed App that uses someone else's API, paid or free.	This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy.	No You are limited to “your ... use only”. You are not given permission to make this available for 3rd parties either commercially or for free.	Pragmatically, on your server side, there is nothing about an http request from a computer program that is any different than one typed manually, so if the "robot" doesn't intend to honor your demand, there's little or nothing you can do. Most sites implement a "robots.txt" file in their root directory that defines the site's policy, and many/most of the web crawlers and spiders respect that policy...but it's an honor system. You can use sophisticated metadata methods to block programmatic access to your site...refuse new connections less than five seconds apart, for example. Edit: There's no law that says you have to honor an http GET request. You can allow or refuse them at your most capricious whim.	All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests.	Yes Best is to call them and let them guide you to the right department. https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/contact.aspx In reality you can give up. They will never ever give you the permission to use the icon, even if you'd pay for it. Why? Because as soon they give the permission to someone others will try to use it too and their legal stand would be more difficult since they softenend the use rights of that icon/intellectual property, opening doors for people who copy without thinking of the legal implications and scammers. EDIT: To add; As far I know you're not allowed to take stuff from wikipedia without noticing them/linking to them. That your app is free also doesn't matters. Maybe you're even showing ads in your app giving it a commercial goal.	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	Any processing of personal data needs a legal basis, for example necessity for some contract or legitimate interest. If no other legal basis allows the processing, you need to acquire consent. Consent must be freely given. If something is gated behind consent without that consent being really necessary, this might coerce users and they would not be able to consent freely. The GDPR does not have a hard ban on this, but it explicitly calls out that this case must be considered when determining whether consent is valid. So what your company is trying to do is in a dark grey area. Not necessarily wrong, but likely so. Consent could be made free if users have an actual choice. For example, some online newspaper sites had success with a “pay or consent” wall. (Success in the sense that some data protection authorities allowed this). In your case, this could mean that users either consent to extra data collection, or that they buy some reasonably priced premium mode. But none of this is for you to decide. You can voice your doubts that the software would be compliant. You could also ask if the Data Protection Impact Assessment document for this proposed processing is available (creating such an assessment is likely mandatory in this case). But in the end, it is the company's obligation to be compliant, and this responsibility is largely shouldered by the company's data protection officer (to whom you can turn with further questions).
Liability in failed house arrest Say police place someone under house arrest. They are negligent and allow the person to leave and attack people. Are police liable for damages, since they are required to protect people in their custody, and presumably also have to protect people attacked by people in custody? Otherwise, bizarre situation where police can only defend criminals.	In the US, police do not put a person under house arrest, instead, the courts do, as an alternative to standard imprisonment (either awaiting trial, or serving their sentence). The police are not involved at all; the courts cannot be sued for lenient sentencing. If a person leaves their house (even to buy a bottle of milk), they will have violated the terms of their more lenient sentence, and will be arrested and sent to regular jail. Generally, police are not liable for damages, especially when they fail to be omnipotent in their efforts to prevent others from doing wrong.	You aren't liable unless you do something stupid with them. Possessing keys doesn't make you the owner, it makes you someone with keys. That said, we could probably come up with negligent things you could do that would be a problem. Like have a huge heroin party (let's assume this is a thing) filled with minors in the back yard. The family of an overdosed kid would have a good action against you personally for being so negligent, and also probably against the homeowner and their insurance as the property owner. If the party turned wild and the house burned down, the owner would likely have good action against you as well. I doubt this is really a problem for you, so there's no need to worry.	In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).	If A reasonably suspects that B committed a felony, A may arrest B, which means that A may also use reasonable force to detain B. They can also arrest for a misdemeanor committed in their presence, if it constituted a breach of peace. It is, of course, up to A to be correct that the act is a felony or a breach of peace, and to know what is reasonable force. If your arrest is in fact not lawful, you may be sued (battery or false imprisonment) or prosecuted (battery or unlawful imprisonment). Punching a person in the shoulder is the felony of battery, and direct observation creates highly reasonable suspicion. In such circumstances, anyone could have arrested the child. Unlike a police arrest, a citizen is not required to Mirandize an arrested suspect. This memo summarizes citizens arrest law including case law for Washington state. The right to perform citizen's arrest is statutorily recognized as a defense under RCW 9A.16.020 The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: ...(2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody	Police have discretion in the enforcement of the law Which is to say, police get to decide which crimes they make arrests for, which they handle with warnings, which they report and which they ignore. This applies whether they are in uniform, undercover or off-duty. If they abuse this discretion then they are liable to disciplinary action. If they apply it corruptly or otherwise illegally then they are liable to criminal sanction.	Police officer failing to act is specifically protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)? Almost every general rule of law has exceptions. In particular, there are exceptions to the general rule that there is not a legal duty to take action to enforce a law. Law enforcement officers have a duty to guard the physical health and safety of someone in their custody. When they are acting as a team, this duty is owed by all of them. Law enforcement officers are responsible for crimes that they commit. An "aiding and abetting" charge implies that the jury must find that the officers present were intentionally working together as a team to commit a crime, rather than acting as individual. In the same vein, you can be liable for conspiracy or felony murder by serving as a look out for a murderer, even if you don't actually pull the trigger. These officers actively prevented third-parties from intervening or creating a credible threat that they would intervene if a bystander stepped in to help Floyd and as part of the same patrol owe duties with respect to each other's conduct that unrelated third-parties dod not.	A police officer can lie, and lying does not render a statement inadmissible. But there is a separate area of law regarding self-incrimination and the right to a lawyer. The basic principle is that a person can always assert their 5th Amendment rights, whether or not they are under arrest. When a person is under arrest and has asserted their right to an attorney, questioning must stop and anything that results from further questions is inadmissible. There is no single factor that distinguishes ordering asking questions from custodial interrogation. For example if you have been dragged by officers to the police station and held in a locked room for hours in the middle of night, one would reasonably believe that you were taken into custody, and interrogation must stop once you request a lawyer. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, police contacted the defendant whom they suspected was involved in a burglary and they invite him to chat at the station. They lie and say they found his fingerprints at the scene (they did not). He then confesses, they read him his rights, and he confesses again. The confession is admissible, because this was not a custodial interrogation. The relevant question is whether "a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave".	In Florida, as in most common-law jurisdictions, you may legally use force to defend yourself and others from someone else's imminent physical assault. Florida makes it explicit. 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person. (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. The force you're defending against must be imminent, though. You can't just believe you may be in danger; you have to believe you are. Further, you must reasonably believe not only that use of force is necessary to defend against that danger, but also that you have to use that much force. Once you believe any of those statements to be false, or any of those beliefs become unreasonable, you're no longer protected by 776.012. If you continue to use force past that point, you're no longer defending; you're attacking. Yes, there may be criminal charges. I mean, use of force is illegal by default, and justified or not, you did just knock a guy out. The government has a duty to ensure that your use of force was lawful, and if it finds reason to believe otherwise, you may be charged. Yes, you might be held liable for the attacker's medical expenses. Mix Tape Guy is likely to try to sue in any case. He has some small chance of winning, partly because civil and criminal trials present different burdens of proof. If you weren't charged, or were found not guilty (and didn't get off on a technicality), then that chance remains pretty small. But if you are tried and found guilty of assault, you're much more likely to lose. Yes, you might be held liable for damage to the restaurant etc. Same story as with Mix Tape Guy. The outcome will depend heavily on the outcome of the criminal trial. If you weren't charged, or you were found not guilty, then you're less likely to have to pay to fix the restaurant. If you're tried and found guilty, you'll almost certainly have to chip in.
In the United States is doing business in only some states considered discrimination? A business would like to only operate in states except for California to avoid the $7500-per-person fine CCPA demands. Is it legal or would the business have to leave out the whole of USA? For information on the CCPA, see: https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa	I have a really good pizza place near my home but the bastards won't deliver when I go interstate! Now, that's discrimination! Yes, it's discrimination. However, it's not unlawful discrimination. Discrimination is not unlawful unless it is on the basis of a protected class. Geography isn't a protected class of itself. It can be if it's used as a proxy for a protected class, such as excluding certain neighbourhoods which correspond with racial or religious groups, but that's not the case here.	The Cayman Islands are well known as a tax haven. They have a corporate tax of 0%, and that includes income from abroad. So by moving your company officially to the Cayman Islands, you can avoid to pay a lot of taxes. Now of course most other countries will still send you a tax bill for any income you make with business activities within their borders. But there are accounting tricks to get around that. For example, many countries only tax profits, not revenue. So you can reduce your annual profits of your national subsidiaries to zero by having them pay money to your company on the caymans. For example, you can transfer your trademark to your subsidiary on the Cayman Islands and then have your subisdiaries in all other countries pay the Cayman company an annual license fee for using that brand name. And the license fee happens to be just so expensive that your national taxable profits become zero. And no, that's not just a Chinese thing. Corporations all around the world use that method to avoid taxes.	The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.	I wouldn't be surprised to see other states and jurisdictions with similar statutes. Fortunately, in the United States, there is a safe harbor against demands for state income taxes: For every dollar of taxable income, you can only be taxed by one state. (This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.) Therefore, if you show that the LLC (or its members if it's a pass-through) paid taxes to another state on the income in question (e.g., by sending a copy of the tax return), that's legally the end of the matter.	Article 1 Section 8 appears to answer your question - only the Federal Government has the power to regulate the value of currency. Unilaterally forbidding the use of pennies as currency would be a regulation of their value (from 1 cent to 0 cents). A state government might be allowed to refuse pennies for the purpose of paying for a service in advance like a private business can, but like a private business are required to accept them as legal tender for the purpose of repaying debts, judgements, etc. Responding to the edited post, I'm inclined to say that the proposed plan is still "regulating" currency, in the same way that only the Federal government is the only entity authorized to destroy worn out currency (which it obtains by fair exchange). As Nate Eldredge points out, this may also violate the Commerce Clause of the same section, both in terms of interstate transactions and in terms of the exchange of currency between persons of different states and the implementing state. However, if it was implemented as suggested in comments, where businesses were required to exchange whatever pennies they receive with the state government for an equal amount of other currency, it might not run afoul of either of these clauses. This is probably a question the Supreme Court would have to decide, since a lot of hypothetical factors could come into play. At first glance, there doesn't appear to be any factual difference between a state holding pennies in storage indefinitely and the state holding any other currency in storage indefinitely, which they are allowed to do so long as they don't violate any part of USC Title 18, Chapter 17 (e.g., melt the pennies for the copper). On the other hand, the Federal Government could argue that the storage of pennies for the purpose of removing them from circulation is a form of currency regulation even if the action would otherwise be legal, or that the state's actions are impactful enough to affect interstate commerce even though they only directly impact commerce in the state and therefore Congress could pass a law outlawing the practice.	Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".	Federal law isn't yet settled on whether employers can discriminate based on sexual orientation (see the other answer), so instead let's take a look at Michigan state and local laws: Based on my reading of this Wikipedia page, it appears that the 1967 "Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act" (pdf) has, as of 2018, been interpreted by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. So, yes, if the company qualifies (looks like there are some exceptions for certain "private clubs" and religious organizations), it appears to be a violation of Michigan law to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation for hiring and/or employment decisions. I'd also encourage you to take a look at this list of Michigan cities/municipalities that have passed additional protections for gender orientation. If your business is any any of those areas, you might be subject to more restrictive laws. Regarding an employee who refuses to work with a gay coworker, I'd strongly recommend consulting with a local attorney; my suspicion is that taking action against the gay coworker would be illegal, firing or disciplining the complaining employee would not. (I'm not an attorney, this is not legal advice, I'm just a dude who knows how to read Wikipedia, don't taunt Happy Fun Ball, etc...)	You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.
How can a game publisher legally "pull their game off" of geforce now? I do not know exactly what category this question should be under. So this is what geforce now basically is: GeForce Now lets users access a virtual computer, where they can install their existing games from existing digital distribution platforms, and play them remotely. As with the original Shield version, the virtual desktop is also streamed from Nvidia servers. An Android client was also introduced in 2019. How can somebody disallow their games from this platform, when all geforce now is actually doing, is streaming the games you already own from another digital platform like steam, to your device? If there was a lawsuit for this, would there be any chance for geforce to actually lose? Now I obviously don't know the laws, but how can a game publisher stop me, for example, from using a virtual machine in the cloud to download steam (the games platform), log in with my credentials, download the games that I already own on steam and stream the gameplay to my device at home? Is there any law or agreement that would make any of this illegal? And if there isn't, wouldn't it mean that there shouldn't be any legal issue for a third party to basically automate the above process for you? Because that's basically what geforce now is doing.	You don't own those games You have a licence to use them in accordance with the terms you agreed The Content and Services are licensed, not sold. Your license confers no title or ownership in the Content and Services. One of those terms (2G) includes: but you are not entitled to: ... (ii) host or provide matchmaking services for the Content and Services or emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services, use of a utility program or any other techniques now known or hereafter developed, for any purpose including, but not limited to network play over the Internet, network play utilizing commercial or non-commercial gaming networks or as part of content aggregation networks, websites or services, without the prior written consent of Valve; So, did you get Valve's prior written consent?	An additional important fact is that the EULA at the time did not assign Blizzard the rights to custom maps.1 And since 2010, Blizzard and Valve have jointly registered DotA-related copyright. See e.g. U.S. Copyright Registration Nos. TX0008153084 and TX0008149056. The theory of ownership is as follows. Because the EULA did not assign Blizzard the copyright in the customization, the modders gained copyright in those, despite the restriction that they not be used commercially. It was then free to them to transfer those rights to Valve. A court has considered in passing whether this assignment to Valve was valid. See Blizzard Entm't, Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., No. 3:15-cv-04084-CRB (N.D. Cal. May. 16, 2017). The judge recognized that the EULA explicitly prevented Eul and Icefrog (the modders who assigned their rights to valve) from using their creations for commercial purposes. However, because uCool "twice failed to argue that the ban prevented Eul and Icefrog from validly assigning their rights to Valve," the judge understood uCool to have waived that argument. Thus, the status of the copyrights is still in flux. However, commentators speculate that Blizzard and Valve have an agreement/protocol for dealing with these copyright issues. It would take a third-party to argue that copyright in one or more of the DotA variants is in the public domain or actually owned by some other creator and force a court to assess the copyright and validity of the assignment.2 1. Today, the language has been updated to "assign to Blizzard all of your rights, title, and interest in and to all Custom Games." 2. For one person's theory of how this could be the case, see David Nathaniel Tan, "Owning the World's Biggest eSport: Intellectual Property and DotA" (2018) 31:2 Harv. J.L. & Tech 965 at 984 (analogizing to Sherlock Holmes). I am not suggesting that a third party with no ownership interest in the copyrights would have standing to enforce Blizzard's former ToS, ELUA, or other agreements, or its copyrights. I am proposing that the third party might raise these as an arguments in defence of their own use (as uCool did).	What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? The existence of a game does not authorise entrance to private property, barring some agreement with the owner. That is - if it is trespassing without Pokemon Go (or, for that matter Ingress), then it is trespassing while playing them. That being said, the creators of the game are free to place their in-game targets anywhere they please, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where they would be liable for their users' actions, unless they have not taken reasonable steps to prevent their users from doing so - Niantic clearly instruct their users to respect the law and also, only require that their users be within a certain distance of these points, not actually be at them. Is it currently legal to say Go to person X house and touch a tree? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? Nope, unless it can be done without entering private property (which includes the airspace above the property, to some extent). And there are no special cases for augmented reality. Now, there is some possibility that if they create a private nuisance - by being too loud, or by otherwise interfering with the use of the property - owners of a property could bring a claim in tort against players for doing so - or charges for a public nuisance, when done in a public area.	Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).	Ownership is a fundamental concept in property law which can be difficult to apply to software, such as computer games. A physical record of information, such as a game disc, a piece of paper with a product key on it, or a computer hard drive with software installed on it, is personal property (chattels). You own these things. However, copyright law restricts what you can legally do with them. For example, the copyright holder generally has the exclusive right to make a copy of a program, which would generally include downloading (and saving) a game ISO. In recent decades, anti-circumvention provisions have been added to national copyright laws. These generally make it illegal to use cracks and other techniques for circumventing DRM, even if you “own” a copy of the software. What is “owned” is the right to assert a claim in court (a chose in action), which is also a kind of property. Specifically, the right to use proprietary software, or software license, is generally understood as a bundle of contractual rights, often documented in an end user license agreement. (While these contractual rights are a kind of property that can be owned, “ownership” of software can also refer to the rights of the copyright holder, which the more limited rights of a licensee are derived from.) Actually determining the legal effect of a software license is complex. As it is intended to create contractual rights, the terms of the contract (license agreement) are important, but not determinative. Consumer law may impose standard “fair dealing” terms which could have complex effects on the rights associated with a digital product in a particular jurisdiction. Because of the low money value involved, these complex legal issues are rarely tested in court. The specific questions you pose all appear to breach copyright or anti-circumvention law. However, you may have acquired contractual rights, including implied rights associated with your purchase of chattels, or dealings with a platform operator like Steam, which limit the copyright holder’s ability to take action against you. You may also have the right to do things that fall within a fair use or fair dealing exception in your jurisdiction. Again, the law is often untested, especially outside of the United States, because it is rarely in the parties’ interest to litigate. However, the exceptions to anti-circumvention law are often different to, and less permissive than, the exceptions to copyright. To further research your questions in a particular jurisdiction, I would look for exceptions to copyright and anti-circumvention law which protect consumers’ rights, if any, to back up or resell copies of licensed software.	You have misunderstood the MIT license. The MIT license requires you to include a copy of "the above copyright notice and this permission notice" in "all copies or substantial portions of the Software." However, this is not the same as requiring you to offer the Software under those terms, and in fact the MIT license explicitly permits you to sublicense the Software under different terms ("including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software"). If you had to offer the Software under the same terms, then the sublicense right would be extinguished, so that cannot be the correct reading of the license. Therefore, you can do exactly what you describe, releasing the software under the GPL. In other words, you have to include the permission notice, but you are expressly permitted to wrap it in terms that state "these permissions don't apply to you, dear end user, but only to people who go and download the original from the upstream source." That's what "sublicense" means. The Free Software Foundation, which publishes the GPL, agrees with this analysis (although they recommend avoiding the phrase "MIT License" because MIT has offered software under other licenses).	Can you locate your license (generally not a trivial task)? It may appear under Help-About and a click to view EULA. The EULA specifically addresses redistribution of parts of the software and number of installations you can make with a single license. They do not say what uses you make make of the software, except that "You may not rent, lease, lend or provide commercial hosting services with the Software". There is no express prohibition against commercial or non-commercial political use of the product: anything not prohibited is allowed. The fact that they say nothing about the content that you create with Word means, they have declined to have a say in the matter. (I am not sure about the wording of the "Educational" versions of Office: those are somewhat negotiated between the institution and MS).	A TOS is not intrinsically illegal, but an interpretation of a TOS may or may not be supported by a court, that remains to be seen. It probably does not constitute a "deceptive practice" under FTC standards. The TOS is your permission to use the software, and there can be no question that they have the right to impose conditions on customer use of the software. E.g. Amazon cannot freely use software that is only licensed for free educational use. They speak of "ownership" of IP so created and explicitly disclaim any claims about Current Law in Your Jurisdiction. At the crucial point in the agreement, they switch to talking about the license (BY-NC) that they grant when you are not a paid member. The exact details of this ownership are not part of the free tier TOS, but they do seem to add certain protections to "owned" content created under the Pro plan – they are under no legal obligation to make all content universally visible and usable.
Is gidazepam considered legal in Ukraine? I've checked the table of illegal drugs, and it seems like every other benzodiazepine is in there. But for some reason gidazepam is not. So is it considered legal (because I'm not sure)?	Yes, in Ukraine, it is legal for doctors to prescribe it, for pharmacies to sell it if prescribed, and for patients to buy it. It is registered with the State Register of Medicines of Ukraine. I’ve seen published cases where the facts mention prescriptions and sales in 2020. It is also frequently supplied through public procurement (as Hydazepam or Gidazepam). As you already noticed, hydazepam is not on the effective list of narcotics, psychotropic substances, and precursors by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. I’ve even encountered a recent court decision citing an expert report from the end of 2019 stating that it doesn’t belong to them under the list which was effective then. In 2019, a procedure was adopted for determining analogous substances, which reproduce the psychoactive effects of the drugs from the above-mentioned list. But no list of such analogous substances has been published yet. According to the effective procedure, the list must be published at the website of CMHMDAMH.	No, it's not illegal... Ads are shown as a contract between the site that hosts it and the advertising company. The contract does not stipulate that customers need to buy something, in fact, the contract can't force the customer to buy anything! At best, the contract can pay the hosting site based on the ad being shown, clicked, or any sale made after it. ...but you will do exactly the opposite Advertizement is made to put your own brand into the head of people. In fact, most ads don't have any effect on people. As I am writing this, ads for a kid TV, travels to Turkey and the primetime films for the weekend on the TV-station I have on are shown. I have no intention of consuming any of these advertised products. Impact of a campaign is measured by two metrics: people reached, and people responding. People reached is measured in clicks. People responding is measured in changes in earnings or sales. Clicking the ad increases the reached rating. If the rating is bad, the ad campaign is just ineffective... which leads to the most paradoxical thing: Bad advertisement and good advertisement both lead to more advertisement - bad to level out the missing response, good to maximize the response. By clicking on the ad you just funnel more money to the ad industry. When does it get illegal? [DDOS] The only way it would become illegal is if John Doe sets up a computer - or rather a botnet - and has that network click the ads thousands of times per second. Google can handle easily 83,000 searches per second, twitter gets more than 9000 tweets that are distributed to millions of people, Tumbler and Instagram handle together about 2500 posts per second. In fact, every second, more than 100000 Gigabytes of traffic run through the net. To have an impact on one site, you need to be truly a large number of calls... and then it is called a DDOS. DDOS is illegal under the CFAA, in this case 18 UC 1030: (a)Whoever— (5) (A)knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (b)Whoever conspires to commit or attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. In the UK, you'd break the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 section 3, because denying someone else service via DDOS is unauthorized, clearly unauthorized, and prevents access to any data (the website) on any computer (the server): (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a)he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; (b)at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and (c)either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2)This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act— (b)to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer But can a DDOS be protest? [NO!] Anonymous attempted to petition to make DDOS a legal form of protest in 2013. The petition got 6,048 of the 25000 signatures needed to warrant an answer by the white house - unlike people in 2016 asking for a Death Star. At least it prompted Joshua I. James to write a research paper about the proposal in March. He too points to the CFAA and Section 5A, especially the sentence I quoted above. Among a lot of stipulations, he points out that internet protest in the shape of a DDOS would need to follow the same rules as a legal protest on the streets - which for example demands that entrance to businesses can't be blocked, and one is not allowed to harass employees and customers. According to the general rules for legal protest as given, there are still a number of challenges. First and foremost, entrances to businesses should not be blocked. In terms of DDoS, if sustained denial of service takes place, then access (entrance) to the server (business)is eﬀectively blocked. This means that, at a minimum, sustained denial of service should be considered as a non-legal approach to protesting. Thus, he concludes sustained DDOS is per se can't be a legal protest, and even a non-sustained DDOS would impact people using the site in a way they will deem harassing - which means that even a non-permanent DDOS can't be a legal protest. And then comes the final blow: DDOS, unlike a real protest on the streets, can't, by its very nature, inform people of why there is protest, even if it were a form of protest! This means that nobody knows it is meant to be a protest and not a normal DDOS, and as it can't convey what the action is about, it can't be a proper protest.	Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.	Yes, this is legal, unless Richardson, TX has a specific local law making it illegal. In the US, discrimination is legal, unless it discriminates against one or more specific enumerated classes. Under federal law, and as far as I am aware, Texas law, students are NOT a protected class. As such discrimination against them is legal, unless Richardson, TX or its incorporating county have a specific law or regulation prohibiting it. Incidentally, age is generally not a protected class, and when it is a protected class, it is generally only illegal to discriminate against people above a specified age, not below. Note that discrimination happens all the time, over a variety of factors, that many people don't even consider discrimination. For example, many colleges and universities discriminate on the basis of GPAs for acceptance to various programs; this is legal. In the past, many colleges and universities discriminated against potential students on the basis of sex or race, which is now illegal.	Generally speaking, what isn't illegal by law is legal. It's possible for law enforcement agencies to share crime rates, maps, and their data, but within any laws regarding access and sharing of that data. Such crime data may be publicly available, but that depends on local and state laws. The local or state agency would have to enter into a legal licensing agreement - if local and state laws allow such sharing - with the GPS company to provide the data, update it, and reasonably assure that it is accurate. The more realistic reason GPS systems might choose to not show crime data may be public relations. If a GPS user lives in an area that has been objectively identified by data as having a higher than baseline crime rate, i.e. for carjackings, that user may not be very happy with that designation. Worse, what happens to public relations when data errors show an area is wrongfully identified as high crime? What kinds of lawsuits could result? Real estate agents suing since bad data from a GPS unit soured the sale of a house?	For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that.	Not all illegal things are crimes. Lack of evidence. They are asked to testify, and they say "what I said in my book was a lie". There is no general law against lying, except when under oath. Statute of limitations. Saying "10 years ago I did smoke drugs" means that any offence is no longer prosecutable. Lack of details. Which jurisdiction were they in? When did they commit the act, how many acts? You cannot be arrested for being a "bank robber" or a "murderer". You are charged with "robbing Bank X on 123 Fake Street the Thursday 25 April 2018" or "murdering Jim Thio in January 2017". Otherwise the defendant would have a hard time defending himself (how to prove that you have not killed anyone at any time?) All of the above combined with prosecutorial discretion in the form that any possible prosecutor will most likely determine that bringing charges would be just a waste of time and resources. UPDATE February 2018: Just for the sake of completeness, a reference to the situation of Jacques Cassandri, who did boast about a serious crime(a robbery in a Societe Generale vault in 1976) in a book. Unfortunately for him, he made some kind of mistake/miscalculation and the crime had not yet expired, so he has become an example of someone being prosecuted by confessing a crime in a book.	There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.
How can you know if a newer statute is referencing another statute, if the newer statute doesn't explicitize this? I'm nonplussed. Please see the subject line of this question, and emboldening below. How can you know which older statute is being referenced (by the newer statute)? What statute is s 11(4) of UCTA 1977 referencing? Do you see why I'm nonplussed? If s 11(4) of UCTA 1977 explicitized which older statute it was referencing, I wouldn't have to ask. Finally, you will identify any cases that discuss or clarify the application or content of the statute in question, again relying on your lecture notes and reading materials to point you in the right direction. You also need to know the extent to which other acts relate to the statute in question. For example, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 incorporates, by reference, the concept of the common duty of care under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 and the Occupiers’ Liability Act (Northern Ireland) 1957 (see section 1(1)(c)). The 1977 Act also relates to obligations arising under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 (see section 6(1)). However, a statute need not refer to another statute specifically Page 16. to bring it into the sphere of influence (see, for example, section 11(4) of the 1977 Act). Again, in a simple statute, the cross-referencing to other enactments may be easily identifiable. In those cases, you would simply highlight the cross-references. You would not need to make a separate list of the potential areas of statutory overlap, as you would do with a complex statute such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. However, no matter how complex your statute is, it is always good to make a single list of the cases which discuss your statute and the statutes/ sections to which they relate. Compilation of a single list is necessary because you may learn about the cases at different points over the term. It is astounding how much more easily you can remember a series of cases if you have them all listed in a single place. Now I copy and paste section 11(4) of the 1977 Act. (4) Where by reference to a contract term or notice a person seeks to restrict liability to a specified sum of money, and the question arises (under this or any other Act) whether the term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness, regard shall be had in particular (but without prejudice to subsection (2) above in the case of contract terms) to— (a) the resources which he could expect to be available to him for the purpose of meeting the liability should it arise; and (b) how far it was open to him to cover himself by insurance. Page 17. Stacie Strong. BA English literature (UC Davis 1986), MPW (USC 1990), JD (Duke 1994), PhD Law (Cambridge 2002), DPhil (Oxford 2003). How to Write Law Essays & Exams 5th Edition (2018).	What statute is s 11(4) of UCTA 1977 referencing? Any and all current statutes (already in force or that may be enacted in the future but before the event occurs) that bear on the reasonableness of the attempt to limit liability. In theory, this is all current statutes. In practice, the vast majority of statutes will be self-evidently non-applicable. In this example, we are talking about contract law so statutes about crime, defence, fishing, aerospace, farming etc. are clearly not relevant. So, a practitioner needs to know which statutes will bear on contract law, and specifically on limitation of liability, and look at those. No one said studying law was easy.	No. Whatever clauses and terms existed in this contract, a second contract between the parties could modify it to remove such a clause, or to directly make such an amendment, or to annul the contract entirely. You can make it a requirement that amendments be unanimous among the parties (as opposed to e.g. unilateral, allowing one party to make certain changes, variously without approval or without notice). Such a clause may also be unenforceable for another reason, but this doesn't fit any of the general points for unenforceability, except perhaps being against public policy if a jurisdiction happened to regulate contracts to that degree.	united-kingdom Yes. The landmark case in the UK is Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart, where the House of Lords: established the principle that when primary legislation is ambiguous then, in certain circumstances, the court may refer to statements made in the House of Commons or House of Lords in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the legislation. Before this ruling, such an action would have been seen as a breach of parliamentary privilege Strictly speaking, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which functioned as the UK's highest court before the creation of the Supreme Court.	The law does have examples They are called “judgements” Every case decided by a court is an example, in common law jurisdictions at least. When those cases are decided by an superior court they become precedents - binding “examples” on courts in their hierarchy and persuasive “examples” on other courts. When you go to a lawyer for advice, she doesn’t just parrot back the statute, she looks at the precedents and decides whether the case decided by the House of Lords in 1848 or the High Court of Australia in 1912 more closely matches your situation. Also, statute law often has examples written into them Statues exist in hierarchies, Constitution, Acts, Regulations, Departmental Policies etc. and the lower you go the more specific the law is and the more likely it is to have examples. For example, this answer I wrote for another question quotes examples from the new-south-wales Evidence Act.	Non-residential tenancies are subject to Fla. Stat Ch. 83 Part I. This is statutorily a tenancy at-will unless a contrary agreement is in writing signed by the lessor: the duration of the lease is yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly as determined by the periodicity of rent payments. There are various legal conditions related to rent default and causes for removing tenants, also conditions about premises that are wholly untenantable. Unlike residential leases, there are not any special statutory conditions surrounding the landlords presentation of leases. Florida law contemplates and allows the possibility that there are no written documents, and for non-residential tenancies has very little to say about it (only pertaining to the distinction between at-will vs not at-will leases). Therefore, the matter follows the general rules for contractual disputes: whoever makes the best case for their claims wins. If Bob has a scanned copy, that is excellent proof. If Alice alleges and proves that the scanned copy was modified, that disposes of Bob's evidence. If Alice presents a copy of the contract that says otherwise (I do mean copy), then this anomaly has to be explained. Bob can claim that they tore up Alice's original and renegotiated the deal, but he needs to prove that claim. If Alice presents the original contract, Bob's story becomes much less plausible. There are millions of variants of what might happen: the point is, there is no requirement to present the original signed document to support a claim in a contractual dispute.	If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.	It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.	"There's no ... contract" - wrong! The emails are the contract, see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? If you didn't agree on which laws will apply then that is a matter for the court to determine. In general, they will tend to look at where the bulk of the work was done - since you are being charged I assume the work was done in the UK so probably UK law applies, noting that the UK is actually 3 different jurisdictions (England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). That said, many jurisdictions have non-excludable laws around contracts, particularly consumer contracts that apply irrespective of the substantial law applying to the contract. It is therefore possible that you apply English contract law subject to, for example, Australian Consumer Law. Usually any consumer protection law in the vendor's jurisdiction will also apply. General contract law dictates that where a price was not agreed a reasonable price must be paid. If its reasonable that the editing should have been included in the original price charged then you don't have to pay more but if it isn't then you have to pay a reasonable amount for it. There is generally no requirement for estimates or any other method of determining the price - you just have to do what's reasonable. However, consumer protection law generally imposes more obligations on a business than general contract law. It is likely that your contract is ambiguous - courts will endeavor to fill in any ambiguities to make the contract work. techniques include read in implied terms to give "business efficiency", from custom or business usage (e.g. if particular industries typically deal with particular issues in particular ways), from previous dealings (i.e. what the parties have done in the past), from statutes, whatever works to resolve uncertain, meaningless or ambiguous terms, from the express words used or from the nature of the contract or from the common intention of the parties (i.e. the court might ask you what you meant). "Breach of contract" is a very broad term - it simply means that one of the parties hasn't done what they were required to do and allows the other party to sue for damages.
Why are headnotes presumed to be correct in England and Wales, but not USA? Please see the question in the subject line. I can post a separate question if you want, but are headnotes presumed correct in other Commonwealth jurisdictions? Canada? Australia? New Zealand? However, the next place to go is to the headnotes, which briefly summarise the facts and salient legal points. Because headnotes are presumptively assumed to be correct in this jurisdiction (something that is not the case in other countries, such as the US), many students rely only on the headnotes and go no further in their research. That sort of approach takes a mistakenly short-term view of legal education. It is based on a belief that to do well in the law (either in academia or in practice), one need only know the facts and the outcome of a particular decision. In fact, the most valuable, interesting and important aspect of a legal education is learning how to reason. Law, like life, is seldom clear-cut. Stacie Strong. BA English literature (UC Davis 1986), MPW (USC 1990), JD (Duke 1994), PhD Law (Cambridge 2002), DPhil (Oxford 2003). How to Write Law Essays & Exams 5th Edition (2018). p 20.	I am not sure what the claim in the textbook means, and have been unable to find any other reference to support or explain it. Headnotes are always “presumptively correct” in the sense that they are professionally authored, so you can generally presume them to be correct, unless they conflict with the full text of the decision. But I’m not aware of any statute or case law that creates a formal presumption in relation to headnotes. Perhaps you could write to the author and ask if that’s what she means. What is unique about England and Wales, as the origin of the common law and the associated tradition of law reporting, is the preeminence of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting. The ICLR was established in 1865 and publishes all official law reports in England and Wales. Arguably unlike the official or authorised reports of other common law jurisdictions, the ICLR’s reports are considered to be more authoritative even than the judgment published by the court itself. The ICLR’s website explains: However important the case, the transcript of a judgment does not have the same value, as a record of the decision contained in it, as a full text law report. Where, therefore, a law report is available, particularly where the case has been reported in one of the official series, The Law Reports, published by ICLR, it must be cited and referred to in that version in preference for any other: see Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) [2012] 1 WLR 780 … the combination of a summary report and a transcript does not enjoy the same status as a full text law report where one is available, for reasons which will become clear once one appreciates the amount of careful editorial work that goes into preparing the full report. In other jurisdictions, the official law reports are treated with less reverence, although it is still normal for courts to require them to be cited in preference to primary sources such as slip opinions. Nonetheless, further down the page the ICLR makes clear that the full text of the judgment takes primacy over the headnote, just as in other jurisdictions: Although the headnote adds value to the report of a judgment, it is the judgment itself which sets the precedent and binds subsequent decision-makers. Nevertheless, a good headnote is a work of meticulous legal draftsmanship and can withstand the closest of textual scrutiny. Accuracy is all. Make the proposition too general, and the principle appears either so watered down as to be meaningless or, more dangerously, misleadingly wide in its application. Draw it too narrowly, and it fails to express the principle on which the court based its decision. At its best, a headnote is a precious distillation – the single malt of legal learning.	Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful.	A copy of the source material is hosted by the British and Irish Legal Information Institute: Street v Mountford, [1985] UKHL 4. I quote the portion showing that the spelling used in the source is "lodgings": ... as landlords commonly do in the case of lodgings ...	Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this!	Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.	You have asked about "United Kingdom", but I can only answer about England and Wales; the law in Scotland is very different (rather more different in some respects than the difference between E&W and the State of New York). There is no time limit per se on manslaughter charges; if the police find evidence for a manslaughter charge after 80 years, there is no difficulty (in principle) in bringing a charge against the now-centenarian (provided they are competent to stand trial, and they can get a fair trial, and so on). However, in the case you mentioned I would have thought the major problem would be a defence of autrefois convict - in other words, the defendant can (usually) only be charged once with charges arising from a particular set of facts. It is just possible that the subsequent death constitutes a new fact which allows a new prosecution. On the other hand, the rule for murder used to be that if the victim survived a year and a day then it wasn't murder (even if they then died of their injuries). Finally, the case certainly would not be reopened with a charge of manslaughter. It would be "causing death by dangerous driving", which is a very different offence. Edit My thanks to ohwilleke whose comment about the "year and a day" rule prompted me to do a little research, and discover the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996. Section 2(2) clearly covers the present case (in both legs), and says that the perpetrator can be re-prosecuted, but only with the permission of the Attorney General. The act is very brief, and I encourage you to read it all. (And incidentally, does not apply to Scotland.)	Stating "This is not blue" or "TINB" on something that is self-evidently blue is of no legal effect Legal advice has the following characteristics: Requires legal knowledge, skill, education and judgment Applies specific law to a particular set of circumstances Affects someone's legal rights or responsibilities Creates rights and responsibilities in the advice-giver If the advice you give meets these criteria then it is legal advice. However, if you are clear that you are not a lawyer and that you are not giving legal advice then this undermines the characteristics above. That is, what would be legal advice without such a disclaimer may lose that characteristic if the disclaimer is genuinely given in the particular circumstances. Context matters: "this is not legal advice (wink, wink)" is not a disclaimer and doesn't turn legal advice into not legal advice. Similarly, the disclaimer must be genuinely understood by the recipient so that they are adequately warned to do their own research or seek actual legal advice before taking the course of action outlined. Using an abbreviation is more likely to be misunderstood but, again, context matters. In the context of this particular site (see various meta questions), which goes out of its way to explain that this is not legal advice the disclaimer is hardly necessary and the abbreviation would be fine. More generally Communication is always under tension between clarity and brevity. It should be detailed enough that it can be understood by its audience but not so long that its audience switches off. Abbreviations, acronyms, symbols and jargon (all of which I’m going to abbreviate to abbreviations) sacrifice clarity for brevity. Depending on the context and the target audience an abbreviation may or may not need to be spelled out in full. In formal writing, it is good practice to spell them out when first used and put the abbreviated form in parenthesis immediately afterward. Alternatively, scientific and engineering reports may use a glossary at the front or back to list them all in one place. It is extremely good practice to explain these abbreviations in any document that is intended to have direct legal consequences like legislation or a contract. Here clarity is waaaay more important than brevity. In a similar vein, it is quite common for such documents to explicitly define real words that already exist to narrow or broaden their scope in the interests of clarity. However, sufficiently common abbreviations may not be spelled out even in these. For example, USA, UN, UK, and EU are in such common usage that they would not need to be spelled out. Similarly, state or province abbreviations would not need explanation within their own country - while an American should know what IA means they might struggle with NSW. Similarly, some contractions may be so common within a profession or industry that no explanation is needed. For example, no scientist or engineer would need to be told what Pa, N, and m mean. In more informal settings (like texts or WhatsApp chats) spelling them out would make you look like a pompous dickhead. If it's sufficiently clear that a reasonable person in the position of the recipient would understand it then legal consequences can flow from it. Ultimately the decision of it it was clear would be a matter for whoever was deciding any dispute about it.	The precedent is very clear and was accurately applied by the judge A treaty does not create domestic law and is only applicable to the extent that it is incorporated into domestic law. She extensively quotes the relevant precedents in the judgement at [42-49].
Recourse for prosecution whose witness suddenly changes their story on the stand Say prosecution has a witness who saw the defendant do the crime and is happy to testify it on the stand. But when they take the stand, they suddenly surprise the prosecution by saying they did not see anything (thereby effectively commiting perjury). They may do it because the defendant has threatened them, or offered money, or whatever. A famous (though not real) example is Frank Pentangeli suddenly saying at the trial that he knows nothing about Michael Corleone's family (crime organization) in The Godfather Part II: In modern criminal courts, what can the prosecution do to fix that? Can they ask the court to adjourn the trial, talk some sense into the witness and have them on the stand again to tell the truth? If so, can the prosecution just carry on with other witnesses and simply bring the liar on the stand again another day, or does it necessarily need to advise the court immediately of what has happened and request an adjournment?	In U.S. practice, double jeopardy protections attach once the jury is seated and this scenario contemplates the change in position arising at trial. A mistrial could be called, or a continuance obtained, if the defendant suddenly claimed an alibi defense, since that amounts of a defendant waiver of double jeopardy protections. But without proof that the witness was tampered with, obtained at the last moment, it can be difficult or impossible to get proof of tampering or to contradict the story with other evidence to undermine the credibility of the witness. The prosecution would probably request a recess in the trial to regroup and try to admit evidence that the testimony changing witness made a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of that witness, from whomever that witness told the first time (probably a law enforcement officer). But this is still far less convincing to a jury than an affirmative statement from a witnesses about a key fact. If the prosecution could find evidence of defense side tampering and present it to the judge in the hours or small number of days before the trial ends, it might be able to get a mistrial declared. But it is much harder to get a mistrial for witness tampering when the witness shows up and testifies contrary to prosecution expectations than it is when the witness is, for example, killed or kidnapped and doesn't appear to testify at trial at all. But if evidence of neither type could be obtained before the jury was sent to deliberate and evidence was closed, and the jury then acquitted the defendant, it would be very hard for the prosecution to change this result. Perhaps not completely impossible, but very nearly so. The witness could be (and in this circumstance, despite the extreme rarity of perjury prosecutions, probably would be) prosecuted for perjury, but that wouldn't change the acquittal. If a link to the defendant could be found, the defendant could also be prosecuted for witness tampering or obstruction of justice or something similar. But that is hard to prove (and the witness would probably have to be convicted or provided with use immunity for his testimony) to do so. In English criminal law practice, in contrast, the likelihood of having the verdict of acquittal set aside and getting a new trial would be much greater (and the likelihood of getting a recess mid-trial would be greater in far more common bench trials in lower level criminal cases), but it would still be a serious burden for the prosecution that it might not be able to overcome. Lawyers aren't entitled to expect that witnesses will testify exactly the way that they discussed things with the lawyers before trial, and this can be explained away with a variety of excuses that are usually true ("after thinking it over after meeting with you, I realized that I was confused and getting it wrong"), but are sometimes a cover for a change of story that is not sincere. I've had similar things happen a few times in civil litigation and there is only so much you can do about it.	Possibly. I wonder if you mean "convicted" rather than "arrested"? There is no way that he will be "arrested" because you don't accompany him ("arrested" is when he taken by the police before a trial). On the other hand, if he plans to call you as a witness for the defence, then your absence may mean he is convicted at his trial when otherwise he would be found innocent. The final possibility is that you might act as a character witness after conviction, and your absence may mean he is sent to jail rather than fined. It may be possible for you to write a witness statement describing what happened, and to have this notarized. On the other hand, the prosecution may well want to cross examine you. I am pretty sure you can write a character witness statement (saying, if true, that it's a first offence and that you have forgiven him, etc) and get it notarized. That might persuade a court to be lenient. I think you (as a couple) need to talk to his lawyer.	Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial.	When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.	The California jury instructions for the crime of perjury give more detail on what it means to commit perjury: it's not just that you make a statement that is false, you have to willfully state that the information is true even though you know it is false. If you have a belief that you will be convicted for perjury (or any crime) by testifying, you may invoke your 5th Amendment right (I assume you are not testifying as the defendant in a criminal matter). You might (theoretically: see below on immunity and perjury) be granted immunity from prosecution, in which case there is no 5th Amendment right to refuse to testify (you are not putting yourself in criminal jeopardy), and the court can order you to testify. Or, you might not be granted immunity and still be ordered to testify. The federal immunity statute, 18 USC 6002, also needs to be scrutinized. When ordered to testify, "the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination", but it generally cannot be used against him: no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case However, there is an exception: except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. In other words, you cannot be immunized against a perjury charge. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 defendant refused an order to testify, on the grounds that they (allegedly) believed that the government's grant of immunity was not broad enough, i.e. that there were areas where they might be questions and forced to criminally implicate themselves. They refused, and were held in contempt. The opinion recognized that the 5th Amendment "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used" (emphasis added). In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, the court held that The Fifth Amendment does not relieve a witness from answering merely on his own declaration or judgment that an answer might incriminate him; whether he must answer is determinable by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, and unless there is reasonable ground, as distinct from a remote or speculative possibility, to apprehend that a direct answer may prove dangerous to the witness, his answer should be compelled. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 asserts that "the constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law, citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (itself quoting Lord Chief Justice Cockburn): "the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things; not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct" Although the wording of the immunity statute does not allow immunity from prosecution for perjury, the 5th Amendment right can only be invoked against a real legal jeopardy. They can be compelled to testify, they probably cannot be immunized against a perjury conviction (certainly not at the federal level). We would need to know the entire circumstances of the case to be able to assess whether the "knowing to be false" part could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.	Information about a defendant’s character or past misdeeds are not generally admissible during a court proceeding. It can be brought in to rebut testimony. If the defendant takes the stand and asserts that they never discriminated against anyone due to their nation of origin, then evidence they they have done so becomes relevant.	united-states Witnesses are generally confined to giving testimony from their own personal memory; most of the time, they can't read a statement into the record or just tell the jury to go look at some other piece of evidence. But this creates problems when a witness knows an important fact but doesn't remember it when she takes the stand. Maybe she counted exactly how much money she stuffed in the robber's bag as she was doing it, and she wrote it down as soon as he fled, but a year later, she can't remember that it was $93,736.45. But the prosecutor isn't allowed to just give the witness a stack of evidence and let her go hunting through the documents to answer each question. Instead,he goes through the "Do you remember" colloquy to lay the necessary foundation to refresh the witness's memory, as contemplated by Rule 612, which then also triggers certain rights for the opposing party with respect to the document used to refresh the witness's memory.	How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established They largely stem from the rules of evidence which are complicated, vary from state to state and knowing which is a big part of what litigation attorneys are paid for. Parties to litigation become aware of all the evidence/topics that their counterparts wish to broach in the courtroom well in advance — during discovery. They will usually disagree whether some bits and pieces can be presented to the jury. In this case the court will hold admissibility hearings — again, well in advance before the trial. Despite all the preparations, some of these disagreements arise during the trial, and then they are resolved in place by way of voiced objections. The attorneys and the judge talk about them using professional jargon of the rules of evidence — having themselves seen all the evidence in advance. does the jury get to know them No, the jury doesn't need to follow the professional talk. In fact, they should hear as little as possible of it — which is the reason why admissibility disagreements are resolved in advance as much as possible. If serious issues arise during the trial, the judge will ask the attorneys to speak to them in chambers — away from the jury. Or they will ask the jury to take a break while the professionals talk. The jury just needs to listen to the evidence that is allowed in, and disregard any evidence the judge say they have to. is this also in the public record somehow? It is in the court record. It may be accessible to the public if the court allows. If someone wishes to see the record they need to apply to the court, provide reasons and a judge will decide if anything can be released.
Is it illegal to carry someone else's ID or credit card? I was watching a video by RealWorldPolice about a high school student who was arrested for carrying a loaded gun into his school in Seattle, WA. Footage of the entire search, detainment, and arrest of the student can be found here. At one point in the video, a police officer is interrogating the student about the contents of his wallet, which apparently contained somebody else's ID and credit card; the officer claimed that this was illegal (starts at 13:48): Cop: ... And who is "Caleb Wartz?" Student: [Indicating to an ID the officer is holding] ... That's Caleb's ID ... he goes here. C: I got that. Why is it in your wallet? S: Because that's my friend Caleb? C: Why do you have his ID? S: Because he left it at the gym, and I picked it up, and I was supposed to give it to him... C: OK, why do you have someone else's credit card? S: That, I don't know... That... I had a new wallet, picked it up from my house, it's always been in there, never used it... C: You realize it's a crime just to possess someone else's credit card? Is there any validity to the officer's claim that merely possessing someone else's credit card is illegal in and of itself, federal or state?	I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.	He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse.	It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.	I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at 11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at 2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.	Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained.	"As we know non-adults aren't allow to carry weapons" This is not something that we know or an obvious point. It is also not obvious that a knife would qualify as a weapon for these purposes. This would not be true in most jurisdictions in the world. I have no idea what knife control laws look like in China or Taiwan. A reference to why you think that this is the case would be helpful. Even if there are laws banning possession of knives (i.e. carrying knives) when one is in public for use as a weapon, it would be very surprising to me if teens weren't allowed to possess knives in a kitchen, or a work site where a knife was a necessary tool. It would similarly surprise me if a teen working on a knife design in a craftsman's workshop would be illegal. What makes you think that any of these things are illegal in China or Taiwan? This might have been illegal in Japan in the 1600s when metal blades were highly regulated (this is one of the reasons that most Japanese food is served with portions pre-cut to be bite sized), but I very much doubt that teen possession of knives for practical purposes is illegal in any of those places today. There is also, in general, nothing wrong with factories run by adults making knifes from other people's designs. They do that all the time and it wouldn't be illegal to do so just because the designer wasn't allowed to use the product of the factory in public. I would be surprised if a factory even asked how old the designer was, particularly if he was operating through a company formed for him (something an adult might have to do). The harder question would be whether the teen can enter into an enforceable and valid contract with a factory without having the co-signature of a parent or guardian. Many countries don't allow this so that the teen is not exploited into agreeing to a big contract on unfair terms. Also, many countries make a distinction between criminal acts committed by adults and the same acts committed by minors. A teen, particularly a young teen, may be under the relevant law, capable of only engaging in juvenile delinquency, rather than an adult felony. But, again, I don't know how this is handled in Taiwan or China. In general, the legal system in Taiwan strongly resembles that of the legal systems in Continental Europe not long after World War II (i.e. in the 1940s), with its own local developments since then. But, China's legal system is quite unique and is not very similar to the common law legal systems of England and former or current English colonies, or the civil law legal system of Continental Europe (or for that matter, Islamic law). China's legal system is different at the level of very deep concepts of legal process, of what is and isn't law, and of many core legal concepts. It also has piecemeal bits that are imposed by treaty even though they are not organically natural fits with the rest of the Chinese legal system (e.g. its intellectual property laws).	Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee & Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property.	Dale has the right answer, but I'd like to elaborate on why it isn't lawful (as compared to why it would be unlawful). I know it doesn't work that way on line, but it's simpler to think of a credit card as a physical piece of plastic. The bank will have issued this to their customer. It will have a number and an expiry date. You have no way of knowing whether a replacement card has been issued. Even if one has, the customer has authorised you to charge a specific card - you do not have the customer's authorisation to charge a different card with a different expiry date. By guessing the expiry date, you would be making a representation to the bank that the customer has authorised you to charge that card (if it exists), when they have not.
How friendly are learned friends supposed to be during court breaks? In a courtroom, just when everyone arrives before the hearing, how common or expected is it for the opposing lawyers to shake hands (covid aside) and have small talk pretending (or really being) friendly to each other? In other words, would a lawyer who has never met the other one face to face before but has only communicated with them formally by email, be expected to just approach them before the hearing begins, shake hand and say the usual blablabla? How does that extend to breaks in the middle, or when the hearing finishes?	About the same as it is for engineers, doctors, architects, hairdressers, plumbers etc. to be collegiate It’s a job. You have shared interests (at least your profession). Why wouldn’t you be friendly? It’s your client’s who have a dispute; not you.	I am wondering if anyone here could say if it is worth going into law, particularly when coming from a good law school (and assuming I have a real interest in the subject and enjoy research, etc.). Is it true that the profession is contracting, and that it could be hard to find a decent job? Is there decent upward mobility in the profession, or should one expect a sub-60-70k salary for many many years after school? Is there anyone here that thinks not going into law (ie pursing a Ph.D. instead) is a better choice? I went into a top law school (the University of Michigan, ranked #8 when I matriculated, graduated in the top 25%, cum laude, with an editorship of a law journal under my belt) with almost the same academic background (undergraduate math major) and a similar LSAT score to you. It was a somewhat easier choice for me. I was a solid A- math student, but didn't have the chops and talent to pursue a PhD in math and make an academic career out of it, even though I was something of a math prodigy. I also didn't have the passion for it. I saw that I was spending my free time focused on the humanities, social sciences and campus politics and journalism, rather than on math (although tutoring and grading paid my way for all of my personal and living expenses). A legal job definitely provides a secure lifetime of decent employment, can be intellectually challenging in some subfields (other kinds of practices not so much), and provides a certain amount of interpersonal interaction and immediate, easily understood relevance that you can't secure as an academic mathematician. It isn't that hard to find a decent job for a graduate of a top law school, and the profession is not meaningfully contracting. Indeed, almost no occupation has been less impacted economically by the pandemic. Post-law school compensation is bimodal. A minority (maybe 30-40%) start at large law firms (sometimes after a judicial clerkship) and make very good money (low 100s) right off the bat. The rest get decent middle class jobs at first. Most, from both routes, end up eventually self-employed in small and medium sized law firms, although a lucky few (maybe 5%-10%) end up as partners in big law firms and a similar share end up as senior civil servants. The problem is that the instincts you learn getting as far into math as you have are not very advantageous to a Big Law career, which places a huge premium on social skills, upper middle class to upper class social capital, and hard work as what amounts to being a super-bureaucrat at relatively menial details for long uncreative hours that are only dimly connected to results. A lawyer needs to be smart, but being a "genius" intellectually doesn't provide much marginal benefit. Most economically successful lawyers have quite narrow and specialized practices that present fewer intellectual challenges as you mass produce the same kind of work over and over, and lawyers derive a lot of their income from their capacity to market their services effectively to the affluent and the powerful. Also, a lot of your compensation in law is basically for your marketing, for taking on highly stressful responsibility, and for dealing with very unpleasant situations. It often isn't the most enjoyable life style unless you have a very particular type A, competitive, extraverted personality who understands people extremely well but isn't academically oriented. Corporate law, in particular, values your interpersonal skills very highly and doesn't place much of a premium on your intellectual legal knowledge and research ability. Those things are factors of production in corporate law but they aren't what leads to success there and are often pawned off on junior associates who never have a shot at making partner. I could have done better economically (I basically took what amounted to a mommy track for various reasons), but didn't understand the profession, or what the work involved, or what was critical to get ahead at the time and in my early career and had other priorities and a set of values and world views ill suited to the work. If I was doing it all over again, I would have chosen a quantitative heavy but non-math PhD path (maybe Economics or physics or operations research or statistics) or would have become an actuary, rather than becoming a lawyer. I love knowing the things that I know because I went to law school (which I loved) and because I've have an incredibly diverse (although not terribly well paying) legal practice for 25 years. I was a professor (in a gradate estate planning program for financial planners) for a while, and it was the best job I've ever had and I still enjoy teaching a lot. I also spend lots of time in math related hobbies to exercise and enjoy math related talent that I have but can't use very often at work. If I were in your shoes, with publications already and an acceptance in a top graduate math PhD program, I would definitely take that path. It is a field within academia with a healthy trend line of stability or growth within academia, and being a professor (which you have a viable shot at doing) is a wonderful way to live. There are fewer job seekers per open position for PhDs in math than in most academic disciplines. I've never met a math prof whose regretted his choice (and I know many, having grown up all my life as a child of a professor and a college administrator in a small college down and having been a math major).	First, while Law and Order should not be taken as an accurate depiction of a New York trial, it especially should not be taken as an accurate depiction of an Australian trial. Australian law, while it has some major similarities with US law (both ultimately derive from the law of England), is not US law. With procedural matters (such as "may jurors ask questions of witnesses"), it can potentially differ from court to court. In general, jurors may not simply ask a witness a question. The jury's job is not to investigate and figure out if the defendant was guilty or not; it's to evaluate the cases presented by each side. US (and Australian, as far as I know) courts use what's known as the adversarial model, where the prosecution and the defense both present the best cases they can and a neutral third party decides which case was stronger. In a US criminal trial, the state is expected to justify why someone should be in jail; the jury shouldn't be helping them justify it. This isn't how all jurisdictions around the world work, but it's how the US does. One concern with juror questions is that it has the risk that the juror will not be impartial. Jurors are not supposed to get into arguments with witnesses, or to go after them to try to prove a point. In your case, the juror might be introducing an entirely different line of reasoning from the one either side is presenting, and that's simply not their job. People have raised the concern that a juror thinking up questions might be deciding the case before they hear all the evidence, and might give too much weight to the answers to their own questions (or read a lot into it if a question is denied). There are also rules on what questions may be legally asked; lawyers know these and jurors generally don't, which is why jurors may almost never directly ask a question to a witness. Where they can ask questions, it's virtually always written questions, which the judge reviews, gives to both sides to see if anyone objects, and then reads to the witness in a neutral tone.	I'm not familiar with the lawsuit, but generally speaking, a court's finding that a lawyer falsified evidence would not directly result in the lawyer being disbarred, as the trial court does not have authority to regulate the practice of law. Instead, a court that reached that conclusion -- either by a verdict, or because a judge was persuaded by the evidence without reaching a verdict -- would likely report that outcome to whatever organization is responsible for licensing attorneys in that jurisdiction.	Rudeness is not a crime Thankfully, or I’d be writing this from jail. The threat or actually of intentional and unwanted physical contact is a crime. Historically these were seperate common law crimes (and torts) of assault and battery respectively. However, in most jurisdictions these have been codified and merged and redefined so there is common assault (which merges historic assault and battery and is what you are asking about), indecent assault, sexual assault etc. In general, there must be an intentionality to the contact - accidentally colliding with someone is not assault (although it can be the tort of negligence). Similarly the contact must be unwanted - participating in a game of rugby means you want to be tackled (in a legal sense, in a sports sense you don’t want to be tackled, you want to score). And finally it must intend harm - holding your hands up to prevent a collision does not intend harm even if harm may result, punching someone does. In the cases you describe, the aggressor is the “elderly person” and they have committed a crime. I am interested in the suggestion that public opinion in first-world countries like Canada is that being old and annoyed justifies you beating someone. That is not my understanding of public opinion in Australia- old people have to follow the rule of law here just like everybody else.	A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest.	You're going to an administrative hearing overseen by an "Impartial Hearing Officer" (IHO). Your goal should be to present your case in as clear, concise, and compelling a manner as possible. If there are guidelines for the hearing then abide by those. Ideally, the IHO will be a real lawyer or judge, in which case they will likely be concerned with giving everyone a chance to advance their position and then efficiently achieving a resolution of the issue that appears most impartial and is least upsetting to everyone involved. Often, however, you will find the IHO is a bureaucrat who enjoys making up and enforcing procedural rules. In which case all you can do is ask, "What are the rules?" and do your best to follow them (or just start working on your appeal now). For example, if the IHO wants to make the hearing "court-like," then you could read your state's Code of Civil Procedure. But if you bring a copy and when the IHO says X point out the CCP says Y, then all you will have accomplished is to irritate the IHO: He'll either grudgingly allow Y, or declare that in his hearing it's X. That will not help you achieve your goal. Re-reading your question: It sounds like you're trying to make up rules for yourself. Remember that you are not a lawyer, and the hearing is not a court of law. If you assert evidence it should be accepted based on what a "reasonable person" would believe. You don't have to establish a forensic chain of custody. So tell your story, and if there's an email that documents it more compellingly – e.g., because you're recounting events from two years ago – then note that you're reading what you wrote two years ago as opposed to stating what you remember now, because that bolsters the credibility of your testimony. If there's evidence in an Email from B, and A knows something about those matters, you should be allowed to ask A about the substance informed by the Email, even if A can't address the writing or sending of that particular message. (But remember: Never ask a hostile party a question if you don't already know what their answer should be!) If you really want to prepare, find someone to play devil's advocate, and present your case to them. That's a good way to find and correct things that hurt or distract from your case.	It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.
Circuit court misquotes supreme court: what precedent does district court follow? In United States v. Bowman (1922), the Supreme Court ruled that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of a statute does not apply to statutes that are "not logically dependent on their locality for the government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents." (I call this the Bowman quote) The Seventh Circuit later wrote in United States v. Leija-Sanchez (2010) that: "what Bowman had said is that the same rule of interpretation (for whether a statue applies extraterritorially) should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, 'not logically dependent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction'". This wording by the Seventh Circuit misconstrues what the Supreme Court had said. The Supreme Court essentially said that the presumption against extraterritoriality doesn't apply when the government exercises its right to self-protection, but the Seventh Circuit's partial quote of the Bowman decision says that the presumption against extraterritoriality doesn't apply when the crime isn't logically dependent on its location. Would a district judge within the Seventh Circuit be allowed to consider the full Bowman quote, or is it restricted to the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Bowman quote?	Would a district judge within the Seventh Circuit be allowed to consider the full Bowman quote, or is it restricted to the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Bowman quote? "Bowman quote" aside, in case of conflict between SCOTUS and appellate precedents, a district judge ought to follow SCOTUS precedent to the extent that it directly controls the matter at issue. Otherwise, the district judge would propagate the appellate contravention of the principle formulated in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989): If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Bowman states that the legislative intent of extra-territorial operativeness is obvious for some types of crimes. In other words, that the legislator does not need to expressly indicate extra-territoriality for certain classes of crimes. Leija-Sanchez 602 F.3d 797 (2010) does not misconstrue Bowman. Instead, it truncated a statement therefrom. A truncated citation does not create precedent. Furthermore, that truncation is inconsequential because "indeed, all of the conduct ascribed to Leija-Sanchez took place here", Leija-Sanchez at 801 (emphasis in original). That defeats defendant's argument regarding extra-territoriality. Even if a party attempted to take advantage of the truncation in Leija-Sanchez, the adversary would defeat that attempt by pointing out the material portion being omitted.	The decision which Assange sought to appeal, United States v Assange [2021] EWHC 3313 (Admin), was a decision of a divisional court of three judges. That is because s 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 provides for an appeal from "the appropriate judge" to the High Court, not the Court of Appeal. A divisional court of the High Court, called the Administrative Court, exercises this appellate jurisdiction and as an intermediate appellate court of three High Court judges, has a similar status to the Court of Appeal. When a point of law has already been considered by a single judge, and a panel of three judges on appeal, it makes sense for the Supreme Court to consider whether to grant leave to appeal directly under the provisions cited by Jen rather than requiring the parties to go through another intermediate court. An example of this is R (on the application of Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd) v Crown Prosecution Service [2020] UKSC 39, an appeal from a divisional court exercising judicial review jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from the divisional court in Assange's case.	Usually, but not always. In California, this is governed primarily by the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1713-1724. The general rule is that the judgment of a foreign court in a country with a legitimate legal system (like New Zealand), that had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, is enforceable through a summary process that does not reconsider the merits of the foreign money judgment, if the person seeking to enforce the judgment can establish those facts. See § 1716(a)-(b). But there are many exceptions to the general rule. See §§ 1715(b) (taxes, fines, penalties, some domestic relations judgments), 1716(c) (seven grounds for procedural irregularities, a ground for public policy exceptions, and certain defamation judgments). Section 1717 of the Act provides for certain exceptions to the exceptions. There are also federal law exceptions in addition to those in the act, including one applicable to foreign defamation case judgments. But these laws rarely have much practical effects beyond the California statute in cases involving purely money judgments that are governed by the California statute. Injunctive and other non-monetary relief granted by a foreign court is less frequently enforceable, and when it is, is not governed by a simple, summary statutory process from this statute. Special rules apply, in particular, to foreign child custody judgments. The summary process, when there is no other pending case in California between the parties is as follows: "If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment." § 1718(a). It is legally possible to file and prosecute a case like this one pro se in California, and it is unlikely that an in person hearing would be required in a case like this one. Usually, one could prevail in motion practice or with a remotely conducted hearing (especially in the COVID era). Whether an in person evidentiary hearing was required in a case like this would depend a great deal on the nature of the defense to recognition of the foreign judgment asserted. But, the better practice would be to hire a California lawyer to handle it for you. Typically, the cost of doing so would be the filing fee, the cost of serving the judgment debtor with process, and something on the order of $1000-$3000 in legal fees. So, it would be much less expensive than a full fledged new lawsuit, but would be too expensive to be practical in the case of a small claims sized judgment in most cases.	In most places I imagine the issue would go before a probate judge who would attempt to determine the validity of each presented will, and if both were valid, then they would attempt to reconcile the disparities to the best of their ability. Broadly speaking, the process would look like this (I'm using UK law as an example): You die An individual is chosen to handle your affairs (executor or administrator [or possibly both depending on jurisdiction]) They choose a will to go off of (these steps could be reversed if the wills named different administrators, in which case each administrator would file for the grant of representation and consequently involve the probate judge earlier) Someone challenges and suggests using the other will (probably because they feel they're not getting what's theirs) A probate judge is involved The probate judge decides Appeals would be made to Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court That being said, every jurisdiction is different, and this is more of a template answer for English common law (and derivative courts), than an attempt to describe in detail any specific jurisdiction's procedures.	Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.	This is a quite complicated area of evidence law in the U.S. as there are many statements which are inadmissible under the hearsay rule, but there are also many statements that would otherwise be hearsay that fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule. In U.S. federal court practice, hearsay is governed mostly by Federal Rules of Evidence 103, 104(a), 201, 801-807, and 1101. Most state court rules of evidence in the U.S. with regard to hearsay closely track the Federal Rules of Evidence. Some states do not follow this pattern but are substantively very similar as the Federal Rules of Evidence largely track of the common law rules of evidence before they were codified. Rule 801 provides two exclusions from the definition of hearsay and a foundational definition. Rule 802 prohibits the introduction of hearsay into evidence unless an exception applies. Rule 803 provides 23 exceptions to the rule. Rule 804 provides five more exception to the rule. Rule 807 provides a final residual exception. So, in proceedings where the hearsay rule applies there are 31 main exceptions to the general rule, in addition to the argument that the general rule does not apply, but this still excludes lots of statements. Rule 201 (judicial notice) is another exception. Some of the main reasons to admit hearsay are that: It is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted (e.g. to prove the someone was present and talking at a place not that what they said was true, or to prove that someone said something defamatory or fraudulent, or to prove the someone made a "verbal act" with legal significance like agreeing to a contract or ordering someone to do something). It is a statement of a party opponent or someone affiliated with a party opponent (i.e. someone affiliated with the other side in the lawsuit or criminal case). It is a prior statement of a person made under oath and subject to cross-examination. It is a business record or public record or an "ancient document" (currently ancient means before 1998 in the federal courts, and typically more than twenty-years old in the state courts). It is a market quotation. It is a statement made describing things "in the moment", for medical diagnosis, or when the facts were fresh in the "declarant's" mind. It pertains to rights in real property, or to family relationships. It is a statement contrary to the interests of the person making it. It is a statement made when the declarant's death was believed to be imminent (i.e. a dying declaration). It is a statement made against someone who caused the witness to be unavailable. There are reasons that the statement is reliable and the intent to provide the statement is cleared with the court in advance. The matter upon which a statement is made is of general public knowledge not reasonably subject to dispute, is easily confirmed without doubt by a court, or is from a learned treatise. Hearsay objections are also waived if a timely objection isn't made to them. See Federal Rule of Evidence 103. And, courts have some discretion to allow hearsay testimony on immaterial matters or matters that are not seriously disputed in the case for expediency's sake. Rules 104(a) (excluding preliminary matters) and 1101 set forth when the hearsay rule applies and when it does not. Rule 1101 excludes from the rule a variety of preliminary matters, mostly in criminal cases such as: grand-jury proceedings extradition or rendition; issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; a preliminary examination in a criminal case; sentencing; granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. Rule 805 governs the complicated situation of hearsay within hearsay. Rule 806 coordinates the hearsay rule with rules on how it is proper to introduce evidence about the credibility of a witness. There is also a constitutional rule of criminal procedure, called the "confrontation right" that established minimum standards for the exclusion of hearsay evidence in criminal trials even when a court's procedural rules do not exclude it. Most states also have a hearsay rule pertaining to oral promises made by dead people called the dead man's statute, and limitations on introducing oral statements related to written agreements called respectively, the parole evidence rule and the statute of frauds. In contrast, in the U.K. courts, roughly speaking, hearsay is generally admissible when the person making the underlying hearsay statement is available to testify, or is unavailable, which subsumes a large share of the U.S. hearsay rule, and makes much more hearsay admissible. U.K. practice would also allow admission of almost anything without a U.S. hearsay exception since they are derived from British common law evidence rules related to hearsay. The main purpose of the hearsay rule is to prevent a defendant in a criminal case or lawsuit from being denied an ability to cross-examine witnesses in court because they would like to present evidence by affidavit or letter instead, effectively placing that burden on the prosecution in criminal cases, or on a plaintiff in simple civil cases, rather than forcing the defendant to pro-actively subpoena witnesses for the other side in the case. The rule has a broader sweep than that, but that is its core purpose.	A non-lawyer can bring torts committed against them in their own name as pro se parties in their own name. They cannot sue for torts committed against others including entities in which they are officers, or persons for whom they are guardians, nor can they represent someone else in their efforts to do so. A handbook written for California judges does not anywhere suggest a greater limitation than that. Neither does a guide for pro se parties in federal courts in California (see also here). Labor law and civil rights claims are routinely filed pro se in California's federal courts. California's state courts have standard court forms for pro se parties to use in state court to sue for torts like personal injury and fraud. The comment that: "[L]ay people can't prosecute [torts] in California", appears to be not literally true. Either the implied meaning was that they cannot prosecute torts committed against someone other than themselves, or the comment was mistaken. It is also possible that the person making the comment meant that it was not as a practical matter possible to be successful in doing so because it is so difficult. There may be a limited exception for law students in a legal clinic working under the supervision of a law school professor.	It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment—specifically the ratio—that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today)
Is the foreclosure moratorium a de facto eminent domain exercise? If the government prevents you from evicting, doesn't that mean they have some ownership of the property ala eminent domain? If the government stops you from making decisions over your property isn't that a backdoor way to achieve eminent domain?	Maybe, but it is not a de jure taking. There are vast numbers of restrictions on what one can do with one's property and on businesses that one can conduct on that property. Zoning ordinances prevent me from setting up a chemical factory where I have my house; I can't build it up 4 stories and there is an obligatory setback from the property line for any extension. I can't freely build on my land, I need government permission in the form of a permit. This is allowed (Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255), when the regulatory action advances a legitimate governmental goal and therefore the action is not a taking. The government might "take" land by rendering it useless without the formality of condemnation (United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745). But a moratorium on evictions does not render the property useless. The tenant remains liable for rent.	As the article suggests, this is called adverse possession. This seems to have occurred because the original owner did not make use of the property, nor monitored for adverse possession. The reason this method of acquiring title exists is for a number of reasons, including the prudent use of land, as well as being analogous to a limitation on the time period during which a claim can be brought. It would be reasonably easily avoided if the original owner had made use of the property, or monitored it and took action to eject the adverse possessor prior to their fulfilment of the necessary conditions.	States can, and some states do, have "mini-Sherman" anti-trust laws of their own. Whether a city could have such a law would depend on whether the state had delegated that power to cities. I haven't heard of a city that has such a law, but I haven't really looked. Or if a state has a "mini-Sherman" law, a city could perhaps bring action under such a law, depending on its exact terms. Or a city could impose a licensing scheme on a specific industry that also prevented a monopoly, similar to the requirements that many cities and towns place on taxicabs, or on bars. Both of those typically limit the number of units that a single entity may own. So perhaps it could be done for parking.	No The criteria for adverse possession is that you have to be in possession without permission. A tenant, even one that pays no rent (or stops paying rent), has permission.	One possible reading of this clause is: The tenant is required to pay for the preparation of a forfeiture notice, even if ("notwithstanding that") the forfeiture doesn't actually happen ("forfeiture is avoided")--but the tenant doesn't have to pay for the notice if the forfeiture doesn't happen for the following reason ("avoided otherwise than by"): because the court said so ("by relief granted by the court"). In other words: if the Court says the forfeiture notice is bogus, the tenant doesn't have to pay for it. Otherwise, he or she does.	The legal position You are quite clearly not running a business and if the matter went to court you could easily prove this be e.g. getting testimony from the people at the party, your testimony etc. In any event, your landlord can’t “fine” you. Fines are a punishment and only government can punish people. They can sue you for breach of contract for damages (which are restitution not punishment) or to seek specific performance. The practical position Take the listing down. Rightly or wrongly, it's souring your relationship with your landlord and their relationship with their HOA. Is having this mildly amusing joke worth damaging these relationships, particularly if you might want to renew your lease? The landlord might feel that they are better off with a tenant who doesn't cause them grief with their HOA. Even if your landlord understands, the HOA might not. If they sue your landlord, they will have very little choice but to join you. Yes, you will almost certainly win your day in court but you will not get reimbursed for the time and effort you had to go to. this includes taking the day off work, subpoenaing all your friends to give testimony etc. Who has time for that crap? Further, whenever you go in front of judge or arbitrator who has the power to force a resolution of your dispute, you are rolling the dice. Sure, you may think you have great evidence and the other sides' is completely bogus but if they present theirs with skill and confidence and you screw yours up then they can walk away with a win. Real court cases depend on who the judge believes. If they believe your landlord's reasonable story about running an illegal bar and they don't believe your crazy tale of it all being a joke - you lose. Remember: free speech can't be restricted but it does have consequences. Further, anyone who bases relationships on legal rights and responsibilities is going to have very shallow relationships.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee & Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property.
As a Sex offender Can a person for take my Photo off my Facebook page, post it, giving my full name and address be charged or sued? I pleaded guilty to a charge of child molestation over 15 years ago, served time and probation. I now have three girls 7,5,2 who I father on my own. My neighbor's daughter play's with my girls, who's mother later found out that I have a charge of child molestation. She went to facebook found my profile, took two photo's of me and posted a public post with my full name, address what my house looks like and talked about my three girls all in this post. This is in the state of Georgia. She stated that I do all of the little girls hair in the neigborhood, and I don't.I have already had one person come to my house because of this post. And as Ive stated I have three girls. Whether someone feels as if I did do the crime or not, this is wrong to bring this around my girls. Is there anything I can do? She never came to me seeking out answers as to what did or didn't happen. She feels as if I betrayed her trust by not telling her. In her last statement she told me "since I don't want to let people know, that she will let everyone know.	this is wrong to bring this around my girls. Is there anything I can do? If my understanding is correct, your primary concern is the harassment your daughters might endure as a result of the publication(s). In that case, you might want to send the publisher a cease and desist letter where you ask the removal of sensitive information about your daughters. If the publisher does not comply within reasonable time, consider pursuing injunctive relief in court. Labels, remedies, and procedural details depend on the laws of the [unspecified] jurisdiction where this is happening. Other than that, the number of gaps and confusing details in your description render your question unanswerable. For instance, your description indicates that the "neighbor's daughter" is the person who learned about the charges, retrieved your full name and address, and so forth. A kid playing with children of age 7, 5, 2 is unlikely to engage in that elaborate conduct, unless the kid is at least few years older. It is also unclear what happened when the other person came to your house "because of this post". There are no details whatsoever, whence one is unable to grasp the extent to which that person's opinion of you and/or your daughters was influenced by the publication. The person's intent might have been to hear your side of the story, to make a proposal, to reproach, etc. There is no way to discern the substance or relevance of that event.	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.	If that which you describe in your comment ( Facebook post as only basis for warrantless search) is, and can be shown, to be the only basis for the search, and there was no evidence of a crime in plain view when they arrived.....then yes, it is likely the search and all evidence acquired from the search would be excludable. As to whether the individual could still be prosecuted, that depends if a case could be built independent of the evidence collected during the search.	Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.	Generally speaking, you have to disclose that the defendant is a minor in the complaint and their deadline to respond is tolled until the court has appointed a guardian ad litem for them. So, while it is possible, it is arduous. Also, since someone below the age of eighteen can claim minority as a defense to an executory contract (as opposed to a contemporaneous exchange of goods or services for cash), and in some cases, to other contracts, you have a better shot at suing for malperformance and nonperformance of work. Finally, even if you can sue, collecting a judgment from a minor, who is likely to lack both employment and any significant assets, is very challenging. A minor's legal guardians or parents would not be responsible for a judgment entered against a minor in these circumstances. there was no written contract for the job and the only information I have of them is their phone numbers. The lack of a written contract isn't a serious problem in a short job that was performed by both sides. You will need to be able to locate them to physically serve them with process to sue them. If you have their names, approximate ages, and the general vicinity of where they live or work, this isn't an insurmountable burden, but it is a bit of extra work that could turn out to be easy or could turn out to be a major obstacle.	In the scenario you described, you were both right: Police have no authority to demand that you leave a public space because you are photographing, nor does the government have the right to prevent you from photographing anything that is visible from a public space, including government facilities or employees. However, the police would likely have followed through on their threat to arrest you. In that event, any vindication for wrongful arrest and violation of your civil rights would only come (if ever) at the end of protracted and expensive litigation in the courts. (A plethora of examples is accumulated by watchdog groups like the ACLU and Photography Is Not A Crime.)	Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough.	There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.
Isn't it wrong to cite a law textbook first, before case and enacted law? I remember reading this somewhere, and I'll update this post if I find the book, but aren't you supposed to cite primary law like cases and legislation first? Even if written by judges or jurisprudes, law textbooks aren't authoritative. Is the author wrong to cite Clerk & Lindsell on Torts on the general four elements of negligence? The library is closed, but I'm certain there must be some leading UKHL or UKSC that dictated the general four elements of negligence. To establish liability in negligence, a claimant must prove the existence of a duty of care, the breach of that duty, causation and damages. These elements are found in virtually every case and treatise on tort, so you can provide support for this proposition by citing to Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, for example, or a seminal case on each point (for example, The Wagon Mound (No 2)8 for causation). 8 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617. Stacie Strong. BA English literature (UC Davis 1986), MPW (USC 1990), JD (Duke 1994), PhD Law (Cambridge 2002), DPhil (Oxford 2003). How to Write Law Essays & Exams 5th Edition (2018). p 73.	The author of a text or essay may cite in whatever order s/he thinks best. It m,ay be that a basic text gives a better and clearer overview than any actual case, and so is worth citing first. It is true that actual case law is often more authoritative than a statute, and cases and statutes are normally more authoritative than any text or essay, but there is no rule binding on an author to cite in any particular order, although citing the actual law first may be the common practice. When writing a brief or a court decision there may be standards of citation that are enforced.	Why do attorneys have these? Originally to use as references, although some kinds of books (e.g. case law reporters, Shepard's citations, Martindale Hubble directories, and serial analysis of case law like Am. Jur.) are rarely used that way any more. When I started practice in the mid-1990s, it cost several hundred dollars an hour to access online legal sources (that were less comprehensive and had lower quality search functions than the service that comes free with my bar membership today), so the vast majority of legal research was done with hard copy case reporters, digests and annotated statute books. A complete set of case reporters for a single state would typically run to hundreds of volumes with new ones arriving monthly. A full set of Shepard's Citations (which told you if a case have been overturned or questioned in later cases or just where it was cited with approval) took roughly a full shelf of a full sized book case when limited to a single state. Any law firm that is at least fifteen or twenty years old needed them when they bought them and lawyers hate to throw anything away. Case law research is now predominantly online. The last time I used Shepard's citations and hard copy case reporters on a regular basis was a decade ago. Law journal research is also predominantly online now. I sent most of my uglier and numerous law books (including several dozen volumes of an outdated legal encyclopedia summarizing case law) to the recycling bin about six or seven years ago. Do they actually reference them, especially when so much information is searchable and indexed online? Lawyers still routinely use statute books in states where they practice, court rules, standard jury instructions, and to a somewhat lesser extent treatises on different areas of the law (including the Restatements of Law). Now and then, lawyers will still use a hard copy of a West Digest. And, I have yet to encounter a lawyer who doesn't have at least one or two decent sized book cases full of law books. In statutes and court rules (and regulations), typesetting details that can get mangled online are important and browsing a structured text can be easier to do on paper than online. There are some regulations available only in online versions that I print for ease of use (e.g. Colorado's marijuana regulations and its Medicaid regulations). I also print for ease of use my state's title standards (for use in determining if someone has marketable title to real estate), even though they don't have the force of law. I also keep a few hard copy model statutes with the official commentary. It can also be hard on the eyes to look at a computer screen non-stop all day, so looking at something you use regularly on paper can be a relief. Are the books updated regularly? or are these the books they graduated with, and are rarely changed out? Statutes and court rules and jury instructions are typically updated annually, following each year's legislative session. Treatises are updated with "pocket parts" every year, that are added to a hardbound edition that is updated at most, every several years. A pocket part is a softbound update with the same section organization as the underlying treatise that has a flap the fits into a pocket in the back flap of a hard cover treatise. Bigger "pocket parts" are printed as thin softcover bonus volumes to the original treatises. I also keep a current softbound "Bluebook" (the reference regarding how legal materials should be cited to in legal documents and legal scholarship) and several high end dictionaries including Black's Law Dictionary, the OED and a few others in hard copy (because browsing is easier when you don't know exactly how a word is spelled). I keep many of my law school textbooks, which some people do, and other people don't, and I buy new treatises especially when I move into a new area of law practice where background guidance is useful. Do the books exist purely for psychological impressions, or is there a utilitarian purpose? Both. Sometimes old books that don't have much ongoing practical use are kept on the shelves because they are pretty. For example, I don't really need a hard copy of my outdated New York State Statutes, but they look good (even though I practice mostly in Colorado and look up New York State statutes online when I need to actually use them). But, I use hard copy statutes and court rule books for the state where I practice on pretty much a daily basis and use hard copy treatises at least several times a week in my law practice. In that respect, I am not atypical, although I probably use hard copy books more than younger lawyers do. Of course, even among these books, some volumes are used much more often than others. I look at a volume of insurance industry regulation statutes at most, once a year, while I read the volume related to divorce and probate at least once or twice a week, for example. Hard copy books are also useful for pinning down the corners of blueprints and surveys when you are in litigation where those kinds of oversized paper documents are at issue. ;)	The law is known to everyone in theory. But as various people are said to have said, In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not. Starting from zero and actually finding out what law is applicable to your circumstances is not a trivial matter. To have an answer you can rely on you need to do the following: Find out what law calls it. Sometimes this is obvious, but not always. Go and find the law in question. Over the last 10 years this has got much easier. It used to mean going to your city library and looking up the relevant law. These days we have Google (other search engines are available). Find any other laws which might have bearing on the matter. This can be a long way from obvious (see below). Find any relevant appeal court cases in which something like your circumstances have arisen, and figure out how they relate to your actual situation. You may find that some of the laws which you read in Stage 3 have been ruled unconstitutional, or that the standard of evidence required to prove or disprove something about it has been set impossibly high, or that the penalties or damages have been set absurdly high or absurdly low. If you are in the US then maybe some of those precedents were set in other circuits, in which case you need to figure out what your local circuit is likely to do about it should the occasion arise. Make a calm, dispassionate decision about what to do about your situation. Many people find this extremely difficult. The answer might be life-changing. Under these circumstances making a good decision is very hard. Just to give you an idea about (3), suppose you are planning on importing something for your business. Here is a list of areas of the law you might fall foul of, off the top of my head and I've probably missed some: Tax. Trade in endangered species. Drug prohibition. Environmental protection. Biosecurity. Health and safety. Consumer protection. And that is just the criminal laws. Theories of civil liability can get really complicated. But OK, lets suppose you figure out the law, but despite your best efforts you find yourself in court (criminal or civil). Now in addition to all the law you find yourself enmeshed in a complicated bureaucratic set of rules, depending on the type of court and where you are (e.g. US rules of civil procedure). At this point you need to learn not just the rules but how to play the game they describe. Think of it like playing chess; learning how the pieces move is only the first step on the long road to becoming a competent chess player. And the legal system is like chess in another way; there are no do-overs if you make the wrong move. (Incidentally, anyone who says "Well lets just get rid of all the complicated rules and laws" is committing the fallacy of Chesterton's Fence. Just because you can't see why the rules are there doesn't mean there isn't a good reason). Or you could just hire a lawyer.	Yes Yes Yes However, these are pretty standard contract terms. Many, many terms survive the end of the substantive agreement. For example, terms with respect to ongoing confidentiality, dispute resolution, warranties, termination itself etc. The second is so common it actually has a named legal doctrine: reading down. In the absence of such a clause, if the contract inadvertently exceeds what the law allows, it preserves the contract rather than leaving both parties without contractural protection.	I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.	Numbering is for the sake of clarity, and is not intrinsically required. If you refer to a section, you need a way to say which section you mean, and a vague description like "up there where I talked about copying" is insufficient. You can refer to a section by a title, if you need to refer to sections within the contract, as long as your titles match what you refer to them as (and you don't have two sections called "Your Rights").	The relevant question for libel under US law is "would a reasonable person understand this to be a statement of fact about the plaintiff, or to imply a statement of fact about the plaintiff." It doesn't directly matter if the name was changed or not; what matters is if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are talking about an actual person (the plaintiff) and are stating (or implying) actual facts, or if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are pure fiction and don't say anything factual about the plaintiff. Changing the name tends to make it seem more like fiction, but that's not always enough: suppose I write a long fictional story about Theodore Bau, who is active on the Pile Market series of online Q&A sites, particularly a history one and a board games one, who published an economics book in 2004 and was an econ and history double major, and fills in more details from Tom's SE bios, and in the book talk about how Mr. Bau stole money from clients; I then send thto potential clients of Tom Au. The fact that I changed the names and said "this is a work of fiction and any similarities are coincidental" isn't exactly an automatic get-off-scot-free card. On the other hand, if I'm telling a story about Tom Au that uses a fair bit of your backstory, with no disclaimer that any similarities are pure coincidence but Mr. Au lives a secret life as a legitimate supervillain, a reasonable person is unlikely to conclude that I'm saying that you actually have a volcanic lair and that you are actually plotting to capture a US and a Russian missile sub to provoke a nuclear war. In this case, the court determined that a reasonable person familiar with the context could understand the book to be talking about the plaintiff's actual behavior, instead of just talking about a fictional character. The fact that it was fiction and the names were changed suggested that it wasn't talking about the real plaintiff, but the details of the book could make it go the other way.	One analysis is in Bow Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd. v. Murray, 2006 ABPC 366, by Judge O'Ferrall (now Justice of the Court of Appeal of Alberta). The defendant sat on a motorcycle, positioned it fully upright, and when he returned the motorcycle to rest on the kickstand, the bike crashed to the floor. There were three potential paths to liabilty argued, none successfully: negligence (for example, if the defendant had repositioned the kickstand at any point—there was no evidence of this) trespass to goods (but this would have required intentional or negligent treatment of the good) contract (which would have required a clear "you break it, you buy it" policy with express statement that the customer would be liable even for non-negligent damage—there wasn't) Context mattered. Liability might be made more strict more easily in a china shop. The judge wrote: in the end, this case must turn on the presence or absence of negligence because, at least in the circumstances of a motorcycle shop, a “break it, you buy it” arrangement would have required an element of fault on the part of the breaker, absent a very clearly communicated term that the customer pays irrespective of negligence. There being no such term and negligence having not been proven, I find the Defendant not liable. In so doing, I considered the china shop analogy. It may be that in a china shop one could infer that the customer pays for broken items irrespective of fault because there is no need to touch the item in order to make the purchase decision. But in order to make an informed purchase of a motorcycle, the purchaser must try it on for size and the fact that he must do so makes it much more difficult to infer a no-fault promise to pay for damage howsoever caused.
Are tweets an intellectual property? I am currently planning to use someone's tweet in my book & tweet won't include any images (which will made commercially available). So , first are tweets intellectual property protected by certain copyright laws and if so will I be sued if I use it in my book even if I give reference to whose tweet it was ???	It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting".	No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder.	Yes That is very simple - copyright is an exclusive right that starts automatically with the creation of a copyrightable work. The default situation is that the author has an exclusive rights to make copies of the work and derivative works. If the code is published somewhere by the author but the author has not said anything about its licence or copyrights, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. They have the right to just publish it somewhere, others don't. If you try to contact the author and they don't say anything and ignore you, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. If it's impossible to find the author (e.g. I have certain cases with literary works where it's not clear who inherited the rights after the author died), then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. That being said, certain forms of reuse (recreating ideas, learning from them, etc) would not be a copyright violation. But in general the situation with the author not saying anything is almost the same as the author explicitly stating "all rights reserved, you're not allowed to do anything, violators will be shot" - some specific uses are allowed even against author's wishes (e.g. 'fair use' clauses) but everything that needs their permission really does need their explicit permission.	This is not (necessarily) copyright violation It's possible that Quora's usage falls within Fair Use. At the very least, the argument could be made. If it does, then there is nothing that Stack Exchange or the OP can do. Stack Exchange can choose not to protect their copyright Unlike trademarks, which lapse if not protected, copyright endures. Therefore Stack Exchange can pick and choose the copyright fights they want to get involved in and those they don't. If you have brought it to the attention of the copyright owner (or, in this case, licensee) and the copyright owner chooses not to act then you have done all you can and significantly more than you have to do. The OP has copyright I note that one of the examples is your question. As the copyright holder, you are free to issue a DCMA takedown notice on Quora if you feel your copyright has been violated.	Twitter's terms says the following: Except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided on dev.twitter.com, you have to use the Twitter API if you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Twitter Services or Content on the Twitter Services. [...] You may not do any of the following while accessing or using the Services: (i) access, tamper with, or use non-public areas of the Services, Twitter’s computer systems, or the technical delivery systems of Twitter’s providers; (ii) probe, scan, or test the vulnerability of any system or network or breach or circumvent any security or authentication measures; (iii) access or search or attempt to access or search the Services by any means (automated or otherwise) other than through our currently available, published interfaces that are provided by Twitter (and only pursuant to the applicable terms and conditions), unless you have been specifically allowed to do so in a separate agreement with Twitter (NOTE: crawling the Services is permissible if done in accordance with the provisions of the robots.txt file, however, scraping the Services without the prior consent of Twitter is expressly prohibited); (iv) forge any TCP/IP packet header or any part of the header information in any email or posting, or in any way use the Services to send altered, deceptive or false source-identifying information; or (v) interfere with, or disrupt, (or attempt to do so), the access of any user, host or network, including, without limitation, sending a virus, overloading, flooding, spamming, mail-bombing the Services, or by scripting the creation of Content in such a manner as to interfere with or create an undue burden on the Services. facebook is a bit harsher: You will not engage in Automated Data Collection without Facebook's express written permission. So just go and use the APIs meant for the explicit purpose of automatic data collection.	Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.	In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.	"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.
Same-sex divorce In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held that there was a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Does this automatically extend to divorce, or is it possible that the Supreme Court will need to rule on a case in the future where a state refused to grant a same-sex couple a divorce because state divorce law only covers opposite-sex couples?	The court said in Obergefell (emphasis mine): Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right. If same-sex couples are to be given in marriage the "same legal treatment" as opposite-sex couples, the divorce process must also be the same.	(The original title of your question suggested you might think that federal circuit precedent binds state courts: it generally does not, even on matters of federal law.) But regardless, Congress would not be able to legislatively lower the constitutional floor. If a certain police act is prohibited by the Constitution, Congress cannot legislatively allow that act, whether in a single state or uniformly across all states. That means that if the Fifth Circuit has decided that the use of some new investigatory tool is a search under the Fourth Amendment, no law that Congress passes could affect that holding. When congress creates laws that result in different effects for different people (e.g. people in Texas vs. people in Florida, as in your hypothetical), the distinction must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Many of the enumerated powers allow for local distinction, some prohibit it. Some examples where Congress has distinguished between states include: localized agricultural programs, time zones, voting rights protections, and various others listed in ohwilleke's review. Some distinctions between states could also intrude on principles of federalism and state sovereignty (e.g. the Supreme Court has said that the Voting Right Act does this). Maybe I am unimaginative, but I cannot think of a legitimate federal government purpose that would call for the powers that police have against the people to vary from state to state. Any such variation would have to come from the states themselves: from their state constitutions, or legislative choices to provide heightened protections. Discord between circuits is problematic (see a list of examples of existing splits), and this is why the Supreme Court of the United States will often hear an appeal where there is a circuit split on a question of constitutional rights.	There is no "different legal procedure" for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling.	No, there is no obligation to repeal It is common for statutes held to be unconstitutional to be left on the books decades later, and for others which quite likely would be so held if anyone tried to enforce them to be similarly left for even longer periods. It is somewhat less common for state constitutional provisions, but it does happen, and as those commonly take more than a simple legislative act, there is even less motivation to go through the troublesome process in such cases. There are even a few provisions in the US constitution which have become obsolete, but not actually amended away. For example, the so-called 'three-fifths compromise', which counted slaves as worth 3/5ths of a person for computing representation, was effectively repealed by the Civil War and the 13th amendment, but was not formally removed. That section was actually formally replaced by the 14th.	In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.	Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.	Every court in the United States from municipal traffic court to a state court to a U.S. District Court has both the right and the obligation to consider claims of unconstitutionality just like any other legal question that a case presents. Contrary to popular misconception, constitutional law issues are not the exclusive province of the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, constitutional issues are only ruled upon in the first instance in the U.S. Supreme Court (or even in a direct appeal from a trial court to the U.S. Supreme Court) in rare and isolated cases. Usually, at least one trial court judge and at least three appellate court judges, and often more appellate court judges, have ruled upon a constitutional issue before the U.S. Supreme Court considers it. This is just as true in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, which have legal systems based upon the civil law legal system, as it is in other U.S. jurisdictions, which have a common law legal system. There is usually only one difference between a case in which the constitutionality of a statute is called into question and one in which it is not. When the constitutionality of a statute is called into question, many state and federal rules of civil procedure require or permit the attorney general of the state whose statute's constitutionality (or the U.S. attorney general when a federal law's constitutionality is at issue) to be joined as a party for the purpose of litigating that issue. This allows the court to receive arguments on the constitutional issue from the public's perspective as well as the perspectives of the parties. A few states also provide that appeals from trial court decisions finding that a statute is unconstitutional are directly to the state supreme court, rather than to the intermediate court of appeals as they would usually be in those states. Notably, the distinct treatment of constitutional issues in many civil law systems is not inherently a part of the civil law system. Constitutional courts are mostly a post-World War II constitutional innovation in the countries where they are found. For example, the "law-screen" doctrine and the existence of a constitutional court in France, is much younger than core of the rest of the civil law system in France, which invented the civil law system in its modern form more than two hundred years ago. Neither France, at the time Louisiana adopted its civil law legal system through the time of the Louisiana Purchase, nor Spain at the time that Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States after the Spanish-American war, had constitutional courts. Footnote Regarding Treaties Also, it is worth remarking that in Europe and much of the rest of the world, the function of protecting individual rights against government authority in a way that is entrenched so that it is not easily overcome by domestic legislation of a current political regime is accomplished through international treaties, rather than only through entrenched rights in a constitution as they are in the United States. Although even then, in many European countries, ordinary courts apply only domestic law and the country in question has to adopt domestic law to conform to the treaties. This treaty mechanism is not very effective in the U.S., because in the U.S., unlike most countries, an ordinary domestic law can override an earlier adopted and ratified international treaty.	The power definitely exists, and it is also said by some (respectable persons) that they have a duty to do so. There are many schools of legal interpretation. One trend is to attempt to discern legislative intent, based on whatever facts there might be such as newspaper articles or legislative committee reports. A contrary trend is to look exclusively at the text enacted by the legislature – this school is known as the Textualist school, and is currently dominant in the US Supreme Court. There are also non-textualist "progressive" trends that seek justice according to some social principle, rather than the text of the law or the definitive intent of the original legislators, which may address the situation that you have in mind. In civil cases, statutory law tends to be rather unclear, allowing a judge to decide on the basis of their beliefs of what is fair, equitable or just. That is because in the common law, close to a millenium old, judgments were supposed to be "just". In the US, much of the common law has been re-coded as statutory law, and in that case, the intent of the legislature is really to "encode the sense of justice implicit in the common law". This does not mean that trial judges have unlimited power to set aside the words of existing laws. Their primary obligation is to apply the law literally, as interpreted by their superiors (appellate courts). When the higher courts are silent and when the legislature is not clear, the trial judge has some leeway to follow whichever jurisprudential philosophy they adhere to.
What happens if two people claim the same (personalized) pardon? What would happen if the identity of an individual named in a presidential pardon could not be ascertained with certainty, but several people have a strong claim to being the named individual? For example, two convicts who happen to share the same unusual name (say, "Ebenezer Q. McGillicuddy") independently petition the president for a pardon. The president issues a blanket pardon for the past crimes of "Ebenezer Q. McGillicuddy" but does not include further details that would indicate to which petitioner he is referring (such as enumerating those past crimes). He then dies before he has an opportunity to clear up the confusion. Records indicate that the president had seen both petitions, but do not reveal further evidence to disambiguate the pardon. How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Presumably both convicts would proceed on the assumption that the pardon applied to them and try to invoke it to their benefit (e.g., demanding release from prison, if still incarcerated). The convicts' respective prosecutors may contest this, pointing to the ambiguity of the wording of the pardon. But then what? If the matters went to court, would the cases possibly/necessarily be joined or would they be tried independently? In such a court case, is it the convicts or the prosecutors who have the onus of proving that the pardon was (in)valid with respect to the given convict? If the cases are tried independently and both judges side with the prosecutors, would this absurd result be grounds for further appeal (since the president obviously meant the pardon to apply to at least one of the petitioners)? I can imagine that similar cases of uncertain identity of beneficiaries may come up from time to time in financial and estate law, but in those cases it's always a question of allocating or dividing some contested property among the claimants, and awarding both claimants sole ownership of the property is not an option. But a pardon is not property; it can't be divided between the claimants, but there is also no reason (that I can see) why it would need to be awarded to only one or the other; pardoning one person doesn't exclude the possibility of also pardoning the other. So perhaps different rules apply.	How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.	Double Jeopardy does obviously not apply to being tried by the state and the federal court system, where you can be convicted for drug smuggling by both the Federal and the State court as you broke both laws with the same act. This is true, and the answer to your question comes in the reason this is true. The exception to double jeopardy you're referring to applies to charges from separate sovereigns. When considering whether two entities can both charge someone, you trace back each of them to the sovereign power that gives them their authority. States are considered sovereign, as are Indian tribes with respect to crimes committed by Indians (although for certain serious crimes like murder, Congress arguably stripped tribal courts of jurisdiction with the Major Crimes Act). The United States is of course sovereign. The military is not sovereign. Military charges are based on the sovereignty of the United States, so double jeopardy applies between military and civilian federal courts. Likewise, US territories (and DC) are not sovereign and have criminal jurisdiction based on the sovereignty of the United States, so territorial (and DC) charges are subject to double jeopardy with each other, with military charges, and with civilian federal charges. That said, double jeopardy only applies if the charges represent the same offense. The UCMJ has offenses with no civilian analog. If you're charged with murder in civilian federal court and mutiny under the UCMJ, those are two different crimes.	A president can be personally sued, and does not enjoy universal immunity while in office, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 US 681 – in that case, Clinton was represented by private counsel. There are differences between that case and the instant hypothetical, the most prominent being whether such statements might be shielded because of executive privilege. The primary procedural question would be whether a potentially defamatory statement was made in connection with official duties. The limits of executive privilege are not at all clear. That kind of constitutional issue could involve the solicitor general. Let us assume that SCOTUS finds (somehow) that a particular statement is completely outside the ambit of executive privilege (separation of powers). Then it is not an interest of the US government to defend the personal interests of a defendant even if he in in office (whereas it is an interest of the US goverment to defend the official interests of POTUS), and private counsel would represent the defendant. Any settlement or award would be out of the defendant's pocket (as was the case in Clinton v. Jones).	No. As the defendant's lawyer, they will have been privy to privileged communications. As such, it would be unfair to the defendant if they now started prosecuting. Also note that a victim very rarely has their own lawyer in a criminal case. The prosecution lawyer is acting for "the Crown" (essentially, "society as a whole"). (There are exceptions, if the victim is bringing a private prosecution - but this is very rare for serious cases such as rape).	Generally speaking if it is substantively unconstitutional for the government to punish a certain kind of criminal conduct, then this provides a basis for a "collateral attack" on the conviction to set it aside (in a post-conviction motion in state or federal court), even if the criminal defendant serving a sentence has already appealed the conviction directly (i.e. to the court of appeals and all higher appellate court that review that court of appeals) to the fullest extent possible and lost. But this is not self-executing. Someone has to file a court case on behalf of the person incarcerated to make it happen. It does not generally entitle the criminal defendant to compensation for wrongful incarceration or to a return of fines paid, although it would end the authority of the state to incarcerate the individual going forward or the compel that individual to pay the balance of unpaid fines. There might be a right to have the case sealed, but the ruling does not automatically remove the conviction from the criminal record of the defendant. And, getting the case sealed is likely to be harder in the circumstance where all of the sentence for the unconstitutional offense has been fully served. When a past conviction does not meet the standards of current law from a procedural context, in contrast, this may be raised in pending direct appeals, but is rarely something that can be brought up in a post-decision collateral attack on the conviction unless certain other exceptions apply (e.g. sometimes if a collateral attack pending before the decision is still pending at the time of the decision or in certain extraordinary cases involving due process concerns that cast deep doubt on the validity of all convictions obtained by that means), and even in cases where it is set aside, does not pose a double jeopardy bar against a new prosecution for the crime that meets the appropriate procedural standards. The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering the proper treatment under these rules of its holding that non-unanimous juries were an unconstitutional manner by which to convict someone of a felony, which is a procedural rule, but may fall within the exception that makes the new rule retroactive anyway. For cases on direct review, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past Justice Harlan's habeas approach was first adopted by a plurality in Teague v. Lane and then by the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh. Thus, for collateral review in federal courts of state court criminal convictions, the general rule is that new rules of constitutional interpretation—those not 'dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final'—will not be applied. However, [a] new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 'watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Put another way, a new rule will be applied in a collateral proceeding only if it places certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to prescribe or constitutes a new procedure[ ] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court extended the holding of Teague beyond the context of federal habeas review, such that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, state collateral review courts must give retroactive effect to that rule in the same manner as federal courts engaging in habeas review. As a result, at least with regard to the first exception, the Court has held that the Teague rule is constitutionally based, as substantive rules set forth categorical guarantees that place certain laws and punishments beyond a state’s power, making the resulting conviction or sentence . . . by definition . . . unlawful. In contrast, procedural rules are those that are aimed at enhancing the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating the manner of determining the defendant’s guilt. As a consequence, with respect to a defendant who did not receive the benefit of a new procedural rule, the possibility exists that the underlying conviction or sentence may still be accurate and the defendant’s continued confinement may still be lawful under the Constitution. In this vein, the Court has described a substantive rule as one that alters the range of conduct that the law punishes, or that prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Under the second exception it is not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of a trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. From here.	Ordinarily, you can be convicted of more than one crime for the same actions, but the sentences are served concurrently, rather than consecutively. So, for example, if the first degree murder but not the second degree murder charges were reversed on appeal (e.g. because the first degree murder charges were for "felony murder" and the appellate court found that the evidence showing the related felony should have been suppressed at trial due to an unlawful search), the second degree murder charges would remain in place.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.	UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson, is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a "Presidential election" of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876, which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis: Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. "This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states," said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing arguments are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.
Have I to specify the sentence and paragraph when referring to the law? Asking for Ukrainian Law system (if there is difference). For example, there is a law; in the law there are an article; in the article, there are few paragraphs, and I need to refer only to one of them; in addition, the paragraph, I need to refer, consist of only one sentence (so do I need to say about sentence in this case). Would it be weird, or even incorrect, I will say/write like (I don’t know what is the short form of words “sentence” and “paragraph”): According to the sent. 1 pr. 2 art. 4 The Law of Ukraine “Name of The Law”. In Ukrainian language: На підставі речення 1 аб. 2 ст. 4 Закону України «Назва Закону».?	In most countries, there is a standard format for citations. The guiding principle behind these is to make it easy to verify the law says what you claim it says. So you only need to give information needed to find the law you are citing. Usually, citations go the opposite of your example -- they start with the most general reference, and get more specific. Also, most citations only give information for sections that are numbered or lettered. Unless sentences are numbered or lettered, I would not cite them. For example, to find something in the US code, we need to know the: Title/Chapter/Section/subsection...and so on. For example, the federal law prohibiting the ownership of machine guns is in US Code, Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Ch 44 Firearms, § 922 Unlawful Acts subsection (o)(1). Since sections are numbered consecutively, we usually leave out the chapter: 18 USC § 922(o)(1). In Ukraine, it appears law is organized into Codes, Chapters, Articles and Sections. Since Articles are numbered consecutively, we can leave out the Chapters. Thus, the citation for the definition of murder would be Ukrainian Criminal Code, Art 115 § 1. Caveat: I am not an expert in Ukrainian law and may be wrong on some details, so you should look at some Ukrainian legal sources to double check.	What is the equivalent for “Consideration” (English common law) in Spanish speaking countries? Prestación. Perhaps not all Spanish speaking countries adopt a one-word term, but the notion of consideration definitely exists in civil law. It is quite mistaken to presume that the concept is unique to common law systems. The Civil Code of both Spain (see art. 1257) and México (art. 1793) are in terms of "transmission or transfer of rights", which fits the meaning of consideration. The Civil Code of Spain in its art. 1254 refers to "[consent] to give something or perform [prestar] a service" (brackets added for clarity), whence the term prestación qualifies as consideration in several --if not all-- types of contract. In fact, article 1274 literally mentions "prestación or promise".	Most of your examples don't seem to be so much self-contradictory, as limited to a subset of the obvious meaning for purposes of a particular law. When a term has a specific meaning within a particular field or context, it is often called a "term of art". For example "Fair use" is a term of art in US Copyright law, and "Under color of law" is a term of art in US civil rights law. "Standing" is a term of art in most common-law jurisdictions. But a term of art is usually somewhat broadly understood, and is not limited to one particular law or section of law. I would just call such a thing a "specially defined term" or just say "Q as defined for purposes of the XYZ law".	If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.	Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004.	At the time of writing, there 642 various UK Procedure Rules and amendments. These are all secondary legislation (discussed here). Taking the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 as an example, these Rules are made under primary legislation found at section 69 of the Courts Act 2003: 69 Criminal Procedure Rules (1)There are to be rules of court (to be called “Criminal Procedure Rules”) governing the practice and procedure to be followed in the criminal courts. (2)Criminal Procedure Rules are to be made by a committee known as the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. (3)The power to make Criminal Procedure Rules includes power to make different provision for different cases or different areas, including different provision— (a)for a specified court or description of courts, or (b)for specified descriptions of proceedings or a specified jurisdiction. (4)Any power to make Criminal Procedure Rules is to be exercised with a view to securing that— (a)the criminal justice system is accessible, fair and efficient, and (b)the rules are both simple and simply expressed	I'm sorry to deflate what is clearly a very philosophically interesting question, but the law is straightforward here. The truth, essentially, is the set of facts that you believe to be true. Yes. It means that you will not lie by omission, and that you will provide the relevant facts. No, you don't need to recount history since the first instant of the big bang. Only expert witnesses may answer by giving their opinion or evaluation. This is presumed accurate by their experience and where it is not accurate, the other side may present opposing expert witnesses to contest their conclusion or evaluation. Laypeople are permitted to answer only with their recollection of facts. Lawyers may not ask them what their opinion is, although by your definition every question is about opinion, since perception and memory is limited. But the question "What colour was Mr Smith's house?" and "What architectural style informed the facade of Mr Smith's house?" require different amounts of expertise and opinion. "Truth" isn't jargon, or even technical language here. I generally aim to be truthful, and so when someone asks me what time it is, I don't feel compelled to answer to the nano/picosecond. Would you call me a liar? Am I lying by omission? Similarly, if someone asks me what colour a car is, I don't feel compelled to say "I can't possibly know, because my perception may differ from yours. If you honestly feel that when someone asks you to be truthful about something, then you must either be lying, or lying by omission if you don't start your answer with the first instant of the big bang, your problem is not one of law.	What a statute means can be difficult to determine. There are several approaches to statutory interpretation that could be helpful: Textual: The plain meaning doesn't confine "use" to a few particular types of uses. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. Legislative history/legislative intent: The previous version of the subsection did limit prohibited uses to only composing, sending, or reading electronic messages. Given the amendment, it seems that the legislature no longer desired that limitation. When the bill was introduced, Rep. D'Amico stated the purpose of the bill was to "[expand] the prohibition on driving while using an electronic communication device to include uses beyond composing, sending, or reading an electronic message." During debate, when asked what a person should do that doesn't have Bluetooth, Rep. D'Amico suggested "You put it on speaker phone". When asked, "Where would you place the phone?", Rep D'Amico replied, "Wherever you feel like; just not next to your ear." During the same debate, D'Amico described the bill: "What House Bill 1247 does is ban handheld cell phones while driving a vehicle." In my opinion, the declaration of the bill's sponsor, and the debate surrounding the bill treated it as expanding the prohibition from including only texting and email to also include voice conversations. As far as I can tell, the full scope of "using" under this statute hasn't been tested in court, but I could see this going either way. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. However, a court might also be convinced by the legislative intent that only aims to add handheld voice communications to the previous list of prohibited activities (or it least it could be argued that this is the case). Further, under a purposive construction, a court could even look beyond the explicit legislative intent and find that the core purpose was to prevent distraction, in which case "using" could include any activity on your electronic device that distracts you as if you were texting, or making a phone call (eg. selecting the next song to play in your music app).
If mathematical equations are not patentable, why are algorithms patentable? I'm new to the domain of understanding the law behind patenting, and I want to start a company that uses machine learning algorithms. Unfortunately, almost every concept is patented by the top companies. Aren't computer algorithms mathematical equations? Any algorithm can be represented mathematically. People may argue that even physical objects like engines can be expressed mathematically, but physical objects are obviously different from mathematical expressions. But how are algorithms different from mathematical equations? Many machine learning algorithms exactly satisfy the definition of mathematical equations, as they were directly derived from statistical methods used in the past (which I believe were not patentable before the software era). Of course, an animation created by an artist, cannot be considered as a mathematical work, even if the software uses multiple mathematical methods to make it function. I have been reading the article in this link: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/software-patents.en.html and here the author states that the public key encryption method was patented. Don't encryption algorithms precisely come under the definition of mathematical equations?	Aren't computer programs mathematical equations? Any program can be represented mathematically. . . . But how are programs different from mathematical equations? . . . Don't encryption algorithms precisely come under the definition of mathematical equations? In the context of patent law, the "mathematical equations" that aren't patentable are those that are discovered and are mathematical laws of Nature. For example, you cannot patent a mathematical equation which is the equivalent of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra (which tells you how many solutions there are to all possible polynomial equations), because it is a statement about what is fundamentally true about something, not about how to do something that works better than other possible ways of doing something. An algorithm, in contrast, in patent law, is a method of doing something that is not inherently the only way of doing something as a consequence of the laws of mathematics or other laws of Nature (although it could very well be the "best" way of doing something). For example, the simplex method of linear programming would probably be patentable if it hadn't been publicly disclosed prior to anyone obtaining a patent on this method. Most computer programs are the digital embodiment of algorithms, rather than of equations that were discovered that represent fundamental truths that are always and uniquely true about numbers or reality. Notably, recent governing U.S. Supreme Court case law has now made it categorically true that there mere fact of embodying an algorithm or other business method in digital form with a computer program, as a matter of law, does not make an idea that would not be patentable if not embodied in a computer program patentable. The underlying idea that is embodied digitally in a computer program must, itself, be patentable. A method for doing something, even if it can be or is represented mathematically, is not inherently not subject to being patented. But, not every method of doing something is patentable either. The "business method" must still clear the hurdles of being original (you can't patent ideas that have already been disclosed publicly by someone else, or by yourself for that matter), of having "utility" rather than merely aesthetic value, and of not being obvious to a person of ordinary skill if the field in which the invention arises. For example, anything that would follow as a lemma or corollary of an existing aspect of prior art would not be eligible for a patent either, even if it is novel and useful. Now, there is some room for sophistry here. For example, you could call a computer equation that calculated a Lorentz transform a method for calculating the relationship between two coordinate frames to which relativistic mechanics apply. But, because that relationship is a law of Nature which is always true, even if it isn't the only means to calculating that relationship, it would not be patentable even if it were not prior art. I want to start a company that uses machine learning algorithms. While it is a risky business model, it is worth considering that over the last 10-15 years the legal threshold necessary to patent a computer program has gotten much, much higher. The Patent and Trademark Office used to routinely grant these applications, but due to a string of important statutory and case law changes, software patents are now denied at a very high rate, and existing software patents are routinely determined to be invalid in litigation. If there is serious reason to doubt that an existing patent that would be important for your business is really patentable, you should consult a patent lawyer to consider the possibility of bringing an interpartes review action in the Patent and Trademark Office to have a previously issued patent revoked. This is an expensive and time consuming process, but it is much cheaper than losing a patent infringement lawsuit after having invested time and money into running a business using a patent you know to be infringing because you believe that it won't hold up in court.	"that copyright is not automatically conferred and that there is a process that must be followed" No, this is completely backwards. Copyright is automatic (in most places), but there is a formal process if you want. Copyright happens the moment that the work is created. In the US, if you want to sue somebody for copyright infringement, you have to register your copyright, but you still have one regardless of registration. Modifying the video is a derivative work and must be licensed/released from the original author/copyright holder. From copyright.gov: When is my work protected? Your work is under copyright protection the moment it is created and fixed in a tangible form that it is perceptible either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Do I have to register with your office to be protected? No. In general, registration is voluntary. Copyright exists from the moment the work is created. You will have to register, however, if you wish to bring a lawsuit for infringement of a U.S. work. See Circular 1, Copyright Basics, section “Copyright Registration.”	Software doesn't infringe any patents. Creating a product that includes the software may infringe the patent, and may infringe that patent because the software is included, but the software itself doesn't. Software on its own doesn't have any effect that could be patented, only as part of some machine. On the other hand, if you want to distribute software that is under the GPL v3.0 license, then a requirement is that you give everyone a patent license for all patents that would be infringed by using the software (as part of some machine), and if you are not the patent holder, then in practice that means you are not allowed to distribute the software. With your grand plan that you write software and then let the end users do the patent infringement, that will backfire in two ways: First, you'd be likely sued for contributory patent infringment, because it is you who enables the patent infringemnt. Second, you can be sued for copyright infringement because you have no license that allows you distribution of the software, depending on the Open Source license used.	Games can be protected by patent. You get some protection through copyright, but only on things like artwork and the precise text of the rules; someone could copy the ideas of the game with different artwork and not violate your copyright. You would need a patent in each country you want to protect it in. In general patents are expensive and complicated. Here is some general guidance on the relevant law in the USA, and how it applies to video games. If you hire a developer you can do so with a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). This is a contract requiring them to keep your ideas secret. Here is an article about using NDAs when hiring a contractor, but its a complicated area of law and you might be better hiring a lawyer to draft one for you.	Software cannot be patented although it does have copyright. Hardware can be the subject of a patent, however, that would not cover any software aspects such as the programming built into a PROM. While it is possible to render any software into an integrated circuit, practically, anything simple enough to make this feasible is probably too simple to patent.	Copyright never protects ideas or processes, it only protects expression: words, images, and sounds, some of which may describe ideas. But when a work is nothing more than a translation of an idea into words, with no independent originality -- when almost anyone would use more or less the same way to describe the idea, then the work will not be protected by copyright at all, as it is not considered an "original work". Computer code that implements an algorithm often falls under this rule. It is my belief that the code shown in the linked SE thread would fall under this rule, and would not be protected by copyright at all. If this is correct, then anyone may share such a program with no copyright concern.	You need to check if the original game developers patented the mechanics/rules of the game. For your example, Monopoly was patented, but expired in the 50s and while it would not be a copyright violation to mimic the rules/mechanics, it would be a different intellectual property violation (patent infringement). Spry Fox vs LOLAPPS is also relevant as it extends copyright protection to the implementation of an idea, but ideas (like rules/mechanics) cannot, by themselves, be copyrighted. This means that there is an avenue for the original developer/company to sue even if the visual/audible aspects are different, but the overall gameplay is the same. Also see Tetris Holding LLC vs Xio Interactive Inc. as it relates to the visual aspect of the game.	The problem is that open source licenses incl AGPL have legal force because copyright prevents copying + modifying software by default (software is treated as a “literary work” and therefore enjoys copyright protection). But copyright on datasets and ML models is very different – if it is even recognized at all. Thus, similar copyleft techniques would only work in particular jurisdictions. For example, the EU recognizes “database rights”. A copyleft license that accounts for this is CC-BY-SA-4.0, meaning that in an EU context, databases based on the original database would have to use the same license. However, database rights are not recognized in the US (facts are not copyrightable, and the “sweat of the brow” doctrine is not recognized). Thus, the CC-BY-SA-4.0 license would not have any copyleft effect with respect to databases in an US context. Independently of copyright in the database as a whole, the data in the database might be copyrighted material, for example if the database contains text or images, complicating matters further. Machine learning models derived from a data set are much more difficult. Clearly, ML models that have been trained are not a creative work and are therefore not eligible for independent copyright protection. At most, it can be argued that the model is an automatically transformed version of the input data, so that copyright in the input data implies copyright in the model.1 Perhaps hyperparameter choices could reflect some creative input. This is very much an active topic of debate. Given this uncertainty, it would be impossible to create a public license that works reliably. 1. An interesting discussion topic is the potential effect on Microsoft's Copilot ML model which was also trained on GPL-licensed source code. Instead of deriving force from copyright law, it would be possible to impose conditions via a contract, i.e. EULA-like terms that only provide access to the material after the terms have been accepted. But again, this is difficult. Contract law differs wildly between jurisdictions. For example, a contract is defined by the “meeting of minds” in some jurisdictions; by offer, acceptance, and consideration in others. But how does such a contract ensure appropriate consideration? How can acceptance be ensured if the material is publicly available? For these reasons, I think that unless broad international agreement emerges about IP protections for machine learning models, such a copyleft system for ML models is impossible. It is worth noting that the lack of such protections is probably quite good for innovation and research, since researchers are free to improve each other's work without legal concerns. The idea of copyleft is a hack to subvert the “everything is forbidden by default” system of copyright, but “everything is allowed by default” might be better.2 2. To continue the Microsoft Copilot example: some copyleft advocates like Bradley M Kuhn are sceptical about Copilot's GPL compliance, but remind us that copyleft maximalism means copyright maximalism, and that this is not the goal of open source. https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2022/feb/03/github-copilot-copyleft-gpl/
Jurisdiction Over A Crime Committed In An Airplane Flying Over U.S. States If a woman assaults another passenger while on a plane flying over the continental United States, which courts have jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal case against her? (This question comes up in various iterations on a regular basis on Law.SE and so I ask and answer the question based upon a recent court decision that is on point.)	Woman slaps fellow passenger on flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles, is convicted of assault in California. Ninth Circuit (panel): Wrong venue. She can only be prosecuted in the district over which the assault occurred. Ninth Circuit (en banc, over a dissent): Nonsense. Not only would that make it practically difficult to prosecute, the Framers couldn't possibly have intended the Venue and Vicinage Clauses to include the airspace over a state or district (had they foreseen metal tubes carrying people while hurtling through the sky at 600 miles per hour). Venue is proper where the plane lands and any state it traveled through; conviction affirmed. From here.	There are some statutes that have a section that says "any violation of this action is punishable by . . . ." but the INA is not one of them. Generally speaking, the way it would be imposed would be: (1) to deny entry on a departing commercial airplane flight or ship (which is enforced by the private enterprises involved pursuant to Transportation Department regulations that the private enterprises may be sanctioned for not obeying) and (2) to set up presumptions about the reasonableness of, for example, laws requiring someone to have brought a passport to secure embassy access. One of the reasons that no penalty is stated is because the constitutionality of this statute is doubtful. Geographical restrictions on travel in some cases have been upheld as constitutional with regard to specific countries and in war time, but are even then strictly construed. But, no case has upheld the restriction as applied to travel to a country to which geographical restrictions do not apply. Likewise, I doubt that the provision denying entry to U.S. citizens without a passport, even during times of war, would be upheld today. For example, 215(b) was given a narrow construction (disallowing criminal prosecutions when someone went to Cuba and returned via a third-country while holding a valid U.S. passport) in part out of concern for the constitutional right to travel. U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967). See also See L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-15, at 957 n.22 (1978) (arguing that ‘the power approved in Zemel must be limited to the most extraordinary situations'). For background see, e.g. Right to Travel Abroad, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 184, 195 (1984) (student note published anonymously) and Thomas E. Laursen, Constitutional Protection of Foreign Travel, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 902 (1981). The fundamental right of a citizen is to enter his own country so that he is not stateless with no place he can lawfully be, and that analysis has been developed more in the law now than it had been in 1967. Alternatively, could a judge impose a penalty without a statutory basis (beyond the designation of the act as unlawful)? Historically, some U.S. states provided this authority which was called the power to impose punishment for "common law crimes", and there are some that still do and there are others, such as Michigan that don't define key crimes that were crimes at common law, such as murder, other than in case law and simply set punishments by statute for these otherwise undefined crimes. As recently as 1947, a majority of U.S. states had at least some common law crimes. Many states codified their criminal laws in the wake of the Model Penal Code in the 1960s even though all states adapted it to their local needs and only a minority of states adopted a penal code close based upon it. The Model Penal Code made it easier to think of what had previous been an ill defined and massive legislative task into a more manageable and finite project for ambitious reformist legislators (an attitude and approach that was common in the U.S. in state legislatures in the late 1960s and early 1970s). But, the federal judiciary has never had this authority (as formally determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1812, just 23 years after the current constitution was adopted), in part, because the federal government does not have plenary legislative authority on all matters and federal courts are likewise courts of limited jurisdiction (while all or almost all states have at least one court of general jurisdiction that can handle any matter that no other court has jurisdiction to handle). From Wikipedia: The notion that common law offenses could be enforced in federal courts was found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). Some have argued that they are inconsistent with the prohibition of ex post facto laws. At the state level, the situation varies. Some states, such as New Jersey, have abolished common law crimes (see State v. Palendrano), while others have chosen to continue to recognize them. In some states, the elements of many crimes are defined mostly or entirely by common law, i.e., by prior judicial decisions. For instance, Michigan's penal code does not define the crime of murder: while the penalties for murder are laid out in statute, the actual elements of murder, and their meaning, is entirely set out in case law.	Is it possible that a court of one jurisdiction would apply the laws of another jurisdiction? For example could a case heard in France (by a French court) apply the laws of the US? If no, then what is the point of such clauses? Yes. This can be done and the example you provide could happen. This is done in civil cases, but not in criminal cases. The other main exception is that a court will not apply another jurisdiction's tax laws, although this is less absolute and the other jurisdiction's tax laws may still be considered as relevant to a civil dispute, so long as they are not enforced. For example, I have litigated a case where the events took place in France in a U.S. Court where the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the relevant choice of law rules pointed to French law. The overarching principle of that the law of the place with the most significant connection to the legal issue decided applies. But there are many subsidiary rules that provide clarity in some areas (although the clarity was reduced with the effect of making forum law apply more often, in the 1960s-1980s after a previous regime of more black and white rules). A clause like this is generally effective if it the parties have any connection to the forum chosen. It is a close cousin, although not nearly so strongly preferred in the law, of an arbitration clause. Also do such clauses go by other names than "attornment" clauses? This article points out such a name is specific to Canada. Yes. In the U.S. an "attornment" clause is a provision that requires a party to a contract to affirmatively declare upon notice from the other party if the attorning party claims that the other party is in breach of the contract or has unfulfilled obligations (with the attorning party waiving any claims for breach of contract not identified at that time). An "attornment" clause is normally found in a lease or secured promissory note and facilitates the transfer of the leased property or secured debt in a way that the new owner can know that there is no risk that it is already in default apart from the transferor's representation. Otherwise, the aggrieved party wouldn't have to mention anything until the statute of limitations arrived. All of the meanings, including the Canadian one, go back to the notion of affirming the existence of certain rights in advance of a dispute arising between the parties. This Agreement shall be construed, interpreted and enforced in accordance with, and the rights of the Parties shall be governed by, the laws of the Province of Québec and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein (excluding any conflict of law rule or principle of such laws that might refer such interpretation or enforcement to the laws of another jurisdiction). The language above is a choice of law clause. The Parties hereby irrevocably attorn to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Province of Québec, judicial District of Montreal, with respect to any matters arising pursuant hereto. The language above is a choice of forum clause, a.k.a. choice of jurisdiction clause, a.k.a. choice of venue clause.	Without regards to the actual case and the particular countries involved, I am wondering how it is even possible that a court in one country orders the whole another country to do something, let alone when the two countries do not even formally have diplomatic relations. The main statute that is relevant in the U.S. is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA) of 1976. In general foreign states are immune from liability in U.S. courts (and most courts of the developed world) subject to certain exceptions, the most common of which are as follows: Foreign state waives its immunity explicitly or implicitly Commercial activities by foreign state in or directly affecting the United States Property taken in violation of international law is at issue Rights in U.S. property acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are at issue Money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury, death or damage to or loss of property caused by its tortious act or omission, occurring in the United States Enforcement of an arbitration agreement made by the foreign state with or for a private party Money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking or their support, if the foreign state is a designated sponsor of terrorism Admiralty lawsuit to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, based on commercial activity The exception above in bold was probably the one applied in the North Korean case. The only countries to which that exception applies are North Korea, Syria, Sudan and Iran. (There are also separate similar rules related to countries with whom the U.S. is in a declared war.) There is sporadic ongoing constitutional separation of powers litigation in the U.S. over whether a FISA authorized lawsuit can proceed over the objections of the President as expressed by the U.S. State Department. The argument that FISA is unconstitutional in this context is that diplomacy and foreign policy is exclusively an executive branch power to the exclusion of Congress and the judiciary, but for the most part, this extreme position has been rejected in recent years. A conservative U.S. Supreme Court, however, could revisit this question (conservative judges tend to favor more absolute executive branch authority in foreign affairs). Once a party wins, however, the winner needs to identify foreign assets subject to the jurisdiction of the court from which to collect the judgment, such as gold deposits or U.S. governmental or corporate bonds or ships docked in U.S. ports, owned by the country. In strong contrast to the case above, the UK media recently overtly demonstrated disobedience of a New Zealand court name suppression order: a man arrested in NZ for allegedly committing an appalling crime was granted temporary name suppression, and that was ignored by the UK media. I am wondering if there is anything that would stop a New Zealand court to hold the UK to account just like the US court just did North Korea. In the New Zealand case, the remedy would be to bring suit against the particular newspapers or reporters involved, rather than the state. But, the U.K. might not enforce those judgments if those defendants lost, so enforcement might be limited to New Zealand based assets and persons, and then, only if the New Zealand court found that it had jurisdiction over the defendants under New Zealand law. So, this isn't really analogous. So, in general, are there any internationally recognised laws/treaties/protocols etc. that define if/when a court in one country can assert jurisdiction over the whole another country and hold it to account? Or is that completely up to the court and whatever extremes it dares to come up with? See above in the U.S. case. Most countries have similar statutes or case law to FISA which codified the case law applying customary international law at the time that it was adopted. One example that comes into my mind is the European Court of Human Rights: if a country signed the European Convention on Human Rights, it can be held to account by the court. But what conventions, if any, can be applied to the two cases above? The European Court of Human Rights case is one of consent to the jurisdiction of an international body by treaty. Countries like the UK and NZ have statutes or treaties governing when a foreign judgment (e.g. a judgment from a New Zealand court) will be recognized domestically. There are also usually laws governing when people present in one state will be extradited to another, usually in the form of a bilateral treaty between the affected states.	One does not introduce statutes in a trial, criminal of civil. Rather, one introduces facts. The judge will present "the law", and will present it in a digested form in the form of interpreted instructions to the jury about what the law says. Jurors are not required to interpret the meaning of statutes, because jurors are also not expected to know the relevant case law surrounding a statute. A party might make a motion to the judge where the argument depends in part on the wording of a statute. Then there is a standard but jurisdiction-dependent way of referring to s statute, e.g. ORS 164.015, RCW 9A.56.010. For Minnesota there are three interchangeable forms: "Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 123.45, subdivision 6" which is the same as "MINN. STAT. 123.45 (2008)" or "MINN. STAT. ANN. 123.45 (2008)", which is for statutes. You have to look it up on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis – here is the answer that Minnesota gives (all legal citations).	If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.	Jurisdiction is a complex topic, and any detailed answer is going to depend on the national law of the states in question. However, there are two general principles to bear in mind: Jurisdiction is rarely exclusive; it is possible to be subject to civil or criminal jurisdiction in any state where you do business; and Jurisdiction can (usually) be accepted or waived by contract. This is the practical answer to your question: almost every contract contains a clause saying something like: "The Parties agree that the law of Norway applies to all matters arising under this agreement and agree that all lawsuits concerning the subject matter of this agreement shall be brought exclusively in the Norwegian Super Deluxe Court for the district of Oslo. The parties waive, to the extent possible under the relevant law, all rights to litigate matters related to this Agreement in any other court." These choice-of-forum provisions are not 100% enforceable--and, again, a lot is going to depend on the law of the forum you're disclaiming--but they often are, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions.	It depends on the situation In a criminal case When the government is prosecuting a criminal case, they are represented by a prosecutor. For a federal case, that prosecutor would be a United States Attorney or Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA). For a state case, they'd be a District Attorney, Deputy District Attorney, or Assistant District Attorney. In civil cases Generally, the Federal government would be represented in civil cases by lawyers with no special title. In many cases, these would be lawyers working for the Civil Division of the Department of Justice, but other agencies also have lawyers to represent them in more specialized litigation—for example, the IRS Chief Counsel's Office. A state government would be represented in civil cases by lawyers from the state Attorney General's office (here is California's, for instance). Before the Supreme Court When the Federal government is before the Supreme Court, they are represented by lawyers from the Office of the Solicitor General. That could be the Solicitor General themself, a Deputy Solicitor General, or an Assistant to the Solicitor General. In cases where the government is not a party, the office may be asked for its input on a case by the Supreme Court via a Call for the Views of the Solicitor General.
PTSD and custody A parent is awarded joint physical and legal custody of their children. This parent is subsequently diagnosed with PTSD. Assuming there are no allegations of abuse verbally or physically or other new issues with the parent, how likely would it be that the custody ruling would be changed? This is in the state of Mississippi.	Generally speaking, custody orders can't be disturbed without a material change in circumstances. A mere diagnosis would not itself be a material change in circumstances and would also usually not be admissible evidence because of the doctor-patient privilege and related privileges for mental health professionals. A diagnosis changes the way people interpret a situation, but it isn't actually something involving or impacting the parent-child relationship in the life the parent and the children that has changed. Instead, there would need to be some event or circumstance that was not known or contemplated at the time of the hearing giving rise to the original custody order which would undermine the factual basis or reasoning of the original custody order. Assuming there are no allegations of abuse verbally or physically or other new issues with the parent, how likely would it be that the custody ruling would be changed? The answer is never "zero" because judges in custody cases are inherently unpredictable. But the likelihood of a change is low. Also, even if there was a prima facie showing of some change in circumstances, e.g. the parent with PTSD is fired from a job for having an outburst at work that a reasonable person would not have made but for PTSD, the diagnosis isn't necessary a negative. A diagnosis followed by repeated incidents after which the parents makes no effort to prevent incidents like that from happening again might be a negative. But often a diagnosis is followed immediately by a treatment plan or the development of strategies to reduce the impact of the condition diagnosis that is informed by the diagnosis and hence likely to be more reliable and effective than efforts to deal with an undiagnosed condition. If the parent is diagnosed with PTSD and then undergoes a treatment plan targeted towards advancing the best interests of the children, in ways that the same parent had not considered at the time of the original hearing, the diagnosis could actually be a plus. The existence of a treatment plan could reduce the significance of pre-diagnosis incidents that happened before a treatment plan was in place. Indeed, probably the more common fact pattern would be for parenting to have been initially restricted based upon incidents which in hindsight were caused by PTSD. Then, the parent is diagnosed, starts a treatment plan, and shows that incidents like the ones that previously caused the court to limit custody are now no longer happening regularly. A court could treat the reduced frequency of incidents and the circumstance of treatment that suggests that the reduced frequency of incidents is not just a fluke, as a change in circumstances justifying less limited parenting time.	Child custody (and alimony) are determined by state courts, so the exact details are state-dependent. There is no legal basis for a person preventing thrie former spouse from moving (assuming the host country doesn't deny a visa), but the courts would be involved in determining whether the child can be taken along: parent A cannot legally just pack up the kids and bolt. When parents don't agree, then the court must determine what outcome is in the best interest of the child. If the children want to move, that counts in favor of them moving ("counts in favor" does not mean "decides the matter"). If the moving parent doesn't have viable employment prospects abroad, that counts against them moving. The amount of time each parent spends with the children also matters, not to mention the laws of your state (here is what the California courts say: "Move-Away" Situations). Generally speaking, the moving parent has to provide notice, then the non-moving parent has to file a legal action to block the move. Your attorney will discuss all of the relevant considerations with you. The fact of a parent moving to another country does not per se invalidate court-ordered support, but the court can modify an order if circumstances warrant (there's no obvious reason why moving to France would result in modification of such an order).	british-columbia Parentage For all purposes in British Columbia law, a child's parent is the person determined under Part 3 of the Family Law Act (see s. 23(b)). Outside of the context of assisted reproduction, there are a series of presumptions that apply unless the contrary is proved. A "male person" is presumed to be a child's biological father in any of the following circumstances: he was married to the child's birth mother on the day of the child's birth (s. 26(2)(a)) he was married to the child's birth mother and, within 300 days before the child's birth, the marriage was ended by his death, a divorce, or voiding (s. 26(2)(b)) he married the child's birth mother after the child's birth and acknowledges he is the father (s. 26(2)(c)) he was living with the child's birth mother in a marriage-like relationship within 300 days before, or on the day of, the child's birth (s. 26(2)(d)) he has acknowledged that he is the child's father by having signed a statement to register as the father on the birth certificate or agreement (s. 26(2)(e)) he has acknowledged that he is the child's father by having signed an agreement under section 20 of the Child Paternity and Support Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 49 (s. 26(2)(f)) If by operation of the presumptions, more than one person may be presumed to be the biological father, then no presumption applies. If parentage can be resolved by one of these presumptions (based on the facts in the hypothetical, it is possible that presumption s. 26(2)(d) might apply, and also likely s. 26(2)(e), since he is on the birth certificate), that answers the question, unless someone attempts to prove that the presumption is incorrect. If someone wants to disprove the presumption, they can apply for an order declaring parentage. When hearing such an application, the judge will consider all relevant evidence, including testimony of parties and witnesses, physical evidence, genetic testing, expert opinion, etc. The burden is on the party seeking the order to displace the presumption, on a balance of probabilities. Parenting arrangement Parenting arrangements ("trying to threaten him with having to keep the kids 50% of the time") can not be imposed by one party on another. Parenting arrangements must be by agreement, or by court order (s. 40). If done by court order, the court "must consider the best interests of the child only" (s. 37). Child support If a person is a parent, they generally have a duty to provide child support for the child (s. 147). Child support from stepparent Even if the person demonstrates that they are not a parent, they can owe child support by court order if they are a stepparent ("a person who is a spouse of the child's parent and lived with the child's parent and the child during the child's life") who has contributed to the support of the child for at least one year (s. 147(4), (5)).	Child support arrangements can be negotiated by the parties, however, approval of the court is required to make them binding. Courts will reject arrangements that deviate too far from what a court would impose.	Assuming that the age of criminal responsibility in your jurisdiction is more than five (I don't know any jurisdictions where it isn't), then you can't be arrested for this. It is possible that the therapist will have to report the information, and it will appear on your record if you apply to work with vulnerable people. On the other hand, if your parents put you up for adoption aged five (but kept a sister), they will have had to explain why - and that is likely to have been recorded (unless this is so long ago that record keeping was much more lax in those days). I would recommend finding a different therapist that is more comfortable being told about these things. You might also need to consult a lawyer for a short while (they will often offer a 30 minute free consultation).	Right of survivorship means that if one of the coowners dies, the other person immediately gets the ownership without having to go to probate. If a ownership is without the "right of survivorship", then the portion owned by the deceased falls to the estate and must be handled via the will or the probate. For example, if two non-related people own property in joint tenancy without rights of survivorship then that portion of the property would go to the heirs when the estate is settled. On the other hand, right of survivorship would mean that the partner would get the property automatically. Note that technically Joint Tenancy could mean without the right of survivorship. One would have to check within the individual jurisdiction to determine if with or without is assumed if not stated explicitly. That is why it is always best to put it into the contract. What Is the Difference Between Joint Tenancy & Tenants in Common? Survivorship Married couples should pay extra attention to the way they take title when purchasing a home, since not every way has the right of survivorship. The right of survivorship means that if one owner dies, the other owner automatically owns the property without it having to go to probate. According to Realty Times, only joint tenancy has the right of survivorship. If a tenant in common dies, her whole estate, including the home in which she owned a part, must be divided according to the rules of the probate court. The rules of Joint Tenant and Tenant in Common differ in how the individual portions of the property would be handled. Joint Tenancy Joint tenancy is a type of homeownership where everyone on the title has an undivided interest. For example, if a husband and wife are on title to the house as joint tenants, they both own equal and undivided shares of the property. According to Realty Times, one or more of the joint tenants may destroy the joint tenancy by selling his ownership position in the property to another party, resulting in a type of ownership called tenants in common. Tenants in Common Tenants in common is a more informal method of taking title in which each owner owns a specific percentage of the property. If there are two owners on the title, each could own 50 percent of the property, or one tenant in common could own a greater percentage than the other. Realty Times states that if no form of ownership is specified when a house is purchased, courts in the United States tend to assume the intention was to be tenants in common. Massachusetts has stated that a Joint Tenancy must be stated on the original purchase. Tenants in Common can purchase their segments at different times and using different deeds.	Is it a crime to have child outside of wedlock? Giving birth itself, regardless of the circumstances, is never a crime in the United States. Some sexual acts which can sometimes result in the conception of a child are crimes (most obviously rape and incest). Circumstances other than rape (including statutory rape and abuse of a position of trust rape), and incest, where a sexual act that can result in the conception of a child are a crime based upon the marital status of one or both of the parties to the sexual act are discussed below. If a legally married man has a child with another woman, what are the consequences for that child? 1- Who will be the legal father of this child in the child's birth certificate? It depends upon how the process is handled. The mother's husband is the presumed parent whether or not he is listed on the birth certificate. In some states, "the other man" does not have the right to bring a paternity proceeding, although the husband or the mother would. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this kind of limitation on paternity lawsuits is constitutional. But, if the mother indicates the biological father's name on the birth certificate (some states require the biological father's voluntary acknowledgement as well), that can supersede this presumption. The biological father always has some process (sometimes difficult for even a non-blameworthy father to comply with) to assert paternity in cases where the mother of the child is unmarried (or was unmarried at the time of conception at least), however, except that in a minority of U.S. states, rapists do not have the status of legal parents of their biological children with a rape victim. There is usually a statute of limitations for the paternity of a father shown on a birth certificate to be contested for the purpose of using that as a defense to a child support claim. Sometimes another statute of limitations applies, however, in other circumstances, such as a lawsuit to collect child support brought by the mother of the child, or the child, where paternity hasn't previously been established, or for inheritance purposes. The exact process by which paternity is established when the biological parents are not married differs from state to state and is the subject of several separate state specific answers at Law.SE. The process is frequently different when the mother is married to someone else than it is when the mother is not married. Some states (including California) permit a child to have more than two parents in some circumstances, and to have two parents who have the same sex in some circumstances. The fact of a genetic parent-child relationship is, as a general rule, neither necessary, nor sufficient, to establish a parent-child relationship, although it is a very important factor to be considered by a court. There is a special body of law governing paternity in cases of "assisted reproduction" (such as artificial insemination or when donated eggs are used or when there is a surrogate parent who gives birth to a child after having a fertilized egg from a different biological mother and father implanted in her). The majority rule in these cases, where assisted reproduction is intended and all parties to the process consent, is that an assisted reproduction agreement of the parties governs paternity. But not all possible scenarios have been the subject of clear law, and there is not uniformity among states regarding the relevant law. For example, there is not much guidance regarding the legal considerations that apply in a case where a man artificially inseminates a woman causing her to become pregnant without her consent or knowledge at the time that this happens, and only subsequently learns what happens, or when the sperm of an intended sperm donor is substituted for sperm by another donor, in an artificial insemination procedure to which the woman otherwise consented. Termination of parental rights and the parent-child relationship is something that, once established, is hard to effect legally in most cases and is a situation in which an indigent defendant facing a parental rights termination has a constitutional right to counsel. But termination of parental rights in adoptions, when the paternity of the father hasn't been established legally, can be done much more easily. 2- Can this child use her/his biological father's last name? A child can have any name agreed to by the parents designated on the birth certificate. It is customary to assign a child the father's last name (unless no father is listed on the birth certificate or publicly disclosed), but in the United States, the issue of what someone is named is almost completely unregulated. The child's surname, for example, does not have to be either the father's surname or the mother's surname. Many children, for example, have surnames that are hyphenations of their father's surname and their mother's surname, even if the parents did not change their names upon marriage. The tradition in Iberia and much of Latin America is for children to take both their father's surname and their mother's surname in a double name surname which is often not hyphenated even though both parts of the name are part of the full surname. The U.S. allows parents to continue to follow this custom as a matter of law, although some governmental and private bureaucratic systems for dealing with people's names in computerized databases don't allow for these kinds of entries and also often disallow hyphens as characters in the name database entries. The process for naming a child when two parents are designated and they can't agree varies from state to state. Usually, a court would decide, or an unmarried mother would decide. Also, some states have the common law rule that your legal name includes any name by which you are commonly called and acknowledge as your own, even without a formal bureaucratic change on a birth certificate or other governmental legal process. Every state, however, also, at least, has a bureaucratic or court process by which a person's name can be changed. 3- Is it a crime to have sex with another woman while you have married? In a large majority of U.S. jurisdictions, adultery is no longer a crime (assuming the sexual act is consensual and not incestuous) including 33 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the several U.S. territories. "States which have decriminalised adultery in recent years include West Virginia (2010), Colorado (2013), New Hampshire (2014), Massachusetts (2018), and Utah (2019)." Adultery is rarely enforced criminally in the 17 states, as of 2021, that still do have adultery laws on the books. This is, in part, due to doubts about the constitutionality of these crimes under federal and state constitutions, in part, due to changing norms, and in part, due to the limited benefit of a misdemeanor or felony prosecution to all persons involved (and the state) in such cases. The birth of a child who is conceived with a father other than the mother's husband while the mother is married is not automatically conclusive proof of the crime of adultery under either state law or under the U.S. Code of Military Justice. For example, under South Carolina law adultery involves either "the living together and carnal intercourse with each other" or, if those involved do not live together "habitual carnal intercourse with each other" which is more difficult to prove. Similarly, in Florida, the crime is "Living in open adultery". Also, in the case of a prosecution of an unmarried man, knowledge that the woman is married would typically be an element of the crime of adultery, and it is similarly never a crime to be raped in the U.S., even if you are married. In 13 of the states where adultery is still a crime (Arizona, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Virginia), it is a petty offense (the maximum punishment in Maryland is a $10 fine), or is a misdemeanor. But it continues to be a felony in four states (Idaho, Oklahoma, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and is punishable most severely among those states in Michigan who someone convicted of adultery faces up to four years in prison. It is a crime that is actively enforced for active duty members of the U.S. military under the U.S. Code of Military Justice. In the U.S. military, adultery is a potential court-martial offense, falling under the General article (Art. 134). The Manual for Courts-Martial defines (para. 99) "Extramarital sexual conduct" as being: "Elements.(1) That the accused wrongfully engaged in extramarital conduct as described in subparagraph c.(2) with a certain person; (2) That, at the time, the accused knew that the accused or the other person was married to someone else; and (3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was either: (i) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces; (ii) was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces; or (iii) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces and of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces". . . . The law on adultery was revised in 2019 in order to include same-sex encounters in the offense. Neither the U.S. military, nor any U.S. state, has penalties for adultery that differ depending upon whether or not the adultery results in the birth of child. The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of adultery crimes since its ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) which decriminalized any kind of sex between consenting unmarried adults that does not constitute prostitution, as a matter of constitutional law (including sex between married adults with each other). 4- Is it crime to father a child outside of marriage? No (assuming that rape or incest is not an issue). Laws prohibiting unmarried consenting adults (or consenting adults who are married to each other) from having sex (including anal sex) or children (in non-incestuous relationships and not in violation of a position of trust) are unconstitutional in the United States pursuant to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). So, even in states where there are laws prohibiting people who aren't married from having sex with each other or living with each other on the books (the former were called "fornication" laws, and the latter were laws prohibiting "cohabitation" of unmarried couples), those laws are unconstitutional (and in the case of laws barring cohabitation are also prohibited by federal fair housing statutes). Unconstitutional fornication laws, which effectively make all forms of sex outside marriage illegal remain in the law books without being formally repealed in six states: Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, South Carolina and Utah. Related Non-Criminal Matters Civil Lawsuits Involving Adultery Or Rape In a handful of U.S. states a husband can bring a lawsuit for money damages (called alienation of affections or "criminal conversation" despite the fact that it is a civil lawsuit) against someone who has sex with his wife. The vast majority of U.S. states have abolished such lawsuits, however. In fiscal years 2000–2007, there were an average of 230 alienation of affections filings in North Carolina per year — a bit over 0.5% of the number of all divorces. The tort is also recognized in Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah, but it is frequently litigated only in North Carolina and in Mississippi. Many of the states where the tort is not commonly used impose restrictions on it that make it less attractive. In Illinois, Hawaii and New Mexico, these limitations make it exceedingly difficult to prevail in an alienation of affections case and recover substantial monetary damages. The standard of proof is lower in Utah and South Dakota, which continue to have actively litigated alienation of affections suits, although not used as often in these states as in North Carolina and Mississippi, for reasons that are presumably unrelated to the relevant legal standards that apply to these lawsuits. Also, in a rape case, a rape victim can bring a civil lawsuit for money damages against the rapist for assault and battery in most cases, and in those cases, many states allow a spouse of a rape victim to bring a parallel lawsuit against the person who committed the assault that is called a lawsuit for loss of consortium. The right to sue for loss of consortium is not specific to rape cases; it applies in all lawsuits for personal injury where it is available. Relevance To Divorce Cases In most U.S. state, divorce is granted without regard to marital fault and adultery is not considered in alimony awards or property divisions. While every U.S. state has some form of no fault divorce, and number of U.S. states also have fault based divorce, and a number of U.S. states, however, allow consideration of adultery as a form of marital fault in divorce proceedings, including how much, if any alimony is awarded and in property divisions. No state would consider being raped an act of marital fault, however, even if this caused a wife to give birth to a child whose biological father was not her husband, and even if the husband wanted her to have an abortion. Relevance To Children's Rights Adultery generally can be considered in child custody cases only to the extent that it impacts paternity or it was something that a child perceived personally, because every U.S. jurisdiction uses a "best interests of the child" standard for making child custody decisions, and because child support is subject to indirect federal regulation by conditioning federal welfare funding to states based upon following federal regulations related to child support. Parents do not automatically have priority over non-parents in proceedings to determine child custody although there is a strong presumption in favor of parents in such cases, even when termination of parental rights is not at issue. A legally recognized parent has a right to only minimal, roughly annual, sometimes supervised, visitation with a child. Parents do not have the full rights of a legal guardian with respect to their children and the rights that they do have with respect to their children are often not spelled out affirmatively in detail in statutes or case law. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is illegal for a U.S. law (including a state or local law) to treat a child born out of wedlock whose paternity is established differently from a child born to married parents. For example, the biological father of a child conceived in an act of prostitution with an unmarried mother can be legally established as the father of the child by the mother in every state. Prior to these rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, many states did not allow children born out of wedlock to inherit from the intestate estates of their fathers, and did not create a right to child support connected to children born out of wedlock. Also, it was historically much harder for a child with a U.S. citizen father and a non-U.S. citizen mother born outside the United States to claim citizenship than it is today, although this still requires a legal process to establish citizenship that is more difficult than for other children when paternity was not promptly legally established between that father and that child. But the courts have permitted fairly onerous burdens to be placed on a child or a father seeking to establish paternity in either an out of wedlock birth or a birth to a married woman when the biological father is not her husband.	What legal recourse does A have, if any? It mostly depends on whether person A had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The fact that the session was a group therapy suggests that such expectation is not reasonable. Tennessee is a one-party-consent state, thereby entitling any participant to record the session. Also, your description nowhere indicates that patient B has a duty of confidentiality toward person, A or that the group therapy has a rule that overrides that entitlement. Under Tennessee law the invasion of privacy is a tort, but it requires the intentional intrusion "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns", Harris v. Horton, 341 S.W.3d 264, 271 (2009) (overruled on other grounds; citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts at 652B). The term "group therapy" seemingly strikes the notion of solitude or seclusion.
Is recent diplomatic service abroad an impediment to becoming president of the United States? Here is Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution of the United States: No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States. Does this "fourteen years" phrase mean that someone who has recently spent some years stationed abroad as an ambassador of the United States cannot become president? Or are such persons considered to be maintaining a permanent residence in the U.S. while having a temporary secondary residence abroad? Was such a theory as the latter considered to justify Thomas Jefferson's eligibility?	I'm not aware of any court ruling about the meaning of the "14 years" clause, but the plain reading of it would be that someone merely needs to accumulate 14 years of residency in the United States in order to be eligible to run for President. There's precedent for this, in the form of Dwight D. Eisenhower: he spent large parts of the period 1942-1946 in Europe before being elected in 1952.	The law was changed several times, and different versions apply to different age groups because certain rules were not changed retroactively. The page you link describes the situation for children born after the year 2000. My advice: citizenship is such a serious matter that you should consult a specialized lawyer, not a random crowd on the web.	There is no law governing the 'number' of the president. Common sense suggests that a person can't be 45th and 46th; there must be someone in between having the presidency and they will become the 46th president. In the extremely unlikely scenario that a foreign power occupies the United States this year, eliminates the office of President, and a few years later the US is liberated and Donald Trump is re-elected, I guess people could name him the 45th and 46th President, but it makes no sense to speculate about this.	Article IX, Section 5 of the constitution says: Removal by impeachment or address. Every person holding any civil office under this State, may be removed by impeachment, for misdemeanor in office; and every person holding any office, may be removed by the Governor on the address of both branches of the Legislature. But before such address shall pass either House, the causes of removal shall be stated and entered on the journal of the House in which it originated, and a copy thereof served on the person in office, that the person may be admitted to a hearing in that person's own defense. This provides at least some mechanism for removing an AG. A subcomittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Maine Legislature reports here on the broader question of tenure of office. p. 5 opines that "Many members of the executive branch of Maine government hold their offices at the pleasure of the Governor and may be removed from office by the Governor's direction to vacate". p. 6 then holds that "For civil officers whose tenure is set by the Constitution, removal from office may only occur through impeachment or address," and the Attorney General is enumerated as one of those Constitutional Officers (referencing Article IX Section 11). The State of Maine web page says that there are three branches of government plus three constitutional officers (state, treasurer, AG) and one statutory officer, thus the AG is not part of the executive branch (and thus the AG does not serve at the pleasure of the Governor).	It's fine, as long as it's clear that it's fiction As far as I know, titles such as "Mr. President" aren't specifically restricted in any way. That said, there are a few relevant laws here regarding impersonating government officials or using the seals of government offices. Generally speaking, they prohibit doing things that are intended to mislead people into thinking that you are part of or otherwise affiliated with the government. One is 18 U.S. Code § 912, which states that: Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. I'm not entirely clear whether the President or members of Congress are included in "officers" here, but it only criminalizes impersonating such officers for the purpose of fooling someone into doing something for you. More directly relevant to the Presidency and members of Congress is 18 U.S. Code § 713, which governs the "Use of likenesses of the great seal of the United States, the seals of the President and Vice President, the seal of the United States Senate, the seal of the United States House of Representatives, and the seal of the United States Congress". It forbids use of the seals of those offices for the purpose of conveying, or in a manner reasonably calculated to convey, a false impression of sponsorship or approval by the Government of the United States or by any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof For official insignia or uniforms more generally, 18 U.S. Code § 716 exempts uses that are not used or intended to be used to mislead or deceive...[or are] used exclusively for a dramatic presentation, such as a theatrical, film, or television production.	First, this issue doesn't come up for people on active duty. 10 U.S. Code § 973 forbids active-duty military officers from holding or exercising the functions of an elective federal office; DoDD 1344.10 extends that to all active-duty personnel. Both the law and the directive also apply to reservists or retirees on long-term active duty (more than 270 days). Second, for status reasons, this is much less likely to come up with enlisted personnel. The sort of people who serve in Congress are generally also the sort of people who'd be officers. Many of the relevant restrictions apply to people holding office in the executive branch, and enlisted personnel do not hold office (only commissioned and warrant officers do). Third, an interesting quirk that makes this even more significant: Retired military personnel do not technically leave the military. They're no longer in active service, but they are still military personnel, bound by the UCMJ, and subject to both voluntary and involuntary recall. In fact, people retired from active-duty components are bound by the UCMJ at all times, whereas non-retired reservists are only bound by it when called up. If this is an issue for reservists because they might be called up, it's also an issue for retirees. Now that we've handled preliminaries, the central issue comes from the Incompatibility Clause in Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution: [N]o person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House [of Congress] during his continuance in office. The question is whether reservists count as holding an "office under the United States." If it does, you have to resign from the reserves before entering Congress. However, Congress decides whether or not someone is qualified to be a member, and Congress has generally refused to explicitly decide if reservists are allowed (implicitly meaning that yes, they are). 6 Cannon's Precedents §§ 60--62 covers the situation as of World War I: the House Judiciary Committee recommended that members of Congress who had accepted National Guard commissions be considered to have forfeit their seats in Congress, but the full House didn't act on the recommendation. After the war, the House decided to pay members who had been on military service the difference between their congressional pay and military pay. In the second debate, the House considered the difference between temporary and permanent office. It was pointed out that in past wars, members had served as officers in short-term volunteer units and then returned to their seats at the end of their service. It was also pointed out that an "office" is an inherently permanent thing: a temporary commission for the duration of a war might not necessarily be an office. 2 Deschler's Precedents § 14 discusses how things played out in World War II and beyond. Here, the US involvement was much longer, and there was more consideration given to the problems with holding both offices. The executive branch was the one that complained; they decided that serving in Congress was more important than serving overseas, and that military personnel who were also in Congress would be told to pick one (either go back to Congress and serve there, or resign from Congress and be in the military). In 1965, the Defense Department issued an order (currently found in DoDD 1200.7) which provides for the involuntary transfer of people in key positions (including all members of Congress) from the Ready Reserve to the Standby Reserve. Congress did not like that, and they (finally) struck back in the 2016 NDAA: they amended 10 U.S. Code § 10149 to ban transfers to the Standby Reserve based on service in Congress. This certainly seems to promote the idea that Congress thinks reserve service is allowable, but when Barry Goldwater tried to get a resolution to that effect in 1963, Congress didn't act on it. So in summary: Congress (which enforces the Incompatibility Clause) hasn't explicitly said simultaneous reserve service is allowable, but has essentially let it happen. The executive branch has tried to discourage it, but Congress has opposed that (personally, my guess is that members of Congress want the political benefit of saying "I'm currently in the military," while the military would prefer not to have them). I've discussed how Congress handles it, and Congress does have the final authority to judge the qualifications of its members. There was one Supreme Court case (cited in Deschler's Precedents) where a group tried to get the two positions ruled incompatible, but it was dismissed on standing grounds (the group could not establish that they were particularly harmed by the alleged violation). A lower court had held that the offices were incompatible, but that ruling was vacated by the Supreme Court. However, there was another opinion issued in 2006 where the courts couldn't duck the question. Sen. Lindsey Graham was also an Air Force lawyer (he's since retired), and while a Senator he was tapped to be a military judge on the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. An airman was convicted at court martial and appealed to a panel that included Graham, then appealed again to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. There's no question that a criminal defendant has standing to challenge whether his judge can legally be a judge, and Congress does not have the final say over whether someone's qualified to be a military judge. In US v. Lane, the CAAF held that Graham's office in the Senate was incompatible with service as a military judge. However, the CAAF cannot tell Congress "you can't be an active reservist and a sitting member of Congress." Even the Supreme Court is limited in its ability to interfere with Congress's decisions on the qualifications of its members: the Court did hold that Congress can't add qualifications, but this is a question of "does this provision apply to this person," which Congress has final authority over.	This FAQ from the US embassy in Korea explains all of the concerns that a Korean-American might have. If you have a Korean lational parent, you are automatically Korean. Before March 31 of the year you turn 18, you must renounce your Korean citizenship, lest you be then subject to the military service law. If you were a Korean citizen and then gained another citizenship, you automatically lose your Korean citizenship, and if you did not complete your military obligation and did not obtain an overseas travel permit, you may be punished if you ever return to Korea. The travel permit lets you postpone military service until age 37, so if you are living overseas, by January 15 of the year you turn 25 you must apply for a travel permit. The laws are set up so that you must enlist by age 28, but must have obtained a travel permit by age 25. That means if you are abiding by the law, there is no risk of sudden conscription if you're there for a short period (e.g. as a tourist). The risk seems to come from not obtaining a travel permit.	I would argue the Constitutional basis of these actions would be the Constitution itself, namely Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. and Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Note also, that as Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, the Impeachment process was a check brought over from England (it predated the formation of Britain by several centuries) as a check on Executive (read Monarchal) power of royal appointments, including Judges. So, to answer your questions directly: Serving out one's term or resigning is not a shield to impeachment, otherwise one could simply play "whack-a-mole", appointing the same individual repeatedly (which is also why future barring of the individual from governmental office is an option). The purpose of impeachment is, per Hamilton, to react to "political crimes"; "mundane" crimes are to be handle by the normal judicial system. Nixon did famously resign rather than be impeached, but he was barred from running again anyway, having served two terms as President. Congress at that time chose not to continue the impeachment process after his resignation (note that disqualification is an option, but not required, punishment that can be levied by Congress in the event of impeachment). See Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, quoted above.
How do I check that my work is not "work made for hire"? I work as a secondary public school teacher in the US. I teach a fairly niche subject, that has few resources for. I am working on writing my own textbook set for this subject area. It will include a textbook, workbook, and teacher's guide. I work on this on my own time during weekends, evenings, summer holidays, etc., but the work benefits my own teaching, as I use the same material in my actual classes. Someone warned me to check that I won't lost my rights to this work under "work for hire" or "work made for hire". I checked my contract, district personnel handbook, site-specific handbook, and union collective bargaining documents, but find no mention of them having a right to ownership of works I create while under their employ. Is it still possible that my situation could be considered "work made for hire" under state or federal laws? Are there any additional steps I should take to check whether I need to worry about my employer taking ownership of the work?	Ask As an employee, anything you create in the course of your employment belongs to your employer. Now, writing textbooks is probably not in the course of a schoolteacher's employment. Note that I said "probably" - it's possible that if you publish and it becomes wildly successful your employer might just want to go to court to check how "probably" actually falls out in practice. So, the simplest thing is to tell your employer that you are thinking of writing a textbook for your subject in your spare time and would they please disclaim any copyright claim they might have. If they won't, find another employer (or don't write the book).	You need permission to copy unless fair use applies Does this mean that when someone sends you their resume, it is unlawful to pass it on to others unless the author gives permission? First note that copyright law only applies to copying. If someone were to give you a physical copy of their resume (assuming such a thing would happen in this day and age) then giving this to someone else without copying it is not copyright violation. There may be privacy issues involved but that’s another issue. Further, in the United States, there is a fair use doctrine which allows limited copying without permission in certain circumstances. This is likely to apply in a lot of situations around copying resumes. Finally, permission does not have to be explicit. For example, if you receive a resume in the course of a job application then permission to make copies for that purpose can be assumed to have been implicitly given. Can you get sued if the resume finds its way to someone the author did not intend to see it, and the author suffers some harm as a result? Under privacy law, possibly. Under copyright law, no. What you can be sued for is making a copy. It doesn’t matter where this ends up. Is distributing a resume in the context of professional networking considered as implicit consent to allow sharing with anyone under the US legal system? No. It’s explicit consent because those networking sites have Terms and Conditions that explicitly deal with copyright. For example, if you post your resume on LinkedIn, you agree to this.	Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.	You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.	Not under US law Under the US copyright law, specifically 17 USC 203: a) Conditions for Termination.—In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the following conditions: The conditions are somewhat complex, and I will not quote them here. The author or authors, or the heirs of the author or authors, or a majority of them, have the right to terminate copyright transfers an license grants. This termination must be effective on a date within a five-year period starting 35 years after the transfer or grant was made, or 35 years after publication. There must be a notice of intent to terminate, sent at least 2 and not more than 10 years before the effective date of termi\nation. Section 205 (a) (5) provides that: (5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant. Section 205 (b) provides that: (b) Effect of Termination.—Upon the effective date of termination, all rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons owning termination interests ... ... (4) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective date of the termination. As an exception, however, an agreement for such a further grant may be made between the persons provided by clause (3) of this subsection and the original grantee or such grantee’s successor in title, after the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4) of subsection (a). Summary Under US copyright law the author, co-authors, or the heirs of the author(s), or a majority of them may cancel a license during a specific five-year period No provision in the license or other agreement may waive this right, or bind the author not to exercise it. Open source and copyleft licenses generally do not mention this legal right of the author. Derivative (modified) works created under a canceled license may continue to be used, but the right to create new derivative works is withdrawn. It is not clear how an author goes about sending the required notice when a work was distributed widely to the general public under a permissive license. Open source licenses have been around long enough that early license grants could be subject to such terminations. But I have found not news reports or court cases about such terminations or attempted terminations and their effects. Probably most authors of open source software will not want to terminate the licenses they once granted. But some may, and US law gives them the right to do so. Users of software or other protected content under such licenses should be aware of these termination rights.	As far as I can see this means that I sign away any rights I currently have to any IP and also that I sign all rights to any IP I create whilst working for the company. The hiring manager says that I have this wrong and that it only means anything related to work that I would undertake during my employment with the company. Based on the quoted language, the hiring manager is correct. The key phrase is "all rights to all material created in the course of your employment with the Company" This means things created as part of your new job. It does not mean copyrights or other IP you now own, nor does it mean rights to things you create outside of work hours, unrelated to your job, not as part of any work assignment, and not created on work premises or using work equipment. You might want to confirm this by talking with a local lawyer with some IP experience and some employment law experience. A one-time consult should be available at a fairly small cost. The section about "whether now existing or created in the future" refers not to existing IP, but to existing kinds of IP and existing laws. If the UK should pass a new "algorithm rights " law next year, this language attempts to make sure that such rights are covered without needing you to sign a revised contract. Note that this phrase occurs as part of the definition of the term "Intellectual Property Right", and it is limited by the phrase "in respect of the material created by you in the course of your employment." A contract that attempted to claim all existing IP you may hold that is unrelated to your employment, or one which tried to claim IP having no relation to your future employment might be held void as against public policy. In any case, if it was ambiguous, any such ambiguity should be resolved against the drafter of the contract (here the company) and in favor of the other party. A separate email might be taken into account as showing what your "meeting of the minds" was with the company insofar as the contract language is ambiguous. It will not, however, be effective in changing the plain meaning of the contract.	how would this differ between say ArXiv which is open access, and a publication that is pay-only, like Elsevier or Nature? It wouldn't. But if the equation is the creation of the author of some publication, as in the author is expressing some unique mathematical expression, obviously the publication should be referenced. But is referencing enough? Are there additional rights one must obtain from the publication and/or author in order to show this content? Laws of nature, including purported laws of nature, are not protected by copyright. So, usually, key equations in an academic paper aren't protected by copyright law. Referencing the work is important as a matter of academic ethics, but is legally irrelevant. Copying of exposition by the author beyond laws of nature is permitted as fair use if it is limited to quotations necessary for academic discussion and criticism, but copying of an entire work would not be permissible fair use in most cases and would constitute copyright infringement. Of course, there is a large gray area between those extremes.	34 CFR Subpart D covers this topic ("Under what conditions is prior consent not required to disclose information?"). This includes The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests so that raises the question of whether there is a legitimate educational interest. Additionally, the question is raised as to the status of an SRO (they are not teachers). Disclosure is allowed to A contractor, consultant, volunteer, or other party to whom an agency or institution has outsourced institutional services or functions may be considered a school official under this paragraph provided... the conditions being that the person Performs an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees; Is under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of personally identifiable information from education records I would take this model memorandum as the most likely agreement, though your district may have a totally different memo where SROs are purely security guards. An SRO is to advance the program objective which include "Education of children regarding the role of laws, courts, and Police in society", which is the hook into "legitimate educational interest". This nothwitstanding the part that says that they "are police officers and not school teachers, school administrators, nor school counselors. The officers will assist teachers with classroom presentations on relative topics when requested and able" (there is no principle that only teachers, administrators, or counselors can have a legitimate educational interest). This model memo does not say anything that indicates that the conditions "Is under the direct control" and "Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a)" are true, but those conditions could be satisfied external to the MOU. There are some additional exceptions of the "if required by law" type, such as a state law "adopted before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released"; or, after that date, is "subject to the requirements of §99.38" which refers you to §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). If that is confusing, here are the two self-referring sections: §99.38(a) If reporting or disclosure allowed by State statute concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released, an educational agency or institution may disclose education records under §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). The disclosure is to State and local officials or authorities to whom this information is specifically...Allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted after November 19, 1974, subject to the requirements of §99.38. So state law is one possibility; "legitimate educational interest" is a remote possiblity. Massachussetts law does include governmental third party disclosures: 603 CMR 23.07(4)(c) A school may release information regarding a student upon receipt of a request from the Department of Social Services, a probation officer, a justice of any court, or the Department of Youth Services under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 119, sections 51B, 57, 69 and 69A respectively. That does not directly apply to local police, but it is possible that a police officer is operating as a probation officer or an agent of the Department of Youth Services. Under paragraph (e), A school may disclose information regarding a student to appropriate parties in connection with a health or safety emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. This includes, but is not limited to, disclosures to the local police department Mass. law allows the possibility of treating a police officer as "authorized school personnel" if they are "providing services to the student under an agreement between the school committee and a service provider, and who are working directly with the student in an administrative, teaching counseling, and/or diagnostic capacity" – which is not completely out of the question but is a bit of a stretch (especially in the context of a blanket statement "we share records", not "we may share yours, if you get special counseling"). Tne law also says "Any such personnel who are not employed directly by the school committee shall have access only to the student record information that is required for them to perform their duties", so sharing of all records would not be allowed.
Homeowner's liability for a social guest injured by a danger unknown to the homeowner P is a social guest, hence a licensee. A flowerpot fell from the balcony and injured P. Is the homeowner liable to P? Suppose that the homeowner claims that she was not aware of the danger. Jurisdiction: the US, common law.	The facts of the flower pot would determine the outcome. The legal question is whether the owner was "negligent". A claim of ignorance is insufficient, what matters is whether the owner departed from what an ordinary reasonable person would have done in similar circumstances. You can write dozens of scenarios that yield different conclusions. For example, was the area underneath the flower pot a place where no reasonable person would be expected to be? Did some other person surreptitiously place the pot in a location, or did they release the moorings and give it a shove? How is it credible that the owner was not aware that there was a flower pot on the balcony? Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable since accidents happen. Things fall all the time, they do not necessarily fall because of something that the person directly controls, you have not proven (and we can't assume) that the victim is blameless, and the defendants explanation is quite plausible. You can of course rewrite the scenario to make it clearer that this is blatant negligence. A starting point would be to say exactly how the pot fell and why the victim was under the pot.	You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company.	None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim.	Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?	Could you insure yourself either given the fact that- you bought the property on mortgage? A mortgage does not generally have the legal effect of insurance. You owe the debt to the lender, which is a strict liability obligation, without regard to the value of the collateral. So, if the collateral is devalued, you still owe the debt, whether or not the lender forecloses. For example, if you sell the property for less than the amount of the debt (i.e. a short sale), you remain personally liable for the deficiency between the proceeds of the sale, and the amount owed on the debt, unless the lender consents. The exception to this is a "non-recourse mortgage", which is a mortgage in which the lender expressly agrees to accept the collateral as the sole means from which the debt can be repaid in a compulsory fashion. The financial crisis of 2009 was mostly a function of a handful U.S. states like California and Florida with economically important mortgage markets having residential mortgage loans that were as a matter of law, non-recourse debts (or nearly non-recourse debts) compounded by people making risky decisions knowing that they didn't face the risk of a deficiency judgment. But, non-recourse mortgage lending is very rare in the U.K. (the linked material inaccurately asserts that mortgages in "most of the United States" are non-recourse, however, when, in fact, that is true only in a small minority of U.S. states, probably not more than five state in all, although a couple of the states that are close to non-recourse for residential mortgages, like Florida and California, are economically important U.S. mortgage markets). Of course, even in the case of a debtor who is obligated on a full recourse mortgage, it may be in the interest of the lender to write off the deficiency judgment, rather than seeking to recovery the debt from the borrower, if the borrower is apart from the collateral, judgment-proof or very nearly so. The lender is taking the risk that both the collateral will be insufficient and that the borrower will also be unable to pay the debt, and when that happens the lender takes a loss. Or is there any insurance which could protect you against massive downfall in any Unforseen compulsory purchase situation. In the United States, lenders often buy what is called "mortgage insurance" at the expense of the buyer, when the down payment on the property is under 20% of the purchase price, that remains in force until 20% of the purchase price has been paid through a combination of a down payment and principal payments on the loan. But, this form of insurance is not generally available to property owners themselves as a matter of economic reality, possibly because it is an uninsurable risk, and possibly because there isn't enough economic demand for it at prices that would make it profitable to do so. Also, when a lender receives a payment on a mortgage insurance policy, the insurance company receives in exchange, all of the rights that the lender had to sue the borrower for a deficiency judgment, if any. These are called the insurance company's "subrogation rights." I have certainly also never seen any form of insurance for an unfavorably bad outcome in an eminent domain/condemnation proceeding for any reason. In a case like that the court determines as a matter of law (in one of the few proceedings where there is still a right to a jury in the U.K.) what the fair market value of the property is at the time of the condemnation, and that determination would complicate recovery on any insurance policy because you would need to have a proof of the loss. Generally speaking, a mere decline in the fair market value of real estate, in and of itself, it not considered to be an insurable loss, of the owner of the real estate, for insurance law purposes. Bonding A very close cousin of insurance contracts are bonding contracts. When a third party is unsure that you will be able to perform a contract or pay a debt, you can encourage them to do business with you by having a bonding company agree to meet your obligations up to a certain dollar amount if you are unable to do so, usually, in exchange for a fee, a right to sue you if they have to make a payment for the amount that they had to pay, and sometimes for some sort of collateral to protect them against the risk that they are taking. But, bonding companies don't generally provide bonds for residential mortgage customers at any price, because someone who needs a bond on a debt like that is unlikely to be able to ever repay the bonding company for its loss if it does have to pay the mortgage debt, and because bonding companies would need to set aside too much money as financial reserves against this risk to be prepared in the event that it had to pay a lot of claims due to collapsing real estate price bubble or something like that. Or is there any way to mitigate this risk / avoid this risk? Option To Sell Contracts On the buyer's side the primary "insurance-like" legal instrument would be for the buyer to purchase from a third-party a legal option to sell the property at a specific price that is lower than the current purchase price. Such an option would probably be legal to enter into, and, with the proper regulatory compliance and financial disclosures, a firm could sell such options to residential property buyers. But, as a matter of practical economic reality, I have never encountered a transaction in which someone actually did that with an unrelated third-party in an arms-length business transaction. In the financial crisis of 2009, secondary market mortgage debt buyers had purchased options to hedge against just this kind of risk, but the counterparties who were obligated to cover the losses pursuant to those options didn't have sufficient reserves and other assets to cover the losses that they were obligated to pay, and so the people who had purchased these options were stiffed anyway. This is because prominent credit rating firms for businesses (of which there were only three or four in the United States) failed to properly evaluate the fact that the risk of one claim under this kind of option was not independent of the risk of other claims under similar options happening at the same time, and in general, failed to accurately evaluate the risk of counterparties being unable to perform their sides of the contracts because the counterparties were be prominent financial companies that had never failed before. But, faced with this situation, almost every investment bank in the United States either went bankrupt or was acquired by another financial company that was not allowed to engage in this kind of derivatives transaction. Mortgage insurance companies, in contrast, paid all of the claims against them, because state insurance regulators had adequately evaluated the risks and forced the mortgage insurance companies to set aside adequate reserves to pay claims in the event of a situation like the 2009 financial crisis. But, because the need to set aside reserves made mortgage insurance (which also had premiums that were not tax deductible to the property owner) made mortgage insurance more expensive than having the same bank give someone both a first mortgage and a higher interest second mortgage on a residence, and then entering option contracts to control their risk of loss in the event of a real estate devaluation that made the second mortgage uncollectible, mortgage insurance companies had a pretty low market share of the financial services providers who were addressing the property devaluation risk for mortgage lenders. Long Term Leases In Lieu Of Purchasing With A Mortgage Another alternative would be to enter into a favorable long term lease of the property, which would be owned by somebody else, rather than actually buying it. If the lease had a term automatically terminating upon a compulsory purchase such as an eminent domain proceeding, the landlord and not the tenant, would bear the risk of loss in the event that the property bad massively devalued due to a change in prevailing market prices (although the landlord would also benefit in the event of massive appreciation at the termination of the lease, although that might be long in the future). This would be an extremely uncommon arrangement for someone to make with their own residence, but isn't unthinkable. For example, over in Ireland, the Guinness Brewing Corporation rents rather than owns most of the real estate that it used on long term 999 year leases (if I recall correctly), possibly out of concern for this possibility, which was a very real one at the time that those leases were put in place. Similarly, my childhood home in a university town was built on land leased from the university on a 99 year lease in the 1960s or 1970s, that was later converted to absolute ownership of the land by my faculty and administrator parents about fifty years into the original lease by mutual agreement between the university and the original home builder. But, that wouldn't really be strictly analogous, because the house was purchased by my parents subject to a full recourse mortgage secured by the building and their rights as tenants on the land lease, so they weren't really protected from a mass devaluation of the property. The transaction didn't really hedge against an economic downturn. Instead, it effectively gave the university the right to buy back the land at the cost of compensating my parents for the value of the residence built on that land, if it wanted to expand. But, it would still probably be possible and legal to enter into a long term lease whose terms did hedge against that possibility, possibly with an option to buy the premises after a certain number of years long in the future when devaluation relative to the purchase price was much less likely to due gradual annual appreciation and inflation over that time period (e.g. 40 years out), if you could find someone willing to serve as a landlord in that kind of deal. Caveat Regarding Taxation The way business transactions are structured is frequently heavily driven not just by the underlying economic effect of the transactions, but also by the tax implications of the transactions. But, I am not familiar enough with the tax laws of the United Kingdom to evaluate that piece of the puzzle. In the context of the question, the most viable alternative to limit risk downside devaluation risk would be to enter into a long term lease rather than buying the residence. But, that only makes sense if there are not big tax benefits to owning a residence with a mortgage as opposed to leasing one. In the United States, there are huge tax incentives to buy rather than lease. But, I don't know if there are similar tax incentives in the United Kingdom that might make a long term lease solution less attractive. For example, a large share of all businesses in the United States lease rather than own the real property that they use, and a large share of skyscrapers and other high rise buildings in the United States are built on leased land. But, those transactions are structured as long term leases, rather than purchase transactions, primarily for tax reasons. Under U.S. tax law, businesses can't treat money spent to purchase raw land or principal payments on mortgages as an expense for tax purposes, but can treat the full amount of any lease payment the business pays to a landlord as an expense for tax purposes. So, transactions are structured accordingly. For example, in a high rise transaction, the building owner pays the fully deductible long term land lease payment to the owner of the land (usually a non-profit that isn't worried about having taxable income not matched by an expense deduction), while the building owner can make up for not being able to deduct principal payment expense on the construction loan by being able to take depreciation deductions on the building itself as an expense in a similar amount. The non-profits usually don't borrow the money to buy the land that they lease to high rise owners. Instead, this is an investment option for cash rich, stable non-profits that need to find a way to get reliable, low risk, long term passively managed returns on their investments. And, the risk of devaluation is much lower for a long term investor with a forty year time horizon than it is for property owner with a shorter time horizon. But, without these tax incentives, there would be far less real estate leasing by businesses in the United States, and a desire to hedge against significant real estate devaluations is a far more secondary reason for businesses to lease of real estate in the United States.	Yes, independent contractors are liable for their acts and omissions The contract between the contractor and the principal should set out what the contractor is expected to do and the standard to which they are expected to do it. If the contract does not set this out then they will be required to perform to the standard of a reasonable person doing that sort of work plus any statutory requirements. So, if they are a plumber, then they are required to install the plumbing to the applicable building codes and to the standard that a reasonably competent plumber would do so. If they fail to do the work or fail to do it to the required standard then they are liable for any damages the principal suffers as a result. Further, an independent contractor is liable for any tort that they may commit against a third party. So, to continue the plumber example, if the plumber negligently installs pipe for a builder and that pipe breaks damaging a tenant's goods (i.e someone outside the contractual chain), then that tenant can sue the plumber for negligence but cannot sue the builder or landlord. Employees are the same but also different Employers are vicariously liable to third parties for the acts and omissions of their employees except where they are on a frolic of their own (i.e. doing something that is clearly outside the scope of their employment). At common law, the employee is also liable to the third party and the employer, however, such claims are rarely pursued because a) where there is insurance, the employee is also covered b) the employee may lack the assets to meet the damages and so be "judgement proof" c) it's really bad PR and d) many jurisdictions prohibit it by statute (e.g. new-south-wales). Protection for an independent contractor Insurance Public & product liability certainly. Motor vehicle insurance if applicable. Professional indemnity insurance if the work is of a "professional" nature, that is, involves providing advice rather than just goods and services. Protection for an employee Insurance Check that your employer has the right insurance and that it covers their employees. Is it better to be an employee or an IC of said company to avoid this type of liability? Like you have a choice. The nature of the relationship will determine if you are an IC or an employee. If you are clearly running an independent business then you are an independent contractor. If you are clearly a wage or salary earner then you are an employee. If it's unclear, you are still one or the other and you don't get to choose. See Indepdendent/Contractor vs Regular Employee	The simple answer is, get a lawyer and explain your case, and pay him to solve the problem (or tell you that it's hopeless). The two main questions would be whether the appraiser have any duty to you, and whether his action was within the scope of what he is supposed to do. If you hired the appraiser, he has a duty to you. I will assume it was you that hired the appraiser (if it was the bank, that's a different matter). Then the question is whether his action or non-action is within the scope of the job. If the place is infested with termites, that is probably irrelevant because an appraiser is not a termite inspector. On the other hand, if he failed to measure the structure, or erred substantially in the measurement, that kind of negligence could be legally actionable. The seller (not the appraiser) is required to "disclose", so it's not obvious that there is any thing that an appraiser could disclose that relates to a map.	This is similar to giving a hammer and needing to state to one is not responsible if the taker uses it to hit their head with. I believe this is the wrong analogy to use here. It would be more like giving somebody a hammer and saying you are not responsible if the head flies off and injures you. There is a concept in "things" you obtain called "fitness for purpose", so if you download open-source software like a registry cleaner, and it deletes your entire registry, the "WTFPL" doesn't absolve the authors of liability. Explicitly denying any kind of "fitness for purpose" or warranty helps shield the author from legal claims (even if they are meritless) because it kills it out of the gate. It's possible that the WTFPL license granter/author could still be sued and have to defend themselves in court because it isn't explicitly stated that there is no warranty or fitness for purpose. Open source does not mean that it's "use at your own risk", which is why there are so many types of licenses and disclaimers. From comments: Thank you for this very clear answer. Does the fact that someone willingly retrieves free code with no control of the provider changes anything? (vs a software vendor which provides code suitable for A and B, in exchange for money) I think closer to your hammer analogy where I would sue the producer of hammer XXX, a hammer I found on the street or which was given to me without involvement of vendor XXX. No, this doesn't change anything. The software vendor here is the person who writes the code, even if they don't charge for it. They are the ones who license the software and they are the ones who take some level of responsibility for it. In this case, the software author is the "hammer producer" that you would sue... If you buy "Registry Cleaner XL" from Best Buy and it bricks your computer, you don't sue Best Buy, you sue the person who authored the software. In pretty much every case, the author is the responsible party, not the vendor, and it is the author who licenses it, not the vendor (the vendor just acts as an intermediary).
Does revealing the owner of an anonymous forum account breach GDPR (or other) laws? This whole thing is to do with using an IP address to identify an anonymous forum account and then sharing details of the ownership of this account with another member. I will explain the best I can: I'm a creative professional and frequent a forum dedicated to my industry. On the forum I have 2 accounts — one 'official' account under the name of my company, used to make official announcements etc, and a personal account under an anonymous username. On the forum I had a discussion about a competitor company and made some personal comments about what I think about them. It's a small industry and the competitor company is very influential, so I wanted to keep these comments separate from my official company account and posted them from my anonymous personal account. Weirdly (and this is what seems questionable to me) the forum owner has figured out that my personal account is linked to my professional account since they share an IP address, and has shared this info with my competitor. (As far as I know the competitor has a relationship with the forum owner because they advertise there regularly.) Now my competitor knows that the anonymous account belongs to my company and can see my posts about them. The whole thing has caused a stir for me professionally since they are interpreting these comments as the official views of my company. It seems like some law must have been breached during the sharing of this information? Does anyone have any insight? I don't necessarily even want to do anything about this, but am just interested in the legality around it.	It seems like some law must have been breached during the sharing of this information? Possibly, even probably. The scrutiny of your personal account in order to glean personal data (your IP address) and then using that personal data to match accounts may contravene Recital 50 of the GDPR: The processing of personal data for purposes other than those for which the personal data were initially collected should be allowed only where the processing is compatible with the purposes for which the personal data were initially collected. If the website terms which you agreed to don't include this data matching, then that processing is not lawful. The rest of Recital 50 is relevant and worth quoting in full: If the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, Union or Member State law may determine and specify the tasks and purposes for which the further processing should be regarded as compatible and lawful. Further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes should be considered to be compatible lawful processing operations. The legal basis provided by Union or Member State law for the processing of personal data may also provide a legal basis for further processing. In order to ascertain whether a purpose of further processing is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected, the controller, after having met all the requirements for the lawfulness of the original processing, should take into account, inter alia: any link between those purposes and the purposes of the intended further processing; the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller as to their further use; the nature of the personal data; the consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects; and the existence of appropriate safeguards in both the original and intended further processing operations. It seems to me that an anonymous account could reasonably expect that the "further processing" of data matching is not in the public interest, an exercise of official authority, scientific or historical research or statistical. There is no link between the data matching exercise and the purpose for which IP addresses are normally collected: the operation and physical security of the website. Now, it may well be that the website terms do allow this data matching to discover links between accounts, or in any case prohibit having two accounts and allow reasonable methods to discover such links. It's also possible that a court has ordered the processing (as Iñaki Viggers has mentioned. We don't have that information; but ostensibly one wouldn't normally expect a personal account to be examined in this way, and certainly wouldn't expect any link discovered to be relayed to a third party.	Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive.	Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful.	IANAL. (1) GDPR is certainly relevant. (2) This is certainly "personal data" under the definition in GDPR article 4. (3) Maintaining this data is probably lawful under article 6 sections 1(a) (consent) - provided that the Terms and Conditions of the site make clear that the user by signing up is consenting to this information being held (3) There is certainly an obligation under article 14 to disclose that the information exists, and to say how it used. (4) Article 15 says that data subjects are entitled to see the information and know what recipients or categories of recipient have access to the information (I don't know whether it's enough to just say "moderators", or whether the moderators need to be identified). (5) I can't see any reasons why the obligations under articles 16, 17, and 18 regarding rectification, erasure, and restriction of processing aren't relevant. This is exactly the kind of situation that GDPR is designed to address. If you're restricting the service available to particular users based on a record of their behaviour or on judgements made by moderators, then they absolutely have a right to know, and a right of redress.	Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”?	Just the email in such a list is annoying but not really concerning. There are millions of people who put their email into publicly available contact data, and after a couple of years of use any email is going to be exposed some way. That's why websites use passwords in addition to just the email and why mail programs have spam filters. Your email was probably not used to sign up anywhere. Instead, spammers pretend that you signed up to slow attempts to prosecute them. A bit of a joke, really, considering how hard it is to prosecute spammers. The valid/invalid remark is used to facilitate spamming, no need to send mails to long-inactive addresses. More concerning than a 'leak' of your email would be a leak of your email plus password. (Such things also happen, and they are a reason why one should use different passwords and 2FA/MFA on important sites.) If it is just the email, see my first bullet point. There is a significant likelihood that the 'website owner' you think you identified is another victim of the address trader. Getting to the real culprit will require significant forensic effort. That effort is unlikely to happen for just emails.	In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization.	Names clearly are personal data and so a good question to ask for GDPR compliance is: Do you need to do what you want to do in order to offer your product or service? For your scenario a common answer seems to be that websites ask for the users first and last name during account creation. The reason is that they need this information to confirm the identity of the account creator. But the public profile only displays a user name that the user can pick freely. In general there is no good reason to publically show the legal names of users so websites don't do it. So for your website ask yourself, why do you want to publically show the names of your users? If you have a good reason to do that specify it in the user terms and go ahead. If you don't have a good reason don't do it.
Why does this movie say a witness can't present a jury with testimony which would assist in making a determination of guilt or innocence? In The Trial of the Chicago 7 (2020) movie, assistant federal prosecutor Richard says: Richard: The witness can't present them [with] testimony that would assist in making a determination of guilt or innocence. Why shouldn't the witness present the jury with testimony which would assist in making a determination of guilt or innocence?	Alternate explanation: Richard is saying that the witness has no "testimony that would assist in making a determination of guilt or innocence", and therefore should not be allowed to testify.	This appears to be covered by the Norway Criminal Procedures Code, of which an English version can be found here. Chapter 10 deals with witnesses. Here are some relevant sections: § 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court. There follow a number of exceptions (spousal privilege, attorney-client privilege, state secrets, etc). None of them seem to apply to your example. § 115. The court may decide that a witness who fails to attend or who leaves the place of sitting without a valid reason shall be brought before the same or a subsequent sitting of the court. In special cases the court may decide that a witness shall be detained in custody until he can be examined. § 128. Before the examination the president of the court shall admonish the witnesses to tell the whole truth without concealing anything. He shall inform the witnesses of the liability consequent on giving false evidence or making a false affirmation. § 137. If a witness refuses to give evidence after being ordered to do so by a legally enforceable court order, the court may by a new order decide that the witness shall be kept in custody until he fulfils his obligation. Nevertheless a witness may not be kept in custody for more than three months altogether in the same case or in another case relating to the same matter. So effectively, if the witness fails to show up voluntarily, he can be brought in forcibly. He can be ordered to testify, and if he refuses, he can be held in custody (probably a jail) for up to three months. However, the authority to compel testimony is limited to courts; the police cannot compel statements from witnesses. § 230. The police may take statements from suspected persons, witnesses and experts but may not order any person to make a statement. So in your example, it appears that the witnesses would be free to refuse to speak to the police. However, if the case came to trial, they could be ordered to testify, and could be held in custody if they refused.	This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud.	The defence sees the prosecution evidence; witnesses don’t From context, it appears that Ms. DeCoutere was a prosecution witness, not the defendant. As such, she would not be privy to the evidence that either the prosecution or defence had or intended to present. No doubt both the prosecution and the defence would have known about the photograph and, I would imagine, it was introduced by the defence precisely because it contradicted the witness’ testimony. Further, revealing such evidence to her by either side would be misconduct - witnesses are supposed to recount the facts as they recall them without prompting or aide memoirs (police are an exception - they are allowed to refer to their own notebooks).	Truth is a defense to defamation Bob must prove the truth of his statement if Rob sues - there is a reverse onus for this defense. Because this is a civil trial the burden is balance of probabilities. Provided Bob can prove Rob stole his bike he will win. A conviction for doing so is pretty good (but not necessarily conclusive) evidence. Absent that, Bob would need other evidence. Of course, if Bob has said that Rob was convicted of stealing the bike, he’s going to lose.	A fact cannot by itself constitute reasonable suspicion; the word "reasonable" describes not only the relationship between the fact and the possible existence of a crime, but also the officer's knowledge about the fact. The officer must not only sincerely believe the truth of the facts constituting reasonable suspicion, but must also reasonably believe it. I do not know whether a hallucinatory experience may be found reasonable for this purpose; I suspect that it would be a matter of dispute at trial. The first example is perhaps more straightforward, as there are probably a few possible explanations for the officer's failure to notice the turn signal. Still, are they reasonable? If the officer could not see the turn signals because something blocked the line of sight, it would not be reasonable for the officer to conclude that the driver had failed to use the signal. Rather, the officer has no evidence one way or the other, and absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The question deals in hypotheticals, where we can assume that the officer is sincere. But in a trial, the jury (or judge in a bench trial) cannot do that. They will look at the evidence, including the officer's testimony, and assess the officer's credibility. They will form an opinion about whether the belief was sincere and reasonable before they look at whether the facts, as the officer believed them to be, reasonably indicated that a crime was being committed or was imminent.	What prevents someone from pleading the Fifth Amendment, even if they don't necessarily have something that would incriminate themselves if they answered? Immunity. Sometimes prosecutors offer immunity to a witness in exchange for testimony against another defendant. In such cases, the witness cannot claim protection under the fifth amendment because the witness's testimony can no longer incriminate the witness. Does the opposition have to prove that nothing they say could incriminate themselves to remove the protection? No. Proving a negative proposition is generally impossible. Does the witness have to reveal something to the judge to enforce the protection? No, because such a revelation would also tend to incriminate the witness. Additionally, who knows what random law they might have broken, and might admit to if they testify? Can someone plead the fifth on those grounds? Yes. It is not in fact necessary to cite specific grounds for invoking the fifth amendment, because forcing a witness to cite a reason would itself be tantamount to forcing the witness to incriminate him- or herself. Quoting Wikipedia: Truthful statements by an innocent person An incriminating statement includes any statement that tends to increase the danger that the person making the statement will be accused, charged or prosecuted – even if the statement is true, and even if the person is innocent of any crime. Thus, even a person who is innocent of any crime who testifies truthfully can be incriminated by that testimony. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege: protects the innocent as well as the guilty.... one of the Fifth Amendment’s basic functions . . . is to protect innocent men . . . who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances..... truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker’s own mouth. (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) (per curiam)) The U.S. Supreme Court has also stated: Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege. (Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (footnote omitted)) (Citations inlined)	where does the prosecution occur? Prosecutions generally occur where a crime is committed. The area where a crime or other wrongdoing is committed is considered the proper "forum" for adjudicating the case. With respect to the law you cited, you should take note of the statutory limitations imposed upon the Attorney General in pursuing such a case (called a § 1119 prosecution). When considering the limitations, it is unlikely a trial of an American who killed an American in Canada would be tried in the United States. Those limitations begin with a prosecutor seeking written permission by the AG. This permission cannot be granted if the other country has already prosecuted the individual for the same conduct. Also, the AG can only give that permission if, after consulting the Secretary of State, he or she determines that the killing occurred in a jurisdiction where the suspect is "no longer present" and that the country is unable to "lawfully secure the person's return." and I'm wondering what that process actually looks like. This would be a consultation between Justice Department attorneys and the Assistant Secretary(ies) of State whose portfolio contains the foreign country in question. From the DOJ in particular, the Assistant AG for the Criminal Division is in charge of considering the above criteria and granting approvals. The Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section handles these issues within the Criminal Division. Does the Attorney General have to petition the other government for permission to prosecute them in the home country? No. The statutory limitations listed above necessitate that the suspect has already left that country and part of the AG's determination must be that it is unlikely that country will be able to secure the person's return. That said, might that country petition the United States that it wants the suspect to be returned to stand trial there? Potentially. Does it make a difference if the key witnesses are also all Americans, therefore arguing that chances of conviction are more likely if tried within the U.S. where all participants reside and are available to testify? This is, of course, a general consideration when determining which jurisdiction should handle a matter. It isn't clear to what degree it comes into consideration in this type of prosecution. does anyone know any famous/well known examples of this happening? Famous/well-known? I can't be sure, but see, e.g., United States v White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 1997), United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818 (W.D. La. 2002), United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brimager, 123 F.Supp.3d 1246 (S.D. Cal 2015). Interestingly, the statute gets substantial discussion and review in this Department of Justice White Paper entitled, Legality of a Lethal Operation by the Central Intelligene Agency Against a U.S. Citizen, in the context of whether the CIA could kill an American citizen in Yemen who has been reasonably determined to be a senior leader of al-Qaida.
Do all cops in the USA actually wear bodycams now? I've seen numerous videos of people getting arrested in the USA, both in their cars on the road and at their homes. Apparently, cops wear always-running cameras at all times these days, not just mounted on their cars (which is bad enough from a privacy perspective). Does this really apply to ALL cops? Do they actually have the audacity to film me and store that footage forever and make it available to the public if they pay me a visit at my home and knock on the door and ask me questions about whatever? Or is it only a certain "segment" of cops, such as those frequently involved in violent encounters on the road or where they suspect that there will be a shootout at the house where they knock on the door?	NO It is decided state-by-state (for state-wide agencies like state troopers), and county by county, and city-by-city whether or not to buy and use cameras. Also, they are not usually always running. Policies as to when officers are required to turn them on vary as well as when the public and the involved officers get access to the recordings.	Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.	Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice.	Huge difference between a car and a house. For example, at least in Pennsylvania no warrant is required to search a vehicle on public roads. In other states there are so many easy pretexts that you practically have little protection from a full vehicle search (although the pretext will have to withstand strict scrutiny if evidence found in a search is used to charge you with a crime). Your house, on the other hand, still enjoys very strong fourth-amendment protections: One of my favorite U.S. Supreme Court cases on the subject is Florida v. Jardines, in which SCOTUS ruled that even approaching the front door with a drug-sniffing dog without a warrant constituted an illegal search. (The majority opinion is worth reading for its illumination of current law on this question.)	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.	“Never” is a very big word… If a burglar stabs someone in claimed self defense, then we have evidence that this was an armed burglary, so that won’t go down well for that burglar. And your rights to self defence are greatly diminished if you caused that situation illegally. So should you get into the situation, try to run away if at all possible. If you had any chance at all to escape your self defence argument will not be accepted. The only possible situation with self defence is if you are threatened with illegal violence that cannot be justified by the fact that you are a criminal. For example you enter a home, two people with guns inside catch you, bind you to a chair so you are no danger at all, and instead of calling the police they announce they will kill or maim you. This is of course very unlikely to happen.	Revised for clarity in light of comments State and local police can arrest anyone who they have probable cause to believe is breaking state or local law. Like all LEOs, Federal LEOs can break some state and local laws while enforcing Federal law. When they grab someone off the street and hold them in a cell, they are detaining them, not kidnapping them, and so on. However, to avoid arrest, the Feds have to identify themselves. That's because state and local LEO who know they are dealing with Feds on federal business no longer have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed. State and local police can arrest Federal LEOs who they: a) have probable cause to believe are breaking state or local; and, b) have no reason to believe are Feds enforcing Federal law. In other words: Any Fed who refuses to identify herself to a local LEO can be arrested if there is probable cause. State and local police cannot, however, arrest Federal LEOs just because they are not wearing insignias. That is because: a) there are no federal statutes requiring federal LEOs to identify themselves; b) the Supremacy Clause says federal law takes precedence over state and local law that conflict with it; c) at least in Portland, the feds were not operating under any sort of formal agreement with Portland or Oregon officials that required them to have identification. While it is hard to prove a negative, the question of whether Federal LEOs are required to identify themselves has been looked at recently by reputable sources. They all agree there is no such law. For example, the answer from Lawfare: Broadly speaking, law enforcement officers do not have a legal duty to disclose either their identities or their agencies of affiliation, even if asked directly. Certain municipalities require police officers to identify themselves if asked, but there is currently no federal statute requiring officer disclosure of such information. The article points out that the two main types of cases involving police identifying themselves really don't apply: police who are working undercover, notably in sting operations, and police searching and seizing property. They go on to point out: Separate from the question of federal law, several states have adopted laws and regulations requiring law enforcement to identify themselves. For example, under New York City’s Right to Know Act, a broad set of police reforms that went into effect in October 2018, officers must tell civilians at the start of some interactions “their name, rank, command, and shield number.” (Also, many departments have policies that generally require officers to identify themselves, although with exceptions. You can see examples of the policies here.) Again, these local laws do not apply to Feds because of the Supremacy Clause. NOTE: As several of the news stories note, the lack of identification will make it very hard to hold Federal LEOs accountable for their actions. Accountability requires identity.	Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
What is the definition of computer virus by law?The definition seems to be broad According to the Indian IT Act we cannot place computer virus(which includes cookies) without user permission but does that mean we need to take permission even for placing nessecary cookies? According to the IT Act the definition of computer virus as given here says that it is any information that executes itself as soon as another program is started. Now many apps are set to autostart with windows. (iii) "computer virus" means any computer instruction, information, data or programme that destroys, damages, degrades or adversely affects the performance of a computer resource or attaches itself to another computer resource and operates when a programme, data or instruction is executed or some other event takes place in that computer resource; Also, several websites deploy cookies and they too fall under this definition as provided here. Now the definition made there makes it seem many websites accessible in India are illegal. How is it possible? Is it really the definition made. (This is not legal advice) My question here is according to the definition many things including cookies and other daily b software become illegal which is not the case in India. How am I misinterpreting the definition? It is true that by taking permission this can be avoided but some cookies are necessary for the function of the website without consent so do we have to take permission for even necessary cookies?	It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.	If there's a reason to believe that your machine has data that would be relevant to a lawsuit, then yes, it is subject to inspection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: A party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: ... any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. So if there's a lawsuit where there becomes a question about what you downloaded from the network, then it's quite plausible that your device could be demanded or subpoenaed. But that's not the same thing as "forfeiting" your device. The normal procedure in such a case would be that the agency's lawyers would notify you of the demand, and you would take your device to an ESI expert, who would make a digital image of the device's hard drive. The parties would then fight about what portions of that image they are allowed to access, but you would have your device again while that was going on.	18 U.S. Code § 2252 defines a crime and punishment for knowingly transporting, or reproducing for distribution by any means, visual depictions involving the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Here are some sample jury instructions that rephrase this and give definitions for each of these terms. Here are some others (at p. 469). This law review article discusses the knowledge requirement of this statute. It would be an easy argument that the operators of the intermediary nodes do not have the requisite knowledge of the material flowing over their networks and computers to be implicated by section 2252, especially when they are broken down into chunks that can only be re-assembled at the destination. United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006) is an example of a case where a defendant was found to not have the requisite knowledge of child pornography that was found in his browser's cache folders. These were complete files, no assembly required. However, the court said: where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and control of the child pornography images located in those files An IPFS user has no more knowledge of the pieces being passed through their computer than this defendant did of his cache (unless of course they are the source or destination).	This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.	This is a developing area within the law. In the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) governs. However, the law is broadly written. This means creative prosecutors can and do win federal criminal cases by arguing the law should apply. Whether violating a website's terms of service should be considered a federal crime subject to the Act has been a subject of hot debate. In United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), the 9th Circuit decided violations of use should be considered breaches rather than crimes. However, the district court refused to dismiss some charges against Nosal when the case was returned, and a jury conviction resulted in a prison sentence. At least three different circuits have arrived at other interpretations of the CFAA. Draft legislation (H.R. 2454 and S. 1196) would limit the scope of the CFAA by excluding TOS violations, however, it hasn't been adopted as of this writing. That CAPTCHA breaking violates website terms of service isn't really in question. For example, see U.S. v. Lowson, 10-cr-114, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey (Newark) in which the judge brought a criminal case to which two defendants plead guilty to wire fraud, one plead guilty to misdemeanor computer crimes, and a fourth went on the lam. But does for-profit CAPTCHA solving violate U.S. law? Given the state of the law, one could make a case either way. Given the industry's reputation, serious questions about intended use, and questionable labor practices, that's a significant risk.	Disclaimer: Not a lawyer or even living in US. I try to write the answer under US law. Other countries law may differ. Make sure you consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction. Here is my understanding of the individual examples: You don't need permission legally, because you are only accessing your own account and your own information. You are the only one damaged by the intrusion and therefore, nobody can really file a lawsuit against you. This is often used by security researchers when the subjects are uncooperative. That being said, if it is an actual pentesting client, you may want to refrain from it regardless. You don't need a permission to modify hardware you own. This is completely legal and not considered an attack. It would qualify as an upgrade, such as replacing a component in your laptop. You are allowed to do that. You should have a permission here. This is an intentional penetration test and you should have permission to do this. The same as 3. This is an intentional penetration test and you should get a permission. Though if you logout immediately and don't mess with the interface, it may not be illegal on the basis that you did not cause any damage or steal any information, or it may be illegal under some circumstances. It may also be impossible to prove that you did not do anything while there.	The relevant Maryland statute is MD. Criminal Law Code Ann. § 9-307 (2021), subsection (a): A person may not destroy, alter, conceal, or remove physical evidence that the person believes may be used in a pending or future official proceeding with the intent to impair the verity or availability of the physical evidence in the official proceeding. Note "that the person believes" and "with the intent to." If you have no reason to think it might be necessary in an official proceeding, you aren't violating this section. If you delete the data unintentionally or for some other reason, then you also probably are not violating the section. (I say "probably" because I'm sure there's some sort of provision for negligence or willful disregard for the evidential value of something you should know has evidential value.) As a practical matter, no copyright lawsuit or criminal trial (and criminal trials over copyright infringement are very rare) is going to depend on the browser history of the defendant's friend. What if my computer has major software issues and the only viable solution is delete everything and reinstall from scratch; am I stuck with a worthless broken computer because reinstalling things from scratch would delete evidence of a crime? If you know of evidence on the hard drive that would be destroyed, you can copy it somewhere else before deleting and reinstalling. Federal law is similar: it requires knowledge and intent. 18 USC 1519: Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.	The site's owners would likely be immune from any civil action based on its users' conduct, under Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act: No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. The users, though, could still face liability. Although it would be libel rather than slander (because it is published rather than spoken), any damaging falsehoods could be actionable. The emotional distress component would also be a possibility, but it would probably be a tougher case. The laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but generally speaking an emotional-distress case requires really outrageous behavior and and very serious emotional damage.
Is MCLeaks breaking the Minecraft EULA? I have been in an argument for the last twenty or so minutes regarding the legality of a website known as "MCLeaks" (link to terms of service), which is a purveyor of free Minecraft accounts by way of users uploading their details to them. The Minecraft end user license agreement clearly states: The one major rule is that you must not distribute anything we've made unless we specifically agree to it. By "distribute anything we've made" what we mean is: give copies of our Game to anyone else; make commercial use of anything we've made; try to make money from anything we've made; or let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable; unless we specifically agree to it. And so that we are crystal clear, "the Game" or "what we have made" includes, but is not limited to, the client or the server software for our Game. It also includes updates, patches, downloadable content, add-ons, or modified versions of a Game, part of those things, or anything else we've made. While the MCLeaks page states: Uploading MC Accounts If you are submitting an accountlist, you provide that you have full owner rights at the specified accounts you submit. The accounts will be automaticially uploadet to our service, and shared with the community. The accounts are stored in our database and get completely deleted after 7 days. You are responsible for every account you have submitted to our service, we are not legally responsible for your actions. However, I'm not certain whether MCLeaks can realistically claim that they are not liable for the actions of the uploaders. Are MCLeaks outside of the bounds specified in the Minecraft EULA?	The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.	You can design whatever this system is (leaving aside jurisdictions without First Amendment-like law that lets you design to your hearts content), the problem comes in implementing. The main legal question is whether you are operating a website. A website operator has to comply with various laws that require them to remove content. For example, if you operate a website that allows users to distribute content that they upload, they can distribute copyright-protected content, and you can be held liable for copyright infringement. DMCA in the US provides a way for you to not get sued, but you have to be able to remove putatively infringing content, so you could get sued if you can't remove illegal content. This may also include legal troubles over e.g. defamatory content where a plaintiff gets a court order to remove the content – you can't plead "I can't it down" if the court orders you to do so. Napster was sued for copyright infringement and racketeering for facilitating law-breaking by others ("secondary infringement"), and in MGM v. Grokster the Supreme Court annonced the general principle that One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses Grokster's problems arose because they clearly intended the software to be used to violate copyright law, whereas it is unlikely that Github will get sued because it is possible to use the platform illegally. So it really matters exactly what this "platform" is and what your relationship to the platform is. Describing a system is generally not illegal, realizing and maintaining one can easily be.	Yes, that’s allowed. Under the Stack Exchange terms of service, content you upload is licensed to Stack Exchange Inc. on a non-exclusive basis under CC-BY-SA 4.0. The terms of service do not give Stack Exchange the copyright to your contributions, and a non-exclusive license means you are not promising Stack Exchange that “only Stack Exchange will be allowed to use this content.” That means you can continue to do whatever you want with your own content and do not need to mention Stack Exchange at all. The only restriction is that you can’t stop Stack Exchange from continuing to use your Stack Exchange content under CC-BY-SA 4.0, and since it’s a Creative Commons license you also can’t stop anyone else from using your Stack Exchange content under that license.	Stack Exchange have already covered this in a couple of places, from MSE's A site (or scraper) is copying content from Stack Exchange. What should I do?: When should I not report these sites? They follow all the attribution requirements. As mentioned before, there is nothing wrong with copying our content elsewhere on the web, so long as they are following all the attribution requirements given. There is no action we can take against a scraper who follows all the rules. And the old Attribution Required blog post mentions that the actual requirements are: Visually indicate that the content is from Stack Overflow or the Stack Exchange network in some way. It doesn’t have to be obnoxious; a discreet text blurb is fine. Hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) Show the author names for every question and answer Hyperlink each author name directly back to their user profile page on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/users/1234567890/username) By “directly”, I mean each hyperlink must point directly to our domain in standard HTML visible even with JavaScript disabled, and not use a tinyurl or any other form of obfuscation or redirection. Furthermore, the links must not be nofollowed	This has some basis in law. You need permission from a person to commercially exploit their likeness especially in California, and a waiver is a way of staving off future lawsuit over right of publicity. YT has a privacy policy whereby a person who have been filmed can request removal of the video (see also this, because they don't explain the policy in a single place). Because YT is commercially exploiting people's personalities, this is necessary.	There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use.	Twitter don’t have to host your account UMG’s and Sony’s business is probably more important to Twitter than yours is. It seems Twitter have made a commercial decision to close your account down. They can do this: We may suspend or terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part of the Services at any time for any or no reason, … What’s happening is not fair use Fair use is a lot narrower than you think it is. UMG and Sony (and every other music label) get paid when people use their music on a commercial platform like Twitter. Which means, you enabling people to avoid this is directly reducing their market so this is not fair use. Giving credit does not help. Now, if your program blocked the use of copyrighted songs that might be ok. Your program looks exactly like a piracy tool I’m sure you have the best intentions but your tool readily enables copyright violations by others. That’s moving out of the realms of civil breach and into possible criminal sanctions. I wouldn’t push this if I were you. Your understanding of copyright is flawed This video is a good primer on copyright.	Is this limitation enforceable? Sure it is; you agree to a TOS or EULA with the company to use the API, and that's a legally binding contract. If the contract stipulates limits to caching, that's enforceable in civil court by lawsuit (possibly criminal court, which will depend on jurisdiction). What if the end-user is the one caching the data on their end? If your end users might be caching, that's something you may need to outline in your own TOS/EULA to adhere to the API's stipulations. And, the API may not allow you to serve API data to your own users; read it and see. the information provided by the API is not proprietary,... That doesn't matter; you're using their API and service. If you don't like that, you need to write your own API or develop your own queries for the information. I'm designing a web application that will make use of a (non-free) third-party API. If that App is going to be distributed and used by others, talk to a lawyer about the API and have them write a TOS/EULA for your App; you run the risk of significant legal liability with a publicly distributed App that uses someone else's API, paid or free.
Is failing to report a bank error in and of itself a crime? (Related to discussion at https://money.stackexchange.com/questions/133263/how-should-i-handle-money-returned-for-a-product-that-i-did-not-return/133270 ) Suppose a customer receives a deposit into their bank account due to an error by the bank. They decline to mention this to the bank, hoping that the deposit will not be reversed, but they keep the entirety of those funds in the same account ready for return in case it is. The customer's contractual agreement with the bank surely has a clause that enjoins the customer to promptly notify the bank of any errors and they will have violated that (although perhaps in plausibly deniable fashion). However for the crime of theft to have been committed, we need "intent to deprive". To me (not a legal expert) it seems that merely failing to inform the bank of its own mistake does not rise to the level of intent to deprive, and no crime is committed unless/until the customer takes further action (such as spending the money). Am I wrong? Even if it is technically illegal, as a practical matter I assume that no bank would pursue this over merely reclaiming the funds. Is there any precedent for someone being punished purely for failing to report a bank error? (Jurisdiction note: the initial discussion centered around UK law, but as this is a hypothetical question, answers from other jurisdictions are also interesting.)	Disclaimer: I was the person who originally had the debate with the OP which prompted this question. My answer is based on the UK jurisdiction. Short answer (TLDR) If the action is deliberate, then under UK law it is likely that a crime of theft has been committed. Under the statutory definition of theft, five elements need to be established: dishonesty, appropriation, property, belonging to another, and intention to permenantly deprive. The first four are easy to satisfy. To establish intention, it is not necessary that the money be spent. It is only necessary to establish that at the moment that the recipient realised the mistake, they intended not to return the money. Even if they do plan to eventually return the money, it can still amount to an intention to permenantly deprive. In A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983), the Court of Appeal held that theft could be committed in a case where an employer had mistakenly paid £74.74 to an employee for hours they had not worked. The obligation to return the money arose at the moment the employee realised the mistake. Whether or not the money was spent was not an issue (it was not even raised). Full answer I'm starting from the assumption (stated in the question) that the action is deliberate, as opposed to the recipient simply not noticing they have received the money. If it was accident or unnoticed then it is unlikely a crime has been committed as the necessary intention will be lacking. By deliberate I mean the person notices the money being received, realises it was an error, knows who the sender was (or can reasonably find out), and does nothing to rectify it. If the action is deliberate then this is likely to amount to the crime of theft under the Theft Act 1968 ('TA 1968'). Note, whether or not the prosecution could actually prove the crime is a separate matter. The question is not asking how easy it is to prove the elements, only whether or not the crime has been committed. Statute Theft is defined as "dishonestly appropriat[ing] property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it" (Section 1(1) TA 1986). Your motivations for appropriating the property (including whether or not you spend it) are not a relevant factor: "It is immaterial whether the appropriation is made with a view to gain, or is made for the thief’s own benefit." (Section 1(2) TA 1986). The important thing is whether or not the five elements of theft are present. These elements appear in the statutory definition of theft and are further elaborated in the Act: dishonesty (section 2 TA 1986), appropriation (section 3 TA 1986), property (section 4 TA 1986), belonging to another (section 5 TA 1986) and intention to permenantly deprive (section 6 TA 1986). Dishonesty: Defences include believing there is a legal right to deprive the other of the property, believing there was consent, or believing that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be reasonably discovered (section 2(1) TA 1986). None of these exceptions apply here, given the premise of the question. However if one of these beliefs were instead present, it is worth pointing out that "belief" is assessed using the subjective test (what the defendant genuinely believed), not the more common objective test (what a reasonable person would have believed in the circumstances) (R v Robinson. [1977] Crim LR 173). If none of the exceptions apply, then there is two-stage test for dishonesty: an objective test and a subjective test. However, if the objective test is passed then the subjective one is likely to as well: "In most cases, where the actions are obviously dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will be obvious that the defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly. It is dishonest for a defendant to act in a way which he knows ordinary people to consider to be dishonest, even if he asserts or genuinely believes that he is morally justified in acting as he did." (R v Ghosh, [1982] QB 1053). Appropriation: "Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner." (emphasis added) (section 3(1) TA 1986). That very clearly applies here. Property: "'property' includes money [and] things in action" (Section 4(1) TA 1986). A bank balance is not money but a "thing in action" (a debt from the Bank to the customer) (A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369). Belonging to another: "Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof, then to the extent of that obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds." (Section 5(4) TA 1986). Note that it is not necessary that the customer be under a contractual obligation to return the money to the bank. Such an obligation can arise anyway under the law of restitution. It also arises in the law of equity - a person who gives property by mistake retains an equitable interest in that property (Chase Manhattan Bank v Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105). This principle has specifically been applied to bank errors (R v Shadrockh-Cigari [1988] Crim LR 465). Intention to permenantly deprive: "A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal." (Section 6(1) TA 1986). There are two important things to note here: firstly, an intention to take and then return an item can still amount to theft. Secondly, it is the intention at the time of the appropriation which matters. If the person intended to keep the money (in our case, by hoping it will never get asked for) at the time they became aware of the mistake then it doesn't what their later intention is after the event (e.g. they later decide to return the money because they have been asked for it). See also the reference to intention above in relation to "belonging to another". Other relevant case law Hibbert McKiernan [1948] 1A, ER 860: Property can cease to belong to another if abandoned. However the threshold for this is very high. Property is not abandoned just because the owner has stopped looking for it. You are therefore unlikely to be helped by the fact that the bank does not attempt to recover the money. R v Scott [1987] Crim LR 235: The defendant stole a pair of curtains from a shop but planned to return them the next day (to claim a fraudulent refund). Held: intention to permenantly deprive was present at the moment they were taken from the shop since the defendant treated the item as theirs to dispose of (see statutory definition of intention above). It didn't matter that defendant intended to return the item, even within a short timespan. Now you may argue that on the face of it it appears that you don't treat the bank balance as yours to dispose of because you leave it untouched. But remember you are under an obligation to return it as soon as you notice the error, which you fail to do. A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369: the defendant (R), a police officer, was mistakenly paid by bank transfer £74.74 for overtime she had not worked. The police made no demand for repayment. Held by the Court of Appeal: (1) section 5(4) TA 1986 applicable, (2) the legal obligation to return the money commenced as soon as R became aware of it, (3) satisfactory proof that R had no intention of making restoration to the police would be proof of an intention permanently to deprive. Note that whether or not the money is spent is not a factor (nor was it examined in the case): it is the intention that matters. Judgment excerpts: 186: "There was some evidence before the jury that she had decided to say nothing about this unsolicited windfall which had come her way, and had decided to take no action about it after she discovered the error. No demand for payment of the sum was made by the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police or anyone else." 189: "there was a legal obligation upon the respondent to restore that value to the receiver when she found that the mistake had been made" 189: "once the prosecution succeed in proving that the respondent intended not to make restoration, that is notionally to be regarded as an intention to deprive the receiver of that property which notionally belongs to him." Other points raised in the question "merely failing to inform the bank of its own mistake does not rise to the level of intent to deprive, and no crime is committed unless/until the customer takes further action (such as spending the money). Am I wrong?" Yes. For most crimes (other than absolute or strict liability crimes), you need to establish two things: actus reus (an action) and mens rea (a state of mind). A failure to inform the bank is part of the actus reus (it is an action, not a state of mind). It therefore has nothing to do with intention. The intention is the reason why you carried out the action. In our case it is the part in bold here: "they decline to mention this to the bank, hoping that the deposit will not be reversed". It is that hope which establishes intention. "Even if it is technically illegal, as a practical matter I assume that no bank would pursue this over merely reclaiming the funds." It is not necessary for a civil entity to pursue a criminal conviction. That is handled generally by the Crown Prosecution Service or by other government agencies that are empowered to prosecute. The bank's co-operation is only needed if their evidence is required to prove the case. Even then, a witness can be compelled to assist the case against their will (section 2, Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 and Part 17, Criminal Procedure Rules and Practice Directions 2020). Note that it is unlikely that a bank would refuse to cooperate. In any case, whether or not a crime will actually be prosecuted is not relevant to whether or not a crime has been committed (see my opening remarks about proving a case). "Is there any precedent for someone being punished purely for failing to report a bank error?" There are plenty of cases reported in the media involving convictions for failing to report and then spending money resulting from a bank error. See 1, 2, 3 for some examples. I was unable to find any precedents specifically relating to cases involving a bank error where the money was not spent. However, A-G's Reference above is essentially the same scenario, just involving an employer instead of a bank. In any case, the lack of an identical precedent does not mean that the courts would acquit a person in these circumstances. What matters is the statutory rules and whether or not the court would apply the existing precedents to the facts.	No, it doesn't seem like you did anything wrong. You can't have committed fraud because you didn't have the intent of entering the museum without paying. Fraud is defined in section 263 StGB: (1) Whoever, with the intention of obtaining an unlawful pecuniary benefit for themselves or a third party, damages the assets of another by causing or maintaining an error under false pretences or distorting or suppressing true facts […] You had no intention of obtaining an unlawful benefit. You presumably did not misrepresent your disability status. German criminal law has a related violation in Section 265a StGB, “obtaining benefits by deception”: (1) Whoever obtains the output of a machine or the services of a telecommunications network which serves public purposes or uses a means of transportation or obtains entrance to an event or facility by deception with the intention of not paying the fee […] Again, your lack of intent means that you haven't committed this crime. Interpreting what actually happened: The K20 ticket fees are reduced for severely handicapped people with 50% GdB (degree of disability indicating the person's difficulty of participating in society, in particular that person's difficulty for working a normal job, as determined by the VersMedV). You were not attested such a degree of disability via the German system, and therefore were not eligible for the discounted entrace fee of EUR 10. The museum has no obligation towards you to actually collect those fees. They can waive them whenever they want, for whatever reason they want. The museum could have given you the discounted price even without suitable evidence of your disability. Instead, they waived the fee entirely. If anyone is going to have problems here, it is the person at the ticket counter for failing to collect the appropriate fees. But that is an internal issue for the museum. You legally obtained a valid ticket to visit the museum. Translations were taken from the official page https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html	In England and Wales, theft is defined by s1 Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it It does not matter if the victim is not the rightful owner of the property, as the law only requires that the property belongs to another: the victim and owner can be two different people. As long as the other elements are present, the offence is committed. It's important when considering theft to look for dishonesty and intention to permanently deprive: borrowing something without permission with the intention to return it isn't theft, and nor is taking something by mistake. Theft is an 'either-way' offence (i.e. it can be tried summarily or by a jury), and in the latter case carries a maximum penalty of seven years in prison (s7 TA 1968).	The question does not say what reasons the other party gives for not paying, and so one cannot judge whether such reason is covered by the terms quoted in the question. In general a contract need not be highly specific if the intent is clear. However, any ambiguity will usually be resolved against the party who wrote the contract, so it is in that party's interest to be as clear and specific as possible. It is not clear from the quoted terms that they form a contract at all. No consideration is stated. Contractual provisions which deny all recourse are not always enforceable. They may be overruled by law or regulation, or by prior court decision or by an equitable decision. If there is a serious problem with the service provided, particularly in a consumer transaction, a court might reject a provision denying all refunds even if it is quite specific and clear. The question does not list the jurisdiction (country and, for federal countries, state or province). Laws on contracts and enforceable terms vary significantly in different jurisdictions. Without this a specific answer is not possible.	Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.	Essentially, if there is no written agreement or receipt of payment, the only records that exist will be in the payment itself. If it was paid by cash, there's probably no recourse without additional facts. However, if it was paid electronically, then even if there's no narration (description) that claims that the payment was for rent, it is still possible that you would be able to file a summons requiring the recipient bank to produce the information relating to the entity that holds the account the money was sent to. The information they have may be limited, but generally this would include: Name Address Date of birth (for natural persons) Phone number The above information is typically required under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist funding legislation. Additionally, if it was paid electronically, the regularity of the payments and the regular amounts may be persuasive. Finally, it's not proof, but you can swear an affidavit or a statutory declaration attesting to the truth of your assertions, but without additional evidence (the aforementioned transaction information), it doesn't really hold weight on its own.	Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well.	Yes A creditor (or alleged creditor) in the US may report such a debt, but must include in the report the information that the debt is disputed, if the creditor has been informed in writing that there is a dispute. If the consumer disputes that debt is valid that is a "factual dispute". That would include claims that goods ordered were never delivered, that the wrong goods were delivered, or that the goods were damaged or non-working at the time of delivery. One relevant law is the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Under § 611 of the act (15 U.S.C. § 1681i) a consumer may file a notice of dispute with a credit reporting agency (CRA). The CRA must re investigate the issue, and may ask for confirming information from the merchant or other person who initially reported the information (known as the "Furnisher" in the law). There is a set of procedures for handliung such disputes. Information found to be "Inaccurate or Unverifiable" must be removed. Subsections (b) and (c) of thsi section provife that: Statement of dispute. If the reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer may file a brief statement setting forth the nature of the dispute. The consumer reporting agency may limit such statements to not more than one hundred words if it provides the consumer with assistance in writing a clear summary of the dispute. (c) Notification of consumer dispute in subsequent consumer reports. Whenever a statement of a dispute is filed, unless there is reasonable grounds to believe that it is frivolous or irrelevant, the consumer reporting agency shall, in any subsequent report containing the information in question, clearly note that it is disputed by the consumer and provide either the consumer’s statement or a clear and accurate codification or summary thereof. Section 616 of the act (15 U.S.C. § 1681n]) provides penalties for wilful noncompliance, and section 617 of the act (15 U.S.C. § 1681o]) provides penalties for negligent noncompliance. These include for wilful noncompliance actual damages, statutory damages of up to $1,000, punitive damages if the court thinks such proper, and "the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees" for winning cases. For negligent noncompliance actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees are allowed. See also the Wikipedia Article on the Acty, "Summaries of Rights Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Regulation V)" from the Federal Register, and "Understanding the Fair Credit Reporting Act" from Experian (a major credit reporting agency). 15 U.S. Code § 1692g which is part of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides that if a consumer notifies a collector within 30 days of the initial debt collection attempt that the debt is disputed, collection attempts must cease until the collector verifies the debt, or obtains a certification from the creditor. Section 807(8) of the FDCPA (15 USC 1692f) prohibits: (8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed. See also "Dealing with Debt Collectors: What You Should Know"
Is there any country where contract overrides law? Why is contract not above law? Is there any country in the world where contract overrides law? If not, why not? What if both parties intend to sign and follow a contract that is against the law? My reason for asking is whether a contract can legitimately override EU refunds laws.	The law often provides a default which a contract can modify. For example, the law might provide that a lease can be terminated on 30 days notice, but the parties could agree on a different notice period, which would control. But a contract cannot be for an illegal result (or if it is, it will not be enforced by a court). Nor can a contract modify positive legal provisions which are specified as absolute. For example in some US states a consumer sale includes an implied warranted of merchantability, and this cannot be waived or modified by contract. Or the law in some cases gives a period, perhaps three days, within which a party has a right to cancel without penalty. This generally cannot be shortened by contract. There are various reasons why laws provide terms which a contract may not overrule. In many cases it is because one party is perceived as being in a stronger position and might be inclined to take unfair advantage. This is the case with much consumer protection legislation. In other cases it is to society's advantage if there are uniform terms and standards known to all, which cannot be varied by contract, so third parties do not need to check for contract terms. For example, US copyrights always expire on the last day of a year, and no contract can modify this. For another example banking law specifies the position and format of account numbers and routing numbers on a check, and a customer may not contract with a bank for a different format. I do not know if the EU refund law provides a default which can be modified, or an absolute rule which cannot.	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.	No Such a contract would be an attempt to evade the court order mandating a given level of support, and would not be enforceable. However it is not the case that no contract can deal with Child Custody or Child Support. A couple could surely make a contract to pay more than a court had ordered, that in no way violates the order. A contract could specify a default or initial amount of support, to be paid until and unless a court orders a different amount. Similarly a contract could specify initial custody, pending any court decision to the contrary, but it cannot preclude the court from making an order in accordance with the best interests of the child.	Yes From clause 7 of the Ebay agreement: When you enter into a transaction you create a legally binding contract with another user, unless the item is listed in a category under the Non-binding bid policy. You have a contract, if you don't fulfil your obligations under it you can be sued. You can only terminate a contract a) if the contract provides for termination and the relevant circumstances have happened, or b) due to a breach of a condition (but not a warranty) of the contract by the other party or c) some very limited and highly technical circumstances at law. The fact that the other party is rude doesn't fit within b) or c) and, barring some very unusual contract terms, won't fit in a) either. Make good on your legally enforcable promise.	There is nothing extraterritorial about these laws. If a company sells a good or provides a service to individuals based in the EU, then this good or service has to comply with EU laws. This concept is self-evident for physical goods that are produced anywhere in the world and then sold in the EU and the GDPR just applies this concept to services provided over the internet. The same legal concept also holds in all other major jurisdictions. The only thing that makes this more complicated for the GDPR is the actual enforcability of these laws but that is a technical issue not a legal one.	If a business literally has an "exact change only" policy, that can't be enforced in post-pay situations. But if they have a "you are free to overpay, but we won't give you change back", that's different, especially if it's communicated from the beginning. If they tell you they don't give change, then you're taking their goods/services implicitly agreeing to their terms.	No Governments have sovereign power. Subject to constitutional and legislative constraints, governments can change laws as they wish. That includes legislative changes and administrative policies. Most governments tend not to use this power arbitrarily because it tends to make investors wary - economists call this sovereign risk. Like any other risk, the higher it is, the greater return an investor expects - countries with high sovereign risk get less foreign investment and pay more for it. Further, most governments don’t make laws that are retrospective but unless there is a constitutional prohibition (like there is in the United States, for example), they can. So Ireland could not only change the rules going forward, they could change the rules that applied in the past (assuming the Irish constitution doesn’t prohibit this, which I don’t know enough about). If Ireland were to change this law, it’s likely there would be plenty of forward notice. The arrangement you spell out between mother and son is not enforceable unless it’s a contract and the presumption is that such familial agreements are not contracts. Such a presumption can be overcome by an explicit declaration by the mother and the son that they intend for it to be legally binding, preferably in writing. Now, governments can and do enter contracts which are enforceable by the courts but that is a one-on-one relationship between a government and a contractor; not a decree that must be followed by everyone. Unless, of course, they are the sort of government that doesn’t follow their own laws - I’m sure you can think of some - but they are huge sovereign risk.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".
Can I sue the bank that allowed a wire scram to go though without my authorization My son was scramed on the computer by allowing access to his computer to uninstall a program .The company was going out of business , so they offered a refund . there was a glitch on the computer and they supposedly credit 30,000.00. my son was told to wire the money back or he would be in trouble. So it was taken from my equity then transfed to my checking and then to my sons checking and then it was wired to a overseas account and bank stated to me they are not allow to question a customer.As there has not been any activite on my equity,why wasn't it questioned.	Who authorized the transfers? Banks don't transfer money without someone telling them to do so. Assuming it was your son there are several possibilities: You didn't log off from a banking session allowing him to access it. Legally, you authorized the transfers. You stored your sign-in credentials on the computer allowing your son to access them. Legally, you authorized the transfers. You gave your son your sign in credentials. Legally, you authorized the transfers. Your son hacked your account. Your son has committed fraud. Your contract with your bank may protect you from this, however, the bank will pursue your son for recovery and will likely refer the matter to the police.	Yes They explicitly make the identified illegal act a breach of contract and allow you to sue. Without that, you may have no remedy.	If you are facing felony charges, you need to hire a criminal defense lawyer, not ask for legal advice on the Internet. Do not talk to the police without your lawyer present. Do not attempt to represent yourself in any kind of hearing. Ignore any advice based on what seems fair or reasonable to someone on the Internet unless it is based on a real case in North Carolina or written by a real lawyer. That said, it appears to me that you have at least two strong defenses. First, if you you returned the laptop (It will help if you sent it by registered mail or otherwise kept a receipt, although, remember, they need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you kept it), that shows you had no “intent to steal” or “purpose to steal” it, which is a necessary element of the crime. Second, according to the University of North Carolina criminal law blog, you appear to have been charged with the wrong offense (although I don’t think that will actually help you if the prosecutor decides to bring the charge that matches what your former employer alleges you to have done). It cites a relevant North Carolina Supreme Court ruling on the difference between larceny and embezzlement, State v. McDonald, 45 S.E. 582 (N.C. 1903). I would focus on getting yourself cleared of these charges first. You can ask your lawyer if there is any recourse you might have against your former employer. I’m skeptical that suing them would be worth it, but I don’t know the circumstances. If you have proof of what they said to you and about you, hang on to it.	She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.	You haven't specified a jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom† this is a clear violation of section 3 of The Computer Misuse Act 1990 (1) A person is guilty of an offence if—     (a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer;     (b) at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and     (c) either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2) This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act—     (a) to impair the operation of any computer;     (b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer; [F2or]     (c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data; [F3or     (d) to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above to be done.]] Deleting the data is unauthorized (3.1.a) The ethical hacker knows it is unauthorized (3.1.b) Deleting the data prevents access to the data (3.2.b and hence 3.1.c) † This is one of the few Acts that apply to the whole of the UK.	Extrajudicial implies there is some weight of law behind the casino behaviors you describe. I don't think there is. For example, refusing to cash out chips could just be a management intimidation tactic to try to coerce the customer into agreeing to be "questioned." Which the customer would be under no legal obligation to do. Card counting can't be proven if the counter is not using a device of any kind. The casino can refuse to serve the customer and expel the customer but they can't unilaterally keep the customer's money by not cashing the customer's chips without a judgment. I am not an attorney. This answer is not legal advice.	You violated Facebook's Terms of Service, and it's entirely within your contractual agreement with them for them to close your account. You agreed to abide by the contract you "clicked through" when you signed up and opened a Facebook account. They didn't break any laws when you broke your contract with them. You clearly broke the contract by violating the TOS. They are not breaking any laws by not restoring your account. What you see as the value of your personal or business data doesn't really mean anything; it was your choice to use Facebook in the first place, and your mistake to break the TOS. You could try hiring a lawyer to make a case that you see a difference between the personal data you want to retrieve and the business data that caused the violation, but that's up to you; Facebook is under no legal obligation (this could be different, according to your jurisdiction and national laws) to restore any or all access to your account or data, but it's possible they could be persuaded.	I see that this would put me under heavy US regulation, and I'd like to avoid that, since it would require huge funding to hire lawyers to do something like that. There are many reasons for financial and banking industry regulations; namely, fraud protection, corruption and money laundering preventions, use of crypto to avoid taxes and records, etc. If you're serious about a startup that involves financial transaction, one of the first things you do is find a law firm to advise you on the legal plausibility of an idea. And be prepared to spend thousands and thousands of dollars in legal fees for regulatory approval. Would doing something like this solve my problem? You're really going to trust randos on the web for legal advice?
Is requesting a customer database for testing purposes legal? We're a company working in building industry and have a program, develeoped together with our software vendor, to create quotes and configurate products. The program uses a MS SQL database. It stores mainly following data (customer created): quotes, created material, prices (extra charge), users with names, company phone numbers, emails, etc., customers (customers of our customer), text modules (cover notes, terms, etc.). When we release a new version (update) sometimes issues occur which happen only at our customers because they've a different database structure for example or different data. Therefore my question: is it legal to ask a customer if we can use their database for testing purpose or is it not?	It's not illegal to ask. Whether they can give it to you, and under what circumstances, is another, much more complicated matter. For instance, if the database contains health information covered by HIPAA in the United States, or personal information covered by laws like GDPR or CCPA, the customer's ability to share the database may be restricted, either requiring additional confidentiality obligations/use restrictions, or preventing sharing entirely.	Awareness of consequences If you knew (or had reasons to suspect) that the server end implemented something like (whether intentionally, or by way of a bug/omission): if variableThing == MyValue { causeALotOfTrouble() } — then yes, you pretty much can be held accountable. Otherwise highly unlikely. By default, it is reasonable to expect that servers handle/filter/sanitise user input properly no matter where the request comes from, so modifying a URL is merely seeking certain data from the server — which it is free to supply or deny. For example, if MyValue is an SQL injection attempt, then yes. If it is trying to filter out the results by a certain criteria, then no.	It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.	Are all interview questions that don't apply to essential functions illegal? No. Not all such questions are illegal, but see one exception from California legislation as pointed out by @GeorgeWhite and others in section 432.7 of the state Labor Code. Other jurisdictions very likely have equivalent prohibitions, but questions like the one you envisioned ("What music do you like") would not infringe statutory provisions. Generally speaking, it is lawful for an employer to assess candidates' personality & non-essential skills under casual and not-so-casual scenarios through the use of questions with no relevance to the job at issue. Only in very specific circumstances certain pattern(s) of questions may lead to a finding of harassment or discrimination. Questions related to categories which the Civil Rights Act protects are risky because a rejected candidate would have at least some grounds for a claim of discrimination. Those categories are [candidate's] race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Questions on those protected categories are not illegal, but the employer will have the burden of proving that its challenged practice (i.e., making seemingly discriminatory questions) "is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity" (see 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)) rather than for purposes of unlawful discrimination.	No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though.	You Own The Code To answer your question on whether or not it is copyright infringement: Yes, you do own the rights to the written code but posting it on Github gives Github the right to store, archive, parse, and display Your Content, and make incidental copies, as necessary to provide the Service, including improving the Service over time. This license includes the right to do things like copy it to our database and make backups; show it to you and other users; parse it into a search index or otherwise analyze it on our servers; share it with other users; and perform it. To simply put it, no matter what license you use, you give GitHub the right to host your code and to use your code to improve their products and features. This license does not grant GitHub the right to sell Your Content. It also does not grant GitHub the right to otherwise distribute or use Your Content outside of our provision of the Service, except that as part of the right to archive your Content. So with respect to code that’s already on GitHub, I think the answer to the question of copyright infringement is fairly straightforward. Things aren’t quite as clear-cut in a scenario where Copilot is trained on code that is hosted outside of GitHub. In that situation, the copyright infringement question would hinge largely on the concept of fair use. If Copilot is being trained on code outside of GitHub, we accept that at least some of what they’re looking at is copyrightable work. So, the question then becomes if it’s fair use. Now, you ultimately can’t conclude definitively that something is fair use until you go to court and a judge agrees with your assessment. But I think there’s a strong case to be made that Copilot’s use of code is very transformative, a point which would favor the fair use argument. There is precedent for this sort of situation. Take the case of Google Books, for example. Google scanned millions of books, provided people who were doing research with the ability to search the book, and provided the user a small snippet of the text that the user was searching for in the book itself. The court did in fact find that was fair use. The use was very transformative. It allowed people to search millions of books. It didn’t substitute for the book itself. It didn’t really take away anything from the copyright holders; in fact, it made it easier for readers to access the work and actually opened a broader market for book authors. And, it was a huge value add on top of the copyrighted corpus. In the latter scenario, a lot depends on the thoroughness and the length of Copilot’s suggestions. The more complex and lengthy the suggestion, the more likely it has some sort of copyrightable expression. If a suggestion is short enough, the fact that it repeats something in someone else’s code may not make it copyrightable expression. There’s also the question of whether what’s being produced is actually a copy of what’s in the corpus. That’s a little unclear right now. GitHub reports that Copilot is mostly producing brand-new material, only regurgitating copies of learned code 0.1% of the time. But, we have seen certain examples online of the suggestions and those suggestions include fairly large amounts of code and code that clearly is being copied because it even includes comments from the original source code.	Legal unless you violate copyright. Screenshots will probably be fair use. The manuals/how-tos need to be your originals, not copies from anywhere.	Yes, it is legal to do that More exactly, it is not copyright infringement. Reverse engineering has been found to be a fair use under US copyright law in: Sega Enterprises v. Accolade 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).; and Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In general pure reverse engineering is fair use when the reuser has not agreed to a contract limiting reverse engineering and has not obtained a copy through deception. But a file format is considered to be an idea or a method of operation, and so is not protected by copyright at all, and nothing that is done with it could ever be copyright infringement. See https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/windows/en-US/3269d4f3-8b39-4a2c-8205-1a55e0c6774d/are-file-types-copyrighted?forum=Vsexpressvcs and "Does copyright protect data file formats?" from Lexology, the latter citing EU law and the case of SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Thus there is no copyright infringement in reverse engineering a file format, or in then writing and distributing code to read, write, or, modify files in such a format. If a valid patent applies, that may prevent creating or using such software without a license from the patent holder. But my understanding is that in most cases a file format will not be subject to a patent.
Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes? I understand that if I want to take a picture of an area for commercial use, I am beholden to copyright laws. As per 17 US 120, The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. The inside of a mall is an open space, but it is privately owned. Is it considered a "public place" by this definition?	The mall is a privately owned public space At least while it’s open to the public. A photograph of architecture taken from within it would not violate copyright. However, photographs of other things (like art) do not have the public space exemption. Additionally, the owner can limit or restrict photography. This has nothing to do with copyright, just that an owner has the right to control what happens on their property (within legal limits).	Yes, except for the part where you say "thus". Copyright protection isn't limited to published works, though in the past this was the case with US law. Current US law defines publication as the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication. Web distribution is one way to distribute a protected work. The distinction between published and unpublished works matters in terms of registration requirements, it figures into the question of the nationality of the author, the duration of protection for a work for hire and (pseudo)anonymous works, as well as the duration of protection for works created before January 1, 1978 but first published between then and January 1, 2003, and so on. The US Copyright office provides guidance that derives from court cases, and they have this to say about published vs. unpublished. They give as an example of publication ("Offering to Distribute Copies or Phonorecords to a Group of Persons") Publication occurs when copies of a photograph are offered to clients, including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, agencies, wire services, and websites with a license permitting further distribution or display of the photograph. also An offer by the copyright owner on a public website to purchase and download an app that they developed and made accessible on that website constitutes publication of that app. German copyright law makes mention of "publication" as well, for instance The right of publication and of exploitation of the work accrues jointly to the joint authors; alterations to the work shall be permissible only with the consent of the joint authors. However, a joint author may not refuse his consent to publication, exploitation or alteration contrary to the principles of good faith. Each joint author shall be entitled to assert claims arising from violations of the joint copyright; he may, however, demand performance only to all of the joint authors. §6 says that (1) A work shall be deemed to have been published when it has been made available to the public with the consent of the rightholder. (2) A work shall be deemed to have been released when copies of the work have been offered, with the rightholder’s consent, to the public or brought to the market after their production in sufficient quantity. An artistic work shall also be deemed to have been released when the original or a copy of the work has been made permanently available to the public with the consent of the rightholder. One would have to inquire into the specifics of German law to know if "putting one copy on a website" constitutes being brought to the market after production in sufficient quantity.	In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).	A work of art is protected by copyright, under US copyright law – see here esp. §908. Jewelry designs are typically protected under the U.S. copyright law as sculptural works, although in rare cases they may be protected as pictorial works. This Section discusses certain issues that commonly arise in connection with such works. (followed by a discussion of what jewelry is). The item must be "sufficiently creative or expressive", which we will take to be self-evidently true.	If I draw something, having been inspired by looking at some other thing, you are not copying that thing. If you carefully copy something even if you are also deliberately changing features of the original, then you are copying. Copyright law gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to make copies. There is a difference between copying music and visual art in this respect, since music can be reduced to a small set of specific symbols, so "being inspired by" a musical work is often found to be infringement. The difficult part is legally distinguishing "making a copy" versus "being inspired by". The courts use a subjective test of "substantial similarity" to decide if there has been copying. the case of Mannion v. Coors. "Pose" is an element that is considered in assessing similarity: the question the court would ask (itself) is whether such a pose could ever have come from elsewhere (such as, your own creative efforts).	Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.	You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data.	"Public domain" refers to things in principle copyrightable but where protection has lapsed, been repudiated, or is a statutory exception (such as government works). A website is not "in the public domain". The idea that a website is "public property" is (cough) mistaken. There are basically two ways in which a web interaction could be illegal. The first regards whether accessing another person's computer is illegally accessing a computer, which is a crime. Authorization essentially comes down to "permission": if the owner permits me to access the computer, I am authorized. Putting stuff out there on a web server is an open-ended grant of permission to look at a web page. That simply means that if I create a web page (with a bunch of links or not), I am granting you permission to interact with my computer to that extent. It does not create permission to hack into a password-protected subdirectory. An ordinary web crawler automates what a clicking human does. Copyright law is also relevant, in that the stuff I put on my webpage is not to be copied without permission. Any webpage access necessarily involves automatic copying from machine to machine: in putting stuff out there for the world to see, I am saying that the world can do that level of automatic copying that arises from normal html-and-click interactions. It does not mean that you can download and do stuff with my copyrighted content (i.e., it is not an abandonment of copyright: I did not put that stuff in the public domain). Putting a web page out there in an unrestricted fashion means that you've given a certain level of permission to "copy" (at least in the automatic server-to-browser viewing sense). I may want to impose conditions on peoples' access to my stuff, so I can impose terms on such material. For instance, I may require users to agree to certain conditions before accessing the CoolStuff subdirectory. Users then have to jump through a minor hoop and agree to those terms. In that case, my permission is conditional, and if you violate the terms of that agreement, I may be able to sue you for copyright infringement. It could then be a violation of my terms of service (TOS) if I say "you may not crawl my website" (in less vague language). A TOS gets its legal power from copyright law, because every webpage interaction involves copying (I assume that technical point is obvious), and copying can only be done with permission. You may technologically overcome my weak click-through technology so that the bot just says "sure whatever" and proceeds to illegally use my web page: I can sue you now for copyright infringement. The robot-specific methods of meta-tags and robots.txt have no legal force. Although there is a way to say "no you may not," which is tailored to automated access, the meaning and enforcement of these devices has not yet reached the law. If my page uses NOFOLLOW and your program doesn't know or care, you (your program) do not (yet) have a duty to understand, detect and respect that tag. Prior registration is also not a legal requirement, and very many pages that are on the master crawl list get there from being linked to by someone else's web page. Again, there is at present no legal requirement of pre-registration (and there is no effective mechanism for verifying that the site owner has registered the site). Archiving and especially re-displaying someone's content is, on the other hand, not legal. It would be plainly copyright infringement if you were to scoop up someone else's webpage and host it. You can analyze their material and somehow associate it with some search terms, and display a link to that page, but you cannot copy and republish their material. You can put very short snippets out there taken from a web page, under the "fair use" doctrine, but you can't wholesale republish a webpage. (It should be noted that the archive.org is an internationally recognized library, and libraries have extra statutory powers to archive).
Is Stack Exchange, Inc. a publisher or a public forum? I'm wondering if Stack Exchange, Inc. is a publisher or a public forum? More specifically do they have the right to censor and suspend users even if they haven't violated their terms of service? P.S. The tag freedom-of-speech was added because, as far as I know, if SE is a public forum, they must honor First Amendment protections.	You really asked two different questions, so let's take them one at a time: Publisher Within the scope of 47 USC 230, Stack Exchange is defined as a provider of an "interactive computer service," which is defined as follows: Interactive computer service The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. Stack Exchange's users are defined as "information content providers": Information content provider The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service. (Small caps removed to aid in legibility.) Then, under paragraph (c) of that section: (1) Treatment of publisher or speaker No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. (2) Civil liability No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of— (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). Therefore, Stack Exchange is specifically and unambiguously excluded from being treated as the publisher of any user-generated content. Additionally, there's an explicit waiver of liability for moderation activities. This waiver does not contain any provision requiring Stack Exchange (or anyone else) to moderate "fairly" or to be "neutral," nor does it say anything about terms of service. Regardless, it's hard to see how they could violate these terms anyway: Stack Overflow reserves the right to refuse, suspend or terminate your access to the public Network if it determines, in its sole discretion, that you have in any way violated these Public Network Terms or are otherwise ineligible to access or use the Network or Services. If your actions are determined by us to violate these Public Network Terms, Stack Overflow may, in its sole discretion, try to remediate that violation by working with you individually, but is under no obligation to do so, and if any such remediation efforts are unsuccessful (in Stack Overflow’s sole discretion), then Stack Overflow may revoke your rights to the Network. (Emphasis added.) Public forum A "public forum" in American Constitutional law normally refers to a situation where an agent of the government contracts with a private entity to set up a space in which the general public may speak or otherwise express themselves. Because the private entity acts on behalf of the government, the First Amendment is extended to the private entity, at least in the context of the space which it has set up. Stack Exchange, to the best of my knowledge, has no such relationship with either the federal or any state government. So the doctrine is inapplicable. In California, the state constitution has a stronger provision which has been applied to private actors notwithstanding their lack of a relationship with the government. This case was Pruneyard v. Robins. In subsequent California caselaw, the courts have repeatedly refused to extend this logic beyond its original context (shopping malls with "common areas" where people may congregate), and it seems unlikely that it would apply to websites.	The United States has a very liberal attitude when it comes to free speech. Short of materials that are: child pornography, restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Libelous/Fraudulent, encourage or aid others in breaking the law, or seditious/treasonous/ terroistic/other credible threats there is almost nothing that can't be published. There is another example where supposedly The Golden Book of Chemistry Experiments was banned by the US Government, but I cannot find any evidence or action against the author to support the claim. The Political Mofia by Schiff was not neccessarily banned, but an injunction from publishing was issued against the authors in US v. Schiff, 379 F. 3d 621 - Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2004 per 26 U.S.C. 7408 on grounds that the books was fraudulent. Essentially it is the Federal courts that can ban a book from commerce with cause. Schools, libraries and other institutions may ban it from their collections, but not from public commerce. Wikipedia has a list of Books banned by governments that you may want to look at to find examples.	Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.	If a newspaper publishes an article that is actually defamatory (i.e. publishes false statements that cause you quantifiable harm), and you successfully sue the publisher, you might get a court order requiring them to retract the statements or remove them from their web page. An archive like newspapers.com isn't making false statements, it is making true statements about what the Poughkeepsie Journal published. At any rate, you name is not defamatory, it is (or was) a fact.	It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable.	The essence of the order's argument is that in editing user generated content outside of the provisions in one section of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the platform necessarily excludes itself from the protections afforded by another section of the CDA. The EFF says: ... Even though neither the statute nor court opinions that interpret it mush these two Section 230 provisions together, the order asks the Federal Communications Commission to start a rulemaking and consider linking the two provision's liability shields. The order asks the FCC to consider whether a finding that a platform failed to act in "good faith" under subsection (c)(2) also disqualifies the platform from claiming immunity under section (c)(1). In short, the order tasks government agencies with defining “good faith” and eventually deciding whether any platform’s decision to edit, remove, or otherwise moderate user-generated content meets it, upon pain of losing access to all of Section 230's protections. ... The order also argues that the very popular social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are the functional equivalent of the public square, not merely private providers protected by the First Amendment, and therefore should not be able to edit user generated content. The EFF article quotes from a Supreme Court judgment that says "merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to First Amendment constraints." Recommend the full article: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/trump-executive-order-misreads-key-law-promoting-free-expression-online-and See also Techdirt's article, The Two Things To Understand About Trump's Executive Order On Social Media: (1) It's A Distraction (2) It's Legally Meaningless. [edit] Eugene Volokh wrote a good explainer with background. Regarding the social-media-platforms-become-state-actors argument, see this recent D.C. Circuit judgment on appeal (Freedom Watch v Google etc): Freedom Watch's First Amendment claim fails because it does not adequately allege that the Platforms can violate the First Amendment. In general, the First Amendment 'prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech.' Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). Freedom Watch contends that, because the Platforms provide an important forum for speech, they are engaged in state action. But, under Halleck, 'a private entity who provides a forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor.' ... This was a group that alleged Google, Facebook, Twitter and Apple "conspired to suppress conservative political views ... its audience and revenues and succeeded in reducing each". Very similar to Trump's complaints. And "this idea that Section 230 requires sites to moderate in a neutral fashion has become very popular even though it has no basis in reality or law" - Ken White (aka Popehat) in another good explainer and podcast about this.	There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction.	Everything you see there is copyright and trademark the Tolkien estate or a derivative work thereof. It's all illegal.
Can someone back out from an agreement to pay someone else money if they fail to achieve a goal? A scenario similar to this has undoubtably been considered before but I haven't come across anything that is in the same vein. In any case, would this example be a specific type of contract/agreement and would it be legally enforceable. Agreement: Person A is determined to stop smoking in six months time. Person A and Person B make an agreement whereby Person A shall deposit into an escrow account $10,000; if at the end of six months Person A has successfully stopped smoking then the agreement stipulates all the money is returned to him. If he fails in his goal and is still smoking after six months, then Person A has instructed that Person B shall be entitled to claim the $10,000 and spend however he wishes; it is intended to serve as an incentive and to discourage failure in achieving the goal. What would a court say to Person A if - after 3 months he decided he was no longer interested to stop smoking and wanted his money back?	common-law What would a court say to Person A if - after 3 months he decided he was no longer interested to stop smoking and wanted his money back? For simplicity, let's take the contract between the escrow service and A/B out of the equation. There is no contract between A and B because there is no consideration moving from B. B parts with nothing for their chance to get $10,000. So, if A takes the case to the court after 3 months they will get their money back (again, not considering troubles with escrow). B will have no legal entitlement whatsoever.	You cannot contract outside the law Any "contract" that purports to break the law isn't a contract - it's an unenforceable agreement. For example, across all jurisdictions, a contract that is unconscionable is void. So is a contract that requires one of the parties to break the law - a "contract" for murder for example. In addition, you cannot call an employment relationship a "business" relationship - if the relationship meets the requirements of an employer-employee relationship then that's what it is and woe betide you if you haven't complied with all relevant entitlement, tax, insurance and safety laws. In addition, all of the relationships you listed are contracts.	What would happen if this money was not returned? The former employee would, based on the given circumstances, be guilty of theft contrary to section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: (1) A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it... Section 5 defines "Belonging to another" to include: (4)Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration [...] an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds. Setion 4 states that: (1)“Property” includes money... Although there are statutory defences to theft, at section 2, to acting dishonestly they are not satisfied in this scenario: (1)A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— (a)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or (b)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or (c)(except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if he appropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps. A very similar set of circumstances arose in the case A-G Ref (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182 The defendant, a police woman, received an overpayment in her wages by mistake. She had noticed that she had received more than she was entitled to but did not say anything to her employer. She did not withdraw any of the money from her bank account. The trial judge directed the jury to acquit. The Attorney General referred a question to the Court of Appeal. Held: [by the Court of Appeal] It was possible for a theft conviction to arise where the defendant had not withdrawn the money. There was a legal obligation to return the money received by mistake.	Please note that I can't provide legal advice and consider the following as suggestions you can and should discuss with a lawyer of your choice: You are probably member of a tax-advisory association (Lohnsteuerhilfeverein). These associations can only advise its members on their tax declarations. Therefore you are indeed a member, not a "member". As a member you are presumably obliged to pay a yearly membership fee, and from your initial question I infer that the membership cannot be terminated before three years have passed. That and when you have to pay your fee is most likely provided for in the association's constitution. Payment of the fee does not depend on an invoice, because the requirements of § 14 UStG are most likely not met: the association is not a trader (Unternehmer), nor is a membership a performance (Leistung). Whether you have to pay a penalty depends on the wording of the section regarding the fee in the constitution. If your membership rights have been infringed by not giving you notice of the annual general meeting, this would not give you a defence or objection against the payment of the fee. You could report this matter to the competent watchdog (Aufsichtsbehörde) under § 27(1) StBerG, though: Aufsichtsbehörde ist die Oberfinanzdirektion oder die durch die Landesregierung bestimmte Landesfinanzbehörde. 2 Sie führt die Aufsicht über die Lohnsteuerhilfevereine, die ihren Sitz im Bezirk der Aufsichtsbehörde haben. That is either the Oberfinanzdirektion or the Landesfinanzbehörde in the German state where the association has its statutory seat.	If it is a multi-party contract, generally all parties to the contract have liability for its breach regardless of who is supposed to receive payment. It is possible to contractually negotiate for limitations of liability in a contract, but not all liability and only with clear language to that effect. Further, if the CorpA and Corp B and Corp C all anticipated at the outset that if there was liability that CorpB incurred that it would not be paid, that would constitute both common law fraud and a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act by everyone involved (entities and individuals) because one is anticipating incurring future liability in an entity with no anticipated capacity to pay it. The circumstances would also plausibly justify "piercing the corporate veil."	Yes You have a contract and, while I don't know what it says, its a fair bet that not making payments the contract requires you to make would be a breach of that contract. This would allow the other party to sue you for the unpaid fees as well as interest on them and the consts of collection (collection agency fees, legal fees etc.). In addition they can report you as a defaulter (which you would be) to any and all credit reporting agencies which would wreck your ability to get credit in the future. If the do sue you and succeed (as the probably would) they can seize your assets to sell them to recover their debt - since the time-share appears to have limited value they would probably seize your savings or your car instead. You need to read the contract to find out how you can end it legally.	Yes, you're allowed to pay someone to keep quiet, as long as whatever they're keeping quiet about isn't evidence of a crime. Companies can do this too, and quite often do. Offering to keep quiet in exchange for money may well constitute blackmail. But that doesn't appear to be an issue here.	You can have agreements that are not contracts As such, there are not legally enforceable as contracts but may be enforceable under non-contract law. Examples of such non-contractual agreements include social agreements, statutory duties, memorandums of understanding, agreements to distribute cocaine etc. However, that’s not what you have here “No contract” agreements for things like internet or phone services are contracts - the “no contract” terminology is advertising fluff to indicate that the contracts are one-off or short term and don’t lock the customer into a long-term contract. The term “contract” is being used in a generally understood way as meaning a long-term binding commitment not in a strict legal way where virtually every commercial transaction is a contract
Child pornography and pictures of oneself Alice is 30 and lives in the EU. When she was underage (say 14) she willfully took photos and videos of herself masturbating and/or performing explicit sexual acts. She still has those photos on her computer. Situation A: She is charged with an unrelated crime (e.g. fraud) and her computer is searched by the police, who find the files. Situation B: She now uploads those files to an American website, and sells them to get money from pedophiles willing to see them. Situation C: She willfully uploaded those pictures to the Internet when she was 16, without asking money for them. The pictures are now public, uploaded to servers in many different countries, and she is OK with it. In what cases and to what extent would she be liable for child pornography related offences?	"The EU" is a lot of different jurisdictions, and laws vary between them. The following answer applies to the UK. A: Alice is guilty of making and possessing indecent images of a child. The fact that the child was herself is irrelevant, as are her current feelings on the subject. The "making" offence was committed when she was under 18, so for that she would be treated as a child, but the possession offence would be be charged at her current age. If Alice has made recent copies of the pictures, for instance by moving her files to another computer, then she is guilty of "making" as an adult. B: As with "A", but with increased penalties for publishing it. C: As with "B", except that the offence was committed when she was under 18.	She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.	I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use.	england-and-wales Yes As well as the general offence of comtempt of court by publishing facts in breach of a court order, there are also two statutory provisions making it an offence if those facts reveal a person's identity (maliciously or not): section 1, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992: (1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) Where a person is accused of an offence to which this Act applies, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed (“the complainant”) shall during the complainant’s lifetime be included in any publication. [...] The relevant offences are listed in section 2 (being rape and a number of other serious sexual offences). section 49, Children and Young Persons Act 1933: (1) No matter relating to any child or young person concerned in proceedings to which this section applies shall while he is under the age of 18 be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify him as someone concerned in the proceedings. (2) The proceedings to which this section applies are— (a) proceedings in a youth court; (b) proceedings on appeal from a youth court (including proceedings by way of case stated); (c) proceedings in a magistrates' court under Schedule 7 to the Sentencing Code (proceedings for breach, revocation or amendment of youth rehabilitation orders); (d) proceedings on appeal from a magistrates' court arising out of any proceedings mentioned in paragraph (c) (including proceedings by way of case stated). [...]	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	The Coroners and Justice Act of April 2009 (c. 2) created a new offence in England and Wales and Northern Ireland of possession of a prohibited image of a child. This act makes cartoon pornography depicting minors illegal in the UK. This Act did not replace the 1978 act, extended in 1994, since that covered "pseudo-photographs"—images that appear to be photographs. In 2008 it was further extended to cover tracings, and other works derived from photographs or pseudo-photographs. A prohibited cartoon image is one which involves a minor in situations which are pornographic and "grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character." Prior to this, although not explicitly in the statutes, the law was interpreted to apply to cartoon images, though only where the images are realistic and indistinguishable from photographs. The new law however covered images whether or not they are realistic. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_status_of_cartoon_pornography_depicting_minors The Wikipedia article includes a further list of footnotes and sources for this topic. The only reason I wrote this answer because I remembered reading about this in the newspaper around 4 years ago when the Netherlands outlawed such images and they referred to the UK having 'recently' banned such things as well rather than just the older acts mentioned by Flup.	Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.	To what legal extent can parents prevent children from masturbating and are religious reasons legal justifications for such actions? One of the main restrictions on parental authority is a prohibition on engaging in child abuse or neglect. But, in most cases, this either isn't defined at all, or is defined only in the most general terms (in the same way culpability for an accident depends upon "negligence" which is also only vaguely defined). So, somebody would have to decide if that conduct constitutes abuse or neglect of a child (realistically, this fact pattern would involve the issue of abuse, rather than neglect), and while religious reasons can justify some conduct that might otherwise be considered abusive because it caused harm for no justifiable reason, ultimately, the interest of the state in preventing the abuse of children outweighs freedom of religion and could give rise to criminal child abuse charges and/or termination of parental rights. Whether or not a chastity belt would constitute abuse would depend upon the judgment of the relevant CPS official, a prosecuting attorney and a trial judge (possibly subject to appellate judge review), in light of common sense and community standards. There is no hard and fast rule, and the question might be resolved in different ways in different times and in different places.
Can Mac Pro customers legally sue Apple if it doesn't offer them an upgrade path to the new chips? In December 2019, Apple introduced its flagship Mac Pro to meet the performance needs of professionals. In addition to showcasing its state-of-the-art hardware components, Apple claimed the machine is built for the future. It's key selling point is upgradability and expansion through swappable hardware modules residing inside an easily accessible chassis. Consequently, Apple charges a hefty $50K for this privilege. Within less than a year after its debut, however, the Mac Pro's status as the most powerful Macintosh is nearly coming to an end. Apple just introduced several low to mid range models featuring its incredibly fast M1 processor. According to several benchmarks, the new models outperform the Intel-based Mac Pro across a range of computing tasks. It must be disheartening for owners to discover their machines rendered dinosaurs by Macs costing 1/50th of the price within a year of unboxing them. Do existing Mac Pro users have a good case for a class action lawsuit, if Apple decides not to provide them with an upgrade path to the new M1 processors? While not explicitly stated as future proof, Apple did market the machine as expandable. Could a legal argument be made that it mislead its Mac Pro customers into thinking they were buying into the future?	That Apple advertised the Mac Pro as "expandable" does not mean that they promised that any particular new chip or technology could be applied to the Mac Pro. As a comment said "built for the future" will generally be treated as puffery that does not extend a specific guarantee unless there are more specific claims along with it. Computers become obsolete, or at least behind the cutting edge. This is a fact that all reasonable computer buyers know. Sometimes this happens quickly. No computer maker promises that there is an infinite upgrade path, or that a machine will never be behind the curve. All that said, Apple might well provide an upgrade path for this machine to the M1 chip. But I do not see anything which legally requires them to do so.	The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.	Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html	If you are producing and selling it, that is an absolute bar to patentability by anyone else (this is known as prior art). So if you are using it very publicly before they file, they can't get the patent.	tl;dr: It seems doubtful an antitrust claim would succeed. Twitter would likely file a motion to dismiss under Fed. Rules. of Civ. Pro 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To your benefit, the judge would tend to construe all of your factual allegations as true (i.e. that Twitter excludes some websites but not others). Then, given this construction it would ask whether your claim is "plausible on its face," where plausibility means "pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Note, in this second step, we're not only looking for factual sufficiency, but also legal sufficiency. The antitrust claim would likely falter for lack of legal sufficiency. Your legal sufficiency would need to come from an alleged violation, so say you alleged an antitrust violation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, amended at 12-27). In this case, you'd want to show 1) an agreement 2) that unreasonably restrains competition and 3) impacts interstate commerce. If there isn't an agreement (e.g. Twitter just chooses to plug SoundCloud), that makes antitrust success even less likely, so imagine you were able to show evidence of an agreement. Then the trouble would be showing this is an unreasonable restraint of competition. Antitrust is a really complicated field, but the short version is: partnership and product placement agreements aren't necessarily violations of antitrust law---especially when the companies aren't in the same market. While there certainly differences, your question is similar (from a legal concepts perspective) to the one LetsListen informally made with respect to Facebook. Aside: another issue is that a Twitter--SoundCloud collaboration isn't a within-market merger, which means the usual antitrust analysis in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines doesn't translate perfectly. united-states	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	I finally found the actual transcript of the voir dire part of the case mentioned in the question. http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012090614295190 As can be evidenced from the transcript, the judge has specifically instructed the two jurors working as engineers at the local tech companies that they'd have to "forget" what they know about both the software engineering and the patent law itself, too, starting their work on the whole case with a completely clean sheet, using a very simple criteria for making decisions: One side or the other is going to have the burden of proof on -- one side has the burden of proof on some issues, the other side has the burden of proof on other issues. When you go into the jury room to deliberate after you've tried your hardest to understand the evidence, if they haven't educated you on it or if they haven't persuaded you, the party with the burden of proof loses. It's that simple. You don't have to -- you have to make a good faith effort to understand it, but if the party with the burden of proof has failed to do that, the party with the burden of proof loses. That's the standard. You have to -- you, the jury, decide. Now, what you cannot do is bring to bear something that you've learned in some other case, some other patent case, about how some piece of equipment works or something like that. You can't do that. It has to be based on the record here. Then, after a short break and a consultation with the lawyers, where Oracle seems to have expressed some concern to having the computer experts be on the panel, which subsequently prompted the judge to declare the following to the two potential jurors who worked at Cisco and HP: So this is really going to be directed at both of you, but, you know, you come to the party, so to speak, with some prior training that bears upon the subject matter we're going to be hearing a lot about here. That's okay. That's not disqualifying, but you -- it's okay to use your common sense when you render a verdict, but you cannot add to the record in court something that you know about the way software programming works that the witnesses didn't actually testify to. You see what I'm saying? You've got to decide the record -- the case based on the record made here as opposed to adding into it what else you may have known about the way programming and software works. Since both jurors had so much software and patent experience that they couldn't disregard it easily, they were thus both excused (page 95 of 224). All right. I think it would be too hard for you to sit in this case and sort out what you knew already against what is proven or not proven here, and itwould not be fair to the parties to have that extra burden even though you two actually know something about the subject. It's in a way too bad, but it's for the best. So you two are excused to go back to the jury assembly room. Thank you. The other instructions that the judge gives to the potential jurors is also worth reading (starts on page 36 of 224) The full transcript is at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-942.pdf. In summary -- jurors are only allowed to talk to one another when the deliberation process starts, and, no, they are not allowed to bring any "baggage" to the case at stake.	If it is open source code, then usually the requirement is that you produce the source code for the software that you release. Exactly for the software that you release. For example if you took open source software X, and added feature Y, and distributed the combined software outside your company, anyone can request the source code for X including Y. Handing them the source code for X only wouldn't meet the open source requirements. Now all this is not illegal, but it means the copyright holder of X could sue you for copyright infringement. They will do that if they have enough reasons to do so. So let's say you are continuously developing your software and occasional hand out your compiled software. Say you built versions 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 of the software, you gave versions 100 and 103 to customers, and anyone asking for the source code is given the source code for the latest, slightly improved version 104. The copyright holder of X might sue you but: 1. They wouldn't know you are doing this. 2. A judge might side with you and decide that newer, improved source code is good enough (I don't know this, but it seems not unreasonable). 3. The copyright holder might decide that they don't want to sue you for this because you are close enough to meeting the requirements.
Does paying the down payment on your parents' home ensure that you will inherit the home? Suppose someone pays the down payment for their elderly parents and then the parents (after some number of years) pass away and have been paying into expenses and mortgage. If the parents are considered as shared owners of the property, how might that affect what they leave to their children in their will? What happens if they are not shared owners, but just living in the house a child owns and allows them to stay in (and I guess pay rent for)?	If the parents own the house (as shown on the official deed) it will go as they leave it in their wills, or as the local law for intestate inheritance (no will) directs. Who paid all or part of the down payment will not matter. If the intent was for that to matter, then the child who provided the down payment should have been listed as partial owner, or some written agreement should have been made specifying the rights involved. Otherwise the down payment would be considered as a gift. If the child owns the house (as shown on the deed) it would not be part of the parents' estate, and their will(s) would not affect it. It would remain the property of the child. If the down payment was a loan rather than a gift, as shown by a written agreement of some sort, then that debt would be an obligation of the estate, to be paid before any legacies were distributed.	If the property has been transferred to HUD in a reverse mortgage foreclosure, the family has no authority to sign anything and the country records are simply not up to date (it is not unusual for county real estate records to be one to six weeks behind being up to date based upon how busy the recording office is and how many staff they have, often they are further behind in the summer and around Christmas when employees tend to take vacations). HUD can sign the easement, and so can any successor owner. Whether they will or not is another question. Even if the foreclosure were not quite complete, any action taken by the family after the foreclosure was commenced would be invalidated once the foreclosure was completed.	It sort of depends on what the will says, for example if the will says "shall receive 1% of the value of my estate at the moment of my death", that answers your question. That's a bit unlikely, more probably it just says "shall receive 1% of my estate", in which case this refers to "the totality of what is left to disburse to beneficiaries", that is, after obligations have been discharged (debts, taxes, funeral expenses, expense of estate administration). You also have to disburse specific benefits first, for example "$10,000 to Aunt Luddy", "the car to cousin Billy". Thereafter, percentages (implied such as "equally" or explicit such as "2%") are then computed over the remainder. Ideally, you will know the current value of everything left and can do the math and transfer title all at once. This might be a bit impractical for an entire estate, but it is practical for an estate composed of a bunch of divisible assets. All of the securities can be transferred on one day; the house may be sold a month later and assets re-distributed according to the formula at that point. In other words, you don't need a fixed instant for computing and distributing the estate, you just need to distribute each asset according to the terms of the estate.	Is this true? Yes. can someone explain how this might work? You can form an LLC, and then fund it with money that would be used to purchase the home, and buy the home in the name of the LLC. One minor exception is that a handful of rural U.S. states prohibit limited liability entities from owning farm land, so if the home is part of a farm or ranch, this could be prohibited in those states. If there is a mortgage, this is more difficult, but not impossibly so. The primary debtor on the mortgage would be the LLC. Ordinarily the owner of the LLC would be required by the bank to guarantee the mortgage, but loan guarantees do not necessarily have to be made a matter of public record. If the LLC has only one member, it is disregarded for income tax purposes, so that isn't a problem. There may be issues in this case of a house not qualifying for residential property tax treatment in some cases (which is often a lower rate than commercial real estate). There is also sometimes an issue that property owned by an LLC isn't eligible for a "homestead exemption" of equity in the home from creditor's claims. It may also be treated differently in terms of eligibility for means-tested benefits like Medicaid nursing home coverage. But, it is allowed. I ask the question, for it seems to me that it should not be difficult to find out who the owner of any given LLC is. In the U.S., the owners of a manager managed LLC are rarely disclosed in the public record (although about half of U.S. states require one or all of the members of a member managed LLC to be disclosed). But all U.S. states allow LLCs to be manager managed. Also, all U.S. states are required as a matter of constitutional law to all LLCs organized in a state other than the state where the LLC owns real property or operates to do business in that state. States can imposed regulations on out of state LLCs to some extent, however. The main exception to these general rules is California. Although the California Articles of Organization do not list the members of the LLC in the Artiles, California requires the LLC to file a Statement of Information within 90 days of the approval of the LLC. The Statement of Information does require a list of the LLC's members, and it does become public record. Records of LLC ownership are maintained in the private internal records of the LLC. A contact person, called a registered agent and sometimes the managers of the LLC with authority to act on its behalf must be publicly disclosed, but neither of these posts has anything to do with ownership. Many states also require the "organizer" of the LLC to be disclosed, but that doesn't have to be an owner of the LLC either. Often it is a lawyer or accountant for the LLC. It will be necessary to disclose the ownership to federal tax officials, and often also to state tax officials. Also, soon, under a newly enacted federal law that has not yet taken effect because regulations have not been written, to federal money laundering officials. But, both of these pieces of information are confidential and not available to the general public. This information can be obtained by subpoena in pertinent litigation, however, must often be disclosed when filing federal lawsuits, and is often required to be disclosed by counter-parties in business transactions. Footnote The U.S. practice is not the global norm. In most civil law countries, for example, ownership interests in entities need to be reflected in a notarized document kept in the custody of the notary involved. In recent times, interests in transparency and avoiding tax evasion and money laundering for terrorism and crime have promoted additional, less decentralized records of entity ownership.	We can't give personal legal advice, but we can explain in general terms what the law is. Apparently, the mother, brother and estate are outside the US, in country X. The disposition of the estate follows the laws of X, so you would need an attorney who can practice law in country X. The primary issue is, (1) how are estates probated in X and (2) what provisions, if any, did the deceased(s) make for the disposition of the estate (was there a will; a trust; did one or more parents die intestate?). To simplify matters, we will assume that the laws of X are very similar to US law (which is not uniform – it is state-specific, but broadly similar). In the US, assets can be in a trust and can be directly transferred to a beneficiary. The disposition of the assets may be irrevocable, meaning that the person setting it up can decide who gets what, and then that cannot be changed. It is thus possible that a child could be excluded as a beneficiary of a trust. E.g. the father could set up a trust with just the mother and brother as beneficiaries. The mother may simply have been misinformed as to what the trust document said. Or, there could have been illegal misappropriation of funds, even something as heinous as providing fraudulent documents purporting that an actually living beneficiary is dead. In other words, even though you can't afford a (foreign) attorney, that is realistically the only way to get a clear answer, if the brother is being uncooperative or untruthful.	Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted.	While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit.	The idea is that, by default, we should assume the payment is a gift, unless we have specific evidence to suggest that it is offered in exchange for something. In the first case, the father-in-law has given no indication as to why he is giving her the money. It could be that he is indifferent to whether she remarries or not, and simply wants her to have a steady income in either case. He may be presuming that, if she remarries, her new husband will be able to provide for her, but until such time, he (the father-in-law) will pay her way. We certainly do not have evidence to show that he actually wants her to stay unmarried and is paying her for that purpose. In the second case, the father-in-law has given us more evidence. His words make it explicit that he does want her not to remarry, and that he is paying her in order to get her not to. Since he is clearly paying money with the intention of getting another party to do something (or in this case, to refrain from doing something), we understand it as a contract.
How easy/hard is it to make an adverse possession claim on a vacant lot in Virginia, USA? I know each state differs in adverse possession laws but reading into Virginia, it sounds very easy to do. All one has to say is they maintained some portion of land for 10 years undisputed and now they can claim they "own" the property. My mother owns a vacant land and I notice someone is mowing the lawn. One of the claims of adverse possession is that they make the land theirs undisputed ("Planting your flag" so to speak) and they make it known to the supposed owner that they maintain and control the land. However, whoever is mowing the vacant land is doing so in secret and without letting us know it. From what I understand in most adverse possession case, someone builds a structure or improve a portion of a property as theirs. For example, a farmer might plant crops in a land which is basically something you can't keep hidden and the owner would have more than enough time to dispute it with survey or otherwise. Then there are cases of building a shed or structure or fence over/just before someone's property line and one can make a claim that a part of a property is theirs. However, to claim an entire property, I never really heard of such a case but I don't know the law enough to really know. I'm just worried that after some time they could come over with some sort of paperwork or something and claim that the land belongs to them because they maintained it for so long. Can anyone explain what sort of ways someone could make an adverse possession claim and just how successful they can be?	It's not THAT easy, and it's fifteen years, not ten. As you say, Virginia requires your neighbors to do more than mow your lawn to get title to your land. In Virginia, most of these requirements are laid out in judicial decisions, not statutes. However, the one requirement set by statute is that the possessor has to have "possessed" the land for 15 years. As for the rest of the requirements, they are the usual ones. Ten years ago, the Supreme Court of Virginia gave a nice, concise summary. It said that to "establish title...by adverse possession," your neighbor would have to prove that their possession was: actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous... Here is what the Court said each element requires: Use and occupation of property...constitutes proof of actual possession. One is in hostile possession if his possession is under a claim of right and adverse to the right of the true owner. One's possession is exclusive when it is not in common with others. Possession is visible when it is so obvious that the true owner may be presumed to know about it. Possession is continuous only if it exists without interruption for the statutory period. Two things to notice: Because your neighbor's possession must be adverse, you can stop the 15 year possession "clock" by simply giving them your permission to mow the lawn. It does not matter that your neighbors are mowing "in secret and without letting us know it." That you are here asking about it shows the mowing so "visible" that you know what is going on. For more information Whether your neighbors can claim your land depends on how Virginia courts have interpreted the law. Luckily for you, several Virginia lawyers have gone online to explain those details. These two, (one in the Washington Post), give nice overviews, while this guy, says mowing alone probably won't do it. This guy says, "Virginia courts don’t make adverse possession easy," but he's a NYer, through and through, so who knows whether he knows what he's talking about? Of course, none of this is a substitute for talking to a Virginia lawyer with experience in adverse possession.	Sometimes you can't. In Washington, for example, it is possible to disclaim property, because RCW 11.86.021 says (1) A beneficiary may disclaim an interest in whole or in part, or with reference to specific parts, shares or assets, in the manner provided in RCW 11.86.031. and there is a procedure for writing up and filing that disclaimer. However, there is a time limit that you have to do it by nine months after the latest of: (a) The date the beneficiary attains the age of twenty-one years; (b) The date of the transfer; (c) The date that the beneficiary is finally ascertained and the beneficiary's interest is indefeasibly vested; or (d) December 17, 2010, if the date of the transfer is the date of the death of the creator of the interest and the creator dies after December 31, 2009, and before December 18, 2010 and RCW 11.86.051 gives a list of reasons why you cannot disclaim an interest. "Indefeasible" means "you can't get out of it". If you fail to pay taxes on real estate, it can be seized and sold by the county to satisfy the tax delinquency. The county will then attempt to sell the property, perhaps for exactly the amount of taxes owed. That sale "clears" the title so that the purchaser does not have to worry about a could over the title (Sec. 34.01.(n) of the Texas tax code). The city can also separately assess you for violation of whatever ordinance they are concerned with: there will be some procedure for the abatement of the nuisance (weeds, usually), an assessment which is made against the property. Notice is given to the owner (or, the person they think is the owner), but the "risk" is shouldered by the property.	If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.	When selling a residential property in the UK, you normally fill out a form called the TA10 Fittings and Contents Form, which outlines everything in the property included in the sale. This isn't a legal requirement, but your conveyancing solicitor will normally recommend it. Anything else left in the property after the completion of the sale is still, legally, a possession of the previous owner and the new owner is obliged to inform them of these possessions in writing. So, you do have to return it (and most people in such situations do return the possessions without question). However, if the presence of those possessions means you can't be reasonably expected to move into the property, then you can claim compensation from the previous owner for alternative accommodation (i.e. a hotel) until the situation is rectified. Or if the previous owner refuses to collect the possessions, you can likewise claim compensation for the costs of disposing of it. Alternatively, if they do want the possessions back, but take their time getting it, you can charge them fair storage costs.	I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.	Did I lose possession of my goods? That seems unlikely. But enforcing it sounds complicated, at least from the standpoint of substantive law (the Code civil). I am not knowledgeable of French procedural law. The difficulty begins with identifying whether your claim is cognizable as unjust enrichment, or --per your subsequent oral agreement-- breach of contract. You might want to read sections "The French Law of Unjust Enrichment" and "Enrichissement sans Cause" in this post. Please note that the French Civil Code recently underwent significant reforms, whence references of its articles are likely outdated. Here I pointed out one example of statutory renumbering in the Code. In the second link, you will read that originally [...] the action in enrichissement sans cause would not be available to the claimant if he or she had any other cause of action, even if that cause of action was blocked for some reason. [...] [B]ut it is perhaps here that the law has relaxed most in recent cases. Thus, the subtleties of your matter can be decisive for identifying the type of claim that is applicable to your situation. Lastly, according to this treatise (on p.54), "[t]he French legal system does not have the principle of [reasonable] reliance as it exists in the American legal system" (brackets added). That makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove his claims under French law.	Your question seems to be about abandoned property and whether Missouri’s statute on disposing of property after a tenant abandons his/her property applies. See Mo. Rev. State. Ann. § 441.065 (“Abandonment of premises, disposition of remaining property.”) Assuming there was no agreement (in writing or orally) for the 19 year-old to pay rent, he was most likely a guest and not a tenant. As a guest, landlord-tenant laws, would not apply to the property that that was left at the nice family’s house. The definitions section of Missouri’s landlord-tenant statutes (and common sense) support this analysis. See Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 441.005. Therefore, the issue them becomes did the 19 year abandon his property? To that question, I think the answer is yes. Missouri Courts have defined the test for “abandoned property” in Herron v. Whiteside, 782 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. App. W. Dist. 1989), stating: Abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment of ownership so that the property ceases to be the property of any person and becomes the subject of appropriation by the first taker. Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo.App.1974). Abandonment of property requires intent plus an act. Id. A sufficient act is one that manifests a conscious purpose and intention of the owner of personal property neither to use nor to retake the property into his possession. Id. Intention to abandon may be inferred from strong and convincing evidence and may be shown by conduct clearly inconsistent with any intention to retain and continue the use or ownership of the property. Herron, 782 S.W.2d at 416. So to synthesize that passage from Herron, the court is saying that there is a 2 part test for determining if property is abandoned. Did the person intend to abandon the property? Did they commit some act to show this intention? If the answer is yes, to both, they the “first taker” or person that gets possession after the property is abandoned is the new owner. Here, it seems that the 19 year-old intended to abandon the property. He left without explaining why and stated that he would not unload the property if the nice family tried to return it (implying he would not accept the property back). Looking at the second part, him moving without giving notice, and telling the nice family that he won’t accept delivery of the property are both acts showing his intent to abandon the property.	Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-).
Is use of names and insignias of disbanded British military units from WW2 allowed in a commercial video game? I wish to make a commercial PC video game based on the British commando units from 1940s that have been disbanded in 1946. The unit is "No.3 commando". Is the use of names like no.3 and commando permitted in the name and other text in a video game? Same goes for insignia. In case it requires special permission, which institution should I contact to seek the said permission, since I'm not a UK citizen? I have heard about crown copyright that expires after 50 years but haven't been able to find enough information pertaining to commercial uses. Just for reference, an existing game that uses such names and markings is "commandos behind enemy lines."	The names of such units are not protected by copyright, and never were. However their insignia would have been under Crown copyright See also Ministry of Defence Crown Copyright Licensing Information. Crown Copyright expires after 50 years for all published works, but lasts for 125 years after creation for unpublished works. Works obtained through archives, such as the Imperial War Museum, are often considered unpublished, unless they were previously published in some form. Use of an insignia on a uniform may not constitute publication. Some UK military insignia, including most current insignia, is also protected by trademark. But if the insignia are not used to advertise a product, nor to identify a product, nor in such a way as to imply sponsorship, endorsement or approval, trademark protection would not apply. In any case it is not at all clear that WWII-era insignia of now-defunct units are currently protected by trademark in the UK. If an insignia is still under copyright or trademark, the above linked licensing information describes how to apply for a license. Free licenses are available in some cases for use in books, but not, apparently, for "commercial products".	Depending on your jurisdiction, such lists may be protected, but not by copyright. For example, in Germany there was a court decision that scanning all the country’s phone books and selling them on CD constituted “unfair competition” and was illegal, while hiring 1000 typists who would manually type in all this information would not be. Databases are protected in many jurisdictions, and a list of the 1000 most commonly used English words could reasonably be called a database.	Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork.	Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.	Reviewing https://stackexchange.com/legal/trademark-guidance shows the following: The logos associated with Stack Exchange Inc. and any Stack Exchange site are a trademark. The purpose of trademark law is to prevent consumers from being misled as to the origin of a product. So if you were making a product, and you used a Stack Exchange name or logo in your product (or in its advertising) in such a way that would mislead someone into thinking that your product was owned by, operated by, endorsed by, or in any way part of Stack Exchange Inc., you would be violating the trademark and this would not be legal. Our logo images and site names are copyrighted. Any content on the Stack Exchange Network not contributed by users is copyrighted. Copyright is different than trademark. Ordinarily you couldn't copy it. But if you were writing a news story or blog post about a Stack Exchange site, reproducing the logo image would almost certainly be considered "fair use" and allowed under trademark law because you were not using it "in trade." So the answer to your question is yes, you would need to seek the permission of the trademark holder.	A short phrase such as the band's name, or a song title is not protected by copyright, either in the US or the UK. The shirt as a whole is not protected by copyright, because you created the combination of image and words. The band's name or song title could have been protected by trademark law, but this almost surely doe snot apply, because: A. You are not selling anything, so trademark protection would not apply. B. The phrases are not now being used in trade, because the band is no longer selling music. Thus any trademark protection should have lapsed. The image of the singer may be protected under his "personality rights" but this usually only protects use for commercial purposes, which a shirt for your own personal use isn't. Even if there were an active trademark, the owner is not likely to find out and order you to stop for one short for personal use. In short, the actions described should be legally safe, but selling such a shirt to multiple other people would be a different matter.	I've seen prohibito used in a few places, but never by any source that I'd use as a model for my writing. As I understand it, the Latin names for the other writs were adopted in medieval times, when Latin was much more heavily used in the English courts, while the writ of prohibition developed centuries later. In that case, I think it would have been natural to simply give it a standard English name.	Yes, but... Trademarks generally have a particular class of goods or services they apply to. For a common word such as "sky", a trademark will only be granted for a very narrow set; there's no chance of getting an "all purposes" trademark like you could for a made-up word. For example, VuongGiaNghi Nguyen holds a trademark to "Sky" in the United States when describing "Eyelash Glue, Eyelash Extension Glue, False eyelashes, False eyelash perm kit, Lash Extensions", while Strange Loop, LLC, holds a trademark to it when describing "Downloadable software featuring conversational agents to facilitate communication between humans and machines in an electronic messaging platform for use in the healthcare and medical fields". I'm guessing that British Sky Broadcasting's trademark has a "goods and services" that overlaps or is very similar to Microsoft's use of "sky".
When does the duty of an executor end? My two brothers were appointed co-executors of my Moms will. Probate has been done for months now. We all 3 inherited her house in equal shares, two of us live there. I am being told because they were executors that they can decide to sell, without my consent as they are still in charge, due to being executors. Is this true? I was under the impression that when probate was settled and all the affairs of the deceased person had been settled, that the duty and/or authority of an executor is done.	If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.	No. This is not a provision that the testator or testatrix (i.e. the person writing a will) may waive in advance. But, the slayer statute does not get invoked unless an interested person invokes it in a probate proceeding after a death, and if no interested party wishes to invoke it, the will would be given effect anyway (just as it would in a case where no one could prove that someone was a slayer). Some states apply the slayer statute to will substitutes, and some do not. Similar laws that revoke dispositions upon divorce are pre-empted for interests in employee benefit plans subject to ERISA, but the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to resolve the issue. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001) (pre-empting divorce revocation statutes, but declining to decide whether ERISA preempts state statutes forbidding a murdering heir from receiving property as a result of the killing) (cited as good law in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator, 555 U.S. 285 (2009) at footnote 14); Wasserman v. Schwartz, 364 N.J.Super. 399, 836 A.2d 828 (2001) (circumventing ERISA pre-emption). But see, Herinckx v. Sanelle, 281 Or.App. 869, (Oregon App. October 26, 2016) (Oregon slayer statute pre-empted by ERISA and reviewing variations in state slayer statutes). A notable comprehensive review of the California and common law rules regarding how the slayer statute applies in murder-suicide cases where the victim and suicidal killer own property in joint tenancy is found in In re Estate of Castiglioni, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 288, 40 Cal.App.4th (Cal. App. 1995). The murder-suicide scenario is also addressed in depth in the case In re Gleason, 947 N.Y.S.2d 761, 36 Misc.3d 486 (Surrogate's Court 2012). Also, the definition of homicide that qualifies under the slayer statute sometimes covers only certain forms of homicide. For example, it might apply in cases of murder or manslaughter, but not in cases of negligent homicide. Alaska, for example, takes the minority position that unintentional homicides suffice to invoke the slayer statute, subject to a manifest injustice exception. In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702 (Alaska 2006).1 There is unsurprisingly little or no case law on an intentional waiver of these provisions, and assisted suicide would often not qualify as an eligible homicide although this would vary from state to state. But see, Colorado Proposition 106 (adopted by voters November 8, 2016) as it pertains to insurance benefits. A Sample Statute The currently effective section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (modeled on the Uniform Probate Code, which is highly influential to legislative drafters and in courts with common law rules, but is not actually adopted verbatim by a majority of states) which are applicable to this issue reads as follows: § 15-11-803. Effect of homicide on intestate succession, wills, trusts, joint assets, life insurance, and beneficiary designations (1) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument. (b) "Felonious killing", except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, is the killing of the decedent by an individual who, as a result thereof, is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or enters a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of murder in the first or second degree or manslaughter, as said crimes are defined in sections 18-3-102 to 18-3-104, C.R.S. (c) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by the decedent. (d) "Killer" is any individual who has committed a felonious killing. (e) "Revocable", with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination, means one under which the decedent, at the time of or immediately before death, was alone empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation in favor of the killer, whether or not the decedent was then empowered to designate himself or herself in place of his or her killer and or the decedent then had capacity to exercise the power. (2) Forfeiture of statutory benefits. An individual who feloniously kills the decedent forfeits all benefits with respect to the decedent's estate, including an intestate share, an elective-share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, the decedent's homestead exemption under section 38-41-204, C.R.S., exempt property, and a family allowance. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent's intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed his or her intestate share. (3) Revocation of benefits under governing instruments. The felonious killing of the decedent: (a) Revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing instrument, (ii) provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the killer, and (iii) nomination of the killer in a governing instrument, nominating or appointing the killer to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, or agent; and (b) Severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship or as community property with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in common. (4) Effect of severance. A severance under paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired for value and in good faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship in the killer unless a writing declaring the severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the property which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such property, as evidence of ownership. (5) Effect of revocation. Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the killer disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the killer predeceased the decedent. (6) Wrongful acquisition of property. A wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered by this section shall be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from his or her wrong. (7) Felonious killing; how determined - time limitations on civil proceedings. (a) Criminal proceedings. After all right to appeal has been waived or exhausted following the entry of a judgment of conviction establishing criminal accountability for the felonious killing of the decedent, such judgment conclusively establishes the convicted individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section. (b) Civil proceedings. Notwithstanding the status or disposition of a criminal proceeding, a court of competent jurisdiction, upon the petition of an interested person, shall determine whether, by a preponderance of evidence standard, each of the elements of felonious killing of the decedent has been established. If such elements have been so established, such determination conclusively establishes that individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section. (c) Time limitations on civil proceedings. (I) A petition brought under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) may not be filed more than three years after the date of the decedent's death. (II) Notwithstanding any provision of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) to the contrary, if a criminal proceeding is commenced in a court of this state or in another jurisdiction against an individual for the felonious killing of the decedent, a petition brought under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) may be filed so long as the petition is filed no later than one year after all right to appeal has been waived or exhausted following an entry of a judgment of conviction, or a dismissal, or an acquittal in the criminal proceeding. However, if the death and the possible culpability of the slayer for the felonious slaying of the decedent is not known to the petitioner within the three-year period of limitations established pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c), the accrual of the action under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) and the possibility of the tolling of the running of the three-year period of limitation under subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) shall be determined according to the principles of accrual and tolling established by case law with respect to similar limitations established under section 13-80-108, C.R.S. (d) Judgment of conviction. For the purposes of this subsection (7), a "judgment of conviction" includes a judgment of conviction on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a judgment of conviction on a verdict of guilty by the court or by a jury. (8) Protection of payors and other third parties. (a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by a felonious killing, or for having taken any other action in reliance on the beneficiary's apparent entitlement under the terms of the governing instrument, before the payor or other third party has received written notice as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8). A payor or other third party shall have no duty or obligation to make any determination as to whether or not the decedent was the victim of a felonious killing or to seek any evidence with respect to any such felonious killing even if the circumstances of the decedent's death are suspicious or questionable as to the beneficiary's participation in any such felonious killing. A payor or other third party is only liable for actions taken two or more business days after the payor or other third party has actual receipt of such written notice. Any form or service of notice other than that described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8) shall not be sufficient to impose liability on a payor or other third party for actions taken pursuant to the governing instrument. (b) The written notice shall indicate the name of the decedent, the name of the person asserting an interest, the nature of the payment or item of property or other benefit, and a statement that a claim of forfeiture or revocation is being made under this section. The written notice shall be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or served upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. (c) Upon receipt of the written notice described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8), a payor or other third party may pay to the court any amount owed or transfer to or deposit with the court any item of property held by it. The availability of such actions under this section shall not prevent the payor or other third party from taking any other action authorized by law or the governing instrument. The court is the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents' estates located in the county of the decedent's residence. If no probate proceedings have been commenced, the payor or other third party shall file with the court a copy of the written notice received by the payor or other third party, with the payment of funds or transfer or deposit of property. The court shall not charge a filing fee to the payor or other third party for the payment to the court of amounts owed or transfer to or deposit with the court of any item of property, even if no probate proceedings have been commenced before such payment, transfer, or deposit. Payment of amounts to the court or transfer to or deposit with the court of any item of property pursuant to this section by the payor or other third party discharges the payor or other third party from all claims under the governing instrument or applicable law for the value of amounts paid to the court or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court. (d) The court shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. A filing fee, if any, shall be charged upon disbursement either to the recipient or against the funds or property on deposit with the court, in the discretion of the court. (e) Upon petition to the court by the beneficiary designated in a governing instrument, the court may order that all or part of the property be paid to the beneficiary in an amount and subject to conditions consistent with this section. (9) Protection of bona fide purchasers; personal liability of recipient. (a) A person who purchases property for value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. However, a person who, not for value, receives a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section. (b) If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not preempted. 1 The other four states and District of Columbia arguably adopting the minority position that negligent homicide invokes the slayer statute are as follows, from footnote 5 of the dissent to the Alaska Supreme Court's decision cited above. The District of Columbia slayer statute covers homicide resulting from grossly negligent conduct. See Turner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 614, 615 (D.C.1985) (explaining that the slayer statute covers "unintentional killing derived from reckless or grossly negligent conduct"). Louisiana's slayer statute covers all criminal homicide. In re Hamilton, 446So.2d 463, 465 (La.App. 1984) (holding that slayer statute "was intended to include situations such as that presented by this case, where a beneficiary does not intentionally and feloniously cause the death of the insured but is nonetheless held criminally responsible for that death"). North Carolina's common law slayer rule prohibits inheritance after any wrongful homicide. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1975); Matter of Estate of Cox, 97 N.C.App. 312, 388 S.E.2d 199, 201 (1990). The continued application of this common law rule has been criticized in light of a slayer statute barring only intentional killers from inheriting. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-3; see also generally Julie Waller Hampton, The Need for a New Slayer Statute in North Carolina, 24CAMPBELL L. REV. 295 (2002). Kentucky Revised Statute § 381.280 bars inheritance from those convicted of any felonious homicide. "Reckless homicide" is a felony. KRS § 507.050. Kentucky defines "reckless" as "a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe." KRS § 501.020. Reckless homicide in Kentucky is therefore equivalent to criminal negligence in Alaska under AS 11.81.900(a)(4). Kansas Statute § 59-513 states that "[n]o person convicted of feloniously killing, or procuring the killing of, another person shall inherit." Involuntary homicide under Kansas law extends to "killing of a human being" committed recklessly, during a misdemeanor, or "during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner." KS ST§ 59-513. This arguably could extend to grossly negligent conduct, especially as KS ST§ 21-3201 explains that "[t]he terms 'gross negligence,' 'culpable negligence,' 'wanton negligence' and 'wantonness' are included within the term 'recklessness' as used in this code." A federal district court has held that Kansas's slayer statute does not apply to negligent homicide, and there appear to be no state cases interpreting the scope of the statute or applying it to negligent homicide. Rosenberger v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F.Supp. 379, 382–83 (D. Kan. 1959) (explaining that "the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute must have been to give effect to the common-law rule"). The Kansas slayer statute is essentially unchanged since Rosenberger.	Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that.	In the US, when a person has unpaid debts and dies, those debts are to be paid from any assets of the estate (as in, any assets). The executor has the responsibility to use those assets to pay the debts. Presumably the executor did that, and there are no co-signed accounts or anything like that, so your mother isn't responsible for these debts in some obscure way. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has a provision that you can tell a collection agency to stop communicating with you, and they must then stop communicating with you except to say they are stopping attempts to collect, to indicate possible remedies (i.e. lawsuits), or notify of an actual remedy (they have actually filed suit). Since they are no longer allowed to discuss anything with you once you give them the go-away notice, one should probably hire an attorney to exercise the nuclear option. You can also request proof that you owe the money: they are suppose to notify you of the right to dispute the debt with 5 days of first contact, which gives you 30 days to dispute the debt. Persuading a debt collector that they are pursuing the wrong person is probably easier than persuading a jury in a lawsuit.	What can I do to prevent someone from leaving me something in their will? Nothing. Allowing other people to legally change someone's will defeats the purpose of a will: To express the writer's last wishes. (That is why the full title is a "Last Will & Testament"). Do I have to take responsibility for things left to me in a will or are there other options? No! You do not have to accept an inheritance. The legal process for rejecting an inheritance is called "disclaiming." It happens often enough that there are plenty of nice summaries of the process on-line. Your next step should probably be to read one of them.	A lien is used to prevent sale of a property until a debt is paid. This has nothing to do with priority over a mortgage. The HOA agreed to release the lien for some payment. The negotiation of that payment doesn't matter to the new buyer. Once the lien is released, then it is no longer listed with the county on the property, so the property can now be sold. The former lienholder cannot now apply a new lien to the property because the new owner is not a debtor to the former lienholder. This would be a terrible way to manage property sales, and no mortgage company would allow a mortgage for a property that could not be sold in case of foreclosure, which is likely why the mortgage holder was a private individual. It is possible for a new owner to take on existing liens, but this would be clearly spelled out in purchase documents. There should be a statement on the title search results that no liens exist.	The personal representative is empowered by law (esp. §3311) to undertake actions on behalf of the deceased, and enjoys certain legal immunities against personal liability for their actions. The personal representative can do things that a random person off the street can't do. Until you are appointed by the Register of Wills as personal representative, you aren't a personal representative. There are provisions for limited disposition of the estate without letters of testamentary such as paying employees of the deceased, paying the funeral home, but not in general any "non-emergency" distribution / disposal. Even with appointment as PR, one has a fiduciary obligation to equitably distribute the estate. That means that the PR has to respect the interests of both of the heirs. If the PR decides that some object is trash and throws it out, they could be liable to an heir who has an interest in the object. Of course, the heir with that interest may have to take the PR to court, so normally people just talk this out. As an intermediate step, an heir's attorney can write a letter to the PR advising them of the legal ramifications of breaching their fiduciary duty.	While the state, or a creditor, can initiate a probate if no one else does (if the state does so, the official in charge of this is called the "public administrator"), neither are required to do so. Also, sometimes a guardianship is converted to a probate, but this doesn't appear to have happened. This is a thankless job that probably doesn't make sense to bother with if estate liabilities exceed the assets of the estate, but most states have a "non-claim statute" that bars creditors claims, other than liens including property tax liens, after a certain amount of time after the death. So, even if the estate may have been insolvent at death, if enough time has elapsed, many of the potential claims may now be barred, making the estate solvent again. Siblings generally have priority for appointment over a nephew, so to be appointed yourself, you would ordinarily have to receive a renunciation of their right to serve as executor before applying to do so yourself, but some states disregard that priority if no one has taken action after a certain period of time. You would initiate probate by contacting an Alaska lawyer in the vicinity of the place he was domiciled at death. The lawyer can review the guardianship court file, determine if an executor was appointed, and determine if there are assets that could justify opening an estate relative to lien debts including Medicaid liens. If there are not, letting the assets be lost to a property tax lien may make more sense that spending money to transfer his property in an orderly fashion to his creditors with nothing in it for any of his family.
Is the source important for fair use? So let's say I am a game developer, and somehow the game I was working on was leaked on the internet. Since nobody can legally obtain a copy of my game, can all the review of the leaked material be taken down and prosecuted, or is it defended by fair use? Furthermore, does it matter how much my material spread for it to be enforced by fair use? This article makes it seem like an unapproved source is enough to disqualify fair use: https://smallbusiness.chron.com/copyright-laws-30-seconds-music-61149.html	Probably not I think this question represents a misunderstanding of the linked article, and in any case of the specifically US doctrine of fair use. Fair use is always based on a part of a copyrighted work copied without authorization. If there was authorization, there would be no need to resort to the defense of fair use. The article discusses the commercial use of short sections of musical works used for commercial purposes. It points out that the idea that any use of an excerpt of less than 30 seconds is permitted is a myth. In this it is correct. While the amount of a copyrighted work used is one of the four factors to be considered in deciding wither a use is a fair use, it is not the only one, and no specific amount is always permitted. In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) The US Supreme Court held that quotes amounting to about 3-400 words from a 500-page book were an infringement, and were not a fair use, because they were the "heart of the book". The linked article says that one should ask "Was the work obtained from a legal source, in a lawful manner?" and asserts that "taking a copy from an unapproved source invalidates fair use." Nothing in 17 USC 107 says this, and I don't know of any authoritative source for such a statement. The article also says that "Commercial, for-profit use is not fair use, while commentary or criticism may be." This is simply incorrect. While a commercial purpose tends to weigh against fair use, it does not preclude it, and commercial use has been held to be fair use in some cases. Even in the case of Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises linked above, fair use was seriously considered, and was not denied simply because the use was commercial. No one o0f the four fair use factors is final taken alone. I do not think the linked article is a reliable guide to US copyright law. In the case described by the question, an unreleased game has been distributed without authorization over the internet, and reviews written based on that unauthorized copy. Whoever copied the game committed copyright infringement, but a suit might not provide substantial damages unless actual economic harm could be demonstrated. (And, of course, the identity of the infringer would need to be proved.) But a review based on such a leaked copy would not necessarily be an infringement. If the review described the game, but did not quote any of its dialog or other text, and did not reproduce any sounds or images from the game, there would be no infringement. If the review did quote from the unauthorized copy, the usual fair use analysis would apply. The fact that the copy had been unauthorized would not determine the outcome. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. This provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Note that criticism is one of the specified purposes for which fair use is designed, and an unpublished work is still subject to fair use. If the review quoted so much of the game that the potential market for it was harmed, that would weigh against fair use, but it is hard for me to see how a mere review could do that to an interactive game. (17 USC 107(4)) is normally applied when an infringing copy serves as a replacement for the authorized version, and sales are lost as a result. I suppose it might be argued that a bad review that was a direct result of an infringement came under this provision, but it is a strech at best, and US First Amendment considerations would tend to prevent such a ruling. In short, it seems unlikely that any normal review would be an infringement, and that the game was leaked would not make it one.	Here's one way to avoid the issue altogether: Wikipedia, or anyone for that matter, can't copyright information (only its expression). You can reword (automate the process?) the content (ie, w/out doing "independent research") and it's yours! Of course, I'm not a lawyer so consult one of those.	It depends on the game and what you copy. Games are an utter nightmare when it comes to IP law as so many parts of them cannot be copyrighted. Game rules for example cannot be copyrighted, nor can the concept itself. Some things can be copyrighted or trademarked. You cannot use the following: Names Written elements- while the rules themselves can't be copyrighted, rulebooks can Artwork and other visual elements Miniatures designed for the game Original characters Try to avoid these and the Hasbro lawyers should leave you alone.	First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc.	This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.	You don't just want to ask, you are required to obtain a license (or in other terms: the OK of the author). Your game is based on a book. That makes your game a derivate work. Under berne convention, any signer state has to make sure that the author has the right to authorize any derivate. That includes translations, films, or games. Without a license, you violate copyright law. It doesn't matter if your game is free. To stay safe, you need to obtain a license. Quite some authors would be happy to cut a deal, license or guidelines for fan-projects. As an example, the late Sir Terry Pratchett OBE has specific guidelines on what is ok and what not. Ask your author* about these questions and consult a Lawyer! Only then make your fan project! * This means the author, their estate or whoever they assigned their rights in the work to. Some examples: For that teenage wizard in a private castle charter school that'd be a certain J.K. Rowling. For those hairy-halflings running all over the continent hunted by orcs that'd be the J.R.R. Tolkien-Estate. And for those space wizards using blades from solid light that'd be The Walt Disney Company or one of their subsidiaries.	If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine.	Yes, you can grant any license you want to your larger work. With respect to Creative Commons, they provide guidance: May I apply a CC license to my work if it incorporates material used under fair use or another exception or limitation to copyright? Yes, but it is important to prominently mark any third party material you incorporate into your work so reusers do not think the CC license applies to that material. The CC license only applies to the rights you have in the work. For example, if your CC-licensed slide deck includes a Flickr image you are using pursuant to fair use, make sure to identify that image as not being subject to the CC license. For more information about incorporating work owned by others, see our page about marking third party content. Read more considerations for licensors here. With respect to MIT License for software, I don't think that many of the reasons for fair use apply to using someone else's source code in your project. If you're creating criticism, commentary, news, or educational material, you probably have more than just code. You should choose a more appropriate license for the complete work (like a Creative Commons License). Taking someone's software source code and trying to use it under fair use may also lead to issues when you consider other factors, such as the purpose of the use, the amount included in the larger work, and the effect of value on the copyrighted work. I'm not finding a lot of cases regarding fair use in software. Galoob v. Nintendo found that you can modify copyrighted software for personal use (not relevant to this discussion). Sega v. Accolade found that copying software for reverse engineering was fair use under certain conditions (again, not relevant here). If you are attempting to use anything under fair use, regardless of the license that you apply to your larger work, you do need to ensure that you do not give the impression that each individual piece of that work is also under that licence once extracted. That's why you need to clearly mark which portions are used pursuant to fair use. If those portions are extracted from the larger work, then the original restrictions to use apply. However, someone can use the larger work under the license you grant. I just wanted to add this brief section to be extremely clear. When you are producing a work, you can choose a license for that work. If you are incorporating someone else's work into your own work, there are two possibilities: You obtain the other person's work under a license. You must abide by this license and all of its requirements. Some licenses are viral in nature, which restrict the licenses that you can apply to the larger work. You use the other person's work under fair use. In this case, you need to properly attribute the work and identify that it is not available under the same license as the larger work. Someone that extracts that smaller portion must abide by the copyright of that work. If it's available under a particular license, they can choose to use that license or under fair use if they are able to. Someone using your complete combined work uses your license.
How does the law know who owns a lease? Imagine this scenario: I find a vacant unit in an apartment complex, pick the lock, and move in. Eventually the complex inspects the property and tells me to leave. I lie and say I am a tenant at the property. They send their security to remove me. The security guard slips on a banana peel or pepper spray and fails to evict. They call the police. How do the police know I am lying? If I successfully defeat the security guard (using proportionate force of course), how does the property remove me and how do they convince the police I am lying? Obviously, the property can re-key the lock to keep me out. But then I caused them to incur an expense at no cost to myself.	In a word: records. A genuine tenant would have at least one of: a lease, records of lease payments to the apartment complex, or records of communications regarding the terms of a lease. The apartment complex would inform the police that they've never heard of this person, never given a lease to anyone by that name, and are not receiving payments from the person. An imposter would have none of these things. They could forge them, but the apartment complex could eventually prove that they weren't genuine, and the imposter would have committed additional crimes. As far as incurring expenses on the part of the complex, they could sue the imposter to recover those expenses, if they desired and thought that the imposter could pay.	Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.	Assuming it's an assured shorthold tenancy (which it will be unless the tenancy agreement says otherwise), the tenancy continues until the tenants give notice, or the landlord gives notice and the tenants leave voluntarily (and failing that, when a court forces them to leave). If no-one gives notice, and the tenants are still present once any fixed term ends, the tenancy continues as a "rolling" tenancy until it's ended as described above. A tenancy agreement stays in force even if the owner of a property changes (whether by purchase or inheritance). So to summarise: by default, nothing changes, and the tenants have the same right to stay that they had before. See, for example, this article, or this one.	If your friend thinks he can live there for free due to his unique interpretation of contract law, he is mistaken. He'll get evicted if he doesn't pay rent, and likely end up with a judgement against him for unpaid rent. At its core, a rental agreement ensures that in exchange for paying rent, he may occupy the property. You can argue up and down about payment methods, but the fact remains he must pay rent in order to live there. Your friend MAY have an argument that he could move out and not be subject to penalty for breaking the lease because the payment terms changed. He'd have to give notice and would still owe for the time he occupied the property. There's just no way he can live there for free. He may find this out the hard way.	The default rule is that a landlord can refuse to rent to anyone for any reason, in which case the landlord can refuse to rent in this case. There are civil rights laws that limit this discretion in the case, for example, of discrimination based on race, or family status. But, those laws often have exemptions for owners of small amounts of property (e.g. a unit in their own home), which can't easily be determined from the question. If a civil rights law applies, the landlord must choose among potential renters on a non-discriminatory basis - the landlord doesn't have to rent to anyone in particular, but can't use the prohibited reasons to make the choice. If the default rule does not apply because a civil rights law unrelated to immigration bars discrimination against a tenant, someone's undocumented immigrant status probably doesn't provide an absolute defense to the civil rights law, but might be one factor among many that a landlord could consider in choosing among available tenants in much the same way that credit ratings, income, and a prospective tenant's criminal record, and other factors might be considered.	You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.	You don't know. You can't know. And you can't force the officer to tell you. Detention Status As a practical matter, you have no way of knowing if you are compelled to follow an officer's order because you are being detained unless the officer volunteers that information (your detention status) which they are not compelled to disclose and have every incentive not to disclose. Consider the situation when the officer does not have reasonable suspicion do detain you. If the officer instantly informs you that you are "free to go" then you are likely to leave and end the encounter immediately. However, if the officer says nothing, then you might stay and inadvertently say or do something that would give the officer reasonable suspicion to detain you from that point forward. Your behavior during that detention could lead to probable cause, arrest, etc. Every officer knows they have nothing to gain by being quick to tell you you are free to go. Deceptive Conduct To compound the issue, police encounters are particularly problematic because police officers have a lawful right to engage in deceptive conduct during an investigation including but not limited to lying. You, on the other hand, can be prosecuted for lying to the police conducting an investigation. (See this article for more information.) Hobson's Choice Therefore, all things considered, police encounters present a Hobson's Choice. Either comply with every order in an effort to end the encounter quickly. Or try to press the officer to determine whether you are "being detained" or "free to go." The former course of action voluntarily cedes some of your rights. The latter risks "provoking" the officer into making your encounter more difficult, painful or costly than it otherwise might be. Never Consent to Searches That said, you are never under any obligation to consent to a warrantless search of your home or vehicle. Typically, saying, "I do not consent to searches." is usually sufficient if asked. Evidence obtained from warrantless searches is barred from being used at trial unless you waive this right by consenting to the search. See this question (and answers) if you are concerned about the officer falsely claiming you gave consent if you didn't. Never Talk to the Police As a legal matter, talking to the police can never help your case in court. Anything you say to the police that might help your case (i.e., exculpatory) is not admissible as evidence because it's hearsay. On the other hand, anything you say to the police can and will be used against you. In fact, even if you are completely innocent of all crimes AND you are completely 100% truthful to the police, you can still give the police all they legally need to convict you of a crime simply by talking to them. Whereas, without your statement, they would not have had sufficient evidence to convict. See this Youtube video for more details and examples of how this can and does happen every day. Practical Matters The above analysis presents the reader with some practical concerns. You don’t want to risk being harmed by an officer in fear for his safety. You don’t want to be handcuffed and taken to the police station if you can avoid it. You must obey all unconditional commands of a peace officer. It does no harm to inform the officer that you are willing to comply with all unconditional legal commands and ask him or her if a given command is, in fact, unconditional. Some attorneys go in the opposite direction from the "never talk to the police" rule and advise that, say in the case of a domestic violence dispute, the best course of action is to answer police questions matter-of-factly, never lie and never admit guilt. That course of behavior can avoid a potential trip to the police station in handcuffs in the back of a police car even if you are never ultimately arrested. TL;DR: Police encounters are tricky. It's difficult to know what to do. The best course of action is to educate yourself about your rights and the law and apply judgment and common sense to guide your behavior to achieve the best outcome. I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. This answer is not legal advice. Please consult an attorney to obtain proper legal advice.	At common law you do not need to sign a contract for it to be legally enforceable; it doesn't even have to be written down. Local real estate law may require a lease to be in writing (and possibly even signed). Putting that aside generally, the purpose of signing a contract is to: Show the intention to be legally bound. This is superfluous: they have sent you the lease, you have moved in - it is clear you both intend to be legally bound. Avoid future disputes over what the terms of the lease are. Signing it provides evidence that the document has not been altered subsequently. A written rather than a scanned signature is better for this simply because anyone with reasonably low computer skills can take a scanned image and apply it to another document. Better than both is a secure electronic signature that is invalidated if the document is changed. Unless you or your landlord are willing to commit fraud to win a dispute over a lease, it probably doesn't matter either way.
Can I successfully sue an online match making website for matching me with a fraudster? Say I used a match making website to find a girl. The website matched our personalities, likes, dislike, etc. It turns out that this women is a fraud. She is drop dead beautiful, but her intention was to suck off all my assets, particularly through divorce settlements. I will be taking legal actions on her no doubt, but can I also successfully sue the online match making website for matching me with the fraudster?	There are only two arguments you can make: The match making website did something wrong. I don't see how you can make this argument unless you have some reason to suspect they actually did something wrong. Strict liability applies. I think this fails for two reasons. One is that no theory of strict liability that I know of would apply to this situation. The other is that this is precisely the kind of risk that a user of the site should be protecting themselves from because it is much easier to detect fraud when you have extensive contact with someone than when you just operate a matchmaking service. So absent some evidence they did something wrong, such as ignoring specific warning signs from this particular user, there is no way such a suit could succeed.	People running web servers are generally liable for contributory culpability, when some user breaks the law by putting the material on the server. There are legal mechanisms for relieving the server guy from this burden. The best-known mechanism is "DMCA takedown", where you publish contact information so that an offended person can serve up a proper legal claim that you are distributing material that they own copyright to. If you follow the rules, you may enjoy "safe harbor" protection against contributory liability: one of the requirements is that you have to take infringing material down. The specific requirements can depend on the nature of the liability and jurisdiction, but generally involves a "hands off" involvement where the person has no knowledge of what's going on on his server. So just disclaiming responsibility does not work. There are other more serious violations, such as distribution of child porn or transmission of top secret information. Jurisdiction is not totally central to internet questions, and I could sue you (the server guy) in US courts, or (depending on the offense: copyright infringement of a particular item) in UK courts. Nailing this down specifically to Sweden is harder, but recall that The Pirate Bay had a whopping judgment against them.	First, it is quite unlikely that a US court would take on the case. Someone will have more details, but for example in EU law if you move away from the place you last lived together, you can only file for divorce in the country where your partner is living (in this case, India). Annullment is a much more serious matter than divorce, so I doubt any American court would take this case: Annulment would mean that a US court would have to decide that an Indian registry office didn't do its job right. Second, A needs convincing evidence. Frankly, "masculine appearance" and "typical masculine voice" are just opinions and therefore not evidence. Even if the court were convinced that B has a "masculine appearance" that's not evidence for being a male. A has to show the evidence, and as half of us know and the other half learned in their biology lessons, there is some pretty convincing evidence that someone is a man which A didnt' mention. And I'd ask anyone not to edit this out, because it is quite essential to the case. B doesn't have to visit a doctor and get a statement that she is a woman (which would destroy any case immediately), because based on the available evidence, A will lose the case anyway. On the other hand, after that court case has finished, B can at any time (after appropriate waiting times according to US law) come to the USA and file for divorce.	A settlement can include whatever terms the parties agree on, short of terms prohibited by law. Usually one party gives up at lest some claims. Then other party nay also give up,claims, or make a payment, or both. There may be other terms as well, including confidentiality of the details. It is not uncommon for both parties to give up all claims against each other. Settlement agreements are legally binding on both parties. We cannot advise on what kind of settlement a particular person should take in a particular case. For tht, consult a lawyer.	In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.	Would they ask for a take down for any other reason, when various other manga reader websites are making money off them? Merely looking at the fact that the other sites have not been taken down is not a good metric to decide if you will face an infringement suit for your own site. Consider the following possibilities: The manga on those sites may be published by a different publisher than the manga you want to host, and that publisher of your desired manga is more litigious. The manga publisher may not have been actively pursuing infringement for the last several years, but they may suddenly decide this fiscal year it's a financially good idea to start aggressively pursuing infringement. They will go after the other sites and your site at the same time. Because you plan to give them money, you are actively drawing attention to your infringing site. While they may not find it worth their while to seek out whatever new infringing sites pop up every week, in this case, they don't have to come looking for you. You show up to them, actively telling them that you're infringing their copyright. Of course, they might not care. They might love your idea. Regardless, the legally sound way to do this is to ask for permission before you do it, rather than forgiveness afterward. If you don't, you are certainly vulnerable to a lawsuit (whether or not the publisher will pursue the opportunity to sue you is a question left to the discretion of the publisher). Considering that myself is not going to be making any money off their work, does this still fall into the category of criminal act? If so, are there more than take down notices that can happen? (C&D? financial punishment? imprisoning?) Having your infringing site taken down is the minimum that could happen. If you commit copyright infringement, the copyright holder is fully entitled to file a lawsuit against you at once. It's possible that they could just file a DMCA takedown notice to your ISP to have the content taken down, but they are entitled to sue you for damages as well. Maybe they won't sue you because it's not worth their while. If not: lucky you! So, ask yourself: do you feel lucky? Copyright infringement is typically a civil offense and only punished with fines. It can only qualify as a criminal offense under 17 U.S.C. §506 when the infringement is "willful" and meets one of the following criteria: (A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; (B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000; or (C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution. As long as you don't violate any of those conditions, your infringement is not criminal. Condition B seems most likely, if I am reading it correctly: if your site serves a $10 book one hundred times, then you've met the $1000 threshold. The threshold of what makes an infringement "willful" versus "ordinary" is somewhat nebulous; see Wikipedia's article on Criminal Copyright Law in the United States.	Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.	I am just a foreign patent attorney who is studying common law to pass the California Bar Exam, but I will present my personal view. (I cannot guarantee the validity of my theory) There is an equitable theory called Constructive Trust. If it is established, the victim is entitled to benefit of any increase in value of defendant's (thief) property, meaning in this example victim (plaintiff) can recover $100 million. In order to assert CT, the following must be met: Wrongful appropriation; Here, D stole lottery ticket. Met. D has title; Here, D has title to $100 million. Met. P can trace his property to D's property; P can trace from P's $1 lottery ticket to its possession by D and collection by D of $100 million. Met. Unjust enrichment by D; D was enriched by stealing P's property (the lottery ticket). Met. Thus, it is highly possible that a court will order D to hold the property ($100 million) in constructive trust for P. This means, in plain language, that P will recover $100 million.
Can someone sue me for not giving back the amount of money they gave me as a gift? I was given an amount of money (less than 2,000$ CAD) as a gift from someone with her confirmation (by message and on paper). At first, I told her that I would accept the gift, but in the future, if possible, I will return it as my will because I do not want to owe anyone any amount of money (with no confirmation of the exact date/time to return it). Now the relationship has gone badly, and she asked me for the money back and told me that she would bring me to court for this. Can she legally do this, and am I obliged to pay it back?	Under normal common-law principles, she has provided you a gift and you have accepted it, which transfers the property to you unconditionally. You also made a gratuitous promise that you might attempt to repay her. That promise has no legal effect as a contract, both because the promise is so uncertain as to be unenforceable, and because it is not supported by mutual consideration (i.e., she has not promised to do in anything in exchange for your promise to pay you back). If the case is presented with these facts, a court should therefore deny her request to force your repayment.	Receive it and keep it. If MS wants to be paid they can either charge your card or send you an invoice. They will look really stupid if they sue you over this and need to explain to the judge why they didn't take one of the two options before taking legal action.	It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.	The idea is that, by default, we should assume the payment is a gift, unless we have specific evidence to suggest that it is offered in exchange for something. In the first case, the father-in-law has given no indication as to why he is giving her the money. It could be that he is indifferent to whether she remarries or not, and simply wants her to have a steady income in either case. He may be presuming that, if she remarries, her new husband will be able to provide for her, but until such time, he (the father-in-law) will pay her way. We certainly do not have evidence to show that he actually wants her to stay unmarried and is paying her for that purpose. In the second case, the father-in-law has given us more evidence. His words make it explicit that he does want her not to remarry, and that he is paying her in order to get her not to. Since he is clearly paying money with the intention of getting another party to do something (or in this case, to refrain from doing something), we understand it as a contract.	No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal.	No employer has ever the right to withhold your pay check for work you have done. It is strictly illegal. Even if they had 100% evidence that you caused damage and were responsible for that damage, they still can't withhold your pay. They have to pay you, and then they can try to take you to court. The reason for this law is exactly cases like yours, where people try to avoid payment. If the "powerful attorney" tells you that you are not getting paid, then that "powerful attorney" is making a big mistake, because any lawyer would love to take your case to court and see the judge cutting the "powerful attorney" down to size. If you don't want a lawyer now, then you can write a letter by registered mail telling them that you worked for them, how much the payment due is, that they are legally required to make that payment, and that you will take them to court if they are not paying. If there is a conflict between law and a "powerful attorney", the law wins, and the law is on your side.	Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.	The first thing you need to do is establish if the arrangement that you have with the person is a contract or not. In summary a contract requires: Intention to create legal relations. Note: social and family agreements are presumed not to have this intention. If you have given money to a friend or relation, then the onus is on you to show that you both intended to be legally bound; otherwise the money is legally a gift. Agreement Consideration Legal Capacity Genuine Consent Legality of Objects If you do not have a contract then your best course of action is to write the money off and get on with your life. If you do have a contract then, depending on the amount of money, your best course of action may be to write the money off and get on with your life. If you decide not to do this then you need to determine what the terms of the contract are. That is, what did you agree to do and when and what did they agree to do and when. If you do not have these written down in a signed document then your best course of action is to write the money off and get on with your life. Verbal contracts are as legally binding as written ones but it is a bugger to determine what was actually agreed. If you can determine what the terms of the contract are; has the other person broken any of them? For example, unless the contract says they must: show you what they've used the funds for show you the progress that has been made, and not live extravagantly (this would possibly be void term anyway for uncertainty or meaninglessness) then they do not have to! If they have (or there is a reasonable belief that they will) breach the contract then you can: Affirm that the contract continues Terminate the contract Repudiate the contract (i.e. there never was a contract) Seek an order for Specific Performance Seek an injunction Seek damages
Why wasn't Sacha Baron Cohen arrested for interrupting CPAC 2020? Comedian Sacha Baron Cohen attended CPAC dressed as President Trump while filming his latest movie Borat Subsequent Moviefilm. Source Why wasn't Sacha Baron Cohen arrested for interrupting CPAC 2020?	The media purports that he was let through security, thus he had permission to be present. There is no evidence that he made a false statement to the effect that he was Trump, or in any way gained unlawful access. It is not at all clear what person in authority told him to leave, but there is no evidence that, permission to be present having been rescinded he remained at the venue. There is no evidence that he did anything that constituted "interrupting" or "disrupting" the event, and it is plainly evident that the disruption comes from the audience who decided to start chanting. Since he did not interrupt the speech and did not trespass, all they could do was remove him from the venue. Courts in the US do not hold that the peaceful presence of an opponent at a political event constitutes "instigation" or "disruption".	Possibly. I wonder if you mean "convicted" rather than "arrested"? There is no way that he will be "arrested" because you don't accompany him ("arrested" is when he taken by the police before a trial). On the other hand, if he plans to call you as a witness for the defence, then your absence may mean he is convicted at his trial when otherwise he would be found innocent. The final possibility is that you might act as a character witness after conviction, and your absence may mean he is sent to jail rather than fined. It may be possible for you to write a witness statement describing what happened, and to have this notarized. On the other hand, the prosecution may well want to cross examine you. I am pretty sure you can write a character witness statement (saying, if true, that it's a first offence and that you have forgiven him, etc) and get it notarized. That might persuade a court to be lenient. I think you (as a couple) need to talk to his lawyer.	A person isn't required to state their evidence that the claim is true when they make the claim, and as a public figure, a defamation suit filed by Trump would be judged under the stronger "actual malice" claim, meaning that the statement was made with knowledge that the claim is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. You would have to look at the specific statement. It is generally not defamatory to hurl insults like "rapist!", "pedophile!", "criminal!" etc. against a public figure especially a political figure, since such word don't generally amount to an actual accusation of wrong-doing. On the other hand, a detailed but false claim purporting to relate factual events could cross the threshold. Hyperbole is not actionable.	The term "lawyer up" usually refers to a person asserting their right to silence and counsel, which means that police interrogation must stop. A lawyer would "lawyer up" in that sense if he was being interrogated by the law. Michael Cohen, on the other hand, retained an attorney because of the threat of legal interrogation. As a general rule, absolutely everyone who is the subject of a legal investigation should seek legal counsel, to protect their rights. Although lawyers are broadly trained in many aspects of the law, they aren't experts in all such aspects, so it would probably not be wise for a tax attorney to defend himself in a criminal trial, and a family law expert might not be the best guy to hire to advise you on a complex real estate matter. Since the particular case is highly political, added insulation in the form of an attorney between you and the investigators is to be expected.	A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ.	Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple \| Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”	The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible.	Your parsing is incorrect. The semicolon after "from the same" starts a new clause. It should be read as: [Part 2] They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, [Part 3] be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; [Part 4] and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. So they are privileged from arrest while attending sessions, or while going to and returning from those sessions, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace. As a separate privilege, they shall not be questioned anywhere (except in Congress itself) regarding their speech and debate in Congress. But if they are neither attending, going to, or returning from a Congressional session, and the crime is not related to their speech or debate, they have no immunity. Also, to echo user6726, the privilege from arrest while attending Congress or traveling is not the same as immunity. If they commit a crime on the way to or from Congress, they can still be arrested after they get home, and subsequently tried and convicted.
Would it be interstate fraud for a company to advertise a brand-new 1957 car? A company advertises a brand-new 1957 car. They claim to have several in stock and will ship it right away. They know they don't have those cars and cant get them because they don't exist and never will be built again. You order a car and they take your money knowing the sale cannot happen. Isn't this fraud? If so, at what jurisdictional level would stealing money this way online relate to? State, interstate or federal government laws?	In general, knowingly making a false statement as part of a commercial or financial transaction, or as part of a contract, with the intention that the other party will rely on that statement and be harmed by this is likely to be fraud. However, there are some limitations. For the lie to be common-law fraud: The other party must in fact rely on the false statement. The other party must suffer harm as a result of relying on the false statement. The reliance must be reasonable. If a seller advertises having new 1957 model cars in 2020, a court might well find that this was so improbable that no reasonable person would have relied on hte statement, and that therefore it is not fraud. Whether the reliance is reasonable depends on the overall facts of the case, and the details might affect what is considered reasonable. In some jurisdictions such a false statement might be actionable false advertising even if it is not fraud. If the US mails are used as part of a fraud or attempted fraud 18 U.S. Code § 1341 applies. This law applies whether any actual harm occured or not, adn whether the victim relied on the false statement or not. It is commonly known as "mail fraud". 18 U.S. Code CHAPTER 47 is a US Federal law that prohibits a variety of false statements and false documents. Section 1001 of this chapter prohibits false statements and documents "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States" but I am not clear if this would apply in the case described in the question. Other sections of chapter 47 deal mostly with false statements made to the US Government, or to obtain money or benefits from the government, Or in connection with various particular regulated activities, and do not seem to apply to the case in the question. According to the Justia article on Fraud: Federal fraud statutes, along with most state laws, require proof of a “scheme or artifice” to defraud. The statutes do not provide an explicit definition of these terms, but courts have developed definitions through precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Carpenter v. United States that the terms apply to any plan intended to deprive another of property, regardless of whether it would cause immediate financial harm. However, I think that a scheme such as the one described in the question would be more likely to be prosecuted by a US State than by the US Federal government. Either the state where the maker of the false statements was at the time of the statements, or the state where the victim was present could prosecute.	Possibly: remember that we have 50 different states and their laws plus the federal government. Alabama criminal code §13A-9-9 define the crime of "possession of a forgery device", which is when one makes or possesses with knowledge of its character any plate, die or other device, appliance, apparatus, equipment or article specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments with intent to use it himself, or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery. Selling is covered under the fact of possession. Arizona has a similar law, referring to the situation when a person Makes or possesses with knowledge of its character and with intent to commit fraud any plate, die, or other device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article, material, good, property or supply specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments. Makes or possesses any device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article, material, good, property or supply adaptable for use in forging written instruments with intent to use it or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery. Federal law would be covered here: §474 covers any plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, from which has been printed, or which may be prepared by direction of the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of printing, any obligation or other security of the United States, uses such plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, or... but this could not be reasonably interpreted to include a printing press, and would not cover a gadget that forges passports (Dept. of State, not Treasury). There isn't a federal statute with the breadth of the Alabama law. Any such law would have to include an "intent to forge" element.	A "similar brand", even a "knock off", does not infringe trademark protection (which is the issue here, not copyright) as long as reasonable consumers or purchasers will not be confused or mislead into thinking that the product is the same as the original product, or is made by, affiliated with, sponsored by, or authorized by the makers of the original product, or that the knockoff in some way shares the reputation of the original product. Obviously that is a fact-based judgement, but a name that alludes to another product but is obviously different is generally not considered an infringement. (I recall reading of a case in which the well-known "North Face" clothing brand tried to sue a new brad called "South butt". I believe that North Face lost. Apparently I was wrong and the case was settled.)	20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued.	You can’t “mislead or deceive” in “trade or commerce” in Australia It is flat out against the law to mislead or deceive - you can’t lie, you can’t conceal salient facts, you can’t tell half truths, you can’t even tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth if that could be misleading. The fines are huge (for example), plus the contracts are unenforceable, plus the reputational damage is extreme. The types of practice that you describe would result in orders to return the premiums, plus fines plus probably revocation of the licence to be an insurer in Australia if they were systemic. This is particularly true of insurance companies - the legislation that applies to them is enumerated here.	No. In the United States, lying is not a crime. Unless it is done: under oath (in which case it's called perjury) or to a law enforcement agent conducting an investigation (in which case it's called obstruction). There are also the civil torts of slander (oral) and libel (written) if someone lies and damages the reputation or business interests of a person or company. Collectively, and without distinction, these are called defamation. Lying also has a close cousin — the civil tort of fraud — which usually applies to inducement into a transaction or a contract. There are also consumer protection statutes (federal and state) that deal with truth in advertising, truth in lending, lemon laws, etc. But those are primarily civil statutes and the last two are pretty far afield from your question. But none of that applies to the Facebook case you described. So, no.	The acts in question don't distinguish between online and in person sales. Both are retail sales. A retail sale is a sale for use rather than a wholesale sale for resale. Wholesale sales are exempt from sales tax and so are easy to distinguish. Online sales are still retail sales. It is a distinction without a difference. Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007(a)(1) and common law case law would suffice. There is also case law under the UCC, and the relevant federal statutes. But, I doubt that the argument of the vendor would be that it didn't make a retail sale (at least once their lawyers got involved). More importantly, there is nothing that says that online sales aren't retail sales. Bob should contact the online sales department to seek a remedy since he was advised by the company to contact that department. But the part of the company handling his complaint doesn't change his rights. Warranty rights don't depend upon the intent of the parties. If a warranty arises and it good isn't as warranted, there is a legal right to a remedy. If a store doesn't honor one's legal warranty rights, then you sue the store for damages, typically, in a court of limited jurisdiction, or if there is an arbitration clause, in a consumer arbitration forum (some of which are not actively doing business due to controversies in recent years, leaving a judicial forum open).	From a comment on the question: They did damage the trailer door and headlight is smashed This seems like the best thing to focus on, especially if you can show that it was not damaged before they towed it. The unusual method of towing (with video evidence) may be a factor in whether they are considered negligent. If the damage to the door looks like they caused it directly by breaking in, that would also help your case. You also asked in your comment if you should go to the police or to a lawyer first. Might as well go to the lawyer and see what they tell you to do. I'm not sure what the police would do if there is no clear crime that has been committed. (The lawyer should have better advice about whether/why to go to the police.)
Can a person who has been pardoned still be held liable for the same offense in a civil court? This answer indicates that accepting, for example, a presidential pardon, is considered an admission of guilt. If a person were to accept such a pardon, can they then still be held liable in a civil court for the same offense they were pardoned for? It would seem that the act of accepting the pardon could then be used as evidence in such a trial.	Yes, they can be sued civilly Or, for that matter, be prosecuted by another jurisdiction- pardons only work within the jurisdiction that issued them. In a common law jurisdiction, the pardon cannot be used as evidence Nor, for that matter, can a criminal conviction. This is partly because the elements that need to be proved for the civil wrong won’t correspond to the elements of the crime. But mostly, because it just isn’t allowed.	That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of "original intent". The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would "incapacitate" the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes.	If the act and the evidence is sufficient, they will all be convicted. It would not be necessary, for example, to prove that it was Brutus's stab that killed the victim. It is not guaranteed that all of the participants committed the act knowed as 1st degree homicide (picking Washington law), some may be guilty of conspiracy to murder. Liability for a crime can extend to others besides the person who "did it": (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she: (i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it	"Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent.	Whether or not one holds the opinion that the adult morally should be prosecuted, there are only two legal questions – can the adult be prosecuted, and must the adult be prosecuted? The easiest question to answer is the "must" one – prosecution by the government is always discretionary. It is settled law that the government can decline to prosecute a crime. The decision to prosecute is entirely political. It seems likely that the government can prosecute, if they conclude that the action was not legally justified under §418 of the Crimes Act 1900, as defense of another against a criminal assault. The government won't prosecute if they conclude that such a defense is likely to succeed.	Your premise that "the law did not exist previously" is, from the perspective of how courts work, mistaken. The law always existed, it's just that some people (maybe even judges) mistakenly thought the law didn't exist (actually, "meant something else"). Many people have wrong ideas about what the law says, but ignorance of misunderstanding of the law is no excuse. Even having an understandable wrong belief is no excuse. There is an area in which ignorance of the law is excused. Violation of a person's civil rights under color of law is a civil wrong for which the officer can be sued. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 and citations therein: Respondents may nevertheless be shielded from liability for their constitutionally impermissible conduct if their actions did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Thus an officer may not use a qualified immunity defense if the court finds that an action is a civil rights violation and this "clarification" of the law is new.	Yes. The U.S. AG can decline to prosecute an indictment at any time until jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn in to consider the charges at trial. The AG can also abandon a prosecution mid-trial but then cannot retry those charges later. The AG might abandon charges, for example, because the evidence does not appear to support the charges when presented at trial, or because, for example, a prosecution might damage a diplomatic relationship of the U.S. with another country, or because a new administration has different priorities than an old one and recently had its AG appointed to office while the trial was pending. This said, there are some situations (e.g. when there is a special prosecutor, or after a lower level prosecutor has entered into a binding plea agreement) when the AG does not have the authority to overrule the decisions to prosecute or not prosecute an indictment that is made by a lower level prosecutor. The AG has line authority to give orders to lower level prosecutors in the AG's office 99% of the time, but not always.	The plea is entered before the trial. The concession of guilt happens during trial: the lawyer acknowledges that the defendant did the crime, but argues that it should be overlooked in some way. For example, Nixon dealt with a death-penalty case where the lawyer's strategy was to admit during the trial that the defendant had killed the victim, but to use the trial to persuade them that the circumstances did not call for the death penalty. You don't get to make those arguments if you enter a guilty plea, which would then strip you of your right to a jury.
What is the meaning of “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the 14th amendment? In the fourteenth amendment, what does the phrase “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” contribute? What people born in the United States would not have been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States? All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. Same question restated: would the formulation below have a different legal meaning? All persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. (Purely theoretical legal question; no relation to current events.)	In the case of United States vs Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (a 6-2 decision), the Supreme Court wrote: [T]he real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States" by the addition "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases -- children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State -- both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. ... [T]he Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. ... To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States. In short the phrase “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” excludes three and only three groups of people: Children born to foreign diplomats here on diplomatic business, who have diplomatic immunity to US Law; Children of members of an invading army that has occupied and controlled some part of US territory, born on that occupied area, who are obviously not subject to US Law (which has rarely happened in the US, although Guam was occupied during WWII, and parts of Alaska, and small parts of Maine during the War of 1812); and Members of Native American tribes, subject to the jurisdiction of their tribal governments, who do not pay US taxes. (This was true when the 14th amendment was passed, but it no longer is. See section below on the act that changed it in 1924.) Any other person born in the proper US or in incorporated US territory is a citizen, no matter who his or her parents are or were. (The case is less clear for unincorporated US territory.) See also the Wikipedia article on the case This view was confirmed in 1995 in an opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel written by then-Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, taking the position that this rule could not be changed by legislation, only by Constitutional Amendment, writing: My office grapples with many difficult and close issues of constitutional law. The lawfulness of this bill is not among them. This legislation is unquestionably unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment declares that “[a]ll persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The unmistakable purpose of this provision was to constitutionalize the existing Anglo-American common law rule of jus soli or citizenship by place of birth and especially to extend it to persons of African descent and their descendants. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) the Supreme Court of the United States struck down both a state statute denying funding for education to children in the United States illegally and a municipal school district's attempt to charge an annual $1,000 tuition fee for each student. The case upheld the same principle that the constitutional phrase "within the jurisdiction" applies to the children of people who had entered the US illegally. According to the Wikipedia article on the case: Texas officials had argued that illegal aliens were not "within the jurisdiction" of the state and thus could not claim protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court majority rejected this claim, finding instead that "no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment 'jurisdiction' can be drawn between resident immigrants whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident immigrants whose entry was unlawful." The dissenting opinion also rejected this claim, agreeing with the Court that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to immigrants who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically 'within the jurisdiction' of a state." Thus the question of whether such aliens were "within the jurisdiction" of the US was very much at issue in Plyler v. Doe EDIT: Since the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 was passed, all Native Americans born within the US have been citizens by birth, and the third class of exceptions noted in the earlier cases non longer exists. Prior to this act Native Americans were in many ways treated as foreigners by the US. They were not citizens by birth, and their tribes had some but not all of the attributes of independent nations. The text of the law is: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all non citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property. (End edit on Indian Citizenship Act of 1924) Edit: On reading through the decision of the case of Wong Kim Ark I find one more small exclusion: persons born on board a foreign naval ship, even though present in US waters in time of peace, are not citizens of the US because of their birth location. This is apparently not a usual case, but is premised on the ground that a military vessel remains the territory of the nation it belongs to. Such persons might of course be citizens by inheritance if one or both parents are US citizens, and the statutory conditions are complied with. (The term "public ship" in the 1800s was used to mean a national ship, that is a military ship.) (End edit on naval ships) I just learned that some parts of the State of Maine were occupied by the British during the war of 1812. I do not know if anyone was born during that occupation whose citizenship might have been affected.	Overview The list in this answer is not comprehensive merely listing some of the leading SCOTUS cases on point, but the approach taken, analyzing the way the term is used in a context specific, case by case approach, rather than trying to ascribe a trans-substantive meaning to it in all contexts is, I believe the correct approach. There are 30 SCOTUS cases that use the term discussing perhaps 15-20 treaties and statutes, and hundreds of circuit court cases that do so. It turns out that the term foreign national often paraphrases treaty language that is not identical when there is no ambiguity in the case before the court. The EO language is probably merely the product of sloppy drafting since the statute uses the word "alien". In many contexts where "foreign national" is used to paraphrase the exact treaty language, the term is relevant because it is used in a context where a relationship between the person and their nation is at issue in some respect as in the VCCR below and the Public Vessels Act. So, in those contexts, the term would often exclude "stateless persons". But, there is really no way to know in the absence of context whether dual citizens are or are not intended to be included in the term. The VCCR: Paraphrase One place that the term "foreign national" is used is Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) which gives a foreign national a right to diplomatic assistance in the criminal justice process. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006). The same section of the same treaty was at issue in Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003). In this context, a stateless person is clearly not a foreign national, as a stateless person has no ambassadors or counsels from the country in which the stateless person is a foreign national to seek recourse. The term "foreign national" also paraphrases the treaty language which actually uses the phrase "nationals of the sending state" (where the "sending state" is the country with diplomats in the territory of the "receiving state") which could in a plain reading include dual citizens. Specifically it says: 1.With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State: (a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State; (b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph; (c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action. The Trading With the Enemy Act: Paraphrase The term was also used in a case discussing the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended by the First War Powers Act of 1941, and Executive Order 9095, as amended, which allowed for an "Alien Property Custodian" to seize property of a foreign national (in this case a German) in connection with World War II. See Silesian-American Corp v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947). It isn't clear, however, that this case has continuing legal validity and relevance. And, the "foreign national" terminology in this case appears to be a paraphrase of the phrase "enemy or ally of enemy" that appears in the underlying text of the authorizing statute. U.S-Mexico Extradition Act and 4th Amendment: Synonym For Alien The term was used in the case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), in which a Mexican citizen was kidnapped in Mexico by U.S. agents and tried in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges without regard to the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, which Judge Kennedy uses the term synonymously with "alien" in his concurring opinion in a case involving facts where any definition of the two terms applies. Hague Service Convention: Concept Not Used In Treaty The term was used in the case of Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) interpreting the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (Hague Service Convention), [1969] 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 which governs service of process of foreign nationals to determine if it applies to service of process on foreign nationals within the United States. The treaty language of the Hague Service Convention itself, however, makes no reference at all to the nationality of the person served and depends entirely upon whether the person is served abroad in the territory of a signatory or not. Under the plain language of the treaty itself, a U.S. citizen in France has to be served pursuant to the Hague Service Convention, although a U.S. court would usually be in a better position to compel compliance from its own national than it would be from a foreign national. In a nutshell the facts and circuit splitting legal issues presented by the service of process in a product liability case in a state court in the United States in Chicago were as follows: VWAG, a corporation established under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, has its place of business in that country. VWoA is a wholly owned subsidiary of VWAG. Schlunk attempted to serve his amended complaint on VWAG by serving VWoA as VWAG's agent. VWAG filed a special and limited appearance for the purpose of quashing service. VWAG asserted that it could be served only in accordance with the Hague Service Convention, and that Schlunk had not complied with the Convention's requirements. FWIW, SCOTUS held that the treaty did not apply to service of process within the territory of the country whose courts issued the process. The Public Vessels Act: Context Specific Usage In United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976), per the official syllabus: Prior to 1960, the Suits in Admiralty Act authorized suit against the United States in cases involving vessels owned by, possessed by, or operated by or for the United States, if such suit could have been maintained had the vessel been a private one, and provided further that such vessel was employed as a merchant vessel. In 1960, Congress amended the Act by deleting.the latter proviso. The Public Vessels Act authorizes suit against the United States in cases involving "a public vessel of the United States," but bars such a suit by a foreign national unless it appears that his government [96 S.Ct. 1321] allows a United States national to sue in its courts under similar circumstances. Respondent, a Philippine corporation, alleging jurisdiction under both Acts, sued the United States to recover damages resulting from the sinking of its fishing vessel after a collision with a United States naval destroyer. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that, since the destroyer was a "public vessel of the United States," the suit was governed by the Public Vessels Act, that therefore respondent was subject to that Act's reciprocity provision, and that, since there was no such reciprocity, the suit was barred. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the suit, although involving a public vessel, was maintainable under the Suits in Admiralty Act, as amended in 1960 to delete the "employed as a merchant vessel" proviso, free from the restrictions, including the reciprocity requirement, imposed by the Public Vessels Act. Held: Claims within the scope of the Public Vessels Act remain subject to its terms after the 1960 amendment to the Suits in Admiralty Act, and, since respondent's claim falls within the Public Vessels Act, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that that Act's reciprocity provision did not apply. Here the focus is on the relationship of the foreign national to a home state court which may or may not offer reciprocity. The statute is 46 U.S.C. § 781. The case at issue involved a Philippine corporation owned mostly by Americans, which was held to be Philippine nationality and the reciprocity of Philippine courts applied. Presumably in this case a dual national would count as an American and a stateless person would not.	You can be prosecuted for the crime in the U.S., both at the federal level and at the U.S. state level (or both), completely without regard to what happened in the criminal justice process elsewhere. This is true in all of the scenarios you pose, for any offense, and with or without an extradition treaty (of course, unless the treaty had some anomalous provision to the contrary or deprived the U.S. of jurisdiction by statute rather than constitutionally of this crime). The U.S. Supreme Court determined in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) that the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution is applied separately with regard to each sovereign involved and that each state and the federal government count as separate sovereigns. In the pertinent part, it states: The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government. When a defendant in a single act violates the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct "offences." United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 260 U. S. 382 (1922). As the Court explained in Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 55 U. S. 19 (1852), "[a]n offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law." Consequently, when the same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, "it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence, but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable." Id. at 55 U. S. 20. In practice, the U.S. Justice Department and most state and local prosecutors are disinclined to prosecute a crime that has already been handled by another jurisdiction and often have official, but non-binding, policies to that effect. In part, this is because an acquittal in one jurisdiction makes it likely that it is a weak case, while a conviction in one jurisdiction often constitutes sufficient punishment. There could be an issue under the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (cruel and unusual punishment) over whether a punishment imposed in a U.S. conviction for a crime needs to consider the already severe punishment imposed in another jurisdiction for the same crime in order to prevent the cumulative punishment from being cruel and unusual. But, I am not aware of authoritative case law that resolves that constitutional question. Certainly, evidence of a prior punishment for the same offense could be presented at a sentencing hearing following a conviction in mitigation of the punishment that should be imposed. Indeed, in some states time served pursuant to a conviction for the same crime in another jurisdiction might statutorily count as "time served" for which the defendant is legally entitled to credit at sentencing.	What appears to be the controlling case is DC v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. In Heller, the meaning of "Right of the People" is relevant, and the court finds that in three instances in The Constitution, these instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not 'collective' rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body" However, Art. 1 Sec 2 of The Constitution says that "the people" will select members of The House, and then there is the 10th: Heller says that Those provisions arguably refer to 'the people' acting collectively—but they deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights In other words, "the people" can act collectively, but "the people" have individual rights. In the remaining cases of "the people", the expression "unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset". We are then directed to US v. Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. 259, which is a warrantless search case involving a Mexican citizen and a search in Mexico, and the part that Heller finds relevant is that ‘[T]he people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution… . [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community." In other case law, Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, F.3d 361 which cites US v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 it is likewise said that constitutional rights expressly limited to the "people," such as those created by the Fourth Amendment, are held only by "a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community" "The People" thus starts from identifying "a national community", and then if the context is about rights, each such individual has the right, but in the context of powers, the collective has it.	In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.	I'm not aware of any court ruling about the meaning of the "14 years" clause, but the plain reading of it would be that someone merely needs to accumulate 14 years of residency in the United States in order to be eligible to run for President. There's precedent for this, in the form of Dwight D. Eisenhower: he spent large parts of the period 1942-1946 in Europe before being elected in 1952.	You are looking for extraterritorial jurisdiction: As the term indicates, it connotes the exercise of jurisdiction, or legal power, outside territorial borders. This can include nations claiming jurisdiction over crimes in nearby bodies of water and to specific categories of crimes (such as sexual offenses against underage victims) committed by or against citizens while abroad. Wikipedia has a summary, including a few different nations' application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Cornell Law Review has a very extensive essay, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?	Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries.
Department of Motor Vehicles driving test makes no sense! I have just received an instructional permit in the state of California after passing my written test at the Department of Motor Vehicles. I am currently trying to find opportunities to use this instructional permit for the very purpose it was issued to me, namely to practice driving with an individual holding a valid driver's license before the real deal. At the DMV, I was advised to find a "friend" who could allow me to use their car to practice and then bring this "friend" as well as their vehicle to the DMV. The DMV does not provide vehicles on test day. I have two major problems with this: 1) "Bring a friend" is not very professional or rigorous legal jargon. What if none of my friends have cars? What if I have no friends? 2) It so happens that some of my friends do have cars. However they all have the same legitimate reaction when I ask for help.There reaction is unanimously "What about insurance?" Their name is on the insurance, so if something happens to the car during our practice or even during the driving test at the DMV, they are ultimately responsible. Is the challenge of finding someone who is willing to jump in head first to a possible legal entanglement part of the driving test? Someone please help as this makes no legal sense to me.	As far as I know in the United States, no DMV provides test vehicles. You need a vehicle to take the driving test. Since you are not currently licensed, you can not legally drive yourself to the test alone... So logically, you must bring someone... anyone... willing to drive you to the test and provide a vehicle for you to test in. As others have stated in the comments above, worse case scenario is the hiring of a driving instructor. If you read the written instructions (and I remember correctly), it does state something along the lines of "must be accompanied by a licensed driver and provide an insured, registered, vehicle". Which is a bit more formal than the "bring a friend". Most people just naturally use more casual terms when speaking. I don't know your age, but it's probably more common to hear "bring a parent" than "bring a friend" when speaking face to face with the DMV staff. Also, not all insurance policies are driver limited. Some policies are on the vehicle regardless of driver. Typically Liability-only insurance is vehicle specific, not driver specific. [*1] You'd have to review the policies or call the insurance agents to confirm this. You may even do something as simple as add you to the current insurance for a month or two while you're practicing and testing. Just reimburse your friend for any increase in premiums during this time. Contact the insurance company/agent. The cost may be minimal. In addition, there are non-owner insurance policies which cover you even if you do not own a vehicle. This would provide insurance if none of your friends has a policy which would work. Realize that most people taking the test for the first time have probably already been added to a policy owned by their parents. So, your situation is a bit more unique. It's not meant to be inherently confusing but if you're "outside the norm" you have to do some deductive reasoning on your own. And finally, if an accident or damage were to happen during your practicing or testing, it would still be your responsibility. If you are in control of the vehicle, you are responsible for any damage to it or damage caused by the vehicle due to any negligence on your part, regardless of any insurance policy. You'd be a pretty bad "friend" if you caused damage and didn't financially make restitution leaving your "friend" holding the bag, so to speak. Restitution could be something as simple as paying the deductible on your friend's policy. Of course, if you are not covered by insurance any claim may be denied -- leaving you responsible for everything. The mindset that just because your friend owns the car they are totally responsible for anything that happens while your driving seem very, very self-serving and, well, I'd be apprehensive about loaning you my vehicle as well. In fact, I absolutely would not.	You are completely in the wrong. It is against the law to operate a motor vehicle without a license. It is against the law to have a motor vehicle that is not insured. It is against the law to violate the conditions of your probation which almost certainly provide that you are not allowed to operate a motor vehicle until your license is reinstated and you have insurance in force. Your personal belief that you didn't break the law is not a valid reason not to pay a fine on a ticket that is ratified by a court. The cop was right when he told you that you were crazy.	In New York State, vehicle registration requirements (including the requirement to display license plates) are under Title IV of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Title IV refers to "motor vehicles." However, Section 125 of the law, which defines "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the law, states that: Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power [...]. For the purposes of title four of this chapter, the term motor vehicle shall exclude fire and police vehicles other than ambulances. [...] Fire and police vehicles in New York State are exempt from registration requirements, including the requirement to have a license plate. They can use license-plate-esque designs, and I believe they can get normal local government plates, but they do not have to. EDIT: Also, I just remembered the NYPD operates at least one ambulance. Per that section, one would expect the ambulance to use a state-issued license plate, not the NYPD fleet plates. And this is, in fact, the case:	Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.	No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.	Is there anything I can do so that the authorities investigate and revoke his privilege of driving a car? Yes. Next time he drinks and gets behind the wheel, call the police and tell them that you are witnessing an intoxicated person about to drive. If the police witness him behind the wheel while intoxicated, he'll be issued a DUI, perhaps face jail time, and will have his license revoked. I would suggest visiting your local chapter of Alcoholics Anonymous. They experience situations like this all the time and can work with you to help this individual.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.	It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.
Claiming workplace vaccine exemption What are the required elements of valid claims for workplace exemptions of the following types? Exemption would be for an employer-required vaccination against some communicable illness. Medical: I guess this requires that a medical professional confirms the need for a medical exemption. Can it be any doctor? Religious/Philosophical: Does the employee have to provide any evidence that beliefs are strongly held and genuine, or must the employer disprove this? Also, how specific does the belief need to be? Also, is it the responsibility of the employee to suggest reasonable accommodations or must the employer figure out how to accommodate? If the employee doesn't find the accommodation suitable, must there be a separate exemption claimed for the accommodation? Assume this in the US, all parties are US citizens, employment is full time salaried exempt, at will and no union. See also this related question.	If the requirement is imposed by an employer, then the basis for an exemption, if any, would be whatever the employer choose to allow, unless some applicable law required some particular exemption. Such mandates are not common. Indeed I do not recall hearing of any such absolute mandates. But an employer could choose to impose one, and I have heard (and read) discussions of hospitals, for example, requiring COVID-19 vaccinations to be taken by employees when available. If an employer mandates a vaccination, it is up to the employer to decide when, and if, an exemption is warranted. It is up to the employee to decide whether to comply by accepting the vaccination or refuse at the risk of being fired. I do not know of any law which would specifically require an employer to grant exemptions in particular circumstances. A law might exist, or be passed, requiring such exemptions. If the employee had a particular medical condition which makes a vaccination si9gnificantly more risky for that employee than for an average person, and if that condition was considered to be a disability (not all or even most medical conditions are so considered) then the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) would require the employer to offer a "reasonable accommodation" to the employee, if one is available. Exactly what accommodation is "reasonable" is a fact-based determination, and would depend on the reason for the mandate, the cost and burden of the accommodation on the employer, and the degree if risk to the employee with and without the accommodation. In some cases no accommodation is found to be "reasonable", and in such cases the ADA does not mandate any accommodation at all. The ADA generally specifies whet must be done when an employee has \ a disability, but dopes not specify exactly how a disability must be proved. A medical certificate is common, but njot invariable, iof an employer questions the existence o a disability. The ADA would not require an exemption for a "Religious/Philosophical" objection. Soem state laws protect religious scruples in various particular employment situations. In some but not all states objections on such grounds for vaccinations otherwise required for school attendance are honored. The exact grounds accepted vary from state to state. A specific state would need to be listed for a more specific answer to be given, and I am not aware of any state that has such a requirement for exemption from a private employer's vaccine mandate. Addition: It seems from comments that some employers, such as hospitals and the military, already require vaccinations for some diseases. This seems reasonable to me, and does not change my answer otehrwise.	In england-and-wales there is no legal requirement, in the private sector, to advertise vacancies and employers can recruit whoever they choose as long as they do not commit unlawful direct or indirect discrimination and follow their own internal HR policies. Re: In the western hemisphere is it quite legal for employers to do things like... Exclude close family/marital relations of existing employees? YES Exclude internal applicants from consideration for jobs for which they have relevant qualifications? YES Hire non-local (here defined as those who can commute to work from their existing home) candidates in preference to local ones similarly qualified? YES Hire foreigners where they have suitable work permits? YES Summarily hire members of the business owner's family? YES as long as they are not "phantom" employees only put on the books soley to evade tax liabilities by, for example, paying a salary when they don't do any actual work.	In the absence of a contractual agreement saying otherwise, the lawsuit would probably just be subject to normal rules of tort liability. In that case, the contractor would probably lose his case unless he could prove that the one worker infected another through an act of negligence or could otherwise prove that the infected worker knew he was infected and posed a risk to others. In the basic negligence situation, the contractor would likely rely on the general duty we all have to avoid creating unreasonable risks of injury to third parties, and he would need to argue that Worker A somehow breached that duty. Coming to work knowing you're infected would almost certainly satisfy that standard, but it might be enough to simply show that Worker A was at a large gathering of unmasked people whose vaccination status was unknown. From there, he would also need to prove that breaching that duty caused him some injury, presumably by infecting Workers B through M, causing a work slowdown, causing missed deadlines, causing late fees, etc. The contractor might also pursue a claim for reckless, rather than negligent, conduct, if Worker A knew he was infected and came to work just the same. Or he might pursue an intentional tort claim if there was some reason to believe that Worker A was actually trying to get other people sick, as opposed to just ignoring the fact that such a risk existed. As I understand it, several states have also passed laws limiting liability for exposure to COVID in the workplace, so it's possible that none of these claims would be viable, no matter how strong the evidence.	Discrimination in employment is legal For example, you can discriminate to hire the more qualified or experienced candidate over less qualified ones. What you can’t do is discriminate on the basis of a protected category: The Alberta Human Rights Act (AHR Act) prohibits discrimination in employment based on the protected grounds of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religious beliefs, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, physical disability, mental disability, marital status, family status, source of income, and sexual orientation. If it’s not on the list (or a proxy for something on the list), you can discriminate on it.	The relevant bit of legislation — Human Rights Act 1993 s22 — protects applicants and employees: Where an applicant for employment or an employee is qualified for work of any description, it shall be unlawful .. to refuse ... offer .. terminate ... retire ... by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. So, if you never advertise but always invite people (i.e. offer them job straight away) then there are no applicants (as at no point does anybody apply for the job), and hence no employment discrimination. If you invite them for a "non-discriminatory screening interview" then there is no discrimination by definition of "non-discriminatory" :) behavioural / relational / mental / spiritual I'm pretty sure these criteria would be discriminatory in a advertised position. None of those criteria are prohibited grounds of discrimination (s21). However, it would be a good idea to clearly define them as "a genuine occupational qualification for the position" by drafting a job description and explaining why those traits are crucial for the business.	HIPAA imposes obligations on some people, but not all people. In the case of security and privacy questions, you would consult 45 CFR Part 164. A patient's actions are not subject to government sanctions, so a patient can provide or decline to provide email addresses following their own judgment. A healthcare or insurance provider would be required to securely keep PII under wraps. The regulations also do not impose obligations on unknowing potentially involved third-parties, i.e. no obligation is imposed on Google to know that an individual is using a Gmail account to transmit PII-related information. The medical provider has an obligation to store and transmit such information securely, which would mean for example that they do not send insecure plain text emails saying "Sally Jones at 12345 67th Ave SW was treated for a loathsome disease, we're coding that as 0102, and we want $500". That obligation is passed on to employees via employment-contractual obligations, for example that may dictate what computer or software you can use to do the job. If the provider passes the buck to the employee (and I assume that the employee is just an employee), they have violated the security rule. In that case, they may be attempting to mitigate the consequences of their actions or at least check if there were identifiable violations of the privacy rule. In the scenario where SmithMed provides all of the infrastructure needed to bill insurance companies, it is not a HIPAA violation to inspect computer logs, email etc. to verify that the employee has been complying with security and privacy policies. It would likewise not be a HIPAA violation to inspect third-party accounts (Gmail etc) to determine whether there has been a security / privacy rule violation. That is as far as HIPAA takes you. Whether or not the ex-employee has an obligation to turn over their email account information is mostly determined by the employment contract, but it is highly unlikely that any such contract has a "gimme your personal email on termination" clause. It is not inconceivable that the employee negligently used their personal account rather than opening a new billing-job only account. Also depending on the email service provider, it may well be a violation of the terms of service to hand over your account information. (Instead, for a certain email provider, the company is expected to set up and pay for a company account). Those are considerations bearing on possible legal impediments to turning over the email information. Needless to say, don't share passwords etc. because that exposes you legally, but that is not about HIPAA.	What follows is a broad overview. I'm not an expert in this; I just have a bit of experience in this due to a tax situation my wife & I experienced a few years ago. Please do not rely on this advice except as a starting point for more Googling. Your obligations (and your assistant's) will depend on whether the assistant is an employee or an independent contractor. In general, an independent contractor is someone you hire to "get a job done"; you have minimal control over the manner, time, place, tools, etc., that the assistant uses. An employee, on the other hand, is someone you hire to come to work at a particular time and do the job a particular way. (I'm glossing over some details here; see the IRS link above for more details.) If your assistant is an independent contractor, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you must provide them with Form 1099-MISC, and file a copy with the IRS as well. Your assistant will then be liable for income taxes on this amount, as well as self-employment tax (see below.) If your assistant is actually an employee, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you are required to provide them with a W-2 form, as well as filing a copy with the IRS. In addition, if you pay them more than a higher threshold ($2200 in a tax year or $1000 in any quarter for 2020), you are responsible for withholding taxes from their paychecks, as well as paying the employer's portion of Social Security, Medicare, and/or federal unemployment taxes. How to figure these taxes is complex, but generally the employee must provide you with a completed W-4, and then you must provide them (and the IRS) with a W-2 at the end of the tax year. See Publication 15: Employer's Tax Guide for all the gory details. The self-employment tax is designed to effectively cover the employer's portion of these taxes for self-employed workers. As you might imagine, employers are often tempted to misclassify employees as "independent contractors", since this means that this tax liability gets pushed from them onto their workers, as well as just making the employer's life easier. The Feds will not take kindly to such misclassification if it is discovered. Finally, for the state of Connecticut, consult the CT 1009-MISC filing guide (if your assistant is an independent contractor) or the Connecticut employer's tax guide (if they are an employee). The distinction is pretty much the same as at the federal level.	Yes, this would be an ADA violation The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires that "reasonable accommodations" be provided to people with disabilities in both the job application process and in the workplace. Specifically, this would be a failure to provide "modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires" as described in the EEOC enforcement guidelines. Software engineers generally are not required to stand up and move around much to do their jobs, so the employer wouldn't have an argument that requiring an applicant to do so in the interview process is somehow related to job requirements. I'm a software engineer myself, and I spend almost my entire day sitting down (and very little time drawing on whiteboards, especially now that I'm not allowed to be in the building where the whiteboards are). Possible reasonable accommodations would include getting a portable whiteboard that's lower to the ground or allowing the candidate to draw on paper instead.
The EU Refunds law and wether cost of download is refundable? Under the EU refunds law : consumers have the right to get refund if the the product is faulty.Thus if someone distributes a faulty app which is free can the developer be asked for the cost of internet he(the user) bought to download the b h f app from play store and is this same for download of content m in other way. I am asking this becaused it is outlined that si shipping cost of this purchase which in this case is the internet must be refundedd as stated here in questionno.5(spain one).Basically must I refund the money of interenet connetion to download my free app? . What is proof internet costs cannot be done refunded	With respect to the two-year guarantee for faulty products, The Consumer Sales Directive does not apply to non-tangible products like softwares delivered by internet. (b) consumer goods: shall mean any tangible movable item, with the exception of: Relevant rules on faulty digital services are contained in the Digital Content Directive, which provides In the case of a lack of conformity, the consumer shall be entitled to have the digital content or digital service brought into conformity, to receive a proportionate reduction in the price, or to terminate the contract, under the conditions set out in this Article. The consumer shall be entitled to have the digital content or digital service brought into conformity, unless this would be impossible or would impose costs on the trader that would be disproportionate, taking into account all the circumstances of the case including: (a) the value the digital content or digital service would have if there were no lack of conformity; and (b) the significance of the lack of conformity. However, this is essentially irrelevant for free apps where no reduction of price is possible and it is likely an obligation to fix the app is disproportional given the price is zero. Notably, the directive also puts most responsibilities regarding the "digital environment" (e.g. computers and network costs) on the consumer, as the environment is not particularly tied to the digital service. In your comment, you refer to a 14-day rule. You might be confusing the guarantee laws with the cooling-off period provided by the Consumer Rights Directive. In that case, you have a right of withdrawal but are only entitled to the costs you paid to the trader, and not any other third party, which is zero in the case of free apps. In an analogy to physical goods ordered online, you don't get a refund for your bus ticket if you need to go to the post office to collect it. By the way, Google terms cannot override public law and in fact if you look into Google refund policy you'll see that EU laws are specifically mentioned.	By "buying the song" on Gumroad you don't actually buy the song, you buy the right to do specific things with that song. I couldn't find the exact license terms, but for 800 Yen (about $6) for a whole album I highly doubt that this will include much more than the right to listen to the song on a private device. The rights to publicly perform, reproduce, redistribute, use commercially etc. usually cost a lot more. So if you want the rights to use the song in your own video, you will have to negotiate the purchase of a license which allows you to do that with the creator. Or if they reassigned their copyrights to a music label or copyright collective (which some music artists do), with that organization. There are some exceptions in the copyright laws of some countries where you can use parts of a song without a license. For example, the "fair use" exception in US copyright law if you review, discuss or analyze a song. But such exceptions usually don't apply if you use the song as background music, adapt the song into an own work or even just reupload the song on your own channel.	I believe you have just misunderstood what you paid for. Blizzard's End User License Agreement says: Your use of the Platform is licensed, not sold, to you, and you hereby acknowledge that no title or ownership with respect to the Platform or the Games is being transferred or assigned and this Agreement should not be construed as a sale of any rights. It also says: Blizzard may change, modify, suspend, or discontinue any aspect of the Platform or Accounts at any time, including removing items, or revising the effectiveness of items in an effort to balance a Game. Blizzard may also impose limits on certain features or restrict your access to parts or all of the Platform or Accounts without notice or liability.	Per GDPR Art 12(5), “any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge”. The right to rectification is Art 16 and reads in its entirety: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement. Thus, I think it would be invalid to charge a fee for an address change if that change was made in exercise of your data subject rights. If you didn't invoke this right, it's debatable whether charging a fee would be proper. On the one hand, they can charge whatever service they want (provided that this was part of the contract you entered). On the other hand, they have an obligation to assist you with your exercise of data subject rights. This includes recognising a data subject request even if you didn't explicitly invoke the specific GDPR article. For example, refusing a request for erasure just because you didn't invoke some magic GDPR words would be clearly noncompliant in my opinion. If the company offers multiple customer service options, charging for some of them may be all right. Typically, the lowest-cost solution for a company to deal with GDPR requests is to offer an online self-service option. An email to the data protection officer would typically also be free. Charging for phone support might be fine though. In an insurance context, there could also be a legitimate claim that updating your address is not a mere correction of your personal data, but a modification of the contract (depending on what you're insuring). Another possible counterpoint (which I think is not valid though) would be that the company never stored inaccurate data and therefore doesn't have to satisfy a rectification request.	Import laws apply to the one who imports. In your scenario that is the person in country A only. The server owner does not cause the digital content to be transmitted to A. The one who downloads does.	Ignoring morals, is there legal obligation for him to attempt to return the refund? No, but he must pay for the goods if the supplier asks. Does this fall under unjust enrichment? No. This is simply a contract law issue. The person is contractually obliged to pay for the goods and, in the present circumstances, they haven’t done so. If so, to what extent must he try? He doesn’t have to make an active effort to pay but he can if he likes. However, if and when the vendor realises their mistake and asks for payment, it must be made in a reasonable time.	I know that I have to provide detailed information which data I save and how I use it. Yes, you should, if you are getting access to users' Dropbox accounts, which will contain all sorts of private data, copyrighted (and illegally copied copyrighted files), etc. You provide the detailed information to your users through a click-through Privacy Policy - TOS (Terms of Service) in your App, like any other App out there. Click wrap (Wikipedia) user agreements are legally binding in many jurisdictions. Even if you don't access files and information - such as personal information or files - you still need a clear TOS for your App, for both your users' and your own legal protection. But I am a poor student who don't want invest money into a lawyer to write me a privacy policy ... I do not plan to get paid for (this app)... Being a free or paid App doesn't make a difference when it comes to the TOS, if you need one, and if you need to pay for one to be drafted. But not investing money in a lawyer can be a critical mistake if your App will be distributed on the popular App directories like Google Play and iTunes and your TOS does not clearly and legally outline all possible usage and data polices. Lawyers have experience in covering all the bases. Is there any way I can do this privacy policy on my own? Sure, you can: https://www.google.com/search?q=privacy+policy+generator But you run considerable legal liability not having a TOS that correctly and legally addresses all users' privacy concerns and clearly outlines what you do to insure security. That's what lawyers are for. Is it possible to just create some “I save all your data“ policy which would of course be to much but it would include all data I save and so I would not miss anything in my policy? Sure, you can simply say I save all your data. But how can you be sure that you've haven't missed important policy details and scenarios that could result in legal action against you? Like how long do you save data? When will you delete it? How secure is it? Can the user ask for deletion? What happens if you get hacked? What about users in countries other than the US? Users under 18 years old? You must use arbitration for any disputes? And on and on. The considerable legal liability of using a non-professionally drafted TOS means you run the risk of getting sued. You have to decide if it is worth the risk.	You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)
Is it legal to record your parents at home? Is it legal for a minor to make an audio recording of his parents engaging in abuse? If so, is it also legal once that child is an adult for him to publicize those recordings? Interested in U.S. law, but if state is necessary use Maryland.	Per your comment responses, Maryland is a two party consent state which means that the other party must consent to your recording IF there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In one's own home is generally considered a place where one has this expectation and thus these recordings are problematic. Depending what you intend to do with them, I would first contact a lawyer to get legal advice as to how to handle this before you publish them. If you are looking to file a criminal complaint (and assuming statute of limitations hasn't run out) the prosecutor may be willing to not prosecute you for violating 2 party consent law because you were trying to gather evidence of someone else's crime, but it's not a guarantee (though this will look bad on the prosecutor come election season). If you are suing your parents it might not be admissible as evidence but I can't specifically say that either. If you are using it to show other people in the same situation what to look for it's probably best to find another set of recordings as these ones carry a lot of legal issues that will come back to bite you if you release them. Finally, while not legal, your parents may not want to pursue the criminal recording side of this matter if they are aware of the "Barbra Streisand effect," wherein actions taken to ensure something isn't viewed by the public cause that something to gain wider viewership than if they never bothered trying to censor it.	Since your consent is not required in Texas, revocation is irrelevant. Restrictions of use of recordings flow from the legal nature of the recording itself, so there is no provision saying, for example, that only one party needs to consent for just recording, but all parties must consent to make any use of the recording. Since these laws were devised to regulate the practice of wearing a wire and collecting evidence of crimes, requiring consent from all parties would be counterproductive to the purposes of the law. You could try drafting a contract where you pay people to not record you (anybody who doesn't sign, you shouldn't talk to them), but enforcement could be tricky, so I would not try a DIY contract: get a lawyer. You would have to show that you were harmed by them making an unconsented recording. It should be in the form of a contract where you give something of value in exchange for something of value, which is a thing typically enforced by the courts. Also bear in mind that even in an all-party state, if you know that you are being recorded, you cannot just say "I do not consent", you have to stop talking. Continuing to talk when notified that there is or may be a recording constitutes implied consent, which is why on the phone companies often announce via recording that the conversation may be monitored, and they do not ask "Do you consent". By not hanging up, you consented.	Disclosure to police of an illegal recording is permitted by s. 193(2)(e), and in court by s. 193(2)(a). The recording could be excluded if the person who made the recording did so on behalf of police (to sidestep their obligation to obtain a warrant), but even then its importance as evidence may outweigh other Charter considerations.	Minor children can, in theory, sue their parents, in many countries, as long as they can prove a cognizable harm. The simplest case is where a parent commits a crime against the child, such as rape; this would also include embezzlement. "Abuse" is a term used in laws, for example RCW 26.44.020 (Washington state), but that sense of "abuse" doesn't include e.g. "overbearing behavior" or "obnoxious politics". If a child is disabled and the parents taunt the child for that disability, it is possible that the child could sue to terminate parental rights. The case is even clearer if the parent fails in their parental obligations to the child. Lgbtqia child rights are less well-defined. The background assumption is that the parent has the exclusive right to determine the child's upbringing, which includes things such as political beliefs, religion, and matters touching no family and sex. Norway is one of those countries with relatively few restrictions on "how you live your life", and they are considering a law against "conversion therapy", but there is presently no law prohibiting a parent from denouncing their child's lifestyle. It is possible that Barnevernet (child protective services) could intervene in a particular case, but they would not sue a parent on behalf of the child unless the parents actually violated the law.	The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation.	In general, police have no special protection from being recorded; if it is legal to video or audio record a person in that jurisdiction then it is legal to record a police officer in that jurisdiction. Anything that it is legal to do with the recording of a person is legal even if that person is a police officer. As to if it is legal to record a person see: Is it legal to post a photograph that I captured of a stranger in the street? Model release for image without faces How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame? What are the legal repercussions of taking a stranger's picture in public? What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?	It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up).	The fact that something is illegal does not imply that it is illegal to post pictures of it happening. In general, under U.S. law, free speech protects almost all forms of communications subject to a handful of narrow exceptions and this is not one of them. There are many legitimate reasons one might want to post video of a fight (e.g. to identify crime perpetrators for purposes of prosecuting them), but no legitimate purpose is legally necessary. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? They most definitely can. Reddit is also not responsible for user posted content under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act, even if it were illegal for the person posting it to post the content
How can private businesses compel the government to collect tax? https://www.forbes.com/sites/kirimasters/2019/08/08/california-lawsuit-says-amazon-should-pay-billions-in-back-taxes/ Apparently an obscure business forced the California government to collect tax from amazon. How does that make any sense? How can a private company force the government to collect taxes?	Apparently an obscure business forced the California government to collect tax from amazon. No, this is not true. Mr. Grosz filed a lawsuit asking the court to force California to collect tax revenues. The lawsuit is still pending before the court without a decision on the merits. As the saying goes, anyone can sue for anything; their success is another matter. The apparent legal basis for standing is section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows taxpayers to sue against wasteful or illegal government spending: 526a (a) An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency ... The Plaintiff has claimed that, allegedly, there is a mandatory duty to collect taxes and that failure to do so constitutes a waste. The court will decide if it will accept this argument and compel the collection.	The only reason you couldn't take all the profits is if your business were a C-Corp. I don't know of any reason a single-owner LLC would elect to be taxed as a C-Corp. Multi-owner LLCs and LLPs are, for federal tax purposes, either an S-Corp or a C-Corp. When possible they can and should generally elect to be taxed as an S-Corp. IRS Pub 2553 lists the criteria for S-Corp election. (Employees have nothing to do with the question.) For tax purposes partnerships, sole proprietorships, and S-Corps are "pass-through" entities that are not expected to pay a corporate tax. In effect, whether you like it or not, you do pay yourself all of the profits each fiscal year, and they are taxed accordingly.	The IRS does not technically have the authority to extend the deadline, but I also don't think that's what happened this week. The deadline for individual returns based on a calendar year is generally set to April 15 by IRC 6072, and automatically extended for weekends and holidays by IRC 7503. So Tax Day is normally April 15, but that's a Sunday this year, so you move it to April 16. But that's a holiday in D.C. this year, so you move it to the next day, which brings us to April 17. Although the media has reported it this way, the Service's official announcement doesn't actually claim that the IRS is "extending the deadline": WASHINGTON — The Internal Revenue Service announced today that it is providing taxpayers an additional day to file and pay their taxes following system issues that surfaced early on the April 17 tax deadline. Individuals and businesses with a filing or payment due date of April 17 will now have until midnight on Wednesday, April 18. Taxpayers do not need to do anything to receive this extra time. The IRS encountered system issues Tuesday morning. Throughout the system outage, taxpayers were still able to file their tax returns electronically through their software providers and Free File. Taxpayers using paper to file and pay their taxes at the deadline were not affected by the system issue. It continues to refer to "the deadline" as April 17, and it says that it is "providing taxpayers an additional day to file and pay their taxes." So that sounds like they are not so much purporting to change the IRC 6071 deadline, but rather invoking their authority to waive or abate interest and penalties. That authority could come from a variety of places, but most likely IRC 6724, which says, "No penalty shall be imposed under this part with respect to any failure if it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect."	No Always assuming that the government has operated within the limits of its powers or, at least, that if they have exceeded those powers the excess was in good faith. First, there is the issue of sovereign immunity. Basically, a government can be held liable only when it consents to be held liable. Most governments never waive this with respect to their lawmaking powers because they have to be able to make laws in what they see as the public interest without fear of litigation. See, for example, cases on plain paper packaging of cigarettes. Second, most governments have the power to regulate commerce and to deal with public emergencies. There is an issue which comes up in Federations about which government has the power but even if a law is invalid, it does not follow that compensation is payable. It certainly isn’t if the law is valid.	Your assumption about charities, "that legally you cannot use any of the money raised/created for anything but charitable purposes" is incorrect. For example, a charitable organization can have an office, and can pay rent for that office; it can pay a janitor to clean up, a secretary to do correspondence, and a CEO to run the operation. The basic generalization for a 501(c)(3) organization is To be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3), and none of its earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual. Specifically, A section 501(c)(3) organization must not be organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, such as the creator or the creator's family, shareholders of the organization, other designated individuals, or persons controlled directly or indirectly by such private interests. No part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. A private shareholder or individual is a person having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization. Accordingly, the organization cannot be created with the purpose of benefiting John Smith, or the board of directors of the organization, or shareholders. This does not preclude spending money to operate the charity.	If a friend uses my home address for his tax return, and he owes the IRS tons of money, will I be liable in any way? Assuming that this is an income tax or sale tax return, rather than a property tax return, generally not. The only case where you could be liable is where you were conspiring to help him evade tax collection somehow, or conspiring to evade state sales or income taxes. For example, suppose that your friend had no connection to your home in your state (Nevada) with no income taxes and has never even set foot in your state, and actually lives in a state with high income taxes (California). But your friend is using your address to falsely claim residency in Nevada with your knowledge and cooperation to avoid paying California income taxes. To make it spicy, let's assume that your friend's state income tax liability would be $400,000 in California, but $0 in Nevada. In that case, you might have felony criminal liability under California's tax evasion statutes (for which you could be extradited to California) for conspiring with your friend to evade his California income tax liability. But if you had no idea of what your friend was up to, and simply agreed to forward mail to him at your address (the way a typical mail drop company does), you would typically have no criminal or civil liability (subject to the "willful blindness" exception to lack of knowledge where you strongly suspect that your friend is up to no good but take a don't ask, don't tell approach). Also normally would it be a problem if he filed a tax return with my address, and I filed a tax return with the same address in the same tax year? No.	The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory.	If your friend was a salaried W2 full time exempt employee hired by the company to, among other things, write software like this, then the fact that it was developed "off the clock" with the employee's own resources means nothing once he gives it to the company. I mean if I give you a present and it blows up and breaks your arm, I'm still liable even if we didn't have a "contract" - especially if I knew it would blow up. Your friend's position is even worse since the relationship entails the employee's having the employer's best interests in mind. If I were your friend, I'd either figure out how to fix this or take gnasher729's advice from the comments and find a country where it's easy to hide from parties public and private. Maybe buy a bunch of canned food and go live on a boat?
What does "for avoidance of doubt" mean in a contract? I've seen this phrase added to various sentences in different contracts. A quick Google search also reveals that the phrase shows up in many Terms of Service or Terms of Use agreements. There are some postings online that suggest this phrase is superfluous. For example: http://www.adamsdrafting.com/for-the-avoidance-of-doubt/ Does the phrase "for the avoidance of doubt" have any legal meaning or any effect on the interpretation of a contract? Why is it added on some cases?	The phrase is added to ensure that a portion of the contract is construed as the parties intended. For example, say the terms of a contract already imply some particular term. To make it clear that this is what the parties intended, they may also state that term explicitly. The problem is, if you specify a term a particular way, a party could argue that interpreting another part of the contract to mean that very same thing would render that portion of the contract redundant and therefore it should be interpreted some other way. The phrase "for avoidance of doubt" indicates a part of an agreement that is intended to restate what another portion of the contract (often in conjunction with applicable law) already implies. The phrase is added to ensure that the restatement won't be pointed to as a way to argue that other parts of the contract should be interpreted differently than intended. It is often used where it's superfluous and there it should be avoided because it will actually do the opposite of what's intended -- implying that what it covers is covered elsewhere when it actually isn't, possibly leading to other portions of the contract becoming ambiguous or subject to misintepretation.	Termination is a matter of fact That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise. Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine. A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim. However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable.	I don't know of a specific legal term but such clauses are quite common in contracts which consist of more than one document. The English words "priority", "prevail" and "precedence" have the meaning you want, however, "precedence" runs the risk of being confused with "precedent" which does have a very specific legal meaning. A clause similar to: If there is any inconsistency or ambiguity between the English and Japanese language versions of the contract, the English version shall prevail. You need to make very sure that this clause can be translated unambiguously into Japanese!	There Is Little Pressure To Improve Contract Drafting One piece of the puzzle is tradition and habitual writing style. A customary writing style for legal documents evolved over time, some of those conventions have evolved overtime (e.g. "Party of the first part, party of the second part"), others have not. Archaic vocabulary is slowly being weeded out, but again, it is almost never the goal of someone drafting a contract to reduce the reading level of the document. As long as the judge, or other lawyers, know what it means, it is an aesthetic stylistic issue more than it is a substantive issue of importance. Contract drafting is highly decentralized and change happens only when there is a powerful impetus for change. Does this mean that legal writing can't be improved? No. Some lawyers are excellent writers in both contract drafting and in court documents. A well drafted contact can reduce litigation costs when there are disputes. It can also increase compliance with the intent of the parties by preventing disputes over what the contract means from arising in the first place. But most lawyers are mediocre contract drafters, and there is little selective pressure in transactional legal work to weed out their sub-optimal writing styles. Bryan A. Garner, who among other things is the editor of Black's Law Dictionary, is pretty much the leading figure in the United States pushing for a more modern, more readable, less flabby legal writing style. This is exemplified, for example, in his book "Legal Writing in Plain English" (2d ed. 2013). But even then, a lot of the impetus for his stylistic decisions was primarily driven by the need to get across ideas clearly, in a minimum of words, when writing appellate briefs with word limits. This is also the main context in which legal writing is taught in law school and continuing education classes. In contracts, in contrast, in our current era of the word processor, long documents are easy to deliver, and long passages of writing can be cut and pasted. So, the same outside pressures to limit word counts and persuade judges who will read legal briefs cover to cover in order, are not present when drafting contracts. So, the pressure to have a succinct plain language writing style in contracts is less strong. This said, when there has been regulatory pressure to write consumer contracts in a way that an average consumer can understand, it can be done. For example, most credit card agreements are written in very clear plain English with a very low reading level compared to other contracts. But those easy to read credit card agreements are drafted by committees of many lawyers and senior executives, each charging hundreds of dollars an hour, over many meetings over a period of weeks of debate and refinement, and a cost of many tens of thousands of dollars each to draft. The flabby and clunky character of legal writing also reflects client imposed budgetary constraints. It takes much more time and effort, with multiple rounds of rewriting and editing, to write a clean, easy to read contract than it does to write a kludgy one. Lawyers bill by the hour and clients want the job done at a price that they can afford. There is little incentive in contracts that will not be used many times as forms, to take the effort to produce a clean, easy to read final product. This kind of beautifully drafted contract costs much more to draft for the client, but provides little additional legal benefit to the client. Few contracts are ever litigated at all, and when they are, the legal drafting tends to focus on only a handful of key provisions that are carefully drafted. Boilerplate language, which is often less carefully drafted, is very rarely litigated, so the quality of that writing doesn't matter much. Capitalization As far as capitalization goes, I agree with @user6726 that all-caps writing is often required by law. These requirements were based upon the previous legislative assumption that it was more prominent and more likely to be read, which has since been proved to be false empirically. But new empirical discoveries about readability haven't changed the relevant laws requiring certain language in contracts to be "prominent" and in all caps. I would also add that there is a legal writing convention that defined terms have capital letters (although not necessarily all caps), which is a pointer to when one needs to look for a definition, that relaxes the need to put the definitions of capitalized words in the actual sentence where those terms are used. Weird capitalization can facilitate shorter sentences. The Relevant Audience I'd also agree that the primary audience for contract language is often not an unsophisticated non-lawyer consumer. While it's true that the average American reads at about the 5th grade level and can't do algebra, that person isn't the target audience. In the same vein, you don't write scientific journal articles for an audience of the average American. When push comes to shove, written contracts are interpreted as a matter of law by judges who are legally trained, and not a matter left to a jury of non-lawyers to decide. Most business to business contracts are negotiated by lawyers. Most business to business contracts have as additional audiences sophisticated senior managers of business with some limited formal business law training in college, who also have great familiarity with the class of contracts involved. Even in consumer contracts, when consumer protection regulations and statutes do not compel another approach, the intent is frequently a MEGO effect (My Eyes Glaze Over) in the hope that the consumer, who often isn't at liberty to negotiate the terms anyway, won't decide to read the fine print. The only language in a contract that needs to be clear to the consumer is the actionable part like the price that needs to be understood by the consumer to perform it. And, often those parts of a contract are provided in a separate short summary document with the full contract available for future reference but not intended to be routinely read in full. Furthermore, characteristic legal writing styles can convey a sense of importance and official authority. It sounds like it is and is intended to have legal effect. It's the same reason that fictional magical spells are far more often in Latin or Greek or Sumerian than they are in plain English. Language too ordinary conveys the false impression to a client that anyone could write the contract even if legal skill is implicated in drafting it, and can even cast doubt over whether a document was intended to be a legally binding contract in the eyes of a non-lawyer encountering it. Long Sentences, Definitional Clauses, And Pronouns One of the key factors that is identified as making legal writing hard to read is the use of internal definitional clauses within sentences and the use of very long sentences. It is possible to draft without those. But, often including it in the same sentence reflects the drafting lawyer's thought process. It can also reflect a negotiated contract drafting process. Even if an initial draft of a contract has simple sentences clearly laid out, it may be easiest to clarify a bargaining point in contracting negotiations by complicating the sentence in question to make it reflect the other side's preferred interpretation, even if it is stylistically ugly. And, changing that language in a final draft to make the contract look pretty is viewed with the suspicion that a subtle substantive change in the meaning of the contract from the haggled term was intended. As an aside, some contract provisions in hotly negotiated contracts are also sometimes intentionally ambiguous. This is because resolving the ambiguity could result in a fight over a side issue that could bust the deal if each side insisted on their own interpretation. Leaving the term ambiguous allows a judge evaluating a dispute that actually arises, if a dispute even arises over that term (which it often doesn't), in order to do what makes sense under the circumstances instead. Also, lawyers are wretchedly afraid of an adverse party quoting a sentence in a contract without including the related context that clarifies its meaning (e.g. by omitting definitions that are not obvious from the plain language of the contract). Unlike most prose, contracts are rarely read front to back the way you would a court opinion or a newspaper report or a short story. Normally, someone using a contract quotes only the relevant portion of the contract in isolation from the larger entire document. When ideas are broken into separate sentences, lawyers are very worried, rightly or wrongly, that different sentences in a paragraph or section modify each other, rather than being isolated islands of legal propositions. So lawyers are more comfortable when as many connected ideas as possible are all contained in the same sentence in which everything must be related somehow. Lawyers feel more comfortable and secure arguing about the meaning of a single sentence, than they do arguing that a simple short sentence should have a particular meaning based upon the larger context in which it is found. Similarly, lawyers are quite wary about using pronouns that aren't defined terms in the contract, for fear that the person that the pronoun refers to will be incorrectly assigned, even though this is an unnatural way of writing. Common Law Contracts v. Civil Law Contracts Also, as an aside, contract drafting is an area where common law legal drafting styles differ materially from civil law country legal drafting styles (e.g. in continental Europe). This is because in civil law countries there is a great effort made to provide for what would usually be boilerplate language in U.S. contracts as default statutory rules that match the default choices that are usually made in contracts negotiated between third-parties. Far less can be taken for granted in common law countries. A lot of the operative language in a common law jurisdiction contract, including much of it the most difficult to read legalese in contracts, is simply implied in law unless specifically disavowed, in many civil law countries. As a result, civil law country contracts are usually much shorter and more focused on the deal specific terms than a common law jurisdiction contract. A civil law business agreement that runs to five pages might typically take 30-40 pages to write saying exactly the same thing in a common law jurisdiction.	One of the key fundamentals for the formation of a contract is that the parties demonstrate their intention to be legally bound. There are two ways that websites usually use to show that intent by their users: click wrap and browse wrap. With click wrap terms the user explicitly agrees to the terms and creates a binding contract by ticking a box or pressing a button. As far as I am aware there has never been a case where a user has been successful in claiming there was not a contract. With browse wrap terms: For assent to occur the browse-wrap agreement should be conspicuous, state that there is an agreement, and provide where it can be located. it is certainly arguable (IMO with a good chance of success) that the stack exchange browse wrap, with its tiny link embedded among many others at the bottom of the page, is unenforceable. For the circumstances you describe the site tried for a click wrap but due to technical difficulties got a browse wrap. If it can be demonstrated that the user saw the terms or a prominent link to them and continued this would probably be enforceable. Licenses: if the terms contain the grant of a copyright licence then that can be enforced because copyright exists even if a contract doesn't.	One possible reading of this clause is: The tenant is required to pay for the preparation of a forfeiture notice, even if ("notwithstanding that") the forfeiture doesn't actually happen ("forfeiture is avoided")--but the tenant doesn't have to pay for the notice if the forfeiture doesn't happen for the following reason ("avoided otherwise than by"): because the court said so ("by relief granted by the court"). In other words: if the Court says the forfeiture notice is bogus, the tenant doesn't have to pay for it. Otherwise, he or she does.	Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."	Yes Yes Yes However, these are pretty standard contract terms. Many, many terms survive the end of the substantive agreement. For example, terms with respect to ongoing confidentiality, dispute resolution, warranties, termination itself etc. The second is so common it actually has a named legal doctrine: reading down. In the absence of such a clause, if the contract inadvertently exceeds what the law allows, it preserves the contract rather than leaving both parties without contractural protection.
Is it enforceable to restrict publication of work created with my tool I created a software compiler, that produces some object code from original source code, and designed processes around it such as documentation and pre-processing. I plan to sell this tool providing monthly subscription fees of X amount, given that software compiled with my tool will be published only on my registry (there are other registries). Is it enforceable to restrict people to publication of their software compiled with my tool only on my registry and no other registries? I'd like to build my own ecosystem and lead in my own way, so ideally I want to include a clause in EULA, saying that you cannot publish your software compiled with my tool online, however I don't think this is enforceable therefore will have no effect. I know I can use marketing to make people want only to publish on my registry, but my registry costs money whereas another one is free, and I don't want code compiled with my tool to be published on a free registry, but it doesn't contain any of my code. Maybe if I include the smallest bit of algorithm to the output of the compiler, under a license that prevents redistribution on other platforms, I can enforce it? heh I think that's what I'm going to do. But then people can remove it manually by modifying the object code, so another question is if I can prevent people from modifying the output my compiler? I know it sounds like drastic measures but I really want to gain my own user base. It is because another registry is my competition and they didn't create a compiler so why should people use my compiler to publish there?	You can license the use of your IP only for certain uses, for example (most commonly) "non-commercial". The general template of permission is "You have permission to ___ as long as you ___". What the user is permitted to do, in your scheme, is something along the lines of "only distribute the output in this manner", or "not distribute code developed with this tool anywhere else". It's up to you to prove that someone violated that condition, if they did.	Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need.	The software is "work for hire" and the copyright is owned by the client, not you. This is the default rule when copyrightable work is done on this basis in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. To not be "work for hire" you would have had to have a written agreement to the contrary or would have had to written the software before you were engaged by the client and then sold it to the client as an off the shelf finished product. [After further research I have determined that the language above is not accurate.] While you didn't have a written agreement, you did have an agreement reached without committing it to a final written form signed by both parties that is sufficient to cover all of the material terms of the contract and that is a binding and fully performed agreement. UPDATE: The "work for hire" issue is a bit more complex than I initially stated. Here is an American Bar Association summary of the issue in the independent contractor context (there is also a plausible argument that while the parties characterized you as an independent contractor for tax purposes that you were in fact of de facto temporary employee in which case it would automatically be work for hire, but I'll put that issue aside and take it at face value): Under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.), a work is a “work made for hire” only if: (1) it is prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) it is specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor pursuant to a written agreement and the work falls within one of nine statutorily defined categories. . . . For works created by independent contractors, only the following types of works are eligible to be “works made for hire”: a contribution to a “collective work” (a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole); a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a “supplementary work” (a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes); a “compilation” (a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship); an “instructional text” (a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities); a test; answer material for a test; or an atlas. This software is clearly specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor. I suspect that if you looked at the course of dealings including the client's specification of what work needed to be done (probably in part by email or in some other written form) that it would meet the requirement of a written agreement even though there wasn't a document called a contract signed by both parties. But, this still begs the question of whether it falls in one of the nine statutory categories. This American Bar Association source says that custom software doesn't qualify. The list above does not include many types of works that businesses frequently hire outside personnel to create, such as websites, logos, advertisements, photography, and custom software. For works that do fall within the defined categories, the business must have a written agreement from the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire for it to qualify as such. Although the agreement and course of dealings between a business and an independent contractor may give rise to an implied license for the business to use the works created by the contractor, it is highly preferable to avoid relying on an implied license. Any business that engages a non-employee to create a work and intends to own the copyright to such work should have a written agreement with the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire (if it falls within one of the eligible categories). If the work is not eligible to be a work made for hire, and for good measure even if it is, the written agreement should include a provision assigning the copyrights to the business. An example of such a provision is: “To the extent that the Work Product is not recognized as a ‘work made for hire’ as a matter of law, the Contractor hereby assigns to the Company any and all copyrights in and to the Work Product.” By including such a copyright assignment clause, a business will be able to obtain the copyrights it expects, even if the work does not qualify as a “work made for hire.” The copyright office's official publication on the subject provides a statutory citation (17 USC 101), and doesn't contradict the ABA presentation, although it is less detailed and specific on the legal issues. This section of the United States Code is a series of definitions. The relevant one states: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that amendment— (A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or (B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.	My understanding is that here "derived from the program" means "created by modifying the source code of the program" and not "created by running the program". Certainly that is the way all users that I have heard of treat the matter. Note that a commercial program, such as a word processor, will be fully protected by copyright, but the maker does not claim to have any rights over documents written using it. "Derived" here seems pretty clearly to mean "derivative work" in the sense in which that term is used in copyright law. In copyright law "derived work" is a term of art with a definition specific to that field.	Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems.	All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests.	In the EU, software license resale is legal, even if explicitly forbidden by terms of any EULA or other contract imposed upon the parties. To quote the European Court of Justice's press release on its ruling in a case in Germany between Oracle and a German reseller, An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his `used' licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet. [...] The principle of exhaustion of the distribution right applies not only where the copyright holder markets copies of his software on a material medium (CD-ROM or DVD) but also where he distributes them by means of downloads from his website. Where the copyright holder makes available to his customer a copy – tangible or intangible – and at the same time concludes, in return form payment of a fee, a licence agreement granting the customer the right to use that copy for an unlimited period, that rightholder sells the copy to the customer and thus exhausts his exclusive distribution right. Such a transaction involves a transfer of the right of ownership of the copy. Therefore, even if the license agreement prohibits a further transfer, the rightholder can no longer oppose the resale of that copy. There are many such companies in the EU who resell software legally, including used OEM Windows licenses that are far cheaper than retail copies. This is, in my opinion, a fantastic thing -- but undoubtedly has been behind the trend towards time-limited licenses rather than perpetual ones, which we all arguably suffer from today.	Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.
Life insurance for security guards From here, death rate of security guards is 1/1000 per year. Of the armed, professional guards its maybe 10x higher. An average life insurance policy is $100 per month for a 30 year old, with a about a 0.001% monthly risk of death. That means, scaled for risk of death, a security guard would need 100x more or $10,000 a month life insurance. This is obviously far excess of their wage. Since security guards are basically irrational and dont adequately value their lives, is it fraud for them to take out a life insurance policy? Not that they would, but if a security company took out policies for security guards would it basically either be impossible or a fraud conspiracy, given their risk of death is so under priced?	As long as a person applying for life insurance accurately discloses his or her occupation (and other relevant personal characteristics, such as age and health) in accordance with local law and the company's application form, there is no fraud. The company may or may not charge a higher rate for people with high-risk jobs. That is a business decision for the insurance company, although it may be limited by law or regulation in a particular jurisdiction.	As no jurisdiction was given, the law in Australia is the Life Insurance Act 1995. Section 228 says; A life company may only avoid a life policy on the ground that the person whose life is insured by the policy committed suicide if the policy expressly excludes liability in case of suicide. This 2011 parliamentary report says: For a death to be classified as a suicide in Australia, it must be: … established by coronial enquiry that the death resulted from a deliberate act of the deceased with the intention of ending his or her own life (intentional self-harm). In practice, life insurance policies have an exclusion period for suicide when the policy is taken out where it is not covered; after that it is.	Although your question didn't ask about the criminal side of this, it's important to consider the offence of driving without insurance in the UK. Section 143 Road Traffic Act 1998 provides that— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act— (a) a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road or other public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this Part of this Act ... (2) If a person acts in contravention of subsection (1) above he is guilty of an offence. (3) A person charged with using a motor vehicle in contravention of this section shall not be convicted if he proves— ... (c) that he neither knew nor had reason to believe that there was not in force in relation to the vehicle such a policy of insurance or security as is mentioned in subsection (1) above. If it's not too late, it may be worth challenging the matter in court on the basis of a s143(1)(c) defence (i.e. you didn't have reason to believe that your policy was not in force). You should speak to a solicitor immediately if you want to consider this. As mentioned in the previous answer, you may have a claim against the insurer if you can provide that you were misled into believing that your policy had been renewed automatically. You should read the terms and conditions carefully to discover whether they were entitled to communicate on matters of renewal solely by email. Again, you should speak to a solicitor to establish whether you have a realistic prospect of success. (in case you're curious, the 'security' mentioned in s143 refers to a sum of £500,000 which, if deposited with the Courts Funds Office, exempts an individual or corporation from the insurance requirement)	Firstly: that depends on the jurisdiction. It might not even be possible at all for employers to attempt to sue their own employees for damages caused by negligence. Even terminating an employment contract for reasons of negligence is quite difficult in many jurisdictions. Second, if it is possible, the question is wether such legal proceedings could be expected to be successful. Employees making mistakes is part of the risk of doing business, and distinguishing a "mistake" from "negligence", "gross negligence" , or "intentional wrongdoing" by the employee ought to place quite a burden of proof on the employer. To be held negligent in the first place, the employer will have to to prove that the employee was aware of the fact that the password they used was common, well-known and extremely insecure. Knowledge of which passwords are common and well-known is, unless you are considered a skilled IT security professional, not something that a typical employee can reasonably be expected to know. Before there can be a case for negligence by the employee, the employer needs to make a strong case that: either the employee is that skilled IT security professional that really should have know better or the company can demonstrate that they provide all employees with adequate instruction and security training that includes how to select good passwords and which bad ones to avoid and that they seriously ensure both awareness of their password and security policies and compliance. even then, not enforcing a good password policy in your IT systems and assigning or allowing users to select weak passwords is in itself already negligent...	Am i going to jail? I'm so scared. No, probably not. The details depend on jurisdiction, but normally the only crime you could be accused of would be that of forgery. However, forgery by definition requires an "intention to deceive". So my personal advice would be to come clean immediately: Go to your employer, and tell them you did not understand the checkout system and accidentally signed yourself, instead of having the customer sign. If you do that, what you did would not count as forgery, because (as you explain) you did not do it on purpose to trick someone. Now, your boss may still decide to discipline you in some way, maybe even fire you, but that's out of your hand. If they are reasonable, they'll hopefully understand a minor mistake on the first day. That said, it is possible your jurisdiction has special penalties for incorrectly filling out medical documents, so there may be more to it - but I doubt it. To be sure, try asking someone you know and trust who is familiar with the legal rules around medication. Or book a single consultation with a lawyer - this is not cheap (typically around $100 in the USA, or 100€ in the EU), but will give you peace of mind. You could also try asking around if there is a local initiative which offers legal help, possibly a professional organization or trade union.	All of this is illegal. You do not give a jurisdiction so I will use NSW, Australia as an example but many countries' laws have similar effect. Australian Consumer Law prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct: It is illegal for a business to engage in conduct that misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive consumers or other businesses. It doesn't matter that what you have said is strictly speaking factual - the way it has been said is likely to mislead or deceive. However, what you are proposing goes further and IMO crosses the line into fraud (s192E of the Crimes Act): 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. In addition to the illegality, stealing other people's money is morally wrong by any reasonable standards of morality.	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	From healthcare.gov: How premiums are set Under the health care law, insurance companies can account for only 5 things when setting premiums. Age: Premiums can be up to 3 times higher for older people than for younger ones. Location: Where you live has a big effect on your premiums. Differences in competition, state and local rules, and cost of living account for this. Tobacco use: Insurers can charge tobacco users up to 50% more than those who don’t use tobacco. Individual vs. family enrollment: Insurers can charge more for a plan that also covers a spouse and/or dependents. Plan category: There are five plan categories – Bronze, Silver, Gold, Platinum, and catastrophic. The categories are based on how you and the plan share costs. Bronze plans usually have lower monthly premiums and higher out-of-pocket costs when you get care. Platinum plans usually have the highest premiums and lowest out-of-pocket costs. Factors that can’t affect premiums Insurance companies can’t charge women and men different prices for the same plan. They also can’t take your current health or medical history into account. All health plans must cover treatment for pre-existing conditions from the day coverage starts. https://www.healthcare.gov/how-plans-set-your-premiums/
How did the USA justify its war against Vietnam by way of International Law? According to Shaws book on International Law: The Soviet Union made considerable use of legal arguments in its efforts to establish its non-liability to contribute towards the peace-keeping operations of the UN [sic]. And the Americans too, justified their activities with regards to Cuba and Vietnam by reference to international law. Q. What were the US arguments, I assume at the UN, with regards to its war in Vietnam? If it's not clear, I'm not asking here about the political dimensions but it's legal dimensions; (although the political dimension would be welcome).	They were there at the invitation the government of Vietnam This is the justification. The government of South Vietnam was the internationally recognised government of South Vietnam (at least by the USA and it’s allies - it’s not a requirement of international law to be recognised by everyone). They were engaged in counter-insurgency against internal rebels. They asked the USA and other nations to help. Those nations agreed to help.	Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually.	The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.	The issue is not whether it is an "act of violence". The fundamental political theory of classically liberal capitalist democracies is that the state has a monopoly on the use of force and violence, or at least, is entitled to assert one if it wishes to do so. But it is recognized as a matter of political theory that the use of force and violence and the credible threat of it, is necessary to secure good order and fairness and justice in society (and from outsiders attacking the society), and to encourage people to act appropriately towards each other. In a classical liberal capitalist democracy, this monopoly on the use of force and violence is regulated and made less abusive by providing that neither liberty or property can be taken by the state without due process of law (except in certain well defined exigent circumstances where due process is provided after the fact). The nuances of what due process is required is what differs. Overall, more due process is required for more serious deprivations, and less is required for less serious deprivations since the consequences of getting it wrong are smaller and don't justify the dead weight loss of more expensive litigation in the same way. Generally, incarceration is deemed to be more serious than a fine or money judgment as explained below, so it needs more due process protections. So, the issue is that interference with personal liberty is taken more seriously than interference with property, and the answer comes from understanding why the former is more serious than the latter. At its heart, this is a widely shared normative view. And, in U.S. constitutional law, this isn't an all or nothing proposition. For example, short deprivations of liberty (incarceration for six months or less) are penalties that a state or local government may take without a jury trial, while longer deprivations of liberty carry with them the right to trial by jury, and moderate to severe deprivations of liberty (typically felonies punishable by three or more years) typically carry with them the right to an evidentiary preliminary hearing before a judge prior to a trial on the merits before a jury that is not available for less serious offenses. Similarly, there is not an absolute right to counsel at state expense in all proceedings in which an indigent defendant might be incarcerated. When the case is prosecuted by a government official, this is the case, but when someone facts potential incarceration for willfully disobeying a court order until that person complies (contempt of court) and the case is prosecuted by a private litigant (possibly pro se), there is not a U.S. Constitutional right to counsel. In the same vein, there are weaker due process protections for someone accused of a pre-trial release rule violation, violation of jail or prison rules, probation violation, parole violations, and requests to be released on parole, when they are already under some form of correctional supervision, even though they can result in longer periods of incarceration, than there are someone living their daily life faces potential criminal punishment. I can't piece together exactly how this came to be, and the legal theory literature is rather thin and not wildly referred to by practitioners. But a couple of key historical points come to mind. One is that due process protections for moderate to serious felony offense criminal defendants were historically important, because certainly as of the 18th century in common law jurisdictions, the death penalty was routinely imposed for offenses that did not cause the death of the victim, such as burglary, robbery, and rape, in part, because the governments of these societies didn't have the economic resources necessary to incarcerate serious criminals for long enough periods of time to protect the public from recidivism and to adequately deter the conduct in the first place. While the line between property and liberty may be debatable, no one would seriously doubt that the historic divide between loss of life and loss of property clearly called for more due process protections against loss of life. A second is that in the late 18th century and early 19th century, a political movement arose to oppose debtor's prisons (and the related civil remedy called "body execution"), as disproportionate and inefficient. Prior to that time, one remedy of a creditor against someone who failed to pay a debt was to have them thrown into a "debtor's prison" or "work house" where they were placed in involuntary servitude until the debt was paid in full. Essentially, the moral argument was that being poor should not be a ground for being incarcerated and simple failure to pay a contactual debt routinely involves merely being poor. In the U.S., Congress outlawed debtors prisons in 1833. The 14th Amendment adopted after the U.S. Civil War, prohibited not just slavery, but involuntary servitude for failure to pay debts, when indentured involuntary servitude to pay costs of an apprenticeship or a passage to the Americas from the Old World, had been common in the colonial period, and into the early 19th century. In 1983 the Supreme Court ruled that in order to jail a person for failure to pay a fine or fee, the judge must first consider if the person was 'willfully' choosing not to pay. Closely related to this, which was a fairly new idea in the 18th century, was the idea of making the discharge of debts that a debtor has no reasonable ability to repay from the debtor's assets or earnings in the short term, routinely available as a matter of right in a court bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, weaker due process protections for monetary debts is backstopped by the fact that the harshness of this is limited by the fact that the debts can often be wiped out in bankruptcy if they are excessive, and that even if they can't be discharged in bankruptcy, that modern limits on the assets and income from which debts can be collected, almost automatically makes such debts survivable for a debtor. So, the risk of doing too much harm with an erroneous judgment is mitigated. Also, keep in mind that most money judgments and fines are compensatory in nature, are a rough justice approximation of compensation, or are proportionate to the seriousness of the harm done in the view of democratically elected legislators, acting collectively, who are presumed to be reasonable. If you deprive someone of property, for example, by failing to repay money loaned, or by destroying their property, taking a like amount of money or property from you seems like simple justice that doesn't call for close scrutiny, whether that comes in the form of a civil money judgment or a criminal restitution award. Similarly, most fines, for things like illegal parking, traffic violations, or minor municipal ordinance violations, are petty. Often they are less than one day's pay for the defendant, and hence, much less serious that depriving someone of liberty for more than a few hours. It is patently less severe. Also, the severity of a money judgment or fine bears a relationship to the ability of someone facing it to pay it. Typically, people who can afford cars can also afford parking tickets and traffic fines. Typically, people who drive cars are required to get insurance to pay meaningful amounts of money to people harmed if they have accidents. Typically, creditors only extend credit to people for whom it is not to burdensome to repay the debt. Typically, homeowners can afford to pay fines for municipal ordinance violations for failing to mow their lawns. In Northern Europe, there is an effort to reconcile the economic impact of incarceration on someone to presumptive prison sentences, with a system of "day-fines" where an offense is deemed to justify a prison sentence of up to X days, and that is converted to a fine equal to one day's wages for the defendant times the number of days (sentences imposed with the full due process protections of criminal defendants). This prevents the state from having to incur great expense to incarcerate someone who has already burden society by breaking its rules, and instead has the opposite economic effect on the state. It also prevents the community ties of the defendant from being disrupted and prevents criminal defendants from being unduly influenced by other offenders who would be incarcerated with that defendant potentially leading all involved to commit more future crimes. And, paying a fine still leaves a defendant with considerable liberty to interact with friends and family, enjoy low cost entertainment options, and move about where he or she desires. Incarceration deprives the offender of income, and also imposes all sorts of limitations on the defendant. One could imagine a system, like the day-fine system, where many fines that are punishment in excess of mere compensation or good approximation of it for the harm done are routinely as several in impact to a defendant as incarceration is to a defendant. But the U.S. does not have such a system. Punitive fines authorized by law are very rarely even remotely as severe as typical sentences of incarceration for the crimes for which those fines are authorized, when committed by natural persons. So, since fines, while they could be more severe than incarceration in a hypothetical legal system, rarely are in most non-day fine legal regimes, affording maximal due process protections in cases of incarceration but not monetary punishment flows naturally from the mere fact that incarceration, in practice, is almost always a more severe punishment, and because a bright line rule is easier to apply even in the rare cases when a fine might be more serious than incarceration. Greater due process in more severe cases makes sense because inaccurate judicial imposition or non-imposition of punishment in minor matters is less of a big deal than in very serious matters. Finally, it is worth noting that incarceration is usually reserved for offenses in which the typical defendant would be utterly incapable of providing money compensation, because the harm done is so great. Criminal offenses punishable by incarceration are designed for instances of "incalculable harm" that can't be made right with the defendant's money, while civil offenses are generally chosen as a policy option in cases where the harm caused in manageable relative to the ability of someone to make it right with a compensatory payment and/or a fine or punitive damages that proportionately compares to the harm done that is not merely economic in some way. The notion that incalculable harms are more serious and hence more important to get right, than those which are measurable and compensable, again, argues for greater due process protections in incarceration cases. (Another area where due process protections are similarly great is in termination of parental rights cases, by the way, which implicate similarly serious and incalculable harm matters.) I know that this lacks citation, but it does go a bit to illustrating the motivating ideas.	So Maryland is a Defimation Per Se state, and lists accusations of moral turpitude, criminal conduct, or fraud. I would say on the second statement about offering support ot Hamas and/or Hezbollah, which are considered terrorist organizations. Being buddies with Louis Farakhan's buddy is likely not a Per Se defamatory statement but a Per Quod meaning you would have to prove damages from this false assertion. Remember that just because you disagree with his political positions does not mean you aren't capable of sitting down with him for a friendly happy hour debate over politics. Lots of people have good friends who they debate politics with and will still be friendly with. I would make certain that you go through your history of statements on social media and in public to make certain you don't have anything that can be construed as supporting political beliefs that these organizations support (even if you don't support those organization's methods of obtaining their political goal). Do not limit yourself to just material support (donating things of value to them). I'm not for the purposes of this answer going to comment on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, but if your political opinions on the matter are in favor of Palestine, the statements above, while hyperbolic, are not totally out of line and thus defamitory, since all of the accused associations against you are also big names in pro-Palestine support circles. Try to also look for any statements where, unprompted, you are critical of the statements of the three false associations. As always, you should discuss specifics with a lawyer specializing in this matter. Most firms will offer a consultation for free so you can discuss the case and the specifics and get advice as to what you should do. I do not think you will be awarded much beyond basic actual damages and legal fees from the guy, since the statements have not caused you any damages such as loss of job or becoming a target of government investigation by law enforcement agencies.	It is unlikely that the US, or any government, would condone any kind of crime. The reason for this is that the law must be seen to be impartial and applied fairly to all those subject to it. What happens if tomorrow, the government decides they don't like you? It is possible that this type of activity, or activity amounting to it, would be sanctioned in specific, authorised cases. But the government throwing a lynch mob at anyone is a bad idea for order and a peaceful society.	england-and-wales Alice's defence will be that she had an honest belief, given the circumstances, that force was necessary and the force she used was reasonable in defence of John (and possibly Alice). John's consent is irrelevant unless it had some bearing on that. Why did John oppose the use of force? Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he would rather die than cause a death? Irrelevant. Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he believed Bob was not a real threat due to circumstances X, Y and/or Z that he wanted Alice to heed? Relevant.	The First Amendment does indeed guarantee the freedom to express any idea or viewpoint, the limitation being incitement to immediate lawless action, recently reaffirmed in Snyder v. Phelps (many free speech cases have been about criminal restrictions on speech, this applied even to a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress). There isn't a clear line that distinguishes "advocating violation of the law" and "inciting to immediate lawlessness". Saying "(You should) shoot The Man whenever you see him" would be protected expression, but "There's a cop, somebody kill him" would be incitement. It also has to be a "credible" incitement, so saying "Kill him now!" to a room full of pacifist nuns would not constitute incitement. Things said to an angry mob would be more along the lines of incitement.
Can shareholders compel a company to not pay taxes? Can shareholders compel a company to evade taxes? Logically, if they think it is in their interest the company has to do it. The charter of a corporation is to make money for shareholders, I don't think most charters require the company to follow the law of a specific federal government. And, they are not aiding or abetting anything. They are just exercising shareholder rights.	No Any conduct that demands someone does something unlawfully is unlawful. Taxes are laws and regulations. Not paying the taxes is unlawful, especially under 26 USC 7201. So the shareholders are not only demanding the company to break laws, they aid and abett such behavior, making them also liable together with the company as there is 18 USC 2: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. It could also be inciting to violate laws. It is not a shareholder's right to ask for someone to break the law.	You have a fiduciary duty as a director to act in the best interests of the company. Not your interests, not his interests, not the shareholders' interests (individually or as a group); the company's interests. You must also separate the other guy's performance as an employee from his performance as a director. If he is not performing as an employee then the correct course of action is to sack him as an employee, not as a director; and vice-versa. If he turns up to the board meetings and considers the information he is given as a director then he is not "performing poorly" in that role. However, provided you follow the law and your company's constitution I have no doubt this would be legal. You need to consult a lawyer before you do anything - it can't be the company's lawyer because he does have a conflict of interest. Notwithstanding its legality, it's a stupid idea. It doesn't fix the fundamental problem: you are in business with someone you don't want to be in business with. You need to find a way to not be in business with him and to start that process by ticking him off is a bad move. You need to reach agreement on how to end your relationship: just shoving him out while he is still a shareholder will have him looking for the first opportunity to sue you and the company the instant it underperforms.	There's a few good reasons that spring to mind. Firstly, it's possible that Tesla or Microsoft have been themselves licensed something where the license is not sub-licenseable. This would prevent them from subsequently licensing you, but a promise/pledge is not a license and they can go right ahead and make promises. Secondly, a license is broadly an agreement between two parties. A promise doesn't require formal acceptance whereas a license does. To answer your question regarding a covenant not to sue - that's something else entirely. A covenant not to sue is a legal agreement between parties where the party seeking damages agrees not to sue the party it has cause against, whilst still preserving the existence of the cause (and conditions may have been set that must be met for the covenant to stand). For example, Party A still maintains that Party B used work that was not licensed to Party B, but Party A has agreed not to sue on the matter, provided that Party B advertises the fact that the work was used.	When a US Senator or Congressperson poses a question to a private company about some behavior or action of the company, does that carry any legal weight? In other words, (a) is the company required to answer? and (b) if the result is "bad" (however that is defined), can the Senator or Congressperson impose any penalty. Is it all just "showboating" on the part of the politician? Individual members of Congress cannot compel a company to testify, although a failure to respond might result in legislation being adopted in a way contrary to the preferences of the person being asked, while a response might influence legislation in a manner that the person being asked likes. Congressional committees have subpoena power which if disregarded may be enforced in federal district courts on pain of the non-responsive person being held in contempt of court, which is essentially equivalent to the power of a court to subpoena someone's testimony.	Neither of those clauses has anything to do with whether a tax on the use of Whatsapp is legal: The first clause tells users that they are responsible for any taxes that may be owed. It says nothing about whether such a tax is or is not legal. The second clause says that users may not charge for Whatsapp services. It says nothing about whether the government may impose a tax for the use of the services. That is all beside the point, though. Even if the TOS explicitly said, "No one may tax the use of our services," that would have no legal effect. Saying that you're exempt from taxation does not make you exempt from taxation.	The private organizations, in difference to international organizations (the organizations, members thereof are the countries) or the countries are not subjects of international law. They are also not a subject of criminal laws, so they technically can't break the law. The people can. If the actions of such organizations will break some laws, the people staying behind that organization will be made responsible. Either it will be single individuals, or the whole organization might be declared criminal (such as mafia or a gang) and there everyone, including stakeholders or casual employees/contractors might be subjects to interrogation, arrest and sentence. As for the problem you describe, when the organization made something illegal under one jurisdiction, and the stakeholders are sitting in other country, where such actions are not illegal, they might only partially be safe. They might be arrested not only in the country where the legal actions are taken, but also in third countries, that have extradition agreements with that country.	The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S.	No. Only the company owns the copyright, not its shareholders. A company is a separate legal entity with its own capacity to own property. Copyright is property, not infection that can be spread onto whoever is close enough. Pretty much like shareholders can't just share the use of the company's tangible assets, they can't wet their beaks in the copyright. As a shareholder, what you could do is to appoint a director/CEO that will give you license to copy (or even transfer the copyright) — if you have enough shares to fire the current CEO and put yours. The CEO will get into legal trouble with other shareholders/creditors, but you'll still enjoy your right to copy.
Can I get around the law of not recording a phone call unless the other end knows by making the call on a speaker in my house? The living room in my house is monitored by CCTV with audio. Will that be admissible in court?	The law 'doesn't care' how the call is recorded. What matters is whether or not you should inform / should have informed the participant(s) in the circumstances. In circumstances where you are acting as an ordinary member of the public, in the course of a purely personal or household activity, not in a journalistic capacity, regulated business or other circumstances where the rules may differ: In the UK it is not unlawful for a private person to record a phone call without the permission or foreknowledge of the other participant(s) - provided the recording is for 'personal use'. If you intend to share the content of the call with a third-party or make it public, then you must inform the person ahead of recording it. If you try to use a covertly recorded call as evidence in court, the court may or may not exclude it depending on the circumstances.	There are legitimate apps that let you buy phone numbers. With the right app I can buy let's say a landline number in Kansas. I call you, and you will think it's some guy in Kansas calling you. That's totally legal, it's a genuine phone number, and just like I can buy 10 phones and have ten phone numbers, I can use an app to pretend to have 10 phones. I cannot pretend to by your child's school with that kind of app, because for obvious reasons your child's school's number is not up for sale. If an app let's you pretend to be someone else, like your child's school, then your phone company will be very interested in hearing about that. You don't have to sue the app maker, your phone company will. These three police officers will also be very interested, and impersonating a police officer is by itself a crime. (Normally impersonating a police officer is done by putting on a uniform, but calling you with the number of that police officer will also count). So these three police officers will have a word with your husband as well. So suing the app maker (you can't sue an app, you can only sue the people responsible for it) is very hard, and not needed. Complain to your phone company, complain to the police, first to the three police officers he impersonated (the phone company will have records of phone calls seemingly coming from them) to advice them they are being impersonated, and then you complain to the police for harassment.	The emails both are and are not hearsay If the landlord seeks to use them as evidence that you did the things stated in the emails, that’s hearsay. However, if he seeks to use them as evidence that he received complaints about you, that’s not hearsay. Notwithstanding, this is no doubt a hearing in a tenancy tribunal or small-claims court - strict rules of evidence generally don’t apply in those. The emails are therefore likely something that will be admissible even if they are hearsay.	GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent. Wrong. The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others. With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one.	A reasonably analogous case is State v. Kipp, 179 Wn.2d 718. The court held that a secret recording was illegal, and the recording was of a face to face recording, using a cassette recorder. The court provides an analysis of the meaning of "private" under RCW 9.73.030, and concludes that "A communication is private (1) when parties manifest a subjective intention that it be private and (2) where that expectation is reasonable" (with appropriate in-state citations). They say that Factors bearing on the reasonableness of the privacy expectation include the duration and subject matter of the communication, the location of the communication and the presence or potential presence of third parties, and the role of the nonconsenting party and his or her relationship to the consenting party. Ultimately, the intent or reasonable expectations of the participants as manifested by the facts and circumstances of each case controls as to whether a conversation is private but in this case, Kipp manifested a subjective intention that the conversation be private. We have found subjective intent that a conversation be private even though the party does not explicitly state such an intention The court in fact rejects the state's contention that a person who confesses to child molestation should expect this information to be reported to the authorities, and therefore it is unreasonable to expect the conversation to remain private and the court reaffirms that the subject matter of the conversation in this case was not one that is normally intended to be public, demonstrating Kipp's reasonable expectation of privacy.	The tenants have a right to the "quiet enjoyment" of the house, but the only way to enforce that is to sue the landlord, and the probable remedy is money damages, with an injunction possible. Neither of those really solves the problem here. The California Tenants Guide notes, onpages 63-4, the "Special rights of tenants who are victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, or elder/dependent adult abuse." These special rights allow a tenant who is a victim to move out on 14 days notes without penalty, rather than a longer period that would otherwise be required. But here the tenants, it seems don't really want to move out, they want the landlord to move into an appropriate care facility. It is also not clear to me if this provision would apply when the aggressor is also the landlord. There is no simple way for the tenants to force this. They could, as interested parties, file a petition witj the proper court claiming that the landlord is incompetent to manager her own affairs, is a danger to herself and/or others, and is in need of a guardian. But such a petition is unlikely to go anywhere unless someone is wiling and able to act as a guardian, someone who would be acceptable to the court. One of th tenants would probably not be acceptable, even if one was willing. One option is to keep calling 911 on every violent outburst, and to document the violence on cell-phone videos, or in any other way possible. This might eventually lead to the police or other authority intervening in s helpful way, but that is far from assured.	I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.	Yes, but it’s not in the Criminal Code It’s in the SURVEILLANCE DEVICES ACT 1998. s6 prohibits using an optical surveillance device to record (or observe if the person is not a party) “private activity” without consent. The penalty is a $5,000 fine or imprisonment for 12 months or both.
Is an offer of a discount an acknowledgement of guilt of negligence and misconduct? I have the following excerpt: I have looked at the bills related to the service calls and can offer discount. This party is being sued for negligence and misconduct in providing services. However, they are denying the allegations. Does the above excerpt show that they are acknowledging that they are guilty? What is the significance of that statement in a court claim against this party? Additional context: This is an excerpt from a reply to a request to cover the amount of damage. The full explanation lists a couple of factors, but the party does not take the responsibility. At the end of this explanation, they offer the mentioned discount.	No, this is not an acknowledgement of guilt or liability. It offers a "discount" some sort of reduction in price. This could be an offer of settlement without admission of liability, or even just advertising for repeat business (unlikely as that may seem). Without the rest of the communication, there is no way to tell. Unless there are specific admissions, this statement alone is not likely to have much significance in such a case. Edit: There is still not enough context to tell exactly what the sender of this communication wanted to accomplish with the offer of the discount, but since the OP now says "the party does not take the responsibility" this is not an admission of guilt, whatever else it is. It sounds like some sort of backdoor form of settlement offer without admission, but that is far from clear to me. My original answer is not significantly hanged here.	Is it worth it to contact a lawyer? No. The amount at issue indicates that the matter would have to be litigated in Small Claims court, where typically parties are not allowed to be represented by a lawyer. Furthermore, litigating in Small Claims court will give you some exposure to judicial proceedings. Being able to advance your legal arguments in court is useful, and this seems to be a great occasion to gain experience of that sort. The rental company's uncooperative behavior is unreasonable and can forfeit its entitlement to at least a sizeable portion of its actual expense. In many jurisdictions, the legislation provides treble damages in claims of fraud. Although claims of fraud and breach of contract oftentimes overlap, your entitlement to treble damages is not something to rule out. At the outset, the company's initial promise to give you the final statement most likely supports a finding of reasonable reliance, one of the prima facie elements of fraud. It is unclear whether the rental company made the aforementioned promise in writing. For evidentiary purposes, make sure that all your subsequent interactions with the rental company are in writing. That will make it harder for the company to disavow its verbal representations.	There is no prohibition on lying in general. Misrepresentation If you misrepresent a fact and that misrepresentation is a material inducement to someone entering into a contract with you then there are a number of problems that follow: The (mis)representation may become a term of the contract and if not complied with can allow the aggrieved party to either sue for damages or rescind the contract. If the misrepresentation led to the contract being entered into by mistake then the contract is void for mistake The misrepresentation may have become a collateral contract an innocent or negligent misstatement may give rise to the tort of negligent misstatement misrepresentation may put you in breach of trade practices statutes. Fraud If you knowingly tell a lie with the intention of receiving a benefit then this is both the tort and crime of fraud. You receiving employment or your company securing a contract probably qualifies as intending to receive a benefit.	The phrase is added to ensure that a portion of the contract is construed as the parties intended. For example, say the terms of a contract already imply some particular term. To make it clear that this is what the parties intended, they may also state that term explicitly. The problem is, if you specify a term a particular way, a party could argue that interpreting another part of the contract to mean that very same thing would render that portion of the contract redundant and therefore it should be interpreted some other way. The phrase "for avoidance of doubt" indicates a part of an agreement that is intended to restate what another portion of the contract (often in conjunction with applicable law) already implies. The phrase is added to ensure that the restatement won't be pointed to as a way to argue that other parts of the contract should be interpreted differently than intended. It is often used where it's superfluous and there it should be avoided because it will actually do the opposite of what's intended -- implying that what it covers is covered elsewhere when it actually isn't, possibly leading to other portions of the contract becoming ambiguous or subject to misintepretation.	The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc.	You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.	I belive you have misread the linked article: "A Narrow Lane: Navigating Claims for Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing"/ It says thst all conrtreacts involve a duty of good faith: It is a settled principle of New York law that “all contracts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of performance.” 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 153 (2002) (collecting cases). Courts have described this covenant as a duty “encompassing any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included and which are not inconsistent with the contract.” It goes on to say that it is tempting for a plaintiff to include a bad faith claim in any contract dispute: After all, most plaintiffs probably believe that the defendant did not act in good faith and/or that the result was unfair. But it says that courts are reluctant to honor such claims in ordinary contract disputes: ... courts are loath to make rulings that might vary the terms to which the parties agreed. A party’s conduct either breaches the terms of the agreement or it does not; if it does not, that is generally the end of the line for a breach of contract claim. A party seeking to impose an additional duty on the ground that it is “implied” bears a heavy burden. In short, claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing fail far more often than they succeed. This article explores some of the nuances that make such claims particularly thorny. ... “[t]he law encourages ‘efficient breaches’”; that is, breaches committed based on the breaching party’s calculated determination that it “will still profit after compensating the other party for that party’s expectancy interest.” 28A N.Y. Prac. Contract Law § 23.2. Absent a specific provision in the contract that requires good faith, a “bad faith breach” is no different from any other. ... although a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires that the parties have a valid contract ..., such a claim will fail if it is based on the same alleged conduct that forms the basis for a cause of action for breach of the contract’s express terms. See Kim v. Francis, 184 A.D.3d 413, 414 (1st Dept. 2020). So the article explicitly says that a claim for breach of contract does not automatically imply a breach of good faith. To the contrary, something more is required.	No. It means the existence of reasonable doubt is in doubt... One cannot conclude the question of guilt in either direction, so one must try again to see if a different jury can answer the meta-question, to then answer the legal question of guilt. ... or is not being addressed If only one person is voting against the consensus, or as many as are allowed by the jurisdiction, they are overruled. That's the allowance made for bias that has somehow reached the jury despite the filtering done beforehand. If more people are voting against the majority so that consensus is not possible, it is potentially because someone has made up their mind on the question of guilt regardless of what (some significant part or the weight of) the evidence indicates, defeating the purpose of the trial and providing all the evidence. A person not accounting for all the evidence can't be said to have reasonable doubt of guilt, since the doubt may be excluded by the remaining evidence. Similarly, guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot be supported by only partial evidence, as exculpatory evidence may be among the part not accounted for. ... or cannot be addressed by that jury at all. Finally, a jury split on the decision of how to weigh the evidence cannot claim either to have or to have dismissed reasonable doubt, because they cannot agree on what a reasonable doubt is, in the first place.
Is using proxies to circumvent rate limit to scrape data legal? Im under the Indian jurisprudence and this is what the Indian Information Act of 2000/66F says on the matter, Indian Information Act 2000/66F Punishment for cyber terrorism.– Whoever,– with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people by– (i) denying or cause the denial of access to any person authorised to access computer resource; or (ii) attempting to penetrate or access a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access; or (iii) introducing or causing to introduce any computer contaminant, Since the administrator of the API has authorised only a certain number of API calls for a network, can it be construed as a violation of 66F clause 2 if we try to circumvent the rate limit even though the information is on public domain?	can it be construed as a violation of 66F clause 2 if we try to circumvent the rate limit even though the information is on public domain? No, unless the element of intent to threaten [...] or strike terror can be proved. I'm assuming that by "clause 2" you mean the excerpt you posted. Although circumventing the limit of API calls sounds in "exceeding authorised access" and might even lead to DOS, it does not imply an intent to threaten the security/sovereignty/etc. or strike terror. The statute is premised on such intent. The fact that the information(packets) is(are) on public domain is irrelevant. For instance, an intent to strike terror and/or actually causing a DOS can involve [targeting] a public domain.	I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?	Affirmative authority that this particular use (incorporation of the format of another program's textual data files into your own program) is protected is somewhat elusive in the US system; however there's a lot of observable evidence that reverse engineering data file formats without a license is widespread. My sense is that this would be analyzed under the same rubric as other kinds of reverse engineering and/or fair use. I'm sure there are others here who are better able to clearly and concisely explain that law than I am. However there may be limits — it seems Microsoft was able to prevent VirtualDub's use of the ASF format by patenting it. That said, it's hard to see how an unencrypted, unencoded ASCII data file file could be patentable (i.e. where the ASCII strings are the data, generated in response to user input, and the format is just their order and separators, etc). For the European arena, there is recent authority in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Limited that the format of a program's data files are not protected by copyright when reverse engineered without the source code. The following is from the digest and application of the CJEUs decision by the English court that referred it, in its subsequent judgment: The judgment of the CJEU On 29 November 2011 Advocate General Bot delivered his Opinion on the questions referred... Questions 1-5 The Court dealt with these questions together. It interpreted this court as asking "in essence, whether Article 1(2) of [the Software Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer program and the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive": see [29]. Having referred to recital (14), Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Software Directive, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of TRIPS, the Court went on: ... 39. [...] it must be stated that, with regard to the elements of a computer program which are the subject of Questions 1–5, neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250. 40. As the Advocate General states in point 57 of his Opinion, to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development. 41. Moreover, point 3.7 of the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for Directive 91/250 [COM(88) 816] states that the main advantage of protecting computer programs by copyright is that such protection covers only the individual expression of the work and thus leaves other authors the desired latitude to create similar or even identical programs provided that they refrain from copying. 42. With respect to the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program to interpret and execute application programs written by users and to read and write data in a specific format of data files, these are elements of that program by means of which users exploit certain functions of that program. 43. In that context, it should be made clear that, if a third party were to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating to the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own computer program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction within the meaning of Article 4(a) of Directive 91/250. 44. As is, however, apparent from the order for reference, WPL did not have access to the source code of SAS Institute's program and did not carry out any decompilation of the object code of that program. By means of observing, studying and testing the behaviour of SAS Institute's program, WPL reproduced the functionality of that program by using the same programming language and the same format of data files. 45. The Court also points out that the finding made in paragraph 39 of the present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of SAS Institute's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation (see Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace, paragraphs 44 to 46). 46. Consequently, the answer to Questions 1–5 is that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as such, are not protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive." Regarding the idea that the user has rights to access their output of a program held in a proprietary data file format there is some additional discussion in the that might be helpful in paragraphs 48 - 62 (of the CJEU opinion), discussing the right of a licensee to 'study and observe' the 'underlying' 'ideas and principles' of a program to accomplish 'acts of loading and running necessary for the use of the computer program.'	This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.	You are mistaken: they deny you on your act When you use Tor, your browser is not sending a lot of information. That makes Tor browsers hilariously easy to detect: nobody knows where the real browser is, but it is hilariously easy to block all Tor users for using Tor, or at least those that the server knows are Tor IPs. Using Tor is an action, not how you look. The closest Brick and mortar equivalent would be "Show me your ID please" and you show them a paper cutout of something that has Sample stamped over it. "No shirt, no shoes, no service" in the united-states Yes, most places can deny service based on how you dress or your state of hygine. These two would in most cases not extend to the protections under the Civil Rights Act, which protects some characteristics like race and sex, but not visual factors like "being dressed" or "smelling of cow". There can be a fine line where religious dress code is concerned, but in general and broad strokes, the restaurant can deny you for wearing the wrong clothes. Actually, the slogan is much broader than it appears: as long as an establishment's dress code is not violating discrimination law (like the CRA), they can enforce it under their freedom to contract.	The facts you describe are very likely an infringing derivative work which would provide a basis for a lawsuit against the person operating the website. But, nothing is certain, and these determinations are highly fact specific. It is highly unlikely that the government would enforce a violation of copyright alleged in these circumstances criminally.	The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.	Of course it's legal. Hyperlinking to an unaffiliated website in no way "determine[s] the means and processing of data." The person who makes these determinations is the person running the website. If I link to Microsoft's website, that doesn't give me any control over how Microsoft processes data on the website.
How to sue Google? I am in Canada And I believe Google has over charged me for $250 I know this amount is too small but it is about the principle Shall I go to the local tribunal and lodge a claim or dispute ?	Have you approached Google? Your contract with Google has a dispute resolution procedure (I’d link to the Canadian terms but I can’t find them). Generally a court will not entertain your claim unless and until you have followed the procedure you agreed to.	You paid a higher amount so you got to drive the latest model for a year. I can buy a lower amount right now, but I only get to drive last year's model. Or I can pay a higher amount to drive the latest model again. That's life. I have a Wii. I didn't buy it when people queued up for it, but when the shop was selling them off for half the price. That's life. You pay more for the latest and greatest, and then it gets cheaper. The protection you are talking about is this: If the shop advertises a motorbike for £8,000 and when you go into the store the price is suddenly £10,000 then there is some protection in place. The protection means the shop will get a major telling off from trading standards if you complain, and possibly a fine. It doesn't mean you get the motorbike for £8,000. And it most definitely doesn't mean you get money back when they reduce the price a year later.	Google is an international company. It has employees in France. It has offices in France. It has costs and revenue in France. It has French subsidiaries, with French bank accounts. Google could absolutely try to ignore a French judgment against it, but the government could seize assets from their French bank accounts, and/or real property they have in the country. The French government could petition other countries in which Google has assets to enforce the judgment, and at least in other EU countries it would likely be successful. Ultimately, though, there'd be no need for such extreme measures. Google's business in France is selling ad space to French businesses. If they didn't have that available as a revenue stream, they might well cut off service to the country themselves.	Canadian law defines "theft" thus: Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent (to deprive the owner, pledge as security, mess it up) In this case, you accepted what seemed to be an offer of a free pizza, so if you took and consumed the pizza you did so with a colorable claim of right and without fraud. Perhaps you misunderstood, but it is not a crime to misunderstand another person's intent. They could sue you for the cost of the pizza (assuming that you took it and did not pay), in which case the question would be whether whatever they said to you could reasonably be interpreted as an offer of a free pizza (if not, pay for the pizza). As an advertising stunt, this would not be unusual. However, if they fix the pizza but then demand money before handing over the pizza, you now know that you have no right to the pizza (if you abscond with the pizza in that circumstance, it would be theft). You may of course pay for the pizza, but you can also not pay and not take the pizza. Again, they could sue you, and in this case your defense would be that there was no contract (no agreement). An important question would be how reasonable it is to believe that you were offered a free pizza. People are offered "free" steak dinners all the time (at the cost of sitting through a sales pitch), so that is a reasonable belief. If a Lexus yacht salesman appears to be offering you a free $5M yacht, it is not reasonable to think that this is an ordinary advertising stunt, if you're not a celebrity.	Consider that stuff "court costs" or "court fees." They are actually often things not related to the court, like environmental fee, or emergency medical something or other, or park poop bag fee. Pretty much whatever either the legislature or administrative decision makers what to put on there. And FWIW, if you were not texting get your phone records and bring them to court to prove that you did not send any texts in or around that time.	Possibly I am Australian so I am not familiar with Albertan labour law but I have done a little research and the underlying common law principles are similar. I will assume that you are covered by Albertan law and not the Canada Labour Code. The next part of the answer is based on A Guide to Rights and Responsibilities in Alberta Workplaces. First, if you lost it they would need to ask you to pay for it, they could not deduct it from your pay without a garnishee order (p. 10). Second, if the device is safety equipment, and it is certainly arguable that it is, then it is the employee's responsibility to use it and the employer's responsibility to keep it in safe working order; this would include replacing it if it were lost (p. 12). The common law position depends on a) the contract and b) if any negligence were involved. Contract What does your current employment contract say about your use of the employer's equipment generally and this item in particular? If it says something then, unless it is an illegal term, that is what happens. If it is silent, then it turns on the particular circumstances. Also, a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, if they are trying to introduce a new term then you have to agree to it; remembering that there may be consequences to taking a stand against your employer, you should say that you do not agree - this removes the risk that the employer could argue that there was tacit agreement. Negligence In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, as an employee this is virtually a given; breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), this would depend on the circumstances of the loss or damage. You have to take reasonable care of the equipment - this is not a subjective standard, you need to do everything that a person in your position can do to protect the equipment from loss or damage; the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff. This has to do with the "proximity" of the harm, if for example the device needed a battery change and you took it to a technician who damaged the item in changing the battery then your actions are not proximate to the loss; and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Well, if it is lost or damaged this is pretty unarguable. So, if you take reasonable care of the device and, notwithstanding, it is lost or damaged then you would not be liable for negligence ... probably. Talk to your union rep; this is exactly the sort of stuff that they are there to sort out.	No An LLC that didn’t exist at the time of the act or omission that caused the loss being sued over is not a valid defendant. They would sue you personally and all of your assets, including the LLC, would be available to the creditor.	Your terms and conditions must comply with the laws in: Your jurisdiction (California) Your customer's jurisdiction (each of the US states, Canadian provinces and ultimately countries and sub-jurisdictions in Europe) If they do they will generally be enforceable; if they don't then they will not be enforceable and you may be exposing yourself to civil and criminal sanctions. While not immediately relevant to you, Australian Consumer Law has such sanctions to goods sold into Australia from anywhere in the world; I am not familiar with other jurisdictions. With respect to your comment that you will not accept returns or refunds, this would expose you to potential fines in Australia of $220,000 for an individual or $1,100,000 for a corporation - under Australian Consumer Law returns and refunds are a consumer right. I strongly suspect that most of the jurisdictions you are selling into would take a similar position. A general "catch-all" like "to the extent permitted by law" may reduce the risk of being prosecuted but it would not eliminate it entirely. Again, in Australia, the provision is that you must not engage in deceptive and misleading conduct - merely suggesting that you will not give a refund even with the limitation above - may still be deemed "deceptive and misleading" if the court feels that a reasonable consumer might assume that they are not entitled to a refund. You need professional legal advice on this.
Free speech and elected positions Suppose Jack is a student at a public university with a student senate. Senators are paid by the university. The senate elects one of its members to be senate president, and the senate president is paid more than the rest of the senators. At some point, Jack makes anti-LGBTQ comments in semi-private setting (e.g. group chat for a student organization). Consider the following hypotheticals: (1) Jack is running for student senate. Jack makes his comments before the election, and as a result loses. (2) Jack makes the comments after being elected, as is recalled as a result. (3) After being elected to the senate, Jack makes the comments, then runs for senate president, but loses the bid to become president because of the comments. (4) Jack makes the comments after being elected senate president, and the senators vote to remove him from the office as a result. In (1), the university is not explicitly giving money on a basis favorable to people who don't express anti-LGBTQ views, but they are offering it in a manner that has a disparate impact on such people. In (4), people acting on the university's behalf are taking a paid position away based on expressing those views. For which of these hypotheticals are Jack's rights being violated?	None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.	The President can nominate whomever he wants; the "advice" is formally post-nomination advice (the motion to confirm appointments is a motion "to advise and consent to" the nomination). In any event, "advice" is by definition non-binding; that's why it's not a command. However, the Senate must consent to the appointment before the officer assumes the office, so pre-nomination advice is relevant. For some nominations (like district judges), the Senators from that state can effectively sink a nomination if they're from the same party as the President and don't like the nominee; that can result in the Senators picking a short list of candidates and the President just picking someone on the list (or asking for a new list, but if he just nominates someone not on the list there's a fair chance they don't get confirmed). The Senate could decide that they will only confirm one particular person for the post. The President can nominate someone different. That's a political fight to be solved by gamesmanship and negotiation, not something that has a legal resolution.	Why has this never been interpreted by SCOTUS? It has never been interpreted by any court, because the interpretation you're advocating is nonsensical, and nobody has ever tried to advance it in any court. Therefore, no court has had an opportunity to rule on it. Congress, however, has (at least implicitly) interpreted this clause to mean that all natural-born citizens are eligible to be president if they also fulfill the other requirements, regardless of when they were born, so that is the prevailing interpretation unless someone manages to challenge the interpretation either before congress or in a court. If such a challenge is made then there will be an explicit ruling.	Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water.	From Roberts' dissenting opinion: Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition. (The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.) In my opinion, this quote speaks as much to the second question as the first. Assume (hypothetically) for a moment that question one was not at issue. If a state defined marriage as only between opposite sexes, and the right to make a state change its definition of marriage is not in the Supreme Court's purview (in our hypo), then the state is as free to reject the validity of marriages abhorrent to its laws, performed elsewhere, as it is to deny the right to marry under its theory of marriage.	Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets.	The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible.	This is unlawful sex discrimination In fact, its incredibly close to the example given on this website: A nightclub allows women in for free but you have to pay because you’re a man. This is unlawful discrimination because of your sex. How do they get away with it? Did you complain or report them? No? That’s how.
Can the President of the United States pardon proactively? President Trump's administration has just formally started the transition process. He is now officially a lame-duck President. It is common for outgoing Presidents to grant pardons in this last phase of their presidency, while they still have the power to do so; Clinton is one of the more infamous examples. The question which occurred to me: Can a President shield people not only from punishment but even from investigation and trial for federal crimes by granting a pardon proactively (a "prospective pardon") before any prosecution, let alone indictment, trial, sentence or punishment?	Yes. The precedent is President Gerald Ford's pardon of his predecessor Richard Nixon in proclamation 4311 before any possible prosecution had started. The pardon was granted specifically to prevent the disturbance of "the tranquility to which the nation has been restored" by "the prospects of bringing to trial a former President of the United States" (emphasis mine). It is noteworthy though that a pardon can be rejected by the recipient, and that there may be good reason to do so, because accepting one is an admission of guilt.1 In the words of the Supreme Court (Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915): There are substantial differences between legislative immunity and a pardon; the latter carries an imputation of guilt and acceptance of a confession of it [...]. (Again, emphasis mine.) Proactively pardoning large swathes of current and former government officials, family members and other people connected to the Trump administration would therefore be a double-edged sword: It surely may save a lot of the money and headache coming with being the target of an (even unsuccessful!) investigation; but it may also amount to admitting that the Trump administration was essentially a criminal organization. 1 As always, things are a bit less clear-cut when one takes a closer look. Because I googled "prospective pardon" after the correct remark by JBentley I stumbled upon the entirely relevant and eminently readable Congressional Research Service reports on pardons. The first one is a "pardons FAQ", the second one is a more thorough legal exploration of what pardons actually do. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court and Federal Courts have edged away from a 19th century opinion (Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866)) which viewed a pardon as an all-encompassing expungement. Newer decisions (prominently, Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 86 (1915) which I quoted) don't.	An accused would be arrested for the purposes of arraignment ("even a scheduled arrest is still an arrest"). That does not entail that the accused would be held in custody pending or during trial. Many commenters are of the view that Mr. Trump would be released under his own recognizance without bail. Reference: AP News.	The President has the power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution to faithfully execute the laws enacted by Congress. Any power that the President has to regulate international travel of non-U.S. citizens arises from statutes enacted by Congress that give the President (or the executive branch more generally) that authority. Immigration laws, in practice, give very substantial discretionary authority to the President, and public health laws probably also do so. I don't have chapter and verse to cite to you regarding which specific statutes provide that authority, without considerably more research, but that is the general idea. The primary statute regulating immigration is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (and more generally, Title 8 of the United States Code). It is not uncommon in the United States for there to be disputes over how much discretion a President has under a particular statute in the United States, because unlike parliamentary systems of government, the execution of laws and the passage of law is split between different branches of the federal government in the Presidential system of the United States, rather than being fused with a Prime Minster who serves at the pleasure of the legislature.	If the Senate has convicted by the necessary majority, Trump would no longer be the President - Mike Pence would be. There is no legal difficulty in removing ordinary citizens from the White House. Of course, President Pence might decide that he didn't mind ex-President Trump remaining in the White House, and I think the law enforcement agencies would be obliged to respect that.	The policy of the Justice Department is that the President of the United States can not be indicted. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-indictment-explainer/can-a-sitting-us-president-face-criminal-charges-idUSKCN1QF1D3 All federal prosecutors are part of the Justice Department and that means the guidelines for them say it is prohibited. There is not an actual law saying you can or can't indict the president. The idea is that impeachment is the right way to handle presidential wrongdoing, because the president shouldn't be distracted and he could be charged after leaving office or if he was impeached. The president can be investigated though and some have. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-13/trump-nixon-five-times-the-fbi-went-up-against-the-president/9539192	Yes, the President can just fire them, or more commonly, request their resignation. The provision for impeachment by Congress exists in case the President doesn’t do what the President should do.	The prohibition of double jeopardy is about each sovereign getting only one chance at conviction for the same offence. If the sovereign handles their chance incompetently, they don't get another attempt. (The only "exception" discussed in user6726's answer here: bribery of a judge such that there was no actual jeopardy in the first trial; that exception has not been extended so far to bribery of the prosecutor.) You ask whether "Bob ends up getting off innocent and can no longer be prosecuted over it due to double Jeopardy"? Yes, but only by whatever sovereign conducted the botched prosecution. The prohibition of double jeopardy does not prevent a separate sovereign for prosecuting the accused for the same acts, though, under their own criminal jurisdiction. This is why a person can be charged and prosecuted sequentially in federal court, in a tribal court operated by a Native American Tribe pursuant to its inherent sovereign authority, or in one or more state courts, even for the same acts, and even if the earlier prosecutions have resulted in acquittals. Your wording reveals a potential fundamental misunderstanding of what a criminal prosecutions is in the United States. You say "if Charlie is poor and hires a bad lawyer to prosecute." But there is no need or avenue for Charlie to hire a prosecutor. The state (or tribe, or federal government) has its own prosecutors and is in charge of the prosecution as the sovereign on behalf of the people.	There is currently no law requiring a candidate for US President to release tax records to appear on the ballot. Nor is there any law requiring the President to release such records after taking office. There are laws requiring members of congress, and other Federal officials, to make public some limited information about their finances. This is much less than the information that would be included in an income tax return. Congress could pass a law requiring candidates to release their returns, but it seems unlikely that the current Congress will do so. States have broad authority over Federal elections. A state could pass a law requiring a candidate to release his or her returns as a condition of appearing on the ballot. Such a law might be challenged on Due process grounds. This would be an untested legal area, so there is no telling how a court would rule on such a challenge to such a law. Congress, or an individual house of Congress, may subpoena almost any information in pursuit of its investigation function. Investigations must be related to possible legislation, meaning it must be related to a subject about which Congress has power to pass a law. But the relation can be rather remote, as long as the information might inform the judgement of members of congress in considering a possible law. There does not have to be an actual law under consideration. Investigations have been challenged, and in a few cases there have been court rulings that an investigation was not related to possible legislation, and so Congress was not allowed to enforce subpoenas on that subject, nor to compel testimony. But such rulings have been rare. Previous Presidents have asserted, under the name of "Executive privilege", a right not to disclose information, such as internal discussions within the executive branch. This is not explicitly specified by the US Constitution, nor by any law, but has been generally accepted, and in some cases supported by court rulings. No court has ever clearly defined the extent or limits of Executive privilege. A House committee issued a subpoena this year for President Trump's tax records, or some of them. I forget whether this was addressed to the IRS or to the Treasury Dept. This has been challenged in court, and the matter is still in court. I be3live that one of the grounds asserted against the subpoena was that it was not to look into tax issues, as specified in the law authorizing the subpoena. No one yet knows how that case will proceed. The NY State Attorney General is investigating allegations that the Trump Organization, and various individuals, violated NY law, including by falsely reporting campaign expenses and contributions. In pursuit of that investigation, he issued a subpoena for various records which he claims will reveal possible evidence of those illegal actions. He pretty learly has the authority to subpoena records which might be evidence in a criminal case. This subpoena has also been challenged, but seems pretty likely to be upheld. However the subpoena was as part of a Grand Jury investigation, and Grand Jury proceedings, including evidence obtained by subpoena, are by law secret unless an indictment and trial results. So even if the subpoena is upheld, this should not lead to the public release of the records, unless someone is put on trial for some crime, and the records are evidence in that case. Even then the judge can order the records not to be released to the public.
Could Trump "trash" the White House? Assume Trump willingly leaves the White House on January 20th, but acts like a bad tenant being evicted, and decides to destroy existing paintings, busts, etc. Would he be legally allowed to do this as the current President? Can he destroy parts or all of the White House? I know the White House hires interior decorators, so I'm guessing some parts of the house are removed/destoryed as taste and fashions change. How is "priceless part of American History" vs. "Shag Carpet" determined? EDIT I'm guessing someone would stop Trump if he tried to destroy Bush's Presidential Portrait (or any number of other historical items). On what grounds would they do this? We know from the news he can move them out of sight. EDIT 2 Has no president ever tried to get back at an enemy by destroying a portrait? Trump can't even rip up a document without having someone tape it back together.	This would be a violation of 18 USC 1361, which prohibits destruction of federal property. See also the DoJ legal notes on this crime. The act does have to be willful, so dropping a cup accidentally is not a crime. If for example the act is mustaching Obama's portrait, the damage would probably rise to the quarter-million dollar fine and 10 years in prison level. It would of course be at the discretion of the (new) DoJ whether to press charges.	According to this Washington Post story: Vance is seeking the records from Trump’s longtime accounting firm, Mazars. Thus Trump himself will not be able to refuse to provide the tax return information. Should the accounting firm refuse, it could be held to be in contempt of court, and fined. It is even possible that a responsible person from the firm would be jailed until the firm complies. I do not see what additional appeals or legal recourse there might be against turning over the returns. But I cannot say that none could be available. There might be arguments that lawyers for Trump or the accounting firm could still raise. News stories published on 23 Feb 2021 say that Mazars intends to comply with the subpoena. The New York Times story "Supreme Court Denies Trump’s Final Bid to Block Release of Tax Returns" said: The firm has said it will comply with the final ruling of the courts, meaning that the grand jury should receive the documents in short order. On Monday, Mazars issued a statement saying it “remains committed to fulfilling all of our professional and legal obligations.”	To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').	The Twenty Second Amendment is quite clear on this: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice In your question, the President has been elected twice - unless of course the President was actually the Vice President (or elsewhere in the line of succession) at the start of the first term, in which case theres other limits: and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. So, someone who has held the office of President after being elevated to it rather than elected to it, but served no more than 1 year 364 days of that first term, could possibly, by the wording of the Twenty Second Amendment, be eligible to resign within their second term and stand again but only once more.	The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.	Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).	"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.	Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.
How do I give all the right credit to the Harry Potter company and John Williams if I create a variation on the theme song? I want to know how do I give all the right credit to the Harry Potter company and John Williams if I create a variation on the theme song for it and if I plan to sell it. I don't want to be sued by them but I want to sell them for 69c. Should I get rid of them from my rework album, because the rest of the variations are of classics in the public domain such as Für Elise.	The Harry Potter company and John Williams may or may not want credit, but they almost certainly want money. You have to get their permission, at least for their creations. In the case of Für Elise, you can freely use the original score to "rework" that piece, but you can't "rework" a version that is itself a recent "reworking" (known as a derivative work). Anything that Jon Williams created is protected by copyright, so you need to negotiate a license to create a derivative work, and he/they get to dictate the terms (like, half of the 69 cents per copy). That might include some attribution statement such as "with permission, copyright Warner Brothers", or whatever is stipulated in the license agreement.	It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work.	From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.	If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA?	If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens.	No. You may not do this. As your post points out this is a blatant copyright violation. It isn't remotely in the realm of fair use.	Am I as the user of this site in any way liable if the music turns out to violate copyright? Yes. In a similar way to if I give you “permission” to take my neighbour’s car. Only worse. Because stealing requires intent - you have to mean to do it - while copyright violation is strict liability - if you do it, you’re guilty. If the user that uploaded the item did not have the authority to give the site permission then the site does not have permission and neither do you. If you take reasonable precautions such as performing a reverse image source and verifying that the item appears to be owned by the same person everywhere and, perhaps, reaching out to them then your violation will be an “innocent” infringement which mitigates but does not eliminate damages. The only way to be sure with copyright is to know the provenance of the copyright/licences back to the original creator.	Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.
Are there temporal limits to data requirements for a GDPR SAR? Are there any limits on data that must be provided as part of a GDPR subject access request (SAR) based on the age of the data? The particular case I am thinking about is SAR made to the 3 credit reference agencies. As I understand it they only keep my credit data for 6 years, but I would expect them to keep sales data for much longer. Say they know that they sold a large dataset to a third party 20 years ago, and cannot definitively say my data was not included. Are they required to give me details of this transaction? What if they had a potential data breach 20 years ago, would they be required to give details of this? Is there any particular language I should use in my SAR to make sure this is included?	In principle, the data subject's right to access involves a copy of all personal data the controller holds on them. There are no time limits by default. Of course, the controller can ask a data subject to clarify their request, e.g. to focus on a particular time frame. There is an implied time limit though: personal data may only be processed/stored for as long as the data is necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was collected. Afterwards, it must be deleted. A controller with good data management will be able to limit their effort by having as short retention periods as possible for their different records. Furthermore, a lot of data is not personal data, or falls out of scope of the GDPR because it is not processed with automated means or forms part of a filing system. For example, if thousands of old invoices were archived in paper form in boxes that are only sorted by year, there might be an argument that this isn't a filing system in the sense of the GDPR and that a DSAR would not have to involve looking through all the archived invoices (compare also Art 11). In your scenario, there is a clear retention period of six years. You are asking for records about how that data might have been used further in the past. To the degree that such data is actually available, that could reasonably be personal data and should be included in a response to a DSAR. E.g. they might have information like this: “File #1234 was included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. The entries in File #1234 that are older than 2014 have been purged, so we do not know which entries were included in the data set. The current name on File #1234 is Dave.” This information about the sale would be personal data because it relates to you, and you are identifiable. Of course, the controller might not be set up to perform this search unless specifically asked. However, more unspecific information might not be personal data. For example: “About 70% of our files were included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. We no longer have records indicating whether your file was included.” Since there is no link between the sale and your personal data, I don't think it would have to be included in a DSAR response. The primary reason why you should be told about sales of personal data is that per Art 15(1)(c), you should be informed about “the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed” in a DSAR response. So when making a data subject access request, it could make sense to explicitly referencing this paragraph. So you would be interested in receiving a copy of your personal data as per Art 15 GDPR, and in particular any available information per Art 15(1)(c) GDPR about the recipients or categories of recipients to whom your personal data has been or may have been disclosed in the past. Quite likely the response will be underwhelming, e.g. by just giving a broad category such as “potential creditors who are contractually obligated to use the data only in accordance with our policies”. Whether such responses are compliant (I don't necessarily think so) will not be clear until there's a good precedent, and that would require that someone sorts this out in court.	In answer to your questions, always get potential clients to sign a contract which covers the GDPR personal data processing requirements at a minimum, prior to giving them a copy of a consultant resume to retain. If you were sat in a meeting with them it is much simpler to record in your logs that the client had sight of the resume but was not left a copy of it in any format, than it is to keep track of which clients have a copy of which data and chasing up to ensure it is erased/destroyed when appropriate. To ensure clients treat the resumes as confidential, make sure they are labelled in the header and footer as confidential. They could also be kept in an envelope clearly marked confidential. There could also be a footnote in small print that informs anyone with a copy, who the data controller is, and that processing is strictly subject to the terms of the 'client contract' or whatever you call it, and that it should be returned or shredded within X days of receipt for example. If you have a computer system generate these it could even specify the client's name and the specific date it should be shredded by. Your notice could include a reminder that the personal data is protected under the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016 and that (client name) as a data processor could be held liable in the event of unauthorised disclosure or processing, if they act outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the data controller. Whilst this won't enforce responsible processing at least it will ensure that your business has done its best to ensure any recipients are fully aware of their responsibilities to protect the information and it would be very difficult for a client to claim they weren't aware the information was confidential or that they had legally binding responsibilities to protect it. It's also worth noting that simply sending CV's/resumes (or other personal data) out via email (unless suitably encrypted) would not meet the requirement in GDPR recital 39 for personal data to be "processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security and confidentiality of the personal data, including for preventing unauthorised access to or use of personal data and the equipment used for the processing." Email technology whilst convenient does not offer any guarantees regarding privacy and confidentiality, therefore instead of sending resumes as email attachments it might be better to use a web-based extranet system which authenticates users before granting access to view resumes. Emails could just let clients know there is a new resume or X number of resumes waiting for them to review and give them a link/button to login. The records of processing activities are in GDPR Article 30 on page 50, and it does not specify a retention period nor that we can choose the retention period, but simply states that data controllers make the records available to the supervisory authority when requested to do so - this may imply indefinite retention of processing records even beyond the life of the processing system (e.g. discontinued products/services), however we may need to await further clarification on this issue from supervisory authorities to be sure.	There are two relevant bodies of EU law to consider here. The GDPR covers processing of personal data. Personal data is any data where the data subject can be identified directly or indirectly. The ePrivacy directive is also relevant, and covers how you may access and store information on the user's device. Directives are not directly applicable law. Instead every member state translates the directive into national law. In the UK, ePrivacy is implemented by PECR. Is the data you collect personal data in the sense of the GDPR? Yes: that hashed unique device ID or a system-provided advertising ID likely is personal data, and any linked data would then be personal data as well. This is going to be the case in particular if you store user accounts on your server and can connect these bug reports to a user. Consider also whether the game save could include personal data, and whether the video clip could be analyzed to identify the data subject. Does this mean collecting this information in bug reports is forbidden? No, the GDPR doesn't forbid or allow anything outright. Instead, you should go through the compliance process. In a nutshell: determine the purpose of this processing, e.g. “fixing bugs” find an Art 6 legal basis for this purpose, e.g. “Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest” or “Art 6(1)(a) consent” if the legal basis is legitimate interest, you must balance that interest against the data subject's interests determine whether your compliance requirements include creating/updating your Records of Processing, or whether you have to write a Data Protection Impact Assessment implement the processing in a manner that respects GDPR principles such as Transparency and Data Minimization if the legal basis is legitimate interest you must implement an opt-out solution if the legal basis is consent, you must request consent first in a manner that satisfies the Art 7 conditions for consent – and allow consent to be revoked easily prepare to satisfy data subject rights: information requirements per Art 13, usually done in the privacy policy right to access, rectification, erasure, and data portability right to object (opt-out) and to restrict processing be aware of your general requirements a data controller to process this data securely, e.g. use HTTPS connections to transmit bug reports, take steps to protect your own accounts (e.g. 2FA), and ensure you have a suitable contract with any data processors that act on your behalf, e.g. cloud providers or contractors I would question whether your bug reports really need to include a device ID. That isn't forbidden, it just complicates compliance a bit. And what about ePrivacy? The ePrivacy directive is known for its cookie consent requirements. But these consent requirements apply when accessing any information on the user's device, or when applying equivalent fingerprinting techniques. Your game save is not an issue because it is necessary for the game. But that device ID and other system information is more difficult. So what to do? Compliance isn't trivial, but certainly possible. You will likely process the bug reports under your legitimate interest, but might still have to collect consent for accessing a system ID due to ePrivacy. Such a screen might look like this: Oh no, the game crashed! Do you want to send a bug report to the developers? Your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, collect system information and send bug report No, do not send bug report You could make an argument that a bug report can be sent in any case, and that you just need ePrivacy consent to collect useful system information. For example: Oh no, the game crashed! When sending a bug report to developers, do you want to include extra system information (link to details) that helps fixing the problem? In any case, your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, send bug report with extra system information No, send anonymous report	The provider has a legitimate interest in the data subjects data, and therefore they can override the right of deletion. See this example from the UK's Information Commissioners Office: A finance company is unable to locate a customer who has stopped making payments under a hire purchase agreement. The customer has moved house without notifying the finance company of their new address. The finance company wants to engage a debt collection agency to find the customer and seek repayment of the debt. It wants to disclose the customer’s personal data to the agency for this purpose. The finance company has a legitimate interest in recovering the debt it is owed and in order to achieve this purpose it is necessary for them to use a debt collection agency to track down the customer for payment owed. The finance company considers the balancing test and concludes that it is reasonable for its customers to expect that they will take steps to seek payment of outstanding debts. It is clear that the interests of the customer are likely to differ from those of the finance company in this situation, as it may suit the customer to evade paying their outstanding debt. However, the legitimate interest in passing the personal data to a debt collection agency in these circumstances would not be overridden by the interests of the customer. The balance would be in favour of the finance company. Article 17 of the GDPR, the "Right to be forgotten", says this: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: A) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; B) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; C) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); In your example, it's obvious that the personal data is still necessary for performance of the contract (Art 6(1)(b)) such as collecting payment, or for fulfilling legal obligations (Art 6(1)(c), Art 17(3)(b)) such as the obligation to keep financial records. Thus, there continues to be a legal basis for processing/keeping the data and rejecting the erasure request in whole or in part. Things are slightly different when the legal basis for this processing was consent (Art 6(1)(a)) or a legitimate interest (Art 6(1)(f)). Consent can always be withdrawn, but this kind of data collection is not typically based on consent. You can sometimes object to processing under a legitimate interest (see Art 21) but that doesn't work when the data controller has overriding legitimate grounds to continue processing. Such overriding grounds might be the legitimate interest to pursue the debt, and Art 21(1) and Art 17(3)(e) explicitly call out the “establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims” as overriding grounds. So that covers requests under A, B and C. Things like legal basis and erasure/objection must be analyzed on a per-purpose basis, so it is possible that you could get a partial erasure, such as erasing information that's only necessary for marketing (compare also objection per Art 21(2)). But its quite clear to me that a data subject cannot get out of paying a bill by using the GDPR.	If the data controller has “reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request”, then “the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject” (Art 12(6) GDPR). Until the data subject provides this information, the request is paused. But what are reasonable doubts, and what additional information can the controller request? The GDPR itself provides no clear guidelines, though general principles apply – the additional information must be necessary, adequate, and proportionate for the identity conformation purpose. The controller's obligation to comply with access requests must be balanced with the controller's obligation to ensure the security of data by rejecting invalid requests. Just accepting any request without any verification would also be a breach of the GDPR. For example: If the company identifies data subjects by email address, then demonstrating control over the email address would be an appropriate verification step. But just mentioning the email address would not be enough since it could be someone else's email address. If the company provides a website where data subjects have created user accounts, then being able to log in to the account would be an appropriate verification step. In these examples, asking e.g. for government photo ID would not be appropriate because that doesn't help strengthen the link between the person making the request and the personal data being processed. Such data collection would be disproportionate and unnecessary. In contrast, if you walk into a bank and ask for a copy of your data, it would be entirely appropriate for them to ask for government ID because (a) the higher general risks warrant stronger checks, and (b) such ID will help confirm that the person making the request is indeed the proper account holder. The bank will also have been legally required to request ID when the account was originally opened, so that asking for ID as an identity verification measure during this later request won't involve collection of more data than they already have. (These examples were made up by me and are not official, but read on.) The EDPB has issued draft guidelines on the right of access 01/2022, which also discuss the issue of additional information for identity verification in sections 3.2 and 3.3. In particular, paragraphs 73-78 talk about IDs: 73. It should be emphasised that using a copy of an identity document as a part of the authentication process creates a risk for the security of personal data and may lead to unauthorised or unlawful processing, and as such it should be considered inappropriate, unless it is strictly necessary, suitable, and in line with national law. […] it is also important to note that identification by means of an identity card does not necessarily help in the online context (e.g. with the use of pseudonyms) […]. 75. In any case, information on the ID that is not necessary for confirming the identity of the data subject, […] may be blackened or hidden by the data subject before submitting it to the controller, except where national legislation requires a full unredacted copy of the identity card (see para. 77 below). […] 76. […] Example: The user Ms. Y has created an account in the online store, providing her e-mail and username. Subsequently, the account owner asks the controller for information whether it processes their personal data, and if so, asks for access to them within the scope indicated in Art. 15. The controller requests the ID of the person making request to confirm her identity. The controller's action in this case is disproportionate and leads to unnecessary data collection. […] Example: A bank customer, Mr. Y,, plans to get a consumer credit. For this purpose, Mr. Y goes to a bank branch to obtain information, including his personal data, necessary for the assessment of his creditworthiness. To verify the data subject’s identity, the consultant asks for notarised certification of his identity to be able to provide him with the required information. The controller should not require notarised confirmation of identity, unless it is strictly necessary, suitable and in line with the national law […]. Such practice exposes the requesting persons to additional costs and imposes an excessive burden on the data subjects, hampering the exercise of their right of access. 77. Without prejudice to the above general principles, under certain circumstances, verification on the basis of an ID may be a justified and proportionate measure, for example for entities processing special categories of personal data or undertaking data processing which may pose a risk for data subject (e.g. medical or health information). However, at the same time, it should be borne in mind that certain national provisions provide for restrictions on the processing of data contained in public documents, including documents confirming the identity of a person (also on the basis of Art. 87 GDPR). Restrictions on the processing of data from these documents may relate in particular to the scanning or photocopying of ID cards or processing of official personal identification numbers. To summarize: controllers can request IDs only in comparatively niche scenarios, and must then take additional safeguards to protect the sensitive document (e.g. instructing the data subject to redact parts of the ID, not making copies, and immediately deleting the ID after successful verification). A lot here comes down to national laws, which may explicitly require or forbid use of the ID in this context. The EDPB guidelines are not binding or normative, especially since this guidance is still in the public consultation phase. However, the guidelines present an overall consensus of the national data protection authorities in the EU, and the guidelines are regularly cited by courts. In practice, many controllers do ask for disproportionate amounts of data. Sometimes this seems to be an attempt to discourage data subject requests, which would clearly be non-compliant. In some cases, this is due to a narrow interpretation of “reasonable doubts” in which they try to eliminate any doubt about the identity. If the data subject and data controller cannot agree on a suitable identity verification process, then the data subject can: Art 77: lodge a complaint with a data protection authority, and/or Art 79: sue the data controller in court, both for compliance (fulfilling the request) and for compensation (if damages were suffered). It is worth noting that the data controller is responsible for being able to demonstrate compliance (Art 5(2) accountability principle), such as demonstrating the apparent reasonable doubts to a supervisory authority or to a court. When the controller requests ID, the controller has the burden of proof to show that this is compliant.	The Right to Access is pretty absolute. However, there are some limitations: Is the service even the Data Controller for the data in question? Here, you're talking about notes of one user about another. Is the platform the controller for the notes, or would the note-taker be the controller? Or both, jointly? If the platform weren't a controller but merely a data processor for these notes, it would be illegal for them to disclose the information. Trish also correctly points out that the GDPR does not apply to processing for purely personal or household purposes, e.g. personal social media use. So GDPR would not provide a basis to compel a user to disclose their notes to the data subject, assuming that the note-taker is covered by this exception. Of course, this exception wouldn't apply if the notes are taken for other purposes, e.g. professional networking. Also, this exception doesn't affect the platform. There is an explicit limitation to the right of access in Art 15(4): The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. Disclosing user A's notes about user B to user B would likely violate the privacy rights of A. The notes are both A's and B's personal data. However, the correct balance depends on context. E.g. an employer probably can't refuse to provide access to a performance assessment merely because it was written by an identifiable manager. The UK ICO has provided detailed guidance on this aspect to the right of access. They propose a three-step test: Step one – Does the request require disclosing information that identifies another individual? For example, it might be possible to redact other people's information (but not in your Mastodon notes example). Step two – Has the other individual provided consent? Step three – Is it reasonable to disclose without consent? What is reasonable is highly context-dependent, but UK data protection law gives some concrete criteria to consider. The EU EDPB has draft guidance on the Right to Access. They note that the Art 15(4) can cover a wide range of rights, not just other people's privacy rights. But as in all things, the data controller is required to strike an appropriate balance between user A and B's conflicting rights. In the Mastodon user notes scenario, I think that the note author's rights to privacy should be considered more important than the data subject's right to access those notes, thus making it possible to reject that part of a DSAR under Art 15(4) GDPR. If we assume that the note-taker A is a (joint) controller for these notes, then it would also be necessary to consult them before making a decision about the access request.	These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine.	Generating a list of all possible numbers doesn't sound like it would constitute personal data any more than listing all dates for the last hundred years as a "possible date of birth" would. However, the moment anyone linked even one of the numbers with any other personal data - for example a name - they would be bound by GDPR and would need to show a Lawful Basis for processing the data. [If you linked your own name you could presumably argue Consent, but anyone else's would need to have an associated Lawful Basis.]
Landlord rights in case of tenant death in Germany In the shadow of recent virus outbreak, I could not help but to think about my landlord’s rights if I happen to die. I can imagine that the German law has this covered. Can someone please point it out?	This is covered in §§ 563-564 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, specifically for the death of a tenant. § 563 BGB: Household members continue your contract in your place, with a hierarchy of spouses before children before other members. They can each declare within a month that they decline to continue the contract. The landlord needs a grave objection against a person to decline continuation within a month after the above month. § 563a BGB: The same rules apply to any surviving tenants. § 564 BGB: If the contract is not continued with anyone living in or renting, then the contract is continued with the deceased's heirs. But in this case, both sides can equally terminate the contract within a month. All deadlines from this section appear to start upon the party receiving notice (of the death / the fact that they are continuing the contract). The death of your landlord has no immediate consequence on your contract.	Yes, but not without notice KS Stat § 58-2557 (2015) 58-2557. Landlord's right to enter; limitations. (a) The landlord shall have the right to enter the dwelling unit at reasonable hours, after reasonable notice to the tenant, in order to ... exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, ...	Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble?	They are inclusive if the contract says they are, they are exclusive if the contract says they are. What does your contract say? The lease starts on 14/1/2016 This is the point at which the tenants rights begin - they can take possession from 12:00:00 am 14/1/2016. This date is included in the lease period The lease ends on 13/1/2017 This is the point at which the tenants rights end - they must be out before 12:00:00 am 13/1/2016. This date is excluded from the lease period. I have no doubt that the magistrate had a view on this but as a mediator, it is not their role to express their view: its for the parties to determine a solution which may or may not be informed by knowing the exact legal position.	Firstly, your "apartment" doesn't prohibit anything; Your tenancy contract does. A terminology nitpick, but one that can shed some light on what is actually happening. TLDR: Your right to bear arms isn't being infringed, its being traded away. An unreasonable trade may be invalidated by the courts. Firearms restrictions are far less likely to be voided than speech content limitations. Yes, you have the right to bear arms(whatever exact meaning of that is). You also have the right to voluntarily agree to a binding agreement limiting that right, in exchange for a consideration. Compare a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). You have the right to freedom in your speech: you also have the right to agree to binding limits on your freedom of speech, in return for consideration (such as money or access to information). Every contract is structured in the same general way: Party A agrees to do or avoid doing certain things, in exchange for Party B agreeing to do or avoid doing certain things. So, in essence, what the apartment contract says is, that you agree to do or not do some things (including paying rent), in return for your landlord temporarily granting you some rights(such as the right to reside(generally exclusive), the right to control the space, etc. ), and imposing some obligations on themselves (which vary from place to place). In your case, one of the things that you are trading is a limitation on your right to bear arms(note that you can still bear arms, just not on the property in question). Now one thing to note is that courts have the power to enforce contracts; they also have the power to void contracts, in part or in full, if they are illegal or "unconscionable". In general, restricting (the content of) speech is not reasonable (e.g. having a general noise level restriction is reasonable), so is more likely to be struck down than one restricting firearms on the rented property.	There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term.	Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.	The law regarding landlords and tenants is Iowa Code Ch. 562A. Part 2 (§562A.27 et seq.) states the legal remedies available to a landlord. §562A.27 specifically spells out the remedies for material non-compliance with lease terms. The gist of that and related sections is that if a person is in violation of a lease, there is a legal process that has to be followed, and if successful, the sheriff will forcibly evict the tenant (though §562A.27A, the clear and present danger section, shortens the process – still, it's not immediate and it does require legal notice etc.). Under the law, you (apparently) have become a landlord and have an unwritten tenancy agreement with the tenant. I assume based on your description of the facts you have a long-term written agreement with the property owner. By allowing this person to live with you, you have entered into a landlord-tenant relationship, which limits your rights. The police will not respond to this situation – a legal squabble – whereas if someone broke into your residence and was trespassing (and you complain in a timely manner, not allowing the person to trespass), the police would respond and not require a court order. §562A.9(5) states that in lieu of a specific term of tenancy, in the case of a roomer paying weekly rent the tenanct period is a week, otherwise it is a month. §562A.6 defines "roomer": basically, if you are a "roomer", so is your sub-lessor. By agreeing to let the person stay with you, you have become a landlord and sub-lessor, thereby subject to the restrictions on landlord actions. That means you have to take the person to court to get rid of them. Failure to pay agreed-on rent is certainly sufficient legal cause, and any monthly lease can be terminated by the landlord after giving legal notice (30 days advance notice).
Data scraping from LinkedIn—is it okay to publicize it? I am doing a project using data from LinkedIn. Basically, I am extracting the "workplace" field from people that went to my university. I was told by someone in the research group that LinkedIn prohibits people to publicize any data. Is that true?	You can’t do this LinkedIn ToS prohibit: b. Develop, support or use software, devices, scripts, robots or any other means or processes (including crawlers, browser plugins and add-ons or any other technology) to scrape the Services or otherwise copy profiles and other data from the Services; c. Override any security feature or bypass or circumvent any access controls or use limits of the Service (such as caps on keyword searches or profile views); d. Copy, use, disclose or distribute any information obtained from the Services, whether directly or through third parties (such as search engines), without the consent of LinkedIn; e. Disclose information that you do not have the consent to disclose (such as confidential information of others (including your employer)); Since you must have an account to do what you propose, you agreed by contract not to do it.	Yes such a username would be personal data. It is information that relates to an identifiable person. In this context,a person isn't identifiable only if you can infer their real-world identity, but already if you can single out one person's records. Thus, your random IDs and any linked information would be personal data as well. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean that processing it is illegal. It just means you need a legal basis. That could be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject (like saving game progress), a legitimate interest, or consent. Taking into account GDPR principles like "data protection by design and by default", it could be sensible to hide a players stats from the leaderboard until they give consent. On the other hand, you may have a legitimate interest to provide leaderboard data for ranking/comparison, especially if the leaderboard entries are pseudonymized. In any case, it should be clear to the users which information is visible to others.	Any processing of personal data needs a legal basis, for example necessity for some contract or legitimate interest. If no other legal basis allows the processing, you need to acquire consent. Consent must be freely given. If something is gated behind consent without that consent being really necessary, this might coerce users and they would not be able to consent freely. The GDPR does not have a hard ban on this, but it explicitly calls out that this case must be considered when determining whether consent is valid. So what your company is trying to do is in a dark grey area. Not necessarily wrong, but likely so. Consent could be made free if users have an actual choice. For example, some online newspaper sites had success with a “pay or consent” wall. (Success in the sense that some data protection authorities allowed this). In your case, this could mean that users either consent to extra data collection, or that they buy some reasonably priced premium mode. But none of this is for you to decide. You can voice your doubts that the software would be compliant. You could also ask if the Data Protection Impact Assessment document for this proposed processing is available (creating such an assessment is likely mandatory in this case). But in the end, it is the company's obligation to be compliant, and this responsibility is largely shouldered by the company's data protection officer (to whom you can turn with further questions).	could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)".	Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself.	Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	No, they can't do that. GDPR Recital 42 states: Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. Here's some more context on consent requirements.
Can I avoid a tax foreclosure by evading service of the summons? Help me understand how property tax works. If the property tax has to be served as a lawsuit- correct me if that is wrong- then I see problems. I buy a huge amount of property in an area. I live in some other, hard to reach jurisdiction to evade service. Gov goes to collect tax. Gov sues over delinquency. They can never find me so lawsuit never happens. Gov collapses from lack of tax revenue Does the government have a way to bypass the service and take the property? And by the way, theres a lot of fraudulent service by publication, but done legally it's still supposed to be where the defendants are. I.e., it is not intended to be a magical get out of jail card for a missing defendant.	There are a few problems with your line of reasoning, but the main one is that if the government can't locate a defendant, California's Rules of Civil Procedure provide a variety of alternative means of service. When all else fails, the government can serve the defendant "by publication," meaning that they simply publish a notice of the lawsuit in a newspaper. If the defendant fails to appear to defend the suit after service by publication, the court will enter default judgment, the government will seize the property, sell it, and use the resulting revenue to continue operating.	To put it as nicely as possible, you're not being very smart by threatening to make the house guest's predicament the worst mistake they ever made. Drawing up a notarized contract with a financial penalty is ludicrous and likely simply illegal in terms of contracting for something that is against the law. Beyond that, any threats you make to against house guest could be grounds for them to file a civil suit against you, either for eviction or physical harm, and you'll end up in court rather than simply getting the house guest to leave. An Unlawful Detainer applies if there is verbal or written lease, and as such you would have to go through the formal eviction process. But if this is a simple house guest issue, with no lease or rental agreement in the past, and they are not a family member with some legal right to be in the house, law enforcement is the way to deal with it. It's very simple: set a move out date and say you will call the police or county sheriff if they don't move out on that date. If they don't leave and you do call the police or sheriff, simply say you have a house guest who won't leave, i.e. a trespasser. Law enforcement will come out and you will explain the story; they will likely make the determination that you are the property owner and the guest is indeed not welcome. Law enforcement will tell the guest to leave or be arrested, as per Florida Law - Chapter 810. You can call the police or county sheriff ahead of the move out date and determine the appropriate laws; and get advice on what you might need to do on the actual move out day. If the house guest has property, law enforcement will stand by at that time while they retrieve their property, or make arrangements for them get it at a later date, with or without law enforcement.	Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.	What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation.	I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.	The United State doesn't have a national sales or value added tax, so the IRS would only care about the phone sale insofar as it might represent income to the seller. Insofar as it's income to the seller, it doesn't matter whether the transaction is cash, bitcoin or barter, the seller is supposed to account for it in their income taxes. If you are suggesting that bitcoin sales could be hidden, well, folks have been hiding cash transactions since taxes were invented. Worst case, the IRS discovers that the seller's spending is wildly out of line with their stated income and they begin a criminal investigation.	I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction I demand you give me your hat! You're not going to, are you? The point of that is that you are not obliged to do anything just because someone demands that you do. Now, if I had a court order that required you to give me your hat ... It appears that there is some confusion over who owns some land in Nebraska. This is a problem; it is not your problem. From my understanding which is entirely based on this: A warranty deed is a type of deed where the grantor (seller) guarantees that he or she holds clear title to a piece of real estate and has a right to sell it to the grantee (buyer). you would be extremely unwise to sign such a deed since it is in no way clear that you (or anyone) does have clear title. Now I take it that you are not interested in owning land in Nebraska and even less interested in getting into a legal battle over it. If that is the case then I suggest that you consult a local lawyer and ask for his advice on the following plan of action: You and your wife will renounce any claim that you may have if: You do not guarantee that you have any claim or title, The person to whom you are making this grant indemnifies you against any legal action that may result, They will prepare the documents, Your lawyer will review them, They will reimburse you for your lawyer's fees. Come back and tell us how this works out. Edit to address subsequent questions Can you be responsible for costs? Well, anything is possible but it would be extremely unlikely. If there was any wrongdoing it was many years ago by someone else! If you approach this in a reasonable way and attempt to assist in reaching a resolution (so long as it doesn't cost you time or money) then it is highly unlikely a court would award costs against you. What about background checks? This would be a civil case. It would not appear in your criminal history. While it is a matter of public record all it really means is that you and someone else had a dispute that required a court to settle; happens all the time.	Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out.
Did Rudy Giuliani act as an effective legal advocate for his client? Setting aside politics and opinions on the actual merits of the case, did Rudy Giuliani act as a competent legal advocate in support of his client's position in his November 17 argument in federal court in Pennsylvania? Were there clear mistakes in his arguments before the judge that a reasonable, competent constitutional-law lawyer would not have made?	No, he was not effective A good lawyer litigating a constitutional law case would know what the standards of review are for determining constitutionality (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review) and have an argument for which one applies. Giuliani appeared to be unfamiliar with these standards. Quoting from an exchange between Giuliani and Judge Brann: Brann: What standard of review should I apply, and why? What standard of review should I apply in this case — Giuliani: On a motion to dismiss? I mean I think the normal one, which is that you, you have to deem the factual allegations to be correct, and even if they are correct, you have to find that there’s no merit, no legal merit, no legal theory on which we can get relief. Brann: Well let me ask you then, are you arguing strict scrutiny should apply here? Giuliani: No, the normal scrutiny should apply. If we had alleged fraud, yes. But this is not a fraud case. Brann: …So if that’s the case, why don’t Secretary Boockvar’s and the counties satisfy the standard of review you’re talking about? If it’s not strict scrutiny, and it’s the standard of review you’re implying, why don’t their actions satisfy this? Giuliani: I’m sorry, I don’t really understand the question, your honor. Brann: Well this is how I would look at it. I would think that it’s a standard of review of strict scrutiny, potentially. You’re not sure that that’s the case. I’m not imposing my — Giuliani: Maybe I don’t understand what you mean by “strict” — Brann: Well, for strict scrutiny to apply, a fundamental right needs to be burdened, as I understand it. So how do the counties or Secretary Boockvar, on behalf of the commonwealth, burden the plaintiffs’ right to vote? How do they burden the right to vote? The judge is basically giving Giuliani the answer here: he's challenging government action, so strict scrutiny would work in his favor, as it imposes the highest burden on the government to justify its action. The judge is even saying that he thinks strict scrutiny may apply. Despite that, Giuliani appears to have no idea what the judge is referring to, and is simply describing the standard for a motion to dismiss. The government's lawyers were prepared for this question, as they should have been, and argued for rational-basis review, which favors the government. Had Giuliani argued competently, there could have been two sides to that argument instead of only one.	An adult is normally assumed to be competent to enter into a contract unless there is some reason to think otherwise. It is not usual to demand evidence of competency unless there is something in the appearance or actions of a party that raises such a question, or something about that party, such as a history of mental illness, known to the other party, that raises such a question. I have heard of a party being medically examined just before signing an important document, to provide evidence of competence, but generally in connection with a will, and generally when the signer is elderly and in poor physical condition, and even then such a procedure is rare. If competence is disputed, medical evidence is required to resolve the question, or more exactly to establish lack of competence. In the absence of such evidence, competence will be presumed. That was the conclusion of the MA Supreme Court in FRANCES M. SPARROW vs. DAVID D. DEMONICO & another, 461 Mass. 322* (2011). The court held: without medical evidence or expert testimony that the mental condition interfered with the party's understanding of the transaction, or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence will not be sufficient to support a conclusion of incapacity. It was a significant part of the court's reasoning in that case that a reasonable person might well have entered into the agreement in question, and that the party was represented by a lawyer, and acted in accord with the lawyer's advice. That does not, however, seem to be a requirement; merely additional evidence of the reasonableness of the action.	The best course of action for Barr would be to file an objection to the subpoena in the proper court (probably the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) under or by analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) (which governs disputes over subpoenas in civil cases in the federal courts), if he thinks that there are matters he cannot lawfully divulge or thinks it is improper to divulge even if they are not privileged, and to let a judge decide. Generally speaking, in a civil action, you can only object to a subpoena by following this process and Congress has increasingly used the civil lawsuit discovery process as a benchmark. Failure to file an objection with the proper court, or at least in a response to Congress by the date required in the subpoena to produce the materials, will generally constitute a waiver of the objections that might otherwise have been asserted to the subpoena. Simply not responding without explanation by the due date would be a pretty clear case of Contempt of Congress which is the basis for both a civil action and criminal contempt charges. For example, in the Lynch case, cited below, the Court stated with respect to information that was withheld without any claim of privilege: Failure to provide any grounds for withholding particular records does not comply with the order or enable the Court to resolve defendant’s privilege claims as to those documents. Accordingly, defendant must produce the material withheld without any proffered justification. This said, in any dispute between Congress and the Executive Branch there is always some uncertainty, and the courts strongly favor negotiation and conferral between the parties before bringing these matters to a head. A general discussion of Congressional subpoenas can be found here, recognizing, however, that while there are a variety of grounds for redaction asserted in the Mueller report case, "Executive Privilege" is not among them and so the special considerations that apply to an assertion of executive privilege do not apply. The authority of the judicial branch to resolve these issues has been upheld, for example, in the cases of United States v. Nixon (U.S. 1974) and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Lynch (D. D.C 2016) (both of which involved the more difficult scenario of an assertion of executive privilege in addition to the more ordinary assertions of privileges like the grand jury privilege). Not infrequently, the judge will review the unredacted material in camera (i.e. privately in chambers without showing it to the requesting party) to determine if the claim of privilege or other basis for redaction is really valid (e.g. maybe something that was redacted under the label grand jury testimony is not, in fact, grand jury testimony). But, there is case law to support the notion that Congress would have to demonstrate some specific reason why it doubts the accuracy of the assertions of the executive branch regarding redactions in this particular case to make it necessary for there to be an in camera review. In the Lynch case (which is a non-precedential opinion itself) the Court said: As for whether the redactions are what they purport to be, the Court notes that counsel for even the most disputatious parties are often called upon to trust each other, and that the judiciary relies regularly on declarations by the executive branch that matters redacted from FOIA productions are what they are described to be in the Vaughn index. See Loving v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion by relying on agency’s Vaughn index and declaration in determining whether a disputed document contained segregable portions); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The reviewing court may rely on the description of the withheld records set forth in the Vaughn index and the agency’s declaration that it released all segregable information.”). The Court has been provided with no reason to believe that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of government assertions made in pleadings by an officer of the court representing another, equal branch of government. If in the end, a neutral is required to read each individual redaction and confirm that what the Department claims is simply a name or a telephone number is in fact a name or a telephone number, the parties can arrange for that on their own. These discretionary issues are likely to be influenced by the partisan leanings of the particular judges involved. Another question is to whom a subpoena could be directed. While attorney-general Barr is one possible person to whom it could be directed, Mueller himself is another possible person to whom a subpoena could be directed and that might lead to a more tractable counter-party in the lawsuit and might simplify some of the conflicts of interest present in a subpoena of the attorney-general himself that in criminal contempt cases is enforceable by his subordinates, i.e. U.S. attorneys, who are required by law to bring such charges.	How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.	Not necessarily. Let's say the victim delivered photos of a harm that were alleged to be done by the defendant. That's a crime in itself. But based on this item the DA orders investigation and finds evidence of a real crime. Discovering that the photo was faked can lead to dismissal (with prejudice), but even without the fake photo, there might be a strong case against defendant. Also, the photo could not even be used as evidence in the actual trial stage. A good defense attorney might manage to convince the judge, that the doctored photo should have been discovered such early in the investigation, but I doubt, that one could manage to make everything else in a proper investigation fruit of the poisoned tree unless police screwed up.	A person isn't required to state their evidence that the claim is true when they make the claim, and as a public figure, a defamation suit filed by Trump would be judged under the stronger "actual malice" claim, meaning that the statement was made with knowledge that the claim is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. You would have to look at the specific statement. It is generally not defamatory to hurl insults like "rapist!", "pedophile!", "criminal!" etc. against a public figure especially a political figure, since such word don't generally amount to an actual accusation of wrong-doing. On the other hand, a detailed but false claim purporting to relate factual events could cross the threshold. Hyperbole is not actionable.	When it can be “reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference.” Which is the standard the New York appeals court endorsed in 2014 for “defamation by implication”. So, on the face of the statements, they have to imply fraud and they have to show that the speaker intended to imply fraud. Whether they did that is up to the jury.	There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.
Can a US company ask prospective American employees, contractors or partners about their country of birth? I decided recently to sign up as a seller on Amazon.com. The first step of the registration process however, asks about the applicants "Country of Birth". Is this legal? That seems to completely irrelevant and an opening for discrimination. I think the country will be worse off if in the course of ordinary business, people were asked about their countries of birth. In America, we're all supposed to be American (though I can understand in certain very sensitive national security situations) If anyone can comment on the legality of this, I would appreciate. As a follow-up question, I would be curious to know if Amazon can in any way be sued for asking this and what the potential risk/reward of such a lawsuit would be?	The EEOC states that national original discrimination in employment is illegal, which is supported by 28 CFR Part 44 (discriminate means "the act of intentionally treating an individual differently from other individuals because of national origin or citizenship status, regardless of the explanation for the differential treatment, and regardless of whether such treatment is because of animus or hostility"). See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. codified at 42 USC 2000e–2. The internet widely advises that asking such questions is illegal. The EEOC has a more nuanced view of the matter as articulated here: they say We recommend that you avoid asking applicants about personal characteristics that are protected by law, such as race, color, religion, sex, national origin or age. These types of questions may discourage some individuals from applying, may be viewed suspiciously by some applicants, and may be considered evidence of intent to discriminate by the EEOC. If you do not have this information when you decide who to hire, it may be easier for you to defend your business against a hiring discrimination complaint. Before reaching a conclusion, we should check what an employee is (42 USC § 2000e(f)), namely: an individual employed by an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. This just tells us that in writing the law, Congress left it somewhat open what an "employee" is. An Amazon seller is, on the face of it, not an employee of Amazon, instead, a seller is an independent contractor. Of course that is a legal question that can't just be decided superficially, see for example California's AB5 (but even under that law, a seller is not an employee). As articulated by SSA The common law control test is the basic test, using the common law rules, for determining whether a relationship exists between the worker and the person or firm that they work for. Under the common-law test, the employer has the right to tell the employee what to do, how, when, and where to do the job If the Dept. of Labor or the IRS determine that you are (would be) an employee, then this is illegal discrimination, otherwise it is not. Since you are not paid a wage, the prospects for being deemed an employee are extremely dim. The EEOC gives this guidance on the distinction, with a very long list of examples which in general support the position that a vendor is an independent contractor and not an employee.	Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion!	The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S.	Greendrake's answer says that a country can declare any jurisdiction it likes. This is true, but in practice it is the convention that a country should claim jurisdiction only over its territory and its citizens. The point about "citizens" is normally not pushed, as when you go to a foreign country you are normally subject to its laws rather than those of your home, but for instance there are laws against child sex tourism where the perpetrators can be prosecuted at home for offences committed abroad. However this basic principle gets more murky with long-distance communication such as the Internet. Someone in country X can, for example, provide a service to someone in country Y which is illegal in country Y. At this point the laws of country Y have been broken by someone sitting in country X. Y is not claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction; the crime occurred inside its own territory, but the criminal is currently resident in X. From a legal point of view this is the same as if both had been inside Y when the crime was committed, but then the perpetrator fled to X before they could be arrested. So in the Kim Dotcom case, Dotcom is alleged to have committed criminal copyright violations by supplying movie files to people in the US. In the Meng Wanzhou case, Meng is alleged to have made fraudulent statements to American banks to the effect that Huawei was complying with US sanctions law (otherwise those banks would not have been able to do business with Huawei). The accounts I've read don't say whether Meng was in the US for those meetings, but the fact that they were made to American banks in order to do business in America makes the precise location of the meeting irrelevant.	Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.	"Legal requirement" can and in this case simply means "it's what is required in order for us to be reasonably able to offer you this service", noting that it would be unreasonable for such a dangerous business to operate, when one moron slipping and suing them could put them out of business. It's a little surprising that you've never had to sign a waiver before, but there are quite a number of similar waivers out there, such as REI (Seattle), The Edge (Vt), Croc Center (Coeur d'Alene), YMCA (MI) and U. Nebraska. They all have in common the requirement of a signature (indicating that you've waived your right to sue them), birth date, date of signature. This is the bare minimum that's required to have a valid waiver, and more info would be better (to uniquely identify the customer out of the 1000 John Smith's in the state and 500,000 in the US). If you break yourself and try to sue, they will trot out the waiver to put an end to the suit. Name, address, phone number and birth date do a long ways towards proving that the person who signed the waiver is indeed you.	If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law.	The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work.
What is the typical delay between reporting a murder with a known suspect and arrest? Note: I am not asking for legal advice here, no rush haha I was recently looking into the Death of Ahmad Arbery who passed away violently on footage earlier this year. Supposedly it took a few months for the father and son who had chased him to be arrested, despite their clear involvement, whether justified or not. Similarly, Kyle Rittenhouse was involved in a death of two people in August, and he apparently interacted with police that night, but was not detained and allowed to return to his home state that same night. Is there a necessary waiting period between a crime being committed and the arrest of someone who is known to be involved but may not be the perpetrator? What is the typical response time? Thanks.	Nothing is typical Investigators have wide discretion on how (and if) they pursue an investigation of an alleged crime. When they make an arrest is part of that discretion. Making an arrest starts all sorts of clocks running on the legal process and investigators may not want to do that for all sorts of legitimate reasons.	In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person.	I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”.	It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot.	It's really the other way around: film crews can legally travel with the police. This is very similar or identical to what you saw on YouTube. From http://blogs.findlaw.com/celebrity_justice/2014/04/cops-and-suspects-rights-whatcha-gonna-do-when-they-record-you.html (dated 4/18/2014) "Cops" will soon begin a 10-week filming stretch in San Jose, California, for the first time in the show's 26-year history, reports the San Jose Mercury News. The "Cops" crew will hit the streets alongside San Jose's finest to provide a window into what these men and women do in America's 10th largest city. More from that link: When the officers on "Cops" arrest most of their suspects, the circumstances leading up to the arrest are out in public. However, in order to avoid unlawfully appropriating the images of those caught on "Cops'" cameras, the crew asks the arrestees to sign a release form. The "news crew" are producers who have permission from the police to follow along. As above, they ask each suspect to sign a release after the arrest. These arrests take place in public, on public streets and right-aways, where filming of the public is legal. If the arrestee does not sign the release, their face is blurred in the resulting footage that is made public. This does not mean the producers or videographers are automatically allowed into a private residence. They need a release to go onto private property (unlike the police involved in an investigation) and as such, the resident can actually forbid the cameramen from entering the house even while the police have entered. The footage from the body cams of the police are a different story; they are public employees of the local government and are bound by the laws of the locality. A search of Google News shows that in San Fransisco, the issues of the use of body cams by police and public access to that video is an ongoing issue; some laws have been finalized, others are bound to change. Around the US, some localities at this point in time allow public access to the footage from police cams; others only after department or local governmental review; still others only on in as need basis for prosecutions. ...the cop is the only one in this situation who can command the filmers to stop. Even if the "news crew" is not a news crew and just someone from the general public, it is generally legal for the public to film the police, as long as they are not causing issues with the police and stay out of the way (re: all of the recent news regarding police shootings and the footage available on YouTube and in news sources). There is case law pertaining to that, but IANAL, so I'll let someone else outline that. But https://photographyisnotacrime.com/ is a good resource. In the US, you pretty much have no expectation of privacy while in public.	Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained.	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.	Yes, a person can be charged with the murder of person or persons unknown The reason that police are really keen to identify the victim include (in no particular order): It will probably clear up a missing persons case; So they can inform the next-of-kin; Being able to place a named person who loved and was loved before a jury rather than nameless corpse increases the chance of conviction - all else being equal.
Limitations for importing from China to US If a US small business company would want to import products from China ( possibly tax-free or low-tax, mostly beauty, cosmetics and fashion products - below $10,000), what are the limitations, taxes, and procedures to follow? Can you maybe refer me to the applicable law (e.g. USC)?	You will have to pay import toll and taxes. There is no way around that unless you get only tiny deliveries, and that would be tax evasion. Atop that, make sure your wares are declared properly and are not regarded as counterfeit or not importable. Fashion products might require to follow some special rules on ingredients that are allowable. You can get the information you need at your customs office or at the customs office website	In the second case, is there anything to declare to the taxes? Yes, just like in the scenario of depositing in your bank account. Otherwise it would be easy for everybody to avoid the heavy tax burden by bartering or transacting without the use of official currency. The Code général des impôts in its Article 13 includes in the concept of bénéfice ou revenu imposable the market value of profits and benefits in kind ("y compris la valeur des profits et avantages en nature").	Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer.	There is a regulation 31 CFR 560.419 making it unlawful to hire an Iranian national ordinarily resident in Iran to come to the United States solely or for the principal purpose of engaging in employment on behalf of an entity in Iran or as the employee of a U.S. person, unless authorized pursuant to §560.505 If the work is conducted long-distance, the employee would not be coming to the US. An additional regulation is 31 CFR 560.201, that Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to May 7, 1995, the importation into the United States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, other than information and informational materials within the meaning of section 203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)), is prohibited. which could be applicable. 50 USC 1702 says that there is no prohibition against the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not include those which are otherwise controlled for export under section 4604 of this title, or under section 4605 of this title to the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or antiterrorism policies of the United States, or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18 It is not obvious how the US government will interpret "information". Following the rule noscitur a sociis, outsourcing accounting services is not clearly "information" given the instances enumerated in the law. Then we come to 31 CFR 560.206, whereby no United States person, wherever located, may engage in any transaction or dealing in or related to: (1) Goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; or (2) Goods, technology, or services for exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the Government of Iran. (b) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the term transaction or dealing includes but is not limited to purchasing, selling, transporting, swapping, brokering, approving, financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing. An Iranian person is subject to Iranian law: I won't try to figure out if there is any Iranian law against such an arrangement, but I assume that it is legal from the Iranian side. In light of 560.206, it may be illegal under US law; however, an Iranian person is not subject to US law. The US company would be. Before giving up hope, I will point out that 560.206 starts with "Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part" (Part 560). There is a sort of contradiction between the prohibition in 560.201 and the one in 560.206, that the former states an exception (about information) to a general prohibition, but that exception is not stated in the later (which is about transactions). The government probably would not interpret the information exception in 506.201 as an "authorization". Instead, specific authorizations are found in Subpart E. The majority of those authorizations pertain to exporting the service of obtaining a non-immigrant visa, but also under 506.509 authorized importation of and payment for certain intellectual property services. However, what is enumerated is services pertaining to copyright and patent registration, and not the creation of IP. Bear in mind that US law is fluid and will change on Nov 4. The Office of Foreign Assets Control is authorized to grant licenses for transactions with Iran. The company that an Iranian might enter into an agreement with bears primary responsibility for navigating the legal waters, but if a company mishandles the transaction, the Iranian person may end up not being compensated for his work. Normally one would hire an attorney versed in relevant law, and there are firms that specialize in the law of Iran sanctions, but such consultations may be difficult for the ostensive Iranian contractor.	Your framing of the issue is basically wrong. There is an exemption, which varies from state to state, from unsecured creditors (but not creditors that take the goods as collateral) in bankruptcy and in debt collection outside of bankruptcy (not always the same exemption), for tangible personal property owned by the debtor which constitutes the debtor's tools of the trade, but that varies from state to state, is a creature of state statute (and the bankruptcy code), is not universal, and is usually limited in dollar amount. Moreover, the exemption only applies when the tradesman actually owns the tools of his trade which is customary in some professions, but not automatic. It is only the case when the tradesman buys his own tools. There is no generic v. non-generic distinction. In the software field, education and the public domain can always be accessed. But, intellectual property, that can be protected, that is developed for the employer, is usually work for hire and belong to the employer. This default rule is subject to the terms of the agreements between the parties entered into contractually.	Under German law, yes sure. As long as you keep to all regulations. You have to declare your taxes. This is income, whether it comes from inside Germany or not and whether it is paid into a German bank account or foreign. You have to have a health insurance and likely need to pay into the social security and pension funds. As your employer most likely does not do this for you as a German employer would be required to, you will need to pay both the employee and the employer's part yourself. So yes, if you pay your taxes on it and have health and social security insurance, Germany does not care where the money comes from. Now whether the company in Mauritius is legally allowed to hire and pay you under their law? I have no idea. Please note that filling out all the right forms correctly is not for the faint of heart. And finding out that you did it wrong only years later is painful and costly. Also calculate your costs before you do anything. Paying both parts for your health insurance for example can easily be up to 400€ a month more then a German employee at a German company, so run your numbers. You may be better off being officially self-employed or even incorporated. Just because it's legal, does not mean it's a good idea. Hire a professional to advise you on the economic and bureaucratic side of this.	The transaction you describe is a "taxable gift" to the extent that it exceeds $15,000 in fair market value (as of 2019) and that your significant other is not your U.S. citizen spouse now (special rules apply to non-U.S. citizen spouses and an unlimited amount of gifts can be made without being taxable to a spouse, including a same sex spouse). The first $15,000 of fair market value per donor per donee per year doesn't count, however (there is a $100,000 of fair market value per donor per donee exemption per year for gifts to non-citizen spouses, if a qualified domestic trust is not the true recipient of the gift). This means that the donor is required to report the gift on IRS Form 709 by April 15, of the year following the year in which the gift is made (or later if the donor files for an extension). But, each person is entitled to make up to $11,400,000 of tax free gifts (during life and at death combined) that would otherwise be taxable per lifetime, and this amount is indexed for inflation, so it goes up each year. So, in your situation, it is highly unlikely that any tax would actually be due in connection with your filing of Form 709, even though the donor is required to complete and file that form. In the event that both the annual and lifetime gift exclusions have been exceeded, the tax rate would be 40% of the fair market value of the gift (net of the mortgage debt to which the house is subject. For example, if the house were worth $40,000,000 and had a $10,000,000 mortgage and you were given a 50% interest in it, the amount of the taxable gift would be $14,985,000 of which at least $3,485,000 would be subject to a 40% gift tax, i.e. $1,394,000), if you didn't get married (the tax would be $1,360,000 if you were a non-citizen spouse of the donor). At one time there were some states with their own state gift taxes that had to be considered, but as of 2019, there are no such states. Also, upon a sale of the house, the donee would be subject to one half of the capital gain that the donor would otherwise have owed taxes upon (this is called a "carry over basis"). We paid with a loan from a family member which I helped to pay back. I also paid for work done on the home. This could arguably reduce the amount of the gift (which would ordinarily be valued at fair market value as of the date of the gift), but given the amount of the lifetime exclusion, that detail is probably irrelevant unless your home is a world class mansion or castle.	Given that this is a UK based company, the most applicable Act would be the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 A person who, not having reasonable cause to believe there is a right to payment, in the course of any trade or business makes a demand for payment, or asserts a present or prospective right to payment, for what he knows are unsolicited goods sent (after the commencement of this Act) to another person with a view to his acquiring them [for the purposes of his trade or business], shall be guilty of an offence and on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale. This law specifically refers to [unsolicited] charges for entries in directories. You also mentioned that they're misrepresenting that a company is already a customer and sending out invoices on that basis. That would be a breach of the Fraud Act 2006 A person is in breach of this section if he dishonestly makes a false representation As to their enforceability, that answer is no. If this came before an actual judge, the judge would throw it out in a heartbeat. No agreement was made to provide a service in return for a payment and these companies rely on sending threatening letters via (seeming) third-parties precisely because they wish to avoid that level of scrutiny.

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