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Why don't governments and private companies sue China for economic and life losses due to COVID-19 (corona virus)? We are witnessing the financial and personal repercussions of the spread of the corona virus that originated in Wuhan. It seems that the virus started spreading possibly as early as mid-November with the Chinese government trying to hide/downplay/minimize the issue at hand. Given the Chinese government failure to: Prevent the sale of raw animal meat and enforce the necessary sanitary measures to avoid human contact with raw meat. Allowing farming and selling of wild animals, which was than corrected later by issuing a law banning such sales, thus admitting the problem. Properly contain the spread in Wuhan by acknowledging the alarm calls of the local doctors and first signs that an unknown strain of corona virus was circulating. Is it possible for governments and private companies, I imagine only the most powerful ones, to sue the Chinese government to seek financial compensation for the damages occurred worlwide? I imagine that if a private company would accidentally leak a virus outside a lab, such company would be liable for all damages, why is a government not liable for any damage in this case? Can, theoretically, Chinese or citizens from other countries sue the Chinese government for the loss of loved ones?
The main problem is that there is no court with authority to hear this case outside of China. It may be futile to sue in US courts, since China will not enforce US judgments. You can sue a Chinese company in Chinese court, under their Civil Procedure Law, but this pertains to contract breach. The question is whether there is any law under which the government of China can be sued for negligence – it is unlikely that that is possible (perhaps there is an expert in Chinese law here who can address that issue). This lawsuit is filed in US courts. It is based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Supposing that this lawsuit is successful in US courts, then the question is what enforcement actions are possible. Since the defendants are various governments and government agencies in China, execution of the judgment would have to be against those defendants – you can't seize the assets of every person with some connection to China. But given the nature of the Chinese government, it is possible that US courts could find that the assets of Chinese companies are effectively government assets. The short answer is, in fact a lawsuit has been filed, and I expect more. I also don't expect them to succeed in the long run.
I am wondering if the government can still implement it and force people to pay even if the decision is challenged in court. Laws are not automatically put on hold because they are challenged. For an action or a law to be halted by the Court before a decision is made, the applicant would have to seek an interlocutory injunction, which are granted only if, as established in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, (i) is there a serious issue to be tried, (ii) will the party seeking the injunction suffer irreparable harm if it is not granted, and (iii) does the balance of convenience favour the party seeking the injunction. The first issue is rarely a problem, especially for a controversial issue like this. I am thinking the government might be able to tax people and then refund people if the court doesn't uphold the decision instead of a court challenge being able to postpone the tax indefinitely. A quantifiable financial harm is rarely irreparable (in private law cases). However there is an important exception for Charter cases where a financial harm is assumed to be irreparable because damages are often not awarded in constitutional cases. Though in this case it might be considered reparable because the quantification of damage and the method of redress are straightforward. For the third question, the Court needs to weigh both sides' interests in the case where the injunction is granted. Even if the damage is deemed irreparable, the Court may (or may not) still find the public interest in health outweighs the financial interests of the unvaccinated.
The lawyer referred to in that article is suing in his capacity as the recipient of spam emails under California's anti-spam law. Not every jurisdiction has a law like this. I'm from Australia. In Australia, when we make laws prohibiting something, the law usually appoints a government agency to administer the law and bring prosecutions under it, and fines are paid to the government. In contrast, America has a lot of these laws where affected individuals can sue and collect the fines personally. So under the Californian law, you can get $1,000 per email for particular kinds of spam even if you haven't actually suffered any real damage: California Business and Professions Code s 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii). How? You need to work out who sent the spam, get evidence to prove it, and file a claim in a Californian court. Apparently you can sue in small claims court, which saves you on filing fees. It helps if you have many email accounts, because then you will receive many emails and therefore can collect many fines. One of that lawyer's wins was in Balsam v Trancos (2012) in the Californian Court of Appeal. Another example of a judgment discussing the Californian anti-spam law is Bontrager v Showmark Media.
Bad people are quite uncommon Most people behave in good faith most of the time - don't tie yourself in knots over the very few people who would be unscrupulous enough to try to do this. Burden of proof The person who makes the allegation has the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. So the person who claims they didn't receive it has to prove that. If there are two equally credible witnesses, one saying they packed and posted the thing and one saying the thing was not packed then the burden has not been met. If the person who packed it has a photo of it packed and addressed then the other person has definitely not met their burden of proof. Insurance Insure it against loss or damage in transit. Then you can just replace it and claim on your insurance.
The issue is more likely that there is no law or regulation allowing the use of dogs to sniff passengers in the US for matters not related to crime, whereas Dubai, a monarchy, has a different political system. In general, you have the constitutional right to move about in the U and the right not to be unreasonably seized, a right which may not exist in some other jurisdictions. That right can be restricted in accordance with law, but there has to be some such law. It is not a crime to have covid, or to travel while infected (it is a crime to carry bombs and drugs on a plane). One area where there is some restriction is where there always has been a restriction, namely entry into the US. There is (was) covid screening at certain airports for flights from certain countries. This directive indicates the airport restrictions, but does not explain what screening will take place. The above DHS site says that "the passenger will be asked about their medical history, current condition, and asked for contact information for local health authorities. Passengers will then be given written guidance about COVID-19 and directed to their final destination, and immediately home-quarantine in accordance with CDC best practices". It is not clear whether a mandatory temperature check without even reasonable suspicion of a crime would constitute an unreasonable search (body searches are subject to higher standards than property searches, it seems), and constitutional law surrounding searches has emphasized the primacy of privacy in search law, not the fact of physically entering property of the body. Some airlines and airports offer voluntary temperature checking, so it might be possible if someone has a covid-sniffing dog to offer voluntary sniff testing, especially if it is offered by a private concern and does not have the appearance of government mandate (which would require a law).
If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts.
There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.
could a case be made for breach of fiduciary duty? Yes, I think, although not every person or stakeholder would have standing to sue the board of trustees of the private university. The prima facie elements of breach of fiduciary duty are "(i) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (ii) a knowing breach of that duty; and (iii) damages resulting therefrom", Johnson v. Nextel Communications, 660 F.3d 131, 138 (2011) (I am not aware of any material differences in other jurisdictions). Absent any explicit disclaimers of fiduciary duty, (1) the element of existence of that duty is applicable because the trustees' relation with the university is not one of arms length; (2) in their deliberate --rather than negligent-- decision to do business with their friends, the trustees are knowingly and intentionally disregarding the advice from economists of the university, despite the evidenced financial detriment of that deliberate decision; and (3) the element of damages would be proved from the expenses as billed by the firm, coupled with any losses the friends' subpar performance may be causing to the university.
Can my accountant bill me for previous work he agreed to perform for free? Context I can provide more context to the story (question), but I also want to keep it short. I have been paying my accountant for helping with my corporate taxes for the last 4 years in Toronto. I was paying for the corporate taxes about 30-40% higher above the average for the same work my colleagues are paying. In return, this firm has offered to file my personal taxes for free. Which did successfully happen three times previously. It was a gentlemen's agreement and I have no proof of this agreement in writing. At the same time, he naturally never invoiced me for this work either. Question This accountant has suddenly sent me an email saying I never paid for filing my personal taxes with him for the last 4 years. The invoice is asking to pay $350-600 + HST per filing. For myself + my wife. Our taxes were really simple with simple T4 forms, nothing fancy. In fact, I used to use TurboTax and it took me 30-50 minutes to file on my own. So the invoice total is about $1600+ for four previous years of personal taxes for myself and my wife. Can I legally ignore these invoices? It does not make any sense that he sends me invoices for work done 4 years ago. Would really appreciate any advice!
Can my accountant bill me for previous work he agreed to perform for free? No. The difficult part will be for you to prove that he agreed to do the job for free. Hence the importance of having this kind of "gentlemen's" agreements in writing. You have the burden of outweighing --even by means of circumstantial evidence-- the common presumption that professional work is done for compensation, not for free. However, just like it might be hard for you to prove the aforementioned "gentlemen's agreement", it would also be hard for him to prove that you agreed to (or knew, or should have known, you would have to) pay the amount he is billing now. In the event that you are unable to prove he agreed to work for free, you might want to dispute the reasonableness of the amounts he is pursuing so belatedly. It is noteworthy that the work at issue being "really simple" would not be the only factor for assessing how much he may recover. Other factors such as the accountant's qualifications or the market rate for similar services would be weighed in awarding recovery (if any). Can I legally ignore these invoices? It does not make any sense that he sends me invoices for work done 4 years ago. You may ignore the invoices regarding older work, that is, those for which the period of limitations has elapsed. For most cases, section 4 of the Ontario Limitations Act provides a two-year period to bring a claim. Since the accountant himself did the job, and most likely he was --or should have been-- aware of the payments due for his services, he would be unable to prove that his "discovery" of claims (see section 5 of Limitations Act) regarding older tax filings meets the period of limitations. Equivalently, see here the paragraph starting with "For example, if the courts determine that [...]".
Is It Legally Binding? While their customer service sucks, your oral authorization of the charge is legally binding (I take payments that way almost every day in my own business, it isn't an unusual business practice in small professional businesses). You authorize oral authorization of payments over the phone in the credit card agreement that your credit card company sends you every year that you don't read and throw away. The provider has to collect more information for a credit card payment over the phone than they do for an in person swipe in a credit card machine (e.g. your credit card billing address) and they are fully responsible for wrongful charges if they deal with an imposter. By regularly checking your credit card statements, you can confirm that no incorrect charges are present. Tax Issues If you want to take a tax deduction for non-reimbursed medical expenses, you simply need to tote up the amounts your are entitled to from your own records, and put it in the appropriate box on your tax forms. You don't have to attach documentation to your return. If the IRS disputes your payment, you can offer up your credit card statements and your photograph of the receipts, and if necessary, medical records to show that you received the services, to show that the payment really happened and are deductible. Your credit card company's records, reflected in your monthly credit card statements, are considered very reliable for tax purposes. You have the burden of proving that the expense was incurred and is of a type that qualifies for a deduction by a preponderance of the evidence in the event that there is a dispute that is litigated, which means that you must show that it is more likely than not that you incurred a deductible expense of that kind in that amount in that tax year. Privacy Issues While there are financial information privacy issues associated with this transaction, HIPAA, which covers medical records, normally wouldn't apply to a credit card payment that indicates the person paid, the person paying, the account, the amount and the date, but not a description of the medical services provided or to whom they were provided, which is what is normally on a credit card receipt. The financial privacy issues are also partially addressed by the provider's merchant agreement with the credit card company which contains terms requiring them to maintain certain kinds of security with respect to your financial information (which is not to say that the provider actually follows all of the requirements of their merchant agreement scrupulously, which is why data breaches happen all the time in businesses both large and small).
It looks like the gym was allowed to take the money out of your bank account and didn't. They didn't notice that they didn't take your money, so they can't really expect you to notice it. So you haven't done anything that would be criminal. The bigger question is how much you owe them. If you used the gym all the time, like someone paying monthly would do, they will most likely have the right to payment. That's not unlimited, there will be some "statute of limitations" so they can't ask you for 30 years back payments, but with less than two years they probably have a right. If they raised prices, it's unlikely the would have a right to that because they never told you. The situation while your subscription was frozen is interesting. Basically you just walked in, used the gym without paying, but they didn't stop you in any way. I could walk into your gym, ask if it is Ok to use it, and if they say "yes" and don't mention payment, I'm in. So for this time you can argue whether or not you owe them money. Summary: You haven't done anything criminal. You most likely owe them money. About the money, they can take you to court if you don't pay which will cost both sides money. Since you did use their service and other users did pay, the morally right thing would be to pay what seems fair to you, possibly with some negotiation. And legally, you might consider paying them enough to make both sides happy enough so you can stay a gym member and don't get sued for the money.
I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.
It is likely that you don't owe any taxes even though you have worked for many years in Brazil. Earned income that is earned outside the U.S. by natural persons who are U.S. citizens (as oppose to entities like corporations) up to a certain amount that is indexed for inflation is excluded from taxation under Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code. The cut off is $104,100 U.S. per year in 2018 (about 347,000 Brazilian Reals per year). Also, unearned income and any excess earned income can benefit from the standard deduction and personal exemption from U.S. income taxation unburdened by your foreign earned income up to the threshold. This can be quite substantial. Similarly, if you have children, they would benefit from the child tax credit which would reduce your income tax obligation. And, any U.S. federal income tax due on your unearned income to the extent that it exceeds the standard deduction and personal exemption from U.S. income taxation is reduced by any Brazilian taxes you paid on your Brazilian income as a result of the foreign tax credit. The bottom line is that unless you are very affluent and have significant unearned income, it is unlikely that you owe any U.S. income taxes. Even if you do owe U.S. taxes after these considerations, they wouldn't arrest you. You have to be "willfully" violating U.S. tax laws for it to be a criminal offense and this is one small corner of the law where ignorance of the law is an excuse. And, the Internal Revenue Service would first have to send you several notices by mail setting forth the amount that they think that you owe, allowing you to dispute that amount, and the declaring that you owe it, before you have a potentially criminal tax violation that is well defined enough and communicated to you well enough that you can willfully fail to file a tax return or can willfully fail to pay. So no, they will not arrest you and make you pay, at least not until they send you lots of notices which you ignore. On the other hand, if you do owe any U.S. income taxes there is no statute of limitations on collecting those taxes for years in which you were required by U.S. tax law to file a tax return but did not (basically, years in which you owed U.S. taxes). So, if you, for example, won a big lump sum payment playing the lottery when you were 20 years old and owed U.S. income taxes as a result (even though you didn't know it), those taxes could still be collected by the IRS when you are 40 years old since you did not file any U.S. tax return for the year in which you had taxable U.S. income. Finally, under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 enacted in December last year, U.S. taxation of the foreign income of U.S. persons was reformed in the most significant way in the last seventy years or so, and the taxation of U.S. persons on foreign source income is greatly curtailed for 2018 going forward. This is not retroactive, but could mean that as you come into your higher income earning years in middle age, that the taxation of U.S. citizens on their worldwide income is no longer a serious concern for you, even if it would have been under U.S. tax law before then. Enforcing laws that have since been repealed is also rarely an administrative priority for the IRS. It is also hard (to the point of being economically not worth it) to enforce U.S. tax laws against someone who has no U.S. assets. It is also possible that even though you were a dual citizen at birth, that you could have taken an act (e.g. voluntarily serving as an officer in the Brazilian military) that could cause you to lose your U.S. citizenship. So, even if you were a U.S. citizen at birth, it is not 100% certain that you are a U.S. citizen now.
It is rather unclear what the facts are, and the legal answer would depend crucially on those facts. My understanding is that you bought a domain from a provider, and they allowed you to use a web server for some period. It also appears that you don't have a clear understanding of the contract, which may have been made online and you might not have retained a copy of the agreement (which would allow you to look at the terms). The assumption that failing to pay substitutes for explicitly cancelling a service is incorrect. If under the contract you agree to pay a certain amount per year, then you have been racking up charges for some time, and you would need to actually cancel. Ultimately, they could take you to court to force you to pay what you owe, although usually there are less drastic intermediate steps. In court, they would produce their documents to show that you owe money, and your attorney would somehow counter, perhaps by alleging that you had a good-faith belief that the contract had been terminated. It is possible that they simply messed up and failed to send you an invoice earlier, which could explain the lack of invoice. At any rate, the fact that you haven't gotten an invoice does not legally entitle you to avoid paying for the service, whether or not you use it. On the premise that they haven't taken back the domain (seems like they didn't), you can legally use it. However, if you do use it, then that would trash any claim that you believed the contract had been terminated (to argue "I thought it had been canceled" entails "and thus I didn't use the service").
As I understand it, they are required to give notice of an intent to levy. Publication 594 gives their version of what they can do, and how. If you don't want to pay what they claim you owe, you can request a Collection Due Process hearing which means Form 12153. You may receive a CP504 Notice, which seems to be one of two "final notices": it is actually final w.r.t. levying state tax refunds, and is penultimate otherwise. Their page on levying mentions a crucial last stem of sending you a Final Notice of Intent to Levy, which is required according to IRC sections 6330 and 6331 which derives from 26 USC 6330 (most of the notice requirement) and 26 USC 6331. If you get notice CP90 which I think is called Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, then, dude, you've been served. There is in fact additional process that they have to do before actually taking, but that as far as I know, is the last part involving notification. Take note of the US Code parts, 26 USC 6330, 6331, because unlike IRS advertising, the US Code states what the law is.
As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine.
How can the date for the 2020 US census legally be changed? The next US census is scheduled for 2020-04-01. In light of the recent COVID-19 pandemic it might become necessary to delay this. How can this legally be done (since the census is required by the constitution)?
The date of the census is not specified in the US constitution. It only says The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. There is no requirement that "ten years" be interpreted precisely to the day. The date is fixed by statute at 13 USC 141(a): The Secretary shall, in the year 1980 and every 10 years thereafter, take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April of such year.... This requires that the census seek data describing the population on April 1, 2020. It does not require that census workers actually visit people on that day. They could conceivably do it in mid August, for example, or at any other time. Of course, that would probably reduce the reliability of the census. Congress could pass a law moving the census date to another later date if they wanted to get a more accurate count of the population on that date instead of a less accurate count of the population on the first of April. In fact, when I got home later in the day after writing this answer, there was a letter from the census bureau inviting me to submit my census survey through the internet. I did that a few minutes ago, so if I die in the next two weeks, the census will be off by one. The letter I got says that if I don't fill out the survey online, they'll send me a paper questionnaire. If I don't fill that out, someone will come to visit. The prospect of that happening on April 1st seems quite remote.
So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.
The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.
Final Result: The 117th Congress did actually meet and swear in on a Sunday, January 3, 2021. Per the other answer by @NateEldredge, this was the first Sunday swearing in for at least several decades. December Update: There still does not appear to be a bill to change the date of convening the 117th Congress. However, an entry in the Congressional Record for December 20, 2020 states this: Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, today is Sunday, and I want to remember what Senator Byrd said on a lot of Sundays when the Senate was in session. He didn't say this because he didn't want to work on Sunday, but he wanted everybody to remember the significance of Sunday for some people, particularly Christians. He always said: ``Remember the Sabbath and keep it holy.'' Now, I want to refer to another particular Sunday. Never in the Senate's history has the Senate convened Congress -- meaning a new Congress -- on a Sunday. The Constitution mandates that Congress convene at noon on January 3, unless the preceding Congress, by law, designates a different day. Of course, January 3 has fallen on a Sunday over the last 238 years, and each time, by unanimous consent, the Congress set a new convening day other than that Sunday. So now it appears, for the first time in history, that Senate Democrats don't want to agree to such unanimous consent and instead are insisting that the Senate start the 117th Congress on Sunday. I am not looking to get out of work. I have proven that I have respect for attendance in the Senate. But out of respect, the Senate usually does not have business on religious holidays observed by members of various faiths. So just like Senator Byrd, I also think the Lord's Day, particularly when it is paired with the weight of starting a new Congress, deserves reverence. I yield. If Senator Grassley is correct, then all previous Congresses never allowed the convening date to fall on a Sunday. Although there do not appear to be any bills formally introduced yet for the convening of the 117th Congress, his remarks above suggest that there has at least been discussion of the issue, and he accuses Senate Democrats of preventing the change of date.
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).
I don't know where you looked, but the Housing Act 2004 on legislation.gov.uk is up to date according to its header: [the] Housing Act 2004 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 12 January 2023. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Sections 212 to 215 fall within Part 6, Chapter 4 of the Act. With hindsight, you may be looking at an earlier version. So for awareness, if the entry's header is: green, then it is up to date. Any provisional amendments (i.e. yet to be enacted) there might be can be found using the "view outstanding changes" drop down option if there is one. red, then there are changes yet to be made which can be found via the "view outstanding changes" drop down option. blue, it's either the original version that has not had any amendments, or it's an earlier version that can be navigated to/from by selecting the the tick box "show timeline of changes" and the sliding calendar above the header.
The UK remains an EU member state until 31st October 2019. Unless a further extension is requested and granted. (One is obligated to be requested if an agreement is not reached by the 19th Oct) At the time of writing, there have been no changes to identity document requirements for EEA (includes EU) or Swiss citizens visiting the UK - they can enter the UK with a valid passport or a national identity card issued by such a state. We don't know today whether that will change after March 2019.
tl;dr: Precedent takes effect on the decision date. You didn't list a jurisdiction, so I'll give a U.S. example. In Citizens United v. FEC (U.S. 2010), there are three dates listed in the header: Argued March 24, 2009 Reargued September 9, 2009 Decided January 21, 2010 Precedent attaches to a decision date. That's also why we see 2010 in the case citation above. However, it's important to note that not all precedent is binding. A decision made in the 7th Circuit isn't binding on a district court in the 2d Circuit, and vice versa. As to the impact on cases in progress, the party that is more favorably impacted by the change can bring it to the judge's attention. The outcome will depend on the a) whether the decision is relevant, b) whether the decision is binding, and c) how far along the case at bar happens to be. Note: most U.S. cases never go to trial. It is (relatively) lower stakes to incorporate new legal theories in the pleading or discovery stage.
Can a thief legally use force to prevent you from take your property back, in Germany In this comment on another stack a user claims: Even in thoroughly socialist places such as e.g. Germany where criminals have more rights than lawful people (see e.g. BGB 858 and 859 which not only say that you (the owner) aren't allowed to take back your property from a "possessor" (thief) against the thief's will, but the thief is even entitled to use physical force against you) I found this hard to believe so I checked the mentioned paragraph § 859 BGB online. Section 2 states: Wird eine bewegliche Sache dem Besitzer mittels verbotener Eigenmacht weggenommen, so darf er sie dem auf frischer Tat betroffenen oder verfolgten Täter mit Gewalt wieder abnehmen. (I used google tranlate for this because I lack the vocabulary to translate a juristic text) If a movable thing is taken away from the possessor by means of a unlawful interference of one's own, then he may forcibly remove it from the perpetrator who has been affected or persecuted in the act. However § 858 BGB says in section 2: Der durch verbotene Eigenmacht erlangte Besitz ist fehlerhaft. Die Fehlerhaftigkeit muss der Nachfolger im Besitz gegen sich gelten lassen, wenn er Erbe des Besitzers ist oder die Fehlerhaftigkeit des Besitzes seines Vorgängers bei dem Erwerb kennt. The possession obtained by unlawful interference is faulty. The defective property must be held against the successor in possession, if he is the heir of the owner or knows the defectiveness of the possession of his predecessor in the acquisition. I say because an object came into a persons possession by unlawful interference, § 859 BGB does not apply to that person because it only applies when the possession is not faulty. So it grants me as the lawful owner to get my things back by force, if necessary but does not grant the same right to the thief although he is technically the new owner of the object. However the user claimed in another comment Besitzer is the one who is currently holding the item in his hands (so ,e.g. a thief coming out of your house), and this is orthogonal to being the legitimate owner. And yes, the law thus explicitly allows the thief (who then is the Besitzer) to exercise force against you, if you try to reclaim your stolen goods. Which is just what I said So the user is interpreting it as it doesn't matter how you got in possession of an object, the only thing that matters is that you have it right now and therefore § 859 BGB does apply to you too. To me his interpretation does not make much sense. Especially because it would allow people to steal from each other in an endless loop. However maybe I'm just missing something important here. I'm a laymen when it comes to law, so maybe I'm just not getting it.
The Law The relevant sections of the German Civil Code (BGB) for posession and protection of posession of movable things (not land) are (semi-official translation): Section 858 Unlawful interference with possession (1) A person who, against the will of the possessor, deprives the possessor of possession or interferes with the possessor’s possession acts, except where the deprivation or the interference is permitted by law, unlawfully (unlawful interference with possession). Section 859 Self-help by the possessor (1) The possessor may use force to defend himself against unlawful interference. (2) If a movable thing is taken away from the possessor by unlawful interference, the possessor may use force to remove it from the interferer who is caught in the act or pursued. The posessor (Besitzer) is the one who has the actual control of the thing (§ 854 I BGB), e.g. holds it in his/her hand. (There are also some more complex forms of posession, but they are not relevant here.) Ownership (Eigentum) is totally seperated of that. Often the owner posseses the thing, but also often the possessor is not the owner, but e.g. a tenant. If someone (e.g. a thief) takes away a thing from the posessor, the one acts in unlawful interference with possession (verbotene Eigenmacht, § 858 I BGB). While the thief tries to take the thing away, the posessor may use force to defend himself, § 859 I BGB. After the thief obtained actual control he/she is the new posessor. The old posessor ends to be the posessor. This only reflects on the factual situation, not on legitimacy. The old posessor now may use force to get the thing back from the new posessor (thief), if the thief is caught in the act or pursued, § 859 II BGB. It is controversial which time frame this implies. There is at least one judgement that accepts the discovery after 30 min. If the old posessor gets the (posession of the) thing back through force, he/she does not act in unlawful interference with possession, because it is explicitly allowed in § 859 II BGB. So the thief is not allowed to "steal back" although he/she was posessor (for a short time). If the old posessor acts too late, the new posessor has the full defense rights against force of the old posessor. The old posessor has to begin judical action. He/she has a right of restitution, § 861 BGB. Reasons One of the most important principles of (German) civil law is the Monopoly on violence of the state (Gewaltmonopol des Staates). Normaly only the state is allowed to use physical force (for the enforcement of the law). Only in special cases, e.g. a clear situation or the necessity of immediate action, the affected is allowed to use force for defense. In all other cases he/she has to go to court and in the end let the state use force for him/her. After a theft there are two people claiming to be the legitime posessor and one who has the thing. No one knows (without further investigation) who is right. So everything should stay as it is until a court decides. If a thief is caught in the act or pursued, the situation is much more clear. So the old posessor may use force and has not to wait for a court. If the thougth thief is the legitime posessor, this may be clarified by the courts afterwards. source: Hanns Prütting: Sachenrecht, 2017, § 13 Every German law student learns this in his second year. So there is plenty of teaching literature (and probably websites) on this topic.
In Germany, there is no statutory offense of “breaking in”. Instead, break-ins are (depending on the nature of the crime) prosecuted as trespassing (Hausfriedensbruch, § 123 StGB), criminal damage (Sachbeschädigung, § 303 StGB) and/or theft (Diebstahl, § 242 StGB). (Some cases may fit additonal statutory offenses, e. g. tampering with an electronic lock can be computer fraud (Computerbetrug, § 263a StGB) and hurting someone can be robbery (Raub, § 249 StGB) and/or personal injury (Körperverletzung, § 223 StGB).) This means: If your brother breaks the lock, then that's vandalism. If your brother walks in (without authorization), it's trespassing and if your brother steals your stuff, it's stealing. On top of that, since your brother is living in the same household as you, breaking into your room may also be considered domestic violence. The violence protection act (Gewaltschutzgesetz) is very harsh when it comes to domestic violence: The offender can be ordered by court to hand over their home to the victim and to stay away from the home. This means that if your brother breaks into your room, your brother may be removed from the house by court order. Non-compliance with a court order issued under the Gewaltschutzgesetz (e. g. your brother tries to show up at your house after he was ordered to stay away), can be prosecuted under civil and(!) penal law. You can read the English translation of the German penal code (STrafgesetzbuch, StGB) here (although I prefer to use German because all translations at gesetze-im-internet.de tend to be low quality): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html And the Violence protection act is here (unfortunately untranslated): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gewschg/BJNR351310001.html
The most minimal elements of theft are: An unauthorised taking or use of another's property; and An intent to permanently deprive that person of that property or its use You've authorised the fee as per the terms of service that you agreed to. If you didn't read the terms of service, you are deemed to have read it. As the first element is not satisifed, no, it's not theft. As to what that fee is for, it's not really a question of law, but because they're a business and they are entitled to recover the costs of providing products or services and make a profit when you use their products or services, I fairly confidently would say that they're charging you to recover the costs of providing you their products and services as well as to make a profit from your use of their products and services. But again, not a question of law.
We are talking about larceny and larceny & destruction of property in the two cases. So at the minimum, there are more laws that apply. But what are the laws? Florida names its Larceny statute... Theft: 812.014 Theft.— (1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. Destroying someone's else property in Florida is in the statute on Criminal Mischief: 806.13 Criminal mischief; penalties; penalty for minor.— (1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he or she willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another, including, but not limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon or other acts of vandalism thereto. So, yes, you would additionally get the criminal mischief charge, but... that only grants monetary damages of 250 USD plus the damages done to the items for first timers, but it can become upgraded to a felony in the third degree - which has a maximum limit of 5 years. Note that damaging items in the course of theft is specifically an aggravating factor for the theft charge, if grand theft is combined with property damage of 1000 USD and more. A bicycle costing between 750 and 5000 USD is grand theft, felony in the third degree according to 812.014.(2)(c)1. This is also the 5 years limit. One could get both sentences... but still only sit 5 years, because often sentences are served concurrently, only rarely consecutively. So, no, you do not necessarily commit a higher offense just for breaking the lock - you'd need to have a 1000 USD damage for that - but you most certainly commit additional offenses that can result in a higher verdict in the end.
I do not know the particular legal environment in France, but in general the shop is private property and the owner decides who may enter and who may not. You have no right as such to enter somebody else's property against their will. Doing so would at least be classified as trespassing, possibly more serious considering you mention using force to enter the premise.
The technical difference is that theft is illegal, and adverse possession is not. I'm assuming you're talking about why there's a difference. Historically, there are two basic reasons for adverse possession. First, land lasts for a very long time, and a sale is generally invalid unless the seller has valid title. That means that no property title is secure, because someone could always come out of the woodwork with a claim that your great-great-great-grandfather threw their great-great-great-grandfather off the land 300 years ago. Not only is all land title insecure, but you might not even be able to defend such a claim (do you know the history of your land for the past 300 years?) Adverse possession, then, is a way to let people know no one else can claim title to their land based on something so long ago no one remembers properly. Even with modern public land registries (which did not always exist), this situation can still arise if someone mistakenly believes that they own some land and starts using it. The second reason is that if someone isn't doing anything with the land for a long time, and someone else is doing something useful with it, the government would rather give it to the person doing something useful. People who lose property through adverse possession are unwilling to take the extremely minor steps needed to keep their property. It tends to move land from totally nonproductive users to productive users, and then keeps those nonproductive users from kicking out people who improved the land and keeping the improvements. The notion that leaving something for too long removes your right to claim it is not restricted to real estate. Almost everything in law has a time limit of some sort.
Law Enforcement can return a firearm to its owner so long as the owner is not prohibited from possessing firearms, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A person can demand the return of property seized as evidence, if both: The property is not needed for evidence in a criminal trial. The property is not "contraband" (meaning illegal for the claimant to possess). If Law Enforcement does not agree to return the property then the owner can petition a Court of jurisdiction for an order that it be returned.
According to regulation 373/1974 § 4(4) (which I presume is still in force due being amended in 2020), confiscated items must be returned by the end of Unterricht (unsure of exact translation, either end of class or school day): Gegenstände, die die Sicherheit gefährden oder den Schulbetrieb stören, dürfen vom Schüler nicht mitgebracht werden. Derartige Gegenstände sind dem Lehrer auf Verlangen zu übergeben. Abgenommene Gegenstände sind nach Beendigung des Unterrichtes bzw. der Schulveranstaltung oder der schulbezogenen Veranstaltung dem Schüler zurückzugeben, sofern es sich nicht um sicherheitsgefährdende Gegenstände handelt. Sicherheitsgefährdende Gegenstände dürfen nur dem Erziehungsberechtigten – sofern der Schüler volljährig ist, diesem – ausgefolgt werden, wenn deren Besitz nicht sonstigen Rechtsvorschriften widerspricht. This translates to (translation by @MechMK1): Objects, which are a threat to safety or disturb the school proceedings, may not be brought along by the student. Such objects have to be handed over to the teacher upon request. Such taken objects have to be returned after the end of the end of the lesson or the course, or the school-related event, as long as the object is not a threat to safety. Objects which are a threat to safety must only be handed over to the parents or legal guardians - or, if the student is of age, the student - if the ownership of said object is not unlawful. Thanks to Vienna lawyer Dr. Johannes Öhlböck who wrote an article pointing me to the regulation. I'm not fluent in German and I can't find an explicit definition of Unterricht in the associated laws. Google currently translates it as lesson, but Duden has a broader definition close to "scheduled, regular instruction by a teacher" and the Vienna city website claims cell phones can kept until end of day. Interestingly during research I found a Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile) article stating that in 2017, a Berlin administrative court allowed confiscation of a cell phone through a weekend.
Is opening a blog, publishing technological/educational content on it and earning money via blogger earning methods like AdSense legal? I am planning to open a blog website and publish technology-based educational content as articles in Turkish language on it. Topics I'll cover are Microsoft and Linux system administration, cyber security, software, hardware, web, mobile, desktop applications with their usage and much more things like this. More clearly, for example, I'll post: What is Active Directory and How to Install it on Windows version x.x.x? How to Configure DNS Server on Ubuntu? What should be considered for cyber security? What are social engineering methods and how to implement them? How to run JavaScript code in C# App? (or it can be complete JavaScript tutorial) What are the differences between USB 2.0 and 3.0? How to change desktop wallpaper on Windows 10? How to change screen brightness on IOS version x.x.x? How to use TeamViewer? As you guess, for all of these, I need tons of programs, software, tools like VMware, virtual machines like Kali Linux, Ubuntu, Windows Server 2012 or 2016, Windows 8 or 10 and screenshots. I am planning to use trial, free or non-commercial version of these for preparing my content. My future plan is adding English articles and video contents to my blog. However, I don't know using the tools, software and programs the way I mentioned with making money purpose is legal. Any advice would be great.
Legal unless you violate copyright. Screenshots will probably be fair use. The manuals/how-tos need to be your originals, not copies from anywhere.
The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.
Apparently Such Files May be Distributes or Sold Section 5.e of the Google APIs Terms of Service reads: e. Prohibitions on Content Unless expressly permitted by the content owner or by applicable law, you will not, and will not permit your end users or others acting on your behalf to, do the following with content returned from the APIs: Scrape, build databases, or otherwise create permanent copies of such content, or keep cached copies longer than permitted by the cache header; Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of, sell, lease, lend, convey, distribute, publicly display, or sublicense to any third party; Misrepresent the source or ownership; or Remove, obscure, or alter any copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights notices; or falsify or delete any author attributions, legal notices, or other labels of the origin or source of material It might seem that 5.e.2 prohibits the suggested use. But if the text is in fact in the public domain,"applicable law" (that is, copyright law) permits you, or anyone, to "Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of" or otherwise use the content. Thus 5.e.2 does not apply. Points 3 and 4 would seem to indicate that the source, including title and author information, must be included or preserved in the output files, but seems to be the only relevant restriction that applies. Response to Comment A comment by user Brian Drake questions the theory of this answer, stating: The most you can say is that copyright law does not prohibit certain conduct (and even that is not clear: just because the text is in the public domain does not necessarily mean that the audio is in the public domain); this does not mean that copyright law expressly permits that conduct. US Copyright law does not define what constitutes the public domain. Rather it defines what is protected by copyright, and specifies some cases in whch a work is not protected. (For nexample, 17 USC 105 provides tht works of the US Federal Government are not protected.) Anything not included in the protection of copyright is in the public domain. This has been confirmed by many cour cases and legal writings. Law generally follows the rule "Anything not forbidden is allowed." Audio as Derivitive Work An audio recording of a person reading a text aloud would be a derivative work of that text, and would normally have its own copyright, if created lawfully. (If the recording was of a text protected by copyright, made without permission and outside of fair use, it was not made lawfully and the infringer has no copyright in the recording at all.) But US courts have held that a work created by a mechanical or automatic process, including many computer programs, is not an "original work of authorship" and thus is not protected by copyright at all, and is thus in the Public Domain. The case of the "Monkey Selfie" is on point. ("Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, § 313.2" (PDF). United States Copyright Office. 22 December 2014. p. 22. "To qualify as a work of 'authorship' a work must be created by a human being.... Works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. The Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants." Moreover, if the audio were protected by copyright, it would presumably be owned by the person who ran the program, and 17 USC 106 specifically grants the copyright owner permission to distribute copies. Sources The Wikipedia article "Public Domain" reads in relevant part (citations omitted): The public domain consists of all the creative work to which no exclusive intellectual property rights apply. Those rights may have expired,[1] been forfeited, expressly waived, or may be inapplicable. ... As rights vary by country and jurisdiction, a work may be subject to rights in one country and be in the public domain in another. Some rights depend on registrations on a country-by-country basis, and the absence of registration in a particular country, if required, gives rise to public-domain status for a work in that country. ... Definitions of the boundaries of the public domain in relation to copyright, or intellectual property more generally, regard the public domain as a negative space; that is, it consists of works that are no longer in copyright term or were never protected by copyright law. According to James Boyle this definition underlines common usage of the term public domain and equates the public domain to public property and works in copyright to private property. However, the usage of the term public domain can be more granular, including for example uses of works in copyright permitted by copyright exceptions. Such a definition regards work in copyright as private property subject to fair-use rights and limitation on ownership *"How Can I Use Copyright-Free Works (in the Public Domain)?" by Nolo Press reads: Copyright law gives creators certain exclusive rights. These rights include the exclusive ability to copy, distribute, and perform the copyrighted work. But copyright is not infinite. Rather, it provides copyright holders with protections for a limited duration. When a work becomes available for use without permission from a copyright owner, it is said to be "in the public domain." Most works enter the public domain because their copyrights have expired. The Legal Information Institute (LII) article "public domain" reads: The public domain includes every creative work that is no longer protected by a copyright, trademark, or patent. Creative works that are no longer protected are owned by the general public rather than the original creator. As such, the work is free to be copied, performed, or otherwise used by anyone. "Copyright and Scholarship: Public Domain" from Boston College Libraries reads in relevant part: "Public domain" works are not protected by copyright. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. An important caveat regarding public domain material is that collections, new editions, and derivative works of public domain material may all be protected by copyright. With collections, an author could collect public domain works in a book or display them on a website, and the collection as a whole could be protected by copyright, even though individual works within it are not. *"Welcome to the Public Domain" (Stanford libraries) reads in relevant part: The term “public domain” refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. Wikipedia article "Monkey selfie copyright dispute" *"A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos" (AP) reads in relevant part: A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos, a federal judge said Wednesday. U.S. District Judge William Orrick said in federal court in San Francisco that "while Congress and the president can extend the protection of law to animals as well as humans, there is no indication that they did so in the Copyright Act." *NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, People forthe Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., v. DAVID JOHN SLATER; BLURB, INC., ; WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD." (Ninth Circuit full opinion April 23, 2018 No. 16-15469, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04324-WHO) reads in part: We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court
Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough.
First, when using profiling third party services (Analytics is "profiling" as defined by the GDPR), your main concern is not such a trivial thing as cookie compliance, but the security of processing I've analyzed Google's IP anonymization in some detail (as part of the DPIA I do for clients). My conclusion is that for most of the web-sites we manage, Google's IP anonymization is adequate to ensure security of processing as required by the DPIA process. However, on some sites that are likely to visited by users interested in what the GDPR calls "special categories of personal data" (Article 9), we either do not use Google Analytics, or we add additional layers of security in case the USA Government orders Google to disregard the stipulations in the DPA and hand over the data (yes, the US Government can legally do that - read the fine print in the Privacy Shield accord). As for Facebook Analytics, I think you've simply misunderstood their policy. Nowhere in that policy document does Facebook say that they "are not collecting Personal Identifiable Information". AFAIK, they collect tons of it, in all sorts of obnoxious and sneaky ways. What they actually say about PII in the context of Analytics is this: We do not share information that personally identifies you (personally identifiable information is information like name or email address that can by itself be used to contact you or identifies who you are) with advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless you give us permission. Let me remind you that one of their "analytics partners" was Cambridge Analytica, so if this promise not to share is true, it looks like a pretty new policy. OK, moving on to cookie compliance. To you (the controller), both Google and Facebook are processors. Given the history of the NSA and the methods it have used and AFAIK still use to get US-based companies to hand over the personal data about Europeans through orders issued by secret FISA courts, plus the fact that total nutcases currently are in charge in the USA, I am not going to rely on the privacy policy of any US-company for protection of personal data. So if I make use of Google Analytics (and I often do, they provide a great service), I always make sure that my users opt-in on that (hard cookie concent), even I make use of their IP anonymization feature (YMMV). As for Facebook, the fact that they promise not to share PII with third parties is irrelevant because they collect personal data. You will always need consent from your users to hand over their PII to Facebook in the first place. This is not optional. PS: If was a user, that consent would never been granted, no matter how great or valuable your site might be. If you have any sort of relationship with Facebook, I'll give you my personal data when you pry it from my cold, dead hands.
There are multiple issues with what you are trying to do, including issues with copyright, personality rights, and data protection. You are trying to use other people's content and likeness for your advertisement. Unless you are certain that you can do this in your relevant jurisdictions, without their consent, this sounds like a very bad idea. At least under GDPR, “but they made it public” is not an excuse. Personal data is personal data regardless of how you acquire it. The GDPR also has a very broad concept of identifiability that goes beyond direct identifiers or PII. If you want to use other people's personal data, you need a legal basis, and must provide them notice about your processing. Consent (informed opt-in) is one legal basis, legitimate interest (opt-out) another. You are suggesting to avoid this by blurring PII, but you may also have to blur other content that is indirectly identifiable. Real anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is a really hard problem. In some cases, a legitimate interest is able to avoid such problems. E.g. if I make a video with commentary about a Tweet, it would likely be OK to show surrounding personal data like the responses including the identities of the various accounts, to the degree that this is relevant to the commentary and/or necessary for proper attribution. However, that commentary likely has strong protections under freedom of expression. At least from an European viewpoint, a tutorial, demo, or advertisement would not have a freedom of expression argument that would shift a GDPR legitimate interest balancing test in your favour. Instead of blurring almost everything in your video or working on GDPR compliance, content licenses, and release forms, you should consider a different solution: create dummy content just for your videos. You can use your own content, and maybe add a dummy profile.
It could be. Accessing any web page is subject to whatever the terms of use are for the page, and if those terms state that the page may only be accessed from within the US, then accessing the page from outside the US is a violation of the TOS (hence use is infringing): see 2.4(h) of the Netflix EULA. There are EU rules that override such terms, within the EU. The usual way to circumvent technological location-restrictions (where the web page says "I'm sorry, I can't let you do that") is to use a VPN and pretend to be somewhere else. Use of a VPN is not per se illegal in most countries (there are exceptions), but using it to circumvent geo-blocking may be. Again returning to the point that the TOS may itself say "No you may not", the interesting question is what to conclude if there is no such statement, for example I did not see anything in the PBS TOS that restricts access to the US (I didn't look very deeply). Terms of service can't be secret: you can't be held to following rules that you cannot reasonably know of. If you attempt to access a page that uses un-announced geo-blocking technology and it informs you that you can't use the page because of your location, then you have effectively been put on notice that there is a rule. If you happen to be using a VPN and access an un-announced, (reasonably) undetectable geo-blocked site, that would not be a breach of the terms (because you have not been put on notice that location is a term of use).
Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely.
Can a landlord refuse to give a receipt for rent payment? Is it legal for a business to refuse to give you a receipt when you pay them? For example a property management company refused to give someone a receipt for rent because they had not yet signed a lease but they have been living there and have paid rent (which the property management company accepted). Also, if a person initially doesn't ask for a receipt, and comes back later, can they say it's too late to give them the receipt?
I am an Ontario-licensed lawyer. The following is a general information about the law and not specific legal advice. You are not my client and I have not given you advice related to your circumstances. First, even when you ask a generic question, define the jurisdiction of interest. For the purpose of your question, Canada is a collection of different jurisdictions with different rules. My answer relates to Ontario, Canada. Other Canadian jurisdictions have different rules. The Law The applicable Section 109 of Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act http://canlii.ca/t/33p is reproduced below for your convenience. EMPHASES MINE. Receipt for payment 109 (1) A landlord shall provide FREE OF CHARGE to a tenant or former tenant, on request, a receipt for the payment of any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent or any other amount paid to the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (1). Former tenant (2) Subsection (1) applies to a request by a FORMER TENANT only if the request is made within 12 months after the tenancy terminated. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (2). Regulation Ontario Regulation 516/06 http://canlii.ca/t/sjx dictates minimal form: Receipt A document constitutes a receipt for the purposes of section 109 of the Act if it includes, at a minimum, (a) the address of the rental unit to which the receipt applies; (b) the name of the tenants to whom the receipt applies; (c) the amount and date for each payment received for any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent, or any other amount paid to the landlord and shall specify what the payment was for; (d) the name of the landlord of the rental unit; and (e) the signature of the landlord or the landlord’s authorized agent. O. Reg. 516/06, s. 9. Landlord Compliance A good landlord will provide receipts immediately upon payment, and keep a copy. An very good landlord will provide additionally a summary of payments for the year, in tabulated form, and keep a copy of the yearly receipt instead of the multiple receipts for each payment. An excellent landlord will keep the tabulated information in a computer system and will issue a receipt for the whole tenancy period on termination. Keep a copy. Tenant's Application If your Ontario landlord refuse to comply with the above, file a T2 http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Tenant%20Applications%20&%20Instructions/T2.pdf *A T2 can also be filed online. Remember to ask for cost http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/03%20-%20Costs.html
With that much potentially at stake, you might want to discuss this with a lawyer. many lawyers will do an initial consultation for free or a low charge. However, you could simply write a letter saying that you do not agree that you owe the money and that you dispute the charge. You may give any reasons why you think you are not liable. It might be a good idea to add that there may be other reasons as well, so you do not foreclose any possible legal arguments that you may learn of later. Send the letter by certified mail, return receipt, and keep a copy with a note of the date that you sent it. It is not a bad idea to get the certified mail form first and include the certified item number as part of the inside address in the letter. Keep the copy, and keep the receipt with it when you get it. It is not a bad idea to send a copy by email, noting that it is a copy of a certified letter. This will put a record of the date and time it was sent in the email service provider's records. Normally it is up to the person who claims another owes money to file suit. If your former landlord takes no action, you need do nothing. However it is a good idea to check your credit reports and see if this was reported as a bad debt. if it is, you can file a statement of dispute with the credit bureaus. If there is any further correspondence on the matter, be sure it is in writing, and that you keep a copy. If you are called on the telephone about it, send a prompt followup letter summarizing the conversation, and particularly any statements made by the other party, and any agreements reached. Keep a copy, and send a copy by email as well as by postal mail. It should probably start something like "In our telephone conversation on {date} about {topic} you stated ..." If you are sued you will need to consider whether to retain a lawyer to represent you.
The house Owner owns the washing machine. Paying the deductible on Owner's warranty has nothing to do with (changing of) the ownership of it. Effectively, the tenant has incurred expenses just for arranging the replacement. Lease specifically stipulates that Tenant is welcome to use washer/dryer but that Owner is not responsible for fixing them if they break. Note that depending on the jurisdiction this term may be unenforceable: tenancy laws often stipulate that landlords have to keep things in working order at their expense (unless things break because tenants misuse/abuse them). In this case the tenant could claim the deductible he paid. But again, this would not affect the ownership of the washing machine in any way.
I do not have a written agreement of her saying she will pay 1/5 of utilities cost. Can I still take her to small claims court to get my money back? Yes. This type of agreements does not need to be in writing. Proving the other roommates' timely payments is strong evidence that also she is under a similar agreement. You did not elaborate on the form of her refusals. If these are stated in writing, they might evidence elements that further weaken her legal position. For instance, these might reflect her inconsistencies and/or bad faith. Even if you were unable (which seems very unlikely) to prove that there is an agreement to the effect of splitting costs, you might still prevail on grounds of equity.
Short Answer Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? Yes. Unless your lease says otherwise. Your sole source of legal protections is your lease. Without knowing the detailed provisions of your lease, it is impossible to know. Long Answer The General Rule In commercial leases, to a much greater degree than in residential leases, the principle of buyer beware (a.k.a. caveat emptor) applies. Commercial leases are typically negotiated between sophisticated parties, and if the tenant doesn't want to start paying rent until the certificate of occupancy is issued despite a lease that says otherwise, then that is tough luck and the tenant is bound to the terms of the lease. Commercial leases are generally rented in "as is" condition, sometimes with and sometimes without a tenant finish and improvements allowance from the landlord. Unless otherwise agreed, in a commercial lease, the burden is on the tenant to do "due diligence" including a physical inspection of the property by a professional inspector and independent review of the zoning status of the property to confirm that the tenant's business is allowed to operate at that location, much as a buyer of real estate would. If the tenant identifies an objection during the due diligence period set forth in the lease or contract to enter into a lease with the tenant, then the tenant can choose to get out of the lease obligation. But, there is only a due diligence condition if the tenant bargains for it. The lease allocates responsibility to maintain the building in good repair and may allocated this responsibility to the landlord or the the tenant. In one of the most common types of commercial leases, called a triple net lease, virtually all maintenance obligations are the tenant's responsibility: The triple net absolves the landlord of the most risk of any net lease. Even the costs of structural maintenance and repairs must be paid by the tenant in addition to rent, property taxes and insurance premiums. Some firms, such as WeWork build their entire business model around entering into the "as is", triple net commercial leases with landlords that are the norm, and then subletting the properties to smaller businesses on a furnished, all maintenance and building services provided, gross lease basis. Many states have statutory or common law implied warranties of habitability in the case of residential leases that require that a certificate of occupancy be in place and that other conditions be met by the landlord: An implied warranty of habitability is a warranty implied by law in all residential leases [ed. in states that have such a warranty] that the premises are fit and habitable for human habitation and that the premises will remain fit and habitable throughout the duration of the lease. New Mexico, in particular, has many statutory protections for residential tenants (statutes found here). But, almost none of these protections extend to commercial leases in New Mexico, because commercial leases are not leases of dwelling units, as defined in the relevant statutes. Note that not every state even has an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies. Colorado did not have one until the early 2000s, and it had only very weak protections for tenants regarding habitability until the current decade. Before then, in Colorado, a defective or unsafe condition of the premises was not a defense to paying rent under either a commercial or a residential lease in the state. In theory, a county or municipal government could impose a habitability requirement on commercial leases. But, this is very uncommon because, as the examples below illustrate, there are circumstances where it is sensible, even in a fair deal, to place the burden of making property subject to a commercial lease habitable. Examples Of Situations Where This Would Not Be Required In A Fair Deal Most commercial tenants insist upon terms that say that the obligation to pay rent starts when a certificate of occupancy is issued and the tenant is allowed to take possession of the premises. But, there would certainly be some times when a commercial tenant would pay rent on property that does not yet have a certificate of occupancy. For example, in what is called a "pad rental", a business rents a basically vacant lot with only a concrete foundation and utility hookups and zoning approvals in place, and then the tenant builds a shop or office building on the pad. See, e.g., this commercial lease offer on Loopnet, a major internet site for listing property available to be leased by businesses: ABOUT 4900-5100 N WICKHAM RD , MELBOURNE, FL 32940 Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Listing ID: 15146692 Date Created: 2/11/2019 Last Updated: 3/19/2019 1 LOT AVAILABLE - Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Lease Term 20 Years Service Type To Be Determined Date Available Now Space Type Relet Lot Size 0.69 AC DESCRIPTION Pad ready site with all utilities, parking field, ingress/egress, retention, and site lighting IN. Join Goodwill, Einstein's Bagel, Verizon, Twins Car Wash, Wickham Road Music, and Nail Salon in this 100% leased new retail center. HIGHLIGHTS Pad ready site. In a commercial pad lease, typically, a tenant would start paying rent immediately and the length of time needed to get the tenant's shop built and approved for occupancy by local government officials is their problem. But, even then, the terms would depend on what was negotiated between the landlord and the tenant which would depend to a great extent on how hot the local commercial real estate market was and on the other terms. A landlord will usually offer more favorable terms (such as a provision stating that rent is not owed until a certificate of occupancy is issued) in a weak rental market, but may also decide to have very tough lease terms with a somewhat lower monthly or annual rental rate. Also, as in the example above, conditioning rent payment on occupancy or availability for occupancy, is less common in a very long term lease such as the twenty year lease being offered for the pad rental above. Something very similar is done in an existing building that requires tenant finish. At one extreme, the landlord will do tenant finish to the tenant's specifications at the landlord's expense and the tenant will only start to pay rent when the tenant takes occupancy. At the other extreme, the tenant will start paying rent immediately and do the tenant finish at the tenant's sole expense. In between, the tenant may do the tenant's own tenant finish pursuant to landlord approved plans, with the landlord contributing a tenant finish allowance that will often be less than the full anticipated cost of tenant finish work, and the rent will be reduced or waived for a set period of time which may be less than the actual or anticipated time that it takes to complete the tenant finish. This gives the tenant an incentive to not waste tenant finish dollars and to push the contractors doing the work to finish as soon as possible. In yet another example, it wouldn't be terribly uncommon for a landlord to rent a commercial space that is already occupied by squatters, or holdover tenants, to a new tenant on a triple net basis. In a lease like that, the tenant is responsible for evicting the current occupants, rather than the landlord. The promise that the leased property won't be occupied by someone else when the lease commences is called the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" (which is "a covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants."). This provision is often, but not always, included in a commercial lease, although often, courts will imply in law a covenant of quiet enjoyment into even a commercial lease, in the absence of express language in the lease stating that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is not intended to be included in the lease. Conclusion It all boils down to the terms of the lease and a reasonable construction of the relevant lease terms. The fact that there is such a thin amount of legal protection from unfair lease terms is one of the reasons that most commercial tenants hire an attorney to help them negotiate the terms of a commercial lease, in addition to, or instead of, a commercial real estate broker. Footnote: Why Is Commercial Lease Law So Harsh? The duties of a commercial tenant are much closer to, and in some cases, almost identical to, those of an owner of real property and are not infrequently for long terms such as twenty, or even ninety-nine years. Why would a landlord and tenant enter into a commercial lease in these situations, rather than having the prospective tenant simply by the property subject to a mortgage? A lot of this is tax driven. Many businesses would purchase their buildings rather than lease them if taxes were not a consideration and the commercial lease is basically a tax favored alternative to a mortgage payment. When the commercial landlord is a mortgage lender in all but name, and a commercial tenant is a building owner in all but name, it makes sense to place the legal maintenance responsibilities of a building owner on the commercial tenant. A business can deduct every dollar paid in rent from its revenues when determining its taxable income, even the portion economically attributable to land value and depreciation in the structure of the building, as it is paid. But, if the business finances the purchase of the property with a mortgage, the business can deduct the interest paid, but not the principal payments. Depreciation of improvements on real estate (for most of recent U.S. tax history, over a straight line 39.5 year depreciation period) can counterbalance some of the principal payments, although often more slowly than the principal payments are actually made. Also, if depreciation deductions wipe out too much of the business's income, those depreciation deductions are disallowed or deferred. Furthermore, the portion of the purchase price of property attributed to land value can't be depreciated at all. In many cases, this quirk of the tax law is addressed with a business structure in which: (1) a non-profit that doesn't care about the tax treatment of its income leases the land to (2) another business that builds a multi-tenant building on the property which it owns even though it doesn't own the land the building is built upon, subject to a mortgage with a long amortization period similar to the depreciation period for the building, which in turn is (3) leased to businesses that actually used the multi-tenant building by the building owner. Second Footnote On Rent Control and Cooperative Apartments Even further afield, in places like New York City that have rent control, residential tenants become more economically equivalent to apartment owners, and residential landlords become more economically equivalent to a combined mortgage lenders and home owner's association. There was a strong demand for rent control in New York City at the time that rent control was adopted, because economic necessity meant that mostly people needed to live in one unit of a multi-unit apartment building, but the legal concept of ownership of one unit within a larger apartment building that is now commonly called a "condominium" in the United States, did not exist. So, there were a lot of renters in New York City who very much wanted to be de facto apartment owners who didn't have the legal tools available at the time to achieve this goal. The other work around which was used in the Northeast before the condominium was invented was a "cooperative apartment", in which all of the residents of a particular apartment building owned the entire building and were jointly and severally liable on the mortgage on the building, but then were allocated a unit within the building in exchange for economic obligations to the cooperative association that managed the building on a not for profit basis for its owners.
you cannot be compelled to accept a modified lease that you never agreed to, and that was not even shown to you when you discussed the issue. You should notify the management in writing at once that you reject this "offer" and do not plan to transfer under those terms.
You have not mentioned your jurisdiction or details on the lease, but generally tenants are jointly and severally liable - which means that if he does not pay his share, the landlord can pursue you for it. In turn, you should be able to pursue him for the courts for his share of the rent. (This does not mean you will get paid - but does mean you can try and get the money off him).
It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.
How is the cost of a software service determined? I just went through a Compliance eLearning which had a section covering anti-trust laws. My understanding of predatory pricing from that is inline with this description I found on wikipedia During the period of predatory prices, the predator's profit is negative, or the price is lower than the cost. At the end of the eLearning, a quiz asked: If a competitor tries to enter the same market one is in, what would be lawful behavior and what might lead to prosecution in regards to anti-trust laws? The correct answer, of multiple possible answers, suggested that One could try to make their products attractive by giving the best reasonable discount you could offer. While another possible answer was Giving a discount on the Software suite that will temporarily sell the software below cost price. But this can be changed again as soon the competitor is driven off the market. which obviously would be a breach of anti-trust laws. But this left me confused, if I ever was working in sales or a related department.... What is actually considered the cost of a software service in this regard? And what is considered a reasonable discount in that regard, and what is unreasonable?
There is no fixed rule for this. Every situation is different, and of course there is nothing specific to software in there. It is very much a matter of intent. For example, negative profits are no clear sign. Company X thinks they could make $6 million profit by developing a product and selling it, minus $4 million development cost. It turns out development cost is $10 million. Raising prices is not possible because of competition. Company X will suffer losses of $4 million, without being predatory in any way. The reality is that a judge will look at the situation, take everything into account, and make a decision based on what they see. Since this is all about competition law, the main point is the intent or effect that your pricing makes competition impossible. That's what the judge will decide. For example, if you offer your service for $500,000 while others offer a similar service for $1,000,000 you could be using some super efficient processes that allow you to make money at that price, or you might have an idiotic sales person who will drive your company into bankruptcy, or you are trying to drive your competitors out of business. That's what the judge will decide.
The customer will own exactly what is stated in the contract. As the contractor, who wants to be able to reuse code (which is in everybody’s best interest) you want to keep the copyright, with the client having the license to use the code any way they want. If the customer wants the copyright with the contractor losing all rights, that will be in the contract, and it will cost. If the contractor produced an application that use lots of domain knowledge supplied by the client, that will often not give the client copyright, if the contractor is the one producing the actual expression of that knowledge by translating knowledge into code. If the client provides knowledge that is actually a trade secret, then an NDA should be signed. And again, it’s contracts. The client can put into the contract that their domain knowledge must not be reused. That is quite reasonable. The client might add to the contract that the contractor will not write software for any competitor. That is legal if it is in the contract, but it will cost.
The user gains the use of the software, the EULA issuer gains the limitations on how the user of the freeware will use it, that for example, prevent the freeware user from exploiting the issuer's labor by reusing it for profit. Consideration doesn't have to be monetary. As a practical matter, sometimes the business model is to give the software away as a loss leader and to have the issuer make their money with training and consulting on how to use it. Also, even in the absence of consideration, a promise upon which the person benefiting from the promise reasonably relies is enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Further, EULA stands for "end user license agreement" and there are many times that license agreements aren't full fledged contracts. They are merely limited grants of permission to use something, often not even amounting to a full fledged property right or contract right. For example, if I let my neighbor walk into my living room while we talk and have tea, the right of the neighbor to be in my living room is called a license, even though it is not a contract. A license can be embedded in a contract, but it doesn't have to be.
At least in theory an end user could be sued for infringing on a patent, especially a method claim. Given the cost of a patent lawsuit, this strikes me as extremely unlikely to happen though, unless the user in question were an extremely large company, or something on that order. Theoretically, the only difference between open-source software and proprietary software would be that availability of the source code makes it easier to prove use of a patent in open-source software. Releasing the software as open-source doesn't confer any immunity from patent law or anything like that though. Realistically, however, the chances of being sued for infringement if you're basically giving away the software in question are fairly remote. It rarely makes sense for a patent holder to spend millions of dollars on a lawsuit where they stand no chance of even recovering their cost (but no, that certainly should not be taken as legal advice that you're free to infringe on patents, or anything similar--in fact, none of this should be taken as legal advice at all). If you can actually prove that a technique was published or publicly known and used (e.g., in a product that was offered for sale) well before the patent was applied for, the patent is probably invalid (and if proven so in court, the case would normally be dismissed with prejudice, which basically means the patent holder wouldn't be able to sue anybody else for infringement of that patent). I'd note, however, that in my experience this is much less common than most people imagine--many look at (for example) the title of a patent, and assume it lacks originality because it refers to some well-known technique, and ignore the claims where it details the precise differences between the previously known technique and what the patent really covers. Just for example, the EFF used to have a web page talking about a (now long-since expired) patent on how to draw a cursor on screen. In an apparent attempt at scaring the unwary, they showed code they claimed infringed in the patent--despite the fact that the patent's "background of the invention" specifically cited the technique they showed as being previously known, and not covered by the patent.
Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client.
Can my water district's billing practices still be legal? They are likely to be legal, but it isn't entirely clear. Contract Law ETo data is not published in advance of billing, which seems to violate Contract Law's notion of agreement between parties. A contract can set forth a formula for determining a price, rather than a particular dollar amount. For example, my utility company charges me a rate for electricity and natural gas that is based upon the market price of those commodities that it has to pay (although since my utility is a regulated utility, it has to get approval from a government agency each time it does so to confirm that it is really charging the market rate). Similarly, in the construction industry, and in government contracts, "cost plus" contracts that charge based upon whatever is spent to get the job done plus a market up by the general contractor, are not uncommon. Proposition 218 The Proposition 218 analysis is trickier. This is clearly not a tax or an assessment. So the threshold question is whether this is a Property Related Fee. In December of 2018 a legislative analysis stated that: A fee is a charge imposed on an individual or business for a service or facility provided directly to an individual or business. Local governments charge fees for a wide range of purposes, from park entry fees to building plan check fees. The amount of the fee may not exceed the cost of government to provide the service. Proposition 218 restricts property-related fees, defined as fees imposed "as an incident of property ownership." At this time, there is no consensus as to which fees meet this definition. The drafters of Proposition 218 indicate that it was their intent to include most fees commonly collected on monthly bills to property owners, such as those for water delivery, garbage service, sewer service, and storm water management fees. Other analysts of Proposition 218 contend that fees that vary by level of service (for example, a fee for metered water usage) should not be considered a property-related fee, because it is based on service usage, rather than property ownership. Because Proposition 218 does not restrict nonproperty-related fees, the definition of this term will be an important and sensitive issue for the Legislature and courts. But, the California Supreme Court clarified this in July of 2006 in the case of Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, ruling that metered rates for consumption of water are “property-related fees” subject to Proposition 218. So, assuming that your Water District is a governmental agency and not just a private company like a Ditch Company from which you receive privately owned water because you have shares in it, Proposition 218 should apply. This leads to the second question: Does the amount of the fee exceed the cost of government to provide the service? This is a non-trivial question with lots of ambiguities associated with it, that are fundamentally accounting issues, regarding the level of generality at which you analyze it. At the most general level, the water district clearly isn't allowed to collect more in fees in the aggregate than is necessary for it to break even from purchasing the water from someone and conducting its operations (assuming that it is a governmental entity). But, assuming that this threshold is met, the question is then how much discretion the water district has to allocate its costs, many of which are fixed costs that benefit all of the people in the water district, to particular users. It sounds from the question as if some of its costs involve purchasing water from a wholesaler, and some involve things like distributing that water to individual customers, metering usage, invoicing customers and collecting payments. Also, another question of generality is over what time period costs have to match services. At a fairly broad level of generality, perhaps it is permissible to match fees to cost on an annual basis. Certainly, the matching doesn't have to be any more specific than for an individual billing cycle, but it isn't obvious that this much precision in timing is required. Almost certainly, the water district is entitled to some deference in how it decides to allocate costs to services when there is more than one reasonable way to do so. Very likely, the water district evaluated its billing policy with its municipal attorney in light of Proposition 218 when it adopted this system and obtained an opinion of counsel that its plan was compliant. Indeed, it probably has covenants in its municipal bond offerings that require it to do so. Therefore, it is very unlikely that the water district's billing policy blatantly and unambiguously violates Proposition 218, even though it make be pushing the envelope with a billing scheme that isn't clearly allowed or clearly forbidden by court precedents that are factually similar. If that is the case, you might find a lawyer willing to bring a class action lawsuit to test the validity of the billing system, but it would likely be a long and difficult case with an uncertain outcome that the water district is more likely to win than you are, although it still might be a technical violation. Given the small stakes you have in the question with your own relatively small water bill, and the high stakes that the water district has in justifying its billing system for all of its customers, it is hard to see how this would be an economic battle for you to fight.
A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it.
It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.
Online Proctoring, Exams, and the GDPR? Due to the coronavirus outbreak, my university has tentatively canceled all live forms of live education, including exams. Instead, they have decided to hold exams through an online proctoring software (third-party), which requires access to the computer webcam, microphone, screen, and browsing history to work. This is the first time the university is doing an examination in this manner, and there are no official guidelines for how these exams are to be conducted. I am concerned about my data privacy in the context of these exams, and am wondering what my rights are and how I can exercise them. Specifically, I am wondering whether I can refuse the collection of my personal data through the online proctoring software, and whether the university may reprimand me for doing so. If both are the case, how can I truly say that I 'consent' to data collection and processing when I am coerced, so to speak, by the threat of failing my courses if I do not use this novel software?
How can I truly say that I 'consent' to data collection and processing when I am coerced, so to speak, by the threat of failing my courses if I do not use this novel software? There is no need for you to "consent". Consent is just one of the reasons that allows a data processor to collect your data. There are other reasons that allows the data processor to capture your data. In this case, it seems of application the "legitimate interest clause", as it is in your university's legitimate interest to capture your activity in order to evaluate you. Of course, that covers only the data collected that is relevant to that interest. They will certainly capture your identity and your answers, they may log your sessions and may try to gather some data to detect if you are somehow cheating, but they would not be allowed to check which are your favorite pornhub videos because that is not relevant for the university's legitimate interest. Art. 6 of the GDPR states: Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. This page also provides some in-depth analysis
Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself.
I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).
Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing.
This question shows a misconception of GDPR. GDPR creates an obligation not just towards the data subject but also towards the authorities of the relevant state(s). The data subject cannot waive your responsibility to safeguard data, document internal processes, etc. GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personally identifying information (PII). Informed consent is one of the ways to get permission to process and store this data. If your data subjects are prepared to give your sweeping permissions, ask for consent (informed, revocable, etc.), document the consent, and go from there. The data subject does not get to decide what classification data falls under. If you collect, say, medical data, then you are subject to increased restrictions and safeguards.
Either approach can be GDPR-compliant. An issue to consider is that you as a data controller relying on consent “shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data” (Art 7(1)). This might be simpler if a record of the consent is linked to a user account. On the other hand, the GDPR's data minimization principle would suggest that decentral, offline approaches are preferable. So you do have some flexibility here, as long as you feel comfortable demonstrating that your approach is compliant when investigated by a supervisory authority. In many cases, consent is not an appropriate legal basis to start with. It is one of several options in Art 6(1) GDPR. If a data processing activity is necessary for fulfilling a contract with the data subject, then Art 6(1)(b) is more appropriate. If the processing is necessary for a legitimate interest, then Art 6(1)(f) would work – after conducting a balancing test. Art 6(1)(a) consent is appropriate when the processing activity is not necessary, or when a legitimate interest balancing test doesn't go in your favor, or in some cases when required by law. For example, consent is required when processing special categories of data (such as biometrics), or when accessing or storing information on the end user's device, beyond what is necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user (the “cookie law”, but much more general than cookies). Consent also has heightened compliance requirements compared to other legal bases. The data subject must be able to make a free decision, without any coercion. You must not use dark patterns. You must leave the data subject a real choice. You must not make access to your app conditional on giving unrelated consent (like providing access to a game only when the user gives consent for personalized ads). The data subject must be able to easily withdraw consent later, without suffering detriment for this. The EDPB has issued relevant guidelines that might be helpful here: EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent EDPB guidelines 2/2019 on Article 6(1)(b) in the context of online services (also relevant for apps) TL;DR: what is “necessary” for performance of a contract is an objective question, and should generally be considered from the data subject's perspective. It is not possible to circumvent consent requirements by putting unrelated processing purposes like “analytics” into a services' terms of service. The main purpose of this document is to serve as a rebuttal of Facebook's GDPR compliance strategy. But it's perfectly fine to avoid asking for consent for those processing purposes that are actually necessary for the user. I've noticed that you mentioned various Google services like Analytics and Firebase. To the degree that your use of these services implies an international transfer of personal data into the US, it might be impossible to be GDPR-compliant. Be wary of claims that you're only transferring “anonymous” data, as the GDPR has a fairly broad concept of identifiability.
If the website's processing of your personal data is within the scope of the GDPR, then you have a qualified right to request the erasure of your personal data. It is relevant whether: the website operates within the EU; the website is operated by a company established in an EU country; the website aims to sell goods or services to people in the EU; or the website is routinely processing the personal data of people in the EU (including non-citizens). Furthermore, it is relevant whether your posts: contain one or more identifiers from which you could be personally identified, directly or indirectly, including by only the administrators or owners of the website; and by their content, directly reveal information relating to you. For example, let's say you posted on a forum saying that "I am a keen supporter of socialism", and your personal email address was used to sign up to the website, then you would have revealed information about your political beliefs, which by reference to a username, the website owners could use to uniquely identify you by your email address. You would not necessarily have to have used your name. If, for example, you posted something factual, like, "The Porsche 911 GT2 RS MR recorded the fastest lap time for a road-legal sports car on the Nürburgring," then it is only personal as long as it is associated with an identifier through which you could be identified. As such, the removal of the relationship could easily anonymise the post. A data controller has an obligation to provide means by which the data subject can exercise the rights guaranteed under Chapter 3 of the GDPR. Article 17 grants the right to "erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay" where the grounds under Art. 17 lit. 1 (a) to (f) are met. It may be relevant what the lawful basis of processing personal data was in the first place, such as in determining whether you can withdraw consent (i.e. you cannot withdraw consent if consent was not given), or in determining whether there is a right to object under Article 21 lit. 1. Derogations permissible under local implementing laws may provide for other exemptions or requirements to the right to erasure, so it is also important to determine the country of jurisdiction.
It's probably legal. This is not a sworn statement subject to perjury prosecution. Even if you can make the case that the statement is knowingly false, there is ample evidence (from colleges) that this is not a material consideration in admission. (I don't care where it actually is, that is plainly the statement that colleges make regarding race and admission). A fraudulent statement has to be material. It might violate college rules and they could conceivably throw you out for breaking the rules, if there is such a rule. Admissions materials are full of false statements. They are required by law to ask, you are not required to answer. Actual cheating on entrance exams is actionable (as we recently discovered); it is possible that in the future it will be "discovered" that exaggerations on entrance materials is also legally actionable.
Can defendants switcheroo whenever they want? Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Now assume the switcheroo idea came from the defendant himself. Not his counsel. And note that although this tactic is unorthodox, it is apparently, "legal" and apparently, at least in this case, highly effective. Nevertheless, it rarely happens. Presumably, this is because attorneys are reluctant to risk their freedom and careers on behalf of a client. Who could blame them? So my question is as follows. Can a defendant choose not to sit at his lawyer's table? Can he choose to have someone else sit there instead? In other words, could a defendant insist on doing a switcheroo over the objection of his attorney? Would the attorney be forced to either quit the case or go through with something they don't agree with? In such a scenario could the attorney be held responsible? Could the defendant be punished by the court somehow? Edit: The difference between this question and the one referenced in the comments is that this question presupposes switcheroo is the defendant's idea but counsel doesn't want to do it. It's more about the relative "power" of the defendant to "force" his attorney to participate in a "grey area" of ethical conduct. The other question has no element respecting this power structure dynamic.
Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.
when is it a good idea to get a lawyer? Only when you are not confident that you can put enough dedication to the matter & learning curve, or when you are not confident of your ability to cope with the emotional/frustrating toll of judicial proceedings. I do not mean this in an ironic way or to challenge you. It is just important to avoid a false sense of confidence. However, if you decide to represent yourself in court, you will have much more control of your case than if you delegate it to some lawyer whose attention is split with many other unrelated cases. Also, never get intimidated by pedantic or wasted phrases such as "he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client". In the XXI century, most urban people can read and write, Canadian laws are written in your own language, and the Internet provides many informative resources for free. Furthermore, even knowledgeable attorneys happen to be clearly wrong about the law, as I pointed out here. I feel like the bulk of the work is carefully detailing what happened which feels more like the job of a news paper editor. It involves more than that. A newspaper editor does not get entangled with subtleties of a story or of the law, and subtleties are often decisive in judicial proceedings. Litigation also involves intensive legal research so as to find case law (that is, binding court decisions) and statutes that support your position. The application of these laws to a particular case are often premised on subtleties. Hence my remark in the previous paragraph. A newspaper editor hardly ever knows what questions or evidence are required or would suffice for proving a case. This knowledge only comes through (self-)education and experience. What options exist if I don't want to pay a lawyer a bunch of money and am willing to do most of the work myself, for example would pro bono be a good option? Start by searching for "pro se" and "Canada" on the Internet. Some of the results might actually provide guidance on what procedural law(s) apply in your jurisdiction, the legislation, and so forth. As for searching case law, there should be a Canadian equivalent of http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch (sorry I am not knowledgeable of the specifics of Canadian litigation/resources). Based on your other post, I presume you are or will be getting acquainted with the Tenancy Act. I recently addressed here a question about the Act, showcasing the combination of that legislation and contract law (interestingly, many tenants presume their issue with the landlord is strictly about landlord-tenant legislation when in fact it has to do with contract law). I am sure in a library will find plenty of useful books covering the basics of the legal system as well as the rules of civil procedure. Find out whether the public has access to case files in Canadian courts. If so, go to a courthouse and study those files. Get acquainted with the drafting and format of pleadings, motions, responses, briefs, and so forth (although in Small Claims court much of this would be unnecessary, for small claims proceedings are much more simple). This will show you the practice aspect of what you learn from books. When using a term that you consider essential to your case, be sure to consult its meaning in a legal dictionary (I do not know whether Black's Law Dictionary is applicable in Canadian litigation). The meaning of many words are much more specific in litigation compared to their common usage. Or would getting a real lawyer and spending only one hour of his time be better? I highly doubt it, especially if you have not gained any background in law. A lawyer will not explain things from scratch, let alone the intricacies you need to know. The most you could get from speaking with a lawyer for an hour would be notions which are too generic to be of any use at all. Moreover, I doubt that a lawyer in a phone interview will give you any legal references for you to verify on your own. In the very beginning of my litigation, I spoke with a law firm as assigned by a lawyer referral company. By then I already had some background in law and therefore I had specific questions. The guy from that law firm just kept babbling ambiguities very quickly. At the end of the phone call, I thought "nah, I will do this by myself". You might end up making that decision in your current or future matters.
Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off.
I haven't reviewed the filings, but I can tell you that it's perfectly routine for lawyers to describe the other side's position as "plainly without merit," with no regard for the actual merits. The lawyer's job is to make his client look good, in court and in public; the existence of this question shows that he's doing a good job at least on the latter half of that equation. But in truth, it's such a generic thing to say that no lawyer who hears it will actually think it means anything. In all likelihood, the filing is like most others, in that it makes a good case on some points and a bad case on others, and the opposing lawyer's job is to argue that all of them are bad. In the rarer case that a filing is actually "plainly without merit," courts can and sometimes do impose penalties under Rule 11, which allows for sanctions against parties and attorneys who make factual assertions that are not supported by reality or arguments that are not supported by the law.
A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't "look for trouble" and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal.
What's the use of contracts if you can't take a contract violator to court? A clear, thoughtful contract can be a deterrent to misconduct, and Australia is one of many jurisdictions where pro se litigation is allowed. Self-represented litigants certainly have to undergo a steep learning curve and are expected to comply with a code of conduct, procedural law, and so forth, but my point is that hiring a lawyer is not compulsory. Even if for some reason the defrauded party declines to sue the tortfeasor (thereby forfeiting the recovery of the losses), there is a societal obligation to alert others about the tortfeasor's misconduct. Making the contract available to others facilitates alerting them on objective grounds so they don't become the tortfeasor's next victim, and it simultaneously helps for setting the record straight that the damages/losses were not one's own fault. Without a contract, it would be more difficult for others get a sense of whether misconduct occurred at all. Or worst, halfway down the line, you don't have any money left to pay your lawyers, and they leave the case. Hence the importance to litigate in pro per from the start. It is easy for a person retaining a lawyer to postpone (be it due to family obligations, workload, and so forth) his learning of the law. But that postponement only makes the client more vulnerable to his lawyer's subsequent withdrawal when court proceedings are midway: the client would have the dilemma of either finding another lawyer to resume the case --predictably at a higher cost--, or cram the learning curve in trying to keep up with the proceedings.
No. She was lawfully ordered by a judge presiding over the case, and, as a member of the bar, she had no right to refuse that appointment. She did, in fact, request that the judge choose a different attorney, but that request was declined. Sources: FactCheck.org - provides general background on case Arkansas Judicial Rule 8.2 - Appointment of Counsel, which provides that: Attorneys so appointed shall continue to represent the indigent accused until relieved for good cause or until substituted by other counsel. Edit: Regarding penalties for noncompliance, refusing to represent the accused would be considered criminal contempt under state law, which provides in 16-10-108(a)(3) Arkansas Code that "willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by it [the court]" is punishable as a Class C Misdemeanor, at least according to 2010 law. Also, professional sanctions might be involved, IANAL so no experience there.
What can we do with people still travel under corona pandemic? What can we do with those people who still decided to travel (for skiing, example) and causing huge problems after they return, even though they know the fact that corona virus (or anything new in the future) is deadly and already spreading around the world? -- Update: According to Phillip, I want to point out a specific country like Finland, with Finnish law, for Finnish people who traveled to Italy. -- Update 2: I asked this question because I think in this way: If you're drunk and going to drive, and because of your irresponsible action could lead to the danger for some (one, two, maybe ten people), so you will be punished, even when you have not made a scratch to anybody. But then why do there are people who would do something which leads to the danger of thousands of people, free to walk away? Of course, we can exclude people who do not know, and people who have important things to do.
Communicable diseases are endemic to the human condition Some places, times and situations are riskier than others but there is always a risk in widespread travel. Outside of disease spread, there are other risks in travel; for example, if no-one traveled at all there would be no motor vehicle deaths. On the flip-side, not traveling has its own dangers; for example, you will not die in a house fire if you are in your car. Of course, there are enormous benefits to widespread travel; economic, cultural and personal - life is to be experienced after all. If you stop the skier from skiing, then you have just damaged the livelihood of all the people who depend on tourism; the airline, the hotel, the bartender, the ski technician, the baker in the ski resort etc. Everything is allowed unless it is prohibited By and large, this is the way that the law works. It's legal to do anything you like. Unless it isn't. It isn't illegal to travel to, say, Finland. So you can. If the government (of whichever country) decides that the costs of allowing people to travel to Finland now outweigh the benefits then they can prohibit it. However, that is a political decision; not a legal one. As for your drink-driving example, I am old enough to remember when it wasn't illegal to drive drunk, although I was too young to drive. Of course, if you are in Somalia or Kenya it's still legal. Also, what counts a drunk varies by country - you can have a couple in Finland but cross over into Russia and you are breaking the law. Why does Finland allow such recklessness? Because it's a political decision and politicians in Finland and Russia have reached different conclusions about what level of risk is acceptable. Same with travel restrictions.
The law in every country where your service is available prevails. That means that if your servers are in Estonia, your file storage is in Lithuania, your company is in Switzerland, you are in France, you hold Thai citizenship, your users are in the USA and the signal transits through the U.K., Belgium, Germany, Canada and Poland then you are subject to the laws of each and every one of them. In addition, if China has reason to believe that the stored files contain matters relating to their citizens then they can take an interest. And so on and so forth ... A country has jurisdiction wherever it wants to have jurisdiction subject to the limits of and its ability to actually enforce its laws. What you are proposing is certainly illegal in many countries and you need to seek professional legal advice - not rely on strangers on the internet.
Crimes are prosecuted either where they were committed, or where the harm was intentionally caused, or both.[1] The statute of limitations that applies is the statute of limitations in the country where the crime is prosecuted. Other statutes of limitations for crimes are irrelevant. Generally speaking, if a crime is still prosecutable in the place where it is committed and is a serious felony, an extradition treaty will require the country where the suspect is located to be extradited to the country where the crime was committed and the country where the crime was committed (in this case Norway), goes through the proper channels under the extradition treaty. (There are exceptions in death penalty cases, but neither of these countries have the death penalty.) The statute of limitations for murder in Portugal would not protect someone who committed a murder in Norway. Also, even if there was a statute of limitations in Norway (say it was an armed robbery not resulting in serious bodily injury instead), most countries don't count time that a suspect spends outside the country fleeing law enforcement against the statute of limitations. [1] There is an obscure exception to this for what amount to crimes against humanity that is not applicable in the case presented by the question.
The only people the law does not apply to are " persons licensed by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control." http://www.visitcuba.com/travel-guide/travel-tips/special-note-to-usa-travellers/ If you have close family there the license is not needed. If you qualify to travel on a general license for family travel, you do not need to seek permission from OFAC. However, it is a requirement of the general license that you be able to document, if asked, how you qualify under the general license. There are also special permissions for certain groups. There are 12 categories of people who are allowed to visit including close relatives of Cubans, academics, those traveling on official government business, those on humanitarian or religious missions, journalists and people on accredited cultural education programs. Those rules apply to people with dual citizenship. New rules are now in place, that allow you to visit under certain circumstances considered to not be simple tourism. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandratalty/2018/04/23/yes-you-can-still-travel-to-cuba/#34139656378d
There isn't any indication in that news story that the disabled son was anywhere nearby. I agree the situation you describe sounds like a legitimate use of the placard, but it seems in this situation, the placard was being used in a manner totally unrelated to the transport of a disabled person. My guess is that the cops cited her because the son wasn't in the car, and was not inside the establishment at which she parked. California code has this to say: A person to whom a disabled person placard has been issued may permit another person to use the placard only while in the presence or reasonable proximity of the disabled person for the purpose of transporting the disabled person. So as long as the disabled person is within a "reasonable proximity", and the placard is being used to transport them, they do not have to be inside the car to make using the placard legitimate. In this case, the woman was just transporting herself and using the placard anyway, which is illegal.
This is tied up in the concept of sovereignty - nation states have control over their territories and citizens and they recognise the right of other nation states to do likewise. The USA, China (Hong Kong) and Panama are all sovereign states, they each decide what the law is within their own territory and they can’t tell each other what to do; they can ask, however, that’s what diplomats do. If a HK domiciled company provides HK based servers then they have to comply with HK law irrespective of where their customers are located. The USA could pass a law requiring US companies (like ISPs) to keep logs of traffic to and from HK servers but they cannot force a HK company to do anything, unless and until it operates in a place where the US has jurisdiction which means both the right and the ability to enforce their law.
Depending on the bridge, you might be trespassing in some way. Railway bridges are the property of the railway company, they don't allow to go there unless specifically allowed and even the absence of a sign is not an ok in those cases. Similarly, highway bridges usually are communal property and they don't need to be marked as off limits if there are laws that prohibit being there. The absence of signs and fencing is not a carte balance to go there: If your starting point for the climbing is not easily accessible, they don't have to fence it. But besides trespassing, you might make a huge dookey: Depending on the attorney general, you might be, in Austria, in violation of § 46 StVO for being a pedestrian on the Highway, as the bridge in whole is part of the highway structure. Even if you are under the lanes, you are technically on or inside the highway structure. If the attorney really wants you in, they could pull out § 89 StGB "endangerment" as well as the § 176 / § 177 "endangerment of the commonality" (by reckless or negligence). After all, you might or might not be climbing the bridge to perform something to endanger all the people using it. In Germany, you will get fined for violating traffic laws if you go onto railway tracks or climb onto a railway bridge as you violate the railway code and the minimum charge is 25 €. You could get also sued for Reckless endangerment of the train traffic (§ 315 StGB) and locked up for between 6 months and 10 years. If you do delay trains in any way (and even if it is to allow a crew to get to you), you are also liable damages - this is very easy in the 5 to 6 digits. Similarly, if it was a highway, you'd get billed 10 € for being on foot on a motorway without special privilege under $ 25 StVO and again, you could get jailed in extreme cases under § 315b StGB.
That depends on several things: Do the authorities have solid evidence of what happened? Authorities in which country? A screenshot is not evidence, that would be easily faked. It takes access to the metadata. Does the country where the perpetrator lives consider it a serious crime? Note that when two people exchange such messages, who is the criminal and who is the victim can depend on the ages of both, and the exact rules of who is guilty of what may differ from country to country. There are countries which prosecute child abuse by their citizens or residents abroad once they come back. So it may be that nothing happens, or it may be prosecuted.
What does a lawyer do if they know for absolute certain that their client is guilty? Say that a person is accused of committing a crime, they either hire a lawyer or have one appointed to them. Some time later, the lawyer learns that their client most certainly committed the crime. Perhaps the client shows the lawyer a video of them committing the crime (and it is proven to be genuine). What does a lawyer do in this case? Are they required to continue to defend their client (and would that mean they may be forced to commit perjury?) or are they allowed to choose not to continue to represent their client in the interest of finding the truth and upholding justice? If there are any historical cases where this sort of thing happened, mentioning them would be a plus. For the sake of argument, let's assume that the lawyer is somehow able to know with 100% certainty that their client committed the crime, so there is no issue of the lawyer passing judgement when there is a chance of doubt.
There is a big difference between knowing something and proving it. A lawyer who knows a client is guilty can take steps to prevent the state from proving guilt. (E.g., motion to exclude evidence, cross examining witnesses.) The belief that a client has committed a crime does not necessarily mean one knows what specific crime was committed. Is a killing Murder 1, Murder 2, or manslaughter? There are defenses even when an act may be a crime. E.g., self defense, insanity, justifiable. Lawyers are not permitted to assist in perjury. E.g., allow the client to testify to something he knows is false.
They are not given independence from statute. This clause just says that conviction is not the end goal of the prosecutor. If in light of the evidence, the prosecutor comes to believe a person is not guilty, they are not to proceed with the prosecution. They must not hide exculpatory or mitigating evidence in order to get a conviction.
To know a defendant is guilty is to know that the government has convinced a judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed all the elements of a crime. A lawyer can't know that the government will accomplish this prior to a trial. Options for a lawyer who determines that the government has a strong case include: seeking to have evidence excluded looking for other grounds for appeals establishing affirmative defenses negotiating a plea deal for a lighter sentence or less serious crime the lawyer will continue to force the government to prove their case
In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.
This is one of the things Martha Stewart was convicted of. 18 USC 1001 is the US federal law requiring truthfulness. That statute forbids you to falsify, conceal, or cover up a material fact. One limitation on how broad this law is, is that it has to be a matter "within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States". If your neighbor is an FBI agent and he asks if you're the one who broke his window, and you lie, that's not a federal matter. Another limitation is that the lying has to be material. The essential part of the law is subsection (a). Subsection (b) then states an exception: (b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. Then you also owe a lesser duty of truthfulness to the legislature. Taking note of US. v. Yermian, it is not required that the person you lie to be a federal officer. Yermian lied to his employer, who was a defense contractor, and the fact that the relevant form was submitted to the government for scrutiny is what made it a matter in federal jurisdiction. Comparing the wording of 1001 to the perjury statute, the operative expression for perjury involves statements "which he does not believe to be true", we can see that the perjury statute requires telling the literal truth (see Bronston v. US), which allows so-called lies of omission (of a particular subtype: much more could be said about that). In contrast the lying statute forbids both literally false statements and concealing of the truth. I don't have cases at my fingertips that indicate how broad your truthful answers have to be, for example if you think the FBI is trying to put away a friend and ask you about what he did on June 14, and you know that he did a bad thing on June 13, would it be lying in the relevant sense to conceal that fact which they didn't ask about. [ADDENDUM] A session of perusing cases has led to a tiny bit of further information. A literal reading of the statute says that you are in violation of the law if you falsify a fact (sloppy epistemology, unless it refers just to altering records and evidence), or conceal a fact, and the courts recognise this as a fundamental division. As for falsifying, the way that has been applied is to refer to cases where the accused makes a statement which asserts something that he knows to be untrue. Thus, saying "No" to a question when the truth is "Yes" is a violation. A propos concealment, in US v. Diogo 320 F.2d 898 the court states that False representations, like common law perjury, require proof of actual falsity; concealment requires proof of wilful nondisclosure by means of a 'trick, scheme or device.' This case is pre-Bronston so there is mixing of concepts from perjury law and lying law, which would not happen now, but we can steering clear of their perjury citations. The crucial fact is that accused(s) were technically married in New York, for immigration purposes, and they were accused of a 1001 violation for having indicated that they were married. Part of the government's case was that such a marriage is not valid, and the court rejected that conclusion. The government's second prong was to maintain that the court "should affirm appellant's convictions on a theory of concealment", and this too the court rejected, saying "proof of their ulterior motives in marriage would not be tantamount to proof of willful and knowing concealment of these material facts". What they said on the forms was literally true, and they did not have a duty to volunteer information that they probably knew the government was interested in. Contrarily in a later case, US v. Zalman 870 F.2d 1047 we are told that the underlying purpose of a marriage is a material fact which bears upon the validity of the marriage, and that any false or fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the actual purpose of a marriage in order to gain status as a resident of the United States can be punished under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 so you have to be more truthful than the literal truth standard. There are also circumstances where there is an independent duty to give information, such as reporting income to the IRS. In US v. Hernando Ospina 798 F.2d 1570 the court maintained It is clear that in order to support a section 1001 concealment conviction there must be a legal duty to disclose the facts the defendant was convicted of concealing citing US v. Tobon-Builes 706 F.2d 1092, where again there was a legal duty to report "existence, origin, and transfer of approximately $185,200 in cash". In other words, it is not clear what information you are allowed to not volunteer when asked a question in a federal matter.
No. As the defendant's lawyer, they will have been privy to privileged communications. As such, it would be unfair to the defendant if they now started prosecuting. Also note that a victim very rarely has their own lawyer in a criminal case. The prosecution lawyer is acting for "the Crown" (essentially, "society as a whole"). (There are exceptions, if the victim is bringing a private prosecution - but this is very rare for serious cases such as rape).
The misunderstanding The only person who can chose to prosecute or not to prosecute a criminal case is the state: in the US this is through the office of the relevant District Attorney advised by the police. When a person makes a complaint to police (or other authorities), the police/DA commence an investigation. In an ideal world all complaints would be investigated rigorously and thoroughly, however, we live in this world. The police/DA will assess the complaint and decide if it warrants the dedication of scarce resources to investigate. One of the factors they will consider is how vigorously the complainant prods them in the ass. Ultimately, the police/DA will decide if there is enough evidence to place the matter before the courts. The complainant has no say in when or if this will happen. A complainant cannot "drop the charges"! The misconduct For a police officer to disclose to another police officer that they were the subject of a felony (or any) complaint is gross misconduct and a huge betrayal of trust. At best it shows poor judgement, at worst it is corrupt. Your friend needs professional legal advice right now!
The best course would be to contact the public defenders office and explain the situation to their intake or consultation services. Remember, you don't have to be going to trial to avail yourself of their services and sometimes, helping cops makes the cops suspicious about you (it would not be the first killer who cozies up to the police to learn what they know about his crime). If the Public Defender thinks you're rich enough not to need their services, you should call criminal defense attorney practices. Most law offices will offer consultation free of charge as part of client intake, so they will be willing to hear your case and offer advice. In either case, check with the lawyer that attorney client privilege is in effect. If they say yes, explain in detail to them, everything you know and want to discuss, even if some of it could criminally implicate you in this or another crime. Treat it as your deathbed confession and you know full well which circle of hell you're going to if the priest doesn't absolve you of sins (okay, too Catholic... but the Lawyer is not going to turn you in if the privilege is in effect... he could lose his license to practice law over it... we can make all the evil lawyer jokes we want, but this is one of the few sacred tenants of their profession.). Listen to his advise. Also see if you can find a second opinion. It's not that the first guy gave bad advice, but the next guy might give you something different. If you still do not feel comfortable, then keep your mouth shut. If they arrest you for the murder, do not talk until you have an attorney present and prepare to tell him exactly what you did. Especially if you did do it. Always answer your attorney truthfully.
Can an EU country close its border (rather than introduce temporary border control)? Title III chapter II of the Schengen border control code describes the possibility of reintroducing temporary border controls, but I can't find what basis there is to remove the right to free movement under EU law? Especially interested in knowing the limitations to their ability to close their border. The context is Slovakia closing its border for anybody who doesn't have a temporary or permanent residence in Slovakia. Do note, under EU law you do not need temporary or permanent residence in a country to live and even work there, thus this means that I now know of people who now can not leave Slovakia without losing the ability to return.
Note that the reintroduction of border controls provided for in the Schengen Borders Code does not restrict free movement more than slightly: EU citizens and others who enjoy free movement should be allowed to cross those borders after being subjected to the border controls (unless they can be excluded on the grounds set forth in directive 2004/38/EC). I can't find what basis there is to remove the right to free movement under EU law? The right of free movement in EU law stems from the treaties establishing the EU. For example, article 45 of the consolidated treaties concerns free movement of workers. Its third paragraph includes the words subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health The broader application of free movement is found in Directive 2004/38/EC. This similarly allows exceptions for public policy, public security or public health, as provided in Chapter VI. Article 27 sets forth the general principles, including Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, Member States may restrict the freedom of movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members, irrespective of nationality, on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. ... Article 29(1): The only diseases justifying measures restricting freedom of movement shall be the diseases with epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instruments of the World Health Organisation and other infectious diseases or contagious parasitic diseases if they are the subject of protection provisions applying to nationals of the host Member State. The directive does appear to require individual determinations to be made in order to restrict free movement, which suggests that wholesale closing of the border may be contrary to Union law. This is not entirely clear, however. In any event, any person who enjoys free movement should be able to appeal their exclusion from Slovakia under Article 31(1): The persons concerned shall have access to judicial and, where appropriate, administrative redress procedures in the host Member State to appeal against or seek review of any decision taken against them on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. It may prove difficult in practice, however, for people to get an individualized "decision taken against them" that they can appeal. If that happens, one way to approach this would be to try SOLVIT, although it's not likely to yield quick results.
@DaleM isn't wrong, but some elaboration is in order. You (almost always) gain your citizenship (or nationality) in the first instance, at birth, without the agreement or assent of you or your parents. It is thrust upon you. Usually, your country of citizenship must consent to end your citizenship (or authorize you to do so unilaterally) under that country's laws. Once you have citizenship or nationality, in practice, in most countries, you can generally only renounce your citizenship if you contemporaneously or already have a citizenship somewhere else. You are at a minimum strongly dissuaded from doing so and are not a sympathetic candidate for relief under laws related to statelessness if you willfully put yourself in this position knowing the consequences. This is a feature of the citizenship laws of most countries in order to implement international treaties designed to prevent statelessness which are widely adopted. When an adult is naturalized as a citizen of a new country, usually, their old citizenship is revoked by operation of law under the laws of their old country. In many countries, including the U.S., there are high fees and tax consequences for renouncing your citizenship. Any potential tax liabilities in the future that were not yet due under U.S. law (e.g. capital gains taxes an appreciated assets not yet sold, and estate taxes that would be due if the person renouncing their citizenship had died on that date) are owed immediately upon applying to renounce your citizenship. A stateless person is, subject to quite narrow exceptions, still subject to all of the laws of the place where they are located, including almost all of its criminal laws (except treason) and its tax laws (at least on income earned in that country). A stateless person lacks many rights. They can't travel internationally (there are exceptions under treaty in some cases, but obtaining those rights is cumbersome at a minimum). They can't vote. They typically aren't entitled to domestic welfare state benefits like national health insurance, disability payments, unemployment benefits, subsidized housing, old age or retirement benefits, etc. They can't work in a licensed or regulated profession. They may not even be able to sign a lease. They may not be allowed to own a company or serve as an officer or director of a company or as a trustee of a trust. They aren't entitled to diplomatic assistance. There are many fraudulent legal movements such as the "sovereign citizen movement" (and the Moorish Sovereign Citizens) that assert that citizenship is voluntary and that just by disavowing it in some official feeling way, they can be exempt from taxes, court jurisdiction, and/or other laws. This is false and people who act on this fraudulent misinformation often suffer serious legal consequences as a result.
They provide a snail- and e-mail way to end the contract here. This will not eradicate the €50 that they say you owe, but you can sort that out separately. That email address might also respond to inquiries about the validity of the charge. At any rate, they also give a link to online dispute resolution per Art. 14, para 1 of the EU Online Dispute Resolution Regulations. GDPR does not give one the right to be deleted so as to avoid an existing liability.
Apparently, Yes In the ECJ's Breyer decision the final conclusion reads: Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is true that in this case the decision was actually under Directive 95/46/EC, not the GDPR, but the GDPR took its definition of personal Data directly from Directive 95/46/EC, so that should make no difference. It is also true that in this case the website in question was operated by the German Federal government, an not by a private individual, or by a private business. A government might have "legal means" to link an IP address with an individual that a private actor does not. However in point 23 of the decision, the Court refered to the IP addresses as: ... stored by the Federal Republic of Germany, acting in its capacity as an online media services provider, ... which seems to indicate that the same ruels were being applied to it as would have been to a private entity. Point 44 of the decision says that: The fact that the additional data necessary to identify the user of a website are held not by the online media services provider, but by that user’s internet service provider does not appear to be such as to exclude that dynamic IP addresses registered by the online media services provider constitute personal data within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46. In point 47, the court says that: ... in the event of cyber attacks legal channels exist so that the online media services provider is able to contact the competent authority, so that the latter can take the steps necessary to obtain that information from the internet service provider and to bring criminal proceedings. This leads the court to point 49, where it says that; Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, ... Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. Nothing in the decision indicates that any particular governmental authority was considered to provide the "legal means" to get an ISP to link an IP used at a particular time to an individual. In this page from Intersoft consulting it is said that: Since the definition includes “any information,” one must assume that the term “personal data” should be as broadly interpreted as possible. ... The same also applies to IP addresses. If the controller has the legal option to oblige the provider to hand over additional information which enable him to identify the user behind the IP address, this is also personal data. In this page from eugdprcompliant.com it is said that: A much discussed topic is the IP address. The GDPR states that IP addresses should be considered personal data as it enters the scope of ‘online identifiers’. Of course, in the case of a dynamic IP address – which is changed every time a person connects to a network – there has been some legitimate debate going on as to whether it can truly lead to the identification of a person or not. The conclusion is that the GDPR does consider it as such. The logic behind this decision is relatively simple. The internet service provider (ISP) has a record of the temporary dynamic IP address and knows to whom it has been assigned. A website provider has a record of the web pages accessed by a dynamic IP address (but no other data that would lead to the identification of the person). If the two pieces information would be combined, the website provider could find the identity of the person behind a certain dynamic IP address. However, the chances of this happening are small, as the ISP has to meet certain legal obligations before it can hand the data to a website provider. The conclusion is, all IP addresses should be treated as personal data, in order to be GDPR compliant. Finally the european Commission says, on this official page: Personal data is any information that relates to an identified or identifiable living individual. Different pieces of information, which collected together can lead to the identification of a particular person, also constitute personal data. ... Examples of personal data ... an Internet Protocol (IP) address; While the case law is scanty on the point, it appears that the consensus is that IP addresses, even dynamic IP addresses, will be considered to be Personal Data under the GDPR. >
The following answer applies in the situation where all countries involved are member states of the European Union: Can the tax services in countryA confiscate accounts that are opened in countryB by me? All countries in the European Union (EU) are party to the Brussels Regulation (Regulation No. 1215/2012), this regulation means that judgments made in one EU member state may be enforced in another EU member state, against those person who judgment is made against. It may take some time, procedurally, for the judgment creditor to do this, but they are entitled to do so. Anyway, what this means for someone in such a position is that they contact a lawyer in "countryA's" jurisdiction to help appeal or find a way to mitigate the judgment since it was awarded as a result of fraud. Alternatively, when proceedings begin to register the judgment in countryB, one in such a position may choose to hire a lawyer practicing in countryB to challenge the registration of the judgment
What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech.
Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.
I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).
In what country do police have to clear scenes for EMTs? I read this on Reddit: Not a lawyer, but work for a law firm as an Investigator. One of our clients stabbed an ex-lover multiple times over $100. Perp then ran out of the house all bloody. Neighbor and her teenage daughter see him covered in blood and rush inside to see if they can help while they call 9/11. Victim is still alive. On the 9/11 call the daughter made, you can hear the mom singing amazing grace while she tried to stop the bleeding. You can also hear the victim, with a stab wound in her neck, gurgling on blood while she tries to sing along. The EMTs arrived in under 3 minutes, but it took the police 19 minutes from the call to show up to clear the scene for them. She lived for 17 minutes. I saw the photos of the scene with the body still in place. It looked like a scene straight from Dexter. I find it shocking that EMTs would ever have to wait for police (except if they would be putting themselves in danger) before saving someone's life. Of course that someone writes about it on Reddit doesn't mean it actually happened, but is there any western / first world country where that is actually the law? Edit: When reading through it again, it sounds like this happened in the United States. The currency in question is dollars, the story is written in perfect English, and an English song was reportedly sung. In which U.S. state could this have happened?
Despite comments in the Reddit thread you linked, I doubt it's the law in any US state, but it would be matter of policy in any state and in many other countries as well. It's not the emergency medical personnel's job, whether EMTs, paramedics or firefighters, to risk their lives giving emergency aid while a dangerous armed criminal is potentially in the area running around free. Instead they will wait for the police to let them know the area is clear and safe for them to do their job. It's easy to say that since the neighbours were giving aid, the EMTs should have been able to as well, but the EMTs wouldn't have seen the person armed with the knife leave the house and wouldn't have known that neighbours weren't themselves the ones who stabbed the victim. The neighbours also probably didn't fully appreciate the risk they were taking, that the "perp" could come back into the house at anytime. The EMTs on other hand would've heard plenty of horror stories about what has happened to EMTs that haven't waited for police to clear the scene. In other words, this could have happened in any US state, Canada, and in many other countries.
There was a case like that in 2010 in germany tl;dr synopsis of the German article: The police raided the private home of an alleged member of a criminal gang. This was performed as a no-knock raid. The police officers did not announce themselves as such when they started to break open the door. The suspect had reason to believe that a rival gang was planning an attempt on his life. So the suspect believed that the people trying to break into his home were actually members of said gang trying to murder him. The suspect used a firearm to shoot at the intruders through the door, lethally injuring a police officer. When the police officers then identified themselves as such, the suspect surrendered immediately. A court later ruled that killing the police officer was self-defense, because they were reasonably convinced that the defendant was unaware that he was dealing with police officers, believed to be in a situation where his life was in danger and where lethal violence was the only way to save his life. Here is the verdict. [In German, of course]
The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.
If the victim is unable to prove who the culprit was, then it will be impossible to prosecute that person criminally or sue them for civil damages. Incidents like these are rarely enough to cause a police department to throw sufficient investigative resources at it to crack the case without some reason to believe that it is part of something bigger. An unfortunate fact of life is that most perpetrators of crimes and torts get away with it and are not caught. And, if the only available witness is willing to lie to cover up the name of the guilty party (probably out of a desire to not have the dog put down), it is that much harder. A private investigator might be able to solve the case, but the cost of hiring a PI would probably exceed the benefit that could be obtained if the PI was successful.
The show ignored the existing legal framework. Almost all U.S. police officers are employed by state and local governments and do not report directly to the President, even in an emergency. A small number of law enforcement officers are federal employees with a direct line of command to the President (e.g. the Secret Service and the security guards in the General Services Administration and TSA officers), but a law enforcement officer, unlike a member of the military or a CIA officer, does not simply follow the orders of the civilians to whom his superiors are responsible without the intervention of their law enforcement superiors based solely upon that civilian's whims and directions the way that a soldier would. The Secret Service has some limited authority to direct and even deputize local law enforcement officers in pursuit of their missions, but that would probably not extend to the kind of national security kill order contemplated in this episode. This said, lots of law enforcement officers are ex-military, most law enforcement agencies has a quasi-military organizational structure, and in the extreme circumstances of Designated Survivor, it wouldn't be shocking for law enforcement officers to follow their natural military chain of command intuitions rather than the law that actually applies in these situations. Law enforcement officers are personality types that are very deferential to authority which is a natural counterpart to support for their hierarchical view of the world that endows them with their own authority. There is no one in the loop to play devil's advocate for the suspected terrorist. But, strictly speaking, the proper protocol within the U.S. would be to have a CIA agent make the strike (because the military is prevented by the posse comitatus act from doing so, unless these events counted as an "insurrection" which they very well might in which case the military could be involved), rather than a law enforcement officer. Incidentally, the U.S. Supreme Court has basically held that the citizenship of the suspected terrorist is irrelevant, even though policy makers in all of the Presidential administrations since 9-11 have not been very comfortable with that state of the law and have sought to distinguish U.S. citizens from non-U.S. citizens in their own policies.
Such sad and tragic circumstances, my sympathy to all involved. General I do not know the specifics of English law as it applies but I believe it is similar enough to New South Wales, Australia that the general overview that follows is not likely to be far wrong. Before a court intervenes there has to be a dispute and someone with standing must bring an action to the court. We can surmise that a dispute arose about the best medical treatment for the child between the child's parents and the child's medical professionals - if there was unanimity there would have been no legal proceedings. Ultimately this is an issue of the welfare of the child. Medical professionals are under a legal obligation to report issues of child welfare to the relevant authorities. In the UK, the government authority responsible for child welfare is the Department of Education. We can presume that they intervened in accordance with their policies and procedures and their understanding of the law and the dispute could not be resolved. It is likely the DoE that brought the matter to the courts or the parent's disputing a DoE decision. The court will decide such issues in the best interest of the child. In deciding what that is, they will consider all the evidence including the parent's wishes, the child's wishes (not relevant in this case but it can be for older children), other relatives, medical opinion etc. They will also consider what the law is, including precedent and make their decision. If you read the linked article about the high court trial the judge is quoted as saying: “It is with the heaviest of hearts but with complete conviction for Charlie’s best interests that I find it is in Charlie’s best interests that I accede to these applications and rule that GOSH may lawfully withdraw all treatment save for palliative care to permit Charlie to die with dignity.” “I dare say that medical science may benefit objectively from the experiment, but experimentation cannot be in Charlie’s best interests unless there is a prospect of benefit for him.” “Charlie’s parents have sadly but bravely acknowledged and accepted that the quality of life that Charlie has at present is not worth sustaining, for he can only breathe through a ventilator, and although they believe that he has a sleep/wake cycle and can recognise them and react to them when they are close, they realise that he cannot go on as he is lying in bed, unable to move, fed through a tube, breathing through a machine.” “Understandably, Charlie’s parents had grasped that possibility, they have done all they could possibly have done, they have very publicly raised funds. What parents would not do the same? But I have to say, having heard the evidence, that this case has never been about affordability, but about whether there is anything to be done for Charlie.” “But if Charlie’s damaged brain function cannot be improved, as all agree, then how can he be any better off than he is now, which is a condition that his parents believe should not be sustained?” This decision was reviewed by the European Human Rights Court who “endorsed in substance the approach” taken by the British courts and declared “the decision is final”. Is it "symptomatic of a Single-Payer healthcare system" Probably not. Almost universally, child welfare cases are decided on the "best interests of the child". This judge in this case within this legal and cultural system decided as he did - and I do not doubt that it was a difficult and emotional task. Change the judge, change the case, change the law and change the culture and you may change the decision but, then again, maybe not. Perhaps in a place with a different culture towards health care, the medical practitioners would not have formed the opinion that the experimental treatment was not in the best interest of their patient and there would have been no dispute that required government intervention. Legal basis Governments can pass laws that impact the people in their jurisdiction. The UK government has passed laws that allow them to interfere in the normal relationship of parental authority. The UK government is not unique - all countries have such laws. Further, the UK government controls who enters and leaves their borders and in what circumstances. Did the NHS (or the hospital) take custody of the child away from the parents? Almost certainly not - this was not a custody battle. Or does the NHS get to decide upon the welfare of its patients once they are in the system? Of course. Every medical professional/hospital/clinic everywhere in the world has a legal and moral responsibility to provide treatment in the best interests of their patients. They will get sued if they don't. Why were the parents not able to take Charlie away on their own recognizance, like (presumably) adults can refuse treatment and leave the hospital? Because an adult can decide for themselves, a child cannot. Other people have responsibility for deciding for the child and when, as here, people with overlapping responsibilities (parents and medical professionals) have divergent views, the government intervenes through executive or judicial action.
In germany, you are likely charged if you actively interfere. Let's preface this with the fact, that in Germany, people have a duty to aid in case of accidents, as long as you don't endanger yourself. The absolute minimum is to call the emergency service and not obstruct those that render aid. However, just not rendering aid is rarely charged. However, since a few years, people that slow down to make videos of crash sites or who stop to look at an accident, and in doing so block emergency helpers, are now almost routinely charged with obstruction of emergency workers, together with possibly other charges like assault and insult. One of the most prominent cases was in 2017, where the person attacked emergency workers and police. He was sentenced to 4 months for the various assaults and bodily injury. Based on this case (where the person was just sentenced for resisting police and assault), it ultimately lead to a new law. One of many cases that started in 2023 had a similar pattern but the charge is based on the new law: § 323 c Abs. 2 StGB - not delivering aid and obstruction of aiding persons. This law allows up to one year of prison time for hindering any person rendering aid. Also, creating pictures at accident sites that depict people or corpses and sharing them in a manner that is humiliating to the victims in itself can be a breach of § 201 a StGB - injury of privacy by means of photography. This can get a sentence of up to two years, and would most likely be joined by a charge of not delivering aid and obstructing helpers. Do note that this is not covering photos that were made for example as evidence of the situation or not shared with third parties. Being in peril yourself... When you technically are in peril yourself, you don't have to render aid. Being stupid like grabbing your carry-on luggage isn't technically covered by the law, and because the person is in danger themselves, it will be very hard for the prosecution to decide if they want to prosecute. If Alice just grabs her carry-on in panic and nothing happens as she evacuates, charging will be extremely unlikely, as in, the chance is nigh nonexistent. Bob, who steps out of the way of others while he calmly takes his things is not interfering with the rescue, and thus charging him is most likely not going to happen. But Charly, who blocks the path of everybody because he wants to go to the other end of the plane to get his luggage and does not let anybody pass and thus increasing the danger of the situation (or even cause death) might break the threshold that the prosecution is willing to prosecute to make an example out of him. The more egregious his behavior was, the more they might look into if other charges can become applicable. However, those other charges are usually not from the blocking or inaction, but from an action against someone that is in the same peril as the actor. If Dora during the building fire grabbed a fire axe and smacked it over someone's head while he was trying to evacuate her, so she could get her items from another room, that would be dangerous mayhem (§ 224 StGB, Gefährliche Körperverletzung).
Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.).
Is it legal in the UK to give different prices to different users, for price optimisation, using A/B testing I'm the CTO for a startup that is about to launch. We have a monthly subscription plan, and we are not sure what price to set it at. We have done some rough analysis, but we are considering using A/B testing to optimise the price further. I want to know if there are any laws against this, considering we are a UK incorporated company, and we will be marketing to people worldwide. I don't want to know reasons for or against A/B testing prices unless they have a legal basis, such as angering users and so on, only any potential legal ramifications. So far I haven't found any online.
You need professional legal advice You need to comply with the law in every jurisdiction in which you do business. Your place of incorporation is irrelevant. If you are selling to Uzbekistan you need to comply with Uzbeki law, Queensland, Queensland and Australian law, Maine, Maine and US law etc. In most jurisdictions, discrimination is legal unless it is on the basis of a protected class, usually things like sex, race, etc. In the EU, price discrimination is illegal if it is an abuse of market power. Therefore, among other things you have to have market power. https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-paper/gclc_wp_07-05.pdf
Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.
The BBC iPlayer restrictions are not, as far as I'm aware, based on regulations; they are based on licensing agreements (in fact, the page you link to says this explicitly). Whether the same is true of programs from other services in other countries--or even other services in the UK--is going to depend on the contracts between those services and you and the contracts between those services and their content providers.
Discriminatory pricing is a real thing. See this BuzzFeed video on discriminatory pricing as an example on how men's and women's products cost differently, even if the men's product consumes more raw material yet still costs less. However, it's illegal for hotels to charge different rates for their rooms, or for restaurants to charge unfairly or give preferential treatment; they are "public accommodations" protected under the various Civil Rights Acts. However, colleges are exempt from current laws, and it's not just tech colleges; even traditional colleges require different SAT scores for entry based on race and/or gender, and also charge different tuition. They are private accommodations and are therefore generally allowed to do this. For example, you'll have a much harder time getting in to Harvard if you're of a particular race, even if you can afford the tuition, simply because you'll be expected to have a higher SAT score. There was a class action lawsuit in California over this (the students were above 4.0 GPA, yet denied entry based on race), and as a result of law changes afterwards, California institutions can no longer do this. This is not the situation in the rest of the country, as no Federal law yet exists that protects minorities, gender, sexual orientation, etc, in regards to higher education. Also, sometimes merely proving a gap exists might not be noticeable, as companies are also starting to display pages on their websites based on data-mined information about visitors, possibly including information that would otherwise be discriminatory if it were done in person, and hiding the information from the general public. Discrimination is a difficult beast to tame, and until the law is introduced that all products and services must be offered to all consumers at the same price regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, etc, businesses will continue to find ways to discriminate in legal ways.
Under the law of common law contracts, posting a price is an invitation to treat and is not binding. However, in many jurisdictions, there may be (probably is) statutory consumer protection law that make this practice illegal. Whether this means the business must honor the price or merely makes them liable to prosecution and fines depends on the specific law. For example, in Australia the law refers to this as multiple pricing. The law requires that the business withdraw the product from sale until the multiple pricing is fixed (i.e. they take the poster down) or, if they are unable or unwilling to do this, they must sell for the lower price. If they do neither then they have committed an offence and are liable to be fined by the government; the consumer does not get any compensation.
It's not illegal to ask. Whether they can give it to you, and under what circumstances, is another, much more complicated matter. For instance, if the database contains health information covered by HIPAA in the United States, or personal information covered by laws like GDPR or CCPA, the customer's ability to share the database may be restricted, either requiring additional confidentiality obligations/use restrictions, or preventing sharing entirely.
The creator of the software doesn't provide any warranty. If you feel confident in the quality of the software, nothing stops you from providing a warranty. If the software doesn't meet your guarantees, you will have to pay out because you provided the warranty, depending on the terms. Not the creator of the software because they explicitly didn't provide any warranty. If that's what you want to do, go ahead. I wouldn't. You don't have to republish under the BSD license, which you wouldn't. You must attach the license terms, which clarifies the role of the original creators, and that they don't give a warranty. Doing this allows you to copy the software. It doesn't mean you can't provide a warranty.
The customer will own exactly what is stated in the contract. As the contractor, who wants to be able to reuse code (which is in everybody’s best interest) you want to keep the copyright, with the client having the license to use the code any way they want. If the customer wants the copyright with the contractor losing all rights, that will be in the contract, and it will cost. If the contractor produced an application that use lots of domain knowledge supplied by the client, that will often not give the client copyright, if the contractor is the one producing the actual expression of that knowledge by translating knowledge into code. If the client provides knowledge that is actually a trade secret, then an NDA should be signed. And again, it’s contracts. The client can put into the contract that their domain knowledge must not be reused. That is quite reasonable. The client might add to the contract that the contractor will not write software for any competitor. That is legal if it is in the contract, but it will cost.
Liabilities of countries as members of the Universal Postal Union Bob, in country A, sends Alice, living in country B (one of the most corrupt countries in the world) a gift by air mail: some non-prohibited good stuff of a total weight 10 kg which will make Alice very happy. The customs declaration/consignment note lists all items/weights diligently. The parcel is insured — Bob will get compensated by country A's post if something goes wrong. The tracking shows that when the parcel left country A it was still 10 kg. But the very first record in country B (at the customs) shows now only 5 kg. There are no tracking events while in transit between A and B. Alice, upon receiving the parcel, demands that it is weighed, opened and the contents are documented on an official report. This is done and now she has legal proof of the loss. Now, whereas the items could have been stolen anywhere in transit between A and B, there is a pattern of incidents like this occurring in B. Allegedly, and according to some insider's info, the corrupt customs of B feel free to open parcels, take whatever they like without an official record, and then weight and register the incoming parcel. Bob files a claim with A's post and gets his compensation. As for a member of the Universal Postal Union, what repercussions will occur for country B? Are they allowed to keep stealing stuff at the sender insurer's expense? Will they face any penalties (e.g. banned from the Union) that would encourage them to hold their customs to account?
As for a member of the Universal Postal Union, what repercussions will occur for country B? None. Are they allowed to keep stealing stuff at the sender insurer's expense? Well, country B isn't stealing stuff. Bad actors in the employe of country B are stealing stuff. This is a matter for law enforcement in country B. If country B is endemically corrupt as seems to be implied, then it is likely that the bad actors will continue to be bad actors. As for the insurer, they are in the business of selling insurance against theft (among other things) and they will take this into account in setting their premiums. Will they face any penalties (e.g. banned from the Union) that would encourage them to hold their customs to account? All member countries of the UN are entitled to be members of the UPU and it seems unlikely that such minor issues could lead to expulsion from the UN - nation-states that have committed genocide are still UN members after all. Since the UPU appears to produce more upsides than downsides, being one of, if not the single most successful and universally adopted international treaty in history this is just one of the minor annoyances.
No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.
Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.
Let's break it apart: The police has an union or charity. That's legal in most jurisdictions. The union or charity accepts donations from non-police. Also legal in most jurisdictions. The union communicates who the donors are. Generally legal in most jurisdictions. Keeping it secret would be just as problematic. Police officers have some discretion if and how they charge incidents. That's just common sense. Otherwise you get cases like 8-year-olds being arrested. (You get those anyway when the police don't use their discretion, or if the laws are too rigid.) Police officers let themselves be influenced by the donor card in how they apply their discretion. That's usually illegal on the part of the police officer. The Brits use the catchphrase 'without fear or favour.' But it is difficult to prove, even if it is systematic. The union issues donor cards to facilitate the effects of the previous bullet point. That sounds at the very least unethical. Some might argue that it is organized corruption. On the other hand, you can assume that the police unions have some decent lawyers on staff, and that they made sure that the words on their cards are not blatantly illegal in the jurisdiction in question. It might take something like a whistleblower, a sting operation, or an internal affairs investigation to prove corruption.
Does returning an illegal product back to the seller for the refund make one liable to said product distribution? The offence, in the USA, relating to posting counterfeit goods (such as bootleg copies of copyrighted items) is at 18 U.S. Code § 2320 (a)(1) Whoever intentionally - traffics in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services ... (f)(5) the term “traffic” means to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or to make, import, export, obtain control of, or possess, with intent to so transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of My reading of (f)(5), is that the element of possession with intent refers back to the transportation for advantage or gain which would not be the case for a straight refund, so it may be lawful to return the goods - subject to any prohibitions imposed by the postal carrier. However, there is no requirement to return counterfeit goods to the seller according to EBay's Money Back Guarantee Counterfeit items If a buyer reports that an item is counterfeit, and there are strong indicators that the item is counterfeit, we may not require the buyer to return the item to the seller. The buyer agrees to cooperate with us to ensure proper disposal of the item. In such instances, we refund the buyer for the full cost of the item and original shipping, and the seller is required to reimburse us for the refund. The buyer may not sell the item on eBay or elsewhere.
There is no contract Specifically, an agreement to agree is void for uncertainty. If the total cost of shipping was an insignificant fraction of the value of the contract then there might be sufficient certainty - that is, it could be argued that the buyer (or seller) has agreed to pay a reasonable rate for shipping. However, in the context of most items on the site this is unlikely to be the case. As an aside, your use of the term "rescind" is incorrect. Rescission occurs when one party breaches a term of the contract and the other party elects to terminate (and optionally seek damages) in response. The correct term for both parties agreeing to release the other is "termination by agreement".
Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
The party that made the overpayment would have the right to sue you for "unjust enrichment" or "breach of contract" (since the terms of service no doubt provide or strongly imply that you are entitled to only one payment per sale), if you didn't voluntarily return the overpayment following a demand to do so, even though you received it through no fault of your own. Most of the core cases involve clerical errors in the bank account number used for a bank deposit. In general, there is a right to recover an accidental transfer of property to another, even in the absence of a clearly applicable contractual arrangement. As another example, if you were accidentally given a valuable coat at a coat check by accident and didn't notice it until later, the true owner would have a right to have it returned. The FTC regulation applies (as demonstrated by the link cited in the question) to intentional unsolicited deliveries of merchandise (which would always be tangible personal property by definition) to you through the mail. It does not apply to transfers of money, or to the accidental mis-delivery of property to the wrong person or the wrong address. The law in question is as follows: 39 U.S. Code § 3009 - Mailing of unordered merchandise (a) Except for (1) free samples clearly and conspicuously marked as such, and (2) merchandise mailed by a charitable organization soliciting contributions, the mailing of un­ordered merchandise or of communications prohibited by subsection (c) of this section constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair trade practice in violation of section 45(a)(1) of title 15. (b) Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. All such merchandise shall have attached to it a clear and conspicuous statement informing the recipient that he may treat the merchandise as a gift to him and has the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. (c) No mailer of any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, shall mail to any recipient of such merchandise a bill for such merchandise or any dunning communications. (d) For the purposes of this section, “un­ordered merchandise” means merchandise mailed without the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient.
What are the regulations around autonomous/unmanned boats? I'm an engineer working on an autonomous boat project. I want to make sure I'm not breaking any laws, but I've been unable to find any laws specifically regulating drone boats (unmanned/autonomous). Is this simply a relatively unregulated area, or am I missing a bunch of regulations that do exist? I'm specifically interested in regulations that govern when and where autonomous boats can travel, and any limitations on their use. For example, aerial drones can only be operated within line of sight. It seems like there are no such restrictions on drone boats. I'm operating out of the US, but I'm interested in any relevant laws in the US or internationally.
Assuming we're talking about U.S. jurisdiction due to your location, some aspects of your question are addressed in this Professional Marine article from June-July 2018, which generally notes that your autonomous boat will still have to comply with any regulations for vessels of its size and speed in terms of things such as operational control, visibility, collision avoidance, etc.: Lt. Chris Rabalais of the U.S. Coast Guard shared some opinions about these small ASVs. If you’re operating them in the 100 percent remotely controlled mode, you’re basically the responsible skipper even though you may be standing on the shore. Rabalais had something to say about the larger ASVs as well. If you intend to operate a larger ASV in U.S. waters in the 100 percent autonomous or semi-autonomous mode, he recommends an early and open communications relationship between the builder or operator and Coast Guard personnel. In short, check with your local Coast Guard station and/or whatever local agency oversees putting boats in whatever body of water you want to operate.
The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.
The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though.
Google maps (Street View, Google Earth) are all legal, although perhaps they are illegal in North Korea (along with many other things). Permission would be required for them to enter your house and take pictures, but if it can be seen publically, it is legal unless there is a specific law forbidding taking pictures. It is possible that there are legal restrictions on the Street View method of driving around with a camera in some countries, but Earth view shots are obtained by satellite, which is out of the jurisdiction of the objecting country. The Street View gap for Belarus may be due to a legal restriction, or it could just be Google-strategic (there seems to be no public explanation). There have been numerous "legal encounters" involving Street View and the authorities, in the realm of privacy concerns: there is no general rule. Google has the right to make and distribute these photos because there is no (enforceable) law against doing so, unless there is.
Here are the Washington state proclamations with legal force, for example this proclamation amending proclamation 20-05. The legal authority is the paragraph starying "NOW, THEREFORE, I, Jay Inslee, Governor of the state of Washington" and what follows is what is legally proclaimed, in this case the effect is to "waive and suspend portions of Title 79 RCW that require in-person meetings", pertaining to Dep't. of Natural Resources. Here is 20-25, the original stay-home proclamation. It claims Chapters 38.08, 38.52 and 43.06 RCW as authority, and prohibit[s] all people in Washington State from leaving their homes or participating in social, spiritual and recreational gatherings of any kind regardless of the number of participants, and all non-essential businesses in Washington State from conducting business, within the limitations provided herein. 43.06.220 is the main hammer that the governor can wield. The powers granted by the legislature include: (1) The governor after proclaiming a state of emergency and prior to terminating such, may, in the area described by the proclamation issue an order prohibiting: (a) Any person being on the public streets, or in the public parks, or at any other public place during the hours declared by the governor to be a period of curfew; (b) Any number of persons, as designated by the governor, from assembling or gathering on the public streets, parks, or other open areas of this state, either public or private; (c) The manufacture, transfer, use, possession or transportation of a molotov cocktail or any other device, instrument or object designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion; (d) The transporting, possessing or using of gasoline, kerosene, or combustible, flammable, or explosive liquids or materials in a glass or uncapped container of any kind except in connection with the normal operation of motor vehicles, normal home use or legitimate commercial use; (e) The sale, purchase or dispensing of alcoholic beverages; (f) The sale, purchase or dispensing of other commodities or goods, as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace; (g) The use of certain streets, highways or public ways by the public; and (h) Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace. One could argue that some order is not reasonable, and perhaps it would fail strict scrutiny, if anyone sued. At present, though, there is no legal order. There is a guidance, a statement of best practices. There may well be a formal proclamation on this topic, which would wrap this in the legalities of other official proclamations. It boils down to RCW 43.06.220(1)(h).
As was mentioned in a comment, in the United States, businesses are generally registered at the state level. The information collected, and the extent to which or manner in which the public has access to it, varies from state to state. There may still be states where that's a paper-only process, but I'd guess in most of them it's accessible online, at least for basic information. For example, in Michigan the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs has a Business Entity Search tool. If a business deals directly with consumers, it may be a member of the Better Business Bureau. Even if it isn't, but consumers have complained about it, the BBB will make public the information it has about the purported business. If a company is publicly traded (that is, it's corporation that issues stock, and the stock is traded on a stock exchange), it is required by law to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC's EDGAR tool will display the company's filings, which should include annual and quarterly reports. If the company is or wants to be a government contractor, it generally needs to register with the General Services Administration, and certain information about successfully registered entities is publicly viewable in that system. (Conversely, the same system also lists "Excluded Parties" who are prohibited or partially restricted from doing business with the government.) Depending on what the business does, it may also be subject to registration with and regulation by additional state or federal agencies. For a full picture, however, unless you're dealing with the obvious agent of a Fortune 500 company, you'll probably want to get information from a private credit-check service as well; for example, as also mentioned in a comment, Dun & Bradstreet for the business itself, or for a really small business a personal credit report on each of the owners and officers.
Governments have a significant interest in controlling pathogens and preventing outbreaks: they are dangerous to dense & unimmunized populations. Can a government legally prevent me from intentionally infecting myself with a virus? Yes, governments have the broad authority to enact laws. The US prohibits and regulates pathogen experimentation (self-infection). There are also rules regarding shipping and export (ITAR). Furthermore, in the US, there are (FL, NY state) laws that prevent patients from being tested unless the order is given by an authorized health care professional. Hopefully, you do live in a state that does not have this regulation (AZ). While I do believe in one's right to do as one sees fit with one's own body, there is the counter-argument: there must be limits when it comes to unnecessarily exposing the community to pathogen risk. I hope that this question is theoretical and that nobody actually believes the immunity supposition without a credible peer-reviewed scientific publication. Unfortunately we live in an age where misinformation is propagated at novel speed and scale. I wish the OP well. That being said, I have concerns regarding the underlying assumptions of the question. While I am comfortable with the OP question, the underlying assumptions give me great pause. UPDATE IMHO: I hope that no reader will seriously consider amateur experimentation in self-infection in the hope of conferring immunity. Giving a pathogen uncontrolled safe-haven to propagate and possibly infect others seems irresponsible. I doubt that the government cares if any individual manages to puts themselves in an early grave, however, it does care if amateurs create an unnecessary pandemic risk. I would think that any government would view pathogen experimentation much like nuclear device experimentation, because of the mass casualty risk. I hope that readers understand the implications of an amateur uncontrolled experiment.
Yes More exactly, nations will not regard places outside of their physical limits as outside of their jurisdictions. Overview Traditionally, a nation has regarded any ship flying its flag as under its jurisdiction, and a place where it may enforce its laws. More recently, many nations will undertake to enforce laws in cases where their citizens are the victims, or in some cases the perpetrators of crimes even within other nations, and more freely on the high seas outside the physical limits or territorial waters of any country. Historically, all nations undertook to enforce laws against piracy wherever they might be committed. Several countries, including the UK and the US, now treat the UN Law of the Sea convention as part of their national law, which defines as piracy: "illegal acts of violence or detention ... against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft" This would include the situation described in the question. Therefore such actions could and quite likely would be prosecuted by any of several countries, depending on the registry of the vessel and the nationalities of those involved. Sources 18 U.S. Code § 7 provides that: The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, as used in this title, includes: (1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. ... (7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States. (8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States. This US DOJ page says: Among the offenses within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States are the crimes of murder, manslaughter, maiming, kidnapping, rape, assault, and robbery. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) there is also jurisdiction over such offenses when they are committed on the high seas or any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States that is out of the jurisdiction of any particular state. See JM 9-20.000 et seq. The page "Maritime Offenses" from the law offices of Trombley and Hanes says: The Federal government also exercises jurisdiction over certain maritime offenses. There is Federal jurisdiction for offenses committed on American vessels in the territorial waters, harbors and inland waterways of foreign nations. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933). ... A number of Title 18 sections specifically declare certain conduct to be a Federal crime if committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” See, e.g., murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111. In some instances, the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, is also applicable. See also, 15 U.S.C. § 1175; 15 U.S.C. § 1243; 16 U.S.C. § 3372. 18 U.S. Code § 1111 (b) provides that: (b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life; Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. The Britannica Article on "Piracy" says: Because piracy has been regarded as an offense against the law of nations, the public vessels of any state have been permitted to seize a pirate ship, to bring it into port, to try the crew (regardless of their nationality or domicile), and, if they are found guilty, to punish them and to confiscate the ship. The UN page on Piracy says: The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the framework for the repression of piracy under international law, in particular in its articles 100 to 107 and 110. The Security Council has repeatedly reaffirmed “that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (‘The Convention’), sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities” (Security Council resolution 1897 (2009), adopted on 30 November 2009). Article 100 of UNCLOS provides that “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” The General Assembly has also repeatedly encouraged States to cooperate to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in its resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea. For example, in its resolution 64/71 of 4 December 2009, the General Assembly recognized “the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional, subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy”. The UK Piracy Act of 1837 defined as a crime: Whosoever, with intent to commit or at the time of or immediately before or immediately after committing the crime of piracy in respect of any ship or vessel, shall assault, with intent to murder, any person being on board of or belonging to such ship or vessel, or shall stab, cut, or wound any such person, or unlawfully do any act by which the life of such person may be endangered, shall be guilty of felony... The more modern UK law, the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act of 1997 embodies the UN law of the Sea convention, including its article 101, which says: Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed— (a) (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (a) (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
Can a US Company be sued for failing to honour equity component of offer of engagement? In the following scenario, does the individual have a legal case against the company? And if so, what law specifically can be applied? Summary A company offers x% equity. The individual engages. The company stalls, eventually offering "x% of profits during employ". The company has acted unethically and cheated the individual, but does the individual have legal recourse? Details A US company (Delaware) engages an individual (UK citizen) to manifest the core technology in exchange for a wage plus x% equity. The CEO projects the value of this equity to be eventually several million dollars. The company stalls on presenting a full legal contract, stating that the internal structure is in flux, presenting instead an interim contract which the individual signs, which makes no mention of equity. The individual commences work, bringing great value to the company. After six months the company finally produces a full legal contract. It offers x% of profits made by the company within the duration of employ. This is absolutely different from x% equity. The individual complains that this is clearly of considerably lesser value (orders of magnitude) from what was offered. First a product must be built. Only then can it be sold. The company has cheated the individual. The investor who initially said "Don't worry, we will not hold you to your stake" now says "We have decided only to reward those that are actively contributing". When challenged (on Slack) for reneging directly upon his word, he remains silent. The CEO says "We can only offer this "phantom" equity due to the way the company has been structured. This is the offer now, take it or leave it. We plan to revise the company structure later." Over the next 18 months, the individual continues to develop the core technology, while refusing to sign any contract that mentions this "phantom" equity. By the end of this period almost the entire technical wing of the company is composed of hires made by the individual. The individual has made a brilliant sequence of moves that would not otherwise have been made, sourcing / hiring developers in capacities in such a way as to guarantee the future of the company's product. Eventually the individual disengages. No revision has occurred. It seems clear that the company has no intention to honour the initial offer. And the product will now succeed. There is no incentive to continue. Evidence Initial email correspondence between individual and CEO making clear that the offer is for 2.5% equity Verified download of all company communication through Slack privy to the individual, demonstrating: repeated attempts by the individual for the company to honour their promise Evasive behaviour from the CEO The investor simply disconnecting from the discussion upon being challenged Contract revisions proffered by the company
does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself.
If the company makes a contract, and as a result of that contract it owes more money than it has, then the company goes bankrupt and the owners and directors can walk away from it. This covers the owners/directors in cases of ordinary business contracts. However if an employee (including an owner or director) does something sufficiently harmful then under the law of torts they can be personally liable as well as the company. Examples are negligence and fraud; if you build someone's new roof while acting as an employee and the roof leaks then its likely to be the company on the hook for damages. However if you misrepresented your qualifications or acted negligently then you might well be personally liable. This is all very general. Details are going to be specific to your jurisdiction. So the answer is that having a company is certainly better than making every contract in your own name, but its not complete cover. You can probably get insurance if this is a concern, but its likely to be expensive.
In the worst case if they shut shop, then how might I go about getting my money back? It is unlikely that you can. A SAFE is not a loan (and for that matter isn't even a share in the company) and doesn't create an enforceable contractual right to get your money back. If you make an equity investment and the company loses money and goes out of business, you lose everything you invested. If the promoter made false representations that induced you to invest, or actively concealed material facts about the investment, you might be able to sue the promoter for securities fraud under federal regulation 10b-5, or under a state securities law, or under a common law fraud theory. You could also sue to issuer of the investment (i.e. the company) but that would usually be futile because the company is broke and hence judgment proof. State or federal securities regulators or a local district attorney or state attorney-general might pursue the case in lieu of a private civil action by you, but getting them to take action is often quite difficult. But, if your investment wasn't induced by fraud and instead the management of the company simply made bad decisions that caused the company to fail, you have no remedy. The investment was for a SAFE (Simple Agreement for Future Equity). I have the signed SAFE with me. This is a very unusual way for a QoZ to be structured, which adds to the sense that this may have been a shady venture.
The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation.
Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.
You say the permission was "public", therefore I am going to assume that it cannot be argued that there was no agreement. There are two possibilities: If Company B has given consideration for the promise then there is a binding contract and Company A may be able to end it but could not seek redress for when it was in place. If there is no contract then the principle of promissory estoppel should have essentially the same effect. An agreement, including an IP licence, does not have to be in writing nor does it have to have any particular form.
england-and-wales No. This type of approach is a breach of the Solicitors Regulation Authority's (SRA) Code of Conduct for solicitors, Registered European Lawyers, and Registered Foreign Lawyers Paragraph 8.9 of the Code states that: You do not make unsolicited approaches to members of the public, with the exception of current or former clients, in order to advertise legal services provided by you, or your business or employer. This requirement is clarified by SRA Guidance that says: ...advertising to the public is permitted, subject to certain conditions... ... Specifically, you are allowed to advertise your services to the public so long as this is done in a non-intrusive and non-targeted way. This means, for example, that you may place an advert on the radio or TV, on billboards, in a local newspaper, online or on a social media platform. However, this advertising is limited... Paragraphs 8.9 and 7.1(c)1 of the Standards and Regulations prohibit unsolicited approaches to members of the public which, even if permitted by law, may feel unwelcome or intrusive. ... This means you cannot make direct or specifically targeted "approaches" to members of the public in person, by phone or via other means which target them individually. (My emphasis) This guidance goes on to give an example of prohibited advertising of the sort suggested by the OP: Firm A identifies from online media a list of people who have recently been involved in a major road traffic accident. The firm sends them a letter saying that it can help claim compensation. We [i.e. the SRA] would consider this a breach of our standards as it involves a targeted approach to specific members of the public which may feel intrusive to those who receive it due to the particular circumstances that they find themselves in. 1Paragraph 7.1 (c) of the Code of Conduct for Firms applies the same standard to firms.
A SAFE is basically what used to be called a "subscription agreement", i.e. an agreement to invest money in the future that will ultimately give rise to an equity investment if made. From a practical perspective, while the contract is legally enforceable, pursuing a lawsuit to enforce it is almost always a death knell level bad move. Firms who sue investors early in the game don't get future investors. The amount of time it takes to enforce such an agreement in a lawsuit is also too long (perhaps a year or two before you have money in hand if it runs its course and still many months if it settles), and the cost of doing so is too great (probably more than $40,000 that you won't get back to bring in $400,000), for it to make sense to do so at the delicate early stage of a start up. Instead, what you need to do is get on the phone with the investor, or quite possibly meet in person, at their offices or in a more casual deal making environment over drinks, for example, to figure out what is troubling them or slowing things up and how to make them happy. This is more of a function of continuing to sell the fact that you are good investment and an opportunity that they are missing out on, than it is about telling them about your legal rights. If this fails, it is probably wiser to seek financing from someone else than to force them to perform.
Can a court order reveal an ssn? Is there any situation where a court might order someone to reveal their ssn? Has this happened and what justification was given?
Can a court order reveal an ssn? Yes, although the legitimacy of such order strongly depends on the claims/charges at issue. That being said, the party may (and should) file a motion to have the records sealed, since the public disclosure --insofar as court filings are public records-- of a SSN is extremely unlikely to advance "the interests of justice" in the claims at issue.
The law, at section 52(4) Data Protection Act 2018 does not expressly require a signature. What is needed is confirmation of one's identity: Where the controller has reasonable doubts about the identity of an individual making a request under section 45, 46 or 47, the controller may— (a) request the provision of additional information to enable the controller to confirm the identity, and (b) delay dealing with the request until the identity is confirmed. One option is to submit the request with an explanation as to why your signature has changed and wait and see if the data controller comes back for additional information. If you can't provide anything more, or they still won't process your request if you do, there's alway the option of appealing to the Information Commissioner's Office
Yes, you can ask but if they don’t they can come in anyway. The law gives them the right to enter in certain circumstances. Notwithstanding, any government employee that disclosed confidential information that they got in the course of their employment could be sued and possibly prosecuted.
You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not.
There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.
An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.
No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal.
The warning notice is intended for viewers and participants, not for the court to make its own official record of the proceedings. Presumably, it was this court record that the judge released for educational purposes under his own Order via Twitter. In which case, there has been no contempt of court.
What is the meaning of notwithstanding in this context? In this Trust document can you explain the meaning of " notwithstanding"? I believe the Trustees feel it means in spite of. My interpretation is that it means with exception of. Here's how it's written, On page 29 of the 5th Amendment, the definition of education is outlined for the Education Trust. It is: Definition of "Education." Notwithstanding subparagraph 5(b) of Article Twenty of this agreement, as used in this Article only, the term "education" shall mean only undergraduate and graduate study leading to a degree, in any and all fields whatsoever, whether of a professional character or otherwise, at an accredited university, college, or other institution of higher learning, whether public or private. The activities described in this paragraph may be carried on either in the United States or elsewhere. In determining payments to be made for all such education, the Trustee shall take into account and may pay for the beneficiary's reasonable costs of tuition, room, board (whether or not charged by an educational institution at which such individual shall be a student), books, laboratory or other equipment or tools (including computer hardware and software), fees, travel to and from school, transportation and charges for tutoring. Thank you so much for any input and observations.
What is the meaning of notwithstanding in this context? The clause that starts with "notwithstanding" narrows down the levels of studies that are eligible for payment by the Trustee(s). In other words, for purposes of payment of benefits, "education" can be interpreted only as "undergraduate and graduate study", and thus it overrides --only pursuant to that clause-- the wide encompassing notion of "education" as defined in paragraph 5(b). The clause implies that any other levels of studies, such as "elementary or high schools", are not eligible for payment by the Trustee(s). The inclusion of "notwithstanding" seems intended to reflect the awareness of apparent discrepancy of the definitions of "education", and to consequently clarify the intent that paragraph 5(b) be regarded as the appropriate definition of "education" for everything except the matter of payments.
Legalese The purpose of a legal document is to set out the rights and responsibilities so that: they can understand them, a third party (e.g. a judge) can rule on them in the event of a dispute. These two requirements are often in tension. We have about 1,000 years of legal precedent where certain words and phrases (sometimes in Latin rather than English) have developed very clear and precise meanings. This serves very well for the 2nd point but it can be confusing to lay people especially where: the word as used in everyday speech has a broader meaning than the way it is used in the law (e.g. shall), the word is no longer used in everyday speech (e.g. thou), or the damn thing is in Latin (e.g. certiorari). For example: "Thou shall not kill" is a legal prohibition - killing by you must not happen. However, "Killing is illegal" is merely an observation. TL;DR There is no reason why an agreement cannot be expressed in plain English. However, when put in front of a judge, that plain English must be interpreted; maybe it is better to use words that have clear and unambiguous legal definitions? An anecdote, probably untrue In the spirit of never letting the truth get in the way of a good story. The legal fraternity's love of opaque language supposedly dates from the 1600s. In those days a lawyer was paid by the folio - a large piece of paper. As a consequence lawyers used very big handwriting. Parliament, justifiably, thought that this was a rort and legislated that lawyers must be paid by the word. So now we have "in the event that" instead of "if" because 400 years ago it was worth four times as much. Parliaments do this kind of thing a lot.
There isn't a difference. The terminology in England and Wales that means the same thing is "litigant in person", with the source of these Latin phrases have abandoned them in favor of plain English terminology. The variation of usage, however, does not necessarily break down on a federal v. state court basis. Pro se is the majority usage, but the variation is more regional, within state courts, than it is a federal v. state divide. California and Michigan, for example, use both terms and use them interchangeably. If there is a historical reason for the variation in terminology, I haven't groked it. Incidentally, there was historically a subtle distinction between the two concepts related to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court that has long since become obsolete (more than a century ago), but which movements such as the "sovereign person" movement errantly believe has great legal importance to the power of a court over them.
You have read it: legally It doesn’t matter if you haven’t read it in fact. At law, you have. Therefore you cannot avoid obligations or consequences by saying “ I didn’t read it”. It’s an extension of the common law principle that if you affix your ‘mark’ to a document you were acknowledging that you understood it and would abide by it: even if your mark was an X because you were illiterate. There are protections. At common law an unconscionable term is unenforceable and may void the contract entirely. Additionally, many jurisdictions have passed legislation to make unfair contract terms unenforceable, particularly in contracts of adhesion. Further, consumer protection laws often have non-excludable warranties that operate in spite of the contract.
As a terminological matter, I assume that by "public school" you mean state-operated K-12 systems. As a part of the government, public schools cannot be sued unless the state has allowed a suit on such grounds. Issues such as negligence and violation of rights are not litigated under contract-law theories. Because the public school is required to accept and teach students, parents are required to send their children to school, and parents are not obligated to pay anything, the opportunities for a contract to exist are highly limited. I set aside popular fake contracts between student and teacher which simply recites the teacher's pedagogical vows and expectations, since these are not enforceable contracts with new obligations and consideration. IEP (Individualized Education Program) "contracts" may be advertised as being agreements, but they are mandated (of the school) by law. The contract would be between the parent and the school because the student as a minor lacks capacity to form contracts. The parent cannot be "forced" into an enforceable contract since state law already mandates that the school must provide an education, and the parent never faces the "sign or no schooling" choice. Public schools can, of course, contract with a business, for example a pest-control service, or employment in general. The person whom they contract with can naturally be a parent of a child in the district, but the business contract is incidental to the person's being a parent.
A private school in the US is not bound by the 4th Amendment requirement for searches to be "reasonable", just as parents do not need a search warrant to search your room. Instead, limitations would arise from contract law. This typically means that per the contract whereby you can go to that school, you agree to certain things (as do they). This may or may not include the power for a teacher to conduct a surprise inspection. It just depends on what is said in the contract regarding dorm room searches. Typically, adjudication of this type of matter is left to parental outrage rather than courts, unless there is a clear violation of the contract terms.
A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.
The plain meaning of "any" is "all". That does not mean that that is how the word is interpreted under current US law: that can only be determined by inspecting the case law. In US v. Alabama 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (No. 11-14532-CC), fn. 2 states "Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card", thus this court has suggested that the meaning is actually "some". However, the case was not ruling on the interpretation of "any" here, so this could be a slip. The case involves an Alabama law, which as reported in the opinion's summary of the part of Alabama law being challenged by the US states: Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)..." indicating that the Alabama statute refers to "some" (which could influence the interpretation of "any", since "some" and "any" are often mixed up in legal drafting). That is, it is possible that the court in the footnote read "any" as "some" because the state law in question, which is parallel to the federal law, says "an". In US v Arizona 641 F.3d 339, the court weakly suggests a "some" interpretation as well, saying: Determining Congress' purpose, and whether Section 3 poses an obstacle to it, first requires that we evaluate the text of the federal registration requirements in in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one's registration document at all times.. Again, the meaning of "any" is not the central issue: in using "one's registration document" in the singular, the court must have been interpreting "any" as "some". US v. Daubon 334 Fed.Appx. 167 (2009), another case that invokes the law but does not rule on the meaning of "any", rephrases the law: 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) requires every alien over eighteen to carry his permanent resident card at all times. which is at odds with the possibility of there being two such documents: it suggests that an I-766 is not good enough. Lexis-Nexis returns 18 cases that cite this statute, and only Arizona v. US which was about the preemption issue was decided by SCOTUS. None of these opinions rules on the meaning of "any", so the matter has not yet been decided.
Would conditioning wildlife to harrass someone playing music too loud risk legal repercussions? This XKCD comic jokingly suggest training wildlife to harass people playing music too loud in their car: I'm pretty sure no one is actually considering a solution like this, but it made me curious what would happen if someone tried it. I'd consider training wildlife to harass individuals to be generally antisocial, even if they were playing annoying music, and conditioning to harass someone who is driving when it could potentially lead to an accident would be doubly so. Thus it would presumably be something the government, and thus legal system, would want to discourage. The question is rather the legal system has any rules about this particular situation. Thus I'm wondering if someone tried this and it lead to a driver being harassed by animals could there be any legal repercussions, and if so what would they be? I'd count both civil or criminal actions here. If jurisdiction matters the creator of the comic is located in Massachusetts, USA. For now lets ignore any potential disturbing the peace issues that may come up with playing music when food is dispensed.
The means and motivation by which you intentionally harass people are no defense. There is no material difference whether you harass someone yourself, ask someone else to harass, use a drone or trained/tamed animals. Whether you harass because the target may subjectively deserve so also makes no difference. The legal repercussions stay the same: charge, trial, conviction, sentence.
Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined).
If you have sufficient grounds to fear that someone is about to infringe on one of your rights, you can go to court to obtain an injunction against that person. This is a court order to refrain from some particular action. In many cases, the point of this is just to have the legal debate on whether the anticipated action is actually legal or not before it happens rather than after. However, the punishment for violating the injunction is set by the relevant judge based on how important it is to dissuade the target from actually doing the thing, and how extensive the punishment needs to be in order to achieve this. After a few rounds of your guy doing the copyright infringement, getting an injunction against him doing it again should be quite straight-forward. And if he violates that, it would be reasonable to ask for a significantly higher fine next time, and then more, and more. Injunctions could also involve preparatory actions, eg prohibit the guy to even approach a computer, if this is deemed necessary to prevent reoffending.
In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source.
CRS 18-3-402 states that (1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: (a) The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will which is to say, sex must be consensual. The essence of a legal order for specific performance is that the party's "consent" is irrelevant. This is not limited to Colorado, and would hold in any jurisdiction where prostitution is legal. A court would not order specific performance in this case, neither in Colorado nor Nevada. Nor would the court order specific performance in case the contract allowed one party to beat the other to a pulp. The contract itself is illegal in Colorado, but not in Nevada (certain counties excluded). In that case, the other party is out $5 in Colorado. In Nevada, they would be entitled to a refund (amount to be determined, depending on the facts of the meat pie).
Because you are on their premises and they get to decide what people can or can't do while on their property. This has nothing to do with if recording is legal or not, it has to do with basic property rights and trespass. Let's assume that recording is perfectly legal: so is eating ice cream. However, if its my shop, I can require that you do not make recordings just as I can require that you do not eat ice cream. If I make this requirement known you have three options: you can comply, you can leave or you can stay and do the thing I have prohibited. The first two are legal, the last one isn't; its trespass which is both a tort for which I can sue you and a crime for which you can be arrested and prosecuted.
There's a bit of confusion in the question's comments as to whether "trapping" in these circumstances is unlawful: He found an injured deer in his garden, and trapped it in his shed whilst he tried to find someone to help. It's not an offence, so there is no Catch 22 - it would be permissible under two seperate pieces of legislation: First, there's Section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 which puts the onus on preventing unnecessary suffering to animals: 4 Unnecessary suffering (1)A person commits an offence if— (a)an act of his, or a failure of his to act, causes an animal to suffer, (b)he knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the act, or failure to act, would have that effect or be likely to do so, (c)the animal is a protected animal, and (d)the suffering is unnecessary. Section 2 of the 2006 Act defines "protected animal” to include: (b)it is under the control of man whether on a permanent or temporary basis And secondly, on the basis that the shed is considered a "trap" then the defence to an allegation of unlawful trapping contrary to Section 4 Deer Act 1991: (1)Subject to sections 6 and 8 below, if any person— .. (b)uses for the purpose of taking or killing any deer any trap ... he shall be guilty of an offence Would be at Section 6 of the 1991 Act: ... (3)A person shall not be guilty of an offence under section 4(1)(a) or section 4(1)(b) above by reason of setting in position, or using, any trap or net for the purpose of preventing the suffering of an injured or diseased deer. As the OP rightly points out, releasing a Muntjac deer is an offence under Section 14, Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 ...any person releases or allows to escape into the wild any animal which— (a)is of a kind which is not ordinarily resident in and is not a regular visitor to Great Britain in a wild state; or (b)is included in Part I, IA or IB of Schedule 9, he shall be guilty of an offence. Schedule 9 of the 1981 Act includes: Common Name: Deer, muntjac Scientific Name: Muntiacus reevesi
Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.
Does the Trump campaign have standing to sue over defamation against Trump? The NY Times, the Washington Post and, most recently, CNN, are being sued for defaming Trump. However: As with the other two cases, this one is being brought on behalf of the campaign, rather than Donald Trump himself as a party. How can the Trump campaign have standing to sue for Trump? I wouldn't think that they'd have the standing to do it.
No But they aren’t suing over defamation against Trump; the are suing over (alleged) defamation of the campaign: the Campaign "assessed the potential risks and benefits of again seeking Russia's help in 2020 and has decided to leave that option on the table."
united-states Simply insulting someone without saying something false is not defamation in the U.S. (historically it was the subject of criminal defamation liability to might light of someone's disabilities or call them out in an insulting way, but later U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence interpreting the First Amendment in the late 20th century rendered these laws unconstitutional). If a statement might damage someone's reputation if taken literally, and the statement is false, it can be defamatory and give rise to civil liability (or criminal liability in the few states that still have criminal defamation statutes), if the people to whom the statement is "published" (i.e. the audience of the statement) could reasonably believe that the statement was intended to be taken literally. Whether a statement can be taken literally is an "all of the facts and circumstances" analysis. Statements meant only as hyperbole or parody or metaphorically, if a reasonable audience person would understand the statements in that sense, do not impose liability based upon what they would mean if taken literally. Other Countries As noted in the question itself, not all countries treat statements like this the same way. Germany imposes criminal liability for all manner of insults. England and Wales imposes defamation liability in many circumstances when U.S. law would not. And, many countries in Asia are closef to the German model of liability for insulting speech than they are to the U.S. model.
"Legal problem" is too vague to be included. "Investigation" needs a bit of refining; "lawsuit" is relatively simple (as long as you mean "actual lawsuit" not "idea that maybe we could sue"). There is no central list of all lawsuits against a given party, but you could theoretically check every jurisdiction to see if there is a lawsuit. That's a really big list, maybe in the millions if you want to be complete. You can use ordinary Google search to find announced lawsuits, typically by government agencies. Finding investigations is even more difficult: you will not be able to determine what investigations I am conducting. Even determining the existence of investigations by police including e.g. the FBI is hard to do. A government attorney is the one most likely to reveal that they are investigating some party with the intent to sue them. Again, you can't get a complete list, you can use Google to get an indication of who has announced an investigation (your results will generally not say whether the investigation was closed, unless you pursue that question as well).
If you are Donald Trump posting under an assumed name then it is illegal, because he is currently president of the USA and not supposed to run any businesses. If you are not Donald Trump, then be aware that Donald Trump owns a trademark for "Donald Trump" according to this site https://onlinetrademarkattorneys.com/donald-trump-trademarks/ so you will be infringing on his trademark.
The Copyright Office has determined, in chapter 300 of the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, on page 36, that the copyright bar extends to works created by the President; Congress; the federal judiciary; federal departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, or commissions; or any other officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the course of his or her official duties. So the Senator is a US employee for copyright purposes, at least according to the US Copyright Office. Technically, this is interpretation rather than law, and in theory a court might disagree, but if anyone is qualified to speak on this issue, it's the Copyright Office. In my opinion, it is most reasonable to assume that the Copyright Office is correct in their interpretation unless there is case law directly contradicting them. The only question is whether the letter was created by the Senator "while acting within the course of his or her official duties." I'm not aware of any case law suggesting that constituent building is or is not an "official duty" of a US Senator, and there are reasonable arguments to be made in both directions. On the one hand, the letter is clearly beyond the scope of Congress's lawmaking and oversight Constitutional functions. On the other, the office of Senator is an inherently political office, and a case can be made that campaigning for reelection is part of the job. Perhaps surprisingly, that question was extensively litigated during E. Jean Carroll's first defamation lawsuit against Donald Trump, because Trump argued that his statements about Carroll were within the scope of his employment (and so a defamation claim would be effectively barred under the Westfall Act). To my understanding, the current disposition of that lawsuit is that this is considered a question of fact for a jury to decide (at least according to the Second Circuit). What can be said is who does not hold copyright: The US Senate and/or the US government as a whole. The only way the Senate could acquire copyright in this letter (short of the Senator directly granting it to them) would be as a work made for hire, but the work-for-hire doctrine requires that the work be prepared by an employee as part of their official duties, just like the federal copyright bar. So the Senate cannot acquire copyright in this manner. If anyone owns the copyright, it is most likely the Senator.
There is no real answer to that question at this point. If on filed such a suit, it would probably be under a negligence theory. You would sue: Forbes, because they're the website the user visited? The ad network that provided a vector for infection and didn't properly check their content? The makers of the ad, because they made the ad with malicious intent? and anyone else who might have been negligent. You then have to prove they were negligent. Can the user sue the responsible party for damages? You can sue anyone for anything. The problem is winning. Does it make a difference whether the user has taken due diligence with software updates and patches? It might. Contributory negligence would be an obvious defense to such a suit.
A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
Can I legally put pressure on the company to get a compensation? (e.g. write an article explaining what they did) Writing an article about being fired doesn't have anything to do with the fact that writing that article is legal or not. Sure, you can write an article - or likely an opinion piece - about being fired for what you say are unjust reasons and hope it results in pressure on your old company. This happens all the time in the press; that's what Op-ed and opinion pieces - and also "objective" journalism - do every day. A big corporation isn't going to care about some bad PR from a disgruntled freelancer. Bad PR is not legal pressure. So consider the answer to your last question Can I be sued for warning of a potential crowdfunding scam? which is an outline of defamation law. If you're not very careful (and the publication's editor, if there is one and if they are not well-versed in defamation law), you will defame someone at the company (publish provably false facts) in your article and they (and/or the compnay) can take action against you. And self-publishing a piece has even greater risks of defamation, because it's likely you don't know the boundaries of defamation. Defamation is complex (especially in an international context) and turns on many details of the facts, how they were published, and more. But: how much money do you have to defend yourself against a libel suit? Another point to consider is this: even if you don't clearly libel someone at the company, the company can still take action against you. They can retaliate against bad PR with a lawsuit. You say they have lawyers and can afford it, and you're alone. Can you afford to defend yourself? Is it worth suing them (they're US-based), considering the cost or the legal action would not come cheap (I guess)? As a side note I am based in Europe (I avoid putting the country here, as a means to protect my privacy) That's entirely up to you. No one here will advise you about that. Only you can make that decision, or your lawyer can advise you on that. Talk to an attorney who might take on such an action, and one involving international jurisdictions (a US state and the unnamed European - possibly EU - country). Aside from potential libel, the other important aspect is to determine what legally can be done internationally in terms of defamation, both with any potential action you take and what actions the company can take against you. That will be determined by different laws and international agreements between the US (and possibly the state) and the unnamed (possibly EU) European country. The minor aspect of your dispute is your termination and the employment contract: The company engaging with the contractor has the right to terminate the agreement after several warnings have been issues.... However, no FORMAL warning has ever been issued. That's legally vague enough to allow the company to fire you at any time. (Update from comments: Virginia is a "Right to Work" state which means that the employer may fire the employee for any reason without cause unless the employee is being fired for being a member of a protected class, i.e.race, religion, sex, etc.) Again, international jurisdictions come into play concerning labor laws. Can you find a lawyer who will take on an international labor dispute?
Is it legal to crack MD5 hashes? I saw a website that involves programming problems. One problem asks to write a program that finds a string whose MD5 hash is given. Is it criminal to crack the MD5 hash by finding those strings?
Is it criminal to find strings whose MD5 hash is known? No, unless the method or purpose involves gaining (or attempting to obtain) unauthorized access to others' computer systems or networks, or causing damage to them. This applies regardless of whether you program some brute-force algorithm rather or query a public [online] database that stores reverse hashes.
So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.
There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.
If it was something important to the owner, they would file injunctions/suits against everybody that they find the code in, and make those very public. This isn't unlike what the RIAA did to individual downloaders of pirated music files, filing over 18,000 lawsuits. They could subpoena GitHub for information related to IP addresses for who downloaded the code and go after them. It is unlikely that they would get a financial award but they could have the court order them to stop using it. Eventually the RIAA found that filing these lawsuits was more trouble than it was worth and started going after the internet service providers. These reduced the number of lawsuits and forced ISP's to moderate its own users, blocking some sites and protocols that programs like Napster relied on. Basically they shifted responsibility from themselves to the ISP's.
Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.
It is, in most jurisdictions, not a crime to download YouTube videos. For criminal law, the answer is that it is not illegal. In many jurisdictions, downloading music or video of any kind from the internet is not a crime. Thus, police has no power to punish you for downloading, and even less power to shutdown such "downloader" websites. YouTube's Terms of Service seem to disallow such downloads so YouTube has the right to terminate the agreement with the downloader. They may prevent you from viewing any more videos, for example. However, I think Google does not even have a technical measure in place to do that. Google is not interested in preventing you from using YouTube (its servers can handle that) and that is pretty much the only punishment it can use. Google could use the Terms of Services to say that the downloader-websites are breaking them and thus should not have access to YouTube. The websites could be sued for breaking the Terms of Services (and the court could order them to stop) and Google can block those websites from accessing YouTube by technical measures. It appears it did so in at least one case. Google could sue you (or the websites) for advertisement revenue loss, but it is unlikely. In theory, Google loses advertisement revenue from the video playbacks you would have done on YouTube but did not play because you downloaded the video and played it offline (contrary to the Terms of Service). Google might attempt to sue a downloader website on this basis and try to make it give it money. It would be difficult for Google to prove that it deserves such money, though. I cannot imagine how it would prove that "you would have played the video online, again, with advertisements, if you didn't download it. Note that when you replay a video from browser cache, advertisements do not replay. Why Google doesn't sue downloader-website more often? It's expensive. Google could pay a lot of money to shut down a website via court order but if it really wants to do so, they can apply a technical measure (such as IP block) instead. It is much cheaper and has the same effect. This may change in the near future. There's a some talk around about European court rulings and directives that may change this. It is quite possible that in the near future, even viewing illegally uploaded music on YouTube will be criminal. I find this doubtful because of the difficulty of proving knowledge ("How was I supposed to know that it wasn't an official clip?"). As for whether downloading to a file (as opposed to downloading to the browser cache) will become criminal, I really doubt that.
Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.
Unless there is a law or regulation against it, it is legal. However in a big government it can be practically impossible to determine whether something is legal. For example, nobody even knows how many criminal statutes have been promulgated by the U.S. federal government. And that's nothing compared to the volume of executive regulation and judicial case-law that determines whether something is illegal. I.e., in practice determining that something is legal is a bit like proving a negative. Furthermore, if you look long enough some argue that you can probably find some law under which almost any action could be considered illegal. Note also that even if it is not against the law, it could be proscribed by contract (read your Terms and Conditions!), and breach of contract is in general – but with an astonishing number of exceptions! – illegal.
How can I effectively report this? I am in the final round of a set of job interviews with a tech contracting company out of Atlanta. I passed the initial technical screening and the very easy coding interview for a machine learning position. In this position, I'd be given 3 months of intensive machine learning training, and then contracted out to other companies. I'd have to sign a 2 year agreement binding me to this contracting company. None of this seems too bad, but I've recently gotten wind that this company (and many like it) regularly add fake work experience to their employee's resumes, and expect you to lie in interviews to back it up. They have not yet asked me to do this (I'm waiting for them to call me now to give me final details). This has happened to others, and questions like "Should I take this job?" have already been asked here, so I won't repeat them. My question is, if they do admit to to such fraudulent behavior, either in writing or over the phone, what legal action can I take against them? I hate the fact that this is a real thing, and I want to see any company like this shut down. I've been out of grad school for 8 or 9 months now, and I was so excited to finally have a job offer. I am incredibly p*ssed that this job, which I was very excited for, is actually a way for foreign nationals to scam money from major corporations by using me as their dummy. Edit: Just got off the phone on the final interview and I am being pushed forward. I was told that "we give you great, in depth training and then we vouch for you", so no admission of guilt, and their training is reputed to be quite good. I actually enjoyed speaking with their data-science expert about some pretty interesting mathematical concepts. The funny thing is, the caller ID said "Brighter Brain", which is not the company that I am interviewing with. So I did a little googling and found out that this company goes by 5 or so names all around the Atlanta area. Each has complaints against them on various job boards, alleging that they make new employees sign a predatory contract and then force them to lie to clients in order to get the job. Some people are ok with this, and others are not, but seems like it is definitely going on. Any advice is definitely appreciated.
if they do admit to to such fraudulent behavior, either in writing or over the phone, what legal action can I take against them? First of all, the intermediary with whom you are dealing will not admit fraud in writing or over the phone. Most likely the intermediary knows where, when, and how to give a candidate or employee directions that are sought to advance the intermediary's fraudulent purposes. The intermediary's practices sound in violation of Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), OCGA 10-1-390 et seq. The Attorney General is in charge of receiving and processing/channeling all complaints pursuant to the FBPA. See 10-1-395(c). Apropos of your mention of scamming and "foreign nationals", you might want to report the intermediary with the USCIS if you reasonably suspect the intermediary's fraudulent practices extend to obtaining visas for its employees. 18 USC § 1546 sanctions the act of "procur[ing] by means of any false claim or statement" any document of authorized stay or employment in the US. You will have standing to sue the intermediary only if it does something unlawful to you. Even if you end up suing the intermediary, there is a chance that your case would be presided by some corrupt judge/narcofelon whose "philosophy" in court consists of favoring "employers and [...] anybody who's powerful". In line with one of the comments, you might also want to consider denouncing the intermediary publicly. When doing so, you need to ensure that you prove or are able to prove the statements of fact you make about the intermediary. In this publication, I made statements of fact that I can readily prove by showing evidence, such as excerpt(s) of a contract with the crooked intermediary as well as excerpts of his deposition. The only reason why I refrained from disclosing other fraudulent practices this intermediary incurred is that neither these were not recorded nor did he reflect them in writing (your evidence need not be in the form of sworn/notarized documents or court filings; records such as emails would be fine). It is comforting that you are not planning on dealing further with that kind of employer. On paper the intermediary might assure you that you retain full control of your resume, yet that will not prevent him from pressing you in ways you could hardly prove later on.
There are professionals who are doing penetration testing in an attempt to find security vulnerabilities with the target company. They will have a clear, written contract with the target company to permit the attack. Professional conduct means making sure that the permission is genuine before starting the attack. Their aim is to map weak points in the security, not to extract personal data. There will be non-disclosure agreements to make sure. Reports go to the target of the attack, not to any third party. As you describe it, it looks as if scammers are setting you up as the fall guy for their schemes. They and the money will be gone, you go to prison.
Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.
Is there any way I can defend myself against penalties when mistakes are made in my favor? Another option, in a similar vein to your suggestions, is to make a contemporaneous record of the conversations. Then send an email* to the public official detailing what was said and agreed, along with a request that they reply with any observations or amendments within a certain time frame. That way you have a date-stamped document properly addressed to the other party to use as evidence or leverage. *or a recorded delivery letter etc
must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Consistent with others' answer, no, you don't need a lawyer. But your question in and of itself is indicative of the steep learning curve you would need to undergo in order to avoid "shooting yourself in the foot", as the saying goes. By this I am not encouraging you to get a lawyer (in fact, here on stackexchange and elsewhere I promote litigation in pro per). Instead, I encourage people to learn about the applicable statutes, procedural laws, how to conduct legal research, and to draft/present their arguments in court. Here are some suggestions regarding your response letter: Avoid sarcastic admissions such as "Right, for sure I am at fault for the employer's [fill_in_the_blanks]". If you ask for a clarification, clearly state that you expect reasonably sufficient detail as well as any and all records that substantiate the alleged damages. Although that won't strictly limit the allegations the employer can make in court proceedings, the attorney's reply might help evidencing the employer's vexatious approach later on. Avoid wording that may be misinterpreted as consciousness of guilt. Be assertive and truthful. Keep in mind the lawyer is gauging (1) how easily he can intimidate you, and (2) whether he can make additional claims to harass you via court proceedings. From now on, all your interactions with the attorney and the employer should be in writing (preferably email, given its reproducibility). When unethical individuals are aware that their position is devoid of merit, they are very tempted to indulge in false accusations (of threat, for example). Thus, communications in writing constitute objectively verifiable proof of who is acting unlawfully. Even if the attorney premises on your contract (or employment agreement/manual, or company's guidelines) the alleged damages, the clauses at issue might be illegal and therefore void. For instance, from 2007-2012 my former employer (an Indian IT intermediary) prohibited me --via contract-- to disclose my salary. The contract contained the typical lawyered babbling, but that doesn't mean that all of it was legal. In 2013 I realized that the prohibition violated Michigan law, and he had no option but to strike the entire clause. That being said, I didn't sue him for that, but for other more important matters which are currently pending review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Absent any further context in your inquiry, it is hard to make additional suggestions on how to proceed.
You have a contract - they have fulfilled their obligation (they paid you), if you do not fulfil their obligation (not to post it online) then you are in breach of the contract. Your obligation continues even if you gift the money back to them. If you breach the contract then they can sue you for the damage that they suffer. Presumably this would be damage to their reputation and for a public figure this could run into millions of dollars. In demanding additional money from them beyond what you are legally entitled to you are, at least, flirting with the crime of extortion/blackmail. This would not be a matter for them to sue you for, it would be a matter for the DA to prosecute if they chose to make a complaint. There doesn't seem to be a defamation issue here because you are not stating anything that isn't true. Now, the extent of the agreement appears to prohibit you posting it on the internet, however, the spirit of the agreement is that you will keep the information secret in all respects - that is likely how a court would look at it. Of course, if someone does steal the information from you then you haven't broken the agreement but you would probably have to prove that it was stolen when they sue you.
IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.
Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.
Is this hearsay? In this situation, the attorney is attempting to find out on direct exam. whether the witness had a conversation with the defendant, who is being sued for securities fraud, about business matters: Q. Did you have any conversations about business with Defendant that day? A. Yes. That morning she called me at home and told me that we’d signed two business deals and that we were hiring a new accountant. I’m wondering whether everything after the “Yes” can be stricken as hearsay. It seems like this statement is being offered for its truth, i.e., that they did, in fact, talk about business.
If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft.
If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.
This wouldn't be customary and is probably improper, but the judge may have been trying to do you a favor. In the absence of being under oath, the judge could not consider anything said in your closing statement as evidence. If you are under oath, the judge can weigh something you say in your closing statement against the other evidence when making a ruling.
Normally, the prosecution case will not rely upon the testimony of the defendant. Instead, the prosecution will call all of its witnesses until its evidentiary case is complete. Then, the defense case opens and it may call witnesses. The defense is not obligated to call all of the witnesses that it stated that it anticipated that it would call prior to trial and the jury doesn't know which witnesses the parties said that they anticipated that they were going to call and didn't call. Until the defense case is closed, the defendant can call himself or herself as a witness if he or she wishes to do so, but is not obligated to do so. Once a defendant starts testifying (generally in his or her own case) he or she has generally waived the Fifth Amendment right not to testify. So, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant in this situation. But since the prosecution's case is usually already closed at this point, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to the scope of the defendant's testimony under questions from his or her own lawyer (there are some nuances of how this is done when the defendant is self-represented and has no lawyer). The prosecution cannot expand the scope of questioning of the defendant to new topic areas. I can imagine deviations from this pattern in odd circumstances, but they would be very rare.
If you sue a person for a tort X, one of the things you have to prove is that the defendant did do X. A baseless belief that it must have been so-and-so will do you no good. You do not have to have iron-clad evidence of your allegations, for a civil suit, but you have to show with a preponderance of evidence that the claim is true. A combination of "hates me" and "provably did this a number of times in the past" could well suffice. As for damages, it depends on what harm you actually suffered. If you get fired and you show that it was because of a false allegation, you would probably have to take this to the big court, since small claims court handles amounts in the $5,000 range (jurisdiction-specific).
Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.)
There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.
You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.
What happens if an expert witness admits he lied in a case This happened in in 2004, in Germany, in a very small town. I don’t speak the language and relied on my English speaking lawyer and my bilingual gf. On the night before the court date, my lawyer told me he wouldn’t represent me anymore because the strategy i wanted to pursue would create damages and he didn’t want to be a part of it. To make a long story short, it would question the skills and reliability of two city workers. I showed up in court, no lawyer, I explained what happened and asked for a continuation and the judge refused. So the whole proceedings happened without me having a lawyer present. There was a semi fluent translator present for me. Then an expert witness was present and essentially delivered a testimony against me, which, in my eyes didn’t make sense. The whole then happened very quickly and I lost the case. As time passed and more people talked, it turns out that, in this small city, everyone knows everyone, went to school together, etc. One policeman even told me that even though I’m right, I can’t win the case in that locality. More than 10 years passed and the expert witness contacted me via a very long letter explaining me that he lied in the testimony because he was engaged in a relation with the plaintiff. He said he felt remorseful and manipulated.. in practice their relation fell apart and he decided it would be a good time to tell the truth. This whole ordeal ended up with a bill of roughly €70k of court ordered payements. Since the judgement was obviously a joke, and I had gone back to California, I never paid anything. This resulted in an arrest warrant in Germany; I eventually went back to another EU country where Germany tried to collect money, but failed, as in face of the new evidence, the local court didn’t want to apply the German judgement. Now.. I will need soon to go to Germany, so I talked to a lawyer. I was told me that it’s too late to modify the judgement and the only thing I can do is negotiate a payment plan. As the proof from the expert witness came a decade later, it can’t be used. Obviously, I find the whole ordeal infuriating because I do not understand how evidence can be willfully ignored, but not the penalties. Are there any precedents, in German law, where new evidence came very late and would invalidate a judgment?
TL;DR: You may have chances. Consult a German lawyer fast. In German civil cases there is the possibillity of "Reopening of proceedings" (Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens), §§ 578 ff. ZPO. It can be used in special cases of incorrect proceedings. You have an "Action for retrial of the case" (Restitutionsklage), if "in a testimony or report on which the judgment was based, the witness or experts violated their obligation to tell the truth, such violation being liable to prosecution", § 580 n. 3 ZPO. The lie of the expert witness seems to be prosecutable as "False unsworn testimony" (Uneindliche Falschaussage, § 153 StGB). This crime is under Limitation on prosecution (Verjährung § 78 StGB). Nevertheless it is a reason for reopening. There are short periods for filing such an action, § 586 ZPO. It has to be within one month after knewing of the cause for rescission. If you expired this period without fault, you may get "restoriation of the status quo ante" (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand, §§ 233ff. ZPO). But again there is a very short period after you are able to file the action. The wording of § 586 II 2 ZPO excludes reopening after five years. But this clause is reduced in practice, if enforcement is still possible (Braun, in: Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO, 5. Auflage 2016, § 586 Rn. 4). So it does not apply in your case. So you may have an action for retrial of the case, but only if you act now fast. For the details, esp. when the periods begin to run in your case, please consult a German lawyer. You may also have a case against the expert whitness and/or the plaintiff because of fraud in the process (Prozessbetrug) and/or § 839a BGB about the liability of court-appointed experts. As the judgement is about €70k the I assume the process was at a "Landgericht". It is not possible to negotiate there without a lawyer. I don't know if it is a cause for rescission, that the judge didn't gave you a chance to get a new lawyer and proceeded without your lawful representative.
The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc.
When a complaint is first file, per case law, courts have a duty to believe each allegation you make on information and belief as long as they are each not contradicting any other statement or other evidence present at the time of filing. This isn't true. The court doesn't have to actually believe you. The court merely has to assume for sake of argument that the things said are true for the narrow purpose of evaluating whether they describe a legal wrong in a formal sense. Also, under modern federal pleading rules in the U.S., the judge doesn't have to believe you and can dismiss your complaint if it is not "plausible." Your attorney has a duty to not merely assume that everything that a client tells the lawyer is true. In federal court, the governing rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which states that when an attorney files and signs a document in court that the attorney: certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. The California state law obligations is more or less identical in substance, although the procedural rules of California are codified differently than the federal rules. So, a lawyer is required to reasonably inquire into whether the client is telling the lawyer the truth about the client's motives and about the facts. It is a breach of the lawyer's duties to the court and the profession to simply take what a client tells the lawyer at face value, accepting it uncritically.
I finally found the actual transcript of the voir dire part of the case mentioned in the question. http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012090614295190 As can be evidenced from the transcript, the judge has specifically instructed the two jurors working as engineers at the local tech companies that they'd have to "forget" what they know about both the software engineering and the patent law itself, too, starting their work on the whole case with a completely clean sheet, using a very simple criteria for making decisions: One side or the other is going to have the burden of proof on -- one side has the burden of proof on some issues, the other side has the burden of proof on other issues. When you go into the jury room to deliberate after you've tried your hardest to understand the evidence, if they haven't educated you on it or if they haven't persuaded you, the party with the burden of proof loses. It's that simple. You don't have to -- you have to make a good faith effort to understand it, but if the party with the burden of proof has failed to do that, the party with the burden of proof loses. That's the standard. You have to -- you, the jury, decide. Now, what you cannot do is bring to bear something that you've learned in some other case, some other patent case, about how some piece of equipment works or something like that. You can't do that. It has to be based on the record here. Then, after a short break and a consultation with the lawyers, where Oracle seems to have expressed some concern to having the computer experts be on the panel, which subsequently prompted the judge to declare the following to the two potential jurors who worked at Cisco and HP: So this is really going to be directed at both of you, but, you know, you come to the party, so to speak, with some prior training that bears upon the subject matter we're going to be hearing a lot about here. That's okay. That's not disqualifying, but you -- it's okay to use your common sense when you render a verdict, but you cannot add to the record in court something that you know about the way software programming works that the witnesses didn't actually testify to. You see what I'm saying? You've got to decide the record -- the case based on the record made here as opposed to adding into it what else you may have known about the way programming and software works. Since both jurors had so much software and patent experience that they couldn't disregard it easily, they were thus both excused (page 95 of 224). All right. I think it would be too hard for you to sit in this case and sort out what you knew already against what is proven or not proven here, and itwould not be fair to the parties to have that extra burden even though you two actually know something about the subject. It's in a way too bad, but it's for the best. So you two are excused to go back to the jury assembly room. Thank you. The other instructions that the judge gives to the potential jurors is also worth reading (starts on page 36 of 224) The full transcript is at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-942.pdf. In summary -- jurors are only allowed to talk to one another when the deliberation process starts, and, no, they are not allowed to bring any "baggage" to the case at stake.
The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.
Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system.
Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".
Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called "jury nullification." And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you "roll the dice" there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move.
How illegal is drug planting? Let's say you leave fake drugs in someone's yard. Eg, you expect the police to be dumb enough to believe it and arrest the other person, but if caught, you can show they are obviously fake. What crimes have I committed? Is it just trespassing? Isnt there any crime for planting fake evidence?
Let's say you leave fake drugs in someone's yard. Eg, you expect the police to be dumb enough to believe it and arrest the other person Obstructing a public officer, specifically "deliberately hindering a public officer from carrying out official duties". Trespassing.
can an individual be charged with selling an illegal substance if they are not in possession or received money for an illegal substance Yes. Testimonies, affidavits, receipts, fingerprints, and circumstantial evidence might conclusively establish that the individual engaged in illegal activity.
The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.
A person cannot be arrested for a misdemeanor by a police officer without a warrant unless the officer has probable cause that a person committed a misdemeanor in their presence. "Probable cause" is when the facts objectively support a belief that the person has committed a crime. If there is a total lack of evidence, then there is no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, so an arrest (for anything) when there is absolutely no evidence that the person committed a crime would be illegal. If, for example, an officer decides he hates your face and arrests you for littering without any reason whatsoever, that would be illegal and a cause for a lawsuit. An officer might arrest a person for smoking marijuana in public based on a person exuding the smell of marijuana and seeing the person smoking a hand-rolled cigarette, but they could also be factually mistaken as to whether the person had actually been smoking marijuana at the time: perhaps they were wearing marijuana-smelling perfume and were smoking a regular tobacco cigarette. The evidence for the crime would not be completely non-existent, but would be insufficient for a conviction. If the officer failed to take the cigarette as evidence, that would be a problem, because the remaining evidence (visual and olfactory) would not support a conviction.
Under U.S. law the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed a particular crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it is not sufficient to prove that someone committed one of three crimes without proving which one it was. an alternative that I thought of later: someone is found somewhere where they can legally be, but in a situation where the only way they could have gotten there would involve trespassing through one of several properties owned by different people. Since the crime of trespassing requires the prosecution merely to show that someone was on the property of another without legal authorization to do so, it might be possible to prove this crime beyond a reasonable doubt without showing precisely which property was crossed, although I wouldn't be surprised if there was a split of authority among U.S. states on this question.
There are two issues, one is the legal issue of whether what you are doing is a crime, and the other is the evidentiary issue of proving that that is what happened. If you take the phone home with the intention of keeping it ('finders keepers') then you have committed larceny (sometimes called 'theft', sometimes correctly). This specific type is called 'larceny by finding'. If you take the phone home with the intention of finding the owner then you have not committed larceny because you have not committed the mental element ('mens rea') of the offence: you don't intend to permanently deprive the owner of their rights. However, and this is the evidentiary issue, if hypothetically you were found in possession of the phone then the police might not believe your explanation and a court might well convict you of larceny. P.S. Firefox has marked 'evidentiary' as a spelling error and suggested 'penitentiary' instead. :s
Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe. Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death.
When a country makes criminal laws, these laws usually apply to anyone present in the country, and acting in the country. But the country is free to declare that some law might apply to its own citizens in a foreign country, or even foreign citizens in a foreign country. Assuming the laws about using marijuana say nothing about the country, that most likely means it only applies to using marjuana in the country itself. But if the US government decided that taking marijuana in Canada is illegal for US citizens, then nobody can stop them. In this case, Canada would not extradite you (unless Canadian law says that it is criminal for Canadians to use marijuana in another country), and Canadian police would likely not collect evidence. So even if illegal, it would be hard to convict you. PS. The "polygamy" case would be interesting, I think you would have to read the exact wording of the laws in every country. Some countries will say that you can't get married twice, and the attempt to get married a second time while already married is bigamy. In that kind of country you wouldn't have committed a crime within that country. Also, you would only be married to the first wife.
Will storing hashed phone numbers violate GDPR? I've read GDPR document from start to end, but I am still not sure about one thing. Let's say I have a system where I store phone numbers in hashed form (let's say bcrypt). Will this violate GDPR if I have those stored in database without the owner consent, given there is no other data collected, no names, emails, nothing. They are not linked to any user (there are no users in the system actually). Just the phone number in a hashed form (same things as storing a hashed password). From what I understand if the data is anonymised there is no problem, but I am still not sure, because if you have the salt you can still create hashes of phone numbers and compare them to the hashes that exists in the database. But this gives you nothing even if you succeed, except that the phone exists there.
But that a phone number exists in your collection is interesting information. Since phone numbers are identifying and so short that they are guessable, hashing does not provide anonymization. Hashing could still be an appropriate safety measure or pseudonymization technique. Note that the salt is typically stored as part of the hash value, and should not be considered to be a secret key. If the information had been anonymized it wouldn't be personal information and the GDPR wouldn't apply. However, since the phone numbers are personal information (even hashed, they relate to an indirectly identifiable person), you should apply standard GDPR compliance processes to determine whether storing these phone numbers is legal: What is the purpose of processing? Some purposes like national security or purely personal and household purposes are exempt from the GDPR What is the legal basis for this purpose? E.g. consent, legitimate interest, legal obligations, … What is the minimum data necessary to fulfill the purpose? If pseudonymized data is sufficient, pseudonymization is mandatory. What safety measures do you think are appropriate? This could shift a legitimate interest balancing test in your favor. What compliance measures are you obliged to take? E.g. information per Art 13–14, preparation for data subject requests, engaging data processors, further safety measures. While your purposes are probably benign, it can be useful to recall that the presence of identifiers in data sets can be a matter of life and death. When accounts were leaked in the Ashley Madison data breach, that drove some users to suicide. In some countries, the existence of a Grindr account can be a death sentence. Those are examples involving special categories of data per GDPR Art 9, so likely far more sensitive than the context of this question. However, in the AM breach it would not have helped much to hash identifiers like emails: third parties would still be able to check whether the email of someone they know was part of the breach.
Names clearly are personal data and so a good question to ask for GDPR compliance is: Do you need to do what you want to do in order to offer your product or service? For your scenario a common answer seems to be that websites ask for the users first and last name during account creation. The reason is that they need this information to confirm the identity of the account creator. But the public profile only displays a user name that the user can pick freely. In general there is no good reason to publically show the legal names of users so websites don't do it. So for your website ask yourself, why do you want to publically show the names of your users? If you have a good reason to do that specify it in the user terms and go ahead. If you don't have a good reason don't do it.
The obligation to notify the supervisory authority (CNIL in your case) no longer exists. It was part of the previous regulatory framework, but it is not part of GDPR (which takes affect tomorrow). If you use CCTV that may monitor employees (i.e. they sometimes enter the HQ to consult with the owner), your obligations under the GDPR is basically to inform the employees that the CCTV cameras are there. I.e. Data subjects are entitled to understand when their personal data is being processed, covering the transparency aspect of processing. The use of CCTV must be communicated via signage which indicates the areas covered and instructions for further information.
Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area.
Your data is not anonymous since from the picture of the face the individual can be identified. It would be anonymous, if the face was blurred and other possible identifiable information was removed. Of course, that would defeat your purpose. Please note that, in any case, Anonymization Techniques are, themselves, a type of personal data processing that requires a legal ground, and achieving real anonymization is not a trivial matter (see Article 29 Working Party's opinion 0829/14/EN WP216 on the subject). 1. The face of a person includes biometric information, which is defined in article 4 (14) among other types of personal information regulated by the GDPR as: "personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physio­logical or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data". A facial recognition software's purpose is exactly to perform a specific technical processing based on the facial features of the persons, to achieve a unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. Article 9 of the GDPR includes biometric data among the types of prohibited processing, unless one of the exceptions in § 2 applies. There are 10 types of exceptions among which: consent of the person, employment context, personal data made public by the person, scientific or historical research,... (each exception having its own conditions). You should check that you comply with one of these exceptions stated in article 9 § 2, if your application is about using facial images for unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. 2. In turn, if your processing is not about unique identification of a person based on these biometric features, but only about emotions recognition (which you briefly mentioned at the beginning of your post), it could be considered as not falling under the requirements of Article 9. That would still be a processing of personal information, but it would fall under the normal article 6 requirements.
I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!
First of all, although the GDPR is stated to apply to any site which processes the data of any person who is in the EU, it is not clear how a site not located in the EU, does not business in the EU, and does not primarily target EU residents as its audience can be required to comply with the GDPR. To the best of my knowledge, no such case has yet been brought, much less decided. There has also been some debate on whether an IP address constitutes Personal Data under the GDPR, and if it always does so, or only under particular conditions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that (under the predecessor Directive 95/46/EC) that a dynamic IP address was personal data. But in that case the web site was run by the German Federal Government, which surely has wider scope for getting info from a German ISP than a small private US web activist does. There is not yet any case law that I know of on the applicability of the GDPR to IP addresses in any case at all similar to the one in the question. Joe would in my view be wise to at least learn that logs are being kept, and post a disclosure of this on the site. Whether Joe needs to do more than that is less than clear at this time.
Simply use a cookie to store consent. First consider the opposite. If a user does not agree to store cookies, a cookie is the only way to remember this, as you want to avoid a new pop-up on every page-load. Because this use of a cookie is functional, you don't need permission to store that cookie. You seem have the impression that you have to prove towards the ICO if someone has provided consent. However I think it would be sufficient if you can demonstrate how your website works technically. In particular whether consent is handled properly. You might need to create screenshots or a screencast to do so. Add new proof after each major update of your website. Storing consent server-side would violate the data minimization principle of the GDPR I think. In particular because you would need to do something to be able to identify users. That would violate Art. 11(1) GDPR: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Notice it is possible to configure google analytics in a way so you don't need any consent. See my answer to this question. Just IP anonymization is not sufficient.
Does spousal privilege extend to a suitor when CHURCH (catholic, baptist, free, et al) teachings are involved? How can the legal system hurt one individual for following church teachings if both of them are of the same religion? In War Games the quote "The only way to win is to not play the game" (let a father judge another father) is for an end game solution, but if someone is being coerced to try to hurt the other person (i.e. restraining order), and the other person can convince the judge that they're being forced into something can a judge choose to extend spousal immunity to the couple if they're communicating by lying on the stand as a "smoke screen"? What happens if someone is made aware of the fact the person is mentally incompetent after the trial is over, and the transcript gets lost? Essentially what I'm asking is spousal privilege a defense for a forced restraining order by a biological father if he won't even speak to a suitor (i.e. may I take your daughter on a date)? The original question was: The CHURCH teaches that every relationship is based upon seeing a potential spouse, so does spousal immunity exist?
is spousal immunity a defense for a forced restraining order by a biological father if he won't even speak to a suitor (i.e. may I take your daughter on a date)? There is no such thing as "spousal immunity". Your post is replete with unclear references, unclear statements, and seemingly unrelated questions. But it is noteworthy that spousal privilege (not "immunity") does not preclude obtaining and enforcing a restraining order. The only relevance of spousal privilege is the evidentiary issue of precluding a spouse's testimony from being obtained and entered as admissible evidence in the court proceedings to which the respondent is a party. In the context of restraining orders, spousal privilege might be available only if the respondent invokes it during the proceedings for civil or criminal contempt that resulted from respondent's violation of the restraining order. If the restraining order is pursuant to, or in the context of, divorce proceedings, spousal privilege is inapplicable. See, for instance, MCL 600.2162(3)(a) and other exceptions listed therein. At least in theory (since courts often do whatever they want), a party's conduct & statements (in or outside of court) regarding his/her spouse may forfeit spousal privilege regardless of whether the respondent or spouse ever spoke to a suitor (whatever that means) at all.
A brief explanation follows. The Code of Hammurabi articulates the first form of alimony: If a man wish to separate from a woman who has borne him children, or from his wife who has borne him children: then he shall give that wife her dowry, and a part of the usufruct of field, garden, and property, so that she can rear her children. When she has brought up her children, a portion of all that is given to the children, equal as that of one son, shall be given to her. She may then marry the man of her heart In the Middle Ages, English ecclesiastical law mandated that a husband still has an obligation to support his wife even when they are separated (recall that divorce was not possible). This carried over to the US. As discussed in this article, there was a view (articulated in Bradwell v. Illinois by Justice Bradley that "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender .... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator". The basic rationale at the time was that the wife had a right to support as a consequence of the marriage, and would continue to exercise that right were it not for the conduct of the husband (by law, someone was at fault, and if it was the husband, he would have to compensate his wife). When no-fault divorce became a possibility in the late 60's, concepts of alimony were re-worked, so that alimony was no (usually) longer a permanent property right, and in its place there developed a desideratum of "maintenance" allowing the spouse with lesser economic power to maintain a diminishing property right. See this 1973 version of Washington's replacement-for-alimony law, which includes "The standard of living established during the marriage" as the law now does. Because this is established by state law in the US, and state legislatures aren't infamous about keeping close track of legislative debates, I don't think there are any surviving records of the rationale of the author of these bills. In fact, this law was drafted a few years earlier by The Uniform Law Commission – there may be some record of their discussion. [This article][5], written after the law was passed, takes note of the history of contractual concepts being applied to marriage (e.g. the territorial legislature enacted a measure that "marriage is declared to be a civil contract"), from which perspective one expects there to be compensation for breach of contract.
Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court.
This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.
Your silence can be used against you: this is known as an adoptive admission. It is an exception to the hearsay rule, and is based on the premise that if a person hears and understands an accusation against them (even framed very indirectly), and "adopts" the truth of the accusation by directly acting in a certain way or by failing to dispute the accusation, this can be introduced as a form of admitting to the accusation. For instance, B might say to A "I laughed when you shot Smith in the foot" and A might say "That was pretty funny, right", that can be admitted and interpreted as a confession. The same goes for A saying nothing. What's crucial is that the accusation has to be made in the defendant's presence, they must hear and understand it, they must be able to deny the accusation and it would be natural to deny the accusation. There is a relationship between this and the Fifth Amendment, see Salinas v. Texas (and prior law), that "To prevent the privilege against self-incrimination from shielding information not properly within its scope, a witness who “‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’". During a non-custodial interview, defendant was asked asked if his shotgun “would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder”, and he said nothing (and actually gave non-verbal indicators that the accusation was true). He did not invoke his right to silence, thus the court reasoned that "Because he failed to do so, the prosecution’s use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment".
A divorce settlement must be approved by the court. A Judge might well refuse to approve a settlement with such a provision in it, although I do not know of any law specifically barring such a term. But once the settlement is final, one party could certainly offer a separate contract to the other, under which one party would agree to remain outside the state (or metropolitan region, or county, or wherever) in return for an agreed recurring payment. There would be no compulsion to accept such a contract, but if the payment offered was large enough, it might be accepted voluntarily. However, if there was a child involved, and such a move would significantly hinder that child's contact with both parents, and this were not in the child's best interest, such a contract might be attacked as against public policy.
The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you.
It doesn't really matter exactly what the judge says as long as it's clear whether the judge is sustaining or overruling the objection. With that said, in movies you'll rarely see the person asking the question get to respond to the objection, but you'll notice in the trial that happens in most cases. For example, if one party objects that a question calls for hearsay, the examiner may defend their question by pointing out that the statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, or that it falls into one of the hearsay exceptions. At that point the judge is responding to both parties and someone else or possibly multiple people have spoken since the objection was originally raised, so she might specify that she's "overruling the objection" as opposed to just saying overruled, so it just makes it clearer on the record what she's ruling about. It's worth noting as well that she might need to specify which objection she's sustaining if more than one objection is raised. In this trial both hearsay and relevance objections have been raised at the same time, and the judge might specify that she's sustaining e.g. only relevance. This can tell the examiner whether they are free to keep going down the same line of questioning with different questions, if the objection sustained was hearsay, or to move to another line of questioning, if the objection sustained was relevance.
Can a person be fired for not agreeing to a contract at work? I have seen contracts (relating to employment) which contain terms like "by accepting this position you agree to sign an NDA that you will be provided on your first day of work". To my understanding these are unenforceable. Can a person be fired for refusing to agree to a contract? Assuming my above understanding is correct, does it make a difference if they had at any point agreed to agree to a contract? Often times when a person is hired there is an on boarding process which contains a bunch of paperwork. Hypothetically could a person refuse to sign it and not get penalized? There can be many (legitimate and illegitimate) reasons why someone must sign something relating to their employment. For example I was given the added responsibility to do work on the servers which were located in a rented secure building. This building had their own paperwork I needed to fill out for clearance purposes (like a background check). If I refused to do this could I have been fired?
An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.
Short Answer It might or might not be an anti-trust violations depending upon the states where the employers and employee are located. But, as a practical matter, it is almost impossible for an employee to prove an anti-trust violation without an insider leaking a "smoking gun" document or a company admitting to improper conduct, before a lawsuit is filed. Long Answer There is considerable regional variation regarding the extent to which legal arrangements to limit employee mobility are legal. For example, historically, Massachusetts is notorious for enforcing such limitations strictly. In contrast, California is famous for refusing to enforce such restrictions. In general, the Northeast is strict, the West is lenient and other states are in between, but it is really a state by state issue. (Incidentally, weak non-competition laws have been empirically shown by economists to be better for the economy in the sector where they might be applied but are not applied.) Usually these legal restrictions on employee mobility are imposed unilaterally by the employer without conferring with competitors, and sometimes remedies for a violation of these non-competition arrangements are limited to the employee and not the hiring company (although this is hardly universal - the intentional interference with contract tort historically arose to punish companies that induced employees to violate non-competes and duties of loyalty of existing employees of the suing firm). The anti-trust dimension comes from the agreement between competitors to honor each other's non-competition agreements, which is meaningful because in the states where Apple and Google are headquartered, non-competition agreements are basically unenforceable so this collusion between competitors has an effect in excess of the default legal situation in the absence of collusion. If Apple and Google had instead both been based in Boston instead, where their non-competition agreements were enforceable against both the employee and the new employer as a default rule of law, their agreement would probably not have violated anti-trust laws because they would simply be agreeing to follow the generally applicable law that would apply in the absence of a collusive agreement anyway. Thus, without knowing the default rules of law in the relevant states, and without knowing if there was actually an actual agreement between the competitors, you can't sue for an anti-trust violation. One of the recent revolutions in federal civil procedure, the Twombly case, arose in an anti-trust situation and held that a complaint for an anti-trust violation is not sufficient unless the person bringing suit has actual knowledge of the existence of a collusive agreement between competitors and does not merely infer the existence of such an agreement from the facts and circumstances available to the general public. It is not permissible to sue first and then use subpoenas and other pre-trial discovery procedures to determine if there was actually an express collusive agreement between the competitors rather than having their behavior arise for other reasons (since under Econ 101 microeconomic principles, marketwide price fixing by all participants and completely non-collusive perfect competition are indistinguishable as they both produce a uniform price in the marketplace for a good or service). Since this information is usually impossible to obtain prior to brining suit without an insider who leaks a smoking gun document, as a practical matter, it is usually impossible for an individual employee to prevail in an anti-trust lawsuit alleging collusion between competing firms. Under federal anti-trust laws, circumstances that have the de facto identical results to illegal collusion between competitors, where this is not actually collusion, are usually not actionable (i.e. you can't prevail in a lawsuit based upon those claims).
In the U.S. severance payments are not provided for statutorily, and are rarely made when an employee quits or is fired for cause. However, even when not provided for within contracts it is common to see voluntary severances paid during lay-offs. Furthermore, in the U.S. it is more likely that they would be "laid off" in order to qualify for unemployment insurance. In Pennsylvania one can make claims on the state-run unemployment insurance system only if one is able to work and does not refuse suitable work when offered. If one quits one is not eligible for these payments. Ultimately unemployment claims are born by the employer (since their legally-mandated unemployment insurance premiums are adjusted based on realized claims). So managers with the authority to layoff employees can impose real costs on their companies, both in terms of direct severance payments (which may be optional), and in terms of the inflated unemployment premiums that will hit the company down the road. However, I have never heard of a company attempting to recoup such costs from managers, since such decisions are specifically delegated to managers with hiring/firing authority. It seems much more likely that a manager deemed to have abused the company's purse would be demoted or fired rather than being sued, unless there were some gross fraud involved (e.g., kickbacks).
I see that most (all up to this point) answers and comments are made around if a verbal contract is binding enough for the employer to "pursue back" the extra payment that you received... but as far as I can see, they don't even need to consider the verbal agreement. Your employer thought (and apparently was right) that you were going to resign, so they offered you a payment raise in exchange for you to stay for two more years. You verbally agreed but this agreement was never written down nor signed by any of the parts, yet your employer respected it and for X amount of time you received more money that what your initial, written, signed contract says. Now you want to quit; as mentioned above, you only have your original contract, a contract that says two things that are key for this "dilemma": The Employee will be paid £9/hr in arrears. Salary may be increased at the direction of The Employer subject to The Employee taking on additional responsibility which is agreed upon by both parties. If the Employer makes an overpayment to the Employee to which she is not entitled, or which is more than that to which she is entitled, the Employer has the right to recover the overpayment by deductions from the Employee's salary or from other payments due to them. You received payments for £11/hr, which is more that that to which you're entitled according to this (one and only) contract; so, your employer has the right to claim back those £2/hr that, officially, you were not entitled to. IF you want to argue that, as the 1st point says, both parties agreed to increase your salary for "additional responsibilities", YOU would also have to admit that you agreed to stay for two more years, agreement that you are not complying to; so, once again, it's a point in favour for your employer. All in all, it all boils down to how your employeer "feels" when you present your resign letter; maybe they will just agree and let you go without further issues, but if they want to claim back that payment raise, IMO they have both the right AND the arguments to do so.
No First, there does not appear to be unlawful discrimination: there is nothing to suggest that you are a member of a protected class and were terminated because of that. Second, you were given no reason for your dismissal so your employer is not claiming you were terminated for just cause. So, in BC, an employer "can end an employee's job by giving written working notice or pay" and this is perfectly legal. For someone who worked for "about 6 months", the notice/pay period is 1 week. So either they must give you 1 weeks work or pay you 1 weeks wages.
No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions.
Generally you can back-date the effective date of a contract. Texas does not have any specific laws that prohibit it and in contracts law, this concept is called the "relation back" theory of contract effectiveness. See Grubb & Ellis Co. v. Bradley Real Est. Trust, 909 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990) for an explanation that back dating violates no general contract law principles and is "determined by the intent of the parties as deduced from the instrument itself." Aside from the obvious issues where someone is back-dating a contract to commit some type of fraud, back-dating raises a whole host of unforeseen consequences with regards to a party's performance under the contract as well as the rights of third parties. The best practice is to make it clear that the effective date and the execution date are different. This avoids confusion and ambiguity that could call the enforceability of the contract into question. Some of the issues that arise when back-dating a NDA are: Liability for disclosures the employee made between the effective date and when the contract is executed/signed. This is particularly troublesome if the NDA provides for liquidated damages or imposes other penalties. If the effective date and execution date are not clear, there might not be a “meeting of the minds.” (The essential elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, and meeting of the minds.) This is a problem for the employer more than the employee. Liability to third parties. Say an employer licensed some technology from a third party and everyone working on the project was required to sign NDAs. Employer could be on the hook here. Also, the employer and employee could both be in trouble if they were back-dating the contract to trick the third party into thinking it had been signed all along. The issue here is fraud. So, the bottom-line is that is generally legal/enforceable, but one should have a clear explanation for the difference in the dates.
The question is a bit sparse on relevant details, but yes, a EULA is binding, even when you agree in the course of employment. It may not be you who is bound, though. In case 1, you install a program at word to do something, the EULA says "don't copy any of these files", you see a cool file and decide "Neat, I'm taking a copy home. I can do this because I installed the program at work and am not bound by the EULA". Wrong. Case 2: you are installing software on behalf of a customer. It's not you that is bound by the EULA, it's the customer. Case 3: you work for the company that develops the software and holds the copyright, either fixing bugs or testing the security of the system by trying to crack it. In that case, you have special permission from the copyright holder that overrides whatever restrictions would normally from from the EULA. I don't know if that covers the kind of case you are concerned with. To reduce the matter to a simple sentence, just because you agree to something in the course of a job does not mean that the agreement is invalid.
Which article of the GDPR implies that one should use the BCC field in order not to dissiminate personal mail addresses? Which article of the GDPR implies that one should use the BCC field in order not to dissiminate personal mail addresses when sending mails?
Article 5(1)(f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’).
I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).
The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site.
GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent. Wrong. The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others. With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one.
It follows from case law from the ECJ, e.g. C‑70/10 (28 January 2010) and C-582/14 (19 October 2016), that IP-addresses are personal data. Since my interpretation of the case law differs from the interpretation offered by @Greendrake, I'll go into the relevant case law in a bit more detail than I did in my initial answer. TL;DR: Yes, IP-addresses in server logs are personal data and you need to declare IP-address logging in your privacy policy. As I said, we need to examine the case law I mentioned in the introduction to find out whether IP-addresses are personal data. The first of those are ECJ C-70/10. In this, the court concludes that all IP-addresses are "protected personal data": It is common ground, first, that the injunction requiring installation of the contested filtering system would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the network is sent. Those addresses are protected personal data because they allow those users to be precisely identified. (my emphasis) Then, in 2016, the ECJ ruled in a more narrow case ECJ C‑582/14 specifically ruling on dynamic IP-addresses: The court goes through a number of deliberations, then concludes: Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is very clear from this text that the court does not challenge or invalidate ECJ C-70/10 on static IP-addresses. The court is very careful, in its ruling to point out its ruling is specifically about dynamic IP-addresses. So the ruling of ECJ C-70/10 still stands for static IP-addresses, these are always protected personal data. I believe this case law is summarized in Recital 30 of the GDPR. This recital lists the identifiers that may make natural persons identifiable: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. (my emphasis). Since it follows from case law that static IP-addresses always makes the data subject identifiable, and dynamic IP-addresses may make the data subject identifiable, I will conclude, based on jurisprudence alone, that: Unless you are able to filter your logs to exclude static IP-addresses. I think you must consider IP-addresses protected personal data under the GDPR. However, in ECJ C‑582/14, the ruling about dynamic IP-addresses hinges on the controller having legal means to identify the data subject by connecting the IP address to some other data. The court seems to think that getting access to ISP logs is the only means of doing that. This is wrong. In 2015, the Norwegian computer scientist Einar Otto Stangvik identified 78 Norwegians who seem to have downloaded abuse material starting only with their IP-addresses. Stangvik did this while working as a consultant for Norway's larges newspaper VG. I know Stangvik and I am familiar with the methods he used. I've tried them myself, and they work. Stangvik did not have access to ISP logs, he did not do anything illagal, and the 78 natural persons identified only by means of their IP-address, combined with other data the Stangvik had legal access to. I will not go into details, I will just say this: If you know how to do this, getting to the natural person when you know the IP-address is not difficult or labour-consuming. To return to the question: It also follows from the GDPR that logging of IP-addresses falls under its definition of "processing". Your privacy policy should list all personal data personal data that is collected by yourself and third parties ("processors" in the terminology of the GDPR) that you rely on. Your hosting company is such a third party, and you need to declare the logging of IP-addresses in your privacy policy.
If GDPR applies, then no one can opt out. If it doesn't apply, then an IP block is superfluous. Whether GDPR applies is determined by Art 3 GDPR. For this, we must distinguish where the data controller is operating from. It is irrelevant where the site is hosted, but primarily relevant where the data controller (your colleague) has an “establishment”, e.g. where he resides or typically works from. Per Art 3(1), GDPR applies to all processing activities in the context of an European establishment, regardless of where the users are. So if your colleague were running this site from Europe, they wouldn't be able to circumvent GDPR by blocking European users. However, if your colleague is running this site from outside of Europe, then Art 3(1) doesn't trigger. Per Art 3(2), GDPR can apply to processing activities where there is no European establishment. There is the Art 3(2)(a) “targeting criterion”: if your colleague “offers” goods or services to people who are in Europe, regardless whether paid or gratis, then GDPR applies to all processing activities related to this offer. I'll discuss this more below. There is also the Art 3(2)(b) criterion: if your colleague monitors the behaviour of people that occurs in Europe, then GDPR applies. For example, an app collecting geolocation information or a website creating interest profiles for ad targeting might trigger this criterion. An IP block can help to establish that no offering/monitoring related to people who are in Europe is happening, but it might not be necessary. It may be worth talking a bit more about the targeting criterion. The GDPR explicitly says that mere availability of a website in Europe doesn't imply that GDPR would apply. Instead, it is necessary to establish the data controller's intention – are they soliciting users from Europe, or otherwise expecting that people from Europe might use those services? Recital 23 gives a couple of non-exhaustive factors that can be considered here, for example: the site uses a language or currency used in the EU but not used in the controller's own country the site mentions users or customers from Europe, e.g. in testimonials This means that a lot of US websites, written in English or Spanish, only mentioning payment in USD (if any), not mentioning any European countries, will not be subject to GDPR. Then, occasional European visitors are irrelevant. It wouldn't be necessary to IP-block potential European users. However, such an IP-based block would help establish that the data controller really doesn't intend for those services to be offered to people who are in Europe. My personal opinion is that it's wasted effort to block users from foreign countries in case their foreign laws claim to apply, but if such a block brings peace of mind that might be worth it. While geoblocking might not be necessary, is it sufficient? There is no clear guidance on this subject, but it seems to be generally accepted that IP-based geoblocking is fine, even though it is trivially circumvented using VPN services. Of course, if a website were to block European IP addresses but were to also advertise that people in Europe can use their services via VPNs, that would probably still be an “offer” and might defeat the point of doing any geoblocking. The Art 3(1)(a) targeting criterion is most easily applied to things like ecommerce where physical goods are shipped to the customer in return for payment – so essentially whenever the data controller participates in the EU Single Market. This is roughly similar to the concept of a Nexus in US tax law. But in principle the targeting criterion can also apply to other kinds of websites or apps such as blogs, even if they are gratis. GDPR does not just apply to for-profit commercial activity, and doesn't distinguish between controllers that are entities/LLCs and controllers who are natural persons. Things are slightly more complicated due to the Art 3(2)(b) monitoring criterion and the pervasive use of online trackers on websites, but this aspect of the GDPR is difficult to enforce and frequently ignored. In this answer, “Europe” means the European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), and the United Kingdom (UK). Note that countries like Norway are covered by GDPR, whereas Switzerland is not. Of course, the GDPR is not the only privacy law relevant internationally.
Why would the EU expect that any of its laws would apply to my business? It doesn't. Unless you choose to do business in the EU (which is possible, thanks to the wonders of the World Wide Web). Then, and only then, do you have to comply with EU law, including the GDPR. From a comment by @BenCollins: I'm talking about non-EU online retail that does allow Europeans (particularly those not actually in the EU at the time of the transaction) to place orders. Basically, GDPR Article 3 says that the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union The phrase "in the union" is clearly open to interpretation, but according to the website Security Now, Dr. Michèle Finck says this: Most people seem to agree that the relevant criterion is whether you're based in the EU at the moment data is collected - citizen or not (my emphasis). While Michèle Finck is a well-respected legal scholar, she is not an authoritative legal source, so we need to wait for to case-law to nail this. For what it is worth, (not much I am afraid) I think it would be against common sense to define the territorial scope so broad that brick and mortar stores in the USA risks to be prosecuted in Europe if they sold goods or services to European tourists. However, what most US based businesses that chooses to be open to business for orders that are placed by natural persons who are in the [European] Union need to know that there is this: According to European law, the GDRP does apply to them when they conduct such business. From a comment by @BenCollins: I question the notions that (a) there is a basis by which the law would apply The legal basis is European law, in particular GDPR Article 3. and (b) that it has any enforcement mechanisms outside the EU. As for enforcement, I think a good answer has already been provided by Dale M. but for completeness: The USA has treaties with EU that mean that after a legal case has been decided in a court of law in the EU, it can request that the USA enforce the judgement (typically by collecting the fine the USA-based business incurred when conducting business in Europe). To make this answer more general, here are a breakdown of the the regulation of territorial scope of the GDPR for businesses that are not located in the EU: The scope is clearly spelled out in Article 3, and if you're not "a controller or a processor in the Union", you are only subject to the GDPR if your processing activities are related to: a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. US based companies that engage in business practices that are illegal in Europe know about this, and has already taking steps to protect themselves from the being prosecuted in Europe under the GDPR by using firewalls to block access to their services from the EU. The bottom line is that if you: have no presence in Europe, and don't offer goods or services to people who are in the Union, and you don't collect personal data about European natural persons, then the GDPR does not apply to you. If at least one of the above applies then you need to follow the GDPR if you do not want to be prosecuted in the EU.
[I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users.
Is this a major privacy loophole? Say you want to (illegaly) obtain someone's ssn. You call their employer and impersonate them and ask for the ssn or ask for a 1099 to be mailed which has the ssn. Is this a major loophole to get anyone's ssn? Is there a specific law against it besides mail tampering which is hard to prove?
You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole.
Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here.
Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.
Question: Do I need a EU passport or EU ID card to legally work in the EU (or establish that I have the right to work in the EU)? Or is a certificate of citizenship sufficient? Legally, your right to work is not contingent on this and there is no Europe-wide rule that makes holding any document mandatory. Importantly, if you do start working anyway, you are not committing a crime and cannot possibly be banned or forced to leave the country. You do have the right to work from the day you became an EU citizen and if any doubt arises down the line, you should be able to clear it up later. In practice, employers are sometimes supposed to check you are allowed to work (and for that would require some proof of your citizenship) but they don't necessarily need a passport or ID. What's typical on the other hand is that you have to provide an official proof of address (in the countries where you have to register your address with the authorities) and the local social security, insurance, or national tax number. Both of these will require dealing with the authorities and will be considerably more difficult, if not downright impossible, without a national ID card or passport (in fact it can even be difficult with a passport). I worked in multiple EU countries and I don't recall always having to present my ID to employers. I recall at least one instance (in Germany) where I could start working without one (it had just been stolen) and another one (in the Netherlands) where I started on the day after I arrived, without official address nor tax number (BSN). In both cases, I was expected to solve these issues within the first month and you risk a fine if you don't register within a week or two but it was neither illegal nor impossible to start working before all the formalities were completed. None of this means I would be completely comfortable about being months without a passport. But the main issue for you will be entering the country and what your employer's HR department is prepared to tolerate, not any sort of legal obligation to hold a passport to work. Note that in one of the cases I described above I went to the local consulate to get an emergency passport. It wouldn't have been possible back in my country of citizenship but there are some special procedures when you reside abroad. These rules change all the time and depend on your country of citizenship but that could be worth a try.
Yes, encrypted personal data potentially still is personal data, so some prior thought is necessary. But are you a controller who is processing this personal data? Possibly not. This hinges on what kind of metadata you process, and whether the encryption happens under your authority, e.g. by a software that you provision. If all you can ever get is the encrypted data but not the plaintext, then you can probably treat this similar to pseudonymous or anonymous data. A related example is a postal service. Letters might contain sensitive personal data. But the postal service is not processing the letter contents, and cannot be treated as a controller of this data. (The postal service is prevented by law from processing this data, you are prevented by the encryption). However, a postal service processes personal data like addresses on the envelope. You might want to create a Records of Processing document, which will help you understand what (potentially) personal data you will process. If you are processing patient data on behalf of a healthcare provider, you might want to look into whether you are a controller or a processor. Processor status is not automatic but requires a suitable contract with the controller. As a processor you still have to take appropriate security measures, but you are not responsible for determining the purposes of processing or for responding to data subject requests.
In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.
My interpretation of the GDPR when it comes to a contact form is as long as your privacy notice states that what data you collect in the contact form and what legal basis that data is used for you are fine. Someone submitting a contact form in my opinion is their consent to reply back to them regarding the data in which they have submitted. Another good clause to have in your privacy policy is to basically state if the user submits information about another natural person that they have consent from that natural person for that data and what it would be used for. The internet is the internet. People have been trolling it for years. People have also submitted false information for years. The best a business can do is simply outline what their site does, what data is collected and what it will be used for. That along with what legal basis it’s processed for and following it makes you GDPR compliant in that regard. As to withdrawing consent and the rights given by the GDPR that’s all specific to what infustructure a business has in place. As a developer I know the headaches of the GDPR. Most of it resides in the fact data is not centralized and thus can’t easily be retrieved, modified, or removed. Once you’ve tackled that aspect providing the user their rights under GDPR isn’t to far off.
Summary If they didn't steal your withholding, it depends a great deal. But if your employer stole your withholding, the IRS will sue them on your behalf. You will absolutely have grounds to sue them, and because tax law is so cut and dried in these situations, in that case, you will almost certainly win. You need to contact the IRS immediately and advise them what your employer has done. This is more important than anything else because until you do, you can't be sure the IRS will figure out what happened (they might. They're really good at tax stuff). If your employer didn't advise you that you are now responsible for paying your own quarterly estimated income taxes, the IRS will almost certainly grant you relief from penalties for failure to file timely and they could potentially abate interest as well, depending on the circumstances. They are especially likely to grant penalty and possibly interest abatement if you've never filed 1099 before. If your employer withheld tax from your pay that they then failed to turn over to the IRS, good news for you - bad news for them. The IRS takes no mercy whatsoever on employers who steal tax withholding from employees. Advising the IRS that this may have been the case is all you should need to do - the IRS can check its own records, your employer's records, etc. They will let you know once they've determined whether your money is where it's supposed to be; if anything is out of order, rest assured they will already be pursuing the case against your employer. In this case, the IRS will waive all penalties and interest that may have been assessed as a consequence of your employer's failure to turn over your withholding. If you are currently unable to pay, that's not the end of the world. Make the IRS aware of your current financial circumstances and your inability to pay due to unemployment. They have installment agreements you can request, or if that won't work, they can temporarily suspend collection action while you get things straightened out. There's a bunch of paperwork they'll ask for, and penalties and interest will continue to accrue, but as long as you let them know the situation, they will apply a dramatically reduced rate to reflect your efforts to comply.
Is it illegal to masturbate inside public toilet behind closed door out of view from the public? I suspect someone is doing that but it is hard to catch him because it is illegal to install surveillance camera in the toilet. Putting that aside, is this act that should be done in private at home illegal when done in a public toilet behind closed door? I welcome legal views assuming the jurisdiction is from UK, U.S, Australia.
It is not obvious that is it illegal in Washington state. Everett WA has local ordinances against "lewd conduct" (there are versions of this at the state level and in most municipalities). Having sex and masturbation are included in the class of "lewd acts", and are also included in "sexual conduct". An activity is "obscene" if three things are true. First, the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest and when considered as a whole, and in the context in which it is used, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. I think having sex or masturbating could pass these two tests. The third condition is that the act explicitly depicts or describes patently offensive representations or descriptions of... [sex, masturbation, or excretion] The prohibition is more narrow: A person is guilty of lewd conduct if he or she intentionally performs any lewd act in a public place or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public. If lewd conduct were completely illegal, you could not excrete or have sex withing the city limits. Now we have to turn to the definition of "public place": an area generally visible to public view, and includes streets, sidewalks, bridges, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, automobiles (whether moving or not), buildings open to the general public, including those which serve food or drink or provide entertainment and the doorways and entrances to buildings or dwellings and the grounds enclosing them, and businesses contained in structures which can serve customers who remain in their vehicles, by means of a drive-up window Focusing not on the probable intent but on the words, it is primarily defined as "an area generally visible to public view". Your house qua building is probably generally visible to public view, as is a public toilet or hotel. The inside of your bedroom is probably not generally visible to public view, nor is the inside of a toilet stall. While the building is probably a public place, a closed stall within the building does not meet the definition (nor does a hotel room). It might however qualify under the clause "or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public". The statute does not give a definition of "observe", but under ordinary language interpretation, observation may be seeing or hearing. Silent sex, masturbation or defecation might not qualify as being public. Obviously, excretion in a stall of a public bathroom cannot be a lewd act, presumably because the average person does not generally consider ordinary excretion as appealing to the prurient interest: but there could be contexts where it does. Another avenue for prosecution is the Indecent Exposure state law which is when one intentionally makes any open and obscene exposure of his or her person or the person of another knowing that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. It is totally non-obvious that sex or masturbation in a toilet stall is "open". There is a slippery slope regarding quiet sex or masturbation w.r.t. knowing that the conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. Because the contexts where sex and masturbation are not clearly spelled out by statutory law, the matter would depend on how courts had interpreted previous cases. There have been arrests in Washington of people having bathroom sex, but I don't know if anyone has ever or recently-enough been convicted for having quiet sex out of view in a toilet stall, or similar place. There is a potentially applicable case, Seattle v. Johnson, 58 Wn. App. 64, which seems to involve public sex, and the conviction was overturned because the complaint was defective, in not including the element "that the defendant must know 'that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm'". It is not clear from the appeal what the act actually was – it probably was for public nudity. There is also an decision by the state appeal court division 3 (not publicly available) in Spokane v. Ismail which, in connection with a charge of public urination declares that "A toilet stall is not a public place. The center of Riverfront Park during the lunch hour is a public place", in connection with an ordinance just like the Everett one against public lewd acts.
Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?
The Canadian law governing interception of communication (wiretapping and recording) is explained here. Canada is a one-party country, so as long as one party (you, for example) consent, this would not be a violation of that statute. That source also believes (not unreasonably) that is would not constitute the tort of invasion of privacy since under the act The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled … is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due regard to the lawful interests of others (bearing in mind that is it allowed w.r.t. Section 184(1) of the Criminal Code: that is, it is reasonable to do so).
The person responsible for the leak pays This is a general principle that if your stuff causes harm, you are responsible for it as well of the costs of doing what’s necessary to stop it. This might or might not be you. Assuming the water is normal “splash” that is making its way into the unit below then it will be the person who is responsible for maintaining the waterproofing in your bathroom - that might be you or it might be the common property owner, you would need to check your by-laws. Of course, this assumes your building is new enough to have waterproofing - older buildings just relied on the tiling. If so, this is almost certainly your responsibility. If instead, it’s a leak from a pipe or fixture, then the owner of that is responsible. That could be you or the building owner or even your downstairs neighbour. Again, check your by-laws. Edit The OP has indicated they are a tenant, not the owner. In this case, it’s nothing to do with you unless your lease says you are responsible for building maintenance or you have been negligent. Residential leases almost never do the former and, unless you did something stupid, like allowing the bath to overflow or having water balloon fights, you probably haven’t been negligent. Refer the matter to your landlord and ask your neighbour to direct all future correspondence to them.
Google is very helpful in this regard. I typed nyc restaurant bath and it suggested nyc restaurant bathroom law, the first result being http://www1.nyc.gov/nyc-resources/service/2360/restaurant-bathroom-requirements. It says: You can make reports about any food establishment with 20 or more seats that has no toilet and was established after 1977. These establishments must provide toilets for their patrons. Food establishments that have been in operation since 1977 or before are exempt from this requirement. Food establishments with 19 or fewer customer seats are not required to provide bathroom access to the public. Food establishments are not required to allow public access to their employee toilets. Patrons are not permitted to use any toilets where the patron must walk through the kitchen or any food storage or food preparation area. Call 311 to report a restaurant with 20 or more seats that has no toilet and was opened after 1977.
First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile.
Your problem is not just that you don't have a working stopcock, but that you now know that you don't have one. Of course it's not illegal by itself, the problem is what is going to happen if you have an insurance case. Your home insurance most likely has to pay for accidental damage. But any damage that would be caused by not being able to close the stopcock, when you knew it wasn't working, they could claim that this is due to gross negligence. Whether they would succeed with that claim or not, I don't know, but fixing the stopcock seems to be a much, much cheaper solution. PS. Seems I made a wrong assumption here - that it was your home, owned by you. The same reasons that would have made it a good idea for you to fix the stopcock obviously make it a good idea for the landlord as well. So I would make sure that you tell the landlord as soon as possible. If something goes wrong, and the insurance doesn't pay, your landlord would be responsible for the damage. Whether it's legal to not fix the stopcock - that's a different matter. I thought you were the owner. You would have endangered yourself and your property. Nothing illegal with that. But with the landlord it's different; he wouldn't be endangering himself but someone else's property.
This helpful video gives the answer, and it's no, you don't have to open your door unless they have a warrant. If you've committed an indictable offence (those considered most serious, such as murder, manslaughter, causing really serious harm (injury) and robbery) they have the power to enter without a warrant (see 17 b of the PACE Act). In the case I saw there was no indictable offence and so the lady didn't (shouldn't!) have opened her door. You can speak to them through a closed door or window and if they try to break in it is they that are breaking the law.
Can "positive news coverage" be considered a "thing of value" in a bribery case? Has it ever been prosecuted in the US before? Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing several corruption charges. It's a complex, multi-faceted case, but at the heart of the indictment, is a bribery charge involving "positive news coverage" in exchange for lucrative regulatory concessions. The indictment purports that Netanyahu offered Shaul Elovitch, a wealthy Israeli businessman, regulatory concessions for his telecom company worth 500 million dollars in exchange for "positive news coverage" from Elovitch's other media companies. However, members of Netanyahu's government blasted Israel's Attorney General for bringing forth bribery charges that they call "impossible" and "unprecedented in the history of western democracy." They claim that "positive news coverage" can't be considered a "thing of value" and has never been brought forth as such in the US or other similar legal systems. Is that an accurate assessment? If the Israeli prosecution can show that said "positive news coverage" was systemic, far-reaching, and out of character for the media companies involved, can that constitute "a thing of value" even though no money was actually exchanged? The prosecution will claim as part of their case that Netanyahu is obsessed with his image in the media and that in 2020, "positive media coverage" can and does amount to a "thing of value." Has such a case ever been prosecuted in the U.S. or any other western democracy?
Can “positive news coverage” be considered a “thing of value” in a bribery case? Yes. Note that a narrow, specific holding that "positive news coverage" is a thing of value is unnecessary because it is implied by the general notion of thing of value as reflected in US case law. Several [U.S.] court opinions, such as U.S. v. Hernandez, 795 F.3d 1159, 1164-5 (2015), cite the following from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines from year 2010: Thing of value means anything of valuable consideration. For example, in a case involving the bartering of child pornographic material, the thing of value is the child pornographic material received in exchange for other child pornographic material bartered in consideration for the material received. (emphasis added) A subsequent version of the USSG incorporated the notion of "agreed [...] exchange [...] for the specific purpose of obtaining something of valuable consideration from that other person". See U.S. v. Hoppy, (U.S. Dist., M.D. Pennsylvania, Mar. 2018) (emphasis added). Apropos of your remark ("My question is mainly focused on trying to understand how "thing of value" is defined in the US and other western democracies"), Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1215 (2012) identifies what element renders something a "thing of value": The Second Circuit commented on the scope of the phrase "thing of value" when it explained that "[v]alue is usually set by the desire to have the `thing' and depends upon the individual and the circumstances." United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir.1964) [...]. It recommended that common sense should inform determinations of whether an improper benefit has been conferred. (quotation marks in original, emphasis added) In the context of your question, Netanyahu's alleged offer to Elovitch reflects Netanhayu's desire to have the positive news coverage. That desire is precisely what gives that "positive news coverage" the status of thing of value, at least under the circumstances you describe. Consequently, in light of the Mulhall opinion, it seems inaccurate and unavailing for Netanyahu's government to portray as "impossible" that the positive news coverage be treated as thing of value in the alleged offer. Additionally, see People v. Campos, 351 P.3d 553, 556 (2016) ("The primary purpose of obtaining employment is to receive the financial benefit of payment for labor performed"). It is clear that a politician's purpose of positive news coverage is to be elected for, appointed to, or remain in, public office. Thus, the motive for procuring positive news coverage [in exchange for lucrative regulatory concessions] easily translates to that politician's pursuit of a financial benefit that results from being in public office. Netanyahu's alleged offer fits the meaning of quid pro quo, which in turn is material for a finding of bribery. U.S. v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 281 (2007) reads: The Supreme Court has explained, in interpreting the federal bribery and gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, that bribery requires a quid pro quo, which includes an "intent to influence' an official act orto be influenced' in an official act." And the U.S. v.v Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th. Cir. 1998) reads: The quid pro quo requirement is satisfied so long as the evidence shows a "course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to the donor. (internal quotation omitted) Has it ever been prosecuted in the US before? Briberies involving a thing of value have been prosecuted in the US, although there appear to be no rulings where the thing of value in a prosecution consisted of --or was explicitly said to consist of-- "positive news coverage". That being said, it seems unclear and doubtful how the accused party(-ies) in your question could legitimately overcome the notions from US case law and construe the alleged consideration (i.e., the sought coverage) as "not a thing of value".
In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021), the US Supreme Court addressed a case that sought one dollar in nominal damages. I'm assuming you mean only claims involving money damages as a remedy, because there are many claims every year involving no literal money damages and the remedy sought is some other kind of relief (although such relief would still have practical or economic value).
Saying "they didn't have an affair", in isolation, would not be defamation. But we have to look at the context. Daniels had previously stated publicly that they did have an affair. So when Cohen said that it wasn't true, he was (claims Daniels) effectively calling her a liar. Calling someone a liar is potentially defamatory. You can read Daniels's complaint here. See paragraph 67: Both on its face, and because of the facts and circumstances known to persons who read or heard the statement, it was reasonably understood Mr. Cohen meant to convey that Ms. Clifford is a liar, someone who should not be trusted, and that her claims about her relationship with Mr. Trump is 'something [that] isn't true.' Mr. Cohen's statement exposed Mr. [sic] Clifford to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and shame, and discouraged others from associating or dealing with her. As to whether calling someone a liar is defamatory, there's a long article on the subject here. There are at least some cases where courts have held that it is. Gutterman, Roy S. "Liar! Liar? The Defamatory Impact of 'Liar' in the Modern World." Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 27 (2) 253-286, 2017.
Where the President explicitly tells a newspaper that they should reveal their sources. Is this not illegal in the US? It is not illegal. Well, it would be a U.S. Attorney, rather than the President himself. You're thinking of shield laws, but no such law exists at the federal level. Moreover, although some people might think that the First Amendment ("freedom of the press") would protect a journalist in such a case, the Supreme Court has held that it doesn't, though the government is required to "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest". So if a reporter were subpoenaed in federal court to reveal a source, and they couldn't convince a court to quash the subpoena under the Branzburg test, they'd have to either reveal their source or be held in contempt. In practice, many reporters have chosen the latter, and served time in jail rather than reveal the source. For instance, Judith Miller. There've been a number of proposals to create such a federal law, but so far Congress hasn't seen fit to do it. According to the Wikipedia article, every state except Wyoming has some sort of shield protection for journalists, either in statute or case law, though the protections are not necessarily absolute. So a state court or prosecutor would find it much more difficult to enforce such an order.
There are four criteria used today in the United States: The statement was false, but was claimed as true. The statement must have been made to a third, previously uninvolved party. The statement must have been made by the accused party. The statement caused harm. The first (and very important) criterion was discussed in New York Times v. Sullivan, where it was ruled that A State cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves "actual malice" -- that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. Pp. 265-292. (c) Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of damages for false statements unless "actual malice" -- knowledge that statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth -- is alleged and proved. Pp. 279-283. Quoting Wikipedia and Justice Black, The Court held that a public official suing for defamation must prove that the statement in question was made with actual malice. In this context, the phrase refers to knowledge or reckless lack of investigation, rather than its ordinary meaning of malicious intent. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black explained that "'[m]alice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment." New York Times v. Sullivan is regarded as one of the most - of not the most - important defamation cases of the century. It was argued in 1964. If the case you discuss - which I haven't been able to find - occurred after to the ruling, then it could have been dismissed, because A did not intend it as malicious in the sense of defamation (and did not claim it was true), though it was almost certainly meant as an insult. Had this case occurred prior to New York Times v. Sullivan, things might have been different. Non-public officials Things are different for private officials. Those who are not classified as public figures are considered private figures. To support a claim for defamation, in most states a private figure need only show negligence by the publisher, a much lower standard than "actual malice." Some states, however, impose a higher standard on private figures, especially if the statement concerns a matter of public importance. You should review your state's specific law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide for more information. Note: There are differences between defamation, libel, and slander; a quick overview is given here: "Generally speaking, defamation is the issuance of a false statement about another person, which causes that person to suffer harm. Slander involves the making of defamatory statements by a transitory (non-fixed) representation, usually an oral (spoken) representation. Libel involves the making of defamatory statements in a printed or fixed medium, such as a magazine or newspaper."
The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.
On the contrary, it is unethical for a prosecutor to bring a case where there is no reasonable prospect of conviction. The prosecutor is an officer of the court and as a representative of the state, their primary concern is the guilty are convicted and the not guilty are not.
This negotiation tactic is not a crime, but it does implicate an ethical rule for attorneys, Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5, which exists in some states, but has been dropped from the national model rules promulgated by the American Bar Association and is a controversial matter from state to state with several variant forms in different states. In Colorado, the relevant rule of professional conduct for lawyers (Rule 4.5 Threatening Prosecution) states: (a) A lawyer shall not threaten criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter nor shall a lawyer present or participate in presenting criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. (b) It shall not be a violation of Rule 4.5 for a lawyer to notify another person in a civil matter that the lawyer reasonably believes that the other's conduct may violate criminal, administrative or disciplinary rules or statutes. The concern about the statement in the question is that mentioning that certain allegations would be put in a publicly filed complaint is an implicit threat to expose criminal acts of the other party if the other party doesn't cooperate, but to refrain from doing so if the other party cooperates. This violates Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5(a) above, and goes beyond Rule 4.5(b) above which states that it is not improper to simply tell someone that it may have been illegal and a crime to do the things that he did. The critical distinction is the implied promise not to disclose these crimes publicly if the other party cooperates by not filing the proposed complaint. Under Rule 4.5, a lawyer can tell someone that certain conduct is probably illegal, and can unilaterally report illegal conduct, but can't hold open the possibility of not reporting illegal conduct to gain a civil advantage. The theory is that it is contrary to public policy for a lawyer to put himself or his client in a position where he is promising to help cover up a crime or other violation of the law. This is controversial, and is not adopted in all states, because it makes some very subtle distinctions that often hinge on strongly implied concepts, and that it provides benefit when applied in many cases to someone who has broken the law, instead of making their violation of the law something that makes them worse off in civil cases as well as in other contexts. There is not a counterpart to Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5 in the Rules of Professional Conduct of New York State, New Jersey, or Florida. So, to the extent that this conduct is subject to ethical rules in any of these states, it would only be indirectly through, for example, through Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 in each of these states, which is a general catch all clause prohibiting lawyers from committing culpable crimes or that is dishonest or that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rule 8.4 is the counterpart for lawyers of the substantive offense in military justice that a military officer has failed to comport himself as an officer and a gentleman. The history of the decision to remove an express prohibition on threatening prosecution from the ethical rules for lawyers is explained in a 2008 ABA article that also discusses how liability might arise under Rule 8.4. In general, there is nothing wrong with making threats in a negotiation. Often that is precisely what negotiations are about. What is (arguably) wrong is making criminal, administrative or disciplinary charge threats in a civil lawsuit to gain advantage in a civil lawsuit. A prosecutor is perfectly free to make those threats in a criminal case, for example. Similarly, it is perfectly acceptable to make a threat of civil legal action, such as filing a lawsuit, in a civil matter, so long as it doesn't imply a threat to bring criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges if the other side doesn't cooperate. Whether it is proper for an attorney to do this depends heavily upon the state in which this negotiation is taking place, which is not identified in the question.
Why aren't email providers liable in some way or another for scams operated via accounts on their domains? Suppose a spam email tells you that you've earned $1m. To get the funds the email goes on to tell you to email [email protected]. My question revolves around why Gmail doesn't block "[email protected]" on the spot when it detects such an obvious fraud (which it correctly marks as spam), so that less savvy users don't take the unfortunate step of getting defrauded out of their savings with little to no recourse. A real life equivalent might seem to be a driver who waits for the hitchhiker they picked up while the latter does a bank heist, and continues on with their passenger after they're done. Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Also, given the amount of spam I receive that actually use Gmail accounts, I presume -- but have not checked -- that the accounts do not get disabled quickly by Gmail and others. (Some do answer, with amusing results.) This is on the basis that fraudsters would use an actual domain name if email account providers did block these emails quickly. Why do Gmail, Hotmail, etc. get away with enabling bank wire fraud? Is section 230 indeed the reason that they do? Has this ever been tested in court as a class action in the US or elsewhere to see where it leads? To clarify what is being asked: This is not about blocking e.g. Gmail accounts that send spam, nor is it about detecting spam. Rather, the question is about blocking e.g. [email protected] in emails that Gmail already identifies as spam (with near 100% accuracy) in a format that revolves around: Congratulations, someone gave you lots of moneys. Please email [email protected] for instructions on how to collect it. Further, the question is not why doesn't Gmail stop such emails from being sent. Rather, it is: Is section 230 indeed the reason that they get away with not shutting down accounts like "[email protected]" in the above example quickly when they detect such emails without being held liable? Has this ever been tested in court as a class action in the US or elsewhere to see where it leads?
Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed.
In theory, such an action could be considered a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, specifically 18 USC 1030 (a)(2)(C): Whoever...intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains... information from any protected computer; Where the relevant "protected computer" definition is in the same section under (e)(2)(B): As used in this section...the term “protected computer” means a computer...which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States; Every computer connected to the Internet is used in interstate and foreign communication. One could imagine a situation where a prosecutor might use this particular quirk of the CFAA, for example if Jody was evading bans in order to harass someone and the prosecutor wanted to throw the book at her, but I'd guess most prosecutors would not pick up such a case if Jody's ban evasion didn't cause any damage.
You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though.
Generally, you are permitted to contact people for whatever reason you would like. However, I would caution that you familiarise yourself with the various spam laws they have been enacted in your jurisdiction and also in those of your prospective recipients. Some of these laws merely impose conditions on the manner in which you can send unsolicited email, others prohibit it in certain circumstances. I don't intend to traverse each jurisdiction, but Wikipedia has an apparently comprehensive list. There's no reason why you can't refer to your employer, but you should note the relevant advertising and libel law in your jurisdiction and ensure you don't run afoul of these. Finally, consider whether you are breaching any terms of use of the site from which you are obtaining this data. Although you've mentioned it's publicly available, and the enforceability of browsewrap agreements is questionable, it may be legal hassle you don't want to incur.
A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals.
HIPAA imposes obligations on some people, but not all people. In the case of security and privacy questions, you would consult 45 CFR Part 164. A patient's actions are not subject to government sanctions, so a patient can provide or decline to provide email addresses following their own judgment. A healthcare or insurance provider would be required to securely keep PII under wraps. The regulations also do not impose obligations on unknowing potentially involved third-parties, i.e. no obligation is imposed on Google to know that an individual is using a Gmail account to transmit PII-related information. The medical provider has an obligation to store and transmit such information securely, which would mean for example that they do not send insecure plain text emails saying "Sally Jones at 12345 67th Ave SW was treated for a loathsome disease, we're coding that as 0102, and we want $500". That obligation is passed on to employees via employment-contractual obligations, for example that may dictate what computer or software you can use to do the job. If the provider passes the buck to the employee (and I assume that the employee is just an employee), they have violated the security rule. In that case, they may be attempting to mitigate the consequences of their actions or at least check if there were identifiable violations of the privacy rule. In the scenario where SmithMed provides all of the infrastructure needed to bill insurance companies, it is not a HIPAA violation to inspect computer logs, email etc. to verify that the employee has been complying with security and privacy policies. It would likewise not be a HIPAA violation to inspect third-party accounts (Gmail etc) to determine whether there has been a security / privacy rule violation. That is as far as HIPAA takes you. Whether or not the ex-employee has an obligation to turn over their email account information is mostly determined by the employment contract, but it is highly unlikely that any such contract has a "gimme your personal email on termination" clause. It is not inconceivable that the employee negligently used their personal account rather than opening a new billing-job only account. Also depending on the email service provider, it may well be a violation of the terms of service to hand over your account information. (Instead, for a certain email provider, the company is expected to set up and pay for a company account). Those are considerations bearing on possible legal impediments to turning over the email information. Needless to say, don't share passwords etc. because that exposes you legally, but that is not about HIPAA.
You need to look at the domain registrar's TOS to determine their polices for canceling a domain after the fact in the way they did, i.e. claiming the domain is "premium" and as such allowing them to cancel and raise the price and re-offer the domain. The registrar may, in fact, have such a policy in their TOS that you agreed to when you opened an account with them and registered a domain. "Clicking through" and accepting a TOS is a binding contract. Their policy may hinge on an "escrow" hold on the domain for a certain time until your payment clears, they do due diligence, or other reasons, and by agreeing to the TOS you allowed them to reserve the right to cancel or re-offer the registration. However, such a policy is at least (I think) ethically challenged and at most could be illegal - US and local laws in your your jurisdiction may come into play - in terms of ICANN's policies. You may have success opening a complaint with ICANN, the international organization that oversees domain registrars and works to resolve complaints such as cyber-squatting, issues with the way registrars operate, etc. See Registrant Rights and Responsibilities Under the 2009 Registrar Accreditation Agreement - ICANN. If the registrar doesn't have a clear policy on the form of cancellation and re-offer you have been subjected to, your next step is definitely looking at Dispute Resolution Options - ICANN. Keep all your documents and emails, and log all phone calls or chats with the registrar. Make screenshots of your Cloudflare account and Google's web cache. And, it might be helpful to do a Google search for that registrar and "domain cancellation" or more relevant keywords to see if anything similar has happened in the past and the outcomes; those stories may give you ideas for other options. You may also need to find a local lawyer to advise you on your next steps, or talk to a free legal aid clinic in your area.
The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.
No reimbursement for job interview travel expenses I have already asked on the workplace about how to ask for reimbursement that was agreed on before a job interview. I'm gonna briefly summarize here what has happened so far. After applying for a job in another German city, the company offered to pay for my travel expenses. I submitted a form that they provided along with the original receipt for my ticket. After a few interviews with the company (both on-site and later online) I decided that I did not want to work for them any longer and therefore withdrew my application via email. They did not reimburse me or reply to an email I sent recently regarding the reimbursement. The email was along the lines of: Hey, I haven't heard back from you regarding the reimbursement. Could you give me an update on that matter? I would like to get reimbursed for my travel expenses (close to 200€). What further steps can I take now?
Since they have allready given you a form to fill that you have sent back with the original receipts, I will assume that the major preconditions have been fulfilled (mainly that they have asked you to come in writing and have not exclude reimbursement). This a case of civil law based on §670 BGB. Since they have not fullfilled their obligation, you must send them a reminder (Mahnung) in the form of a registered letter, requiring them to do so within a reasonable timeframe (like 10 working days after receipt of the letter). look for standard letters on this topic (Mahnungen) The letter should be descriptive in nature (i.e. a Judge, after reading a copy of the letter, will understand the whole situation). Nowadays such a letter should be sent through your local Amsgericht, so that they can certify that your copy of the letter was included in the original letter. If they don't react to this, then you must charge them. This is a basic description of the needed method. Look up the details of the process and/or for someone to assist you. Section 670 Reimbursement of expenses If the mandatary, for the purpose of performing the mandate, incurs expenses that he may consider to be necessary in the circumstances, then the mandator is obliged to make reimbursement. Sources §670 - German Civil Code (BGB) Wer trägt die Reisekosten für das Vorstellungsgespräch? - ingenieur.de
What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem.
With respect to the first question, discussing an idea in a non-encrypted email is not a publication that forfeits the right to patent an idea, even though it is not 100% secure. In the same way, talking about an idea for a patent with your patent lawyer in a secluded booth of a coffee shop in person does not constitute publication of the idea for this purpose, even if someone is secretly spying on you at the time. Since I am at the moment employed by a company, even though the idea originates from myself, it seems that I should quit my job first not to have my current company have any claim over my idea. It is possible that the contract makes even ideas that you come up with yourself while employed by the company the property of the company. If so, you are legally in the wrong and the idea belongs to the company. But, proving the reality that you are stealing the idea from the company is harder if there is nothing in writing. An email discussing an idea while you are employed would have to be disclosed in litigation with your employer over whether the patent applied for belongs to you or to your employer under an employment agreement. If you didn't put it in an email, it wouldn't exist to turn over in litigation.
In the US, persons with a disability are entitled to a reasonable accommodation for their disability. There is no requirement to tell an employee everything about their working conditions before a hire, in fact it would be illegal for the employer to ask "Do you have a disability that would prevent you from working underground?". Once hired, you can request an accommodation for your disability.
In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.
You entered into two contracts, one with a Canadian travel agency and on with an airline (maybe multiple airlines). The travel agency acted as your agent, in securing the booking with the airline. In each case, the contract reduces to the promise "I will give you this in exchange for that". The other parties did what they were supposed to do, now you are legally required to pay up. It is highly unlikely that your agreements included a clause to the effect that if they don't get the money from you within a particular short time-frame, the ticket is free. There can be a statutory limit on how long a civil claim (unpaid debt) is valid, but that is measured in years, not months. You can certainly negotiate with the party seeking payment (I assume it is the travel agency). If the agency clearly, unambiguously and explicitly states that they will accept half payment to settle the debt, then if they try to sue you in court, you can produce that email plus proof of payment as evidence that there is no debt. Thanking you for an offer is not clear, unambiguous and explicit acceptance of half payment.
You were on a performance improvement plan, those often require special requirements of the employee. I'm sorry your mother died, but a year seems like a very long time to take, and your company was very kind to give you that long. I am not a lawyer but I sincerely doubt there is anything actionable here.
She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.
Is there really a German law that requires that credit card companies *only* provide statements in read-only format? I live in Germany and have a German €-denominated credit card. I used to download my monthly transactions in CSV format, but after a recent web site redesign, the new credit card web site only allows downloads as PDF. I contacted the bank about this, and they replied that German law requires them to give the transactions in a read-only format such as PDF. I don't know what law they're referring to, but this seems far-fetched to me. I could see a law requiring them to make statements available in a read-only format, but I find it hard to believe that the law would insist that exclusively read-only format is permitted. Would anyone be able to locate the law in question, so I can read it for myself? (I can read German reasonably well.) Articles about this law or other commentary would be welcome as well, in English or German.
The laws you are looking for are §§144 ff Abgabeordnung (AO) and are for those who are required by law (earnings greater € 500000) to retain their bank statements and wish to do so in an electronic form (§146a AO). So when needed as proof for the tax office, this unchangeable PDF format is needed. The law does not forbid the bank to also give out the bank statements in another form (not acceptable by the Federal Ministry of Finance). The CSV format would be one such format. Sonderpflichten für Besserverdiener Für Privatpersonen mit positiven Einkünften von mehr als 500.000 Euro im Jahr besteht eine besondere Aufbewahrungsfrist für Kontoauszüge von sechs Jahren. Die gesetzliche Aufbewahrungspflicht für Unterlagen von Personen, die zur Buchhaltung verpflichtet sind, beträgt übrigens zehn Jahre. Special duties for high earners For individuals with positive income of more than 500,000 euros a year there is a special retention period for bank statements of six years. Incidentally, the legal retention requirement for documents from persons who are obliged to keep accounts is ten years. Elektronischer Kontoauszug gilt als Nachweis Immer mehr Bankkunden ziehen elektronische Kontoauszüge der papiergebundenen Form vor. Da stellt sich die Frage, ob die digitalen Belege im Ernstfall genauso als Zahlungsnachweis gelten. Das Bundesministerium der Finanzen hat erklärt, dass dies der Fall ist, sofern das elektronische Dokument vorher vom Kontoinhaber auf seine Richtigkeit überprüft worden ist. Wenn ein Steuerpflichtiger also einen Kontoauszug vorlegt, den eine Bank im unveränderbaren PDF-Format erstellt hat, gilt seine Nachweispflicht als erfüllt. Da das Bundesfinanzministerium den Ausdruck des elektronischen Kontoauszugs jedoch lediglich als Kopie des Originals ansieht, sollten Betroffene das digitale Dokument besser nicht vor Ablauf der jeweiligen Aufbewahrungsfrist löschen. Electronic bank statements serve as proof More and more bank customers prefer electronic bank statements to paper-based forms. This raises the question of whether the digital vouchers also serve as proof of payment in an emergency. The Federal Ministry of Finance has stated that this is the case if the electronic document has been checked for accuracy by the account holder. If a taxpayer presents an account statement that a bank has created in the unchangeable PDF format, its obligation to provide evidence is deemed to be fulfilled. However, since the Federal Ministry of Finance regards the printout of the electronic account statement only as a copy of the original, those affected should not delete the digital document before the respective retention period has expired. Sources: § 146a AO - Einzelnorm Kontoauszüge & Co. aufbewahren? – ING WissensWert
The EU-wide 48 hour limit and the German Arbeitszeitgesetz only apply to employees, not to self-employed persons or freelancers. Thus, it would in principle be legal to have a full-time job and do any amount of freelancing on the side. I'm not sure whether your PhD student position factors into this since it is unpaid. If you have multiple employers, the sum of working time matters – this is one reason why you have to notify your employers about additional jobs. One employer cannot check your time with another employer, so you should inform them when your shifts change (while employers can assign you shifts, they must consider your personal circumstances). But self-employment is not employment. If you take this offer, you would act as a German business, perform work in Germany, pay taxes in Germany, but have an UK client. (Assuming your work would be done remotely rather than travelling to the UK to perform your work there). Freelancing would also mean that you'll meet the wonderful world of German bureaucracy, including registering with the Finanzamt, writing invoices, doing accounting, filing taxes, dealing with VAT, and trying to navigate a no-deal Brexit. At least your work likely counts as freiberuflich rather than gewerblich, which would free you from a Gewerbeanmeldung. Your don't have to seek permission from your employer when taking up a side job, but you must notify them. They can object if your side job would impact your work. This would clearly be the case when working for a competitor, or when your side job would bring you over the working time limit. Since you work in the public sector, there may be additional rules (parts of Beamtenrecht apply to your employment relationship). While the working time limit does not apply to freelancing, this might still impact your job if you get too little rest, or if you would become unavailable for your main job during normal working hours. Taking up a side job despite an objection could be cause for immediate termination. Note also that you cannot generally use vacation days to work a side job since vacation is intended for recuperation. To summarize: you would not work an UK job, but be employed in Germany and be self-employed in Germany the working time limit only relates to employed work, not self-employed work your employer may nevertheless be able to object to you taking up another job if it would affect your work
Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."
As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself.
Being as general as possible - refund policies are governed by bank and scheme policies, and so aren't necessarily the domain of law. There may be jurisdiction-specific regulations that limit your liability as a consumer, but there's not usually a legal requirement. This is almost certainly wholly governed by your credit card terms of use.¹ You can report this to your local authorities, but without proof of a crime, it's unlikely to be actionable. The website isn't necessarily to blame, either - if your computer or your connection to the website was somehow compromised, then your details may have been obtained in that way, and the website could have had nothing to do with it. Again, this is almost certainly wholly governed by their scheme agreement.¹ 1. Some off-topic information here, which may or may not be accurate, and which you should not seek clarification for here (check Money SE instead, and first check whether it is on-topic there) - generally, bank policies will refund you for fraudulent transactions below a certain quantity or value. In this case, the bank tends to take a loss and chargeback rights are not exercised. In other cases, the bank will require the merchant to prove that the authorised cardholder did in fact authorise the transaction. The level of proof is governed by the way in which the transaction was conducted and verified at the time of purchase - whether the CVV2 code was verified, whether address verification was completed, whether 3D verification was completed. If the merchant is unable to prove, according to the scheme guidelines, the transaction will be charged back to their account.
Variations of contracts must be consented to by all parties. This means that if the company sent your friend varied terms, it would have included means by which she would have consented - this may be by continuing to use a service. You cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract. You could try to charge the company PoS terminal storage fees, but it's highly unlikely to be enforceable if they don't agree to it. In theory if they are aware of the change and they accept them in some way then they are bound to the terms just as she would be, even if they later claimed that they were not aware of them. There is some precedent - in Russia - for this with a bank and it made the news some time ago. There's plenty of cases in which people who don't read EULAs or loan contracts thoroughly are still forced to honour their obligations to their creditors under them.
I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.
There are jurisdictions that do not allow authors to place their work in the public domain, such as Germany. Main reason is the strict monistic approach the German copyright law bases on. Key feature of this approach is the concept that, in principle, the copyright/author’s right itself can neither be transferred to another person nor waived by the author herself. The German author’s right consists of two parts, the moral rights and the exploitation rights. The moral rights are – as a rule – personal rights that are bound to the person of the creator (or, after her death, her legal heirs), i.e. they can neither be transferred nor waived. Since moral and exploitation rights are considered as inseparable parts of the author’s right as a whole (monistic approach) the exploitation rights cannot – in principle – transferred or waived by contract as well. CC0 is supposed to get you as close to the public domain as possible in your legal system. CC0 helps solve this problem by giving creators a way to waive all their copyright and related rights in their works to the fullest extent allowed by law. CC0 is a universal instrument that is not adapted to the laws of any particular legal jurisdiction, similar to many open source software licenses.
Is it legal, in the US, to sell business insurance which is triggered by a political loss of a pro-business party? Regardless of whether it is right or wrong, Republicans are considered to be the pro-business party. It doesn't really matter, for the purposes of this question, whether that's a correct assumption. We can denominate hypothetical parties B and L (to stand in for pro-"business" and pro-"labor"). Assuming that a state, governed by B, adopts a policy which attracts businesses from other states, but there is a close gubernatorial election (but B wins over L by a razor-thin margin), it becomes risky for a business to make long-term commitments in such a state. The next election can reverse the policy. Is there anything which legally prevents an insurance company from explicitly writing a policy that would pay out a certain sum of money to any business in the state if, in the next election, L wins? I do realize that there are other markers which can be used to stand in for such a direct triggering event, but my question is not about insurance. It's about the law. I can't think of anything which would preclude such an explicit triggering event in an insurance policy (other than maybe prudence or ethics).
Political risk insurance exists, but not in the format hypothesized. What the question is contemplating is more like a gambling bet, or a futures contract (which is a type of "derivative" contract), than insurance. What constitutes an insurable risk of harm to an insurable interest is mostly a matter of common law although there are some state statutes on point in the U.S. which is the level of federalism at which insurance is regulated. Basically, you can only insure against a loss to an "insurable interest" caused by an insurable risk. In practice, this means that insurance has to be linked to an individualized loss of an individual or business that is clearly and directly caused by a covered occurrence. A change in governing political party itself, doesn't give rise to such a loss. The mere fact that a party is elected or that the people elected take an oath of office, doesn't itself change any laws or regulations. It just puts in place people who might do such things in the future. Political risk insurance, when it exists, insures against the nationalization of one's business at a loss, or against the industry that one is engaged in becoming illegal, at a loss. It is the specific action taken by the newly elected regime towards the particular insured firm or individual, and not the actual new regime itself, that gives rise to a loss to an insurable interest in the case of political risk insurance. For example, you might be able to buy political risk insurance against the possibility that your marijuana business which is legal under state law but not federal law, will be seized in a civil forfeiture or shut down by a change in the practical effect of the relevant state law. If you are worried that your company's stock will decline in value due to an election result, the available financial instrument would be to short sell your company's stock, hedging against losses arising from a drop in stock price below a certain dollar value by a certain date for any reason. If your company is not publicly held, the risk of a decline in business due to an election result is not something that can be insured against.
Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.
UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson, is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a "Presidential election" of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876, which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis: Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. "This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states," said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing arguments are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.
It is basically fraud, and there are two ways in which it could be illegal: it might be a crime, and you might get sued for doing it (you would not be fined or imprisoned, but you may have to compensate the hotel chain for their loss). Whether or not it is a crime depends on the jurisdiction. In Washington, there are very many laws against fraud such as RCW 9.38 (credit), RCW 9.45 (numerous things where a business defrauds others), RCW 9.60 (forgery) but none of them would apply to lying about a material fact to a business in order to get a discount. Texas likewise has a long section on criminal fraud. It is not clear from the wording whether a customer lying to a business (not involving forgery, vehicles, credit, or financial institutions) is covered. 32.42(b)(10) says A person commits an offense if in the course of business he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence commits one or more of the following deceptive business practices... making a materially false or misleading statement of fact concerning the reason for, existence of, or amount of a price or price reduction The question of interpretation that this raises is whether a person who has said "I'm over 70" so that they can get a discount has made a statement "concerning the reason for a price reduction". The ordinary interpretation of "concerning the reason for" would be that it refers to explaining why or under what conditions a price reduction exists. For the moment, I am skeptical that this definition would include the case at hand, but that will require a search through case law and jury instructions. From the lawsuit angle, you would have knowingly made a false material statement in order to obtain a value, which is illegal, and they could sue you to recover the discount.
In the US, people are generally allowed to charge arbitrary amounts for services, as long as they do not violate various anti-discrimination laws in doing for. For example it would be illegal to charge people of one race less than they charge people of another race, because of federal and state anti-discrimination laws. Three primary factors govern the legality of a particular form of discrimination. One is the type of interaction, for example "voting rights", "public accommodation", "employment", "housing" – medical treatment would generally fall under "public accommodation". The second is jurisdiction – there can be federal, state, and municipal laws governing a particular kind of discrimination (the lower in the hierarchy you go, the stricter the laws tend to be). Finally there is the "protected class", that is, the basis for discrimination. Protected class is extremely variable, given the preceding two factors. Age discrimination is legal in ways that race discrimination is not. "Has insurance" is not a protected class anywhere, so this does not violate any discrimination laws (per se). There are numerous legal forms of discrimination which are analogous, for example to shop at Costco at all, you have to be a member; there are numerous businesses that offer "member discounts"; some doctors work on a "subscription" basis where they don't treat you unless you are a (paid) service subscriber. The idea that a service has to treat all comers identically is legally incorrect. Co-pay rates are dictated by insurance companies, and can vary depending on the specific insurance carrier that you have. To the extent that there are no specific laws saying otherwise, a service provider is legally entitled to charge less to a person who does not make a claims for coverage by medical insurance – or they could charge more. Indeed, the "without insurance" cost of medical services is typically higher, and the insurance company insists on doctors accepting lower compensation. A "practical" but somewhat risky solution is that if you know that the copay is higher than the street price, you can simply not reveal that you have insurance. However, sometimes an office visit results in a finding that some treatment is needed, and the street price for that treatment may be substantially higher than the insured price. At any rate, contractually-determined co-pays are legal. I should mention a remote possibility for applying anti-discrimination laws, owing to sec. 1557 of ACA. See this article on health care discrimination litigation, where the law enabled "private right of action for disparate impact claims opens the door to class-based claims challenging facially neutral health care policies, treatment decisions, and insurance coverage on the basis that they disproportionately affect members of protected classes". Under this regime, if a policy effectively discriminates on the basis of a protected class, without explicitly mentioning the class, the policy could still be found illegal. If there is a strong enough correlation between race and having health insurance, then "having health insurance" could be found to be a substitute for discrimination on prohibited grounds. There isn't enough case law on this issue, that we can clearly say that such an argument would or would not work.
Can a bank sue someone that starts a bank run that destroys the bank? No (assuming, of course, as is the usual case, that the person who starts the bank run is not engaged in perpetrating a defamatory falsehood). Most bank runs are, and certainly the Silicon Valley Bank bank run was, based upon wide disclosure of a true fact. In the case of SVB, the bank run was triggered by the fact that its balance sheets failed to reflect the true value of fixed nominal rate bonds that it held as assets. In the usual case, a lawsuit also isn't a very helpful option to a bank that suffers a bank run. In the case of SVB, the bank had a book value (which is often a fair measure of a bank's value since its assets are so monetized) of $34 billion which was reduced to a pittance by the run on it. Even if someone who started a run on the bank had a moderately high net worth of $3.4 million that could be collected in a money judgment, that would cover a mere 0.01% of the loss to the bank, and there would be serious issues over the causation of any loss (i.e. how much of the losses suffered bound to occur sooner or later anyway due to causes unrelated to someone who triggered a panic). Another fine point of procedure is that when a bank becomes insolvent, it is promptly taken over by the FDIC or similar regulatory agency, which installs a receiver. This makes it effectively impossible for the bank itself to sue anyone. If the bank would otherwise have had a right to sue, the receiver for the bank would have the right to sue rather than the bank itself. But, this subtly while not irrelevant, doesn't capture the core reason for the question.
You have to pay the premium You are not buying insurance by the month - you are buying coverage for a year for which you making monthly payments. At law, your insurer has to pay out for a single claim that happens during that period - most insurance policies contain a reset clause that reinstates the cover after a claim but this only applies if the asset still exists. Insurance law started with insurance of wooden ships on intercontinental voyages where losses were usually total and this ‘accident of history’ informs modern insurance where losses are usually not total. Similarly, being able to cancel the insurance if you dispose of the asset is a creature of the contract and usual practice rather than a legal requirement. As for “mak[ing] it clear to me” - they did. It’s in the policy which you legally read and understood even if you didn’t actually read it.
The corporate veil can be pierced if the millionaire failed to sink in sufficient assets for the business to meet reasonably expected liabilities. In particular, the millionaire should have funded the LLC sufficient to hire qualified people and secure business liability insurance. Further, anytime a corporate structure is set up specifically to be a liability shield and not with other reasonable reasons, it will generally be vacated by the courts. See Asset Protection by Atkisson & Riser, a must-read in this field. I know you are trying to create a "straw man" example for simplicity, but unfortunately the character and obvious purpose of the LLC does have a bearing on its survivability. Hardly anyone creates an LLC for a lemonade stand, which begs the question of "why do it". It may be a defense against discrimination if the job listing was so particularly specific that the millionaire's child or ward was the only possible candidate, and then it could be defended as an educational exercise to show the ward how businesses are set up. Rather than an attempt to discriminate in any disallowed way.
I'm being defamed on Facebook. Do I have a legal case? I live in Maryland. Over the past few months there is a guy on Facebook who has been openly lying about me. He has repeatedly said that I have made threats against him, I have not. He has repeatedly said that I am friends with Louis Farakhan, I have never had any contact with LK. He said that I'm a supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, I have never supported them in any way shape or form. I have screenshots and evidence of all these false statements about me. I know where this person lives (near me in Maryland). Do I have a legal case to sue for defamation and is it likely I would be awarded any significant damages?
So Maryland is a Defimation Per Se state, and lists accusations of moral turpitude, criminal conduct, or fraud. I would say on the second statement about offering support ot Hamas and/or Hezbollah, which are considered terrorist organizations. Being buddies with Louis Farakhan's buddy is likely not a Per Se defamatory statement but a Per Quod meaning you would have to prove damages from this false assertion. Remember that just because you disagree with his political positions does not mean you aren't capable of sitting down with him for a friendly happy hour debate over politics. Lots of people have good friends who they debate politics with and will still be friendly with. I would make certain that you go through your history of statements on social media and in public to make certain you don't have anything that can be construed as supporting political beliefs that these organizations support (even if you don't support those organization's methods of obtaining their political goal). Do not limit yourself to just material support (donating things of value to them). I'm not for the purposes of this answer going to comment on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, but if your political opinions on the matter are in favor of Palestine, the statements above, while hyperbolic, are not totally out of line and thus defamitory, since all of the accused associations against you are also big names in pro-Palestine support circles. Try to also look for any statements where, unprompted, you are critical of the statements of the three false associations. As always, you should discuss specifics with a lawyer specializing in this matter. Most firms will offer a consultation for free so you can discuss the case and the specifics and get advice as to what you should do. I do not think you will be awarded much beyond basic actual damages and legal fees from the guy, since the statements have not caused you any damages such as loss of job or becoming a target of government investigation by law enforcement agencies.
Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system.
canada The aspects of a defamation claim that seem to be in issue are the following: is the publication defamatory in the sense that it tends to lower the reputation of the subject in the eyes of a reasonable person does the statement fall within a defence to defamation, specifically fair comment or truth Your statement of the scenario is somewhat ambiguous for the purposes of the above analysis: But what if Bob instead publishes a hypothesis that Rob murdered Alice: he analyses the well known facts about Rob, Alice and the circumstances of her death, and concludes that those facts are consistent with Alice being murdered by Rob? It matters whether Bob: simply publishes "Rob murdered Alice", Bob's hypothesis publishes "Rob murdered Alice" accompanied with language or context that communicates that it is merely a hypothesis publishes the underlying facts, the analysis, along with the conclusion of consistency Your description is ambiguous because despite talking about Bob's methodology in arriving at his conclusion, you don't clearly say that he publishes that along with the hypothesis. The plaintiff's threshold burden: Is the statement defamatory? Depending on the precise content of the published statement it may meet the low threshold of tending to lower the reputation of the subject in the eyes of a reasonable person. If it does, then the burden will flip to the defendant to establish a defence, such as truth or fair comment. Of these, based on the methodology you have described, I view fair comment as the more directly applicable defence, but it does really depend on what the content of the publication is. Fair comment defence The test for fair comment is: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any [person] honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was [subjectively] actuated by express malice. For a fair comment defence, the receivers of the impugned statement must be able to identify the underlying facts on which the statement is based. Therefore, it would not be enough for the hypothesis to be "reasonably based on facts"; those facts need to be also published to the listeners/readers and a reasonable listener/reader needs to be able to associate the impugned statement as being based on those. Another component of the fair comment defence is that the statement must be one of opinion, not fact. If the statement, considered in its full context, is not amenable to empirical verification or falsification, then it is a statement of opinion.
If what you show is correct and above-board then you are being sued in superior court. However it sounds unlikely that the plaintiff could have served you with notice of such a lawsuit without you realizing it, so if I were you I would first call the court to see if they do in fact have a case with the docket number listed. Then ask: When and who served the original notice in the case (because if you really didn't get it then whoever said you did majorly screwed up and is probably in trouble) Who the plaintiff's counsel is If the letter was from a real lawyer on the California Bar, and that case really is open in the superior court with you as a defendant, then you really are being sued, and you should either get a lawyer or negotiate a settlement, because if you don't answer and defend then you're just going to have more judgments against you. If any of the above does not check out then whoever sent that letter is in big trouble if you report it to the DA, postal inspector, and (if they are a real lawyer) the Bar.
Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them.
Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives.
There are two common defenses to defamation (there are others): That what you said is true. That what you said cannot be reasonably interpreted as a factual claim. If after examining the totality of the circumstances, a fact-finder (judge or jury) sees your statement to be an expression of opinion rather than a factual claim about the subject, you would not be found to have defamed the subject. The opinion defence doesn't have a bright line rule. In your example, I think it is clearly on the side of opinion. However, if you were to say something like "Douglas Dunce, Apple's Chief Engineer, has an IQ of 76", that would be almost certainly be deemed a factual claim. The leading case here is Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. The court held that "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected". Other summaries of this defence: http://www.defamationlawblog.com/2009/01/fact-vs-opinion-setting-the-record-straight/ http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/opinion-defense-remains-str
A person isn't required to state their evidence that the claim is true when they make the claim, and as a public figure, a defamation suit filed by Trump would be judged under the stronger "actual malice" claim, meaning that the statement was made with knowledge that the claim is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. You would have to look at the specific statement. It is generally not defamatory to hurl insults like "rapist!", "pedophile!", "criminal!" etc. against a public figure especially a political figure, since such word don't generally amount to an actual accusation of wrong-doing. On the other hand, a detailed but false claim purporting to relate factual events could cross the threshold. Hyperbole is not actionable.
Castle doctrine Does castle doctrine mean any guest at a house can kill uninvited guests? Is it awkward because they would have to know the guest was uninvited despite not being the property owner? Would a quick phone call be enough? Assume the uninvited guest is just some random person who entered the house and is not violent.
Does castle doctrine mean any guest at a house can kill uninvited guests? No. You have a completely faulty reading of the Castle doctrine (Wikipedia). The Castle doctrine allows a person... protections and immunities permitting one, in certain circumstances, to use force... And, those circumstances: Castle doctrines lessen the duty to retreat when an individual is assaulted within one's own home. Deadly force may either be justified... "when the actor reasonably fears imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm to him or herself or another"... While Castle doctrines may not provide civil immunity, such as from wrongful death suits, which have a much lower burden of proof. Aspects of the castle doctrine vary according to jurisdiction.
There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door".
Clean your tub. Scratch that off the list. Typo - forget about it, there is nothing here, clerical errors are curable if not outright reasonable. In CA your landlord can enter under certain circumstances. All but emergency require notice, agreement, or your presence. But what is your remedy? A civil suit for damages or call the cops and try to get the landlord charged with criminal trespass under CAL. PEN. CODE § 602.
Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?
on behalf means that the party of the agreement is the landlord, not the property manager. The contract both entitles and obliges the landlord, not the property manager. The property manager is not a party of the contract. So the fact that the property manager is fired completely unrelated to the existing contract. Additionally, in most jurisdictions that I know of, even if the property changed ownership (the landlord sold or gifted it, or the landlord died and it was inherited by someone) the contract would still be in force, as the change of situations would not invalidated the rights and obligations of the other parties.
The question for trespassing is whether the trespasser has been adequately notified of the possession interest that another person has in the property. Although it is legal to evangelize door-to-door without a permit, most jurisdictions will require you to leave promptly if the owner asks you to leave. In the absence of such verbal requests, you have a legally protected interest in engaging in conversation with your neighbors. Based on the law as I understand it, it is likely that your jurisdiction will recognize a right to proselytize to your neighbors door-to-door regardless of a no trespassing or private property sign. However, for the sake of certainty, here’s a little bit about trespass law. Typically, states have statutes that define what it takes to make a sign “conspicuous” enough to create grounds for prosecution. Such laws include specifications for the thickness of markings and the sign’s distance from the ground. Arkansas statutes have established that a person who enters or remains unlawfully on property has committed trespass, which means that the person must enter or remain in or upon the premises when not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon the premises. Communication is key. Arkansas law provides that if the property is unimproved and apparently unused, and is not fenced or otherwise “enclosed in a manner designed to exclude an intruder,” the person entering the property does so with license and privilege. Generally, however, if a person unlawfully enters property that has been improved, he has trespassed regardless of a sign on the premises devoid of some religious purpose for his visit. Thus, there really is not a significant difference between the “No Trespassing” sign and the “Private Property” sign. Both would communicate to any potential intruder that the property he is about to enter is presently being possessed by another person and thus would likely be sufficient to provide grounds for claiming notice in court if a property owner should choose to bring a suit.
The language is worded broader: "A victim of [list of crimes] or that victim's representative shall have the following rights as provided by law:" The list is seemingly alphabetically, and covers besides arson injuring people, also aggravated arson & battery, misuse of explosives, negligent use of a deadly weapon, murder, [two other types of homicide], kidnapping, [various types of sexual misconduct], [two types of hit and run], [two types of child endangerment]. That is a closed list, that gives the victim or his representative (estate or legal guardian) the rights enumerated after.
I would serve the parents (certified mail), with a "cease and desist" letter, telling them that the children are repeatedly trespassing on your property and that you want them to stop; even get the police involved if you have to. I know it sounds harsh, but you said New England; that's where I live and I know the trespass laws are not in your favor ... especially when it comes to kids. Take Connecticut as an example: This is their law on trespass and kids (not just attractive nuisance!): A possessor of land owes each person who enters his land a certain duty of care based on the person's status. The legal significance is that a possessor of land has the duty to an invitee to inspect the premises for hidden defects and to repair or erect safeguards, if necessary, to make the premises reasonably safe. He has no duty to inspect or to repair or erect safeguards for licensees. But he is liable if he knows of a condition, realizes it involves unreasonable risk, has reason to believe the licensee will not discover it, and he permits the licensee to enter or remain without warning or making the condition reasonably safe. Generally, an owner owes trespassers no duty of care because he has no reason to expect them to be on his property. Therefore, he does not have to warn or protect them from potentially harmful conditions on the property. However, an exception applies if a property owner knows, or has reason to anticipate, that children will trespass on his land. In this case, a special duty arises and the owner must take steps to protect children from any of the property's dangerous conditions. The post you just made indicates even you think that the rock walls, or other "normal garden features" could be dangerous; and they can be! The law requires that you take reasonable steps to eliminate the condition or by otherwise keeping children away from it. DUTY OWED TO TRESPASSER In Connecticut, the following rules apply to a possessor of land with respect to a trespasser. He may not intentionally harm the trespasser or lay a trap for him. The trespasser is entitled to due care after his presence is actually known. There is no duty owed regarding the condition of the premises. The possessor of land has no duty to trespassers if he is engaged in a dangerous activity until the person's presence is know. The possessor of land has no duty to warn trespassers of dangerous hidden conditions (Conn. Law of Torts, § 47). Duty Owed to Trespassing Children Connecticut's appellate courts have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts rule regarding the duty of a property owner to trespassing children (Duggan v. Esposito, 178 Conn. 156 (1979), Neal v. Shiels, Inc., 166 Conn. 3 (1974), Greene v. DiFazio, 148 Conn. 419 (1961), Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110 (1937), Yeske v. Avon Old Farms School, Inc., 1 Conn. App. 195 (1984)). Under this rule, if an owner knows or has reason to know that children will be on his property, he has the duty to protect them from injury by either fixing the harmful condition or ensuring that the children will not have access to that part of the property. The rule states that a possessor of land is liable for harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition on the land if (1) the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass in that place, (2) the condition is one the possessor knows or has reason to know and should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to children, (3) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk, (4) the utility of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight compared with the risk to children involved, and (5) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect children (Restatement (Second), 2 Torts 339). Put in the letter that you are disclaiming any liability for injury to them that may occur on your property, and make them aware of all the ways they could be injured – so they've been informed. You don't have a duty to remove rock walls because unsupervised kids jump off them. They are not invitees, they are trespassers. So make it known you do not want them on the land and for any further breach you will call the police. Because otherwise you could be responsible. Using CT again as an example, you could include the legal statute about trespass in your notice: Trespass Crimes and Infractions A person commits first degree criminal trespass when (1) he enters or remains in a building or any other premises after the owner or an authorized person personally communicates an order to leave or not enter and (2) he knows that he is not licensed or privileged to be there. This crime also applies to entering or remaining at a place in violation of a retraining or protective order. This is a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison, a fine of up to $2,000, or both (CGS § 53a-107). A person commits second degree criminal trespass when he enters or remains in a building knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so. This is a class B misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in prison, a fine of up to $1,000, or both (CGS § 53a-108). A person commits third degree criminal trespass when, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any premises for hunting, trapping, or fishing or enters or remains in premises that are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or that are fenced or enclosed to exclude intruders. This also applies to state lands near state institutions. This is a class C misdemeanor punishable by up to three months in prison, a fine of up to $500, or both (CGS § 53a-109). It is a defense to these crimes if (1) the building was abandoned, (2) the premises at the time of entry were open to the public and the person complied with all lawful conditions on access and remaining on the premises, or (3) the person reasonably believed that the owner (or someone else with the power to do so) would have or did license him to enter or remain on the premises (CGS § 53a-110). A person commits simple trespass if, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters premises without intent to harm any property. This is an infraction punishable by a fine, currently $77 plus costs and fees if paid by mail (CGS § 53a-110a). A separate infraction covers trespass on railroad property when a person enters or remains on the property without lawful authority or consent of the railroad carrier. This is currently a $121 fine plus costs and fees if paid by mail (CGS § 53a-110d). You could just substitute your state's laws if you're in MA, or RI, or wherever. You could have a lawyer draft this letter for probably $200 (free if you have a friend who practices :~) and that will really scare them. Tell them they will be liable for any damage the kids cause/or may cause to your property. But without doubt, put them on notice!
Does a doctor have to release medical records from the last 5 years? My mother stopped seeing a doctor about a year ago. She has been without a PCP. She just procured a new one and was asked to get her medical records. Her old doctors office told me today that those records will include 2 years worth of documents ( from today ) so essentially i years worth of documents. She was with that doctor for 5 years. Is it not the law that doctors have to keep records for 7 years? Is it also not the law that they need release those documents? What can I do to pursue this and make sure she is able to get the full breadth of medical history
One approach is to direct their attention to this publication from the NY Dept. of Health. It says "Physicians and hospitals are required by state law to maintain patient records for at least six years from the date of the patient's last visit". There is also a PDF printout which you can hand to them. If they still absolutely refuse, the publication explains about the appeals process and the consequence to the doctor, but it also provides some "rationalizations" that the staff-person might invoke (for example "Yes, but we charge for copying, I thought you meant for free" – they can charge up to 75 cents per page). There is no legal basis for their 2-year conclusion.
The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.
Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation.
The general rule is that the ability to have a valid divorce has nothing to do with where the marriage was entered into, or the citizenship of the parties. Usually, any jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with either member of the couple has jurisdiction to enter a divorce. Hence, generally, people get divorced in the place that they live. The problem in this scenario is step 5. I think that it is highly likely that the U.S. Embassy is simply wrong, unless there is some serious irregularity in step 4. An annulment after four years of marriage, as opposed to a divorce, is highly irregular and would not be allowed in the vast majority of jurisdictions. But, maybe there are facts and circumstances that make it otherwise. This fact pattern, while it on one hand sounds like a "for a friend" question based on real facts, also sounds like some important details that may be outcome determinative have been omitted.
Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.
Short answer: No. If a court destroys the criminal file due to age, the defendant's criminal record lives on in law enforcement databases, be it local, state, or federal. In San Diego, the Superior Court records are open to inspection. Court case files are public records and subject to public inspection. California Rules of Court, rule 2.400(a) states that all papers in the court files may be inspected by the public in the office of the clerk. Rule 2.550(a) says that unless confidential or sealed by law, all court records are presumed open. However, again, this does not impact a criminal history report retained by law enforcement. To get the conviction literally removed from the criminal history report, the defendant will typically need a court order directing the law enforcement agency to remove the arrest and/or conviction. For example, in California, if the defendant can prove there was no reason to have arrested the defendant in the first place. Specifically, Penal Code section 851.8 (b) requires “any law enforcement agency” to destroy their records. “[Penal Code] section 851.8 is for the benefit of those defendants who have not committed a crime. It permits those petitioners who can show that the state should never have subjected them to the compulsion of the criminal law -- because no objective factors justified official action -- to purge the official records of any reference to such action. . . ...” (People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1056.) (Emphasis added) In People v. Scott M. (1985) 167 Cal. App. 3d 688, 700 [“Section 851.8 is for the benefit of those defendants who have not committed a crime.”].) Factual innocence may be determined based on circumstances at the time of arrest or any meritorious defense. Recent case law establishes the pivotal time for viewing the evidence is when the motion is heard. The statutory language “necessarily means that the existence of reasonable cause depends on the current evidence rather than simply the evidence that existed at the time that the arrest and prosecution occurred.” (People v. Laiwala, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1065, 1068 & n. 3 (2003) (emphasis added). Keep in mind in California, "expunge" does not mean to seal or destroy, but officially dismisses the conviction - leaving the public record intact. The best place to start is contacting your local public defender and ask about post conviction relief or record sealing if your arrest did not result in a conviction. Getting free advice never hurts.
Businesses only keep transaction data for as long as they have to For a live loan account they will keep transactions while the account is live and then for as long as local law dictates (it varies but 7 years is typical). For transaction accounts it will generally be only for as long as required by law - typically what is required by tax law (again 7 years is typical) or as long as you can sue them under statues of limitations (2-5 years). Banks (and other businesses) do not keep records indefinitely. 10 years seems more than necessary.
Note that I am not a lawyer. All law code here is from the official Georgia Law at LexisNexis. In the case of Georgia, the law regarding a child’s election changed in 2008. Prior to 2008, a 14 year old child could choose with which parent to live, unless the judge determined that the chosen parent is unfit. As proving that a parent is unfit was not always easy, the Georgia General Assembly in 2008 replaced the unfit parent standard with a Best Interests of the Child Standard. This new standard provides more flexibility to the judge in determining custody. Some basic facts about how the law in relation to the child's selection of parent: A parent that wishes to modify an existing custody arrangement must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred that warrants a new decision by the court. If the child is 14 then the child's desire to select the parent may be considered as the "material change in circumstances". However the court will only consider the child's choice if at least two years have passed since the last custody determination. These aspects of the law can be seen in Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 5, which states: (5) In all custody cases in which the child has reached the age of 14 years, the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live. The child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless the parent so selected is determined not to be in the best interests of the child. The parental selection by a child who has reached the age of 14 may, in and of itself, constitute a material change of condition or circumstance in any action seeking a modification or change in the custody of that child; provided, however, that such selection may only be made once within a period of two years from the date of the previous selection and the best interests of the child standard shall apply. Note that the expression "The child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless..." is the same as saying that "the child's selection shall be controlling (the decision) unless...". As to children that are between 11 and 14 the law states as follows (Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 6) (6) In all custody cases in which the child has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years, the judge shall consider the desires and educational needs of the child in determining which parent shall have custody. The judge shall have complete discretion in making this determination, and the child's desires shall not be controlling. The judge shall further have broad discretion as to how the child's desires are to be considered, including through the report of a guardian ad litem. The best interests of the child standard shall be controlling. The parental selection of a child who has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years shall not, in and of itself, constitute a material change of condition or circumstance in any action seeking a modification or change in the custody of that child. The judge may issue an order granting temporary custody to the selected parent for a trial period not to exceed six months regarding the custody of a child who has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years where the judge hearing the case determines such a temporary order is appropriate. (Note that a "guardian ad litem" is the same as a "legal guardian".) If the child is younger than 11, there is no expectation for the judge to consider the child’s preference when awarding custody. Besides the desire of the child, the judge may consider following factors listed under Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 3: (3) In determining the best interests of the child, the judge may consider any relevant factor including, but not limited to: (A) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child; (B) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between the child and his or her siblings, half siblings, and stepsiblings and the residence of such other children; (C) The capacity and disposition of each parent to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child; (D) Each parent's knowledge and familiarity of the child and the child's needs; (E) The capacity and disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, day-to-day needs, and other necessary basic care, with consideration made for the potential payment of child support by the other parent; (F) The home environment of each parent considering the promotion of nurturance and safety of the child rather than superficial or material factors; (G) The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (H) The stability of the family unit of each of the parents and the presence or absence of each parent's support systems within the community to benefit the child; (I) The mental and physical health of each parent; (J) Each parent's involvement, or lack thereof, in the child's educational, social, and extracurricular activities; (K) Each parent's employment schedule and the related flexibility or limitations, if any, of a parent to care for the child; (L) The home, school, and community record and history of the child, as well as any health or educational special needs of the child; (M) Each parent's past performance and relative abilities for future performance of parenting responsibilities; (N) The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent, consistent with the best interest of the child; (O) Any recommendation by a court appointed custody evaluator or guardian ad litem; (P) Any evidence of family violence or sexual, mental, or physical child abuse or criminal history of either parent; and (Q) Any evidence of substance abuse by either parent.
If a couple pre-drafted a *non binding letter* stating opinions on custody do you believe it would be admissible? -I will get an attorney don't need to make the recommendation again -I understand that prenups/postnups can't negotiate custody (best interests of child) -But lets say a couple drafts a letter that makes clear that its not a contract, not binding, but is intended to be admissible as evidence* on the issue of custody and what is in the child's best interests. It would talk about our views of custody when our relationship was peaceful (and not pitted against each other). Things like our views of both of us being capable parents, personal belief that joint custody is in the best interests of child or if we can't work together that even split legal custody would be our preference, etc. *****I'm curious whether you believe a family judge would allow such a letter to be admissible as evidence and whether that would play any baring on their decisions (lets assume that once the day came one of the parents were no longer in agreement with the letter). I realize that the best interests of the children is the standard, but would a judge be swayed by a prior written opinion on the best interests from the child's own parents?** Would resigning the letter every ~5 years (and having multiple copies as evidence) be a big help or a little help?
Admissibility is one thing, enforcement is another. My observations, which are more detailed than casual, is that Family Courts are a different breed, and more than most any other court, "they do what they want." I have associates who had agreed to stipulations, detailing how a child might be handled, only to have a family court decide at some point to implement some completely different plan, and in doing so run against what both parents were interested in doing. Prenuptial agreements appear to be meaningless, as this is not about the assets of the couple, it is about the state's interest in the child. Even then, the courts seem to act in manners which appear to not be in the best interests of the child (and sometimes even say so.) Back to your question, would an agreement be admissible? Yes. Does it mean much? In my opinion, and based upon the preponderance of evidence, no. Do whatever you have to do to stay out of family court. Being married doesn't matter. Working together for 21 years does. In the future, you should state the jurisdiction you are in. It does change the answer, but in this case only subtlety.
This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.
It is binding precedent for lower federal courts in the Ninth Circuit. They are required to follow it. It is persuasive precedent for the other circuits and for state courts. They may be persuaded by the reasoning and will consider the fact that the Ninth Circuit held as it did to be one factor in their decision-making, but they can make a different decision if they want to. Some courts are also more persuasive than others, although this is usually not explicitly acknowledged in written opinions. For example, state courts in the Ninth Circuit are likely to give more weight to a Ninth Circuit opinion than they are to give weight to a decision from another circuit. Cases from the Second Circuit are more likely to be persuasive than cases from other circuits, because of its reputation. Cases from the Southern District of New York are more likely to be persuasive than cases from most other non-local District Courts. There is also a personal reputation function that comes into play when looking at persuasive decisions. Some judges have a better reputation or a better reputation with a particular other judge, and their decisions may be considered more carefully. This is not explicit, but it means a good lawyer will mention the judge's name when a case in support of his position was decided by a well-regarded judge. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's holding would be persuasive precedent for the Supreme Court. You could write law review articles about this, but to dip one toe in: they may be persuaded by the reasoning and it matters to their function of providing unifying law, so especially during the process of applying for a writ of certiorari, they will care what different circuits have held on an issue and which circuits are going which way. But they are not bound by the circuit courts, and will overturn all of the circuits if they think that's the right decision. They did that a while ago with a statute about what it meant to use a firearm while committing a crime, for example.
While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.
Beware: The details will depend not only on jurisdiction, but also on the details of the parents, the parenting agreement and, of course, on the situation of the child. However, here are some general guidelines (mostly independent of jurisdiction): Ideally, you should resolve the problem by non-legal mechanisms. However, you may have to resort to legal means if this fails. I would advocate a gradual escalation of your reaction: First, do not assume malice. Nicely ask parent A why the plan was not followed. Maybe it was a simple oversight, maybe there was an emergency? Try to find out, and decide whether the change was warranted. If there is no satisfactory answer, clearly remind A that the parenting plan is binding for everyone, and that it is important for both the child and the parents that they can rely on it. Stress that any last-minute changes must be discussed as soon as possible, even in emergencies. This should be done in writing, maybe even by registered mail. If the problem repeats, send a last letter indicating that you will seek legal remedy if the problem persists. This letter may work better when sent by a lawyer. A letter from your lawyer to A's lawyer (assuming you both have one) may also prompt A's lawyer to explain to A that they are hurting the child and themselves by violating the parenting plan. Finally, if all the above fails, go to court. You could ask for a change in the parenting agreement, maybe with less frequent changeovers, or with changeovers that are easier to arrange, or at an earlier time, such that a delay causes less problems. You could also ask for a formal permission to have the child fetched by the police or similar on subsequent violations (though that is a rather desperate option, and may not be available). If you reach this point, following the previous steps should give you a fighting chance to prevail in court, as you have demonstrated that you tried everything to make the agreement work. Courts generally take a dim view of people who violate an official agreement. In Georgia specifically, like in most US states, violation of a court-ordered parenting agreement by one parent is a serious matter. The other parent can ask the court to hold the parent in contempt of court. The court can then order a number of consequences for these violations, such as awarding the other parent extra visits or monetary compensation, up to and including sending the parent to jail (this only happens in extreme cases). The article Violation of Custody and Visitation Orders in Georgia gives a good overview.
The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts.
Married (or married at the time of birth) fathers have equal rights to custody as mothers in AZ. There are no (active) laws establishing that a mother is to be given more rights to a child in a custody arrangement than a father. This is a little different for unmarried fathers because paternity is not assumed, it must be established. Married fathers are presumed to be the father of the child automatically. AZ used to follow the tender years doctrine where preference was given to mothers during the child's younger years. There is an entire somewhat interesting history there on the linked page. This has mostly been phased out in the United States in favor of the "best interest of the child" doctrine. So provided that you are financially stable, have a stable living environment, and can provide for your child, you as the father should have equal standing in a court with regards to custody. I say "should" because many judges still lean towards the mother. For your specific case I'd immediately talk to a family court advocate. They can get you in front of a judge with your estranged wife either being "in absentia" (not present) or ordered to be in court and produce an order to return the child to the home state. It will also help a custody case later on to establish that you are actively seeking a relationship with the child and you are being denied that (keep records of everything, phone calls, texts, letters, emails, etc).
This depends on your state, but most likely they would stay the father. Many states abide by the Uniform Parentage Act, and part of that act states that if a man has been acting in the role of Father for a long enough period (I think 18 months, but not certain) then he is considered the legal father regardless of parentage. Similarly many states say if he was married to the mother he would be considered the legal father regardless of parentage. If you want an exact legal response I would ask on the Law StackExchange, including marital status and the state they're in, but most likely he will legally have a right as father if he wants it. If the mother is interested in the well-being of the child she would want him involved in the child's life anyways. Even if they separate they can hopeful agree on shared custody for the sake of the child without needing any legal discussions to come into place. If he separates from her without antagonizing her and makes it clear he wants to play a role in the child's life and set rules for doing that there is a good chance this can be settled without any lawyers or legal discussions to begin with!
Copyright statement with domain name I am curious is there any legal force in a statement like Copyright (c) MyDomain.com. In other words, the copyright holder is a domain name or the owner of the domain.
Copyright exists whether they make that statement or not. Giving such notice informs the public that the work is copyrighted, who owns it, and when it was published. If the work is infringed, the defendant will not be able to use an innocent infringement defense. There's nothing special about using the domain name, as it's probably the name or DBA of the business that owns the domain.
Yes, assuming the material was given the standard license. You would be creating a derivative work, and only the copyright owner has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. See the copyright FAQ for general information. The owner can file a DMCA takedown notice with YouTube and they will by policy notify you of the infringement claim and unless you file a counter-notice (you legally couldn't given the facts you're asserting), they will take it down. The owner can also sue you.
Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.
More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Yes. Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? Yes. In general, copyright protects particular expressions of ideas, not higher level ideas or concepts.
Distribution on YouTube implicates, at least, US copyright law. Shropshire v. Canning 809 F.Supp.2d 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2011), Subafilms v. MGM 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) Are you infringing? Is the original work eligible for copyright? "It is undisputed that computer programs— defined in the Copyright Act as a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result, can be subject to copyright protection as literary works." 17 USC 102, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Are you making a copy or displaying the work publicly? (17 USC 106) You concede that you are doing this in the hypothetical, so we can skip this step. Do you have permission to do this? Some work is licensed to allow your proposed use. If you have permission, then this entire answer is moot. Are you taking what amounts to a substantial taking of the original? Presumably, you will not need to show the entire source file to present the naming conventions and techniques that other developers have used. But, what you do show will be an exact reproduction of the original. In the case of computer programs, all US districts use the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). The abstraction stage of this test is irrelevant in this hypothetical because the reproduction is exact. Filtration excludes any uncopyrightable elements of the original from consideration (due to scènes à faire, merger, lack of originality). The comparison stage compares what remains after the filtration stage, to determine if the new work takes substantially from the original. Fair use defense If your use is found to be infringing based on the above analysis, the affirmative defense of fair use is available. I can't tell you whether a fair use defense would be applicable or successful in your particular case. However, you can search the US Copyright Office's Fair Use Index for many examples successful fair use defenses when a literary work was reproduced in part or whole for educational purposes. There are also other affirmative defenses available (implied license, for example), or defenses that directly attack the elements of copyright infringement. Some confusion exists regarding "idea/expression merger" as a defense after a prima facie case of copyright infringement has been made. This isn't completely correct. Where idea/expression merger enters the analysis differs from circuit to circuit. In the 6th circuit, merger enters in the copyrightability analysis (paragraph 1. above). But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat merger as part of the infringement analysis (paragraph 4. above) and in the 9th circuit, merger is an affirmative defense. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) The idea/expression merger doctrine is not implicated just because "the idea one that is expressing is 'this is the code they used.'" When you need to cite/show the original work for purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching", that is a direct implication of fair use. Using using this justification triggers the full four-factor fair use analysis. (17 USC 107). You don't get to reproduce a work just because you want to say "this is the work they created."
According to CENDI, yes the US government is able to claim copyright on works internationally. The law in question which makes US government works public domain in the US (17 U.S. Code § 105) only does so within the confines of US copyright. Since copyright protection is on a per-country basis, there's no reason that the US government couldn't assert IP rights under foreign copyright law (though I didn't go looking for an example). While the Berne Convention generally requires countries to provide foreign works the same protection as domestic works, I can think of two general reasons why US government works wouldn't fall under copyright protection in some countries: The country simply doesn't apply copyright protection to any government works (don't know how common this is). The country applies the rule of the shorter term. If they do, they aren't required to provide a longer term of protection than the country of origin does (which is nil in this case).
Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors.
The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.
Is the a retainer simply a synonym for a deposit? Is a typical retainer's purpose to be a deposit for work to be done? IANAL and seeking to understand why and how the typical retainer works.
A retainer can be either pre-payment for services (a deposit) or it can be a payment for a promise of availability (a "true" retainer). A lawyer may ask for pre-payment to avoid extending credit to the client. A lawyer might want to do this if he's dealing with a new client or for some other reason thinks that he might not be paid. This type of pre-payment is refundable if the client does not use all of the deposit amount. A "true" retainer is much less common, but still exists in some circumstances. A "true" retainer is paid purely to guarantee the availability of the lawyer; any work done by the lawyer will be billed separately. A client might want this to reserve a particular lawyer for some work in the future. The client would pay the retainer amount and the lawyer would promise not to take on any conflicting work that would prevent him from representing the client. This type of payment is usually non-refundable. Those are basically the differences between the two usages.
Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.
Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee & Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property.
The physical cash in the bank is not your property, at least not in US law (according to Scalia). It becomes your property when the withdrawal is performed by some means specified in your contract. A deposit gives you a contractual right to demand money from the bank. Bank robbery is a crime. Having money deposited with the bank doesn't change that. The only possible chance a robber has at trial is jury nullification. I haven't found records for that in Lebanon, but it does have jury trials. Impartial review classifies Lebanon's justice system as somewhat corrupt, but generally compliant with the basic principles. So it might be possible to get away with it at trial, but a very long shot.
My recollection is there's a big difference between money and property. I found a 1929 law journal article that supports my recollection. The owner of stolen property is entitled to have it returned. If the person who obtained it from the thief didn't know it was stolen, the person didn't commit a crime, but must give up the property and is not entitled to any compensation (unless the person can get compensation from the thief). A person who innocently receives money is the holder in due course, and gets to keep it. The victim's only recourse is to get compensation from the thief.
It is sometimes necessary or desirable to hold customer money in a separate account because it is their property. For lawyers, this kind of account is highly regulated. For most other kinds of businesses, this kind if account is not highly regulated. If you were required to have an account of this time, you could not borrow against it or pledge it as collateral. The whole point of having a separate account is to hold the property in trust for the benefit of the customers separate from your own funds and not subject to your creditors. Sometimes a separate account of this type is set up to fund an employee retirement fund that does not qualify for the tax treatment of a 401(k) or IRA or similar account. An account set up for this purpose is called a "Rabbi Trust" (political correctness was not a big thing when this kind of trust was given its name, and the name has unfortunately stuck). But, in those circumstances the exposure to the firm's creditors is intended from the outset for tax purposes and to give the beneficiaries an incentive not to screw up the company, rather than being problematic.
australia A tenant must return the property in the state it was given subject to fair wear and tear Fair wear and tear represents the deterioration that occurs in normal use - so it includes wear on a carpet from walking on it but not wear from having a horse walk on it (unless you’re renting a stable but who puts carpet in a stable?) If the wall is in the condition that it was given to you but for the normal deterioration over time, then you are not liable to fix it. As for who has the onus of proof, since the landlord is the one claiming the entitlement, they have to prove it. However, the burden is only the balance of probabilities. So, if there is a fist shaped hole in the plaster wall and there is no evidence it was there when the tenant moved in, then, it’s more likely than not that it happened on the tenant’s watch and they have to fix it. Because putting fists through walls is something that residents are more likely to do than landlords. However, if there is a painted wall and the initial application of the paint is defective, then absent evidence that the tenant painted the wall, it’s more likely than not that the landlord did it. Because painting walls is something landlords are more likely to do than residents.
The landlord is complying with a city ordinance that mandates security deposits must earn interest that belongs to you. A security deposit and interest due thereon shall continue to be the property of the tenant making such deposit, shall not be commingled with the assets of the landlord, and shall not be subject to the claims of any creditor of the landlord or of the landlord’s successors in interest, including a foreclosing mortgagee or trustee in bankruptcy.
How should multiple copyright holders be credited using the MIT license? Let's say three coders write a program and want to release it under the MIT license. How should the copyright notice look like? I have something like this in mind: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice, Bob, Cassandra Or should it be more like this: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice Copyright (c) 2017 Bob Copyright (c) 2017 Cassandra Or completely different?
If Alice, Bob, and Cassandra are working on the program and releasing it as a joint work, the copyright statement should reflect it: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice, Bob, Cassandra If, on the other hand, Bob and Cassandra are taking advantage of the "modify" clause of the MIT license to create derivative works, the copyright statements are required by the license to be separate: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice Copyright (c) 2017 Bob Copyright (c) 2017 Cassandra
You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article.
If the code is unrelated to your employment you own the copyright no matter if it is written in Visual Studio, on a piece of paper or tattooed on your butt. In the same way a sculptor owns the copyright in their sculpture even if they use someone else's chisel. Using Visual Studio in this way may, however, violated your contract with your employer and/or their contract with Microsoft. Why go there? Visual Studio Community is free.
The major differences: MIT has a general "deal in the Software without restriction" clause, where Boost enumerates the things a user is permitted to do. For the sorts of things the average user is likely to want to use the software for, there may not be any practical difference, but the MIT license is considerably broader. A copy of the Boost license does not need to be included with an executable binary, while a copy of the MIT license does. The Boost disclaimer covers "anyone distributing the software" in addition to authors and copyright holders; the MIT license doesn't. Other possible differences differences: A non-corporate-person organization may be unable to deal in MIT-licensed software as an organization, though I'm uncertain about this. You could probably keep an army of lawyers arguing about this point for years. The MIT license may not require including the disclaimer with the license statement. It's unclear whether the disclaimer is part of "this permission notice" or not.
Ideas are not protected by copyright, only arrangements of words are protected. If you "rephrase" by only a minor change of wording, leaving much of the wording intact, that is still a copyright infringement unless an exception such as fair use or fair dealing applies (and that seems a bit doubtful in this case). If you "rephrase" so that the wording is quite different, even though the idea is the same, there is probably no infringement. Copying elements of computer code or other IT commands that are essential to making an example work is not infringement. Where there is only one or a very small number of ways to naturally express a fact, copying such expression is not infringement, as facts are not protected by copyright. Adding examples but keeping significant wording unchanged is still likely to be infringement.
When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.
Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe.
Is it a violation of copyright to publish a computer program that exactly produces such a piece, without containing the piece itself in the program? Yes. A program that reproduces a particular work is functionally a derivative work and is a copyright infringement. A program that composes music not tied to a particular work would be patentable, but the algorithm would not be protected by copyright, although derive works based on the code implementing the algorithm might be protected by copyright. Of course, this assumes that the person devising this algorithm knows about the original work that it will produce. If the person devising and the person using the algorithm are ignorant of the existence of the prior work that it produces, it is not a copy or a derivative work and is not infringing. The source of the creation of an allegedly infringing work in relevant in copyright law even thought it is not relevant in patent and trademark law. Copyright protects independent inventors of the same work from infringement liability, although this may be hard to prove. In theory the burden of proof to show copying is on the personal bringing the lawsuit alleging infringement. But, a copyright infringement plaintiff can meet their burden of proof in a copyright case by inferring that copy was made from the circumstantial evidence of the allegedly infringing work's similarity to the allegedly infringed work without direct evidence of copying or deriving the work from the original work.
Can a fan be considered an "air conditioning unit"? Saw this apparently ridiculous statement from Airbnb on social media today, A fan legally constitutes an air conditioner It's unclear by what law that might be the case - the situation took place in Mexico, and Airbnb is a US company. What I managed to find is Definitions concerning commercial air conditioners and heat pumps, which doesn't concern fans, and that "The [air conditioning] term excludes window units" (which suggests that a fan is in no way an A/C unit). However, my experience at large companies suggests that support agents are trained to not make risky statements involving legal matters, so is there some legal ground for a fan to be considered an air conditioning unit?
Probably not “Air conditioning” is the process of changing the temperature and/or humidity of air. A “fan” is a device for moving air around. It’s almost certain the arbitrator would agree. However, the customer is unlikely to be entitled to a refund because there hasn’t been a “complete failure of consideration” - they contracted for an apartment with air conditioning, they got an apartment ergo Airbnb has provided some part of the consideration. They would be entitled to damages - perhaps the cost of hiring an air conditioner or if that’s not possible, a hotel room (which I realise may be more than the value of the letting but that’s how damages can work).
Lying may be wrong, but it in the United States, it is generally not illegal. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). For a lie to be illegal, it generally needs to fall into one of a few specific categories, usually involving either fraud or the frustration of legitimate government activities (as in perjury, falsification of records, or lying to a federal agent). In any of these cases, the First Amendment is generally going to prohibit any penalties unless the false statement is material, i.e., it had the potential to change the outcome of the event in which it was uttered. As you noted, it is generally illegal to discriminate against Asians, so I would expect a court to treat the tenant's ethnicity as immaterial and require the landlord to honor the rental contract. Of course, this assumes that the landlord is prohibited from disciminating against Asians, which is not always true. The Fair Housing Act has exemptions for (a) private clubs; (b) for buildings with four or fewer units, one of which the landlord occupies; (c) for single-family homes that the landlord is renting without the help of an agent; and (d) for religious organizations. In such a case, the landlord may be actually be permitted to disciminate against Asians, so the tenant's false statement about their ethnicity would become material the transaction, and a court may therefore permit the landlord to rescind the contract. (Note, though, that even though the FHA permits discrimination in those limited situations, it does not permit advertising discriminatory preferences. The landlord's "No Asians" language is therefore illegal, whether it is communicated on a sign in the window or in a classified ad or by word of mouth.)
Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police.
I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!
I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.
Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).
This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy.
There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained.
Could a charity manufacture patented medications for free? Let's say there is a patented medication that is very effective and very expensive at the pharmacy, say $1,000/dose. But also assume that the medicine only costs $1 to formulate - most of the "cost" was in the research. I understand that a competing company cannot legally manufacture and sell a patented medicine to consumers. However, could a nonprofit legally manufacture and give away the patented medicine for free?
No, they could not. The conditions of violating a patent don't revolve around monetary gain, so regardless of compensation they would be in violation of the patent.
No You are limited to “your ... use only”. You are not given permission to make this available for 3rd parties either commercially or for free.
On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.
Some MP3 technologies are still under patent in the US: you can read the wiki page on that matter to see if it is applicable to what you intend to do. This assumes you write your own code – if you use someone else's conversion software, that would depend on the licensing terms for the software.
Can an idea be a trade secret? Certainly -- most trade secrets are ideas. The thing is, unlike copyright, patents, or trademarks, trade secret isn't a very strong form of protection. Trade secret legislation only protects against certain "unfair" methods of obtaining the secret. Independent invention is perfectly fine: if I figure out on my own what the secret formula for Coca-Cola is, there's nothing the Coca-Cola company can do to stop me. Reverse engineering is also fine: if I take a bottle of Coke to a chemistry lab and analyze the ingredients, there is again nothing the Coca-Cola company can do. Additionally, a company wishing to make something a trade secret needs to take active steps to preserve that secret. Continuing the Coca-Cola example, they might require anyone reading the formula to first sign an agreement to not disclose what they read.
At least in the United States (and I'm pretty sure this is true around the world), facts and information cannot be copyrighted. Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, and factual information conveyed by the work is a part which is not subject to copyright. Copyright on a collection of facts is limited to the selection and arrangement of those facts, and only if that selection and arrangement has some bare minimum amount of originality. See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340. In this case, it looks at first glance like the person who made that site made their own selection of which materials and which sources would be included; the one place where they really seem to have copied their selection is from glass catalogs with datasheets from specific manufacturers, who would have a hard time arguing that "everything we manufacture in this widely-recognized class of substances" is an original selection. What the author of the website has done is relinquish his rights in his selection and arrangement of the data. In some places, there are other rights besides copyright that do apply to databases; for instance, the EU recognizes database rights to protect significant investment in compiling a database of stuff. But the US does not have that concept. For citing stuff, that's not really a legal question, and has more to do with academic standards. Ask your adviser or teacher if you have one.
A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc.
In the UK sodium thiopental is a controlled substance, it is licensed for use as a general anaesthetic (and I think it has other medical purposes). Your quoted passages refer to the so-called 'export ban'. Following campaigning by, among others, Alistair Carmichael MP and Reprieve, the UK Government prohibited export of the drug without authorisation. In applying for an export licence for the drug you must persuade the Government that it is not intended for use in capital punishment. The campaigners sought to prevent exports of drugs used in lethal injections. Previously the Government had said it would not ban exports of sodium thiopental because it is a medicine with legitimate medical purposes and in any case could be obtained from other countries, e.g. (in the particular case below) Austria, so a ban would make no difference to the USA's supply but it would harm UK business. Nevertheless the Government maintained its opposition to the death penalty in all circumstances. That decision was challenged by judicial review - the claimants said the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills had "acted unlawfully in refusing to exercise his powers under the Export Control Act 2002 to make an order prohibiting its export to the United States". If I understand correctly the judicial review failed on two of the three grounds and decision was deferred on the last ground; subsequently the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, changed his mind as it had emerged the export's purpose was solely for use in lethal injections and the Government had after all committed to oppose the death penalty. The Queen (on the application of Zagorski and Baze) Claimants - v - Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and Archimedes Pharma UK Ltd EWHC 3110 (Admin)[2010] http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2010/3110.html https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-bans-export-of-lethal-injection-drugs-to-the-us
HOA bylaws: Are they enforceable absent a contract? If one lives in a community (a “Resident”), in which there has been a longstanding non-profit corporation calling itself a “homeowners association” (the “HOA”), with bylaws, and registered with the state, that conducts meetings, does maintain certain ”common areas” (primarily roads not maintained by the local municipality), and invoices “members” (meaning anyone living in that community) for such efforts, is the Resident obligated (under any theory, statutory, contract, etc.) to pay those invoices, when the Resident purchased a home in the community recently, and never signed any contract with the HOA? The Resident was not provided with the HOA’s bylaws until well after moving into the community, and had paid past invoices on the belief that payment was voluntary among those living in the community (i.e., for the common good of the community), until the invoices increased dramatically (without forewarning or explanation). The home is a private single family home on private property, accessible by dirt roads not maintained by the municipality. The HOA was not mentioned in the closing papers for the purchase of the home, and there is no mention of it on the Resident’s deed for the property. Can the HOA compel payment?
Can the HOA compel payment? Yes, at least from the standpoint of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. That is because the resident obtains some benefit(s) from the HOA's activity & expenses, such as the maintenance of common areas and other items that advance the common good of the community. However, a drastic or arbitrary increase in invoices might not be enforceable, especially if these are unreasonable. The HOA would need to persuade in court that the resident accepted or would have knowingly and willfully accepted such drastic change. HOA bylaws: Are they enforceable absent a contract? If by bylaws you mean something other than bills, the question would depend on the substance & scope of those bylaws as well as the HOA's/resident's jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that a written & signed contract is oftentimes unnecessary. There is the notion of "implicit contract" to refer to rights and duties that can be inferred from the parties' conduct and the expectations that can be inferred therefrom. This notion of implicit contract is common in situations where there is no written document that reflects the parties' intent in the relation they willfully enter.
I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.
A lien is used to prevent sale of a property until a debt is paid. This has nothing to do with priority over a mortgage. The HOA agreed to release the lien for some payment. The negotiation of that payment doesn't matter to the new buyer. Once the lien is released, then it is no longer listed with the county on the property, so the property can now be sold. The former lienholder cannot now apply a new lien to the property because the new owner is not a debtor to the former lienholder. This would be a terrible way to manage property sales, and no mortgage company would allow a mortgage for a property that could not be sold in case of foreclosure, which is likely why the mortgage holder was a private individual. It is possible for a new owner to take on existing liens, but this would be clearly spelled out in purchase documents. There should be a statement on the title search results that no liens exist.
Here's a bit of Georgia law that is relevant. By law, your apartment shall have installed an approved battery operated smoke detector which shall be maintained in good working order unless any such building is otherwise required to have a smoke detector system pursuant to Code Section 25-2-13. Also, "Detectors shall be listed and meet the installation requirements of NFPA 72". Furthermore, Any occupant who fails to maintain a smoke detector in a dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility, other than a nursing home, listed in subsection (a) of this Code section in good working order as required in this Code section shall be subject to a maximum fine of $25.00, provided that a warning shall be issued for a first violation. (note that there is a burden on the occupant, not just the landlord). However, Failure to maintain a smoke detector in good working order in a dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility listed in subsection (a) of this Code section in violation of this Code section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not be considered by the court on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, shall not be any basis for cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance rates, and shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or occupancy of such dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility listed in subsection (a) of this Code section. Whether or not a photoelectric smoke detector is NFPA-compliant is not a legal question, but you could read NFPA's comparison of ionizing and photoelectric detectors here. If we assume (as is reasonable to do) that you install an approved device, then there is no code violation by picking your own device, does not change liability, and can have no effect on insurance rate / cancellation. OTOH, it is conceivable that the lease is written to prohibit any monkeying around with the smoke detector.
This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied.
No Common law jurisdictions read contracts objectively - that is if it unambiguously states what the parties agreed to then that is what the parties agreed to. If that includes selling your offspring into slavery or mortgaging your organs then so be it (such terms would be void for illegality but if they weren’t illegal then what it says is what happens). Terms can be implied into contracts but only in limited circumstances: implied by statute. A statute can imply a term if a contract doesn’t. A statute can also override an explicit term with the statute’s term. implied by custom. Customary usage in an industry or market can be implied into a contract. implied by past dealings. If the parties have repeatedly entered into contracts, terms may be implied by their past conduct. implied at law. Specific categories of contracts can assume implied terms, for example, property leases imply that the tenant will have quiet enjoyment of the premises. Such terms can be overridden by explicit terms. implied by fact. Such terms must be reasonable and equitable; necessary to give business efficiency to the contract. For example, the contract will not work effectively without the term; so obvious that it ‘goes without saying’. An impartial bystander in the position of the parties should be able to assume that the term is part of the contract; capable of clear expression; and not contradict any other terms of the contract. If there is no clause permitting the host to cancel the contract, there is no basis for implying one: the host cannot cancel the contract. If they do they are repudiating the contract and the other pa try can sue for damages.
I know that in many countries, including the US, the UK, and most, perhaps all, of Europe, it is common for houses to be sold while still under construction, so no such legal prohibition exists (or at least is enforced) in any of those countries. I have never heard of any country which has a general law against such a practice, but I cannot be sure for all countri8es in the world. There are other was to "prevent contractor delays and/or construction malformations and even constructions deformations". Many counties have building codes, which make improper building techniques unlawful. In some countries failure to adhere to proper professional standards in such matters is unlawful, and it is usual for the purchase of an unfinished building to involve a contract, in which performance standards and dates are spelled out. Failure to adhere to such requirements would give the purchaser grounds for a lawsuit for damages.
One possible reading of this clause is: The tenant is required to pay for the preparation of a forfeiture notice, even if ("notwithstanding that") the forfeiture doesn't actually happen ("forfeiture is avoided")--but the tenant doesn't have to pay for the notice if the forfeiture doesn't happen for the following reason ("avoided otherwise than by"): because the court said so ("by relief granted by the court"). In other words: if the Court says the forfeiture notice is bogus, the tenant doesn't have to pay for it. Otherwise, he or she does.
Libel and Defamation I have seen numerous allegations from numerous people on social media stating that President Trump is a rapist, child rapist and pedophile, without one piece of verified or unverified evidence. Can President Trump sue for libel or defamation?
A person isn't required to state their evidence that the claim is true when they make the claim, and as a public figure, a defamation suit filed by Trump would be judged under the stronger "actual malice" claim, meaning that the statement was made with knowledge that the claim is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. You would have to look at the specific statement. It is generally not defamatory to hurl insults like "rapist!", "pedophile!", "criminal!" etc. against a public figure especially a political figure, since such word don't generally amount to an actual accusation of wrong-doing. On the other hand, a detailed but false claim purporting to relate factual events could cross the threshold. Hyperbole is not actionable.
A woman can always accuse you of rape. In the U.S., at least theoretically, you are presumed innocent until proven guilty, so unless there is actual evidence you raped her, odds are you won't be convicted. If you are wrongly and maliciously accused, you can probably win a defamation suit as well. There is nothing you can legally do to prevent being accused - only principles which protect the innocent against conviction (e.g., presumption of innocence) and means for being made whole (e.g., civil suits).
While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation.
No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.
The Fifth Amendment would not apply, because nothing in the testimony would incriminate the doctor. Indeed nothing would be at all likely to incriminate the President either, it is not a crime to be unable to carry out Presidential duties. It is likely in such a case that the President would waive confidentiality. In that case the doctor could testify freely. If the President insisted on confidentiality, and attempted to prevent the doctor from testifying to Congress, there would be a conflict between the power of Congress to compel testimony, in this case on what is clearly a vital national issue within the scope of the needs of Congress, and traditional doctor-patient confidentiality, let alone the requirements of HIPAA. I am not sure how this conflict would be resolved. There might be an emergency application to the Supreme Court, but the SC does not usually do very well with truly urgent issues. The Pentagon Papers case and Bush V. Gore indicate some of the problems that can arise. If the doctor was prevented from testifying, that might incline members of congress to think the testimony would not be favorable to the President, and thus tend to suggest that they should not approve the President resuming or continuing his or her powers and duties. But that is rather speculative. The 25th has never been invoked, and the detailed procedure that would be followed if it were is not very clear. I am not aware of any similar situation in which medical testimony has been demanded to deal with an urgent issue, but the patient has attempted to block it. I think this case must be considered to be undecided until it actually arises and a court rules.
The answer is likely "yes" in both scenarios, because defamation can be either intentional or negligent. This is what the Restatement says: (1) Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person defamed. . . . COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS Comment: a. Manner of making publication. A publication of the defamatory matter is essential to liability. (See § 558). Any act by which the defamatory matter is intentionally or negligently communicated to a third person is a publication. . . . . . . k. Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defamatory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it to a third person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so communicated. (See § 8A). It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third person, the conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent communication amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional communication. Illustrations: A and B engage in an altercation on the street where there are a number of pedestrians. During the course of the quarrel, A in a loud voice accuses B of larceny, the accusation being overheard by a number of passers-by. A has published a slander. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 (1979).
You say: the school expects him to create a public Twitter account, with his real information, in order to promote the program & the results of the program. This is a cut-and-dried case of compelled speech. Your son is being required to say certain things in public in order to pass this course. The Supreme Court has decided that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate". This is subject to the legitimate interests of the school, but it is hard to see how compelled speech on Twitter can be defended as a legitimate interest. You also say this is to "promote the program and the results of the program". It sounds like the students are being required to say certain things about the course. If your son were to create the account and then post only material critical of the school, such as complaints about compelled speech, would that result in a passing grade? It sounds like it might be an issue. Compelled speech at school was considered by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which is the case about students being required to salute the flag. They found that requiring students to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Public education, according to the Court, should “not strangle the free mind at its source [or] teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Instead, education should enable students to make informed choices about what to believe. From the judgement itself: the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. That is very much the case here. Your son's refusal to make the required public speech is not causing any difficulty for the school authorities. In conclusion, your son has made a decision not to create a Twitter account under his own name and say certain things within that account. This is entirely his constitutional right. You might consider contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who have a history of engaging in cases like this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) might also be interested. Edit: Zack Lipton in comments below makes the point that much student work can be considered a kind of compelled speech (e.g. "Write an essay on Hamlet" or "Submit an entry to this poetry competition") and asks how this is different. Its a good question, and I have to say it does suggest that there is a difference of degree rather than kind. However I would argue that posting to an international forum widely used by adults is a different matter to a school assembly, or even a national essay competition. It would also depend a great deal on what has to be posted to get a passing grade.
Sometimes In general, intentionally false speech gets less protection than other speech, and in some cases it is unprotected. The classic example of speech that is unprotected is "Falsely shouting FIRE in a crowded theater". Note that this is both intentionally false and highly likely to be seriously harmful to multiple uninvolved people. On the other hand, the classic case of New York Times vs Sullivan said that, at least when the subjects were public officials (later broadened to public figures) it was not enough to prove simple falsehood in a defamation case, one must prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term) which in this context means statements that are either knowingly false or are made with reckless disregard for the truth. The court in that case said, in effect, that if a newspaper had to be sure that its every statement could be proved true in every detail, it would be unwilling to vigorously report on matters of significant public concern (this is a paraphrase, I'll add a quote later). Opinions are considered legally not to be either false or true. "President Jone is the worst leader the US has ever had" Is a statement of opinion, and so is not defamation. Moreover, in political contexts, attempts to punish false statements of fact that are not defamatory have been held unconstitutional. One example was the "Stolen Valor" act, which punished falsely claiming to have been awarded a medal by the US armed forces. This was held to be against the First Amendment. In general, regulation of speech (which here includes writing and other forms of communication) must be fairly narrowly drawn and must have good reasons behind them to survive a court challenge. How much so depends on the nature of the law, and particularly whether it is "content-neutral" or not. Details and cites to come when i have a little more time.
Can US drone strike pilots be charged with murder? Can a case against a US serviceman be brought before the Federal government against those responsible for killings in war zones, like drone operators?
Killing people is not illegal Killing people in certain circumstances (e.g. murder, manslaughter, negligent driving occasioning death) is illegal but killing people when you have a lawful reason to do so isn't. Military drone pilots acting under legitimate military authority and complying with the rules of engagement for the particular armed conflict are legally allowed to kill people. Whether they should be allowed to do so is a political and philosophical question, not a legal one. Of course, a drone pilot acting without legal authority to murder someone can be charged with murder.
Countries can prosecute people for their actions in any part of the world, but generally only do so for certain crimes. In other words, whether the country is likely to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction depends a lot on what "action A" is. For example, many countries reserve the right to prosecute crimes against humanity and similar violations of international law in their national courts. The accused need not be a citizen of that country. The US can prosecute its citizens for having sex with children anywhere in the world. On the other hand, a US citizen doesn't need to worry about being prosecuted in the US for a relatively minor crime if the action occurs in a foreign jurisdiction, such as for possessing a controlled substance.
No. Arizona tried passing a law that, among other things: criminalized failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements, criminalized working without being authorized to work in the United States, and authorized state officers to arrest aliens without a warrant if they had probable cause that the alien had committed a crime that made them deportable. All three provisions were struck down in Arizona v. United States. The federal government has "occupied the field" on most immigration issues. That means they've regulated it so extensively that there is zero room for states to act independently. One of Arizona's laws that was struck down exactly duplicated a federal criminal statute, but even that went too far by allowing the state to apply its own enforcement priorities and prosecute cases the federal government would not. If a state made it a crime to be unlawfully present (which is not a federal crime), that intrudes even further on the federal immigration scheme. This doesn't mean a state can't alert the federal government to people who are unlawfully present. It doesn't necessarily mean state officers can't arrest for federal immigration crimes: a previous Ninth Circuit decision held that Arizona officers could arrest for federal immigration crimes on the same basis that they could arrest for state crimes, and the Supreme Court in Arizona v. US explicitly didn't address the question. However, if state officers make an arrest for a federal crime, the federal government still gets to decide whether or not to prosecute. What you're asking about would remove that federal control, so it is preempted by federal law.
Why should they? If a person is accused of a crime, say murder, why should more evidence be needed to convict them if they are a high ranking government official than if they are just an ordinary person? Why should their trial be conducted differently? If convicted, why should their punishment be different? Yes, you can run societies that way and people have and do but it isn’t very fair is it? Equality before the law does not imply any other sort of equality People high up in the government have more power and authority than others but if they are alleged to have broken the law they are treated the same as anybody else.
You can sue anyone for anything. I will answer these on the assumption that the real question is whether there is a legal basis for such a suit. 1) Could someone open a civil action against the city of Las Vegas for failure to provide security? Or are city/county municipalities immune? And is the state of Nevada immune? This would not prevail. There is governmental immunity and there is no duty of care. And there is also no plausible argument, factually, that somebody in the government did something wrong. Note also that a comment accurately notes that the incident took place in the City of Paradise rather than the City of Las Vegas, and the question has been revised accordingly. Some states have a general victim's compensation fund that helps partially cover losses of crime victims, but I am not aware that Nevada has one. 2) Could someone sue the concert promoters for failures to provide safety? And/or was that safety limited to the actual physical area of the concert? No. The risks were unprecedented, unforeseeable, and there would have been no cost effective way to prevent them. 3) Could someone sue the hotel/casino for failure to provide general safety? What about failure to prevent the gunman from bringing weapons into the hotel/casino? The hotel/casino is not a guarantor of general safety. The trouble with "failure to prevent" is that the weapons were legally obtained and owned. While it could have raised suspicions, there was no crime or illegal activity to report due to the lax guns laws of the U.S. and Nevada. Notably, in a similar suit arising out of the Aurora, Colorado theater mass shooting at a showing of The Dark Knight Returns, a court dismissed claims of those injured against the theater because the crime was not foreseeable at the time and because the crime was an intervening and superseding cause of the harm. The precedent is not directly applicable, since Nevada is in the 9th Circuit and is a different state, while Colorado is in the 10th Circuit. But, the principles of law that apply would be very similar and persuasive to a court in Nevada. 4) What about the store that sold the firearms to the shooter? Even though those sales appear to have been legal in Nevada? No. As you note, the sales appear to have been legal. If someone could show that the sales were made illegally, or worse, were made illegally with knowledge that this was intended, that would be a different story. 5) Or one or more of the firearm companies themselves? No. The guns were not defective and were in compliance with federal regulations. Specifically, this is governed by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act which would also apply to the conversion kits that he purchased to make some of the firearms more like automatic weapons. 6) What about the shooter, his estate, and/or his family? I assume it can be alleged that they might have known of the shooter's plans and/or failed to intercede. Claims Against The Shooter The shooter is dead, so he would be hard to serve with process (i.e. you can't sue dead people, you can only sue their estates). Another way that crime victims often receive compensation is from restitution awards in a criminal case. But, in U.S. jurisprudence, criminal charges cannot be brought against dead people and are automatically dismissed if a defendant dies before he is convicted or after he is convicted but before the conviction is final. Claims Against The Family Family is not legally responsible for other family member's torts and crimes simply by virtue of being family members (although claims against a decedent's estate may impact them by reducing the inheritance that they might otherwise have received) and there is no plausible reason to believe that anyone, other than possibly his girlfriend, would have had any knowledge of his plans. He appears to have had a distant relationship with his brother who knew nothing, his parents are dead, he was not currently married, he divorced each of his two successive wives long ago, and he has no descendants. Claims Against The Girlfriend His girlfriend might have knowledge and involvement (her ID was used, but apparently without her consent while she was out of the country, and the $100,000 sent to the Philippines, probably for her, could be construed as a unilateral dying gift) and the FBI is investigating that, but there is no terribly good reason to think that she could foresee what was going to happen or acted negligently in some respect. She has denied having any knowledge in public statements made by her lawyer - she says she thought he was just breaking up with her when he asked her to take a trip to see family in the Philippines and there is no immediate reason to doubt her statement. There is also not a general duty to report crimes which one suspects that someone you know will commit in the future. One could argue that the shooter had an arsenal of guns that could have clued in the girlfriend, but so does about 3% of the total population, and a much larger proportion of the population that is wealthy and has a hunting hobby. So even if she'd told authorities about the arsenal, this concern probably would have been dismissed, and without causation there is no cause of action. The $100,000 sent to the girlfriend could probably be recovered for the creditors of his estate as a fraudulent transfer action against the recipient. This has nothing to do with the fault of the girlfriend. But, any gift made while someone has liabilities or anticipated liabilities in excess of his assets are voidable, and the tort liability anticipated in this case would have been far in excess of the shooter's assets. Claims Against His Estate Claims for wrongful death absolutely can and should be filed in his estate. He was a wealthy man and there should be enough to at least make some payment to every victim. It may be necessary for a public administrator or a creditor to step forward to open the estate as it is unlikely that the shooter's family wants that job. They would not want the job because the heirs will almost surely get nothing from his probate estate because his tort liabilities almost certainly exceed his net worth. But, it is important that someone step up to serve as the executor of his estate, because otherwise his assets could be depleted by failures to pay debts resulting in penalties and seizures of collateral, and by failure to collect property to which his estate is entitled such as rent and mortgage payments owed to him or to companies he owns. There is a strict time limit for asserting claims against an estate that can often be a short as three months after the date of death. The relevant statute is as follows: 147.040. Claims: Limit on time for filing A person having a claim, due or to become due, against the decedent must file the claim with the clerk within 90 days after the mailing for those required to be mailed, or 90 days after the first publication of the notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020. A creditor who receives a notice to creditors by mail pursuant to subsection 5 of NRS 155.020 must file a claim with the clerk within 30 days after the mailing or 90 days after the first publication of notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020, whichever is later. If a claim is not filed with the clerk within the time allowed by subsection 1 or 2, the claim is forever barred, but if it is made to appear, by the affidavit of the claimant or by other proof to the satisfaction of the court, that the claimant did not have notice as provided in NRS 155.020 or actual notice of the administration of the estate, the claim may be filed at any time before the filing of the final account. The period of 90 days prescribed by this section is reduced to 60 days if summary administration is granted under chapter 145 of NRS. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.040. It is possible, and even likely, that filing new lawsuits against the shooter or his estate after his death, other than by filing a claim against his estate in a Nevada state probate case, would be barred by Nevada probate law, so that claims are concentrated in the claims process. Also, while federal courts would usually have jurisdiction over a diversity lawsuit brought by an out of state plaintiff against an in state defendant, there is a probate exclusion from diversity jurisdiction that requires claims to be filed in the probate estate rather than in federal court. The hardest question for the estate once it is liquidated will be how to allocate the estate's limited assets among unrelated debts of the decedent, claims of the deceased victims and claims of those victims who were injured or suffered property damage only. There are, of course, rules to govern that in the Nevada probate code and in case law. The primary rule that applies is as follows: The debts and charges of the estate must be paid in the following order: Expenses of administration. Funeral expenses. The expenses of the last illness. Family allowance. Debts having preference by laws of the United States. Money owed to the Department of Health and Human Services as a result of the payment of benefits for Medicaid. Wages to the extent of $600, of each employee of the decedent, for work done or personal services rendered within 3 months before the death of the employer. If there is not sufficient money with which to pay all such labor claims in full, the money available must be distributed among the claimants in accordance with the amounts of their respective claims. Judgments rendered against the decedent in his or her lifetime, and mortgages in order of their date. The preference given to a mortgage extends only to the proceeds of the property mortgaged. If the proceeds of that property are insufficient to pay the mortgage, the part remaining unsatisfied must be classed with other demands against the estate. All other demands against the estate. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.195. Of course, often people end their lives and go on killing sprees when their situation is much worse than it appears and it could be that he has debts that left him on the verge of bankruptcy with nothing left for others to recover out of his estate. Claims Against The Shooter's Liability Policies The shooter almost certainly had comprehensive general liability insurance policies in his businesses and homeowner's insurance that cover him for liability for negligence. But, these policies are required as a matter of public policy, and do as a matter of commercial practice, have an intentional acts exclusion. So, there is no reasonable argument that he or his estate were covered by insurance for his acts. Claims Against The Shooter's Life Insurance Policies and Retirement Plans As a wealthy accountant, the shooter probably have life insurance and probably had retirement plans. If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was his estate, the analysis is unchanged (but the IRS has a priority claim for taxes due upon the distribution of the retirement plan assets). Also, the fact that he killed himself does not invalidate his life insurance policy if it is incontestable (which is usually defined in the policy to mean at least two years old). If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was someone other than his estate (particularly if the beneficiary designation is more than four years old, removing the fraudulent transfer act as a challenge to the designation), the default rule is that these assets are not available to his creditors including the shooting victims. Some states allow an insolvent estate to invade certain non-probate transfers. I would need to do further research to determine how this applies in Nevada, but his probate estate might have a basis to recover some of the life insurance and retirement asset proceeds with third-party beneficiaries for the benefit of the insolvent estate. (There is also a choice of law issue presented. Many life insurance policies and retirement plans state that they are governed by the law of a particular state. It isn't always clear if that choice of law provision, or Nevada law, would control the question of whether an insolvent probate estate may access funds otherwise payable in a non-probate transfer to another beneficiary.) The main statute in Nevada governing invalid non-probate transfers is Nev. Rev. Stat. § 155.093, et seq., and it does not allow an insolvent estate to secure those funds, but I am not an expert on Nevada probate law and there may be another exception that allows an insolvent estate to reach these amounts. A Nevada statute which could be applicable to override these beneficiary designations says: SB 454, § 51. Creditor claim: General power created by powerholder Appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or of the powerholder's estate to the extent provided in chapter 112 of NRS. Subject to subsection 1, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is not subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or the powerholder's estate to the extent the powerholder irrevocably appointed the property in favor of a person other than the powerholder or the powerholder's estate. Subject to subsections 1 and 2, and notwithstanding the presence of a spendthrift provision or whether the claim arose before or after the creation of the power of appointment, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of: (a) The powerholder, to the same extent as if the powerholder owned the appointive property, if the power is presently exercisable; and (b) The powerholder's estate, to the extent the estate is insufficient to satisfy the claim and subject to the right of a decedent to direct the source from which liabilities are paid, if the power is exercisable at the powerholder's death. As used in this section, “power of appointment created by the powerholder” includes a power of appointment created in a transfer by another person to the extent the powerholder contributed value to the transfer. Nev. Rev. Stat. § SB 454, § 51. The beneficiary designation could be reviewed as a power of appointment. Chapter 112 of the Nevada Revised Statutes is Nevada's Fraudulent Transfer Act. 7) And more of an opinion: could a group of victims attain class action status against any of those entities? Against the shooter's estate, yes. Against anyone else, there is not a valid cause of action unless new facts are revealed. On the other hand, since the probate claims process consolidates claims into a single case at a single forum before a single judge, it would usually be unnecessary to file a class action in this situation. Other Possible Plaintiffs and Defendants The Hotel The shooter damages the hotel's windows and his room, and he may not have paid his bill. These would be claims of the hotel in his estate. Criminal Enterprise Victims Josh Marshall at the Talking Points Memo is among those who have suggested that his spending was far in excess of his apparent source of income, and that he may have been engaged in some form of illegal activity which could conceivably even have caused him to decide to end his life. The shooter reported his source of income in real estate transactions as $1,000,000 per year from "gambling", which as Josh Marshall accurately points out, is pretty much impossible given the type of gambling that he engaged in which is overwhelmingly biased in favor of the House in the long run. Professional gamblers play games like poker where it is possible, at least in principle, to win in the long run without cheating. But, he didn't play those kinds of games with any frequency. One of the more plausible explanations for why he would gamble so much is that it is a form of money laundering that allows him to turn ill gotten gains that he would use to purchase chips at casinos into gambling winnings, in exchange for the house's inevitable net gains from his bets in the long run (which can be a pretty small percentage transaction cost, on average, compared to other forms of money laundering). If so, others may have claims against his estate, that compete with the claims of the shooting victims, under statutes such as RICO, based upon this conduct if there was any. Criminal Conspiracies Of course, if evidence came out that this was actually done at the direction of some criminal syndicate (perhaps to raise the price of gun company stocks?), that would be another thing entirely and one could sue the other conspirators (as well as prosecuting them criminally), but there is nothing strong enough to file a case in court that would survive an attorneys' Rule 11 obligations to file claims with a genuine factual basis at this point. It would be an avenue to investigate on the long shot possibility that this conspiracy theory was true. Such conspiracies are not entirely unprecedented. One mass shooting incident in Germany recently that was originally believed to be a terrorist attack turned out to have been motivated by a desire to influence the financial markets. Life Insurance Policies Everyone who has a life insurance policy that was killed could make a claim against that policy. The harder legal question is whether people who had only "accidental death" life insurance policies could make claims in this case. Worker's Compensation Claims Everyone who was killed or injured while on the job at the scene (e.g. roadies for the concert, security guards, police, photographers working the show) could make a worker's compensation claim against their employer's worker's compensation policy. This would include medical costs, lost wages and funeral expenses. Health Insurance Everyone with health insurance who was injured who was not on the job could make a health insurance claim for their medical costs. CGL, Auto and Homeowner's Insurance Claims Most comprehensive general liability insurance (CGL) policies of businesses would cover property damage in this incident. Most automobile insurance policies (but certainly not all) would cover damage to a car in this incident. Most homeowner's and renters insurance policies would cover property damage to property other than a vehicle in this incident. It wouldn't be unusual for a CGL policy for the concert organizers or the venue would have a provision that covers medical expenses up to a small dollar limit for injuries sustained by invitees (i.e. concert goers) at the concert or venue as the case might be. But, it wouldn't be unusual for there to be no such coverage. Travel Insurance Claims From the comments: Many tourists from the UK would have travel insurance. Other European countries probably as well. I checked the online terms of a random UK company, they would pay for the cost of hospital treatment or funeral in case of "unexpected injury", and I seriously hope they wouldn't claim that if someone fires a gun at you, an injury would be "expected". Plus travel related expenses, like transport home, just losing your flight etc. The one I checked wouldn't pay for disability except for "personal injury", that is something you caused yourself. And no compensation, just the actual financial loss. Tort Claims Of People Not Personally Injured The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress tort, which is recognized by Nevada, while by its terms applicable only to "negligence" cases not at issue here, allows recovery by someone who had a near miss with physical harm and suffers emotional distress as a result. There is a reasonable chance that Nevada courts would allow this tort to be applied to "near miss" cases of intentional physical injury. Pretty much anyone on the scene (roughly 22,000 people) could arguably make such a claim against the shooter's estate. Spouses of people who are injured can often make a claim for "loss of consortium" in Nevada for physical harm to their spouse, even if they are nowhere near the scene of the incident. These claims could be made against the shooter's estate. This would allow claims by several hundred people in this situation. Many of the wrongful death claims would be statutory claims of next of kin, rather than claims brought by their estates. these would be brought against the shooter's estate. Trivia Point If this had happened on certain Indian Reservations, there probably would have been federal liability to all Indians harmed in the attack, as the federal government has liability for all criminal harm caused by "bad men" on the Indian Reservations in question to Indians under the treaties creating those reservations. But, obviously, the Las Vegas strip is not in Indian Country, even though many casinos in the U.S. are in Indian Country.
This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.
One of the conditions for a contract to be enforceable is that its undertakings must be legal. This would mean that you cannot, contractually, be indemnified for murder - at least, not in any jurisdiction where homicide is illegal.
1-3: This would be prohibited under Article VI, paragraph 2 of the US Constitution, which provides that federal law, and the ability to enforce that law, has supremacy over state law. As summarized by Cornell Law, the Supremacy Clause: establishes that the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state laws, and even state constitutions. It prohibits states from interfering with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers... 4: Not legally; see above. 5: Yes, probably a lot of laws. Those charges could range anywhere from interfering with a federal investigation, wrongful imprisonment, assault, or kidnapping. I think it's important to point out that it is highly unlikely the situation would ever escalate to 4, let alone 5. The federal government is incredibly well resourced with regards to being able to move its law enforcement officers throughout the country. And that's not withstanding that the FBI and other agencies (CBP, TSA) are already stationed in any particular state. A non-zero number of those agents are also residents of the state they're stationed in, which would complicate things further.
Can you legally sell parts of a car (engine, etc.) that still has a loan on it from a bank? Is it possible to dismantle a car and sell the parts even though the car is still on a loan in Illinois or any state? My thinking is that the car is still owned by the bank that the loan is through. Can I do whatever I want because the car is in my possession?
No, because you are affecting the car's value by selling its parts. The car is collateral to the loan, so if you don't make the payments, the lender has the right to repossess and resell it to recoup their money. If they are unable to recover at least the outstanding balance of the loan through resale, you will be on the hook for the difference. This is called a "deficiency balance". Simply having possession of something isn't adequate basis to decide you can do whatever you want with it. You have physical possession, but the lender is the first lien holder on the title until the loan is satisfied.
Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule.
You have the right to refuse the insurance company's offer and keep your car, but that would be self-defeating. You can keep the car at the shop, and you will incur storage fees; it is possible but quite unlikely that the insurance company will change its mind and offer you more money (unless you're contending that they made a serious technical error in computing the value). The insurance company has no obligation to the shop, but they might have an obligation to you (i.e. it might be a term of the policy that they will pay storage fees up to some limiting condition). Whether or not you have to move the car or pay storage fees is between you and the shop. If I understand your idea about a signed document from the shop waiving fees, you're suggesting that they might waive the fees if you end up having to pay it, but they would stick the insurance company for the amount if the insurance company were to pay. Again, the insurance company only pays what you owe, and under this scenario, you wouldn't owe storage fees, so the insurance company wouldn't be obligated to pay. If you were on the up and up about this, the insurance company would just say "No, that doesn't work". If you were not on the up and up about the arrangement, that would be fraud.
There are limits to what you are allowed to modify on your car. Federal safety regulations require certain features to be installed by the manufacturer, and to be maintained by the owner in a state that they remain functional. Besides obvious things like brakes, you need working headlights, turn signals, bumpers, wipers, etc. Heated seats is an option. A luxury convenience feature. Most cars don't have heated seats. If you had heated seats, but left them off or the switch broke and they weren't working, there would be no reason for the State Patrol to care one bit that your rump was a bit chilly. So, the state doesn't care enough make it illegal to have heated seats or not. It is entirely your choice. The question then becomes, does the state have any reason to care whether you have a manual switch to turn them on or off, or use a special software code to enable the feature? Logic dictates that if they don't care whether or not you have the feature, and don't care if you are using it or not, they would have not reason to care about the particular method you use to turn it on or off... Therefore the only real question is does BMW care? They might, if you came up with a method of enabling heat without a subscription and it became known to them. Especially if you made money publishing a how-to guide that cost them potential revenue. But that would be a civil, rather than a criminal matter. To me this action would be equivalent to buying a burger at a place that charges $.25 for a packet of ketchup, and instead using your own ketchup. It's your burger, and your ketchup, do what you want! ADDENDUM: Based on discussion on the other answer, as well as a suggestion in comments, I would like to briefly address (my opinion) on the applicability of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DCMA) of 1998. I actually just looked up this act, and have only a layman's understanding of copyright law, but there is a basic element that needs to be met for a violation to occur: The copyrighted material must be reproduced, altered, repurposed, and distributed in some manner. Private avoidance or selective non-use of a digital feature would not seem to rise to that level. I touched on this above when I alluded to publishing a written hack. It would probably also apply if you offered code that would bypass a feature, or to a car tuner offering to enable the feature for a fee. If there is a commercial benefit, there is a potential "victim", and a copyright issue. However, even code is questionable... There are many examples of companies offering aftermarket Engine Control Module code to enhance performance or improve gas mileage. Of course a manufacturer could always challenge a commercial competitor, but lawsuits cause money and create publicity - positive and negative. About the only "free" enforcement tool a manufacturer has is to not honor the warranty on any owner altered parts. Of note is the fact that seat heating elements are not digital, copyrighted, or otherwise protected work. The digital intellectual property that MIGHT potentially be at the center of a copyright controversy is the function of the pay system and the processing of an access code that unlocks a relay. What that relay sends electrical current to is really immaterial. It could be your stereo, it could be the airbag... One person snipping and splicing wire to avoid the IP "brain" and install a simple on/off switch or rheostat for personal use of seat heat should not be violation of any digital copyright law.
Any property of a decedent which does not evade probate because of a transfer on death deed is subject to probate. It turns out that this probate avoidance in New York can include one automobile within a family, here is the main form and a companion form. But let's say that the car is worth more than the limit (and you don't want to pay the estate the excess), then it might have to go through the longer process. That does not mean that the spouse cannot use the vehicle, as long as the spouse takes reasonable action to transfer the vehicle (waiting 5 years is not reasonable).
Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.
If by invalidated you mean you do not have to pay it back, no it is not invalidated. The way a loan is supposed to work is that you are given the money and then you could spend it or use the unused portion of the money to pay back the loan. The $400 that you did not use would technically be considered payment on the loan and you would owe $300.
If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail.
Can the USA military be used as a police force domestically? A discussion on a sister Stack Exchange site led me to ask this question. Under what conditions can a branch of the military (excluding the Coast Guard for technical reasons) be used in an active role in law enforcement operations domestically in the United States? By active, I am envisioning active duty soldiers from the Army, Air Force, Navy or Marines breaking down doors and arresting suspects, so above and beyond manning checkpoints and road blocks or logistical operations in support of local law enforcement. Can the President make this decision unilaterally acting under the Insurrection Act, or does he or she need the consent of Congress as specified in 18 U.S. Code § 1385? If it depends, what does it depend on?
The use of the active duty military in a law enforcement role is not unconstitutional but it is prohibited by the posse comitatus act. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (adopted 1878). The text of the relevant legislation is as follows: 18 U.S.C. § 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Also notable is the following provision within Title 10 of the United States Code (which concerns generally the organization and regulation of the armed forces and Department of Defense): 10 U.S.C. § 375. Restriction on direct participation by military personnel The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law. The act does not apply to the National Guard mobilized at the request of a state governor. In practice, 10 U.S.C. § 375 has more bite because a federal prosecutor can and usually would refrain from prosecuting a crime ordered by his ultimate boss, the President, and there is not legal duty to prosecute every possible crime, but 10 U.S.C. § 375 creates an affirmative duty on the party of the Secretary of Defense that might be enforceable in a civil action.
The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent.
This is a hard question, but a good question. The following relates to the issue from the perspective of the USA. You ask "...if the US wants to invade France, can they officially declare war by...", You have to make clear what you mean by "can". If you mean whether or not the US has the physical ability to do this, then of course they do. If you mean whether they are allowed, then this is another question. When you ask whether something is allowed, then you have to make reference to a moral code or a law that determines what is and what isn't allowed (legal). Normally each country will have laws that govern what is and what isn't legal for it's citizens to do. That hard part is how this applies to nations. There are two sides to the question. (1) What are the leaders allowed to do under their own laws, (the domestic laws) (2) what are countries as entities allowed to do? (the international laws) It sounds a bit like you are asking about the second thing. Here treaties govern what is and what isn't "legal". However, usually when someone breaks a law, other entities have the power to enforce that law and decide (judge) whether the person has broken the law. The question is: who decides whether a country has broken a treaty or an international law? And if a law is broken, what exactly can be done about it? This is hard to answer. Consider for example the conflict in Ukraine. Here many will argue that Russia has piratically invaded Ukraine. There should be war between the nations. But Russia denies this and other world powers have done little beyond imposing sanctions. This illustrates how hard it is to deal with this question. One question that comes up is what the purpose of international treaties are if a country can just violate them without much consequence. Pointing out two points about this. (1) If, for example, a president wants to convince his/her own congress that the country should engage in war, then it makes a stronger point if you can show how the country you want to engage has violated international trities. (2) After you have won a war, you might want to prosecute the leaders of the loosing power. Here you will stand stronger if you can make references to some international law that existed before the conflict started. This second point is illustrated in the Nuremberg principles. Here it was exactly stated that "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." According to the US constitution "Congress shall have power to ... declare War". That means that historically Congress has the power to decide where to wage war. The War Powers Resolution says, for example, that "The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities ...". Note that this doesn't mean that the US has do formally declare war before going to war. Example: The Iraq War was authorized by Congress, but there never was a formal declaration of war. It is interesting that you ask about the timing for when the declaration should be given. The Japanese wanted to deliver their declaration of war just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But because of issues with decrypting the message from Japan to the Japanese Embassy, the declaration wasn't delivered until after the attack. Remember also in all of this that the winning party to a conflict, usually decides what was and wasn't legal! One good reference for more on all of this is the report by the Congressional Research Service called "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications". Here you can see more on what I have tried (and failed?) to say above.
39 CFR § 232.1(l) provides that: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, rule or regulation, no person while on postal property may carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, or store the same on postal property, except for official purposes. Police officers on active duty, enforcing the law at the request of post office employees, appear to be discharging "official purposes".
Presidential power of that type might arise from congressional authorization, where Congress authorizes action when POTUS deems that such-and-such is the case. An example is 8 USC 1182(f), which says Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. Explicit constitutional powers are not numerous, but include commanding the armed forces and overseeing execution of national law by appointing and removing executive officers. POTUS is constitutionally the federal official responsible for relations with foreign nations, so he can make treaties (subject to Senate approval) and executive agreements (not subject to approval), can appoint US ambassadors and can receive foreign ambassadors. Executive agreements have the greatest potential for being an avenue for POTUS to act contrary to Congress, but they are limited to agreements pursuant to legislation, treaty and constitutional authority (and, as agreements, are not unilateral). Congress was able to somewhat limit presidential military authority by statutes such as the War Powers Act, and in the policy statement at 50 USC 1541, Congress declares The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces The law limits the length of engagement of the military, without Congressional approval, but there is no toothful restriction on deploying the military for up to 60 days. 50 USC Ch. 34 more generally addressed "national emergencies", and started by declaring an end to all existing declared emergencies. Other sections of the law require Congress to be notified and emergencies to be published in the Federal Register. An emergency can be terminated by POTUS or by act of Congress, and after 6 months (and every 6 months thereafter), Congress shall meet to discuss the emergency. POTUS must also annually re-declare the emergency to keep it in force. These are procedural requirements, not content requirements. In general, you wold have to go through Title 50 to check for particular powers granted by Congress The International Emergency Economic Powers Act grants powers to POTUS, with the following limit: (a) Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat. (b) The authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national emergency which must be with respect to such threat. which appears more limiting than the War Powers Act. There is an extensive list of powers granted under 50 USC 1702, which in that domain could be called "bright" lines. Generally, the lines are only as bright as Congress has painted them.
In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.
It is premature to judge the particular case because the facts are not all available. But we can address the general principles. The Model Penal Code 3.04(2)(a) sets out the general principles clearly. A person has the right to self-defense against unlawful force. But, the use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful. But more specifically under (b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat However, there is a further condition that force is not justifiable if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take Then finally, §3.05 says that this goes for people using force in defense of others. The short version is that the common law right to resist illegal arrest has been supplanted by a statutory requirement to submit to police authority, for example in California and New York. In Ewumi v. Georgia, defendant was illegally arrested and physically defended himself, which resulted in a battery charge and conviction. The battery charge was overturned because the arrest was illegal ab initio. If one resisting an authorized arrest, where an officer's force is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm, the question is whether a reasonable person would find it necessary to resist in self-defense. It is unusual for the courts to find that to be the case. Minnesota law says that reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other's consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist: (1) when used by a public officer or one assisting a public officer under the public officer's direction: (a) in effecting a lawful arrest Other sections say that a person who is not a public officer may use force to effect an arrest, or, "(3) when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person". Being arrested by the police is not an offense, and none of the other justifications for use of force apply.
The question starts with a wrong statement, that international law does not allow the use of force against unarmed border violators. It does. There are human rights involved, and any one border policy may be against international law and conventions, but generally speaking the use of (lethal) force may be allowed. When a person dies, the proper disposition of the body is governed by the laws of the country where the body rests. This can become problematic when the body rests on a border fence, possibly inaccessible from the side on whose territory it is. Once the body is recovered, there may or may not be an autopsy, again according to national law.
Reading books in public, copyright Can you read, not aloud, copyrighted material eg. Books, scientific papers in public eg bus, airplane, cafe, where other people can potentially read it/take picture?
Of course. Copyright law prevents you from making copies, and prevents others from making copies. It doesn’t oblige you to take extreme precautions against vague possibilities that others might break the law. And reading is not considered “copying”. So you don’t have to prevent others from reading your books at all.
Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
No, you cannot ever legally use copyrighted property without a valid license from the copyright owner. It is understandable that when government restrictions prevent people from licensing intellectual property, people will turn to piracy and black markets to obtain them. However, whenever you find yourself in a region where you can legally license the property, you are (presumably) also in a region where intellectual property rights are respected, and it is illegal to use the property without a proper license from the owner. I.e., the fact that you paid a pirate for a copy – even where that was the only option to obtain one – does not give you a license. You have to obtain a license from the owner.
I assume you are talking about United States federal copyright law. You can freely use any: material published before 1923 material published between 1923 and 1963 for which the copyright was not renewed material explicitly placed in the public domain material not copyrightable (such as any US government publication) material whose copyright has been abandoned (for example the author died with no heir)
Wikipedia has two kinds of pictures: Reusable pictures, most of them stored at http://commons.wikimedia.org Copyrighted pictures under fair-use, stored on the local Wikipedia (in your case, the Russian Wikipedia) but not on Commons. To know what case it is, just click on the Wikipedia picture, click on the blue "Description" button, and see whether it redirects you to Commons or not. Pictures on Commons are reusable if you include the author and license (see the full requirements). Commercial use is OK. Fair-use pictures can not be reused. Unfortunately, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Файл:Tschedrovitsky.jpg is in the second case, so you can not reuse it, even in a non-commercial setting, unless you can justify that your usage qualifies as fair-use in your country. Hopefully one day someone will find a legally reusable picture of Shchedrovitski and upload it to Commons.
The default answer is NO, but you would have to check the terms&conditions of Meetup.com. For a simpler example, just look at the bottom of this page: "user contributions licensed under cc by-sa 3.0 with attribution required". That means that you can copy pictures from this site to your Facebook page, if you acknowledge the photographer and link back to here.
This would likely be considered a derivative work. You would need permission from the copyright holder to make it, especially if you intend to distribute it for profit.
A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc.
Canadian's car in USA I live in Boston MA with a TD visa. I don't want to buy a car in USA. Can I drive my Canadian car (car registered in Canada) here? How long can I drive it? How about car insurance? Any detailed information about this?
When you started living in Massachussetts, you are required to register your car in Massachussetts. Residency means "living there", and isn't about citizenship / permanent residence. There is no provision at all for delaying the change of registration: here is how to transfer the registration. You can't use Canadian insurance, so you will also have to get Massachussetts liability insurance (and collision, if you want it). Pretending that you are "just a tourist passing through" will not work and is easily disprovable. Your Canadian insurance agent will confirm that you have to switch to a Massachussetts policy when you move to Massachussetts, because you are not covered by Canadian insurance when you reside in Massachussetts.
Law enforcement sometimes use "pacing" as a speed enforcement tool. The basic idea is that they consistently drive a certain speed - which is at or above the speed limit and notice that the "alleged speeder" is either keeping pace or exceeding the pace. The details are complicated and a police officer would know them much better than me. But basically They have to calibrate their speedometer - because if their speedometer is broken pacing is obviously worthless. They need to bring the calibration results to court. Not having those calibration records for your speedometer means that many police departments will be reluctant to issue a speeding ticket to the other motorists. They rely on the fact that most state laws allow law enforcement leeway to exceed the posted limit. Not being a lawyer or a police officer, I do not know the exact circumstances, but if they were not allowed to slightly exceed the limit for pacing then logically every pacing enforcement should result in 2 tickets - one being for the officer. If you can swear that your speedometer is good then they can use that evidence to write you a speeding ticket, because whatever allowances the law allows law enforcement for pacing are not granted to you. I am sure they can overcome the calibration issue with regard to a ticket issued to you by your certification that the speedometer is correct. If they issued a ticket to me based on your certification that your speedometer was correct, I would call bullshit. Talking to the police can only hurt you.
The booklet from the condominium management could legally be seen as a part of the lease, and you should have been aware cars can be towed without notice, and have in fact agreed to that by living there. The fact that the tow company entered your car really isn't relevant; they are tasked with removing the car, and by law, they must do everything they can in order to tow the car while not causing damage. They will be insured and bonded for damage during the tow and liability for storage at their lot; but in order to safely tow the car, they must have access to the parking brake, the gear shifter (if manual), the steering wheel (to straighten the tires, if needed, which could be a problem if the steering wheel is locked), etc. They can legally enter the car to ensure a safe tow if the car is unlocked, or use a "slim jim" or other tool to unlock the door, disable the alarm if needed, etc. If the tow company damaged the car while towing, or you find property is missing from inside the car when the care is returned, your issue is with the two company and not the condominium management. See Virginia Code § 46.2-118. Prohibited acts by tow truck drivers and towing and recovery operators
According to this press release, Toronto is "stepping up enforcement" of its leash by-law. You should call 311 to report violations: http://www.toronto.ca/311/knowledgebase/29/101000050429.html You can find more information here: http://www.toronto.ca/311/knowledgebase/47/101000050447.html http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=b6c9dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD You can find a list of areas where dogs are permitted to be unleashed here: http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=5a81dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD&vgnextchannel=b6c9dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD I note, however, that the press release says that "A dog is considered running at large if it is unleashed, off its owner's property and not under its owner's control." Reading this strictly, where all three conditions must be met, a dog owner is permitted to unleash a dog if it is still possible for the owner to control the dog. I don't know how the courts have interpreted this, but it could certainly be interpreted very widely.
No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket.
What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes
Yes. This doesn't remotely approach the threshold to which the excessive fines clause applies. Also SR-22 insurance isn't a fine, it is a requirement that you take extra responsibility because you are a high risk driver. In general, states have broad authority to regulate the right to drive a car.
Note: I am not familiar with Washington law, but I can make an educated guess as to what is happening here. I am guessing that the couple in question are the joint registered owners of the motor vehicle. In many jurisdictions, motor vehicles are treated differently from "normal" things, they are treated as inherently dangerous and thus ownership carries a certain set of responsibilities. (Similar to e.g. owning a firearm, which carries with it certain restrictions on how it can be stored, for example.) One of those responsibilities is to keep track of who is operating the motor vehicle. Therefore, unless the operator of the motor vehicle can clearly be identified without incurring unreasonable cost, tickets for traffic violations are generally addressed to the registered owner, who can then forward them to the responsible operator. (Note that "unreasonable cost" does not have to be monetary. It could also be an invasion of privacy: it is less invasive to just ask the owner to identify the operator than to e.g. surveil the owner's property to find out who is using the vehicle or run facial recognition against the owner's family, friends, and colleagues.) In many jurisdictions, there is a form attached to the ticket (or downloadable from some website) which will look something like this: I accept the ticket: [ ] I do not accept the ticket [ ] because … I was operating the vehicle, but I did not run the red light [ ] I was not operating the vehicle [ ] … the vehicle was operated by: name ___, address ___ … I do not know who was operating the vehicle at that time [ ] If you claim not to know who was operating the vehicle at the time in question, that might have other consequences. In some jurisdictions, you can then be ordered to keep a logbook, for example. If the vehicle then gets caught again and you again claim to now know who was operating it, or you cannot produce the logbook, you might get fined for violating the court order to keep a logbook.
Why are there quirky ASCII dividers in deposition transcripts? I was reviewing a deposition and noticed the following characters used as cute little dividers in the transcript: ---oOo--- To see an example in action, look here, both on the directly linked page and throughout the document. This looks very nice, but I wouldn't have expected to see this in an official legal document. It appears several other times throughout that deposition transcript, as well. However, I have reviewed several other depositions from the same case and haven't seen any such dividers. But when I Googled it, I found some other depositions with the same set of characters used as decoration from other cases. Is this a well-known convention? Does anyone know the history of it, or the reasoning behind it? Can a court reporter make the executive decision to include these types of decorations?
It's a typographic divider line dating back to the days of typewriting; there's a passing reference to the practice on the Typography for Lawyers website. Standards for formatting documents -- especially those being uploaded as text into online repositories -- are generally set by the local jurisdiction; some courts may specify exactly how and where to use this sort of spacer; others may not allow it at all. For example, this E-File Manual for the Ventura (Calif.) Superior Court specifies "There is NO blank line between the ' ---000--- ' and the caption," whereas the Typography for Lawyers sample document from the Supreme Court of Utah uses "----ooOoo----".
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (it was revised between 1868-1869, but enacted in 1870) applied specifically to civil cases (i.e. disputes between private parties); it's organized by topic area, and is there to keep people from having to comb through every law ever passed that has to do with civil cases. The Revised Statutes of 1870 gathered all the laws of "general character" into one place, for the same reason. The difference between the two was almost certainly an error. In general, there is one official version of the law; other versions are a convenience. The official version normally defaults to the individual laws passed by the legislature (which are organized by date, not by anything useful for finding relevant laws), but that can be changed by statute. In this case, the Revised Statutes contains section 3990, which says in so far as there may be any conflict between the provisions of this act and any provision of the said Revised Civil Code and Code of Practice, that said Code shall be held and taken as the law governing So, the Civil Code took precedence. Your revisions of 1876 and 1882 were not successor laws; rather, they were compilations of the Revised Statutes and Civil Code of 1870 with the amendments to those that had since been passed. The Revised Statutes from 1876 were really the Revised Statutes of 1870, modified by later laws (that didn't touch the divorce provisions). Likewise, the Civil Code from 1882 was really the Revised Civil Code of 1870, modified by later laws. The Civil Code of 1870 still took precedence over the Revised Statutes of 1870, so the divorce provisions of the Civil Code were authoritative.
The judge's instructions state: You have been allowed to take notes during the trial. You may take those notes with you to the jury room. You should not consider these notes binding or conclusive, whether they are your notes or those of another juror. The notes should be used as an aid to your memory and not as a substitute for it. It is your recollection of the evidence that should control. You should disregard anything contrary to your recollection that may appear from your own notes or those of another juror. You should not give greater weight to a particular piece of evidence solely because it is referred to in a note taken by a juror. There is a pattern instruction in Washington that addresses requests to rehear testimony: In making this decision, I want to emphasize that I am making no comment on the value or weight to be given to any particular testimony in this case. The testimony you requested will be [read to you] [replayed for you] here in the courtroom. You will hear it only one time. After you have heard the testimony, you will return to the jury room and resume your deliberations. When you do, remember that your deliberations must take into account all the evidence in the case, not just the testimony that you have asked to rehear. The notes on use state "Although judges have discretion in responding to these requests, the case law disfavors repeating trial testimony for deliberating jurors", followed by the state of the relevant case law. The central point in that discussion is: The concern addressed in the case law is that rereading requested selections from a trial transcript can lead jurors to give undue emphasis to the selected testimony. and an additional concern is that reading the trial transcript selections to the jurors could constitute an unconstitutional comment on the evidence. and finally jurors often request the testimony of a single witness rather than requesting balanced testimony from multiple witnesses that more accurately reflects the positions taken by both parties. If the judge grants such a limited request, then one party's version of the case might be unduly emphasized, yet if the judge expands on the request by repeating the requested testimony along with other relevant testimony, then the judge runs the risk of improperly commenting on the evidence. Minnesota criminal procedure rule 26 Subd. 20(2) addresses the matter of rehearing evidence, saying that the court can allow a hearing of specific evidence: (a) If the jury requests review of specific evidence during deliberations, the court may permit review of that evidence after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard. (b) Any jury review of depositions, or audio or video material, must occur in open court. The court must instruct the jury to suspend deliberations during the review. (c) The prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant must be present for the proceedings described in paragraphs (a) and (b), but the defendant may personally waive the right to be present. (d) The court need not submit evidence beyond what the jury requested but may submit additional evidence on the same issue to avoid giving undue prominence to the requested evidence. This rule where judges have discretion is a change from an earlier rule where judges had an obligation to allow rehearing. When there is no obligation to allow rehearing, the "safer" path is to not allow rehearing. In State v. McDaniels, 332 N.W.2d 172, the appeals court notes that The judge reasoned that to read the requested portions of the two police officers' testimony would give undue prominence to that portion of the evidence. The prosecutor argued that three or four other witnesses had testified regarding Fifth and Royalston. The testimony was widely scattered throughout the transcript between direct and cross-examination. To locate all references would be burdensome and impractical thus reflecting the reasoning underlying the Washington instruction. In State v. Rean, 421 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 1988), the court turned down a request to rehear testimony, saying "You will have to rely on your memory of the testimony". The Supreme Court concludes that "To avoid giving undue prominence to the testimony requested, and in light of the difficulty of providing all relevant testimony, the jury's request was rejected". It then observes that "Simply because the jury apparently felt that it was at an impasse did not mean that the trial court was obligated to grant the jury's requests". The court rejected "the wooden approach of always granting a request, even an unreasonable one, if the jury says it is at an impasse" We do not know what objections the prosecution and defense raised regarding the request to rehear, but if one side would likely benefit from a rehearing, the other side is entitled to a "balancing" rehearing (the rules allow the jury to be directed to consider testimony that they did not request a rehearing of); and tit might have been onerous to assemble that evidence.
While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.
The language that you're referring to, where it states that if they do not provide responses to legitimately served discovery requests in a timely manner, that they would be responsible for attorney fees, this does not refer to your attorneys fees that you incurred in defending the suit. It refers to attorneys fees that would (actually could) arise out of a hearing on a motion to compel, in the event they never answered. If that occurred, the law allows you to ask the court to award you reasonable attorney's fees as well as sanctions, but only those having to do with getting the court to make them answer. Importantly, despite the rule that states this is a potential repercussion for continually failing to answer, they rarely get awarded. This usually only occurs when the court has already warned them, after you (i.e., your attorney) has willingly given them extensions, the court has given them further extensions, and they still failed to produce/respond. Typically an attorney will allow the other side substantial extensions of time, and this is something you may not even know about. When you say they completely ignored the deadline, I'm assuming you mean the deadline on the discovery notice that gets served with the papers. Interrogatories and Requests for production of documents rarely get done anywhere near the deadline in the rules, which is a mere 3 weeks. Many times, it takes much more than this to track down everything that was requested. This is why extensions happen all the time and unless you're asking, this isn't something your lawyer will even discuss with you. When you say they "didn't offer a remotely reasonable settlement until after the deadline and didn't finally dismiss the case until months after the deadline," I'm assuming you mean they didn't make a reasonable demand (it sounds like you were the defendant). This is actually very common, and in fact, it is very early on to make (or reduce the original) demand low enough that the Defendant will accept it prior to the discovery deadline and all the depositions have passed. (When I say deadline, I don't mean the one you're talking about, I mean the actual discovery deadline, which is set forth in the scheduling order; this can easily be 9 months from the time an Answer to the Complaint is filed.) If you're referring to the token deadline put in the first set of interrogatories served, this not a "real" deadline anyone of the attorneys expects to be adhered to. Further, this a very quick settlement and you should be happy your attorney disposed of your case so quickly. As you pointed out, you are paying a lot of money every day the case lives on. In fact, the money you saved by settling early is substantial. If your attorney had gotten the documents and responses and had to wade through all of them, organize them, send follow up requests, take depositions, etc., you would be out easily another $10,000. Your lawyer did you a favor, because a less honest attorney would tell you to wait, to see if there is a defense, just so they could pad their bill. Many times when it is clear that the case is going to settle, the lawyers will serve pro forma discovery, and will say to each other not to bother answering while they attempt to settle. They are timely served if you cannot settle, but it's clear that settlement is the ultimate goal. This is very typical when the defendant almost certainly has exposure, but when the plaintiff's case also has some holes. Because of issues on both sides, they agree a modest settlement to dispose of the matter, quickly, is the best course. When you say the settlement explicitly involved each party paying their own attorney's fees, all settlements contain this clause. I have never seen a settlement agreement where a party agreed to pay the other's attorneys fees. It's just not done. In the rare case it is, it's part of the structure of the settlement and it flows to the Plaintiff, not the Defendant. This may occur in a civil rights case where there are no real damages, but the statute allows for attorneys fees to be awarded if even one-dollar is awarded. So, in a case like this, sometimes the plaintiff will accept their attorney's fees being satisfied as the settlement, (usually along with some sort of consent decree), so as to curtail the abhorrent behavior. If you want to discuss these issues with your attorney, they are not billable: they are administrative pertaining to your bill; hence, you can do so without fear of being charged. If you're nervous, tell him ahead of time you'd like to discuss your bill. He won't try to bill you for this, as he can't, and furthermore your case is settled so your file is closed. To answer your question explicitly: No - your fees are not recoverable. This is not only because you've already settled, but you were never entitled to them anyway. To answer your question about the point of sending discovery at all if you are not going to expect answers and the goal is to settle, (1) is to preserve the right during the discovery period, in the event settlement negotiations break down; (2) to give the other side a picture of how sharp your attorney is, and that he/she will be asking the right questions and they will be invasive; and (3) this is just how it is done. What you've described is how almost all low level cases proceed. Lastly, just to address what you said about it taking a few months from reaching a verbal or "handshake" agreement and having the settlement actually be recorded by the judge and a dismissal issuing, this is just something that takes a little while. Depending on the type of case it is, the court may need to approve the settlement. Even when it's not necessary for the court to approve the settlement, it takes a while to go back and forth on the language, draft the stipulations of dismissal and so on. A few months is right on target. It sounds to me like you had a pretty effective and honest lawyer who could've dragged this out for much longer. Advice for the future, in case you ever find yourself needing the services of an attorney again: If you have these types of questions, you should ask them as they come up. Again, it's not something that you can be billed for, and your lawyer should be happy to answer. Some lawyers are better than others in remembering to explain what the technical stuff means, and what the game plan is. However, the client has a responsibility too, which is to ask if you don't understand.
Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.
In closing arguments, an attorney should only refer to evidence that was admitted at trial. In opening arguments, an attorney may refer to evidence that the attorney reasonably believes will be admitted at trial, and if the attorney has grounds to admit the transcript as an exhibit, could do so. If not, the attorney could still reasonable state: the evidence will show that an arresting officer described Mr. Jones as "crazy" without showing a transcript or explaining where it comes from (on the theory that the officer will either testify to that effect at trial or will be impeached at trial with the transcript for testifying in a contrary manner). Usually the transcript can usually be admitted only for impeachment, so usually it wouldn't be admissible absent contrary testimony at trial. But there are exceptions that apply to that rule which could make it admissible and hence proper to reference or show in opening arguments.
"as is" is likely in quotation marks because it reflects its usage in the Uniform Commercial Code. Although in the UCC it is reasonably clear that the quotation marks serve to delineate the example from the text, legal drafting is generally precise and by using the same form it unambiguously refers to its usage therein. Another reason is that in this circumstance, it doesn't necessarily take on its ordinary meaning, but rather the meaning stipulated, and with the effect stipulated, in the UCC. Finally, the UCC stipulates that the exclusion of warranty must be conspicuous. Adding quotation marks may help to show that it was set apart from the rest of the text.
GDPR and CDN (content delivery networks) I have a website hosted in a European server. The website is static (serverless) so I can take advantage of a CDN to serve its whole content. A CDN is, basically, a distributed network of servers. That means that a copy of my website would be hosted on several servers around the world. User requests are (ideally) directed to the server which is closest to the user. By doing so, a CDN improves the performance of the site. How is this relevant concerning the GDPR? By using a CDN I'm adding to the system a new third-party that will collect the IP and other metadata from my users. Obviously I can't get consent from the user beforehand: when they hit the server it is already too late. Probably, users will get routed to a server close to them, but this is not guaranteed. I don't know to which server they are going to connect. I don't even know the country. It could be that a German user end up sending his IP, browser footprint, etc. to a server in Japan (unlikely but possible). Because I don't know it, I can't inform the user about it. My assumptions are: Without CDN, the hosting provider would collect that same data so I don't think there is a relevant difference. I just need to inform my users in the privacy policy which CDN provider I use and that it collects personal data on the basis of legitimate interests (Art.6(1)(f)), as I do with the hosting provider. Because there is a potential transfer of personal data out of the EU, I must ensure that the DPA that I sign with the CDN provider includes the SCC. Also, I must inform the users about this possible data transfer in my privacy policy. Are my assumptions correct? Is there, in the frame of the GDPR, any other aspect to take in consideration when using a CDN?
Are my assumptions correct? Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that would fall under the purview of "the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party", as it fundamentally enables you to deliver the service to the data subject, and its also difficult to argue that "such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" given its a fundamental part of delivering the service before any consent can be given. Its not the intention of the GDPR to solely require a direct relationship between the data controller and data subject, its intention is to allow the data subject to control more of the relationship than they did previously - in some cases, that control remains with the data controller, which is why not all of the lawful basis for processing rest on consent. So long as you ensure that the CDN provider has a relevant privacy policy and is identified as a data processor in your privacy and data policy then you are good to go. In my mind, this is similar to the issue of how the data subjects packets get to you from their computer - we aren't including all of the network providers who carry the packets between the data subject and the processor (despite the fact that those providers will have access to much of the same information as the CDN, such as IP address, source, destination etc), even though in many cases we don't know that information (for example which route it will take over the internet). The only difference here is that as the data controller, you know about the CDN and can include it in your policies, so you should.
The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were.
It seems clear that this is personal information under the GDPR. If you are subject to the GDPR, you need to have a "lawful basis" to store or process such information. (You are subject to the GDPR if you are locates in the EU, or if your users are. My understanding is that it is location at the time the app is accessed that matters, not a user's citizenship. I am not totally sure about that, however. Unless your app is limited to non-EU access, it it probably safest to comply with the GDPR) The degree of precision of your location data will not matter -- a specific city is quite enough to make it personal data if it can be tied to a specific person. There are various lawful bases that may be relied on for processing and storage, but explicit consent is probably the one with the widest applicability. To use consent as the lawful basis, you must present an OPT-IN decision to the user, and record the results. If the user does nothing, the result must record lack of consent. You may not use a pre-checked consent box or another mechanism that has the effect of an opt-out choice. You should be clear about what information will be stored, and how it will or might be used. You will also need to consider how your app will function for those who do not consent, and how to handle requests to withdraw consent. So if an app obtains user consent to store location data in a manner that complies with the GDPR, it may store user location data. The consent should make the possible uses of the data clear. If the data is to be shared, the consent should make the possible extent of sharing clear. Some previous questions and answers here on law.se dealing with GDPR consent that seem possibly relevant: User consent required under GDPR What provisions should I make regarding GDPR consent when users do not sign themselves up? GDPR - Withdrawn user consent Opt Out Consent under GDPR
Whether GDPR applies does not depend on the country of residence. Instead, GDPR applies to a non-EU site or service if the data controller offers products or services to people in the EU (see Art 3(2) GDPR). This depends solely on the behaviour and intent of the data controller / the provider of the website – compare also the discussion of the “targeting criterion” in EDPB guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR. While your proposed measures might not be entirely ineffective (in that they document an intent to not serve people in the EU), they are both unnecessarily restrictive and overly lax. For example, they would unnecessarily prevent EU tourists in the US from registering but would nevertheless allow US tourists in the EU. For the targeting criterion, it matters whether the data subject is in the EU at the time of the offer, not at all what their residency is. Even if a person who is currently in the EU registers with your service, that doesn't necessarily mean that you are targeting people in the EU. Instead of implementing signup restrictions, a better strategy might be to clarify in the copy on your website that you are only targeting the domestic US market, not the European market with your services. I have discussed this in more detail in an answer to “How can you block GDPR users from US based sites?” If you have a site where GDPR doesn't apply, and you receive a GDPR data subject request, you shouldn't deny it on the basis that the user must have lied – instead you can deny it on the basis that GDPR just doesn't apply to you.
The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site.
A data controller is whoever determines the means and purposes of processing. It is possible that multiple controllers jointly determine the means and purposes. However, someone can only be controller over processing activities where they actually have the ability to influence these decisions (see e.g. the Fashion ID case). The provider of an app does not have any control over what Google does on its servers with the collected data, unless Google were a data processor for that particular processing activity. Thus, the app provider is not a data controller for Google's subsequent processing, and is not responsible for Google's GDPR compliance. HOWEVER, the app provider is a data controller regarding what happens within the app (including any SDKs, libraries, or frameworks). The app provider is data controller for processing activities such as “collecting data” and “sending data to Google”. These processing activities must comply with the GDPR (if GDPR applies), for example they need a legal basis. Under some circumstances there might be a legitimate interest for sending data to another data controller. But in the context of behavioural advertising, such a legitimate interest would be very weak and would not pass the required balancing test. Instead, the app provider would likely have to collect consent. This is very similar to the question of whether a website can embed content from Google services such as YouTube videos, which would necessarily share data with Google. I have written related answers here and there. You are correct that many apps do not collect valid consent before showing ads. GDPR/ePrivacy enforcement in this space is rather lacking, especially since many offenders are outside of the EU. However, this doesn't mean such illegal data processing by apps would be OK.
Can you anonymise people It is valid to anonymise the data of people, instead of deleting all of the records. The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Source As long as the person is not identifiable, then you do not need to treat the data as personal under the GDPR. You do have to inform a person once they are no longer identifiable, and be able to identify them if they provide the missing information: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. Source The articles covered by this are: 15 - Right of Access 16 - Right to rectification 17 - Right to erasure 18 - Right to restrict processing 19 - Right to be informed 20 - Right to data portability
The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you.
Are open letters protected by freedom of speech? Any court precedents? I would like to know if there is legal precedent protecting the freedom of speech in distributing an open letter or something similar. A friend owns a unit in a condominium, and since day one she has been subjected to random fines and hostility from certain neighbors. The condominium is managed by a private company, and the manager finds every opportunity and every excuse to slap fines on her, for all kinds of random things that she didn't do. She tried and fought back by filing complaints with fair housing organizations, but it has had little effect. The management company retracted some fines but still shows express hate and hostility toward her and fines her whenever they can. My friend has requested a meeting with the HOA board many times in email to the manager, which have all been ignored or denied. Then an extremely discriminatory and hateful thing against her happened. With her access to the board blocked, she had no choice but to write an open letter to other residents, asking for their help, and leave the letters at their doors. A few weeks later the management company found out and slapped her with several other fines, claiming her act of distributing an open letter constituted a violation. (Funny thing is the section they cited in the Condominium Bylaw in regard to the violation doesn't even exist.) Are open letters protected under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? Are there other specific clauses on the federal and/or state level that are relevant in this case?
No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract.
This can be effected without evidence or trial or a right to an appeal in front of an objective party. Not so. If a person is charged with a crime for violating such a code, (or refusing to leave when ordered under such a code) they could defend on the grounds that it is unreasonable, unauthorized, or violates that person's constitutional or statutory rights. Or, if a person has been ordered to leave, the person could comply and then seek an injunction forbidding future enforcement of the regulation. Such methods have been used in the past to challenge the lawfulness of administrative regulations. The Colorado code CRS 24-90-109. Powers and duties of board of trustees says that: (1) The board of trustees shall: (a) Adopt such bylaws, rules, and regulations for its own guidance and policies for the governance of the library as it deems expedient. ... (b) Have custody of all property of the library, including rooms or buildings constructed, leased, or set apart therefor; (c) Employ a director and, upon the director's recommendation, employ such other employees as may be necessary. The duties of the director shall include, but not limited to: (I) Implementing the policies adopted by the board of trustees pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section; ... (III) Performing all other acts necessary for the orderly and efficient management and control of the library. This law seems to authorize libraries to adopt and enforce codes of conduct for persons using the library. This page from the CO State library development agency gives example policies that libraries are encouraged to model their policies on. In the section under "Library Use/Behavior" there are three example policies. All of these list various prohibited acts, which seem relatively reasonable to me. Two of the three include an explicit appeals process for serious violations. You do not indicate what sort of behavior you have encaged in for which the library may wish to ban you. In general, government facilities are allowed to make reasonable regulations for members of the public using those facilities, and it is not a violation of people's Constitutional rights to make and enforce such regulations. However, that depends highly on what the regulations are. A regulation limiting access by race would obviously be struck down. A regulation prohibiting shouting, even though it impacts speech, would be permitted as a content-neutral regulation of "time, place and manner". In short it would depend very much on the specific regulation, and what rights it is alleged to violate.
Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either.
Can the HOA compel payment? Yes, at least from the standpoint of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. That is because the resident obtains some benefit(s) from the HOA's activity & expenses, such as the maintenance of common areas and other items that advance the common good of the community. However, a drastic or arbitrary increase in invoices might not be enforceable, especially if these are unreasonable. The HOA would need to persuade in court that the resident accepted or would have knowingly and willfully accepted such drastic change. HOA bylaws: Are they enforceable absent a contract? If by bylaws you mean something other than bills, the question would depend on the substance & scope of those bylaws as well as the HOA's/resident's jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that a written & signed contract is oftentimes unnecessary. There is the notion of "implicit contract" to refer to rights and duties that can be inferred from the parties' conduct and the expectations that can be inferred therefrom. This notion of implicit contract is common in situations where there is no written document that reflects the parties' intent in the relation they willfully enter.
Banning you from the museum raises questions about your due process, equal protection, and First Amendment rights. Generally speaking, a person banned like this would be unlikely to collect any damages, but may be able to obtain injunctive relief to prevent the museum from enforcing its ban. Of course, it would depend on the reason for the ban and the procedures the museum went through in imposing the ban and permitting you to challenge it. In your case, though, the ban has already been lifted, so there's probably not much room for any kind of legal action. EDIT: Since there are several people contesting -- with no law to support them -- the validity of this answer, here's a case discussing the First Amendment implications of access to museums: As a limited public forum, there are certain First Amendment activities permitted on [National Civil War Museum] grounds and others that are not. For example, lectures or programs on a Civil War topic authorized by the museum and the public's attendance at these activities would be permitted uses, but activities concerning other topics (including the immorality of homosexual activity) would not. Diener v. Reed, 232 F. Supp. 2d 362, 385 (M.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, 77 F. App'x 601 (3d Cir. 2003).
Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes.
To what degree are such emails admissible in court as evidence, and what weight do they carry? Your own statement, when offered by you as evidence, is hearsay, unless it comes within an exception to that rule. Recorded recollection might be one of the better exceptions. There is also a chance that you could get it in as a business record of the company if you were using a company email account and the company stores all of its email communications. The documents also sometimes come in to provide fair context for a conversation with a party-opponent's statements that are admissible. It appears that Canada does not follow the modern British rule (which repealed the hearsay rule in civil cases in 1995), which if it were available, would come in without any difficulty at all. But, Canada does have what it calls a "principled exception" (which is somewhat broader than the parallel U.S. residual hearsay exception) that is generally available if the document can be shown to be reliable and there is an unavailable witness, or if there proponent of the document can show that it is reliable and necessary for other reasons. Even if the document itself is not admissible since it is hearsay, you could still testify as to what the boss said from your own recollection, and then have your lawyer ask you why you are sure that this is what was said. You would answer that you contemporaneously wrote a confirming letter to the boss spelling out what was said and you reviewed it to refresh your recollection before testifying at the hearing or trial. These kinds of confirming letters are used quite frequently in business and employment litigation. And, in my experience, these statements tend to be surprisingly effective and persuasive, because, while they do not foreclose the possibility that the person writing it was lying or inaccurate in the confirming email account, it does rule out the possibility that you forgot exactly what was said, and you provided the boss with an opportunity to dispute you which the boss didn't feel an obligation to correct. If one party has a coherent account in confirming emails of what was said, and the other party is trying to remember what happened a year or two earlier without notes from the witness stand, the person with the coherent, documented account is almost always going to come across as more credible unless the other side can show that your confirming emails are not infrequently gross misrepresentations of what really occurred. (I've also dealt with witnesses like that now and then.)
GDPR: What is the legal situation on documenting cases of "Right to be forgotten" claims? I wasnt able to find an explanation inside the GDPR whether a data privacy officer (or similar responsible) is allowed or required to document cases where individuals claimed the right to be forgotten. Is it against the law to document the individual cases? edit for clarification: Such as "on Feb 26th Mr. John Doe inquired via e-Mail and requested to purge all his data". Now there is another data set about John Doe, documenting his deletion request, whereas he initially inquired to have his data erased. Instead of being forgotten, he is now remembered in one extra data collection. /edit On one hand documenting the process allows a company to prove they obeyed the law and the request, should this be questioned later on by the individual. I can even imagine a former employee first claiming his right to be forgotten, and then - a week after getting the confirmation - claiming his right to receive a resumee (a right in existense in Germany), which a company would not be able to fulfill as it hasnt got any data to base the resumee on. In case they do not have documentation, that the former employee requested to be forgotten, they cannot tell this. On the other hand documenting such cases is 180 degree against the original request to be forgotten, as the individual ends up being stored in yet another data processing process.
The "right to be forgotten" is not absolute. It is subject (Art. 17) to certain conditions, in particular the absence of "overriding legitimate grounds for the processing" (1(c)). 3(b) explicitly exempts data controllers from the erasure where needed "for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject". I can even imagine a former employee first claiming his right to be forgotten, and then - a week after getting the confirmation - claiming his right to receive a resumee (a right in existense in Germany), which a company would not be able to fulfill as it hasnt got any data to base the resumee on. If the "right to receive a resumee" indeed exists in Germany and employers need to comply with it, that would be perfectly legitimate ground to only partially fulfil the request to be forgotten⁠ — forget everything but the resume. Is it against the law to document these cases? If you document "On 27 February 2020 John Smith requested to be forgotten so we deleted or anonymised all his records", you will effectively NOT forget him. If you actually had to forget him, it will therefore be against the law to document your forgetting that way.
This depends on the context – GDPR rarely restricts the use of specific kinds of data (see Art 9) but instead regulates the processing of this data, and the purposes for which it is processed. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person (Art 4(1)). So to show that some information is not personal data, you must show either that it doesn't relate to the identifiable person, or that it's not possible to identify the person. Whether a person is identifiable depends on the means of identification that are reasonably likely to be used, taking into account the cost and effort of these means (Recital 26). This recital also mentions that singling out a person is a kind of identification. If you have lots of birthdays so that there are no unique birthdays, or if the birthdays are stored without contextual information that would allow identification, this can indicate that it's not personal data. Some examples to illustrate my views: Scenario 1: you are collecting statistical data in a shopping mall and are collecting birthdays from passer-bys, without any additional information. This information is anonymous and not personal data, since you have no reasonable means to identify the persons. Scenario 2: in an office, there's a publicly visible calendar on the wall with the birthdays of all staff members. However, the calendar doesn't say whose birthday it is. This information is likely personal data, since it's reasonably possible to infer the correct person based on contextual information. At least HR would also have the birthday for all staff members on file, so that the company clearly has the means to identify anyone. (This doesn't mean such a public calendar is illegal, just that there must be a legal basis.) It is more difficult to determine whether information also relates to an identifiable person, i.e. whether this information is about that person. This depends not just on what the information is, but how the information is used. AFAIK there has yet to be EU-wide guidance by the EDBP, but the ICO has listed some hints. I think that a birthday of an identifiable person will almost always relate to that person.
Is there any sources of information where extraction of data from a closed source application and provided to a data subject is further defined? No, the GDPR is based on "general principles" and does not concern itself with implementation details for such matters. It's possible there's EU case law on this, but I can't find any. Am I within my rights to insist on this, even if to comply they would have to do some software development? Yes you can demand it, but they don't have to comply with your demand. The information only has to be provided in a "concise, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language." and they only have to provide the information electronically where "reasonably practical" to do so, and they only have to take "reasonable steps" to do all this per Section 52 of the Data Protection Act 2018 which implements GDPR into UK law. You can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office, and they will decide if Section 52 has been complied with or not. 52 Form of provision of information etc (1) The controller must take reasonable steps to ensure that any information that is required by this Chapter to be provided to the data subject is provided in a concise, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. (2) Subject to subsection (3), the information may be provided in any form, including electronic form. (3) Where information is provided in response to a request by the data subject under [the Right of access by the data subject], the controller must provide the information in the same form as the request where it is practicable to do so.
The way you describe this UUID, it is pseudonymous data (see GDPR Art 4(5) and Recitals 28–29). That is, it is not directly identifying, but you have a mapping between pseudonyms and identifiers that can be used to re-identify this data. Effective pseudonymisation requires not only that the data is logically separate, but that there are effective organisational and technical measures preventing re-combination by unauthorized persons. Alongside with encryption, pseudonymisation is one of the safety measures that the GDPR explicitly requires whenever appropriate (see Art 25, Art 32). Pseudonymous data is still personal data, because you can easily re-identify the data. The PII concept is US-specific and is misleading in a GDPR context, where it is not the inherently identifying characteristics of the information that matters, but the realistic ability of the data controller to single out data subjects to whom this data relates (compare Art 4(1) and Recital 26). However, were you to irrevocably erase the UUID–email mapping, things are more tricky. There is no longer any connection with directly identifying data, so this data might be anonymous. On the other hand, such a persistent UUID still allows you to recognize/distinguish persons, so it might still be personal data. This might be the case especially when the UUID is used in long-lived cookies of website visitors, thus matching the GDPR's concept of an “online identifier”. This conclusion could be avoided by limiting reuse of UUIDs, e.g. creating a new UUID after some context-dependent appropriate duration. The GDPR does not require all data to be stored in the EU, but requires international transfers of personal data to have sufficient protections. If you're processing these data in countries without adequate legal protections (like the United States), additional safeguards have to be used. Pseudonymisation could be part of such safeguards, and has been suggested by some data protection authorities in the wake of the Schrems II ruling. However, pseudonymisation alone does not make the international transfer legal, it is more of a strategy to reduce remaining risks. I think that your systems has a good chance of being OK, but not neccessarily so. If in doubt, perform a DPIA and possibly consult your data protection authority under GDPR Art 36. If feasible, storing/processing data only in the EEA or in countries with an adequacy decision will simplify compliance. Safeguards such as pseudonymisation could be strengthened by rotating UUIDs, and by restricting access to the table with identifiers.
There are a number of misconceptions in this question. Firstly, the regulatory environment did not drastically change when the GDPR came into force in 2018. Previously, each EU member state had its own laws implementing the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive. The GDPR harmonizes these laws, and replaces them with a single EU-wide law. However, the GDPR is largely identical with the DPD. In particular, both laws have the same definition of a controller. Secondly, the data controller is not a position to be designated, like a Data Protection Officer would be. A controller is whoever – alone or jointly with others – determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data. Whether someone can decide the purposes of processing is a matter of fact, not a matter of formalities. There can be more than one controller. Most likely, the institution hosting the research group is the controller. For individual researchers, the important aspect would be to demonstrate that they've fully complied with their institution's procedures at all times – that they acted as agents of the controller, not as controllers of their own. The institution might have a more difficult time mounting the defense if its technical and organizational measures were inadequate. For example, keeping an unattended server running for five years without security updates borders on gross negligence – so there should have been a procedure so that each system has a clear point of contact who is responsible for administrating the system. The controller should also have inventoried its systems and processing activities at the latest in preparation of GDPR, e.g. for an Art 30 record of processing activities. Your question suggests that no one could be at fault because no one did anything, but inaction and failure to fulfil responsibilities can also be a violation of law. If the institution wasn't convinced that this server was GDPR-compliant, the correct approach would have been to shut the server down, not to continue the processing of personal data. Of course, the controller may be able to demonstrate that this breach of GDPR was very minor, for example because the personal data was pseudonymized and because other technical measures (like firewalls) would have prevented unauthorized access.
It depends. Can the data controller or another person, with "means reasonably likely to be used," (see clause 26 of the preamble of the GDPR) use that data alone or in combination with other data to identify a natural person? If yes, it is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. If no, it is not personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. Anonymous data is not subject to the GDPR. "The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes." Assigning an unique alphanumeric code to a thing does not necessarily make the code and/or the thing "personal data". But if you have a set of data that is or can be linked by the unique alphanumeric code (e.g. as a primary key in a set of tables) and you can use it to identify a person, then it is personal data. Either way, to be GDPR-compliant / to mitigate risk you should make some kind of record to reflect that process of thinking and what you decided. And if the answer is Yes, it is personal data, then you should record your "lawful basis" for processing the data and how you decided that.
How can I truly say that I 'consent' to data collection and processing when I am coerced, so to speak, by the threat of failing my courses if I do not use this novel software? There is no need for you to "consent". Consent is just one of the reasons that allows a data processor to collect your data. There are other reasons that allows the data processor to capture your data. In this case, it seems of application the "legitimate interest clause", as it is in your university's legitimate interest to capture your activity in order to evaluate you. Of course, that covers only the data collected that is relevant to that interest. They will certainly capture your identity and your answers, they may log your sessions and may try to gather some data to detect if you are somehow cheating, but they would not be allowed to check which are your favorite pornhub videos because that is not relevant for the university's legitimate interest. Art. 6 of the GDPR states: Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. This page also provides some in-depth analysis
I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!
Are there states that don't require having a family name? I know this session might seem absurd. I don't like the family name appearing in my passport and will likely change it in a bureaucratic procedure in an interior ministry affiliated consulate (outside the borders of the state of which I hold citizenship) or in a population bureau branch (inside the borders of the state of which I hold citizenship) sometime in the future. My problem I know that in the past, before states became existent generally everywhere besides Antarctica, some people didn't always used family names (people would have been named by a nickname or by one or more parents or by town of origin). My problem is that I never came across a modern state that allows issuing a passport without a family name (let alone a country that accepts a person from such a state, as an expat); so just a personal name would appear there alongside some identification number. My questions Regarding my problem, I (exceptionally) have two questions: Are there states that don't require having a family name in passport? Are there states that allow a family name to be a number (say, 0, and not as the word zero but as in integer only)?
australia There is no limitation on the number of names you can have so long as it is at least 1. You cannot have a prohibited name (NSW Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995, other states are similar): "prohibited name" means a name that-- (a) is obscene or offensive, or (b) could not practicably be established by repute or usage-- (i) because it is too long, or (ii) because it consists of or includes symbols without phonetic significance, or (iii) for some other reason, or (c) includes or resembles an official title or rank, or (d) is contrary to the public interest for some other reason. (b)(ii) prohibits you from having the name "0". However, having any particular name does not mean that a passport will be issued in that name. The Australian Passports Act 2005 says: (4) The Minister may refuse any name or signature of the person that the Minister considers to be unacceptable, inappropriate or offensive. If the Minister decides that you need 2 or more names to get a passport - you need 2 or more names. AFAIK, no Minister has ever decided that.
The question is definitely specific to a jurisdiction. I think this is legal in the jurisdiction you specify. Wikipedia shows incest in New York defined as: Persons known to be related to him or her, whether through marriage or not, as an ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece. I don't think "our children have married" means the couple is related "as brother and sister through marriage". In England and Wales, this would definitely be legal. Wikipedia lists the relationships that cannot marry, and co-parents-in-law are not on the list. (The table is probably out of date, in that the "for men" and "for women" column should almost certainly be merged.)
One often has to show a family relationship or other legitimate grounds to access a death certificate even though it is a public record and I suspect that this is the case in Nebraska as well. But anyone who has access to a death certificate has access to all of it, including the cause of death. If the cause of death is initially undetermined, the coroner's office would have discretion about whether to update the death certificate as new information becomes available to the coroner, and a family member could make a personal appeal to the coroner not to exercise his discretion in this manner. But there is no legal grounds upon which a family would have a right to go to court to prevent a coroner from updating a death certificate on any grounds. Keep in mind also that cause of death on a death certificate isn't even a complete sentence worth of explanation and is in very medical/scientific terminology. Some government investigation reports are available for the public to see in an open records request under state law, but there is usually an exception for ongoing criminal investigations which is calculated to provide tactical benefit to the government in its efforts to catch criminals, rather than to preserve the feelings of the next of kin. There might be grounds for the next of kin to ask a court to redact a government investigation report which would otherwise be available to the public in an open records request, and to seal the unredacted copy, either because leaving it open could facilitate identity theft, or because the material revealed would appeal to the prurient interests of third-parties reading it without advancing a valid public interest (i.e. if it would be basically pornographic for many people requesting it).
Finding S seems to be hard and I have not much hope, if her siblings cannot provide any information. I think the "inhabitants registry" (Einwohnermeldeamt) is not allowed to give you her first address in Spain ("Zuzugsanschrift im Ausland") (§§ 44 and 45 Bundesmeldegesetz (BMG)). The best option I see is a court auction (Zwangsversteigerung), more precise a "Teilungsversteigerung". If one of S's siblings want money for the land, he can ask for a court auction at the local court (Amtsgericht). The court will get S's first address in Spain (§ 34 BMG) and if it cannot deliver its letter to S, there will be a "public delivery" (öffentliche Zustellung) through a posting in court. It would take a while, but in the end the land could be yours. Be prepared that the cost for the court auction will be much higher than the 1000€. If you plan to take this way, ask a lawyer for detailed advice. Also you need one of S's siblings to participate in the process. If the trees are really a danger for your house, the heirs could also have an obligation to remove them. Maybe this could help you too.
I suspect that US voting records would fall under Article 2(2)(a): Article 2 Material Scope ... This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; I doubt it would be possible to argue successfully that a foreign election is anything other than "an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law." Even the territorial scope could be questioned. This is set forth in the next article, on "territorial scope," the second item of which says: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. It is probably arguable whether processing absentee ballots from EU residents constitutes "offering services to data subjects in the Union," but in this case it's likely to be more difficult to resolve that question than to determine whether the activity falls outside the scope of Union law.
Unfortunately, there are no EU visa’s for non-family members on the basis of a romantic partnership or relationship. The EU recognizes family members to be facilitated entry and residence as follows: Article 2 Definitions For the purposes of this Directive: 1. ‘Union citizen’ means any person having the nationality of a Member State; 2. ‘family member’ means: (a) the spouse; (b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State; (c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); (d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); 3. ‘host Member State’ means the Member State to which a Union citizen moves in order to exercise his/her right of free movement and residence. Some Member States, potentially Italy included, recognize domestic partnerships as equivalent to marriages. Maybe you and her are able to come to peace with this idea that for a longer stay, you two would have to make deeper commitments. Maybe that is a non-question, and can work well if that is the case in Italy. Other than that merely on this basis, there is not much room to consider. If there are other facts that may be relevant, for e.g., she may apply to a university and get a student visa; maybe the familial tie you mentioned or other familial ties or ancestry may entitle her to naturalization and citizenship, but these questions vary from state to state; if she’s from a widely recognized less democratic country where she was subjected to or has a well-funded fear of persecution as a member of a social, ethnic or “racial” group or for political opinion or faith, asylum may be another option.
GDPR killing genealogy websites? I could see GDPR totally killing genealogy websites if they follow the rules strictly, but would they really want to do that. Seems to me genealogy has an important historical role. Treat living persons with anonymization I assume you don't have data to identify a person or contact the living person. How would you contact to get consent to show personal information if you only have a name, impossible right? GDPR tries to stop abuse of personal data, yes, and your family tree certainly is personal data. However those who come to your website would mostly want to search and edit the non-living, search back in the history, thus the current generation follows the family tree and are not the point of entry. You can provide certain anonymization to those alive by not displaying the first names in full, maybe just the first letter. You may want to hide address, spouse, children for current generation. You could make those available for view/edit first by going through a secondary login, "not a robot". Further you may remove living people from search results and hide from search engines so they do not have ability to index the current generation. That would make it harder to abuse if you're going after an individual, but at the same time doesn't lock out the people providing information.
Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license."
Is it legal to use "Java" in a domain name for a website? I want to register a domain (within Poland) that contains "Java" word in it. Am I allowed to it, or is it illegal? I heard about the case of Vavr (formerly Javaslang) which changed the name due to trademark issues - http://blog.vavr.io/javaslang-changes-name-to-vavr/ Does this law works globally or just in few countries? Is it ok to use "Java" in a domain in Poland?
Update 11/16/18 Per the comments, using the term Java in an online course about the language would almost certainly draw scrutiny from Oracle. Trademarks | Legal | Oracle says this: Domain Names Do not use Oracle trademarks or potentially confusing variations in your Internet domain name. This helps prevent Internet users from being confused as to whether you or Oracle is the source of the Web site. That could be viewed as a warning of potential litigation. Oracle is a worldwide company with deep pockets, so as in your example, they will litigate over a business or product name. If your domain is related to software, beware. Poland is a member of the European Union, so EU laws apply in Poland. Trade mark law of the European Union - Wikipedia.
You can license the use of your IP only for certain uses, for example (most commonly) "non-commercial". The general template of permission is "You have permission to ___ as long as you ___". What the user is permitted to do, in your scheme, is something along the lines of "only distribute the output in this manner", or "not distribute code developed with this tool anywhere else". It's up to you to prove that someone violated that condition, if they did.
If you use the reviewer's code, or code derived from it (e.g. if you just changed a variable name) then they own the copyright on that part of the software. If the reviewer describes a solution which you implement, or if you re-implement the code from scratch while taking ideas and methods from the reviewer's code, then you own the copyright on that code. However if there are only a few ways to implement something in code then the code is not creative and hence cannot be copyrighted. For example the regular expression in the question you link to is (as far as I can tell) the only correct solution to the problem: any programmer addressing the problem will have come up with that RE. In this the position is akin to a database of phone numbers: while the collection may be copyright (depending on whether selection or arrangement required creativity), the fact that Alice Jones has the number 012345 is not copyrightable, and neither is the alphabetical arrangement of names. Where it gets messy is the boundary between the two. The requirement to detect 4 or more repeated digits in a credit card number could be implemented in a number of ways, but whether there are enough of these to qualify any particular solution as "creative" would be a matter of fact for a court to decide.
Do I have to pay taxes if I register the domain but the website income belongs to someone else? No. The person or company who runs, and/or profits from, the business is the entity under obligation to pay all the applicable taxes: Value Added Tax, income tax, corporate tax, and so forth. Unless you charge a significant amount therefor (see the comments), the mere registration of just one domain is unlikely to trigger tax obligations.
Germany may be different, however in the United States this would be considered work-for-hire and the employer would be the rightful owner of the source code. Regardless of jurisdiction, and from a more practical point of view, you are better off not having a copy of the source code. Using it as reference or example in the future could easily turn into (unintentional) copyright infringement. If, in the future, you write code you would like to be able to freely keep and reuse in any project, make sure the owner/employer licenses it using something like the BSD, MIT, or ISC license.
Both the displayed site (including all text and images) and the html, css, javascript and other code that generates the display are protected by copyright. This is true in pretty much every country. You would not be able to reuse them lawfully without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. If no exception applies, and you have not obtained permission, this is copyright infringement. In most cases copyright infringement is treated as a tort (a civil matter), not as a crime. This means that law enforcement generally will take no action and have no interest in such a situation. The copyright owner could sue for infringement, and possibly collect money damages. In the US, statutory damages can be as high as $30,000, or up to $150,000 for "wilful" infringement, or as low as $750 (per work infringed). Or actual damages can be collected instead. In other countries, actual damages plus costs of suit are more likely, but the rule can be different in each country. The possible exceptions to copyright vary significantly in different countries. In the US the major exception is Fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? for more information In general short snippets of code can probably be used under fair use, but substantial parts of the code or the displayed site are less likely to qualify as fair use. And if it is illegal then why are there so many legal open source or paid software and applications for cloning of website like httrack, cyotek, webcopy etc? Most of these tools have legitimate uses, including learning how a site is constructed without distributing copied content; and cloning or partial cloning of a site with permission. Even if the tools were mostly used for unlawful copying, that might well not be a high priority for law enforcement, and cross-border law enforcement (which this in many cases would involve) is often much harder for the police and other authorities.
It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works.
It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.
Is there any legal recourse for a resident who believes their city is committing financial nonfeasance? My city has entered into an agreement to provide fire service to a neighboring city of 1000 people for $10,000 yearly. This rate is less than 1/20th what my city pays. I've made efforts to convince the city council and mayor to act but they have stated that they will continue to renew the agreement. Is there any legal precedent for suing a city to amend or terminate an agreement due to fiscal nonfeasance?
Is there any legal precedent for suing a city to amend or terminate an agreement due to fiscal nonfeasance? There is not really any legal precedent for prevailing in such a lawsuit. Obviously, of course, the detailed facts and circumstances matter. If a state statute prescribed other terms, for example, and expressly gives someone standing to enforce the statute, then that is another matter. In many states, standing to enforce violations of municipal laws governing their finances and contracts is vested by statute or the state constitution in the state attorney general. Is there any legal recourse for a resident who believes their city is committing financial nonfeasance? Probably not. Certainly not in court. Usually, individual citizens or taxpayers do not have standing to bring suit related to acts which affect all citizens or taxpayers equally or proportionately, but do not constitute an individualized injury to the particular taxpayer. Municipal governments have broad discretion to enter into contracts with other municipalities on rates that they deem fit which do not have to approximate cost or be profit maximizing. Some states and cities allow citizens to petition to have legislation that has been adopted (agreements are generally adopted by city ordinance) to be placed on the ballot for a vote if a sufficient number of people vote on it within a sufficient time of the ordinance or law being passed (this is called a "referendum power"). But, most do not. Otherwise, your sole recourse is to get a majority elected to city council and a new mayor, to change the policy when the agreement expires. wouldn't the city have to prove that there IS a benefit to the city? No. Assuming for sake of argument that someone suing the city had standing to sue, the burden of proof is always on the person bringing the lawsuit. Ordinances are presumed valid unless this is disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. For example: It is an axiom of our judicial system that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. Parties attacking their validity carry a heavy burden of proof: invalidity must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt People v. Beaver, 549 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Colo. 1976) The constitutional test in the face of an equal protection challenge (assuming for sake of argument that there was standing) would be a "rational basis test" and there would be a rational basis for (1) saying that the city benefit from its neighbor not having adequate fire protection which could spread to them, (2) on the basis that the marginal cost might be low, and (3) on the basis that the municipality probably has a legal duty to aid a neighboring municipality if it has the ability to do so in the absence of an agreement without necessarily having a right to compensation under a doctrine called mutual aid when the proper conditions are met (sometimes formalized by agreements and/or governed by state statutes such as the Tennessee's Mutual Aid and Emergency and Disaster Assistance Agreement Act of 2004, Tennessee Code Annotated § 58–8–101, et seq.,). The rational basis test is met if you can describe some rational reason why the law might make sense for the city to pass (which is not expressly prohibited by law or a constitutional right), even if the rational reason is not empirically correct, and even if the rational reason wasn't the actual reason for passing the law. This ordinance would almost certainly pass the rational basis test. In general, a disagreement over the price term of an agreement being too high or too low almost always fails. A municipality is not obligated to negotiate a "fair market value" or "fair" price for services that it provides to other municipalities.
In the United States, there is no potential liability for the municipality or the police department. There is no legally enforceable duty of police to act to prevent either violations of the law, or apprehend criminals, or to prevent suicide of people who are not in police custody. Other countries have different laws on this subject.
Off the top of my head, unless there's a provision that says otherwise, no, they cannot do that. Obviously, I can't tell you if there's a provision that says otherwise. Consult a lawyer for more specific advice.
We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances.
we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.
There is certainly no legal problem in asking if the tenants would be agreeable with the landlord discontinuing the security service. Even if it were in the lease, a lease like pretty much any contract can be changed by mutual agreement of all parties (unless there is a law preventing such a change, which is rare and I do not think will apply in this case). A more difficult question would be if the landlord would be within his or her rights to discontinue the service without asking the tenants first, since it is not in the lease. Since the property was advertised as coming with the service, it might be held that the continued service was reasonably expected by the tenants, and thus an implicit term of the lease. But since the landlord does not plan to take such unilateral action, that remains a purely theoretical issue. The landlord could offer the tenants a small rent reduction, perhaps one quarter of the amout that was being paid to the security firm, but there is no legal requirement to do so. As to whether asking for such a change would be "rude", I don't think so, but that is a matter of opinion, and not really on-topic here.
I'm not going to comment on what your manager is doing specifically, since I don't know all the facts. But in general: As a general rule, businesses have freedom of contract. This means they can choose to do business with, or not do business with, anyone they want. There are specific laws that create exceptions to this freedom of contract. The most important are federal and state civil rights laws, which prohibit many businesses from discriminating on the basis of certain protected classes, such as race, sex, religion, etc. In general, "locals vs. out-of-towners" is not a protected class, and therefore no law explicitly prohibits this type of discrimination. However, it's possible a court could find that "locals" is a proxy for some actual protected class--for example, if the hotel is in a city and the "locals" are predominantly Black.
This is actually pretty standard. You have a contract with a business to provide some service, and you get a bargain on the price of the service as long as you stay with them for some period, such as 2 years. You could get the 'pay as you go' option which doesn't have a termination fee, but that costs more if you are sure you can commit to what you signed up for, for that period. So it's not that you can't terminate the contract, it's that you can't just walk away from your obligation (what they call a "minimum term agreement"), cost-free. The early-termination fee is part of the cost of moving. You have to look in the Legal Agreements & Contract part of Account Details on your account to get the specific agreement that you are bound by. Generally, you are subject to that fee, unless the subscriber dies, or is in the military and is shipped out. You can also transfer your service from area to area – I assume you either are moving to an area without Xfinity service, or you elected to not use Xfinity in that location. It is legal for a business to put their business interest above that of a customer, even in the case of regulated "utilities".
What is the concept of by enforcing the law a person cannot be forced to break the law called? I remember long ago I was watching one of those judge Judy type shows and an interesting case came up. Two roommates came to court because they had a valid rent agreement but the one housemate was smoking marijuana. The other one left the house and refused to pay his part of the rent for which he got sued. The jist of the ruling was that if the judge enforced this valid rent agreement, he would force the defendant to be an accomplice to drug usage. If he would then fail a drug test his chance at gainful employment would be greatly diminished which would also be unfair to him. It was a loophole and he found it. The judge remarking that if you want your roommate to pay his rent, don't do drugs. I would love to know what that legal principle is called.
This is contract law. There is nothing in legal codes that stipulated that this is valid, but rather that by signing a document that allowed for a signatory to void the contract if one of the terms was broken (don't do drugs... don't do criminal acts) is a valid agreement and the contract documented it was signed, thus the clean roommate was allowed to void his agreement without penalty for the exit because of the terms within. You can call it a loophole or a clause but it's perfectly valid as the contract was entered without any duress by both parties and the terms were violated. It should also be pointed out most shows in the vein of "Judge Judy" are not actually being handled in a real courtroom setting or real civil trial, but a set that is designed to look like a court room. What is actually going on is a legal process called "Binding Arbitration" where both parties in a disagreement sign a separate contract stating that they will agree to the decision of a neutral arbiter, who need not be a judge (though having a legal background is very helpful). With rare exception, the outcome cannot be appealed or elevated to a real civil court (unless the losing party is not cooperating with the arbiter's judgement, or the case is dismissed without prejudice, which is judge speak for allowing a civil case to be refiled or filed with another court. Typically this happens when the plaintiff is the victim of something that requires a little more legal authority in the judgement.). They also don't typically do this in a real court room but in a conference room. The court room trappings in these tv shows are for the audience. Arbitration does not create a legal precedence and typically the requested settlement must be small claims ($5,000 or less) though Judge Judy type shows will pay for travel and lodging for both parties and their witnesses regardless of outcome.
A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.
Let us assume that you were high on meth at the time, that you were acting normally (that is, were not smashing windows or other such criminal things), but you had mouth sores and high blood pressure. Let's also assume that you are docile, but don't consent: so you stick around. Even with all of these assumptions working against you, the sheriff cannot force you to take a drug test without a warrant. When he goes to the judge, the judge will not issue a warrant to force you to take a test. Drug tests are forms of searches, which are protected by the 4th Amendment, and they basically require "probable cause" to the effect that you had committed a crime. Given your description of the circumstances, there is no such probable cause (i.e. "most likely that it is true"). The threat to call the sheriff was empty, though perhaps sincerely believed (many people sincerely believe lots of wrong things about the law). You can consent (sounds like you did): as far as I know, if you give in to a suggestion from a nurse that the sheriff will make you take the test (an untruth), that would not invalidate evidence derived from a voluntary search. Every citizen is expected (unreasonably) to know and follow the law, and it is expected that you will know that you have the right to refuse, so you cannot say "But I didn't know I could refuse". You always have the right to refuse any medical treatment or testing. This is true even if your insurance requires you to take a certain test. There could be contractual consequences to violating the contract with your insurance company, but again you cannot be compelled to take a test or undergo a procedure because an insurance company "requires" you to. If, for example, your insurance company requires you to take a meth-abuse screening test, then if such a contract condition is legal in California, refusing to take the test could lead to some insurance problems, like they would cancel your policy. As for financial liability for the test that you didn't really want but agreed to, there is a chance that you could argue in court that you were coerced into the test and thus your apparent consent was not real. You have the right to refuse the test; if the other party, "whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state", then they crossed a legal line and you can sue them, plus any "agreement" that is coerced is null in the courts, and the putative debt arising from the test is also null. You simply have to establish that you were coerced, and not convinced.
This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.
You are correct. A judge may only issue a warrant when it is supported by an affidavit, in which the officer seeking the warrant swears under oath to the facts supporting the warrant. Lying on the affidavit would constitute perjury. But judges very frequently just rubber-stamp the warrants without meaningfully reviewing the affidavits, so the primary form of oversight would be the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge asserting that the warrant wasn't supported by probable cause. If a judge does review the warrant application and finds the officer's statements not to be credible, he can refuse to sign the warrant, and he is free to also carry that credibility determination to subsequent warrants sought by the same officer or other officers in his department.
A government can pass laws which cannot be fully enforced, or even widely enforced. Such laws are nonetheless legally valid, unless repealed by the legislature, or struck down by the courts in accord with the procedures in the particular country's laws. In common law countries, it is often a defense to a criminal charge that a law is impossible to comply with, but this only arises when there is an attempt to enforce the law, and it is in fact impossible for that defendant to comply with that law. If the defendant can comply, it is not relevant that other defendants might not be able to. If taxes were assessed that totaled more than all the legal money in circulation, the government might increase the money supply. Or it might not try to collect in all cases, or not collect the full amount. Otherwise many taxpayers might enter bankruptcy. In other cases of impossible laws, the results would depend on just how enforcement was attempted. The government cannot magically give people the ability to do things they cannot. A law requiring everyone to fly by flapping his or her arms would not secure compliance. It might put a lot of people in jail if people were arrested for not flying by hand. A law requiring everyone to register with a government agency before stepping outside would be foolish, and perhaps unenforceable under current conditions (but perhaps would be sensible in a Moon colony). Such a law would be legal (although it might fail a "rational basis test in the US) but an attempt to enforce it widely would lead to confusion or perhaps resistance. Most governments are not so foolish as to pass laws that cannot be complied with by large numbers of people, even if they have the legal power to pass such laws. A government that passed such a law might become unpopular, or even be overthrown. In some cases in history, laws that could not be complied with by particular groups were used as ways to persecute those groups.
What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.
If the agreement is the result of a binding determinative process like the decision of a court, arbitrator or administrative tribunal, the aggrieved party can go to the court for enforcement. If it isn’t, then the agreement may be enforceable as a contract (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?). Breach of the contract allows the aggrieved party all the normal remedies. In either case, breach by one party does not excuse breach by the other. Of course, the agreement can be worded “you do this then I do that” so if you don’t do this, you are in breach but I’m not. If it isn’t either of the above, it can’t be enforced.
Could you explain the concept of money laundering in simple terms? launder 2 informal Conceal the origins of (money obtained illegally), typically by transfers involving foreign banks or legitimate businesses. (from here) Suppose, I have illegally obtained money (I don't). So, basically, everything I can do with it, other than spending, would be laundering, is that correct (putting them into a bank account, investing in a business, etc.)?
Laundering physical money Let's say a career criminal committed a couple crimes and is now in possession of a large heap of money in form of coins and paper currency. They want to use that money to buy themselves a nice house. But showing up with a huge bag of money at a bank or real estate agency would look very suspicious. It is very likely that they will get reported and then investigated by law enforcement. What do they do? They need some explanation where that money comes from. A good way to turn that dirty money into apparently clean money is by running a legitimate cash-based business. The criminal then goes to the bank each week and deposits a chunk of their ill-gotten cash claiming it's income from their business. Common choices are restaurants, casinos or the name-giver laundromats which were famously used by crime boss Al Capone to launder his illegal income. But they can use any business for this purpose which takes payment in cash and doesn't leave easy to analyze evidence how much business they really performed. Now the criminal has all that ill-gotten money on a regular bank account and can use it to buy what they want without raising any further suspicion. Laundering electronic money Another category of money laundering which got very relevant in the age of online banking is to launder illegally obtained money which can be found on bank accounts. For example by hacking online banking accounts or running scams. If the criminal would just send that money to their personal account, then the investigators would just need to subpoena their bank and their real identity would be revealed. So they need some way to move that money which is hard to trace. Common methods are: Transfering money to accounts in foreign countries in order to tie up investigators with the bureaucracy of international investigations. Transferring money in ways which are hard to trace, like cryptocurrency, gift cards, private money transfer services or private people they recruited to forward money through their personal accounts. Buying, transfering and selling virtual assets in online games. Buying physical items from online stores using false identities and selling them again under their real identity. Fortunately none of these methods of money laundering are completely untraceable. They make the work of law enforcement more difficult, but not completely impossible. The criminals usually hope to frustrate law enforcement to the point that they give up and prioritize "larger fish".
The physical cash in the bank is not your property, at least not in US law (according to Scalia). It becomes your property when the withdrawal is performed by some means specified in your contract. A deposit gives you a contractual right to demand money from the bank. Bank robbery is a crime. Having money deposited with the bank doesn't change that. The only possible chance a robber has at trial is jury nullification. I haven't found records for that in Lebanon, but it does have jury trials. Impartial review classifies Lebanon's justice system as somewhat corrupt, but generally compliant with the basic principles. So it might be possible to get away with it at trial, but a very long shot.
The "point" of including bank-interest income on your tax return rather than having the government automatically deduct what it feels that you would owe is that the government is not legally empowered to take money away from you in that fashion. The government is legal empowered to compel you to pay your taxes, and there are numerous rules enacted as law or as a consequence of laws passed. You can read the various relevant laws here. There simply is no general law that says that banks must withhold taxes on interest. There might be a specific case when an entity is subject to backup withholding (as a response to a taxpayer not following certain rules). There are also special rules regarding non-resident alien withholding, which could require interest withholding. Apart from the intrinsic political unpopularity of imposing new withholding requirements on people, it is difficult to compute the correct amount to withhold, since not all interest is taxable. In theory, a set of rules could be constructed to require withholding of interest income, if Congress were to pass a law similar to 26 USC 3402.
There is nothing wrong with paying in cash; there is something wrong about hiding a transaction that relates to a taxable event. Cash makes that easier.
It is basically fraud, and there are two ways in which it could be illegal: it might be a crime, and you might get sued for doing it (you would not be fined or imprisoned, but you may have to compensate the hotel chain for their loss). Whether or not it is a crime depends on the jurisdiction. In Washington, there are very many laws against fraud such as RCW 9.38 (credit), RCW 9.45 (numerous things where a business defrauds others), RCW 9.60 (forgery) but none of them would apply to lying about a material fact to a business in order to get a discount. Texas likewise has a long section on criminal fraud. It is not clear from the wording whether a customer lying to a business (not involving forgery, vehicles, credit, or financial institutions) is covered. 32.42(b)(10) says A person commits an offense if in the course of business he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence commits one or more of the following deceptive business practices... making a materially false or misleading statement of fact concerning the reason for, existence of, or amount of a price or price reduction The question of interpretation that this raises is whether a person who has said "I'm over 70" so that they can get a discount has made a statement "concerning the reason for a price reduction". The ordinary interpretation of "concerning the reason for" would be that it refers to explaining why or under what conditions a price reduction exists. For the moment, I am skeptical that this definition would include the case at hand, but that will require a search through case law and jury instructions. From the lawsuit angle, you would have knowingly made a false material statement in order to obtain a value, which is illegal, and they could sue you to recover the discount.
Ignoring the question of whether knowingly trying to deceive the IRS about the nature and purposes of an organization is a crime or even a lie, running any sort of tax-exempt organization for your own benefit is tax evasion and a crime. What you propose actually does happen in the US, but it's non commonly done by claiming tax exempt status a religious organization. Instead of registering fake churches (which strictly speaking isn't necessary as user6726's answer says), it's simpler just to register a fake charity. You don't need any of those things that you've noted that the IRS says a religious organization must have. Done intelligently, people running these scam charities do just enough charitable work to avoid investigation by the authorities while diverting the majority of earnings and donations of the organization to themselves through salaries and payments to for-profit businesses they own. Done not-so-intelligently, virtually all the proceeds of the scam charity end up in the hands the people running it, and those people often get caught and end up in jail. If proven, the charges against Steve Bannon would be a notable recent example of this. While it's less common with religious organizations, people have done time for misusing a religious organization's tax exempt status. For example a Virginia couple were sentenced to prison for crimes relating to a scheme to route profits from a business through a religion organization they had set up.
I'm based in England, but I'm sure the principle is similar in Canada. The night club or concert venue is private property. When someone owns or rents private property one of the main things they are buying is the right to control who is present on that property, and generally they can use reasonable force to remove people who are not authorised. Security guards generally act as agents for a property owner, tenant or similar.
Both the police and the courts are likely to look at the situation as a whole, rather than adopting any policy specifically in relation to drivers or owners. For example, it's unusual for people to rent cars to their friends for months on end. That might suggest there is something untoward about the arrangement. Is there evidence of the commercial arrangement, or is the owner pretending to have rented the car out for months, when in reality they had stashed the drugs then let a friend borrow the car for a day? It would also be unlikely for a drug dealer to stash a large amount of drugs in a car then lend the car out on a long-term basis, so if the car is out of the owner's hands, that would tend to suggest the drugs belong to the person in possession of the car (and not the owner). But if the amount of drugs were small, typical of personal use, then it becomes more credible to imagine they could be forgotten by the car owner before lending the car to a friend. Police intelligence might also have a bearing. Does one party or the other have known links to the drugs trade? Also, is the lifestyle of one or the other, in particular, inconsistent with known sources of legitimate income? My point with all these questions is to highlight how sensitive the issue is to the fine details of the circumstances, and that it's impossible to give a strictly general answer.
Can you get sued for someone else modifying a website you own? I own a website and domain and i've given someone access to modify it (developer). I am not a business and the person who has access is not paid for the job. Recently the person who has access uploaded swastikas on the website. I was asleep at the time, so the swastikas were public for about 1-2 hours, after that i immediately removed them and also removed the persons access to modify the site. I live in germany where it is illegal to use symbols like a swastika (StGB § 86a). Can i get sued for someone having put swastikas on my website for such a short period of time? And if yes, how bad would the punishment be? Thank you for your time.
I can't tell you there's nothing to worry about, but this sounds like a scam - possibly an attempt at blackmail. They may be looking to acquire your domain, or subsequent communication might ask for money for it all to go away. A local lawyer would be able to advise you far better than The Bloke On The Internet. Mention to them : That you were not responsible for the prohibited content That you removed the content as soon as was reasonably possible That you can provide details of the person you believe to be responsible (and, ideally evidence to show who posted the content, when it was posted, and when you deleted it) The lawyer may advise you to contact the local police. Tell them the same. It sounds like you are the victim here, and not the perpetrator.
Basically, statement 3 above is correct. The owner of the copyright in a work may release that work unmder different, even incompatible, licenses, as many times as s/he chooses to do. None of these releases cancels or invalidates any other. A person who obtains a work from a site where it is listed under a particular license, may rely on that license grant. The owner may (if the site allows) modify the license or remove the posted work, but this does not invalidate the license granted to those who obtained the work before any modification or removal. An incorrect or incomplete copyright notice does not, under current law. invalidate the copyright, and to the best of my understanding will not invalidate either of the license mentioen in the question.
It depends. Symbols which are not entitled to trademark protection in a market, usually because they are merely descriptive or generic or functional, are in the public domain and may be used by anyone, but a person using a descriptive or generic symbol can't prevent someone else from using the same symbol to promote their own business. For example, I can use the scales of justice symbol to promote my law practice on my law firm website. But, since that symbol is a generic one in the law firm market, I can't sue a competing law firm from using the same symbol on their website. The essence of a protectable trademark that an owner of can legally exclude competing firms in the same market from using, is that your firm manages to infuse into the distinctive affectation for which trademark protection is claimed with what is called "secondary meaning" to the words or image or other manifestation of the trademark when it is used in the market where the owner of the mark wants to obtain trademark protection. For example, descriptive trademarks are not eligible for trademark protection and are instead in the public domain and can be used by anyone in a market where the mark is descriptive. You can't gain a legally protected right to use the word "liquor" to describe a business that is engaged in selling liquor, and you can't gain a legally protected right to use the words "doughnut shop" for a business that sells doughnuts. But, if you use the words "doughnut shop" to describe a business that sells liquor or bras, rather than doughnuts, and those words come to be associated in the mind of the public with your particular chain of liquor stores or lingerie stores, then the words "doughnut shop" have acquired a "secondary meaning" which can be legally protected by trademark law allowing you to deny other businesses the right to use that trademark in the economic market where it has acquired a secondary meaning. (The scope of an economic market can be both geographic and conceptual related to the nature of the products sold. The manner in which an economic market is determined for a mark is beyond the scope of this answer or the original question.) The analysis with respect to symbols is analogous. You can't gain legal protections for using a common symbol in a manner that merely conveys its pre-existing common meaning. For example, if you use the hashtag sign # to mean "number" or "pound", that probably cannot be legally protected by trademark law. But, suppose that one particular firm (e.g. Twitter) uses the hashtag sign in a novel sense associated exclusively with a service that this particular firm provides, in a manner that is not semantically derived from its pre-existing meanings. In that situation, the firm might very well be permitted to claim trademark protection for the use of that common symbol in this new sense that has a "secondary meaning", which associates that symbol in a certain context exclusively with that firm, in the market where that firm does business. Similarly, you could probably not gain trademark protection for the common highway "yield sign" design to mean "yield" or be careful or some other similar semantic meaning. But, if you used the common highway yield sign to sell spaceships, and people came to associate that symbol with the spaceships sold by your particular firm, rather than with spaceships in general, you might be able to secure trademark protection for the yield sign symbol in that marketplace. It is easier to develop a "secondary meaning" for a distinctive and particular stylized presentation of either words in a particular script, or a variation on what would otherwise be a common symbol, than it is to develop a "secondary meaning" for generic words or a generic symbol that is has an existing meaning in other contexts. For example, while Apple could probably not have claimed trademark protection for an image of a clock spinning clockwise while the user has to wait while the computer is thinking about something, Apple's distinctive variant of this image (which some people call the "pinwheel of death") might very well be eligible for trademark protection.' The AppleOS pinwheel of death
If you form an LLC, and then someone later obtains a registered trademark in the same name, the registered trademark would be enforceable everywhere except in the markets and places where the LLC developed common law trademark rights prior to their registration. Your LLC formation would also put a bump in the road in their trademark application. You can, of course, do both, although it is unclear to me why you feel such urgency in the likelihood of an infringement, which suggests that there may be relevant facts that aren't revealed by your post.
Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork.
As I understand it, you can pretty much sue anybody for anything. The question, of course, is would you win the suit? All the lawyers here can correct me, but I believe in order to win, you would have to Show standing, that is, they're your comments and not someone else's Show that it's a deliberate act, and not just someone accidentally clicked the wrong checkbox. Show that it was an act by the agency and not by Facebook, for example. Show that you've been singled out for your viewpoint (they allow some people's comments) Show that there is no other reason to delete your comments (they're obscene, or advocate for an illegal act, for example). I'm probably missing something else. The real question is, even if you could demonstrate all these things, would it be worth it? You may spend $1,000's and you might not recover your legal fees. The case might take years.
The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.
I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you.
How has James Madison's term 'infamous crime' typically been defined? James Madison in his speech to Congress in regards to what eventually would become the 5th amendment talked about 'infamous' crimes and how they should be handled. As far as I know he did not define what an infamous crime exactly is. So, how exactly was term defined when the specific definition was required?
Under current law, an "infamous" crime, for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, is one which carries a sentence of imprisonment for more than one year, or death. In other words, "infamous crime" is now a synonym for "felony". For context, the Fifth Amendment reads: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury [...] So the definition of "infamous" would control which crimes must be prosecuted by an indictment from a grand jury. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7 describes which crimes must be prosecuted by indictment, and its accompanying notes link this to the "infamous" criterion: (a) (1) Felony. An offense (other than criminal contempt) must be prosecuted by an indictment if it is punishable: (A) by death; or (B) by imprisonment for more than one year. [...] Note to Subdivision (a). 1. This rule gives effect to the following provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury * * *”. An infamous crime has been defined as a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in a penitentiary or at hard labor, Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427; United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433. Any sentence of imprisonment for a term of over one year may be served in a penitentiary, if so directed by the Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. 753f [now 4082, 4083] (Commitment of persons by any court of the United States and the juvenile court of the District of Columbia; place of confinement; transfers). Consequently any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of over one year is an infamous crime.
It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.
Both Congress and the state legislatures are expressly forbidden by the Constitution from passing bills of attainder. That means neither can ever pass a law that names an individual and says "they are suspended." It is so important that it's one of the very few restrictions on government that the original Constitution (before any amendments) prohibited in bot state and federal governments. (Also, a "bill" is not a law. It's what a legislature is considering making a law.)
Your parsing is incorrect. The semicolon after "from the same" starts a new clause. It should be read as: [Part 2] They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, [Part 3] be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; [Part 4] and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. So they are privileged from arrest while attending sessions, or while going to and returning from those sessions, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace. As a separate privilege, they shall not be questioned anywhere (except in Congress itself) regarding their speech and debate in Congress. But if they are neither attending, going to, or returning from a Congressional session, and the crime is not related to their speech or debate, they have no immunity. Also, to echo user6726, the privilege from arrest while attending Congress or traveling is not the same as immunity. If they commit a crime on the way to or from Congress, they can still be arrested after they get home, and subsequently tried and convicted.
Start with the premise that Person A has so far engaged only in speech, which is presumptively protected by the First Amendment. So unless the speech is for some reason unprotected, the police should not involve themselves. This of course begs the question of whether this speech is protected. The First Amendment does not protect "true threats," which includes "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). So the question for the police is whether Person A's texts were meant to communicate a serious intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. Removing First Amendment protection won't be as simple as letting B testify that he truly felt threatened, as the question is whether A meant to communicate a threat. But that also means that for A, it won't be enough to simply deny any violent intent, so the "nothing illegal" disclaimer won't be enough. In the end, this is a question for a jury to decide, should the case ever reach that far. The jury would essentially be asked to engage in mind-reading, determining what A was thinking when he sent those texts. The jury should be instructed to take several factors into consideration when it makes that decision, including the "context" of the remarks (the explicit disclaimer of violence helps A), the "conditional nature" of the threat (the three-strikes langauge helps A), and the "reaction of the listener" (calling the police hurts A). Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). Practically speaking, if B were to call the police, I'd expect them not to investigate, unless they were awfully bored. If they decided to, I don't think there would be any actionable violation of A's rights, given their obvious inability to divine A's intent based solely on B's account. A court would likely allow them to investigate, but I doubt a prosecutor would allow them to bring charges based on the facts you've described.
It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.
(The original title of your question suggested you might think that federal circuit precedent binds state courts: it generally does not, even on matters of federal law.) But regardless, Congress would not be able to legislatively lower the constitutional floor. If a certain police act is prohibited by the Constitution, Congress cannot legislatively allow that act, whether in a single state or uniformly across all states. That means that if the Fifth Circuit has decided that the use of some new investigatory tool is a search under the Fourth Amendment, no law that Congress passes could affect that holding. When congress creates laws that result in different effects for different people (e.g. people in Texas vs. people in Florida, as in your hypothetical), the distinction must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Many of the enumerated powers allow for local distinction, some prohibit it. Some examples where Congress has distinguished between states include: localized agricultural programs, time zones, voting rights protections, and various others listed in ohwilleke's review. Some distinctions between states could also intrude on principles of federalism and state sovereignty (e.g. the Supreme Court has said that the Voting Right Act does this). Maybe I am unimaginative, but I cannot think of a legitimate federal government purpose that would call for the powers that police have against the people to vary from state to state. Any such variation would have to come from the states themselves: from their state constitutions, or legislative choices to provide heightened protections. Discord between circuits is problematic (see a list of examples of existing splits), and this is why the Supreme Court of the United States will often hear an appeal where there is a circuit split on a question of constitutional rights.
I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”.
Can American citizens legally patronize Pyongyang (restaurant chain)? Can American citizens legally patronize Pyongyang (restaurant chain)? I am aware that, according to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tourism_in_North_Korea#Restrictions_and_warnings: In July 2017, the U.S. government announced that American citizens would no longer be permitted to visit North Korea as tourists. The travel ban took effect on September 1, 2017. but I don't know whether the U.S. government prohibit American citizens from frequenting businesses owned by North Korean entities.
The prohibition is against using a regular US passport to enter North Korea (you can apply for a special passport): or you can use a non-US passport. There is no prohibition against patronizing a North Korean business, be it in North Korea or elsewhere.
The ICERD would not apply to the natural born citizens clause by its own definitions. Part 1, Article 1, secs 2 and 3 read: This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
The law is here (too long to quote, or understand). There is a proposed modification of the law which may be enacted. In the section Justification, it is noted that under the existing law a global corporation may technically "own" five subsidiary corporations. Company A may own a winery in France while Company D may own a hotel containing a restaurant in New York. Under New York Law, the liquor license for the restaurant would be prohibited - and it could be subject to financial penalties. So the restrictions are broader that you mention (ownership of stock is an "interest"), but certainly what you mention is prohibited. The proposed law limits the effect to an interest in a restaurant or brewery "licensed under this chapter", i.e. in the state of New York (currently, a NY manufacturer cannot have an interest in an alcohol-selling restaurant anywhere).
The only train service between the U.S. and Canada is via Amtrak and its Canadian partner Viarail. Amtrak's website states (as of today): In addition to the standard entry documentation requirements, the Canadian and United States Governments have several additional requirements for travel into Canada and the United States. Travel into United States: Non-U.S. citizen passengers must be fully vaccinated with a U.S.FDA or a WHO approved COVID-19 vaccine. See details on the United States Department of Homeland Security website. Travel into Canada: All passengers must use the ArriveCAN app before travel and wear a mask in Canadian stations and on board trains while traveling through Canada. Non-Canadian citizens must be fully vaccinated and carry the vaccination record that was uploaded into ArriveCAN. See details on the Government of Canada and Viarail websites, and additional Cantrail thruway bus service to Vancouver travel requirements. The requirements are essentially the same for travel by car between the U.S. and Canada.
united-states An ex post facto law criminalizes conduct after the fact that was legal at the time, something that is prohibited under U.S. constitutional law. But, as the question states: my question is about actions that were illegal and then had changes made to them. If something is a crime in 2015 and this criminal law is violated, and the conduct is then legalized in 2016, the conduct committed while it was a crime does not cease to be punishable as a crime and may be punished criminally. Often a judge would consider the fact that the conduct was later legalized when evaluating the seriousness of the crime at a post-legalization sentencing, but a judge is not required to do so. A significant number of pardons and commutations of criminal sentences by Presidents and Governors in the U.S. involve people convicted of crimes for conduct that is now legal or is now punished less severely. But pardons and commutations are purely discretionary. As an aside, France has constitutional protections that give newly lenient treatment of crimes retroactive effect, but the United States does not.
In the case of United States vs Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (a 6-2 decision), the Supreme Court wrote: [T]he real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States" by the addition "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases -- children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State -- both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. ... [T]he Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. ... To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States. In short the phrase “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” excludes three and only three groups of people: Children born to foreign diplomats here on diplomatic business, who have diplomatic immunity to US Law; Children of members of an invading army that has occupied and controlled some part of US territory, born on that occupied area, who are obviously not subject to US Law (which has rarely happened in the US, although Guam was occupied during WWII, and parts of Alaska, and small parts of Maine during the War of 1812); and Members of Native American tribes, subject to the jurisdiction of their tribal governments, who do not pay US taxes. (This was true when the 14th amendment was passed, but it no longer is. See section below on the act that changed it in 1924.) Any other person born in the proper US or in incorporated US territory is a citizen, no matter who his or her parents are or were. (The case is less clear for unincorporated US territory.) See also the Wikipedia article on the case This view was confirmed in 1995 in an opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel written by then-Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, taking the position that this rule could not be changed by legislation, only by Constitutional Amendment, writing: My office grapples with many difficult and close issues of constitutional law. The lawfulness of this bill is not among them. This legislation is unquestionably unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment declares that “[a]ll persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The unmistakable purpose of this provision was to constitutionalize the existing Anglo-American common law rule of jus soli or citizenship by place of birth and especially to extend it to persons of African descent and their descendants. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) the Supreme Court of the United States struck down both a state statute denying funding for education to children in the United States illegally and a municipal school district's attempt to charge an annual $1,000 tuition fee for each student. The case upheld the same principle that the constitutional phrase "within the jurisdiction" applies to the children of people who had entered the US illegally. According to the Wikipedia article on the case: Texas officials had argued that illegal aliens were not "within the jurisdiction" of the state and thus could not claim protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court majority rejected this claim, finding instead that "no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment 'jurisdiction' can be drawn between resident immigrants whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident immigrants whose entry was unlawful." The dissenting opinion also rejected this claim, agreeing with the Court that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to immigrants who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically 'within the jurisdiction' of a state." Thus the question of whether such aliens were "within the jurisdiction" of the US was very much at issue in Plyler v. Doe EDIT: Since the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 was passed, all Native Americans born within the US have been citizens by birth, and the third class of exceptions noted in the earlier cases non longer exists. Prior to this act Native Americans were in many ways treated as foreigners by the US. They were not citizens by birth, and their tribes had some but not all of the attributes of independent nations. The text of the law is: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all non citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property. (End edit on Indian Citizenship Act of 1924) Edit: On reading through the decision of the case of Wong Kim Ark I find one more small exclusion: persons born on board a foreign naval ship, even though present in US waters in time of peace, are not citizens of the US because of their birth location. This is apparently not a usual case, but is premised on the ground that a military vessel remains the territory of the nation it belongs to. Such persons might of course be citizens by inheritance if one or both parents are US citizens, and the statutory conditions are complied with. (The term "public ship" in the 1800s was used to mean a national ship, that is a military ship.) (End edit on naval ships) I just learned that some parts of the State of Maine were occupied by the British during the war of 1812. I do not know if anyone was born during that occupation whose citizenship might have been affected.
To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').
The "letter" you quote says more than what Ionos says publicly, the latter not mentioning any date. The most obvious possibility is Treasury Department sanctions against Russia: while the sanctions don't necessarily prohibit servicing and any all Russian nationals or residents, Russia is subject to sanctions and that's what the TOS says. A problem is that the TOS refers to a "country subject to U.S. Treasury Department embargo restrictions", which is not legally defined. Here is the Treasury Department's explanation of that point (which is that there are very many types of restrictions: there is no legal category of "embargo restrictions"). One could then argue, in one's breach of contract arbitration hearing, that the clause cannot reasonably be interpreted the way the company (possibly) intends it to be. The force majeure clause does not seem relevant unless they see some way in which the invasion of Ukraine makes it impossible for the company to fulfill the contract with Russians.
Can a company change its contract only for a specific person? If a rich man is doing business with a company and they want him to sign a contract, can they present him with a different contract than the one they give to other customers to try and take advantage of him? (And this contract they presented him contains unacceptable conditions.) I am asking because some contract papers are very long and would take hours to read. And if a contract contains some ridiculously unacceptable conditions, then are the chances of the person who signed the contract winning in the court high?
Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.
If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract.
Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
If the company makes a contract, and as a result of that contract it owes more money than it has, then the company goes bankrupt and the owners and directors can walk away from it. This covers the owners/directors in cases of ordinary business contracts. However if an employee (including an owner or director) does something sufficiently harmful then under the law of torts they can be personally liable as well as the company. Examples are negligence and fraud; if you build someone's new roof while acting as an employee and the roof leaks then its likely to be the company on the hook for damages. However if you misrepresented your qualifications or acted negligently then you might well be personally liable. This is all very general. Details are going to be specific to your jurisdiction. So the answer is that having a company is certainly better than making every contract in your own name, but its not complete cover. You can probably get insurance if this is a concern, but its likely to be expensive.
In the US, in general anyone can claim anything. Others are free to believe or disbelieve the claim. In theory, a person might base their decision to do business with Hilton partly on this particular claim (this is why some software companies start presentations about their new features with a Safe Harbor statement letting the audience know not to base purchasing decisions on unreleased features), and in that case they could argue that Hilton's claim damaged them by causing them to enter into a contract under false pretenses. I doubt such a case would be meritorious, but there could be some contrived situation where the point of whether Hilton owned the hotel when it invented the brownie was actually important.
Neither The contract is completed when each party has totally fulfilled its obligations under the contract. In this case, it is when the purchaser has consumed or otherwise dealt with the banana to their satisfaction. The vendor has ongoing obligations under the contract until this happens. For example, obligations that the banana is of merchantable quality and fit for purpose. If the purchaser peels the banana and discovers that it is "off" or eats the banana and develops food poisoning then the vendor still has obligations and can be sued under the contract. Yes, I realize that no one is going to sue anyone over a rotten banana but let's assume that "banana" is code for 54km of motorway construction and £1 is actually £1 billion. When is the contract formed? This is not a trivial determination and there are literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of lawsuits that have turned on this exact question. Once the contract is formed its binding on both parties; until then, either can walk away (subject to estoppel) The traditional analysis involves offer and acceptance. In your banana scenario, the shop displaying "Banana's: 50p/each" (it's a fruit shop - they always have unnecessary apostrophes) is not an offer - it is an invitation to treat. An offer is made by Ben placing the banana on the counter and proffering the £1, it is accepted by Sam taking the £1. At this point, the sale is binding on both parties. Ben has fulfilled all his obligations under the contract, Sam still has some. In addition to those discussed above, he owes Ben 50p. Strictly speaking, this is not an obligation under the contract but a debt due and payable. Consumer protection law The proceeding is a strict contract law interpretation - many jurisdictions have consumer protection legislation (and food safety laws for bananas) that impose additional protections and may change the contract law position.
Generally speaking, you signature and delivery of the lease to the landlord makes it possible for the landlord to enforce. Particularly when, as in the question, the landlord presented the lease to you as an "offer" which you accepted without modification, it is probably binding upon the landlord even if the landlord does not sign it or return a copy with the landlord's signature. In jurisdictions that have a statute of frauds, your part performance by sending checks in the lease period consistent with the lease, and the landlord's part performance by continuing to allow you to occupy the premises without objection, would probably make the statute of frauds (which generally requires a signed writing by the party against whom a lease is enforced) to be inapplicable. On the other hand, if you materially changed a version provided by the landlord, there is a real question over whether there has been an offer and acceptance, or a meeting of the minds, agreeing to the new lease. Materially here meaning changes that are more than updating your contact details and go to the heart of the lease contract.
In my experience, varying jurisdictions can and do differ as to the myriad ways these disputes are resolved. Contract law is one area where the judge has a lot of discretion. This is definitely true in state courts, even from judge to judge, and can even be true in the federal level-The 9th Circuit has some wildly different appellate decisions when compared to the 1st Circuit, and so on. I say this not to be argumentative, but to highlight the importance of careful and concise drafting that fully explicates the bargained for exchange, as there can be a vast amount of judicial subjectivity that goes into determining which rules pertain to certain situations. "Conflicting or competing clause" cases are now some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. This is largely because the last 20 years has seen a huge influx of people "drafting" (more like piecing together) contracts without benefit of qualified counsel. This is particularly true because lay people do not generally create a specific insturment like an attorney would - from scratch, with definitions and terms specific to the transaction. Rather, they go online and find "form" or model contracts that they feel are close enough (which are almost always missing key components), and then they type in their own terms, or even write them in. Because this is so common, most jurisdictions follow the rule that hand written terms supersede pre-printed terms; likewise, type written terms will take precedence over pre-printed terms. Specific terms also carry more weight than general terms. Specific terms will usually be given precedence over general terms, as these are seen as creating a specific exception to the general terms. For example, if Clause A in your scenario said: Written notice must be provided at least five days in advance of (any) change... (leaving out "to price"), then clause B would prevail because it would be more specific than the more general term (A), which in my scene would pertain to any change whatsoever (this is assuming the whole of the agreement did not shed light on the issues more fully). In your hypothetical, these are both specific terms. In that case, the court would first examine the entire contract and all addendum, specs, plans, etc. when interpreting competing or conflicting clauses applying the fundamental principal that a contract should always be interpreted as a whole - not clause-by-clause - and not section-by-section. Contracts will often have numerous parts with portions incorporated specifically by reference, or numerous documents that may be integral to the transaction, If the parties agree to what constitutes the various parts of the contract (even if not incorporated) the entirety of the transactional documents may be considered by the trier of fact (and law). Once examined, if a proposed interpretation makes other portions of the global agreement meaningless, illogical or unenforceable, and another party's interpretation is in keeping with the document as a whole, that is the interpretation that will typically be adopted. Assuming this analysis doesn't work to resolve the issue, then the court would look to see if there is an order-of-precedence clause, which is a clause that lays out what parts of the contract / types of clauses take precedence over others (ex. written requirements take precendee over performance requirements, addendum hold less import than the signed agreement, schematics hold less import than addendum, and so on). Assuming this there is no order of precedence, the court will look first to see if the contract was negotiated back and forth, with terms being modified with each draft. If Yes, then the court will except extrinsic evidence (parole evidence) that goes to the intent of the parties bargained for exchange. If not, the contract term(s) will be construed against the drafter and in favor of the one who signed the others' instrument. So, as you can see, there is no clear answer to what seems to be a simple issue. This just goes to show: Lawyers seem expensive when you decide to hire them - Lawyers are expensive when you have to hire them, because you decided not to in the first place!
Rhode Island and Connecticut My real property instructor wrote, "Connecticut and Rhode Island are divided into geographic regions called counties, but they do not have functioning governments, as defined by the Census Bureau." I live in New York. I wonder what hat would be analogous to our counties in CT and RI? (I asked my instructor but he declined to answer.)
In New England, town governments have always been relatively strong, and county governments relatively weak. Traditionally New England counties only provided courts, jails, and sheriffs. They did not provide the kind of services seen in other parts of the country, such as county roads, general government services for unincorporated areas, etc. Connecticut now has judicial districts, which provide the courts that formerly were provided by counties. The judicial district boundaries are similar to the old county boundaries. Added:In Connecticut and Vermont, property taxes and zoning are administered by cities and towns. Construction-related inspections tend to be done by larger cities and towns, while the state handles the smaller cities and towns.
It looks to me like this is authorized under New York State's Executive Law Section 24. The text is long, but I think it addresses most of the points in your question. The law allows the chief executive of a local government (e.g. mayor of a city) to declare a local state of emergency "in the event of a disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency". Under such a state of emergency, the executive can promulgate local emergency orders, that can include provisions like travel bans, curfews, mandatory evacuation, etc. Violating such an order is a Class B misdemeanor (see paragraph 5). I didn't see any explicit requirement for the executive to weigh safety benefits against restriction of personal liberties. The executive just has to "find" (i.e. decide) that a disaster exists and imperils public safety. However, there are some safeguards. The local state of emergency is limited to 30 days (some orders can be extended for an additional 30 days); see paragraph 1. And the state legislature has the authority to terminate the state of emergency by a concurrent resolution (paragraph 8). Further good reading is a primer (PDF) written by the legal counsel of New York's Office of Emergency Management, giving a guide in layman's language for local chief executives on how to handle state of emergency declarations. I'm slightly puzzled as to why, in this case, the order was given by the governor, when it looks from the law like it should be the mayor's role to do so. It could be that the mayor took the appropriate legal action and just let the governor make the public announcement. Also, Executive Law Article 2-B (Sections 20-29) have many other provisions regarding emergencies. Section 28 gives the governor the power to declare a "disaster emergency", though it's not clear from that section whether this includes the power to issue similar emergency orders.
For the same reason that states require doctors to be licensed Surely, if I want an unqualified, unlicensed surgeon (or a person that says they’re a surgeon) to crack open my cranium and poke my brain, that’s up to me? There is no doubt that requiring people to attend medical school for half a decade and then spending a similar period as an intern and a resident is a large barrier to entry compared to handing high school graduates a scalpel and a bone saw and telling them to learn on the job. The same applies to engineers, lawyers, plumbers, electricians, builders etc. I mean if a building falls down because the engineer or builder didn’t know what they were doing, it can’t kill that many people, can it? Even drivers for that matter - it’s a large cost to individuals and businesses to learn to drive, pass a test, maintain a license and a relatively clean record, register a car, keep it roadworthy etc. Surely it would be simpler to let anyone drive anything and if they cause someone harm, like dying, for that individual to seek redress through the courts? We’ll, there’s a reason why states mandate things and it’s economic rather than legal. When people don’t trust each other transaction costs go up. These costs are usually borne by the consumer as the suppliers engage in a “race to the bottom” - whoever provides the worst service at the lowest cost wins. Further, these costs are borne unevenly - most consumers are fine, some are very severely damaged; possibly with no real redress. By imposing minimum standards, the state places these costs in the hands of the people who are best positioned to manage them - the supplier. Once a user has given their data to the supplier they have no control over it. Therefore the economical optimal solution to maximize economy-wide output is to make the supplier legally responsible for managing the data in accordance with minimum standards. Extraterritoriality In an ideal world, there would be universal privacy standards. There would also be universal standards for training doctors and engineers. But there aren’t. Therefore, countries and states impose their own standards on organizations that operate within their jurisdiction. The threshold for the GDPR (and most other privacy laws) is whether you are targeting users within their jurisdiction. If so, they have the power under international law to assert sovereignty even if you are located elsewhere. A state has power where it says it has power. Otherwise, you could plan a terrorist attack on the USA from the UK and not have to fear prosecution. That’s what extradition treaties and honoring other nation’s civil judgements is all about. A website or similar platform operates in each and every jurisdiction it is accessible from. Like a surgeon with unlimited plane tickets. Therefore, it must comply with the law in each and every jurisdiction it’s operating in. Countries have adopted one of 2 solutions - China’s is to simply block all external sites, everyone else has said you can operate here but you have to follow our rules, just like every other business has to. Now, you may not like this but there is no doubt they have the legal power to do it.
These states have relevant (offending) sales tax laws. Amazon has no physical presence in Louisiana, but Louisiana recently passed HB30 which requires businesses with in-state affiliates (p3 line 25) to remit sales tax, by redefining "physical presence" which is a requirement for collecting sales tax (Quill Corporation v. North Dakota 504 US 298). Similar laws exist in these states. It does collect sales tax in Kansas, Kentucky, New York, North Dakota and Washington since it has a real physical presence in these states.
That is the case in the state of Washington, for example. All property acquired during a marriage is considered community property. This can make things complicated since there are state-specific rules that can arise in case of a divorce (Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Communications, Inc: the couple declared no community property at the time of the divorce, meaning the wife who was not a party in in infringement case, had no standing – and therefore the infringement suit could procede). This page goes into details. There are 9 US states with community property regimes: it is also the law for Sweden, Germany, France and Italy. In the US, permission from one author is sufficient to constitute "having permission" w.r.t. copyright: an owner of the copyright can license the work, and you do not have to get permission from all owners. This does not invalidate an open source license: spouse 1 can grant such a license even if spouse 2 refuses to grant such a license. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 partially answers the question in Louisiana specifically w.r.t. copyright. A lower court held that the state-specific quirk of giving a non-author an equal interest in copyrighted IP must be swept away in the interest of uniformity of federal law. The lower court indeed rejected an argument based on 17 USC 301 which declares federal law to be superior to legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to that set out in Title 17: but community property law is not equivalent to Title 17, it's much broader. The higher courts reasoning is a tall wall of words which boils down the their conclusion that "we disagree with the district court only to the extent that it held the conflict between Louisiana community property law and federal copyright law irreconcilable absent congressional intercession", and having found a way that didn't involve Congress, they declared the work-creator to be the sole owner of the IP created during the marriage. See also the myriad citations contained therein. What this case in particular shows is that the specifics of the states community property laws will have an effect on how a courts would rule on such an IP question.
No. Just because some building is "owned by the public" or State, doesn't mean it's public property. A state's national guard installation comes to mind immediately. State workers' offices are not public places. Airport hangars/buildings/runways. You can't just go hang out in the DPW garages.
All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out.
"Understanding the law" and the availability of information on law and in particular the real estate laws of NYC are different things. There are many online resources for the law; Google "NYC Real Estate law" and look at Wikipedia, Findlaw, Justia, the Cornell and Stanford law sites, state and federal government sites that make codes available, etc. But understanding the law takes your own effort and your skills at reading and critical thinking. It's your choice to read and think and take classes in the law if you choose, i.e. Law | edX. No one or any government is obligated to you in that respect.
What do, "X speed limit while children are present", street signs mean, specifically? while I'm driving near schools I often notice street signs that say something like, "speed limit 15 mph while children are present". I am curious what this means specifically. Does it still count if any child is in school? What if they're outside, but in a fenced area? Is there some specific distance from the road that drivers need to be aware of? What is the specific meaning of these types of signs?
Legally speaking, it's hard to say, because it depends on the laws in the particular jurisdiction. There is a wide variation in how these warnings are phrased, and how they relate to local law, for example it may be limited to "when flashing" (which seems to be the pattern in Washington, but that's more a matter of practice than state requirement). Federal Way WA can indicate school speed limits "when flashing" or "when children present", in case 1.) School Children are occupying or walking within the marked crosswalk. 2.) School children are waiting at the curb or on the shoulder of the roadway and are about to cross the roadway by way of the marked crosswalk. 3.) School children are present or walking along the roadway, either on the adjacent sidewalk or, in the absence of sidewalks, on the shoulder within the posted school speed limit zone. It appears that "when present" is a theoretical option in that town, and instead they rely on flashing lights and photo-enforcement. This definition follows from a state administrative rule 468-95-335 that defines "when children present" this way, and the state no longer uses the "children present" standard. In another state / town, the law could be different.
You are not obliged to say anything to a police officer during a traffic stop, in fact you are generally better off staying silent. This is your Fifth Amendment right to silence. The only exception to this is that the officer could ask for your name and you are obliged to give it under Arizona Laws 13-2412, but the answer to that is language-independent and is usually already answered with your driver's license in a traffic stop. If you did choose to communicate only in German, this may have the effect of frustrating the officer's investigation but if you only make truthful statements in German it is unlikely to be obstruction of their investigation. Arizona Laws 13-2409 is I believe the relevant section (emphasis mine): A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if the person commits the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. In general, a law that required you to give answers to a police officer during an investigation in English if you understand English and have waived your right to silence would violate your First Amendment right to free speech (as it is in effect "forced speech"). However, you would need to be careful not to tell the police officer that you do not understand English if that is not true, as it could be misrepresentation. Police officer training likely includes instructions for detaining someone that cannot understand them and the police can detain you and wait for an interpreter to continue their investigation if they determine that is necessary. You may actually be shooting yourself in the foot by doing this, because the time it takes for them to get an interpreter likely extends the amount of time the detainment can last while remaining "reasonable," so you may be waiting by the side of the road longer than you would have if you had simply told the officer that you were invoking your right to silence and followed the officer's instructions without speaking. As an aside, as more people are educated on their rights via the Internet and understand why they should always invoke their right to silence when detained, police officers will get more used to people they pull over immediately and politely telling them that they are going to invoke their right to silence. I doubt most police officers will hold it against you as long as you are otherwise cooperative and don't yell at them or berate them.
The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though.
If you were moving "with the flow of traffic" but over the limit, you were still breaking the law, and the cop can choose which car or cars to stop on any basis or none (except ones forbidden, such as racial in the US). This is almost surely not a valid defense, not in any jurisdiction that I know of at least. If you can show that to slow to the speed limit would have actually been unsafe, you might have a defense, but that is going to be hard to get a court to accept.
I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)
The route described is probably in violation of Section 22100 of the vehicle code: Except as provided in Section 22100.5 or 22101, the driver of any vehicle intending to turn upon a highway shall do so as follows: (a) Right Turns. Both the approach for a right-hand turn and a right-hand turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb The approach for the second turn is being made from the middle of the road. Neither of the exceptions apply, as 22100.5 is about U-turns at traffic lights, while 22101 is about turns controlled by markings or signs. Additionally, since you describe the route as a "curve to the street and turn right out", it's probably in violation of Section 22105: No person shall make a U-turn upon any highway where the driver of such vehicle does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon. Since the driver didn't make a complete right turn, it's likely that the forward view of oncoming traffic was partially blocked by the car's A-pillar or even the passenger seat, while the backward view of traffic was limited because none of the car's mirrors was pointed in the correct direction. It's certainly in violation of Section 22108: Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The side road's not a hundred feet wide. There's no way the driver could have given the required signal for the second right turn. There's a decent chance this is also in violation of Section 22102 of the vehicle code: No person in a business district shall make a U-turn, except at an intersection, or on a divided highway where an opening has been provided in accordance with Section 21651. The six lanes of the main highway make it likely that this intersection is in a business district. "Business district" is rather broad, including not only roads lined by businesses, but roads lined by apartment complexes and other multi-family housing developments. And finally, the catch-all offense of "reckless driving" (Section 23103) could probably be applied: A person who drives a vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.
I couldn't find any decisions on CanLII where someone was punished for a fictitious or out-of-province front plate in Alberta, however the Traffic Safety Act states the following: 1(1)(s) “licence plate” means a licence plate that is issued under this Act and includes an object that is recognized under this Act as a licence plate; (9) For the purposes of sections 1(1)(rr) and 11.1 and Part 8, licence plate includes a licence plate issued in another jurisdiction. 53(1) Except as otherwise permitted under this Act, a person shall not do any of the following: (b) display on a motor vehicle or trailer a licence plate other than a licence plate issued or authorized for use on that vehicle; (c) operate or park a motor vehicle or trailer on a highway with an expired licence plate displayed on it; (Part 8) 168(1) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe (a) that a vehicle is displaying licence plates that (i) were not issued for that vehicle . . . the peace officer may seize and take possession of the licence plates displayed on that vehicle. 169(1) A peace officer may arrest a person without warrant if the peace officer, on reasonable grounds, believes . . . (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the following are the provisions for which a person may be arrested without a warrant: (c) section 53(1)(b) relating to the displaying of a licence plate other than one authorized under this Act; While the connection of the extended definition in s.9 to s.53(1) is a little vague, the connection to Part 8 is not, and therefore I can confidently say that the Act clearly states it is a violation to use out-of-province plates on the front of a vehicle. The plates can be seized and you may be arrested. It may further be a violation of the BC Motor Vehicle Act if/when you travel there.
Portable signs are legal and you have to obey then. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/27/section/65 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/482498/2-11.pdf
Can a manager kick you out for being trans in North Carolina 36 minutes ago They kicked me out for being trans and going to my preferred bathroom. I get not using the lady's restroom if I had a big beard but I don't have a beard I wasn't doing anything in there but fixing my hair and makeup
It is not presently illegal for a private property owner in North Carolina to impose such a requirement on restroom users.
Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?
There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.
I will assume B.C. as your specific jurisdiction: there could be provincial differences. As phoog says, you certainly may mention this problem to management, who have an interest in keeping you happy. No law against that. As for the "legality" of sexual harassment, the CBA BC branch says that "Sexual harassment, which is discrimination based on sex, is illegal under the BC Human Rights Code". It is interesting to see what the code actually says. Section 8 Discrimination in accommodation, service and facility says (1) A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable justification, (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public, or (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or class of persons. The question is whether using the term "babe" constitutes discrimination against a person regarding service because of sex. This article on the Law Society of BC web site specifically identifies "verbal harassment" as an instance: Verbal harassment – This comes from anyone within the firm and or other workplace or a person who does business with the firm or company. Some examples are: referring to an adult as a babe, honey, girl or stud; whistling at someone; turning work discussion to sexual topics; asking personal questions of a sexual nature; making sexual comments about a person’s clothing, anatomy or looks; or asking someone repeatedly for dates and refusing to take no for an answer. (emphasis added). In case you're thinking that maybe there's a difference in what the code says regarding services and what it says regarding employment, section 13 Discrimination in Employment says: (1) A person must not (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or (b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of employment because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that person. In other words, it is defined simply in terms of "discrimination", which means "making a distinction". It is known that unwanted sexual advances constitute illegal discrimination, see Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 SCR 1252. The court found that Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Sexual harassment in the workplace is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job‑related consequences for the victims of the harassment. They did not, however, find that this is the only form of sexual discrimination (obviously, since it isn't). I can't point to case law indicating whether gender-biased expression are actionable, but that would be consistent with the letter of the law and "babe" is indeed an example cited in the Law Society article.
There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass).
If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment.
This is largely a matter of state law. In California, for example, this would be plainly unlawful (my emphasis): All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51) Other states may define "business" more narrowly, or exclude professional services. Also, there is the question of professional ethics. Discriminating against a racial group will likely run afoul of the rules of the licensing board, the AMA, the APA, and other organizations. Finally, remind your friend that every racist has what they regard as good reasons for their racism, and your friend is not special in that regard.
I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.
Opposite of "Ignorantia juris non excusat" (ignorance of the law excuses not) The title of this question is about how being ignorant of the law is not an excuse for violating it. However, I believe being ignorant of the law is sometimes applicable as a defense. I am curious what the opposite term is (assuming my assumption isn't incorrect) And if my assumption is incorrect, would be interested in an elaboration. Furthermore, would be interested (if my assumption is correct) what the parameters for such a defense would actually be. (how could I go about arguing my innocense based on ignorance?)
The term doesn’t come up Because, AFAIK, there are no circumstances where being ignorant of the law allow a person to escape culpability. There are, however, laws that allow ignorance of the facts to be an excuse. For example, a person who receives stolen goods where it is reasonable to believe that they aren’t is not guilty of the crime (although the still don’t own the goods).
I'm sorry to deflate what is clearly a very philosophically interesting question, but the law is straightforward here. The truth, essentially, is the set of facts that you believe to be true. Yes. It means that you will not lie by omission, and that you will provide the relevant facts. No, you don't need to recount history since the first instant of the big bang. Only expert witnesses may answer by giving their opinion or evaluation. This is presumed accurate by their experience and where it is not accurate, the other side may present opposing expert witnesses to contest their conclusion or evaluation. Laypeople are permitted to answer only with their recollection of facts. Lawyers may not ask them what their opinion is, although by your definition every question is about opinion, since perception and memory is limited. But the question "What colour was Mr Smith's house?" and "What architectural style informed the facade of Mr Smith's house?" require different amounts of expertise and opinion. "Truth" isn't jargon, or even technical language here. I generally aim to be truthful, and so when someone asks me what time it is, I don't feel compelled to answer to the nano/picosecond. Would you call me a liar? Am I lying by omission? Similarly, if someone asks me what colour a car is, I don't feel compelled to say "I can't possibly know, because my perception may differ from yours. If you honestly feel that when someone asks you to be truthful about something, then you must either be lying, or lying by omission if you don't start your answer with the first instant of the big bang, your problem is not one of law.
"Without prejudice" does not, of itself, create an obligation of confidentiality What it does do is prevent the contents being used against the author in any future proceedings - by this litigant or anyone else. The purpose of civil litigation is to resolve disputes. There is another, better, cheaper and more commonly used mechanism - parties agreeing on their own resolution through negotiation. The purpose of the without prejudice rule is to allow parties to have a full and frank negotiation without the risk that what they say will bite them on the ass in court. If they do not settle, then the court cannot and will not know about any concessions or negotiating positions that either party made or took. Adding "save as to costs" means that after the case is resolved, a party may introduce any offers they made that were better than what was won in order to show that costs should be mitigated - basically that because there was a better offer on the table the litigation was needless and the costs unnecessary. You can share it with whoever you like - they won't be able to use it in court.
There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.
In the United States, prohibition against double jeopardy is a constitutional protection. As long as one was actually at jeopardy for an offence by a particular sovereign, that sovereign may not subsequently prosecute the accused for the same wrong. In other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., it has a less strict form, even though generally, special pleas of autrefois acquit would be available. It is also not the case that after an apparent "confession" in public that there is "no doubt" about a person's guilt. No evidence is "certain" in law without being tested in court. Also, you propose: you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person This does not put the acquittal into question. The prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. This means at law that one is deemed to be not guilty. Your scenario does not show that the trier of fact was "wrong" about the prosecution failing to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not an avenue by which the prosecution can challenge an acquittal. If a properly instructed trier of fact finds that that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, this conclusion is unassailable. You ask "where is the justice?" The justice of a system is assessed by its application across the totality of cases. Given that a system of prosecuting and judging that is run through humans will inevitably produce errors, the law has developed to promote a measure of "justice" across the entirety of the cases that are disposed of by the court rather than to futilely attempt to ensure the "correct" result in every particular case. The rule against double jeopardy has arisen out of this systemic concern for justice. It does not purport to secure the "correct" result in every case.
Your assumptions are incorrect. Courts allow oral arguments (when they do allow them) so that attorneys have a chance to better address a judge's concerns. The idea is that it lets an attorney not only present the core of his case, but it also lets him address any problems with his reasoning that the judge may have or help the judge explore a complicated question. Without that all you have is the back-and-forth in writing with opposing counsel, which is useful, but may not actually address the issues that are important to the judge. There is some difference in how you present arguments on paper as opposed to in oral argument, but the distinction is largely one of style rather than substance. An argument that is great on paper is still great when presented out loud, you just present it differently because you are presenting it in a different medium. For example, you have to present oral argument with the assumption that the judge may interrupt you at any time to ask a question they are interested in, derailing your entire pre-planned argument into a tangential point the judge considers important. This is great because it lets you address what the judge is concerned about, but it requires a different preparation and some changes to the format of your argument. For example, while you will front-load both oral and written arguments with a roadmap, both your roadmap and your first sentence are much more important in oral argument.
That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.
A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.
Quitclaim reversal in Washington state. Statue of limitations? Options? Legal recourse? My question involves real estate located in the State of: Washington My home, has been hostilely taken over. It appears after my home was legally purchased and transferred into my name, that a dispute emerged and a default judgement was entered and I lost the house because of a quitclaim reversal in Washington State. What is the statute of limitations? When does tolling begin? I have not been in Washington State for years, but it appears the other party hired an investigator, and filed a news paper notice, et all, and received approval from the assigned judge to have the quitclaim reversed without my presence. However, I was never notified, nor present, even though the person(s) involved knew and know how to contact me, they went an alternate route and it was determined i was "unreachable." Do I have a case for recourse? Thank you in advance.
The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address).
Short Answer The question of whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the real property is located. The place where the parties to the agreement reside, or where the documents are signed, is irrelevant. I am not aware of any exceptions to this rule anywhere in the world. In some circumstances, the parties may reach an agreement regarding whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse if the law of the jurisdiction permits agreements of this type. But, often the parties are not allowed to vary this aspect of their real property mortgage agreement by contract. Choice is law for loans secured by collateral which is property other than real property is pretty much irrelevant in the U.S. This because the law is the same in every U.S. state, territory, or district. Long Answer Background regarding recourse and non-recourse loans To clarify, the terms "recourse" and "non-recourse" are normally used to refer to the remedies available in the event of foreclosure of a loan secured by property that serves as collateral for the loan. When the collateral is real property, the core documents in the transaction are a promissory note that represents a borrower's promise to reply the funds borrowed from any assets available to the borrower that is not exempt from creditor's claims, and a document representing the fact that the collateral may be seized if the promissory note is not paid as agreed, and that the creditor's interest in that collateral has priority over all third parties seeking to collect their debts out of that property which cannot be erased by transferring the property to someone else. This document is sometimes called a mortgage, and a substantially equivalent document used mostly in the Western U.S. is called a deed of trust. I will call this document a mortgage for simplicity, whatever its true name in your locality. In the case of a recourse mortgage, if the borrower defaults, the lender can foreclose on the mortgage, which results in a foreclosure sale at which the lender can bid all or part of the debt secured by the collateral together with any additional cash desired, and their parties may make cash bids. Ignoring for the moment the complications involved when there are multiple mortgages and liens with different priorities encumbering the real property, the person who makes the highest bid at the foreclosure sale is given ownership of the real property in exchange for paying the price bid at the foreclosure sale either in cash (in the case of a third-party bid) or in the from of a reduction in the debt owed, in the case of a lender bidding the debt owed against the property. If the mortgage is a recourse mortgage, then if the lender bids less than the full amount of the debt owed on the promissory note and is the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, then the debt owed on the promissory note is reduced by the amount of the bid made by the lender and the remainder of the balance owing on the promissory note is a personal debt owed by the borrower to the lender called a deficiency judgment. For example, suppose that you buy a house for $1,000,000 with a $200,000 down payment and an $800,0000 recourse mortgage loan. Some time later, the balance owed on the mortgage loan from regular monthly principal and interest payments is $775,000. But, due to a collapse in the real estate market in the real estate market where your house is located, your house, which had a fair market value of $1,000,000 when you bought it, now has a fair market value of $725,000. You lose you job due to the same economic downturn that has caused the market value of your house to decline and are unable to make mortgage payments. The lender forecloses on your house and bids $725,000 at the foreclosure sale, even though you still owe $775,000 on the promissory note. After the foreclosure sale is completely, the lender owns your house, and you still owe the lender a deficiency judgment of $50,000. The lender may now collect the $50,000 deficiency judgment in much the ame way that the lender would collect a judgment entered by a court on an unpaid credit card bill for $50,000. The lender can garnish your wages (once you get some), can seize your bank accounts, and can seize other property which you own which is not protected by a statutory exemption from creditors. In a recourse mortgage the economic risk of declining property values that wipe out the down payment equity is born by the borrower. In contrast, if you had a non-recourse mortgage, the lender's sole remedy would be to seize the collateral and the lenders would not be able to obtain a deficiency judgment no matter how little your house was worth. Operationally, this means that the lender is required to bid the full amount of the debt owed by the borrower to the lender at the foreclosure sale, even if the property is worth much less than the amount of the debt owed. In the case of a non-recourse mortgage the economic risk of declining property values that wipe out the down payment equity is born by the lender. Choice of Law For Real Property The place where the documents are signed and the domiciles or place of organization of the parties to the agreement are irrelevant to the question of whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse. In the U.S. (and everywhere else that I am aware of), the law governing security interests in real property, such as mortgages and deeds of trust and liens is the law of the place where the real property is located. So, if you take out a mortgage on property in a non-recourse state, the mortgage will be a non-recourse mortgage. Usually, in a non-recourse state, it is not possible for a lender and a borrower to mutually agree to make the mortgage a recourse mortgage when the default rule is that mortgages are non-recourse mortgages. In contrast, if you take out a mortgage on property in a recourse state, the mortgage will be a recourse mortgage, unless the borrower and lender expressly waive the right of the lender to obtain a deficiency judgment in a foreclosure within the mortgage document. Choice of Law For Other Property The law governing security interests in property other than real property in the U.S. is usually the Uniform Commercial Code which contains choice of law rules. While, in theory, different rules that states could adopt regarding whether security interests in property other than real property are recourse or non-recourse, in practice, every U.S. state has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as a matter of state or territorial or district law, and at the level of generality of whether a security interest (which is the legal name for a mortgage with collateral other than real property under the Uniform Commercial Code) is recourse or non-recourse, the law is uniform throughout the United States, although there might be slight technical differences between the laws of different states or other jurisdictions within the U.S. based upon the version of the Uniform Commercial Code that is on the books or the decision of state legislators to deviate from the uniform statute's language. The Uniform Commercial Code of each state contains choice of law rules determine which state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to a case. And, the choice of law rules of the Uniform Commercial Code in the state where a lawsuit pertaining to the personal property security interest is what a court in that state applies to resolve the choice of law question. These rules are generally consistent with each other. Footnote on Macroeconomic Implications Of Recourse v. Nonrecourse Mortgages The incentives of lenders and borrowers when entering into mortgage loan arrangements is different in recourse and nonrecourse mortgages, particularly, when the decision to give a borrower a loan is made by a third-party mortgage broker subject to bureaucratic conditions, or by a low level bank employee who acts in the same way, rather than by someone with an economic stake the financial well being of the lender. When mortgage loans are non-recourse, down payments are small, and housing prices are rising, and may be entering a real estate bubble, a borrower is in a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation. If real property values collapse, the borrow loses only his small down payment. If real property values go up, the borrower can sell the property and pocket all of the profits (in some circumstances the profits are even tax free). The borrower has little incentive to worry about the possibility that the fair market value of the real estate could collapse at some point. But, if the decision to allow the borrower to borrow is made by an employee or broker with nothing to lose if a loan is authorized when it shouldn't have been because the risk that the property values will collapse due to a real estate bubble are too great, the mortgage broker has an incentive to be lax in underwriting the loan to make sure that the borrower can really make the payments and that a foreclosure of the loan will realize enough value to pay of the loan if a real estate price bubble collapses. And, since the bank can get its money back and more by foreclosing if the borrower doesn't make payments while prices are going up, there isn't much of an incentive to make sure that the evidence of the borrower's ability to make the payments on the mortgage is accurate. The incentive of the broker or employee is usually to get as many mortgages processed as possible, even if that means overlooking problems with paperwork in a loan application, or using an appraiser who will say that the property being financed is worth what is necessary to get the loan approved, even if you know that the appraiser is cutting corners or just making up inaccurate values to get what the broker wants done. These events can conspire to make a real estate mortgage very bad and to expose the entire community of lenders who make loans in a non-recourse state to catastrophic losses in the event that a real estate bubble collapses. In contrast, this is much less likely to happen in a recourse mortgage state, where the risk of a downside loss deficiency judgment discourages borrowers from trying to finance the purchase of a house that could easily lose more value than the down payment if it was apparent that a real estate bubble was developing. So borrowers would self-police. The reason for this extended footnote and story is that this was one of the root causes of the financial crisis. A handful of states with big real estate markets and non-recourse mortgages (California, Florida and Texas mostly) started to experience real estate bubbles and mortgage lenders, because they had bad incentives in their mortgage origination systems didn't do enough to prevent themselves from financing the purchases of overprices houses. Eventually, the real estate bubble collapsed, lots of borrowers with overpriced houses and little money down defaulted on very large mortgage loans, and the lenders took huge losses on their real estate mortgage portfolios which were supposed to be ultra-low risk but weren't because the people evaluating the real estate mortgage investments overlooked or willfully ignored the risks. This, in turn, resulted in losses so great at the financial institution level that almost every major investment bank in the country and almost every subprime lender in the country went out of business or went bankrupt, and the collapse of this part of the financial industry, in turn, wrecked havoc on every firm in the economy that relied of these financial institutions as a source of investment or a source of financing for their unrelated businesses. The result was the worst recession since the Great Depression.
What is the process for having the plea withdrawn? Is it even possible at this point? Maybe, but YOU are not going to be able to do this on a pro se basis. It is clear from the way you word the questions you are still extremely emotionally invested in the whole scenario and want to make sure you get your pound of flesh at every turn. That is not going to work in this case. The first thing you need to accept is that for the purposes of the plea withdrawl the judge does not care to hear about how the lawyer tricked you. If you go in on your own pleading that your lawyer did you dirty, the judge is just going to deny your request in the best case. You will need a lawyer to prepare and argue the motion to withdraw your plea. Get a good lawyer they are worth their costs. Focus on the main goal of resolving your issue of the Criminal Trespass. How the police treated you or your Tenant took advantage of you does not excuse criminal behavior. So if the plea does get withdrawn focus on winning the criminal case. After the criminal issues are resolved then you can deal with the other issues.
He is mistaken. The statute of limitations for suing someone for a car accident, and for enforcing an oral promise, are both far longer than 3-4 months. You could get an estimate of the damages, report it to his insurance company, and, if the insurance company does not cooperate promptly, bring suit in a court of limited jurisdiction or a small claims court. Even if you don't retain a lawyer to take on the case for you fully, if you need to sue, you should hire a lawyer to coach you on the high points of how to represent yourself in this case, particularly with regard to how to fill out the Complaint, how to serve the other driver with process, and what evidence you need to present in what manner a trial.
TL;DR: You may have chances. Consult a German lawyer fast. In German civil cases there is the possibillity of "Reopening of proceedings" (Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens), §§ 578 ff. ZPO. It can be used in special cases of incorrect proceedings. You have an "Action for retrial of the case" (Restitutionsklage), if "in a testimony or report on which the judgment was based, the witness or experts violated their obligation to tell the truth, such violation being liable to prosecution", § 580 n. 3 ZPO. The lie of the expert witness seems to be prosecutable as "False unsworn testimony" (Uneindliche Falschaussage, § 153 StGB). This crime is under Limitation on prosecution (Verjährung § 78 StGB). Nevertheless it is a reason for reopening. There are short periods for filing such an action, § 586 ZPO. It has to be within one month after knewing of the cause for rescission. If you expired this period without fault, you may get "restoriation of the status quo ante" (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand, §§ 233ff. ZPO). But again there is a very short period after you are able to file the action. The wording of § 586 II 2 ZPO excludes reopening after five years. But this clause is reduced in practice, if enforcement is still possible (Braun, in: Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO, 5. Auflage 2016, § 586 Rn. 4). So it does not apply in your case. So you may have an action for retrial of the case, but only if you act now fast. For the details, esp. when the periods begin to run in your case, please consult a German lawyer. You may also have a case against the expert whitness and/or the plaintiff because of fraud in the process (Prozessbetrug) and/or § 839a BGB about the liability of court-appointed experts. As the judgement is about €70k the I assume the process was at a "Landgericht". It is not possible to negotiate there without a lawyer. I don't know if it is a cause for rescission, that the judge didn't gave you a chance to get a new lawyer and proceeded without your lawful representative.
Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).
From the time that the lease expired and you remained with permission, you had a shorter period of obligation and protection. I assume that the lease ended long ago, and you've been living there month to month. Assuming that we can read "two rental periods" as "two whole months" (if there is something else in the lease that indicates this, such as a rent due-date), then we can interpret the notice requirement as saying that you must give notice before the first of the month 2 months before the intended end of tenancy – that is one meaning of the lease. Another meaning is that you can give notice 58 days in advance. The lease has an ambiguity as to what the notice requirement is. Since you did not write the lease, and they did (well, someone, whose obligations they inherited, did), the ambiguity is construed against the party to wrote it. In the present circumstance, because you want to leave soon, you would not be held to the notice requirement that favors the landlord. It's entirely non-obvious why such wording would be used. In 504B.135, the statutes say (a) A tenancy at will may be terminated by either party by giving notice in writing. The time of the notice must be at least as long as the interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever is less. (b) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent due on a tenancy at will, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 14 days notice to quit in writing. Once you're past the end of the lease, you are a tenant at will, by the definitions section: "Tenancy at will" means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date. Assuming that you pay rent at the first of the month, then the lesser of a whole calendar month and three months is, obviously, a whole calendar month. The stuff at the end of the statute that you cite – "The notice must be in writing and direct the tenant's attention" – is addressed to the landlord's notice to tenant, where he says "Your tenancy will not auto-renew". This applies to leases of 2 months or longer, not recycled 1 month leases, and requires the landlord to give the tenant appropriate notice (it does not define the tenant's notice requirement).
Check your local law. In Washington, the chapter RCW 63.21 says what you are supposed to do. The first part of the law has apparently been satisfieds: Any person who finds property that is not unlawful to possess, the owner of which is unknown, and who wishes to claim the found property Then you need to get a signed appraisal stating current market value from a qualified person engaged in buying or selling the items, or by a district court judge (I have no idea where district court judges get their qualifications to appraise bricks), then within 7 days, report this to the cief LEO where the stuff was found (and surrender it, if requested). You also have to serve written notice upon that officer stating your to claim the property. The burden now shifts to the government, which must publish notices in a local newspaper at least weakly, for 2 weeks. The notice might be publishable in a no-cost venue, in case the publication cost is greater than the value of the stuff. If the owner appears and establishes ownership, that's the end of the finder's potential interest. If the owner does not show up, the property will be released to the finder once he has paid the government's publishing expenses plus $10, but if the goods are appraised at less than publishing cost, there is no fee. As a finder, you have 30 days after that 60 days to pay required costs, otherwise it goes to the government. There are some exceptions, things not subject to finders-keepers (crab pots, secured vessels, motor vehicles, unclaimed property in the hands of a bailee). If you do not comply with these requirements, you forfeit any right to the property and you are liable to the property owner for the value of the bricks. Under the definition of theft, you have a defense that The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable since you presumably intend to claim ownership of the bricks under the lost property statute.
Does the surveying term "right-of-way line" refer to a single line, or to a strip or swath? I'm taking a class in real property law. We have many exercises where we read a survey map and write a legal description in metes and bounds. Many of the maps use the "centerline" of a road but some say things like "the southeasterly right-of-way line of StreetName." What exactly does that mean, "right-of-way line"? I checked Black's Dictionary and Black's Dictionary. It talked about: Right to pass, easement, strip of land (the land itself). If it's a strip of land, typically how wide is the strip? Are these rights of way recorded somewhere systematically? If so, do surveyors have access to the full list?
One widely-used book on the topic is Brown's Boundary Control and Legal Principles. I have the 4th edition published in 1995, and the relevant chapter is 8, "Locating Easements and Reversions". The law varies from state to state. In New England, it is likely for interstate, US, and state highways, the state will own the roadbed in fee. Smaller roads are likely owned by the adjoining private owners, with the public holding a right-of-way that allows the government to build and maintain a road; the adjoinders are restricted from using the right-of-way in any manner that would interfere with the transportation use. The meaning of "right-of-way line" depends on context, but is likely to be the line between the pubic's right of way and the portion of the adjoining private property that is exclusively under the control of the private property owner. If the public records do not reveal the width of the road, there is likely to be a statute that states a default width of the road. This is discussed, for Vermont, in The History and Law of Vermont Town Roads by Paul Gillies
The fire department is entirely within its rights, which are the same as any other property owner. The fact that property is owned by a governmental body does not mean that members of the public can't be excluded that property. Some governmental property is public, but lots of it is private, and this would usually include most parts of fire department property. As long as you have not been denied any access to a public road by this fence, there is nothing improper about it. Anyone can walk through their parking lot, park their car there, meet friends, whatever, This is almost surely inaccurate. The fire department does not have to allow members of the public to have any access to their property and probably would demand that most of the uses you describe stop if they interfered in any way with the performance of its duties.
My general belief is that in the United States entering structures like the ones you've pictured would be considered trespassing regardless of if there is a sign in place or not. This is based on the fact that I'm almost certain that if you become injured while on the premises you could sue the land owner. I believe the trespassing signs are just there to give legal cover to the land owner in case someone does try to sue them. Here are two sources that essentially support my beliefs: General definition: Trespass is defined by the act of knowingly entering another person’s property without permission. More detailed legal definition: § 11.411 Criminal trespass. (a) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so, he or she enters or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure. An offense under this subsection is a misdemeanor if it is committed in a dwelling at night. Otherwise it is a petty misdemeanor. As you can see these buildings are clearly owned by someone, and you clearly haven't gotten permission to enter the building. Ergo, you're trespassing. Now if you were talking about ancient Mayan ruins, or an Old West ghost town then this would be more of a gray area, I believe, since those structures have been abandoned for 150+ years. The same goes for structures in National Parks, since a National Park is public land you could make a case that you thought you were allowed to go since you weren't specifically told you can't go (assuming you didn't cross a fence line/no trespassing sign). You should definitely contact a real lawyer though. Now if you do enter then I think the probability that you will be caught and prosecuted would be fairly low. It is your decision if that risk is worth the reward of entering/exploring the structure.
If, as your question stipulates, there are no public rights of way (such as an easement) to the enclaved public area, then you must gain permission from the private landowner to cross their land before accessing the public area. If it's possible to fly over the private land using something like a helicopter or a plane, as long as you fly high enough, That wouldn't require permission.
(d) a place to which the public have access, whether as of right or not Be that broad or not, it applies to airport car parks. Would I be wasting my time trying to argue this in court? Pretty much.
I know this is not what you've asked (I will get to that too), but I figured I would take the opportunity to state that the owner of the well cannot send you an invoice for the water unless you agreed to a price and entered into a binding agreement. They cannot just decide their water is worth X and then tell you that the amount is due. Just as you cannot send them a bill, in the same amount, for the use and maintenance of the pump. While the well may be located on one parcel of land, with the pump on the other, chances are, the properties were linked at one point and that is why there is a separation of the two (unless you bought it as one and divided it yourselves). This should have been dealt with on the deed, with easements appurtenant to the neighboring land regarding water rights. A contractual agreement could have been attached by reference that dictated the land with the well would maintain the well, while the landowner with the pump would maintain the equipment (or whatever you both agreed to regarding upkeep and the like). Depending on the state you live in, the property itself may not even "own" the well. For instance, in Colorado, water rights typically come by way of 100 or 200 year leases, as the native american tribes of the area "own" the water rights. Other states have laws that declare that nobody owns the water table, hence land is only owned as far down as the water table and then it is owned by the county, or state, with easements running with the deed. Other states, (I'm wondering if this is your issue) the water runs in veins and does belong only to the property that it is below – as there is no water table, so to speak. Regardless, I would talk to your title insurance policy company and ask why this easement was not addressed in the deed. I'm assuming that you did not divide the land yourselves, post purchase, and the land with the pump cannot access the water table without going onto the land of the other. Otherwise, it would be very easily solved by drilling your own well (and much cheaper), whereby you already own all of the equipment to run the water to the dwelling. You just divert your equipment to the running of your own well. It's only a few dollars a foot to drill a well, unless you live in the Granite State! Likewise, you should check with your land assessor's office, or registry of deeds, and see how the title ran back regarding water. Again, depending on jurisdiction, you may be able to drill down and over. You cannot divert, but you can access, in most jurisdictions. I say to contact your title insurance company, because the water issue should have been dealt with at title examination, and further, if your land is inaccessible to any water, it would not be sub-dividable for dwelling purposes under almost any zoning law I have ever heard of. A property that is land locked, or utility inaccessible, cannot be zoned for dwellings, without irrevocable easements or rights of ways, respectively. Just because you purchased near family doesn't have anything to do with any of this analysis. They could be anyone, or you could end up at odds, the water cannot be relationship dependent and you cannot be held hostage over natural resources. If so, I would sue the title insurance policy for a refund of the purchase price or the negotiation of the purchase price of an easement to the well/water table, assuming you have none under your land and have no existing right to it. If you just happen to have the pump, and they have the well, you own the pump and they own the well. Simple as that. You do not have to allow the pump to be used for their well. Assuming you can drill your own well, but may not want to, you can just rent them the use of the pump at the same rate they are charging you for the water. You can agree to split the cost of maintenance of each, since you've invested in the upgrade of the pump.
You don't really "solve" a problem with IRAC. It is a rubric for summarizing cases and writing about how a legal issue was or should be resolved. As noted by @Putvi it stands for issue, rule, analysis and conclusion. It is common when writing a court opinion, or summarizing a case. For example, you first state the issue: Does the statute of frauds bar claims for promissory estoppel to establish who owns real property? Then to state the rule: Promissory estoppel can overcome the statute of frauds for many purposes, but not for purposes of lender liability or conveyances of real property. Then to provide analysis: Promissory estoppel has been used to substitute reliance for consideration and other formal requirements such as the requirement of a writing in many contexts, but the lender liability statute of frauds was enacted with a broader application than the traditional statute of frauds and the statute of frauds for conveyances of real property is definitional in nature since a conveyance of real property doesn't have a meaning in the absence of a deed or other instrument of conveyance. Since determining who owns real estate and not just who is obligated to transfer it in the future necessarily involves a conveyance, the exception to the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds applies. Finally, you state the conclusion: Therefore, the statute of frauds bars claims for promissory estoppel to establish who owns real property. IRAC is a tool used for communicating legal concepts and conclusions, not for reaching those conclusions. Usually, the first stage of research is that you are presented with a fact pattern from which you have to "spot issues" and you may need to do legal research to use terminology that will be helpful and accurate to determine what the exact issue you want to resolve is and what the legal rule that applies to the case is. This often involves significant analysis prior to stating the rule or defining the issue. Also, it isn't uncommon in adversary practice to start with a conclusion, and see if you can find a way to describe the issue, rule and analysis that will lead to that conclusion. It would also be common to ask a junior attorney or law clerk to IRAC a large pile of cases to allow the senior attorney to focus in on which ones matter more quickly.
There is no particular mention in the OSCOLA guidelines for how to refer to laws of England and Wales. In academic papers it is common to see both "English Law" and "English and Welsh Law", usually depending on whether the particular point relates directly to England, Wales or both. However, in the case of Welsh Measures and Statutory Instruments of Wales then it would be correct to only describe the laws as "Welsh Law".
If a company notifies you that calls may be recorded, can you record the call? Assuming a two-party consent state. If a company notifies you that all calls are (or may be) being recorded, can you then record your conversation with the customer service representative without notification? Rationale: notification has already been served and there can be no assumption of privacy on the CSR's part.
It depends on how the law is worded. CA Penal Code 632 says: (a) A person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, uses an electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon or record the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per violation, or imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or Section 631, 632.5, 632.6, 632.7, or 636, the person shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation, by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. [...] (c) For the purposes of this section, “confidential communication” means any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes [...] any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. [emphasis added] If you're told that a conversation may be recorded, then you can reasonably expect that the conversation may be recorded, so the California law would not apply to it. A further issue is interpretation of "may". It is ambiguous as to whether it means "might" or "can". If the other party says "This call may be recorded", and "may" is interpreted as "can", then the other party has consented to the call being recorded. A case where the passive voice could have significant consequences; if they were instead to say "We may record this phone call", then, depending on the state law, things might be different.
They likely can. This information would likely fall under an NDA (Non-Disclosure Agreement) clause in the contract with the contracting company. The other clients of the contracting company could be considered confidential information, e.g., a client list, which can be covered by an NDA. An NDA will usually have a term for duration and a term for breach consequences. However, it is unlikely that an NDA would apply to prevent disclosure of other companies if the contracting company posts [all? | some?] of their clients publicly, such as in advertisements or blog posts online. For some more information, you may check out this post from LegalTemplates.
As far as I can tell, there is no exception under the MA wiretapping law to allow for businesses to record phone calls without both parties' consent. The one possible exception is for financial institutions, and even then, notice has to be provided regularly. B. Definitions. As used in this section: ... The term ''interception'' means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device by any person other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such communication; ... The term ''person'' means any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation, whether or not any of the foregoing is an officer, agent or employee of the United States, a state, or a political subdivision of a state. ... The term ''financial institution'' shall mean a bank, as defined in section 1 of chapter 167, and an investment bank, securities broker, securities dealer, investment adviser, mutual fund, investment company or securities custodian as defined in section 1.165-12(c)(1) of the United States Treasury regulations. C. Offenses. Interception, oral communications prohibited. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section any person who willfully commits an interception, attempts to commit an interception, or procures any other person to commit an interception or to attempt to commit an interception of any wire or oral communication shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned in the state prison for not more than five years, or imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one half years, or both so fined and given one such imprisonment. .. D. Exceptions. Permitted interception of wire or oral communications. It shall not be a violation of this section: ... f. for a financial institution to record telephone communications with its corporate or institutional trading partners in the ordinary course of its business; provided, however, that such financial institution shall establish and maintain a procedure to provide semi-annual written notice to its corporate and institutional trading partners that telephone communications over designated lines will be recorded. Given the complicated nature of interstate wiretapping laws, it would be well worth your while to consult with legal counsel before you start recording callers from Massachusetts (or, indeed, anywhere out of your own state.) The most important quote in that article is, I think, this one: [O]ur research led us to conclude that the law is still developing in this area and that much uncertainty remains.
Is there any way I can defend myself against penalties when mistakes are made in my favor? Another option, in a similar vein to your suggestions, is to make a contemporaneous record of the conversations. Then send an email* to the public official detailing what was said and agreed, along with a request that they reply with any observations or amendments within a certain time frame. That way you have a date-stamped document properly addressed to the other party to use as evidence or leverage. *or a recorded delivery letter etc
It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest.
The question is rendered moot because Cal. Civ. §1798.100 declares that Any provision of a contract or agreement of any kind, including a representative action waiver, that purports to waive or limit in any way rights under this title, including, but not limited to, any right to a remedy or means of enforcement, shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be void and unenforceable. This section shall not prevent a consumer from declining to request information from a business, declining to opt out of a business’s sale of the consumer’s personal information, or authorizing a business to sell or share the consumer’s personal information after previously opting out. You can fail to request such information, and you can tell a business that you don't plan to ever exercise that right, but you cannot be bound by such promises, which is to say, this is an un-waivable right. For another right, you might be able to waive that right. Your 5th amendment rights can be waived, but we would have to know more of the circumstances to know if that was a knowing and intelligent waiver.
The GDPR does not outlaw such processing of personal data. It merely regulates how and for what purposes you can process personal data. In general, you can conduct any processing activity as long as it has a clear purpose and a legal basis. Here, the purpose would likely be something like “conducting business with my clients” and the legal basis would be a “legitimate interest”. A legitimate interest always requires a balancing test that weighs your interests against the interests and rights of the affected persons. For example, can the affected persons reasonably expect such processing activities? In a professional setting, it can probably expected that business partners keep notes about contact persons so your intended processing could be fine. The GDPR does impose some general constraints. There are general principles like data minimization and storage limitation – you should only collect data that is necessary for your purpose, and shouldn't store it for longer than necessary. You should think about appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to protect the processing activity, for example about how your CRM is hosted, how backups are made and how security updates are installed, who has access to the personal data, and how the people with access to the personal data can be trained. For example, such training might inform your employees that they can only use the data in the CRM for business purposes, but absolutely not for personal purposes like asking Gina from reception out for a date.
You asked the rep about how to change some details on your account, and asked him about the cost. It is clear from the recording that you are not changing anything right now. I can't see anything where you state that you want to enter a contract right now, I can not see anything where the rep indicates they want to enter a contract right now. In other words, no contract has been formed. The rep did tell you that a name change will not increase the phone plan price. That was a promise. It was a verbal promise, and you have evidence that the promise was made. Your contract will determine whether the company is bound by such a verbal promise. If you change the name on the contract, with nobody mentioning a price increase, and the price increases, you can surely complain that you were misled and wouldn't have changed the name if you had known about the price increase. However, if you get told that the price will increase before the name change, and you quote the previous promise, I don't think that will force the company to allow a name change without price increase, because your phone conversation didn't create a contract.
Is firing for unionizing legal? (The Office, S2E15) In Season 2, Episode 15 ("Boys and Girls") of The Office (U.S. series), the warehouse workers in the Pennsylvania branch of the New York-based company begin deciding to unionize. Vice President of Sales Jan Levinson learns of the workers' discussion from Regional Manager Michael Scott, who is her subordinate and their supervisor. Jan then tells the workers that the company will terminate their employment if they unionize. Jan (to Michael): What? A union? ... Michael (to Jan): Let's be rational here. What are the pros, what are the cons? Jan (to Michael): The cons are that everyone will lose their job, Michael. Everyone. Office, warehouse. What do you think the pros are here? ... Jan (to workers): Excuse me. Excuse me. I'm told there's been some interest in forming a union, and that Michael supported it. Obviously he's not a friend of yours, because he didn't tell you the facts. So let me. Jan (to workers): If there is even a whiff of unionizing in this branch, I can guarantee you the branch will be shut down like that. (Snaps) They unionized in Pittsfield, and we all know what happened in Pittsfield. It will cost each of you a fortune in legal fees and union fees and that'll be nothing compared to the cost of losing your jobs. So I would think long and hard before sacrificing your savings and your futures just to send a message. My understanding was that U.S. employees could not be fired for forming a union. However, if that were so, this scene would square oddly with the rest of the series, as entire episodes are devoted to displaying that company's reticence towards lawsuits. A. Was it illegal for Jan to state this threat to their jobs? B. Would it be illegal for the company to carry out the promised actions? EDIT: Clarified who the conversations were with.
A. Yes it is clearly illegal to fire employees for unionizing. B. Companies get around this all the time by closing the facility. That means the managers lose their jobs too, which is incentive for management to keep a union from forming.
This is not an NDA (non-disclosure agreement), it is a non-compete agreement. An NDA would tell you that you cannot disclose anything you did or saw at your old employer's place. A non-compete agreement is what you have here, an agreement that limits your ability to get work. If what you say is correct, then your employer is not exactly the brightest. You stay that you haven't been given a written notice, and your contract says that a "Notice of termination will only be valid if it is given in writing". So you haven't been given valid notice. There is no reason why you would sign the non-compete agreement. If they plan to fire you without notice if you don't agree, they have a problem: Your contract doesn't allow them to do that. And they have apparently not given any written notice yet. So what they can do is as soon as they decide that you are not signing, they can give you one month written notice.
I have the same line in a contract that was just sent to me. So I did some quick research into this. However, I AM NEW TO THE SYSTEM AND DO NOT KNOW IT WELL!!, so please do not act on this information without seeking further advice from the relevant professionals. From what I can gather, the "Arbeitszeitgesetz (ArbZG)" is the law that governs working hours in Germany. Here is a link: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/arbzg/gesamt.pdf I used Google Translate to translate this information and found that in §3 it states that "The default daily working time must not exceed eight hours. It can only be extended up to ten hours if within six calendar months or 24 weeks an average of eight hours working day is not exceeded." This would lead me to believe that even if overtime is not paid as extra on top of your salary, they must give you the time off at another time to keep the average working day to 8 hours. **However, as the working week is Monday - Sat, the average working hours per week may be calculated as 48 hours per week, and not 40! Once again, I am not fully sure of my information, so use at your own risk!!
What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem.
The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.
In New Mexico, where Better Call Saul is set, N.M. R. Prof'l. Cond. 16-505 prohibits an attorney from employing a suspended or disbarred attorney as a law clerk or paralegal only if there is an order from the New Mexico Supreme Court or its disciplinary board prohibiting that appointment. I don't believe the show ever indicates there was such an order. Other states have different rules. Some prohibit this type of activity altogether, while others permit an attorney to continue as a paralegal while suspended, but not after being disbarred. I believe some states merely require that the attorney disclose that she is using the services of an attorney who is under discipline.
How does John protect himself from false claims (e.g. if the woman decides to roll down the stairs and blame him)? It would be very helpful if John has evidence of Oxana making false statements about him or others, and/or of Oxana threatening to make them. False accusations are common --and hardly ever prosecuted-- in a context of divorce. Examples of that are police reports (here and here) and excerpts of court proceedings that ensued during my father's (desisted) proceedings to divorce his 2nd wife (for additional excerpts, see also at 22:49-24:29). According to one of those police reports, my father's 2nd wife allegedly extorted him with "You'll have to pay me even until my ring!" (see page 15 of the pdf file) at the time they were going through the divorce proceedings he filed. Based on your description, it is not far-fetched that John could end up experiencing a similar mess as reflected in these police reports. Note: I don't know whether the poorly written quote from page 15 of the pdf was my father's translation of their interactions or whether he merely transcribed them to the police. Is there any downside to basically putting a camera in every room of the house except hers? John is strongly suggested to check Ohio law to avoid criminal charges. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 750.539d(1)(a) prohibits to "Install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place.". As a wife, Oxana would be reasonably entitled to that privacy in rooms other than --and including-- her room. Moreover, placing cameras in every room will not preempt false accusations. For instance, Oxana could still calumniate John by falsely alleging that he and the daughter went to a hotel to have intercourse. How do you find a good divorce lawyer? Before you even decide to retain a lawyer, see this report about New Jersey Family Court, where judges and attorneys allegedly are in the habit of dragging divorce cases for as long as it is profitable to the lawyers (obviously, at the expense of the parties pursuing the divorce). I don't really follow --and have never litigated-- divorce matters, but the multi-year divorce & custody case of Tsimhoni --formerly presided by Michigan infamous judge Lisa Gorcyca-- illustrates that NJ is not the only state where parties fall prey of legal malpractice. John should search for Ohio court opinions related to divorce matters and get acquainted with the applicable concepts, laws, and doctrines. For that purpose, one free, very useful resource is http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch . Court opinions usually cite relevant statutes, whence John can get an idea of what laws are decisive on divorce matters. Is it reasonable to ask for some sort of record of past outcomes (are there standards to provide full and complete records like for financial companies)? It is reasonable, but no, there are no such standards at all. An attorney will most likely allege grounds of attorney-client privilege, the extensive time that would be needed to redact court documents, and possibly other excuses to deny John's request. Instead, John should go to the court in his county and study as many files of divorce cases as he can. A number of courts display some information of cases in their website. For example, some Michigan trial courts have deployed Odyssey (see here and here), whence a party could search from home whether an attorney has litigated cases in that court and how long they've taken. To see the contents of complaints/motions/etc., John can read them only in the courthouse, unless the county court has configured Odyssey (or its equivalent) to allow the public to read the contents from elsewhere. I don't know what progress Ohio courts have made on this. Regardless of the attorney's transparency to share with John any redacted records about his performance, another important variable is the judge. In this regard, see the next item. Is it reasonable to ask to pay way less if the lawyer fails to get certain terms? Unfortunately, that is neither reaonsable nor realistic. Just from meeting with John, it is impossible for the attorney to know aspects such as: whether John is truthful and the meritorious party; how much trouble Oxana will cause during the divorce proceedings (see the aforementioned police reports); how vexatious the opposing counsel will be; whether John will weaken or sabotage his case during an unforeseen situation or lose control as a result of exasperation; whether the case will be presided by a judge who follows the law (instead of incurring personal bias or influence trafficking); if the judge engages in influence trafficking instead of following the law, whether the attorney is in cozy terms with that judge; whether the opposing counsel is in even cozier terms with that judge; in the event that the matter is appealed, any of the three previous items may apply; whether the parties settle (or John desists for whatever reason). Given the multitude of unknown/uncertain variables and possible outcomes, no person (attorney or otherwise) could establish beforehand the semi-contingent pricing that you have in mind. Do the lawyers even do anything other than fill out paperwork? Yes, they do, but that doesn't necessarily mean that what their work is any effective. Even if the lawyer is diligent, the court might negligently fail to enforce its own orders.
I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead.
Is There Any Alleviating Defence in Intoxication While Driving Considering this hypothetical scenario: A voluntarily intoxicated man (e.g. driving home from a bar) causes an accident which results in the death of the other driver. Under UK law is there any mitigating circumstances involving impaired judgement resulting in driving under the influence? Considering I'm fairly sure it's an automatic murder charge - are there any considerations made as to the degree/sentence length? A few sources seem to suggest there aren't any intoxication considerations but I can't find anything concrete that doesn't use jargon I'm unfamiliar with.
On the contrary, voluntary intoxication is an aggravating factor in driving offences, particularly if the intoxicated driver causes the death of another person. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/life-sentences-for-killer-drivers (2017 press release) increasing the maximum penalty for causing death by dangerous driving from 14 years to life increasing the maximum penalty for causing death by careless driving whilst under the influence of drink or drugs from 14 years to life creating a new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving Sentencing Guidelines for causing death by dangerous driving https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/offences/crown-court/item/causing-death-by-dangerous-driving/ But causing a death by accident is not murder.
They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court.
Rule 286 states: If you are involved in a collision which causes damage or injury to any other person, vehicle, animal or property, you MUST stop. If possible, stop in a place of relative safety (see Rule 275) give your own and the vehicle owner’s name and address, and the registration number of the vehicle, to anyone having reasonable grounds for requiring them if you do not give your name and address at the time of the collision, report it to the police as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case within 24 hours. This mirrors the underlying legislation at section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988: (2) The driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle must stop and, if required to do so by any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle. (3) If for any reason the driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle does not give his name and address under subsection (2) above, he must report the accident. (4) A person who fails to comply with subsection (2) or (3) above is guilty of an offence. The penalty for this offence depends on the particular circumstances, and, as per the Sentencing Council' guidelines, it is: Triable only summarily: Maximum: Unlimited fine and/or 6 months Offence range: Band A fine – 26 weeks’ custody A Band A fine is: 25 – 75% of relevant weekly income The Offence Range has three Categories to determine the appropriate sentence depending on the: Level of seriousness
How does the victim know that there is water in the bottle? And not some strong acid? I think there will be a difference between someone cleaning their windows and spraying someone with the same bottle they used for cleaning the windows, and some woman's jeaulous ex-boyfriend sneaking up on her in the night and spraying her in the face with fluid from an unknown container. In UK law: "An assault is committed when a person intentionally or recklessly causes another to apprehend the immediate infliction of unlawful force." So spraying water out of container labelled "acid" would be assault. Spraying water on a person after threatening them with an acid attack would most definitely be assault. If the victim expects to be injured then it is assault. Even if the victim fully expects that the fluid is water, I could imagine that you would be charged with assault if a bride to be just spent two hours getting her hair and makeup done, and you destroy the work just before the wedding by spraying her with water.
UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence.
Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court.
I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)
The hitting by itself would not be too bad (though the police would likely take a close look because of the two scratched cars – was the driver drunk or something?), but the subsequent running constitutes a crime under § 142 StGB (official but non-authoritative translation). The maximum sentence for this is imprisonment for three years, but a first-time offender would most likely be sentenced to a fine corresponding to a few months’ income, if there are no aggravating circumstances.
Both parties have retained a lawyer, what if the other party still communicates to me directly? The other party started to use a lawyer, and then I retained a lawyer and responded to their letter. But what if they still contact me directly about the matters lawyers are dealing with? What type of wording should I use to write back to them?
Don't write back to them. Pass any direct communication on to your lawyer and let your lawyer handle it.
That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life.
You don’t have to talk to the lawyer However, if you don’t it’s very likely you will be subpoenaed. Then you’ll have to talk to them at a time and place of their choosing rather one that’s mutually agreed.
If what you show is correct and above-board then you are being sued in superior court. However it sounds unlikely that the plaintiff could have served you with notice of such a lawsuit without you realizing it, so if I were you I would first call the court to see if they do in fact have a case with the docket number listed. Then ask: When and who served the original notice in the case (because if you really didn't get it then whoever said you did majorly screwed up and is probably in trouble) Who the plaintiff's counsel is If the letter was from a real lawyer on the California Bar, and that case really is open in the superior court with you as a defendant, then you really are being sued, and you should either get a lawyer or negotiate a settlement, because if you don't answer and defend then you're just going to have more judgments against you. If any of the above does not check out then whoever sent that letter is in big trouble if you report it to the DA, postal inspector, and (if they are a real lawyer) the Bar.
If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft.
There is really no point in hiring a lawyer until you can identify a culprit. Lawyers can't sue people until they have a way to serve the person at fault with legal process. You need an IT professional instead.
Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court.
The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one.
If a customer doesn't have money on them, is there way to put down their information so that they pay later for what they took? I want to sell articles of clothing but it is possible that the individual doesn't have money on them. Can I put down their information and have them sign to where they can walk away with the article of clothing and pay me later?
Yes The document is called an invoice and the customer has taken the clothing “on account”. Most businesses of any size outside the retail sector operate this way. Remember that you are effectively lending your customer money. What are the terms of this loan? What are you going to do when/if they don’t pay? You need to deal with this either in your sale contract or a separate credit contract.
Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion.
Probably Terms and Conditions extract: 7.2 Limitations on Closing Your Account. You may not close your Account to evade an investigation. If you attempt to close your Account while we are conducting an investigation, we may hold your funds for up to 180 Days to protect PayPal or a third party against the risk of Reversals, Chargebacks, Claims, fees, fines, penalties and other liabilities of whatever nature. You will remain liable for all obligations related to your Account even after the Account is closed. 10.6 Information about you a. PayPal reserves the right to request additional information from you, other than what is referred to in this Agreement, to allow it to comply with its anti-money laundering obligations. You agree to comply with any request for further information as we reasonably require to enable us to comply with our anti-money laundering obligations. This may include, without limitation, requiring you to fax, email or otherwise provide to us certain identification documents. You also agree to provide us, upon our reasonable request and at your own expense, information about your finance and operations, including, without limitation, your most recent financial statements (certified or otherwise) and merchant processing statements (if applicable). This is the contract that you agreed to be bound by.
There is a form, which both parties to the sale sign. Note that it does entail paying sales tax. There are other aspects to the sale which reinforce the "It's not my car anymore" message, such as returning the plates and getting a receipt for the plates. Even doing the sale in a DMV lot would not help you.
The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.
You didn't consent to being ripped off. You did however fail to grasp the terms under which you were permitted to park on their property, and you failed to pursue an alternative (such as looking for change; using a credit card). It is possible that you should have known that this was a no-change-given machine, since one can often see that there is no mechanism on these machines whereby you can actually get change. However, if you have clear proof that you owed $6 and you paid $10, then 4 of those dollars are properly yours, and there is a reasonable chance that you could prevail in a suit against them. There is even a greater chance that they would refund the difference, just as a sensible business practice. "Exact change" is legal and can even be the law, especially in government-run transportation systems.
What does the contract say? I write that so often I should get a stamp made. If the contract is silent, then it is implied that payment in US currency is acceptable, as is any other method of payment the parties agree to. As you have correctly quoted, there is no limit to the number of US coins that are valid for payments, unlike in many other jurisdictions where there is such a limit. Accept the coins, make the tenant wait while you count them one by one and then give them a receipt. Oh, and change your lease when you can to nominate sensible forms of payment like electronic transfer.
As described, no. Paying employees with benefits instead of money is called in kind remuneration. There are various limits on in kind payments around the world, including the US. Very generally, in kind payments are only allowed for particular industries and occupations, only allowed up to a certain dollar value, and only allowed as a certain fraction of the employee's wages. Furthermore, the value of the benefit can't exceed the actual cost to the employer - a meal that's priced at $7.25 on the menu is sold at a profit, and would be worth less than the menu price as in kind remuneration. So, given the scenario described, a restaurant employer could not replace 100% of their employee's wages with food sold for the same amount. It's too high a percentage of the wage paid as in kind payment, and the menu price equivalent of the wage would not have sufficient in kind value. A more detailed description of in kind payment laws can be found here. It's a rather long document that's not particularly well-organized, and is structured by describing various aspects of law in different geographic locations, rather than describing all aspects of the law in a location-specific manner. I was able to find US-specific law by searching the document for "United States".
Who are the "inferior officers" of the federal government? A part of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States says this: He [the President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. News reports recently suggest that the director of the FBI, although "inferior" to the attorney general, is not one of those "inferior officers" who do not need to get confirmed by the Senate. I suspect maybe the head of the Federal Aviation Administration or the Postmaster General or the Director of the Census is one of those. (For some decades before the late '60s -- maybe the Nixon administration -- the Postmaster General was a member of the Cabinet.) If I'm not mistaken, all members of the Cabinet and all ambassadors and all federal judges need to get confirmed by the Senate. What is the current list of those officers who need to get confirmed by the Senate and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by the President without the need for confirmation, and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by department heads, and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by the judiciary? Would this list be on the web somewhere?
I conclude (contrary to an earlier expression) that there is no such list, nor can there be, because the term "officer" is not well enough defined. The inferior officers are those officers who are not principal officers (as specified in the Constitution, e.g. ambassadors, cabinet members, judges), since there are only two kinds of officers. There is no constitutional or statutory definition of "Officer of the United States", so we have to figure it out from case law. As noted in Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654 The line between "inferior" and "principal" officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn. Officers of the US cannot be appointed by Congress (Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so that narrows down the possibilities – if in fact an appointment can be made by Congress, that is not an inferior office (since Congress has no such authority). That court also said that We think that the term "Officers of the United States," as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in United States v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article. To take a specific example, "special trial judges", authorized in 26 USC 7443a are an example of an officer. We know they are officers, because Freytag v. Commissioner 501 U.S. 868 says so (since they read Buckley): A special trial judge is an "inferior Office[r]" whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause. Such a judge acts as an inferior officer who exercises independent authority in cases governed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). The fact that in subsection (b)(4) cases he performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status. The Dept. of Justice offers an analysis of "Officer of the United States". The main elements in their opinion are that the position must possess delegated sovereign authority of the Federal government, and the position must be continuing. There are other criteria possibly applicable (things that were invokes at some time) including method of appointment, having been established by law, taking an oath of office, an emolument (not a volunteer), and receiving a commission. Still, Congress authorizes (by law) the hiring of federal employees, and not all employees are "officers". An earlier memorandum on the topic is here. Footnote 54 notes that It is at least arguable, however, that the authority exercised by second lieutenants and ensigns is so limited and subordinate that their analogues in the civil sphere clearly would be employees. Warrant officers and non-commisioned officers would likewise have quite limited authority. Since the definition of "Officer of the United States" is up for grabs, there can't be a complete list of inferior officers, especially if all military officers are included. There is a long list of civilian officers under the executive branch published in United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions, after each presidential election. The so-called Plum Book is on a government web page here in the 2012 version, and here for 2016. However, you will not find special trial judges of the tax court in the Plum Book, which were held in Freytag to be officers, and are civilians in the executive branch. The special trial judges are apparently listed here, as are the sitting judges (who are also not in the Plum book).
The Supremacy Clause makes Federal laws superior to state laws and even state constitutions, but that is only true for Constitutional federal laws. If Congress passed a law seeking to restore the effect of the now overruled Roe decision, there would be a question as to what provisions of the constitution empowered Congress to do so. Such a law might be challenged, and if no convincing source of congressional authority to pass such a law was cited, it could plausibly be overturned. One supposes that the members of the majority in Dobbs would be reluctant to see that decision superseded by a new Federal law. One hopes that they would take a principled stance, and only overturn such a law if there was good legal reason to do so. Without seeing the text of such a law, and the constitutional arguments for and against it, there is no legitimate way to judge if it would be within the power of Congress. As a political matter, I doubt that the current Congress will pass such a law.
Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.
Yes. The absence of immunity for a U.S. President's unofficial acts was established both in the Nixon Administration and later in the Clinton Administration. In practice, a prosecutor would be loath to file such charges absent very, very solid probable cause, and a court would often be very deferential in accommodating the President's schedule and, for example, in allowing appearances by telephone when allowed by law, or by electing not to seize the President's passport as a bail condition to be free pending trial, as would be common for someone facing felony charges pending trial. But, ultimately, the President does not have the right to either defer the charges until the completion of his term, or to any immunity from charges for his or her unofficial acts.
Does this mean that all four of the above are "equipotent"? No. The inclusion of these foundational documents in the Front Matter of the United States Code does not indicate anything regarding their legal status. It is more of a political statement, as a preamble to all laws in today's sovereign federal state, describing the foundation of the United States of America and its constitutional order. The only constitutional law in force today in the U.S. is the Constitution for the United States of America, beginning with We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. and the subsequent amendments. The ratification of the Constitution replaced any previous constitutional orders in effect between the States. A new government was created by the Constitution and replaced the old one under the Articles of the Confederation: Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The New Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble. Owings v. Speed The States abandoned their old agreement (the Articles of Confederation) and subjected themselves to the new Constitution. Of course, the other documents remain historically very significant and may shine lights on the interpretation of the present Constitution, for example, in Texas v. White, the reference made to the concept of "perpetual union" found in the Articles. The Declaration of Independence is not so much a legal document per se but a declaration of the existence of the States sovereign from the British Crown; but such sovereignty is not a result from the declaration, but from the acts of war. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, while remaining in effect under the Constitution by Acts of (the new) Congress, is in any case spent as its territorial extent is extinguished by the establishment and admission of states, who enjoy equal status under the Constitution. See for example, Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans and Strader v. Graham.
There are several possible ways to get there, but the answer is "there is no such position." Acting President vs. President Under the Constitution: In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. When William Henry Harrison died, there was some question as to what "the same" that devolved on Tyler (his VP) meant. Some thought it meant that Tyler was Acting President; others thought the office itself went to Tyler. Tyler was in the latter group, and set a precedent that the VP became the President (finishing out the President's term) if the President died; the VP wasn't just acting. The 25th Amendment later clarified that presidential death, removal, or resignation made the VP the President; if the President was unable to exercise the powers and duties of the office, the VP was Acting President. Further down the line, the Constitution explicitly says Congress decides "who shall act as President." Congress only talks about succession further down the line in terms of the Acting President and the officer acting as President. So, if that interpretation is correct, the answer is "the VP is the only officer who can assume the office of President in the event of the President's death." Of course, a new precedent could potentially be set if this situation ever arises; if someone will definitely act as President until the end of the term, then it makes a certain amount of sense to say they just assume the office itself. Eligibility for office The Constitution doesn't say "you can't be elected President unless over 35, natural-born citizen, and 14 years a resident." It says you are not eligible for the office unless you meet those requirements. That would include any way of assuming the office, including succession. You can't become President if you are not eligible to hold the office, period (that's what eligibility for an office means); the only requirements you'd get around are those covering eligibility to be elected. Succession It's unclear whether the Constitution's eligibility requirements apply to a person acting as President who does not assume the office. However, Congress has decided that they should. 3 USC §19, which sets out who acts as President if both President and VP are unable to, says: (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section [i.e. the ones listing people who can act as President] shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.
Do I correctly understand that Federal employees, notably including the Armed Forces, pledge their duty first to the Constitution of the United States and only secondarily to carry out legal orders? And that they have no legal obligation to execute an illegal order? What process allows a subordinate to defy an illegal order if a superior gives the order? What legal protection does the subordinate have? All officers of the United States government (and for that matter also all officers of state and local governments) including soldiers in the armed forces are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Members of the armed forces are not only allowed to disregard illegal orders, they are obligated to not carry out illegal orders. Operationally, disobeying an order due to the fact that it is unconstitutional is a defense to an effort to fire or discipline a federal government civil service employee who may only be fired for good cause after due process. In the military, the issue would usually present itself in the form of a defense in a court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Of course, it would hardly be unprecedented for someone's firing from a job that was unlawful, or for a wrongful court-martial conviction, to be upheld on appeal. Suppose the Congress holds someone in contempt. The Congress, as I understand it, goes to a court to enforce the contempt charge. The court turns to Federal law enforcement to bring action. What if the President directs Federal law enforcement to ignore the court order? What if law enforcement complies with the President? The U.S. Justice Department is charged with bringing contempt of Congress cases at the request of Congress. But, an attorney retained by Congress could probably bring such an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia if the U.S. Justice Department refused to do so. Contempt may be civil or criminal, and unlike ordinary criminal charges (felonies can only be brought based upon grand jury indictments and grand juries are controlled by prosecutors) either civil or criminal contempt charges can be brought by a non-governmental employee attorney. The established practice is to seek contempt sanctions against the lowest level employee who has the authority to take the action requested, or to seek contempt sanctions against everyone from that lowest level employee up through the chain of command to the responsible cabinet officer. The President is generally not named as a party against whom contempt charges are sought. Defiance of the law in the face of a binding and immediately effective court order would be a constitutional crisis and you would need to move to the realm of politics and political realities, and away from the realm of what the law says that people should or should not do, to meaningfully predict how a constitutional crisis turns out. The law assumes that all government officials will obey a lawful court order duly enforced. If government law enforcement officers start defying court orders, then there is a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, the vast majority of law enforcement officers in the United States are civil servants who aren't beholden personally to the President. They were appointed on a merit basis, they are civil servants who can't be fired without good cause and due process, they are in agencies that have an institutional culture of obeying court orders. The civil servants with more seniority (and basically all senior military officers in the U.S. military) have served under multiple Presidents of different political parties. The number of political appointees supervising them is fairly modest. Likewise, most federal judges at any given time were appointed by prior Presidents and even judges appointed by a current President will not infrequently rule against the federal government when the facts and law demand that they do so. There is less politics and there is more unity in interpretation of the law among federal judges and federal law enforcement and legal officials than is generally assumed by more cynical members of the general public. Suppose Congress orders fines. What is to be done if no one will enforce the fines? A court can order that the fines be paid out of the U.S. Treasury. The order itself can have the force of law without the cooperation of any U.S. Treasury official. Sustained defiance of such a court order would lead to a constitutional crisis. Same scenario as 1 but this time it’s impeachment and conviction: the President defies any action to remove him. What if the President simply barricades himself in the White House and orders security and military personnel to protect him? Is there a protocol in the U.S. military hierarchy to deal with this scenario? This has never actually happened, of course, so it is hypothetical. The Treasury Department, General Services Administration and Secretary of State (and all other government officials) should revoke privileges that the President has by virtue of being President and provide them to the new acting President (realistically, in the simple scenario presented, current Vice President Pence). The military should stay out of it, but should immediately start treating acting President Pence, and not the impeached incumbent as the Commander-in-Chief. U.S. military forces are indoctrinated on the Presidential succession and it is unlikely that many military officers would disregard a Presidential impeachment. The Secret Service should stop defending the former President except in an ex-President capacity. In theory, one could imagine acting President Pence bringing an eviction action in the local courts of the District of Columbia just as one would with any holdover tenant. Since the local courts in D.C. are federal, this doesn't present the federalism problems that it would if the same thing were done in a state court with respect to federal real estate, and U.S. marshals would evict him and his family like anyone else. The trickier situation in terms of creating a constitutional crisis, honestly, is really one where the President is clearly and blatantly defying the law and court orders, but the U.S. Senate refuses to convict the President in an impeachment proceeding out of partisan bias. What should common citizens do if any of these scenarios play out? Whatever they want, in a lawful manner. Ultimately, this would be a matter for federal government officials (elected and appointed alike) to figure out.
Yes, it has happened. Charles Evans Hughes served on the Supreme Court from 1910 until 1916, when he resigned to run for President as the Republican nominee. He lost to Woodrow Wilson. Later, in 1930, he was appointed again to the Supreme Court, this time as Chief Justice, and served there until 1941. John Jay, Oliver Ellsworth, and James Iredell all received electoral votes for President in the election of 1796. Jay had recently resigned as Chief Justice in 1795, and Ellsworth and Iredell were still serving and did not leave the court until 1799 and 1800 respectively. It's not clear that any of the three seriously campaigned for the presidency, though.
Can a U.S. President undo an act of clemency or a pardon of his predecessor? Can the next U.S. President undo the current President's pardons?
No. There are few if any checks on any President for any Pardons issued (a general Impeachment may be the only check but there has never been a strong call for impeachment for a pardon.). Further more, the protection against Double Jeopardy is in effect meaning future Presidents cannot prosecute the pardon recipient for any crimes that were pardoned by a previous president, though they may prosecute any future criminal incidents perpetrated by the pardoned person that are not related to the events surrounding the pardoned crime.
The judge's decision is reversed or vacated, and then she continues being a judge as though nothing happened. There are essentially no consequences available for federal judges, with the exception of impeachment.
How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.
Let's start with the most important point first: A campaign finance violation is not a ground to remove an elected official from office, no matter how egregious, on its own, even if one could prove that the campaign finance violation probably caused the outcome of an election to change. Congress could decide, however, that a campaign finance violation constitutes a "high crime or misdemeanor" for which a sitting President could be impeached, if a majority of the House of Representatives votes to impeach the President and a two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate trying the impeachment under the supervision of the Chief Justice of the United States (that and not "Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court" is the official title) finds that the offense set forth in the impeachment has been committed and constitutes sufficient grounds to remove the President from office. At the outset, there is some ambiguity over whether the violation of campaign finance laws would have been by individual person, or the political campaign of the individual person (which is a Section 529 non-profit organization). The individual or the campaign, as the case might be, would definitely owe either civil or criminal fines, as the case might be, for a violation of the particular campaign finance laws that the individual or campaign is alleged to have violated. The violation could also affect the ability of the violator to obtain all or any amount of federal matching funds in a future election. Depending upon the particular campaign finance law involved, which isn't clearly specified, there might be a criminal penalty (either a misdemeanor or a minor felony) as well, which could give rise to a probation sentence, a sentence to some period of incarceration, a period of post-release parole, criminal fines, court costs, and, at least in the case of a felony, some collateral consequences of that conviction such as a prohibition on owning a gun and ineligibility for many occupations and jobs. Neither a civil campaign finance violation, nor a criminal conviction for a campaign finance violation, disqualifies someone from holding the office of President. The President does not have immunity from civil or criminal consequences of campaign finance violations committed prior to taking office, and the President's campaign, at a minimum, is not immune to campaign finance violations at any time. Presidential immunity from liability is limited to the conduct of the President while holding the office in furtherance of the governance duties of the President. Generally speaking, campaigning would not be a governance duty of the President, but there are factual circumstances under which it is hard to distinguish between what constitutes governing and what constitutes campaigning in the case of a sitting President who is currently in office. Also, campaign finance violations can't be prosecuted by just anyone. A violation of federal campaign finance laws must be prosecuted by a federal government lawyer authorized to do so by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which has an even partisan balance of members by design and almost always deadlocks on motions to prosecute anything but the least controversial and most blatant campaign finance violations against members of either of the two major political parties in the United States. A "private attorney general" can't bring a lawsuit to enforce campaign finance laws unilaterally. The President can definitely pardon a criminal violation of a campaign finance law by anyone other than himself. The President definitely cannot pardon a civil violation of a campaign finance law by anyone. The majority and more analytically sound position is that the President cannot pardon himself for his own criminal violation of a campaign finance law (there are prior questions and answer at Law.SE regarding that question). A judge considering a campaign finance violation charge against a sitting President could, however, take steps short of dismissing the charges that could accommodate a sitting President. For example, the judge could be very deferential to the President in setting hearing dates, allowing the President to participate in proceedings by telephone or (in some but not all cases) through a representative, or in setting the amount of a bond or the terms of pre-trial release in the event of a criminal charge, or in cooperating with the President's security detail when the President is required to appear. In a civil violation case, the President would probably be allowed to be a deposition witness, with the deposition testimony used at trial, rather than appearing in person at trial, if his lawyers requested that treatment.
The canonical example is Gerald Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon.
In general, no, if you make a will then you can revoke that will while ever you are still legally competent. Also, in general, this is a good thing. For your first example, you are ruling out all possibility of redemption - people change: a person who is a selfish a*$%^#@e in their 20s may be a kind, caring, dutiful and loving person in their 40s. For your second example, what if XXX gets demolished? Or you move cities? If you are truly serious, you can transfer all your assets to a trust, put your instructions in the trust deed and then nominate someone you really, really, really trust to be the trustee. This would prevent you modifying the instructions but you are then relying on the trustee interpreting them.
Yes, the President can just fire them, or more commonly, request their resignation. The provision for impeachment by Congress exists in case the President doesn’t do what the President should do.
Not for that reason This would not make the Act invalid. The interaction between the two laws would simply mean that criminal prosecution would only succeed for acts on or after the Act came into effect. So, even though the law purports to invoke criminal sanction for acts before it came into effect, the Constitution says it can’t so it doesn’t. That doesn’t render the law invalid, just unenforceable for that period.
Can an individual in California file a small claims case and NOT serve the defendant (or defer the serving)? Does California allow a plaintiff to file a small claims case and either not serve the defendant or defer the serving until some time in the future (perhaps the plaintiff has 6 months to serve the defendant)?
Service is not optional is California, see the court page on service. The specific rule, Rule 3.110, says that The complaint must be served on all named defendants and proofs of service on those defendants must be filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the complaint. When the complaint is amended to add a defendant, the added defendant must be served and proof of service must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the amended complaint.
That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.
Almost certainly the answer to this is no because SB.8 talks of the $10K as being (minimum) statutory damages. (The actual provision 171.208(b)(2) is for damages "not less" than $10K, i.e. the court can award more in the first suit.) If e.g. someone breaks the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by making spurious claims against a group of people, they are each entitled to up to $1,000 statutory damages each (and class action is specifically allowed/mentioned). Generally, you can't avoid paying damages to an injured party by paying them to someone unrelated (before). There's nothing in SB.8 to suggest otherwise, the wording is: a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed Only proof of payment (not even having lost another suit on the same incident in another county) precludes a judge from awarding the statutory damages. (Claimants can file suits in their county of residence per 171.210, which me not knowing the Texas civil procedure too well, seem to allow multiple parallel lawsuits to proceed.) Now SB.8 is special in that limits relief to the first who sues (or maybe the first who wins) while enabling a very large class to claim injured status and sue... which in itself doesn't make a lot of sense when speaking of statutory damages, but it's a novel kind of relief, so who knows what courts may decide. (It would be interesting if a court determined that that first-claimant limit in SB.8 is unconstitutional, under either Texas or federal constitutions. In some other state laws, there is sometimes a limit on the total amount of damages out of a single incident, but it's not awarded on a first-winner basis, instead there's a provision to "allocate to each claimant his equitable share of the total".) Granted a defendant could come with a legal strategy that look something like: when sued in Texas county arrange for a "friendly" organization (members) to immediately sue in another county. Fight the first lawsuit so as to delay judgement, but immediately concede the one from the "friendly" organization members, so that only the "friendlies" get the statutory damages (first), possibly e.g. donating them back to the defendant thereafter. Whether this would work really depends on details in the Texas civil procedure law, which I'm not too familiar with.
Once you withdrew the complaint without prejudice, any statute of limitations benefit you obtained from filing the lawsuit evaporated. From a legal perspective, it is as if you never filed at all, except that the lawsuit that was filed proves that you had notice of the claim at the time you filed, so you cannot take advantage of any "discovery rule" that allows a statute of limitations to start running from the date that you knew or should have known of your right to file a lawsuit. In all likelihood, the statute of limitations has now run, although that would depend upon the jurisdiction in which it was filed. Some jurisdictions toll the statute of limitations during a period of minority, but that tolling might very well be insufficient to allow the claim to be filed 20 years later.
No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal.
In general, you cannot neither change contracts nor restrict/nullify other people's rights by your acts alone. The people who hired you personally have a contract with you, not with your LLC. So, if someone has a claim against you, then their claim should not be contingent of your LLC going bankrupt or not; they have a right to have their damages restored by you (who was the entity they hired). Otherwise, fraud/liability delinquency would be trivial: get debts on your name and, when the things get difficult, create a shell LLC and let it go bankrupt.
Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 sets the limitation period for defamation cases to 1 year. However, under section 32A, the court is, in certain situations, allowed to disapply the limitation period to defamation cases. Essentially a court may lift the period if they think it is just and fair to do so. They will take into consideration factors such as the extent to which enforcing the limitation period would unfairly prejudice the claimant, whether new evidence came to light (and if it ought to have come to light sooner) etc. It all really depends on the merits and circumstances of your case. I would recommend seeing a solicitor on the matter.
Yes In general, default judgements can be set aside for good cause. If the defendant can show that they had a legitimate reason for being unable to respond to the cause of action, then the judgement can be set aside and a new hearing scheduled. However, “good cause” encompasses things both unforeseen and unforeseeable and includes having good cause why the court and/or plaintiff/prosecutor could not have been advised of the incapacity before default judgement was entered. In most jurisdictions, they also need to show that they have a prima facie defence such that a different result is possible. The “superior sovereign” is not really germane: good cause can include a sudden illness or injury, police detention (be they superior, inferior, same-level or foreign sovereign), natural disaster etc.
Can an abutter park on my property if they have a right of way easement? I have a private road that goes around the perimeter of my property and is on my property. The abutters that use the road do so via a "right of way" easement. Sometimes people, especially contractors, are parking on the roadway. Do they have the right to park there or does a "right of way" easement only allow them to pass through and keep moving?
I would like to give you a clear definitive answer, but there isn't one. This depends entirely on the scope of the easement which is determined on a case by case basis in light of the facts and circumstances. It is frequently ambiguous. These cases come up frequently and usually either get resolved fairly quickly via mediation or negotiation, or escalate into very ugly lawsuits that can last years. I have a case like this that has been pending eleven years, is on a final appeal to the state supreme court, has involved about $800,000+ of legal fees between all parties involved, has been to the court of appeals following about six times so far, and has led to five evidentiary hearings in addition to depositions, motion practice, etc. Obviously, this is an extreme example, but long, costly litigation if a negotiated resolution isn't reached is pretty common.
Your numbers are off The states don't seize a mile next to every road, as farms don't suffer from traffic noise. They also don't seize land when they just rebuild a road, but that is still part of the 400k acres of road. In fact, most "new roads" are rebuilding old ones, and a huge part of the rest is through undeveloped land that is owned by the state or farmers - and thus cheap and doesn't need a mile-wide strip of noise protection. Eminent domain cases are RARE 2018 saw 87 cases of eminent domain in colorado - most of them for buildings no longer deemed habitable and condemned to be torn down, then re-developed. The federal government lists 1001 real property cases filed by the US in the same year's report, not indicating what kind of development or redevelopment would happen there, or if it is Eminent Domain or some other type of real property case. Under Eminent Domain, the seized land can be used for any public use. And in strange cases, it happens even to what used to be a private road and shopping complex in front of Walt Disney World - to build an interchange.
Can a restrictive covenant deny a land owner the right to use a road on their own property? Yes. A restrictive covenant could impose such a limitation, although usually a court would disfavor that interpretation of a covenant unless no other reasonable interpretation is possible from the language of the covenant. This is basically because it would be lawful (at common law anyway) to convey the land in its entirety to the covenant beneficiary, so it is lawful to convey a lesser interest to that person. It isn't inherently unconscionable unless it makes the property subject to the covenant landlocked with no access to a public road, in which case some mandatory doctrines regarding a right of access would probably apply. Often this would be done to create a private drive across the "front lot" (which has direct access to a public road by other means) when the "back lot" of a parcel was conveyed by the owner of the combined lot to the new owner of the back lot. A covenant might be chosen instead of an outright conveyance of the dogleg of road because it retains mineral rights in the servient estate owner, because it clearly allocates property tax payment duties to the underlying owner as part of a larger economic deal, and/or because it could make a transaction possible that would otherwise be prohibited by subdivision requirements applicable in that locality. The restriction might also reduce the servient estate owner's liability for accidents arising from use of the covenant access easement, since it would ordinarily vest all maintenance and use regulation in the dominant estate owner. Some other common easements that deny the servient estate owner all use of land for a period of time are easements to allow staging of road construction activities, and easements incident to mineral rights in states where destruction of the surface is allowed if it is later restored when the minerals are extracted (such as Wyoming).
Sec. 14-3 of the city ordinances says that No person may engage in the business of collecting recyclable materials, solid waste or green waste within the city, or haul recyclable materials, solid waste or green waste through a street or public right-of-way in the city, unless that person has been granted a franchise or license to do so by the city. However, a property owner may occasionally transport recyclable materials, solid waste or green waste produced on his or her own premises to a licensed disposal area, subject to the requirements of Section 14-7 pertaining to solid waste transportation So that means you can't contract with someone else to haul your trash. You can do it yourself if you can follow the various regulations pertaining to transportation of waste.
If it doesn’t cause substantial interference to the easement rights You need to look at the specific terms of the easement i.e. what right it gives to your neighbour. If you can build your chicken coop in such a way that it doesn’t materially affect those rights, then that’s ok However, for this type of easement, any ground level structure is likely to interfere with the use of the easement.
Gated communities are generally part of homeowner's associations that have covenants, rules and regulations regarding how you can use your property. In all likelihood, blocking sidewalk, and perhaps even parking in your driveway, is prohibited by these HOA limitations. HOA's have the right to ticket and fine you for violating its rules. The fines, if not paid, can be converted to liens and used to foreclose upon your property. You can also be banned from using HOA common areas if you do not refrain from violating HOA rules and/or don't pay your fines. This is perfectly legal. If you live in gated community, you are required to follow their rules. Even if you didn't live in an HOA, blocking a sidewalk is usually a violation of municipal ordinances and is tortious activity that can be the basis for a lawsuit against you.
It depends on how you got the right to participate in the event. Let us assume that you "sign up" for the event, and agree to certain conditions in exchange for being allowed to participate. In that case, there could be a condition prohibiting you from tracking the route, or publicizing the track: you have to read what the agreement says. Agreement might be necessary if the track is on private property (you need permission, otherwise you're trespassing). If this is a run on city streets, you can (possibly) follow along on the public sidewalk, and as a non-participant, you aren't bound by any agreement so you can upload whatever you like. You might also be a non-participant follower in the street, which might not be allowed by the city, but that is between the police and you and not the organizer. Running down the middle of the street is not generally legal, but the police might not care enough to ticket you.
Purchasing a lot that contained the keys does not provide any rights to access the locks that those keys would open. What someone who did this would be charged with would vary by both location and also by prosecutorial discretion. The only exception in this scenario would be if the storage locker contained the deed to the property in question.
USA: Can a witness take the 5th to avoid perjury? Lawyer Alice is questioning witness Bob. Bob is not on trial, and no one has accused him of a crime. Alice demands Bob answer a particular question with either a "Yes" or a "no." Bob believes that doing so would mislead the court so greatly that he attempts to use a complete sentence, only for Alice to interrupt him and demand the one word answer. In frustration, Bob simply takes the 5th, to avoid what he believes is perjury. What will happen to Bob now that he's taken the 5th? Will he be held in contempt of court, or will the judge be concerned and try to probe further? Assume Bob is unaware of the concept of rebuttal questions. In case the specific fact pattern is required: Bob witnessed Charlie be hit with a baseball bat, which resulted in Charlie knocking over (and breaking) a vase. Alice is asking if Charlie broke the vase. In Bob's mind, a "yes" answer is a lie, the blame lies with the assailant. A "no" answer is a lie, as Charlie's fall did cause the vase to break.
Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
The parties are generally entitled to present their case as they see fit, as long as they stay within the rules of evidence. If they want a straight yes or no, the court will often require the witness to provide one, which keeps lawyers happy, makes the answers clear for the jury, and limits the parties' grounds for appeal. If a yes or no answer is not as accurate as a more qualified answer, the other lawyer would typically have an opportunity to invite the witness to provide a fuller answer on redirect. If a yes or no answer is inappropriate because of assumption embedded in the question -- as in your "beating his wife and kids" example -- the question should quickly elicit an objection from the defense attorney, who would note that the question lacks foundation or assumes facts not in evidence. Assuming there isn't any evidence of domestic violence, the court should sustain the objection, in which case the witness would not need to answer at all.
united-states Witnesses are generally confined to giving testimony from their own personal memory; most of the time, they can't read a statement into the record or just tell the jury to go look at some other piece of evidence. But this creates problems when a witness knows an important fact but doesn't remember it when she takes the stand. Maybe she counted exactly how much money she stuffed in the robber's bag as she was doing it, and she wrote it down as soon as he fled, but a year later, she can't remember that it was $93,736.45. But the prosecutor isn't allowed to just give the witness a stack of evidence and let her go hunting through the documents to answer each question. Instead,he goes through the "Do you remember" colloquy to lay the necessary foundation to refresh the witness's memory, as contemplated by Rule 612, which then also triggers certain rights for the opposing party with respect to the document used to refresh the witness's memory.
This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.
Bob should certainly expect to be impeached by whichever side his testimony injures. Their attorney will confront him with the transcript of his previous testimony, and likely read it out loud for the jury to hear, and force him to acknowledge that he said something different before. This is pretty standard trial tactics. Bob would not be treated as formally admitting that he committed perjury, though I think it's fair to say that he has effectively made that admission. One side will treat him as having lied the first time; the other will treat him as lying now. It's possible that he will have some explanation for the discrepancy -- he was high, he has memory problems, he misunderstood the question -- but in your hypothetical, the explanation would have to be pretty amazing to justify such a complete reversal.
The defense lawyer has the duty to do the best for his client. The client will be convicted if he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the lawyer can create a reasonable doubt and manages to free his client then he has done a good job. So yes, if the lawyer knows that some other person might have committed the crime, to the degree that it creates reasonable doubt, then the lawyer must raise this. Of course if it turns out that there is just some phantasist making wild accusations, that might not be helpful.
If someone testifying before congress refuses to respond to appropriate questions (questions within the scope of the congressional inquiry), that person can be cited for contempt of Congress. One way to avoid this is if the witness can invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. That says that a person may not be compelled to be a witness against himself (or herself) in a criminal case, and has been interpreted to mean that if testimony might in future be used against the witness in a criminal case, it cannot be required, even if the current occasion is not a criminal case. However, if a person has been granted immunity in a particular matter, no testimony can be used against the person in a criminal case on that matter, and so there is no Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify on that matter. This applies to testimony before a court as well as before Congress. The grant of immunity must be at least as comprehensive as the refusal to testify would have been, or the privilege remains. Therefore, if a person has been granted immunity on a subject, that person cannot refuse to testify before Congress by invoking the Fifth Amendment. If the person does refuse, s/he can be cited for contempt of Congress. However, the person can raise a claim that the inquiry was not a proper one, for example because the subject was not a proper one fo Congressional inquiry, or that the Committee was not properly authorized. If the court upholds such a claim, the person will not be convicted of contempt. Also, while Congress can issue a citation, the Justice Department is not required to prosecute the person, and may choose to let the issue drop. Or the court might not convict on some other ground. And of course Congress (or one house of it) has to vote to issue the citation, which it might decide not to do, for political reasons, or indeed for any reason at all. So a grant of immunity alone is not enough to say that testimony will be compelled, but it is a significant step towards such compulsion. Note that under Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), a state grant of immunity also bars Federal use of the compelled testimony or its fruits, and under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) a Federal grant of immunity bars state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits. See also This Justia essay on "the Power to Compel Testimony" which covers the whole subject with multiple case citations.
No, a defendant may not remain silent on cross-examination. Witnesses who voluntarily testify in their own defense are subject to cross-examination on that testimony. In Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, (1900), a murder defendant testified that he was at two bars and then his cabin the night of the crime. The trial court held that having waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the defendant was subject to cross examination about what he was wearing that night, his connections to a co-defendant, the co-defendant's clothes, and who else was at the cabin with him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that if a defendant voluntary makes a statement about the crime at trial, the prosecution may cross-examine him with as much latitude as it would have with any other witness: The witness having sworn to an alibi, it was perfectly competent for the government to cross-examine him as to every fact which had a bearing upon his whereabouts upon the night of the murder, and as to what he did and the persons with whom he associated that night. Indeed, we know of no reason why an accused person, who takes the stand as a witness, should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).
Is it legal for a business in the US to charge to make change? Is it legal in the US, for a business to charge a fee to make change (cash to smaller denominations, e.g., taking a dollar bill and giving back coins) or the reverse (e.g., taking coins and returning bills)? For example, would it be legal for a business to offer to change a dollar bill into three quarters?
Yes, you can charge for providing a service Even if many businesses provide that service for free.
Is it legal to sell currency at a price lower than face value? Yes. In fact, to donate is the act of transferring for free the ownership of something. Outlawing a transaction that is less extreme than a donation would be inconsistent with the lawfulness of donations. A significant departure from the market exchange rate does not affect the validity of currency exchange. A "sale" of currency in terms of itself is not illegal, since the transaction can be viewed as a combination of two transactions performed instantaneously and involving the fiction of an intermediary currency. Offers of currency for less than face value also happen very often when transacting the bonds issued by a country's central bank. Any two parties can transact those bonds in secondary markets. The scenario you describe obviates redemption periods, fluctuation risks, and various formalities, but those differences are inconsequential from a legal standpoint.
I am not aware of any law making this illegal. You need to avoid any "bait and switch" tactics, though, like initially offering cola for $1 and then not actually letting them buy it for that price.
Yes, that would be legal, indeed required According to the Michigan Dept of the Treasury: Individuals or businesses that sell tangible personal property to the final consumer are required to remit a 6% sales tax on the total price (including shipping and handling charges) of their taxable retail sales to the State of Michigan. Sales of electricity, natural or artificial gas and home heating fuels for residential use are taxed at a 4% rate. Michigan does not allow city or local units to impose sales tax. According to the official Michigan State Sales Tax Handbook Groceries and Prescription Drugs are exempt from sales tax, but prepared food is not. This includes restaurant food, and would, I think, include drinks served in a bar. When I worked in a Michigan restaurant and bar about 40 years ago, sales tax was charged, to the best of my memory.
Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.
A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from).
Bill and Jane are free to enter into a contract where, among other things, each provides valuable consideration; in this case Bill provides valuable lawn mowing services and Jane provides valuable money. In week No 1 they have negotiated the terms and the contract is complete when Bill mows the lawn and Jane pays the money. If Bill turns up next week without Jane's instruction then there is no contract and Jane does not have to pay anything; I don't think this is what you are asking but I include it for completeness. If it is understood that this arrangement continue week after week then either there is an ongoing contract or, more likely, a series of independent contracts. If there is an ongoing contract, then it can be renegotiated but it cannot be changed unilaterally by Bill. That is, he cannot unilaterally increase the price to $2. If there is a series of contracts then the terms of each of those contracts will be the same based on the course of dealing. Basically, the parties have accepted over a long period of time that the rate for a mow is $1 and Bill would have to get Jane to accept the revised rate before he mows the lawn. For your example, Jane owes Bill $1 but if she wants him back next week she will have to agree to Bill's rate.
No. You have to pay taxes no matter what currency you are paid in, or for that matter, in most barter transaction as well. You would have to pay taxes even if you were paid in goats. Also, the counter-parties in transactions in which you are paid in Bitcoin and earn money often have an obligation to file information tax returns to the IRS. If you don't report the income, both you and any counter-party subject to reporting requirements could be liable for the tax as well as for penalties and interest and possible criminal charges as well for intentionally evading taxation and filing false tax returns.
Did Avi Yemini illegally record "Jim Jefferies" by using a hidden mobile phone? Activist and YouTuber Avi Yemeni recorded the conversation he had with "comedian" and show host Geoff Nugent A.K.A "Jim Jefferies". The conversation seemed to have taken place on a professional broadcasting set. Jefferies' show recorded the conversation as well, with production cameras. The reason Yemeni recorded the conversation was in anticipation for how he believed Jefferies or his production company was going to twist his words and make him look like something that he is not. His intuition was proven correct. Yemeni has now filed a lawsuit against the production company and Jefferies for defamation. I read one comment that suggested that Yemeni illegally recorded the conversation by using a hidden camera and did not receive consent to do so. My question is, under New York state law (which is where the lawsuit was filed), is it illegal to record the conversation in question the way it was done in this specific case? I did read that NY state is a one-party consent state when it comes to recording. I'm looking for clarification. This shows the video in question: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odCQhAezB_Q
Did Avi Yemini illegally record “Jim Jefferies” by using a hidden mobile phone? No. One- and two-party consent rules are about confidentiality of a conversation rather than an issue of whether either party gets to monopolize the recording(s) of their conversation. In this case, the conversation took place with both parties' awareness that the conversation was being recorded for its subsequent broadcast[ing] or transmission to the public. At that point it is irrelevant whether there were additional devices recording the same conversation. The parties' aforementioned awareness is tantamount to mutual consent, and thus it precludes either party from alleging a violation of the confidentiality that the two-party consent rule seeks to protect.
The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps.
Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.
Generally they don't. If the conversation was made while there was a third person present, the person can be a witness at trial. Unless the witness is impeached, the witness's statement may be sufficient for you to meet your burden of proof to show the statement was made, because the burden is just a preponderance of evidence in most civil cases. Note that, the existence of a statement is not sufficient to prove breach of privacy. The context surrounding the statement is important. If you intend to record communications from the landlord in the future, please check with your jurisdiction's laws regarding recording of communications. Many jurisdictions (such as California) only permit a private communication to be recorded when all parties give consent. Not only an illegally recorded conversation is inadmissible as evidence (with the exception to rebut a witness), it is also a crime to do so. Some other jurisdictions in USA allows one party to record the conversation without obtaining consent from the other party.
We do not really know, and relevant legislation is pending. The most relevant case for this, where the company that is hosting the service is being held responsible for the output of the chatbot, is MARK WALTERS vs. OpenAI, L.L.C.. This is described by The Verge: A radio host in Georgia, Mark Walters, is suing the company after ChatGPT stated that Walters had been accused of defrauding and embezzling funds from a non-profit organization. The system generated the information in response to a request from a third party, a journalist named Fred Riehl. It seems plausible that if Open AI are held responsible in this case then they may be in your hypothetical.
The opt-out option is exercised by hanging up the phone. The federal wiretapping law 18 USC 2511 would contain any specific restrictions on recording federal employees, and there are no such restrictions. Each state has their own laws as well, so if either party is in a two-consent state such as Florida, consent from the other party would be required. The federal law only requires one party consent. It is possible that the individual expanded a separate rule that s/he may have heard of, one prohibiting recording of an IRS due process collection hearing that is conducted by telephone, as ruled in Calafati v. Commissioner. In that case, petitioner owed taxes and penalties and there was a process where the IRS was going to take his stuff, which requires a hearing. There is a federal statute 26 USC 7521 allowing the in-person hearing to be recorded, but no mention of recording telephone hearings. The Tax Court has taken the position that if it is not explicitly allowed, the IRS can forbid it: but this is in a very specific context, i.e. a specific legal hearing.
Yes, this can land you in jail, no matter what In France, per article 226-1 du code pénal recording without consent may be punished by one year in jail and 45000€ fine. Any recording without authorization of all parties involved (including the owners or administrators of buildings recorded either outside or inside due to copyright of the architectural image) can also land you in legal trouble either criminally or in civil court. The consent is implied if the parties involved knew about it and had means to deny authorization but didn't, but mind that any recording, secret or not, can be considered non consented, which probably discourage anyone from recording anything in France. However you can still show these images obtained illegally in a court and the judge has the right to declare such recording justified (no statute about this, it is totally up to the judge) and thus allow you to use it as evidence both in civil or penal matters. It does not, however, protects you from being sued latter for the exposure of the recorded party, but the acceptance as evidence by a judge may serve as defense. This means that many forms of recording in France, including tourists taking pictures of the Eiffel tower, obviously without authorization of the administrators of the tower or any potential passer-by, is in fact committing a crime, although obviously the law in simply not enforced for these cases. However, if a filmmaker records the Eiffel Tower and makes millions in box office, the tower administration will probably go to the trouble of collecting some money threatening to press charges if not paid.
If there's a reason to believe that your machine has data that would be relevant to a lawsuit, then yes, it is subject to inspection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: A party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: ... any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. So if there's a lawsuit where there becomes a question about what you downloaded from the network, then it's quite plausible that your device could be demanded or subpoenaed. But that's not the same thing as "forfeiting" your device. The normal procedure in such a case would be that the agency's lawyers would notify you of the demand, and you would take your device to an ESI expert, who would make a digital image of the device's hard drive. The parties would then fight about what portions of that image they are allowed to access, but you would have your device again while that was going on.
Is it just to forcibly isolate an infected person when medical resources are deficient? The background is the outbreak of the coronavirus in China. Many infected people have been isolated to prevent the spread of the virus. However, medical resources are highly deficient in serious regions, leaving many patients untreated (or badly treated). Under this circumstance, is it just to isolate them?
Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola.
This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."
You missed a bit: Unless, of course, the patient was a private patient and the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble: As well as the state-run National Health Service (which is generally free to most patients) the UK also has a number of private health care providers where patients pay, for example, to be treated sooner than they would if they went with the NHS. Some NHS doctors also work on a self-employed basis in this private sector, called private practice, which creates the contractual relationship alluded to by Lord Devlin. Re: Don't NHS doctors receive consideration, even if patients don't pay? Yes they do. But not from a (non-private) patient - they are paid by the NHS (or related entity). There are different contractual relationships available, such as being on a salaried payscale or in a partnership but all remuneration comes from the NHS.
As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for Murder, Manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him? There are basically two distinct issues here. What is the duty? And if a duty was breached, what intent is necessary to breach it? There is not a legal duty to be vaccinated. There is a duty to use reasonable care not to hurt others. The duty not to hurt others could be satisfied by not seeing Bob in person, by wearing a mask around Bob or by having other non-transmission means available, in addition to being vaccinated. But Eve didn't do any of these things. We don't know if Eve had any reason to think that she presented a risk of infection to Bob because she could have passed the virus to him while she was asymptomatic. We also know, by the assumption of the question, that Eve was the source of the infection. But, in real life, proving the source of an infection beyond a reasonable doubt is very challenging or impossible. This must be established for any homicide crime. There is no indication that Eve knew she was transmitting the virus to Bob, or that Eve intended to transmit the virus to Bob (if she intentionally spat in Bob's face intending to infect him that would be a different matter). At most, her conduct was reckless, but if she was asymptotic and has no idea that she was doing something that was actually putting Bob at risk, her intent could be as slight as negligent (for tort law purposes only) or criminally grossly negligent. Since she lacked the necessary intent to commit murder (i.e. either an intention to kill, or an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm), she could not be guilty of the offense of murder. There are three types of voluntary manslaughter in England, none of which apply here: "There are three types of voluntary manslaughter: that resulting from loss of self-control; that resulting from statutorily defined diminished responsibility; and killing in perseverance of a suicide pact." So, this leaves involuntary manslaughter as the most serious possible homicide offense. Involuntary manslaughter could encompass either reckless conduct (i.e. "the unlawful act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise it as an act which must subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm resulting therefrom albeit not serious harm") and is usually in furtherance of some other criminal offense, or in the case of "gross negligence manslaughter", negligent conduct that is a far greater level of wrongdoing than the negligence that would suffice for civil tort liability. Gross negligence manslaughter is the most plausible charge and is itself a hard call that involves judgement and discretion on the part of the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, and the jury in a jury trial) that is exercised on a case by case basis considering all of the circumstances. Also, to be clear, the wrongful act in a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter case would be transmitting the virus (which could have been prevented multiple ways) and not failing to get vaccinated itself.
I guess it depends on what courts decide is the "standard of care" in prisons against transmissible diseases. This has been litigated in various way recently, not just following deaths: From a legal standpoint, many the cases center upon: due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly related to pre-trial detainees; Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment; Americans with Disabilities Act violations; and discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs are often asking judges to intervene to force immediate changes at prisons and jails, while litigation is pending. The approach has yielded mixed results thus far. Some judges have moved aggressively, ordering institutions to improve conditions and to do more to adhere to CDC guides. Yet those decisions have met with continued appeals and resistance from corrections officials, and the U.S. Supreme Court has twice overturned efforts by federal judges to intervene forcefully in coronavirus-related matters. In May, the high court rejected on procedural grounds a request by inmates to increase cleaning and COVID-19-related education efforts at their Texas-based geriatric correctional facility. The court upheld the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, which had overturned a Houston-based federal judge’s ruling supporting the prisoners. A few days later, however, the court appeared to switched course, letting stand a federal judge’s order requiring that prison officials move hundreds of inmates from an Ohio institution where nine people had died from COVID-19. Then, on Aug. 3, justices, in a 5-4 decision, overturned a lower-court injunction requiring stricter health and safety measures at the jail in Orange County in Southern California. The Orange County case, Barnes v. Ahlman, is instructive in terms of the arguments being made on both sides and the response by the courts. The jail’s leadership was accused by prisoners of ignoring Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations by failing to enforce social distancing measures and declining to isolate inmates with COVID-19 symptoms. A federal judge in California had issued a preliminary injunction that required the jail to take stronger measures, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined a request by the jail to halt the injunction. Jail officials argued that, prior to the injunction, CDC guidelines had been “largely implemented” and said the injunction’s requirements far exceeded the scope of the CDC’s recommendations. They also cited their efforts to voluntarily release half of the jail’s inmates to help with social distancing and said they had all but eliminated “COVID within the jail population.” The Supreme Court majority voted to stay the injunction while litigation continues. As is custom, the justices did not explain their reasoning in the order. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, saying the stay was premature and that jail had placed inmates at significant risk. Earlier in the Texas case, Sotomayor encouraged lower courts to ensure “that prisons are not deliberately indifferent in the face of danger and death.” I guess some Supreme Justices might not say it but probably think it that it's not cruel and unusual to (catch and) die of transmissible diseases in prison since it happens all the time. E.g. according to one study 97% of infected inmates don't get Hep C treatment. At the other end of the spectrum: a former jail administrator in Oklahoma was sentenced to more than 4 years in prison following his decision not to take an inmate with diabetes to hospital, resulting in his death in 2013. The administrator "pleaded guilty to one count of deprivation of rights under color of law." The inmate in question died of ketoacidosis. So the standard of care in prisons is somewhere in between these extremes. Most litigation regarding Covid-19 seems to center on whether CDC guidelines have been followed or not. I see that the CDC does have some specific guidelines for correctional facilities in this regard. I'm not sure of negligence case law in prison, but regarding the 8th Amendment violations, Helling v. McKinney is probably relevant to preventative measures: In Helling v. McKinney, the Court considered the case of a Nevada prisoner, "the cellmate of a five-pack-a-day smoker," who sought to be housed in an environment free of second-hand smoke. McKinney suffered from no ailment and sought no medical treatment. Justice Byron White wrote for a 7-2 majority of the Court that McKinney's claim that prison officials "have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of ETS [second hand smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health" raised a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. He wrote that McKinney would have to prove both the scientific facts of the dangers of exposure to second-hand smoke and prove that community standards supported him, that "it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate." He would also have to prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. Also following Ashcroft v. Iqbal government officials could not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates so each official would have to be proved liable individually for involvement in such a (faulty) decision.
There are circumstances in which medical ethics historically authorized treating physicians to defer sharing information with patients or even to mislead them in their best interests medically, although the scope of what is considered ethical in that regard is narrowing. But in the fact pattern described in the quoted material there is no plausible way that this withholding of information could be justified. If it was intentional (or for that matter, even if it was negligent) there could be grounds for tort liability for harm caused as a result (although causation and damages are hard to prove). On the other hand, just because it could give rise to tort liability, doesn't imply that the action is necessarily a crime, at least without some kind of motive other than random spite to intentionally provide a false result. However, it is quite difficult to come up with a believable reason that this would happen to someone at random. If the person taking the test bribed someone to provide a false result, which is plausible, that is one thing, but just doing it randomly really doesn't make any sense. The fact pattern provided sounds like it doesn't include the "full story." Why keep records of the actual test results (or for that matter why do the actual tests at all) if you are merely going to intentionally provide a false negative?
Yes. Although there are numerous child-protection laws, there is nothing specific for (beggar) children in this scenario so it would fall within Criminal Force, an offence contrary to section 350 Indian Penal Code: Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent ... or intending ... or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other. The punishment for which may be found at section 352 Whoever ... uses criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment ... for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. For completeness "Force" is described by section 349 as: A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling... [A substance could be, for example, a broom handle or a pan of water] Also, for completeness there's the alternative of Assault under section 351 if no force is used.
Are UK Tier 4 rules law? Yes. The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All Tiers) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020/1374) has been amended by SI 2020/1611. Unfortunately, the amendment is only available as pdf at the moment and I can't copy-and-paste it on my phone for you. SI 2020/1374 and all subsequent amendments may be found here... https://www.legislation.gov.uk/primary+secondary?title=Coronavirus%20all%20tiers ETA: The Introductory Text to SI 2020/1374 states: The Secretary of State makes the following Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 45C(1), (3)(c), (4)(b), (4)(d), 45F(2) and 45P of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22/contents
What to do if complaint is submitted as feedback As it stands the UK definition of a complaint is currently: We treat as a complaint any expression of dissatisfaction with our service which calls for a response Now as far as I'm aware you have to proceed with a complaints handling process if a complaint is submitted. However, if feedback was submitted into a form but fits the definition of a complaint would the same procedure need to be carried out? I've searched the .gov website and I've found this page which shows me how they handle complaints but they do not openly advertise how to get here. (I did a Google search) Whereas other companies openly have the link in the footer. Do both forms need to be equally visible if presented on a website? Could you for example have a feedback form on the main page but put a link to your complaints form in the footer?
In the UK, if you're in a regulated sector e.g. financial services or health services, there are obligations relating to complaints handling. E.g. the Financial Conduct Authority sets out complaints handling rules in DISP 1.3. The FCA says a complaint is: any oral or written expression of dissatisfaction, whether justified or not, from, or on behalf of, a person about the provision of, or failure to provide, a financial service, claims management service or a redress determination, which: (a) alleges that the complainant has suffered (or may suffer) financial loss, material distress or material inconvenience; and (b) relates to an activity of that respondent, or of any other respondent with whom that respondent has some connection in marketing or providing financial services or products or claims management services, which comes under the jurisdiction of the Financial Ombudsman Service. So if there is "feedback" expressing "dissatisfaction" etc it is a complaint. Some entities have acted such that they seem to believe a complaint must be submitted through 'proper channels' to be a complaint. E.g. a complaints form online, a complaints@companydomain email address or a letter addressed to the Complaints Department. Is that the distinction you are making? But that is not the case in regulated organisations, where a complaint is "any oral or written expression of dissatisfaction..." Now, in such an organisation you're not obliged to have a particular type of form or email address etc. But you are obliged to make the complaints procedure relatively easy and reasonably priced if not free (i.e. premium rate phone number for the complaints line = bad, local rate or freephone number = OK).
If you don't respond to the letter, you will be penalized. So why would they send you a pre-stamped envelope? Paying for communications is just part of your everyday life and shouldn't come out of tax payers' money.
The question reads: I see an NDA as a pseudo-public document, something you need to read in detail before you acknowledge and opt-in to limit rights (discussion of topic/tech). Unfortunately for this view, the law normally sees an NDA as a private contract, except when it is alleged that it violates public policy. If an NDA explicitly or implicitly includes itself in the list of things not to be disclosed, then posting it would be a violation of the contract. In such a case the party posting the agreement would be subject to whatever consequence the agreement specifies for violation, unless that person had a valid defense. The operator of a web site where the document might be posted would not normally ne a party to the agreement, and so would not be liable for hosting it, unless some other limitation applies, beyond the NDA itself. An NDA can indeed be a significant limitation on the signer's freedom to discuss certain topics, and a person would be wise to consider it in detail, and perhaps consult a lawyer, before signing one. But that does not mean that the person should post or distribute it publicly, nor that the person is automatically entitled to consult NDAs that others have signed. There are sufficient sample NDA forms available that a person can compare an offered NDA with other possibilities, and get an idea if an offered NDA goes beyond the usual terms.
A review is a classic occasion for fair use under US law, for fair dealing under UK law, and for other exceptions to copyright under the laws of a number of other countries, including many of the EU countries. However, such exceptions usually require that no more of the copyrighted work is used than is needed to demonstrate and support the reviewer's points. It is usual in a review of a film or video to show only very brief clips, usually a few seconds or a minute or so at a time. There is no specific limit on how long an excerpt may be used in a review without the review constituting copyright infringement, this is judged on a case-by-case basis. But if the reviewer actually includes a full fifteen-minute clip, that might be held to be too much. Note that the reviewer can, and often will, discuss the entire film. But it is not usual to "show" the entire film. Just a a book review normally quotes only a few paragraphs, even as it discusses the entire book, a film review normally includes only short clips of scenes significant to whatever points the reviewer makes. In US law, a significant issue is whether the review can "function as a substitute for the original" (17 USC 107). That is, whether people are likely to watch the review and come away feeling as if they had seen the entire film, and so need not watch the original. If sop, it is more likely to be considered an infringement. I can only speak to what might be an infringement of copyright under the law of various countries. I cannot speak to YouTube policies or how such policies might be applied. But my understanding is that YouTube only applies "demonetization" to things that it considers clearly copyright infringements, although sometimes it is overly cautions in such decisions.
No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal.
You can take action against the shop directly under the tort of nuisance. The available remedies are damages to compensate for interference with your property rights, and injunction to require the defendant to cease the activity which is causing the nuisance. You could also bring a judicial review action against the council if they refuse to investigate the noise. In England, Wales, and Scotland this would be based on Section 79(1)(g) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 which defines "noise emitted from premises so as to be prejudicial to health or a nuisance" to be a "statutory nuisance". Section 79 places an obligation on a local authority to "take such steps as are reasonably practicable to investigate" a complaint made by a person living within its area. Section 80(1) requires that "where a local authority is satisfied that a statutory nuisance exists [it] shall service [an abatement notice]". Section section 80(4) provides that it is an offence to contravene an abatement notice. Torts and judicial review are complex areas of law and you should seek legal advice if you intend to pursue either of these routes. The limitation period for judicial review is relatively short (3 months per CPR 54.5(1)), so if you are seeking legal advice, you should do so quickly if you have already approached the council.
Yes, there is a reasonableness limit, and this is especially true in consumer transactions. If you were given an estimate and the final bill is a lot more than what you were expecting, you can dispute it. The final price should be ‘reasonable’. The law doesn’t say what counts as reasonable, so you’ll have to agree it between you. You should consider: the estimate you agreed to [if there was one] any changes, and why they happened anything that happened that was beyond the control of the trader, like bad weather or the cost of materials going up https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/consumer/getting-home-improvements-done/problem-with-home-improvements/ When it comes to work itself, the act states that a tradesman or professional has a 'duty of care' towards you and your property. Any standard or price you agree must be honoured. But if it isn't agreed in advance the work must be done to a reasonable standard, at a reasonable cost, and within a reasonable time. So if you haven't fixed a price, you don't have to pay a ridiculously high bill. All you have to pay is what you consider 'reasonable' and invite them to sue you for the rest. Be careful though, in some circumstances when you are withholding payment you may have a claim made against you by a supplier if you are in breach of contract. What's a reasonable amount would be what similar tradesmen would have charged for the job. So get a few quotations. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/1fdlwC9xzyxjCpWMlsCGG3j/supply-of-services NB that article refers to The Supply of Goods & Services Act 1982, which was partially superseded by the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies.
Am I responsible for unpaid water bill of a previous tenant? I recently moved into a house in South Carolina. Upon trying to get my water turned on they informed me I was going to have to pay $1500 in "unpaid fees" in order to get it turned back on. I have a lease, I don't understand why I'm being held accountable for these fees. Can they really deny me water and force me to pay this?
South Carolina Code §27-33-50: Financial responsibility of tenant for utilities. (A) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, a tenant has sole financial responsibility for gas, electric, water, sewerage, or garbage services provided to the premises the tenant leases, and a landlord is not liable for a tenant's account. (B) An entity or utility providing gas, electric, water, sewerage, or garbage services must not: (1) require a landlord to execute an agreement to be responsible for all charges billed to premises leased by a tenant; or (2) discontinue or refuse to provide services to the premises the tenant leases based on the fact that the landlord refused to execute an agreement to be responsible for all the charges billed to the tenant leasing that premises. (C) This provision does not apply to a landlord whose property is a multi-unit building consisting of four or more residential units served by a master meter or single connection.
The landlady is trying it on. The purpose of a deposit is to protect the landlord from being left out of pocket by: damage to the property rent arrears Reasonable wear and tear does not constitute damage. It seems unlikely that the stiff tap is as a result of damage. The hob is not so clear cut: the landlady could argue that it was damaged, albeit by accident, and the cost of repair taken from your deposit. If she insists that the only remedy is to replace the hob, she should make an appropriate deduction to reflect the fact that it is several years old and will be replaced by one that is new (thereby gaining her some value). It would be reasonable for you to expect to see the written report from the gas inspector who has condemned the whole hob in that case. But I find it hard to believe that: the plastic knob cannot be replaced doing so would make the hob unsafe, if the knob can be removed for cleaning it's my understanding that if the hob is indeed broken, I only have to pay what it was worth at the moment before it was broken. Your liability is to return her to the position she would have been in had the damage not occurred. If that means replacing a removable plastic part instead of the whole hob, that would be a reasonable remedy.
You need absolute written buy in from the landlord. His agreement is with you, not this new person. If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after you.
You owe money if there is a contract obliging you to pay. Whether you receive what you pay for (e.g. services) only affects your stance when suing for non-performance/damages; your obligation to pay still stands until the court decides it does not (or there is a mutual agreement to discharge the contract). It is irrelevant whether the original payment method still works or not. If it does not but you still owe money — you have to pay. The ability to turn the credit card off is just a handy feature. It does not affect your contractual obligations in any way except for when the terms explicitly provide for it (like automatic cancelling subscription when payment method fails).
Maybe, maybe not. The answer is implicit in the restraining order, which I assume you have a copy of. If the wording is unclear, you can ask your attorney. The order will state the consequences for violating the order, so you have some idea what the risk factor is. A person may also petition for a new restraining order to include bill-paying, which may or may not be granted.
I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.
Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble?
am I obligated to pay this fee? Yes. You entered the lease despite been aware of the existence of that fee. That meets the contract law tenet that an agreement be entered knowingly and willfully. Does it not invoke an issue where they can arbitrarily set the price? If the landlord requires a fee that is unreasonably high, that would violate the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As such, that part would be unenforceable, meaning that the landlord may only charge a reasonable fee. Likewise, unless the lease clearly entitles the landlord to decide the telecom fee arbitrarily, the lease would fail to meet that extent of the aforementioned tenet of a contract being entered knowingly. Does this fall under the category of lease addendum? The form (or format) in which the requirement of telecom fee was mentioned --and agreed upon-- does not matter. The landlord only would need to prove that the tenant was --or should have been-- aware of that fee. Usually the landlord can prove that by showing/producing in court the lease with tenant's signature.
Can one be liable for poisoning food one expects to be stolen? A friend of mine posted about how someone keeps stealing her food at work, and I recommended she lace it with some insanely hot hot sauce. Someone else commented that she could be liable for poisoning someone if she did that. The thief is already ignoring written labels saying 'private' and 'do not take this if your name isn't ____'. My assumption would be that this constitutes a warning label, and that she isn't responsible, just like a company isn't responsible if you injure yourself using their product in a manner inconsistent with their instructions. So, I'm wondering: Is there any liability at all, since the item in question is being stolen? Are there any specific legal guidelines for what constitutes a written warning that waives liability for misuse of a product? If so, would this meet those criteria?
(I'm taking for granted that the question is about the application of poison to food, and I'm answering the general question about liability for poisoning food expected to be stolen. Whether application of a particular hot sauce meets that assumption is outside the scope of my answer.) The facts right now are: theft is foreseeable injury is foreseeable If you poison the food in a situation where a reasonable person would foresee theft and subsequent injury, then you are liable for at least the tort of negligence if the thief is in fact injured. Simply adding a note saying "don't steal" doesn't disclose the danger. Do you have a duty of care to other people with access to your food? (That is the remaining element of negligence.) Yes. (See http://premisesliability.uslegal.com/duty-owed-trespassers/). You have a duty to not willfully or wontonly trap or otherwise prepare harm for would-be tresspassers, and I believe that extends to lunchroom thieves. But, the simple answer is don't poison food!
There is, as far as I can see, no Crown exemption from the sale of goods acts (including the International Sale of Goods Conventions), but unfortunately for this patient the NHS has no liability either in logic or in law. The doctor provided a written prescription, for which there is no charge, and which allows patients to buy certain drugs. The patient took the prescription to a chemist's, which (for money) provided the drug specified in it. Even if the patient had noticed that the prescription was for the wrong form of medicine, the pharmacist has no discretion to alter it; if the prescription specifies tablets, the patient can either buy the tablets or not buy them and take the prescription back to the doctor. In neither case has either the doctor or the chemist committed any conceivable offence regarding sale of goods. (There might theoretically be a case for negligence, but it would never be worth either suing a doctor for an £8 prescription fee or reporting him to the authorities for writing a prescription for the right drug in the wrong form).
The term "illegal" is also often used for actions that the law prohibits, but that give rise to civil liability, rather than criminal prosecution. We see such use a lot in questions on Law.SE. One also says that a person "is liable" when there are grounds for a civil suit against that person. One might also say that such a person "has commited a tort" or "has civil liability" or "could be held liable". In the specific cases of copyright, trademark, and patent law, one says that a violator "his infringed" or has committed infringement" and that an act contrary to those laws "is an infringement".
There is commonly a law like RCW 69.50.309 which says that A person to whom or for whose use any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed by a practitioner, and the owner of any animal for which such controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was delivered to him or her by the person selling or dispensing the same. A controlled substance is "a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V as set forth in federal or state laws, or federal or commission rules". Schedule V includes some opiates with low potential for abuse and dependency. It does not include prescription antibiotics, and does not include Ibuprofen and other OTC NSAIDs. The cop may be right about keeping your narcotics in the original container, but wrong about anything less. I can't presently locate the Oklahoma analog of this law. After diligent searching, I even suspect that Oklahoma does not have such an "original container" law. It would count as a "counterfeit substance" if it is a controlled substance and is in a container with labeling that is not that of the original distributor, but if the contain is completely blank, it is not legally a "counterfeit substance". And again, that only applies to controlled substances.
The crime of theft generally requires two elements - taking control of property, and the intent to deprive the rightful owner of it. If Bob had no intent to leave without paying, he may lack the intent often required for theft. In the scenario described, it's possible Bob has not committed theft, but his actions may indeed constitute theft depending on the jurisdiction. As pointed out in the comments, some jurisdictions codify the concealment of merchandise as prima facie presumption of an intention to steal, or may even codify the act of concealment itself as a crime. There are some shoplifting laws statues that specifically call out "willful concealment", which does not require leaving the premises of a store to have committed a crime - merely concealing the item may be a crime in itself, although perhaps not the crime of "theft". Whether a court would find Bob guilty of theft will depend on a number of factors, depending if there is leeway in inferring intent, and how that intent is inferred. If Bob's actions are found to be sufficiently inconsistent with the behavior of someone who truly intended to pay, the court may find him guilty. If a reasonable person would infer a lack of intent to pay from Bob's actions, he may be found guilty.
What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice.
Is something considered stolen if it possibly could have been lost? Something is considered stolen if it was stolen. You don't have your passport + Someone entered the room where it was ≠ They stole it Can this be brought to small claims court? What damage did you suffer that could be remedied by a monetary settlement? Sure, the landlord entering your room without your permission is probably unlawful but it's not clear that it did you any damage. No damage; no case. Should the police or some other government agency care? Here is a ranking of government cares: Getting reelected National security Economic Management ... 42,567. Murder ... 421,762. Passport Fraud ... 7,656,232. Passport theft ... 58,432,546. Passports that might have been stolen but probably weren't
In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them.
Can we bring a foreign national to court in Australia? I have a contract violator who is a foreign national. Can I bring him to court in Australia? The contract was made online. It was just a simple email: will you do this task for me? I will pay you such and such. I agreed and that's it. All through email communication. Also, if a judgement is made, will he be caught if he enters Australia?
Yes, but ... You can bring a suit in an Australian court of competent jurisdiction. You would then need to find and serve the defendant in compliance with both Australian law and the law of the jurisdiction they are in. They can then raise a jurisdictional challenge that the Australian court is not the appropriate forum - they might be right depending on where the substance of the contract happened, whether the contract has a nomination of venue clause and if the contract is subject to an arbitration agreement. If the Australian court decides it does have jurisdiction it would have to decide which law applies - this is likely to be a mix of law because some laws in both jurisdictions are likely not excludable by contract. If you win, you would then have to get the judgement enforced somewhere the defendant has assets. Not paying a judgement is not a crime so the defendant will be of no interest to law enforcement - getting money from them is your problem. tl;dr Cross-national litigation is way more expensive in time and money and way less certain in outcome beyond the inherent uncertainty in any lawsuit. This is not something you can expect to succeed at without lawyers in both countries so you will be spending tens of thousands for an uncertain outcome. If you are chasing millions this may be worth it but if you are - don’t do million dollar deals by email in the future.
The solicitor is allowed not to accept a case. If your ex-wife asked him to prepare papers, and he feels that she is getting ripped off, it is absolutely understandable that he won't prepare these papers for her, because he doesn't want to be sued or badmouthed when the deal goes wrong. "We would also reserve the right to take our own professional advice as to our efforts on your behalf." means simply he is not specialised in some subject, and will prefer to ask someone who is. Like a medical doctor asking for a second opinion before going ahead and cutting your leg off. Now I would have preferred if the solicitor had said concretely what exactly is wrong with the contract. Also, it would be obvious that you would be very comfortable with anything that he would advice her against. If he thinks that it is a good deal for you but not for her, he should advice against it. (Your comment to another question seems to indicate that she should be paid a lot more than you offered, so her solicitor seems to have been perfectly right).
Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one.
The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with.
As I understand it, you can pretty much sue anybody for anything. The question, of course, is would you win the suit? All the lawyers here can correct me, but I believe in order to win, you would have to Show standing, that is, they're your comments and not someone else's Show that it's a deliberate act, and not just someone accidentally clicked the wrong checkbox. Show that it was an act by the agency and not by Facebook, for example. Show that you've been singled out for your viewpoint (they allow some people's comments) Show that there is no other reason to delete your comments (they're obscene, or advocate for an illegal act, for example). I'm probably missing something else. The real question is, even if you could demonstrate all these things, would it be worth it? You may spend $1,000's and you might not recover your legal fees. The case might take years.
If correctly structured, probably First, there is no issue with escorts in Canada. If you are in Toronto and need a plus one for the big gala dinner, you can hire a date provided sexual gratification is not part of the deal. An NDA as part of that sort of contract would be fine. Similarly, in jurisdictions where sex work is legal, there’s also no problem. So, we will just focus on contracts where one of the fundamental obligations involves an illegality. This doesn’t have to be prostitution, it could be a contract for murder, or the supply of illicit drugs, or the supply of unpasteurised milk. One of the requirements for a valid contract is legality of objects. A contract for an illegal purpose is void. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Therefore, an NDA that was a term of such a contract is also void. However, an NDA that was a separate contract, even a collateral contract, would be enforceable because NDAs do not have illegal objects. This can probably best be illustrated by an example. Let's imagine there is an establishment where people can go for food, drink, entertainment, and socialise - we'll call it the club. As part of the contract for using the club or being an employee or supplier to the club or its patrons, there is an NDA not to reveal anything that happens in or is associated with the club. There is no reason to believe that this NDA would not be a valid and enforceable contract - subject to the normal laws that limit such agreements. Now, if visitors entered other agreements that were void, with each other or with the club - such as for the supply of sex or illegal drugs - this would not, on its own invalidate the NDA contained in the other contract. If a court decided that the whole operation was a sham and that the club was merely a front for a brothel, they may find the original contract is void as being against public policy or, it quite likely may be an irrelevancy, because people engaged in a joint criminal enterprise have very few rights against one another anyway. However, if the club is primarily a legitimate business, then there would be no reason to impugn the original contract.
You do have a contract - you agreed to pay them for services, that creates a contract. If they have failed to provide the service that you paid for, the onus is on you to prove that. Getting a bank to make a chargeback when services have been provided in return for the payment is likely unlawful notwithstanding that you are not satisfied with the service they provided. They can sue you in either Bulgaria or the USA and a judgement in one countries court will likely be enforceable in the other. In addition, if you have committed a crime in Bulgaria then the Bulgarian police may investigate and may issue a warrant for your arrest and seek your extradition from wherever you happen to be.
My story: UK passport holder, resident in Switzerland, driving from Houston to San Antonio and stopped doing 105mph in a 60mph section of highway. I was given the citation and instructions, etc., but told the officer I was leaving in 2 days and may not be able to tend to it in time. On my return to Switzerland, I called the court and asked how I could pay. I was told I could get a money order from the post office, to which I replied, "Really, the Swiss Post office will issue U.S. money orders?" After a further 15 minutes of conversation about how I was willing but unable to pay, the officer said, "Well, I guess that we ain't commin' to Switzerland to get you so just ignore it!" I asked if I could have that in writing and he asked me to write to the court and explain my situation. 3 weeks later and I received a reply saying all was forgiven and I should have no problem re-entering the U.S. or the State of Texas. So my advice would be to call them, and act willing to pay. Things may have changed and you may be able to pay with a credit card, but if you act willing and they are unable to accept your payment, then as long as you have a paper trail, you should be fine. I have entered the U.S. dozens of times since and have even sponsored visas for others.
When does a fan game fall under parody? Apparently there was a case in 2013 where the fan game My Little Pony: Fighting is Magic got taken down by Hasbro. This makes me wonder, why did it not fall under fair use in terms of Parody? This article by a legal information website says [...] a parody is a literary or artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule. It is regarded as a criticism or comment on the original copyrighted work. In simple terms, it has to convey to the audience some type of message about the original work. This “message” fits can be understood to transform the original work (the work that’s being parodied) because that message is adding something new; it takes all or part of the original work and gives it a different purpose or character. [...] Making a game about characters from this TV show fighting each other, when in the series it's all about loving each other could be seen as criticism or comment on the peacefulness of the original characters. So why doesn't that count as parody? In a related fashion, I'm thinking about a game where giant dynamaxed Pokemon unleash death and destruction onto the world. If PETA's Pokemon clone is parody, wouldn't an overly brutal version of Pokemon be parody as well? I would be creating my own assets. What exactly is and isn't parody?
The details of this specific matter are not clear because it appears that Mane6 relented in response to a cease and desist letter, rather than be dragged through court. Since we are not privy to the letter from Hasbro, the best we can do is guess based on the degrees of freedom that exist under the law. The claim that this game was a "parody" is an affirmative defense that Mane6 would have to raise in response to a copyright infringement claim (we don't know if there were also trademark infringement claims in the letter). Then the jury would look at the arguments of the two sides to determine whether this was really "fair use", performing the "balancing act" to see how much of the original work was copied, how transformative the derived work is, what the effect on market would be. The lines drawn for making these judgments are not bright. A quick scan of a successor product Them's Fightin' Herds suggest that someone thought the artwork was too substantially similar to the Hasbro product, that is, the fighting pony version was judged to not be transformative enough. Since it didn't go to court, we'll never know.
Arguably not (or, the example terms are not restricted by copyright, but not for the reasons given, which means this protection may not extend past the examples given in all cases). The protection for "stock characters" comes from the "Scènes à faire" doctrine, which protects elements that are elementary and near-required to be part of a genre. For example, a fairy tale is "obligated" to start with "Once upon a time" and end with "And they lived happily ever after". Character classes, by virtue of being character classes, do not qualify under this doctrine to me, simply by virtue of being "character classes". What matters are: a) the terms used for the classes are generic b) there is prior art to any claimed copyright, with uses of such terms in fantasy fiction stretching back at least hundreds of years and predating, for example, modern English. Note that the above is not universal to all character classes. For example, if you had classes whose names that directly related to various other copyrighted works IP (e.g. "Jedi Councilor", "Yogo Wardmaster", "Grey Warden", "Aes Sedai", "Asha'man" "Eversor Assassin"), those could still be infringing copyright.
If I draw something, having been inspired by looking at some other thing, you are not copying that thing. If you carefully copy something even if you are also deliberately changing features of the original, then you are copying. Copyright law gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to make copies. There is a difference between copying music and visual art in this respect, since music can be reduced to a small set of specific symbols, so "being inspired by" a musical work is often found to be infringement. The difficult part is legally distinguishing "making a copy" versus "being inspired by". The courts use a subjective test of "substantial similarity" to decide if there has been copying. the case of Mannion v. Coors. "Pose" is an element that is considered in assessing similarity: the question the court would ask (itself) is whether such a pose could ever have come from elsewhere (such as, your own creative efforts).
Since the person who posted the game component under the CC-BY license has no right to do so, no one who used it in reliance on that license had any rights either, and all such uses were at least technically infringement (unless they came under a copyright exception, which seems unlikely). The holder of the copyright on the component could sue in any country where a game using it was published. The details of the law, including the rules on damages and other remidies, will vary from country to country. In the united-states those rules are contained in Chapter 5 of title 17 USC particularly sections 502-505. Section 504 provides for possible money damages. Section 502 provides for a possible injunction (court order to stop infringing). Section 503 provides for for infringing works to be seized. Section 505 provides for possible awards of costs and legal fees to a successful plaintiff (copyright holder). Section 502 allows injunctions to "prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright" on "reasonable" terms. But when the infringement has already been stopped, no such injunction is needed and a court is not likely to impose one. Section 503 allows the court to order the impoundment of infringing copies and "plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced". This is largely obsolete for digital content. Section 504 is the key. It offers the plaintiff a choice between actual damages plus profits and statutory damages. The rule for the first is: The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. This means money made by use of the unauthorized content, plus any loss of sales or other losses suffered by the owner. Money mad by the infringing work but not made by use of the infringing content is not included, if this can be proven. Income obtained after the infringing content was removed would probably not be included in the infringer's profits. Statutory damages can be any amount between $750 and $30,000 that the count thinks is just, but id the infringement is proved to be "innocent" the lower limit is $200. The exact provision reads: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. An award of costs and fees under section 505 is entirely up to the discretion of the court. If the maximum possible award of infringer's profits is $10,000, and a defense of innocent infringement is plausible, a plaintiff might well find such a suit unprofitable, given the legal expenses involved in preparing an carrying through such a suit. But that is entirely up to the copyright owner. An owner may choose to file even an unprofitable suit in an effort to deter others. A person who has discovered that s/he has innocently infringed a copyright and made some money in the process would be wise to document the prompt removal of the infringing content form any publication, and efforts to notify the copyright owner. Ther is no way to be sure what actions the owner will take, if any, within those that the law allows. Often a owner in such a case will not bring suit if the infringement was apparently innocent, resulting profits were small, the infringement has been halted, and future infringement by that infringer seems unlikely. But different owners have different policies on such matters. An owner can delay in deciding whether to file suit or not.
What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.
Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.
Can I sell below parody T-Shirts? Sure, you can sell those shirts. But there is no guarantee that your own determination and claim of Fair Use for a parody would prevail in court. The determination that your use of those derivative designs - Fair Use as a Parody - is not yours to make; it is for a court to make, if and when the copyright holders of those two franchises choose to take you to court. Your determination of Fair Use could only be valid in the US; there may be no Fair Use law in your country, and any relevant international laws and agreements will impact what the legal steps the copyright holders can take against you. Read Fair Use again for exceptions to the law and about international laws such as as Berne Convention and World Intellectual Property Organization. Warner Brothers (Superman) and Paramount (Godfather) could decide at any time to confront you with a cease and desist letter or a lawsuit to challenge your claim of Fair Use. They may win; you may win your defense of their lawsuit. That's a risk you will take. The fact that other people currently produce shirts with similar designs doesn't mean anything. They may not have been confronted by the copyright holders; or the copyright holders may not care to confront small producers of possibly infringing designs and products.
Someone similar say While it is quite true that no one can have a copyright that excludes all others from preparing their own unique copy of the Bible or other public domain works for copyright protection, our Bibles and other materials are not exactly like any others and are fully protected by copyright laws in all countries So for example, I could theoretically take an ancient public-domain texts and republish it in some modified form. Copyright does not protect the original, but it does protect my modifications. To the extent that Mechon Mamre does include protected material (of their own creation), and Snunit redistributed that material with permission, Mechon Mamre might sue you for copyright infringement. Since they don't say what their creative contribution is, it's hard to evaluate the merits of their claim.
Can terms of service prohibit a user from quoting content on a website? I was wondering whether Facebook's TOS on automated data collection would actually be legally feasible. As far as I am concerned there is a universal right of quotation. Of course that will vary from the implementing country, but here in Germany this law is pretty strong, we are even allowed to quote entire pages, songs or pictures. Does it matter whether I quote in an automated way? Suppose I visit Facebook once a day to observe a time change on the social network (e.g. a community page). Every day, I would then republish this information, explicitly marking it as a quotation, and referencing it back to Facebook. The regulation suggests that for scientific purposes the quotation right can practically be expanded indefinitely. I cannot see how Facebook could infringe with the universal right of quotation, which in this case weighs much more than their TOS. Technically speaking, there is no difference in me using a browser to visit their website, or me using a script that uses a browser to visit their website.
Quoting content may or may not constitute copyright infringement, depending on the various factors that go into the fair use defense. Short quotes which are made for the purpose of discussion, research and commentary and not for copy would be squarely in the domain of "fair use" under US law. That means that the copyright owner would not succeed in suing you for quoting them: under the statutory mechanism for recognizing his right to his intellectual product, there is a limit on how much control he can exert over your behavior (since the two of you have not worked out some kind of agreement -- copyright law creates rights even when there is no contract). As for Facebook, you have a contract with them, embodied in the terms of service. You have been given permission to access material that they host (permission is required, under copyright law), and their permission is conditional. It says "you may access stuff on our platform only as long as you do X": if that includes a clause "don't be nasty", then that limits your right to speak freely and be as nasty as you'd like. If it says "don't quote even a little", that means you cannot quote even a little, even when you would have the statutory right to quote a little (or, to be nasty). Fair use would mean that you can't be sued for copyright infringement of the stuff that you quoted a little of. You can, however, be expelled from Facebook. You probably cannot be sued for "accessing Facebook without permission". There is a federal law against unauthorized access of computer networks, and there was a failed attempt to construe violation of a TOS as "unauthorized access" – it isn't. But accessing Facebook necessarily involves copying (that's how computers work), and there is no "fair use" defense whereby everybody has a fair use right to access Facebook. Theoretically you could be sued for copyright infringement, for accessing Facebook's intellectual property without permission. Also, Facebook can rescind your permission to access their content (see this case), and once you have been banned, it is a crime to further access their network. This assumes that there is no overriding limit on contracts that would nullify a no-quoting condition. There is no such limit on contracts in the US, so such a contract would be enforceable. There is also nothing illegal (unenforceable) about a TOS which prohibits automated methods of access.
Yes, once law is passed and Facebook is designated under it as a "designated digital platform corporation" then it will be obligated either pay remuneration to all "registered news business corporations" in Australia for content they voluntarily post on Facebook, or not allow any Australian news on their site at all. The same applies to Google and in theory any other digital platform corporation designated by the Australian government. The law makes no distinction according to where the content is shown, but only Australian news businesses can benefit from it. The purpose of the law is to "address a bargaining power imbalance that exists between digital platforms and Australian news businesses" and amends the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 to create a "News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code". Currently Australian news companies, like any other Facebook user voluntarily posting content on the site, are paid nothing by Facebook. Similarly, Google doesn't pay anyone for the content the indexed on their site, essentially also voluntarily, since it's trivial to opt out of this. The Australian government sees this as the result of unfair competition. According to them, Facebook and Google have abused their power to force Rupert Murdoch's News Corp and other Australian news companies to agree to put their content on their sites for free. This new bargaining code seeks to solve this problem by forcing designated digital platform corporations and registered news business corporations into final offer arbitration over remuneration if they can't come to a negotiated agreement. Any arbitration determination would require that Facebook or Google to pay some amount of remuneration, and the determination would be based in part on "the benefit (whether monetary or otherwise) of the registered news business’ covered news content to the designated digital platform service". This would include the benefit they receive by showing the content outside of Australia. A key part of the law is it's "non-differentiation" requirements. This would prohibit Facebook and Google from showing or indexing Australian news corporations' content differently depending on whether they're forced to pay them money or not, or even whether they're an officially registered news business or not. This means Facebook and Google aren't allowed to choose to show some Australian news businesses' content and not others. If they show any of their content then they must show content from them all. If they show content from a registered Australian news business anywhere in the world then they must pay for it. This leaves Facebook and Google with three options if the law passes: Pay for news content from all registered Australian news business. Don't show or index any Australian news business content. Remove their presence completely from Australia to prevent Australia from enforcing their law on them.
Using software generally does not entail any legal requirement to acknowledge the use of that software, and would only arise as a licensing condition. Google services, including Translate, are subject to certain terms of use especial the part about what they expect of you. They do not impose any requirement regarding acknowledgment, therefore they cannot later demand any royalties. If a translation program imposes any demands on your usage of the program, that has to be part of the original agreement whereby you were allowed to use the software at all.
In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.
From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.
united-states Facts are not copyrightable. Assuming Scrapehero collected these facts in a legal manner and assuming the source of these facts does not contain copyrighted (protected) material, then selling such a collection may be legal. Of particular relevance is Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co.. Here, Feist Publications copied Rural's phone directory into Feist's own phone directory. The supreme court found that Rural's phone directory was not copyrightable and thus not protected. Of course, this cuts both ways. Assuming Scrapehero did not inject creativity into the data, nothing stops a recipient of such data from distributing it themselves. In practice, this probably isn't a concern for Scrapehero. This answer is US-specific. Some countries recognize Database Rights, which may prevent such activity.
The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.
I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer 1 For the avoidance of doubt, the thrust of this debate is: By placing a logo associated with a certain political movement near my user profile, does StackExchange violate Section 4(c) of the CC BY-SA 3.0? Subscriber Content is Content that is contributed by StackExchange users. The relevant sections of CC BY-SA 3.0 (emphasis added) are: c. ... The credit required by this Section 4(c) may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of a Adaptation or Collection, at a minimum such credit will appear, if a credit for all contributing authors of the Adaptation or Collection appears, then as part of these credits and in a manner at least as prominent as the credits for the other contributing authors. For the avoidance of doubt, You may only use the credit required by this Section for the purpose of attribution in the manner set out above and, by exercising Your rights under this License, You may not implicitly or explicitly assert or imply any connection with, sponsorship or endorsement by the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties, as appropriate, of You or Your use of the Work, without the separate, express prior written permission of the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties. d. Except as otherwise agreed in writing by the Licensor or as may be otherwise permitted by applicable law, if You Reproduce, Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work either by itself or as part of any Adaptations or Collections, You must not distort, mutilate, modify or take other derogatory action in relation to the Work which would be prejudicial to the Original Author's honor or reputation... Does changing the logo on all pages imply an endorsement of the site/organisation by the user? It is likely, though not definite, that this positioning of the logo will imply that the user endorses the website. However, actions taken by the user - such as creating an account, accepting the Terms, contributing content - are likely to affirm this view. Does changing the logo imply that the site/organisation supports a particular political view? Again, it is likely, not definite, that changing the logo will imply that the site/organisation supports a particular political view. Does changing the logo impute support of a political view to the user? In this case, however, it is highly unlikely that the change of logo would impute to the user support of the political view. In a case such as this, onus of proof is on the plaintiff - were this claim brought in court, it would need to be proven on the balance of probability (or, less likely, on the preponderance of evidence) that a reasonable person would impute support of the marriage equality (and perhaps some other) agenda to the user. Reasonable person does not mean any particular person, nor does it mean, all people. Part of the imputation must come from the purpose that the user subscribes to the site. Perhaps if StackOverflow were a site that promoted marriage equality or judicial activism, this could support an opinion that the user supports this view. However, StackOverflow is about programming, and programming doesn't imply that kind of agenda. Perhaps if the icon had been changed to something that suggested support for object-oriented programming, the icon could be taken to suggest that the user supports this agenda. Neither does the user's content suggest support for this cause - if they constantly made off-hand remarks about it in their posts, then perhaps, again, a reasonable person may make that imputation. In any case, the damages awarded to the user would likely be compensatory rather than punitive - the user would need to therefore demonstrate actual suffering or loss as a result of the change of icon. If there were actual damages or loss, the way in which the user contributed to them - perhaps by posting a thread that would be likely to be inflammatory and attract attention to the user - may reduce an award of damages. In the case of no actual suffering or loss, the user could be awarded nominal damages. Injunctions that could be awarded would need to be proportionate to the breach of license - the court could require references to this user to be anonymised. This is easily done. It is unlikely that the court would require all contribution by the user to be removed - this is unlikely to pass a public interest test. In relation to placing a disclaimer in the footer, US courts have generally accepted disclaimers if they are positioned such that a reasonable user is likely to see it... In the footer? It's not a great place, and easily missed. It could be better than nothing, though, and may help with the likelihood of someone imputing such opinions to a user. Essentially - it's extremely unlikely that a reasonable person would impute support of the marriage equality agenda on a user based on a logo change, because the support is not sufficiently connected to the primary purpose of the site, or the user's activities on the site. Even if the user were successful in showing that this is the likely conclusion of a reasonable person, the remedies available to them would be limited to damages (which limited to actual losses, including suffering), and an injunction (which is likely to be anonymisation). A disclaimer may not, on its own, actually preserve the validity of the license, but it may be useful on determining the likelihood of a reasonable person imputing opinions to a user. 1. This is larger than normal, because I think it is more important than normal.
Life insurance and taxes: Does a sole beneficiary need to tell other heirs? (Utah) Situation Updated A sibling died. There are several heirs. One heir was named the sole beneficiary of a life insurance policy, who received and deposited the check. There is no will or other document that states how the deceased sibling hoped that the insurance proceeds would be used or otherwise distributed. Question: Must the sole beneficiary reveal to the other heirs any of the facts about the policy, such as the existence of the policy, the amount of the policy, or anything else? Clarification Added The beneficiary of the life insurance policy wants to keep it private to avoid family dramas (jealousy, hurt feelings, etc.). Assume that the beneficiary will talk to a CPA about any federal or state obligations (so taxes are not an issue).
NO In most cases there is no tax owed by the beneficiary and it has, in any case, nothing to do with the estate.
@Rick aptly answers your first question (and I totally agree with his answer including his conclusion that the cited provisions apply to single member LLCs). So, I'll touch on issues associated with your second one. Would there be anything legally wrong with my intentionally wasting the company's money or doing something similarly pointless and harmful to the business, considering I'm the only actual person (as in human, not legal person) who is harmed in any way? If the way you use the money wastefully is considered by a court to be a de facto distribution by the LLC to you, its sole member, and this renders it insolvent (as defined in ORS 63.229 (Limitations on distributions), you could have personal liability for the distribution to the company. See ORS 53.235. Creditors of the company could then garnish that obligation to collect their debts owed to the company from you (a garnishment is technically a right to obtain money or property from someone who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, usually a bank or employer, but not always as in this case). Intentionally wasting the company's money would probably constitute a "fraudulent transfer" on the part of the LLC which could expose you to liability to third-party creditors if those actions left the company unable to pay its debts as they came due, or with assets with a fair market value that was lower than the fair market value of its current and currently anticipated liabilities. This parallel liability would arise under the Oregon Fraudulent Transfers Act and related provisions of Oregon law found at ORS 95.200 to 95.310. If you were anticipating or in the process of divorcing, it could constitute economic waste that could be held against you (treating the wasted assets as if they still existed and were allocated to your in a property division). Likewise, if the waste reduced your income for child support purposes, a court would seriously consider imputing the income you could have had if you had not acting in that matter to the income you actually had, in order to calculate your child support obligation. And, you might be disallowed a deduction for the waste of the company's money, rather than having it treated as an expense, which could increase your income tax and self-employment tax liability. But, to the extent that you are the sole owner of the company, no creditor, spouse or child has rights impaired by your actions, and you don't claim the wasted assets as income tax deductions, there would be no one with standing to complain about your conduct in court.
Dead people have to pay their debts just like everybody else It is one of the primary roles of the executor to make sure this happens. Dead people can dispute a debt just like everybody else Just because someone says you owe them money, that doesn't mean you owe them money. In fact, the onus of proving the debt lies with the person claiming the money. It is perfectly reasonable for an executor to ask the creditor to do so. Some questions that are appropriate to ask: Presumably, the entitlement arises under a contract; when was the contract entered into? What were its terms? Where is the evidence the deceased agreed to these terms? Do the terms comply with (consumer) law? Have the prices been calculated in accordance with the terms? Have previous invoices been submitted and paid on the same basis? All the issues you mentioned. These are all things the creditor would need to prove if they went to court. If they can provide satisfactory answers to these then pay the bill. If they can't then try to agree to a settlement amount acceptable to both parties. If you can't do that, let them sue the estate and let a judge decide. The debts of the deceased person are payable by the estate of the deceased person for which the executor is the trustee. The executor has a duty to the beneficiaries of the estate to act in their best interest. This means paying bills that they are satisfied are justified, contesting those that aren't but ultimately, making commercial decisions that benefit the beneficiaries. Getting bogged down in a court case may not be in their best interest especially if it delays finalisation of the estate. In any event, the executor is not liable personally for the debt, or for anything they do or fail to do if done or not done in good faith.
If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.
Contracts are a relationship between two or more people Just as it is meaningless to speak of marrying yourself, it is equally meaningless to speak of a contract with yourself. Even if you were to draft such a thing, you would not have standing to sue because you can’t sue yourself. Your example probably isn’t a “one person contract” It’s a contract between the car owner (person 1) and the car yard (person 2) - probably a corporation. The fact that person 1 is representing both parties to the contract doesn’t make it a “one person contract”. There are potential conflicts of interest with this but they are not necessarily ones that can’t be overcome. However, if the car owner runs a business as a car dealer as a sole trader, then, no, they cannot make this kind of contract.
The only time it is relevant is when an estate is subject to the Generation Skipping Transfer Tax. But, the exemption from the tax is currently (as of 2019) $11,400,000 per donor per lifetime, so if the expected inheritance is less than that amount there is not a tax issue. When I started practicing law (in 1995), the exemption was $600,000, so it affected a lot more people. All aspects of inheritance are governed by state rather than federal law except the income tax, estate tax and generation skipping transfer tax issues. Otherwise this is permitted under U.S. law in every state (some countries, such as Mexico, only allow a child to be disinherited by a Will for dishonoring the parent in some way or predeceasing). Many people intentionally devise an inheritance plan (in the narrow sense this would be a bequest or a devise, and an inheritance is what you receive from someone without a will, but there is also a broader sense of the word) along the lines that you are suggesting.
Question 1. In the trust that goes solely to my brother, in the event either my mother or father are dead, how is that asset split up? Can a trust dictate how an asset if split up if I am not on the trust. This is governed by the terms of the trust. The trust can say whatever the people who wrote it wanted. Question 2. How is the debt handled? The asset still has debt on it, who is responsible for the debt? I am thinking the answer to this question depends on the answer the Question 1. The trust owns the property subject to the mortgage. The people who originally signed the mortgage (presumably both of your parents) are also personally liable to pay the mortgage in the event that the debt is not fully satisfied in a foreclosure sale, or in the event that the mortgage creditor prefers to sue the mortgage debtors individually in the event of a default. After the death of the mortgage debtors, the mortgage company can file claims in their probate estates for repayment of the mortgage related debt if it does so in a timely fashion, although it would be more common to simply foreclose on the real property and obtain repayment of the debt that way. The death of the mortgage debtors is almost always an event of default under a mortgage, so if both mortgage debtors die, the mortgage creditor can usually force the trust to repay the debt, either by selling the house or by refinancing it. Question 3. They currently live in New York state, I found an article that New York state for nursing home care at more that 12k per year. If they were to move to a cheaper state like Alabama what are the laws or rules, ie. how long they have lived there, assets. This question verges on incoherent. But I think I understand what you are trying to ask. In every U.S. state, the joint federal-state program known at the federal level as Medicaid, although it has different names at the state level (California, for example, calls it "Medi-Cal"), will pay for nursing home care at approved nursing home facilities if the applicants meet state eligibility requirements. This generally involves an income test, an asset test, and a determination that the applicants have not made disqualifying gifts to trusts or to third-parties within the past five years. The income test is based upon state median or average income and is usually lower in a state like Alabama that has a lower median state income, than it is in New York, that has a higher median state income. For retirees, the main kinds of income considered are defined benefit pension plans payments, annuity payments, and investment income. The exact details of the asset test vary somewhat from state to state. Generally speaking, New York State is among the most strict in this regard. The basic outlines of the disqualification for gifts made within five years to others including trusts before applying for nursing home care are similar in broad outline, but the consequences for violating the rules are a function of the average cost of nursing home care in a state, which varies considerably. Generally, a gift of a fixed dollar amount gives rise to more months of disqualification of Medicaid in a state where the costs of nursing home care is low than it does where the costs of nursing home care are high, because the amount of the gift made in the past five years is divided by the average cost of nursing home care at the time the application is made, to determine the number of months that the applicants are disqualified from Medicaid. More generally, setting up trusts intended to qualify you for Medicaid is a highly technical matter with severe consequences if it is done incorrectly, and I would hope that your parents did so while conferring with a competent elder law lawyer. If they did it themselves, there is a high chance that this will have very severe negative consequences.
Wills typically handle this by specifying a survivorship period. Such a clause may say, in effect, "I leave all my assets to my spouse, provided they survive me by at least 30 days, and otherwise to beneficiaries X,Y,Z." That way, if your spouse dies shortly after you, your assets go to X,Y,Z, rather than going to your spouse and then to their beneficiaries. Another issue this avoids: suppose you are in an accident together, and by the time rescuers arrive, you are both dead. Without a survivorship period requirement, courts might have to try to determine whether one of you survived a few seconds longer than the other, in order to decide whose beneficiaries get the assets. That could be difficult and error-prone, not to mention gruesome and upsetting to loved ones. But with such a requirement, it's not necessary. The linked article notes that in many jurisdictions, if you don't specify a survivorship period, there may be a statutory period that applies automatically.
Difference between "Private Property" and "No Tresspassing" signage In my door-to-door ministry work I've observed various forms of "No Tresspassing" signs on properties. Do "Private Property" signs imply the same laws as a "No Tresspassing" sign? At one house in particular, the owner had posted a sign which said "Private Property," but had covered the "No Tresspassing" part of the sign with duct tape. We skipped that house to stay on the safe side, but would like to know if there are actually any differences in meaning.
The question for trespassing is whether the trespasser has been adequately notified of the possession interest that another person has in the property. Although it is legal to evangelize door-to-door without a permit, most jurisdictions will require you to leave promptly if the owner asks you to leave. In the absence of such verbal requests, you have a legally protected interest in engaging in conversation with your neighbors. Based on the law as I understand it, it is likely that your jurisdiction will recognize a right to proselytize to your neighbors door-to-door regardless of a no trespassing or private property sign. However, for the sake of certainty, here’s a little bit about trespass law. Typically, states have statutes that define what it takes to make a sign “conspicuous” enough to create grounds for prosecution. Such laws include specifications for the thickness of markings and the sign’s distance from the ground. Arkansas statutes have established that a person who enters or remains unlawfully on property has committed trespass, which means that the person must enter or remain in or upon the premises when not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon the premises. Communication is key. Arkansas law provides that if the property is unimproved and apparently unused, and is not fenced or otherwise “enclosed in a manner designed to exclude an intruder,” the person entering the property does so with license and privilege. Generally, however, if a person unlawfully enters property that has been improved, he has trespassed regardless of a sign on the premises devoid of some religious purpose for his visit. Thus, there really is not a significant difference between the “No Trespassing” sign and the “Private Property” sign. Both would communicate to any potential intruder that the property he is about to enter is presently being possessed by another person and thus would likely be sufficient to provide grounds for claiming notice in court if a property owner should choose to bring a suit.
If a trespasser openly and notoriously, exclusively and continuously possesses your property by building a fence on your land for the right time period, they automatically own the land. It still takes a court proceeding to record the passing of title (the trespasser has to prove in court that it is legally theirs). The trespasser would also have to establish that the recent survey was correct (survey errors do exist): was there an earlier survey in connection with the fence that established different boundaries? If (as it turns out) this has become his property, he abstractly has title to it, but only you and he know about it. The trespasser may have an interest in officially changing the property description, because it will officially increase the size of his lot and thus the value of the house+land. This also will increase their tax burden (while decreasing yours). The county has no knowledge of the fence: they go off of the official record, which says that you own that wedge. You also may have an interest in changing the property description, primarily to reduce your tax bite. There could also be issues with your resale of the property, since a mortgage company may require a survey of the property. Whether or not that is bad is hard to say: the consequence could be that the buyer is alerted to the fact that the lot is smaller than advertised and so on; in the current market I doubt anyone would care. If the fence goes away and you start using the land, then it will officially revert to you after a while. If you catch the party and complain within 10 years, you may recover the property (RCW 7.28.010). The limitations statute says that The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. That ship has (apparently) long since sailed. There is a different law pertaining to "Adverse possession under title deducible of record" which shortens the limit to 7 years, which is even less useful to the original owner. RCW 7.28.070 also shortens the time limit for an adverse possession case, to 7 years: Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands..who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be ... the legal owner of said lands There is another (more recent) tax-related provision, RCW 7.28.083. (1) A party who prevails against the holder of record title at the time an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession was filed, or against a subsequent purchaser from such holder, may be required to: (a) Reimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to have been paid by such holder or purchaser; This does not require them to have paid taxes, it say that the victor in the dispute may nevertheless be ordered to reimburse taxes paid by the other party (assuming the other party has paid the tax). So there is some chance of getting the taxes back. The reimbursement is at the court's discretion (continuing that section): (2) If the court orders reimbursement for taxes or assessments paid or payment of taxes or assessments due under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall determine how to allocate taxes or assessments between the property acquired by adverse possession and the property retained by the title holder. In making its determination, the court shall consider all the facts and shall order such reimbursement or payment as appears equitable and just. One should also pay attention to the last provision in that statute: (3) The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an award is equitable and just. That means that the victor can request the loser to pay his attorney's fees. This is delicate math, balancing the chance of recovering some paid taxes vs. paying the other guy's costs. You could try calling the assessor to find out how much the decrease in lot size might net you (the land vs. improvement proportion of taxes is all over the map in KC, easily ranging from 60% to 250% depending on year). One additional feature of adverse possession is that it must be "hostile", i.e. without permission. If a neighbor builds on your land, you can explicitly give them revocable permission (to avoid "no you didn't" arguments, explicit and revocable written permission, signed by the neighbor, would bar an adverse possession claim). This raises an interesting question, to which I don't know the answer. Suppose the prior owner gave permission to the fence builder, and did not demand the removal of the fence when he sold the property or right after the neighbor sold his property (there was only on act of granting permission). Does the clock start from your acquisition of the property (whereupon the element of hostility is satisfied)? Or does it start from the point where they acquired the property and were in hostile possession of the land (I would bet a quarter that that's the answer). If (or, given that) the fence was moved further onto your property more recently, there is a chance to recover the newly-taken piece of land. If you grant them revocable permission to build a fence on your property, you would not be subject to an adverse possession taking for the newly-taken land. If at some point you tell them to tear down the fence and they refuse, you can sue them and the court will (almost certainly) order the removal of the fence. The neighbor might then initiate an action to quiet title on the originally-taken piece of land, so you'd be back to where you were 4 years ago. From a practical perspective, this is well-worth the small amount of money involved to consult with an attorney to get legal advice. The legal matter probably will not go away quickly, and they may be presently inclined to settle in a manner more in your favor.
The other answers don't quite spell it out, so I will. There is no law in the UK requiring landlords or their agents to show a property to all parties interested - refusal to show a property may however in some cases fall under discrimination laws, so that might be something you can pursue if you feel the refusal is due to your gender, race or sexual orientation. While they may have to justify their data collection under the GDPR, that is entirely separate to their refusal to show the property to you.
Non-residential tenancies are subject to Fla. Stat Ch. 83 Part I. This is statutorily a tenancy at-will unless a contrary agreement is in writing signed by the lessor: the duration of the lease is yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly as determined by the periodicity of rent payments. There are various legal conditions related to rent default and causes for removing tenants, also conditions about premises that are wholly untenantable. Unlike residential leases, there are not any special statutory conditions surrounding the landlords presentation of leases. Florida law contemplates and allows the possibility that there are no written documents, and for non-residential tenancies has very little to say about it (only pertaining to the distinction between at-will vs not at-will leases). Therefore, the matter follows the general rules for contractual disputes: whoever makes the best case for their claims wins. If Bob has a scanned copy, that is excellent proof. If Alice alleges and proves that the scanned copy was modified, that disposes of Bob's evidence. If Alice presents a copy of the contract that says otherwise (I do mean copy), then this anomaly has to be explained. Bob can claim that they tore up Alice's original and renegotiated the deal, but he needs to prove that claim. If Alice presents the original contract, Bob's story becomes much less plausible. There are millions of variants of what might happen: the point is, there is no requirement to present the original signed document to support a claim in a contractual dispute.
In general, permission is not granted to enter the premises of another by climbing a fence unless it is explicitly granted. That the fence is on your property, but adjacent to the school's property, is a complication. The school, observing that there is a boundary fence, might reasonably rely on that to exclude people from entering other than at desired entry points. So it might be that your entry over the fence would be unauthorized and thus technically trespassing. If you were to put a gate in your own fence, the school's reliance is probably less reasonable. Or if you were to formally notify the school that you intend to enter the school grounds over your own fence. However, in practice, you are not trespassing until you are notified by the owner or owner's agent or someone with proper authority. If there is no sign, there can be no claim that you were notified by one. So until a school official or employee notices you using the fence and orders you to stop, there is no issue.
Under an AST agreement the landlord is not permitted to evict you on a whim - if you refuse to leave, in order to 'take possession' the landlord must persuade a court to give him a court order. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/applying_for_possession_assured_tenancies In the fixed term the landlord must first serve the tenant a 'section 8 notice' with a 'ground for possession' (there are 20). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/50/schedule/2 http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies Were you to refuse or fight it a court would determine whether the landlord may take possession on the ground in the section 8 notice. That particular clause you are concerned about is common to the AST agreements I've seen. See for example the government's model agreement: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695944/Model_Agreement_for_an_Assured_Shorthold_Tenancy_and_Accompanying_Guidance.docx The guidance isn't specific about "illegal, immoral, disorderly or anti-social purposes" but examples elsewhere include prostitution in the property (doing it yourself or allowing it to be done) or it being used to store stolen goods. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies/discretionary_grounds_assured_tenancies#7 I'm just curious to know if there are any laws protecting me as a tenant from the landlord abusing that i.e immoral is certainly subjective and realistically he could find anything he doesn't like immoral? It is unrealistic to assume the landlord can take possession based on saying anything he doesn't like is immoral. Do any laws exist to ensure there is a limit on what can be considered reasonable? Statute isn't specific about what's "reasonable". Ultimately what's reasonable is what the court says is reasonable. You can look at case law. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies/discretionary_grounds_assured_tenancies#1 If not, am I within my rights to ask the landlord to expand on that clause to ensure there is no doubt between the two parties? You are free to ask the landlord what that clause means and to define it specifically - the landlord is free to do so or walk away from the deal. Consider that landlords tend to want tenants who will pay on time, keep the property clean and warn them about maintenance problems - I doubt the majority have any interest in their tenants' private lives that the landlord comes to know about unless the landlord anticipates an economic impact.
In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it.
A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire.
Is it legal to sell suspected or proven counterfeit US currency? If someone ends up with suspected counterfeit US currency, what can they do with it? Obviously tendering it for goods or services would be illegal. Handing it in for analysis and eventual destruction by the issuing authority would be the "right" thing to do but the acceptor will have lost that value. The acceptor has been the victim and is unlikely to see restitution. Can the holder of the fake notes on-sell them legally to recoup some of their lost money? Inspired by https://travel.stackexchange.com/questions/153780/how-can-i-tell-if-old-us-currency-is-usable and related to Is it permissible to collect counterfeit currency?
To avoid criminal penalties in the U.S. (18 USC 473 and related general provisions of the federal criminal code in Title 18 of the United States Code), the suspected counterfeit status must be disclosed, and the seller must be able to reasonably determine that the buyer does not intend to pass off the bills as true and genuine (otherwise there would be potential accessory or conspirator liability for the counterfeiting conduct of the buyer). Counterfeit currency may be sold as an object, but not as currency or as a tool for someone else to engage in counterfeit currency offenses.
england-and-wales The government grants limited rights of return (thanks Jen), for which you are entitled to a cash or cash-like refund (e.g. reversal of a credit card charge as described below). The vendor has the option to go above and beyond that statutory minimum as a courtesy to the customer. In that non-compulsory zone, they have the liberty to offer store scrip rather than a cash refund. Of course, any business can try to cheat you, and then you have to stick up for your rights by insisting or reporting to relevant authorities. united-states If you buy with a credit card, the rules and contractual obligations of the credit card companies oblige the merchant to accept returns by doing a refund to the card. It's important to understand how this happens: the merchant isn't just picking an arbitrary amount of money and doing a new "sale in reverse"... they are identifying a specific past transaction that already happened, and modifying or reversing it. That is a system safeguard so they don't credit the wrong person or be tricked into a reversal on a transaction that never happened. That's why they want your receipt. On a cash transaction, it is sellers prerogative whether to issue cash or store credit. Issuing store scrip is a reasonable option to deter theft and fraud. For instance someone who wanted an item could get it for free, by buying the item, taking it home, returning the next day without the item, grab another identical item off the shelf and sneak over to the CS line and "return" it with yesterday's receipt. With cash sales, that would be completely untrackable, and the thief is gone. With credit card, they have your identity; with scrip they can "flag" the scrip in their system to either prevent its use and/or have a security officer detain you if you try to use it. For instance American home stores will cheerfully take re-saleable condition items back even without a receipt, but will issue a store voucher for the value rather than cash. That policy would be a disaster if they refunded cash. As it is, I find it rather convenient! So if you want the convenience of cash refunds, you can just use credit cards - gaining the feature at the expense of anonymity.
Is it legal to send a document with your signature claiming to be somebody else? Is it legal to allow somebody to sign a document "for you" (using your name)? I'll answer these two questions together. It depends on what laws apply to the specific document. For example: For a contract for the sale of land, the Statute of Frauds requires a signature. However, the Statute provides that the signature may be made by a person authorised by you. In Australia, a Commonwealth income tax return must be signed by the taxpayer. The taxpayer must sign it personally. If you get your assistant to sign it then you haven't filled it in properly and you are liable to be fined for failure to lodge a valid tax return. There are rules in the legislation for corporations, e.g. the public officer signs it. Sometimes the law allows a tax agent/accountant to sign a form. The theme is that the law provides specific rules. In Australia, banknotes must bear the signatures of two senior officials such as the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor of the Reserve Bank. However, the law imposing this requirement allows a great deal of flexibility about how these signatures are applied, freeing these officials from the tedium of signing millions of banknotes: Reserve Bank Act 1959, s 37. In the case of a letter, there are no specific laws about who can sign it and how. You could very well get an employee to sign it for you. The other issue to be aware of is deception. If I write you a letter signed "Kim Kardashian", but she has no idea I've done this and has not given me permission, but I lead you to believe that Kim Kardashian just wrote you a letter saying you're great, and then you go and embarrass yourself posting that letter on Facebook, then potentially I am in a bit of trouble. (A more serious example would be where I impersonate your bank and purport to waive the repayments on your mortgage, resulting in you defaulting.) In such a case, the relevant laws are the various laws to do with deception, not laws specifically about who can sign a document. Is it legal for a single individual to use multiple signatures when signing legal documents (ie, is there a requirement your signature be identifiable or consistent)? This is fine. A real signature is not like a cryptographic signature. Its function is not to, by itself, prove the authenticity of a document. The act of signing something is significant because it shows commitment, etc, and for very important documents (e.g. deeds) people (or the law) will ask for the signature to be witnessed. The verification in that case comes from the witness being able to testify as to who they saw sign the document, not the appearance of the signature itself. Keep in mind that the law related to signatures evolved at a time when not everybody could write their name and continues to accomodate people who cannot today. There is no reason or principle requiring an individual to use a consistent signature. There is a practical exception in relation to banks. Banks keep a specimen signature on file for each customer and use this to decide whether to accept withdrawal slips, cheques etc. It is not an ideal system (it is not hard to forge a signature well enough to get past a teller) but in conjunction with the banks' other fraud prevention methods it is the best they can do. However, this is a matter of their own risk management not a legal requirement. If you were transacting in person at the branch and the teller knew you and the bank manager was happy, legally you could sign withdrawal slips with an "X" or a different signature every time.
I emailed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the USA asking this and received the reply: "There is nothing to prevent you from marketing antiques in the UK while present in the US." I also contacted a relevant US attorney and received: "There’s nothing in your question which would implicate Colorado or US law. If you're a UK citizen, and the sale is happening in the UK while you're in the US, then the US has anything to do with it. So as long as the UK doesn’t have any problem with it, the US will not." So I would conclude this question fairly answered.
No, because you are affecting the car's value by selling its parts. The car is collateral to the loan, so if you don't make the payments, the lender has the right to repossess and resell it to recoup their money. If they are unable to recover at least the outstanding balance of the loan through resale, you will be on the hook for the difference. This is called a "deficiency balance". Simply having possession of something isn't adequate basis to decide you can do whatever you want with it. You have physical possession, but the lender is the first lien holder on the title until the loan is satisfied.
united-states I am going to answer based on US law. But many of the principles would be similar in many other countries. In particular the law in the EU is similar. There are two separate issues here, trademark rights and copyright. Trademark Rights Trademark law provides protection against the use of the mark "in commerce". This means using the mark to identify or advertise goods or services. It does not provide any protection against use not in commerce. Specifically 15 USC 1114 (part of the Lanham Act, the main US Federal trademark law) provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (1) (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (1) (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. If the plane was being used commercially, using someone else's trademark would be infringement and could lead to a successful infringement suit. But if it is not being used to provide or advertise a service or goodsm there is no trademark issue. Copyright 17 USC 106 specifies the exclusive rights that a copyright owner has. One is to make copies, another is to make derivative works. Unless fair use (or fair dealing in the UK) applies, one needs permission from the copyright owner. Without such permission, copying is infringement, and can lead to an award of damages. However, according to the question, the image has been released under a CC-BY-NC license. That grants permission, under certain conditions. One condition is that the image (or text) not be used for commercial purposes. If the plane is purely private, not rente out, these conditions seem to be complied with, so there is no copyright issue either. Conclusion Based on the statements in the question, there seems to br no IP issue here. Be sure that there is no commercial purpose, and that the CC license was issued by the actual copyright owner. A brief consultatuion with a lawyer might be wise.
Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.
As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting.
Is cruel and usual punishment constitutional? The U.S. Constitution’s bill of rights prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment”. I am asking about a catch: cruel and usual punishment. If a punishment were determined to be cruel but is commonplace would it be constitutional?
As a preliminary note, the mandate that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” can be interpreted two ways, (a) prohibiting punishments which are cruel as well as those which are unusual, or (b) prohibiting just those which are both cruel and unusual. The courts have not interpreted this to have meaning (b), even though "cruel and unusual" is a fixed phrase repeated in court rulings. In various cases where the "cruel and unusual" clause is invoked, e.g. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 the courts consistently analyze the punishment in terms of being jointly "cruel and unusual", and never consider the possibility that a punishment might be cruel but usual, or unusual but not cruel. The prohibition derives from the pre-American "cruell and unusuall Punishments" provision of the English Declaration of Rights, analyzed in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, which provides "[t]hat excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted". The court observes that cruel punishments can indeed be quite common, for example But the vicious punishments for treason decreed in the Bloody Assizes (drawing and quartering, burning of women felons, beheading, disembowling, etc.) were common in that period -- indeed, they were specifically authorized by law, and remained so for many years afterwards. The court concludes from its historical analysis that "unusual(l)" in the context of English common law really means "illegal", i.e. "contrary to Law and ancient practice," without "Precedents" or "express Law to warrant," "unusual," "illegal," or imposed by "Pretence to a discretionary Power."
This is totally, flat out wrong. Quite frankly, it is immoral, although not illegal, for the producers to even cause some viewers to believe it is true. The United States criminal code (Title 18) in Chapter 77, prohibits all forms of slavery (except as punishment for a crime which New York State does not authorize) including the one described. It is not legal. This statute implements the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (abolishing slavery except as punishment for a crime) and was enacted under the enforcement authority provided by that statute. Those statutes have been in force for more than a century. For example, 18 USC § 1590 states: (a)Whoever knowingly recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services in violation of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. (b)Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be subject to the penalties under subsection (a). Similarly, 15 U.S.C. § 1584 is squarely on point: (a)Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. (b)Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be subject to the penalties described in subsection (a). It also would constitute criminal child endangerment, child abandonment, use of a child to commit a controlled substances offense, conspiracy to commit criminal coercion, conspiracy to have a child engaged in illegal child labor, etc. Possession of controlled substances by the mother is also a crime, although that crime was committed before the mother tried to sell her child to pay her drug debt. (I originally also included crimes like sex trafficking and pimping a child, but from the question it does not appear that the facts implicated those offenses.) It would also constitute grounds to civilly terminate the parental rights of the mother for child abuse and/or neglect, because it violated laws in addition to criminal laws. If the child had a living father whose parental rights had not been terminated (one can't tell from the question, but perhaps the full episode made it clearer), it would violate the father's right to custody of his child. The child, though a guardian or as an adult, could sue the mother for intentional inflection of emotional distress/outrageous conduct, false imprisonment, failure to provide support, etc.
Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004.
As others have said, the reason for this is that the US Constitution grants a jury trial as a right in criminal proceedings. The reason for that right to be granted is to be a check against (that is, a limitation of) the power of the government, generally, and judges, specifically. To answer your specific question of why "the judge system is not reformed and stays like this and is more vulnerable to take a wrong decision because they do not know the law, thus the verdict depends on people’s morals?" Firstly, the jury does know the law (or at least, the specific portions of the law that are relevant to the case), by the time they render their judgement. An important part of the judge's responsibility in a criminal case is to craft "jury instructions" that are given to the jury before they are sequestered for deliberations. These instructions should have an explanation of what questions they need to collectively answer, and what evidence they can and cannot consider. Secondly, there are two central dogmatic difference between the points of view that your question seems to promote or be based on, and the one generally held by the US Founding Fathers, who wrote the US Constitution. Your question seems to assume that: judges are sacrosanct, or at least trustworthy; and rule by law is the foremost concern In contrast, the general view of the US Founding Fathers was that: judges have power, and thus need to be checked (in the US system, a judge's power is checked by the prosecutor, the jury, the chief executive, and by courts of appeal); and protection of the citizenry from the power of the government is the first concern. One thing to note, is that this second point means that the judge in a US trial can actually override a criminal jury, but only in the defendant's favor.
In the United States, the constitutionality of a law can be challenged in any court. Unless and until the court is reversed by a higher court, then the law will be considered unconstitutional and invalid. A jury can also theoretically nullify a law for any reason, including unconstitutionality, however, the jury's finding will only hold for that one case that they are trying.
I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce.
No, but the legislature can (and does) Many jurisdictions have mandatory sentences where there is no judicial discretion in sentencing. In effect, the sentence is known when the charges are laid - if the defendant is found guilty.
No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it."
Will Stack Exchange EU terms still apply to Britain now that BREXIT has finished? Background Information Britain has recently finished BREXIT (after years of painstaking decision making about pretty much nothing) and I was wondering whether Stack Exchange's EU specific terms still apply to Britain. Example of EU specific terms If you are located within the European Union, you must be at least 16 years old to access or use the Network or Services, including without limitation to complete a Stack Overflow Account Registration. By accessing or using the Services or the Network in any manner, you represent and warrant that you are at least 16 years of age. If you are under 16 years old, you may not, under any circumstances or for any reason, access or use the Services or Network in any manner, and may not provide any personal information to or on the Services or Network (including, for example, a name, address, telephone number or email address). Questions Do Stack Exchange's EU specific terms still apply to Britain? If so, will they ever stop applying to Britain?
No. The UK is no longer in the EU, and the terms of service, which are probably drafted poorly, fail to include non-EU countries that are subject to EU law, such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. This oversight means that the UK is also not included as of the beginning of February 2020 when it ceased to be a member of the European Union.
No, it is not illegal in UK to use proxies. No, it is not like the tor concept. No, the ISP does not slow you down (they mostly throttle detectable p2p connections), but if you use public proxies, many of them will be unacceptably slow. Note: for things like facebook, a proxy is utterly useless. You already donated your private data to them, there's nothing to hide.
Your boss is totally wrong. Legally, there is no such thing as a "probation period" in the UK. You have the right to your holiday payment, according to the days that you worked. What can happen: The legal minimum is I think 28 days per year including bank holidays, but most companies give 23 or 24 days PLUS eight days bank holiday. Your contract may say that the first three months are called probation period, and during that time you only get the legal minimum, and after that the much more common higher amount. That would be legal. But even so, you would be entitled to seven days, minus any bank holidays where you didn't work.
Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people.
This would not be "legal jeopardy" per-se, really the only remedy that Stack Exchange would have in a case like this would be to ban both accounts. It would be different if you caused SE some kind of monetary/reputation damages to the site itself. From SE's Acceptable Use Policy: Identity Theft and Privacy. Users that misleadingly appropriate the identity of another person are not permitted. It seems your described scheme would violate that term. But this isn't a legal problem, just an operational one. You aren't violating any law (unless there are local laws against this) by paying somebody to "be you" on SE. The most that this would earn you and your cohort would be a ban and probably removal of the contributions.
Per Art 3(2), GDPR only applies to non-European companies when their processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services to people in Europe, or when the processing activities relate to monitoring people in Europe. However, the word “offer” of this targeting criterion requires some level of intent. It is not enough for GDPR to apply that they're marketing to someone who happens to be in Europe, but GDPR would apply if they are intentionally marketing to people who are in Europe. I don't know what they are marketing, so I don't know if that would be the case here. Even if GDPR were to apply, it would not be the most appropriate law. Yes, there's the GDPR right to erasure, which applies under some conditions (though there's a pretty absolute right to opt-out from marketing). The EU's ePrivacy Directive provides more specific rules though, in particular that every such marketing email must offer a way to unsubscribe. Other countries have comparable anti-spam laws, potentially also the home country for this online service.
There is a general EU anti-discrimination directive 2000/43 which in Article 3(1)(h) which applies the standards to housing. This document analyzes Czech anti-discrimination law. If you were discriminated against on the basis of being English, that could support legal action. There is no current EU or Czech legislation that guarantees a right to operate in the language of your choice. There have been calls to create some such legislation. Such legislation would be the implementation of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which says that Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. There is under Article 9 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages a right to use regional or minority languages in judicial proceedings, but there is no generic "right to use your own language". There are occasional cases where governments are sued because their actions linguistically discriminate. As observed here, there was a case in Belgium where the government was sued for not subsidizing French education in non-French territories, but the court said that "Art. 14 cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing children or parents a right to obtain instruction in a language of his choice".
Neither of those clauses has anything to do with whether a tax on the use of Whatsapp is legal: The first clause tells users that they are responsible for any taxes that may be owed. It says nothing about whether such a tax is or is not legal. The second clause says that users may not charge for Whatsapp services. It says nothing about whether the government may impose a tax for the use of the services. That is all beside the point, though. Even if the TOS explicitly said, "No one may tax the use of our services," that would have no legal effect. Saying that you're exempt from taxation does not make you exempt from taxation.
Does Evidence Have to be Legal in Both the State Where it is Created and Where It is Adjudicated? Suppose Suzie in Alabama calls Bonnie in Arizona, and records the call without telling Bonnie. Alabama and Arizona are both one-party consent states, so this recording is legal. Suppose that for some reason, this phone recording becomes a critical piece of evidence in a case that is being heard in California. California is a two-party consent state, so it would have been illegal to make the recording there. But since the recording wasn't made in California, would the California court allow it to be used?
since the recording wasn't made in California, would the California court allow it to be used? Yes because the recording was obtained lawfully. The rule of one- or two- party consent primarily regulates the act of obtaining the evidence (i.e., recording the conversation), and the lawfulness of that act determines whether using that as evidence is permissible. Section 632(c) of the California Penal Code excludes from the definition of confidential communication "any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded". When Bonnie took part in the phone conversation with Suzie, Bonnie knew or should have known it was in a jurisdiction where one-party consent applies. Accordingly, Bonnie could reasonably expect that the communication may be recorded, thereby preempting the effect(s) of section 632.
Thus being a fundamental question of constitutional law, this translates into asking how SCOTUS would likely rule given a certain situation where e.g. there was no confession and the two-witness requirement is not satisfied. In the case of Cramer v. US, 325 U.S. 1, the direct testimony of two or more witnesses established that "Cramer met Thiel and Kerling on the occasions and at the places charged; that they drank together, and that they engaged long and earnestly in conversation", but "There was no proof by two witnesses of what they said, or in what language they conversed; no showing that Cramer gave them any information whatever of value to their mission, or that he had any to give; no showing of any effort at secrecy, they having met in public places, and no evidence that Cramer furnished them shelter, sustenance, or supplies, or that he gave them encouragement or counsel, or even paid for their drinks". The ruling (in favor of the defendant) focused on the fact that what was suffiently witnessed was not treasonous (drinks and conversation are not overt acts of treason). The court assigns some significance to the testimony of a single witness Kopp, stating that To the extent that his conviction rests upon such evidence, and it does to an unknown but considerable extent, it rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness not without strong emotional interest in the drama of which Cramer's trial was a part. The fact that the evidence was uncorroborated is dispositive in this case. There has not been a case where a conviction was supported only by circumstantial evidence, and the language of the Constitution plus the meaning of "testimony of a witness" is clear enough that it would be a major break with legal tradition to say that circumstantial evidence can substitute for direct evidence (testimony). A video recording cannot testify, only a person can testify. A person can testify that they watched a video, but they cannot testify that they directly witnessed defendant making a certain statement. Rather they can testify that they inferred from watching the video that defendant made a statement. This is not to say that some SCOTUS could not find a path for conviction based on circumstantial evidence, but that would be a significant break from existing tradition.
The recording is not illegal because you've been told it would happen, and by not hanging up, you've agreed to have a conversation that can be recorded. This was determined in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. applying the exception of Penal Code 632 that communications are not considered confidential if there is a reasonable expectation that the call will be overheard or recorded - being explicitly told that the call will be recorded makes this true. It would not be illegal for them to only record their own statements during the call, nor for you to record only your statements, either. In particular, the company is allowed to record the part of the call where they make this statement, as they are not recording a conversation, only their own (likely pre-recorded) statement (again?). Indeed, including their statement about the recording in the recording is common practise partly for protection against claims that the other party was not informed of the recording occurring.
Possibly: remember that we have 50 different states and their laws plus the federal government. Alabama criminal code §13A-9-9 define the crime of "possession of a forgery device", which is when one makes or possesses with knowledge of its character any plate, die or other device, appliance, apparatus, equipment or article specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments with intent to use it himself, or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery. Selling is covered under the fact of possession. Arizona has a similar law, referring to the situation when a person Makes or possesses with knowledge of its character and with intent to commit fraud any plate, die, or other device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article, material, good, property or supply specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments. Makes or possesses any device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article, material, good, property or supply adaptable for use in forging written instruments with intent to use it or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery. Federal law would be covered here: §474 covers any plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, from which has been printed, or which may be prepared by direction of the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of printing, any obligation or other security of the United States, uses such plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, or... but this could not be reasonably interpreted to include a printing press, and would not cover a gadget that forges passports (Dept. of State, not Treasury). There isn't a federal statute with the breadth of the Alabama law. Any such law would have to include an "intent to forge" element.
The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge.
Generally they don't. If the conversation was made while there was a third person present, the person can be a witness at trial. Unless the witness is impeached, the witness's statement may be sufficient for you to meet your burden of proof to show the statement was made, because the burden is just a preponderance of evidence in most civil cases. Note that, the existence of a statement is not sufficient to prove breach of privacy. The context surrounding the statement is important. If you intend to record communications from the landlord in the future, please check with your jurisdiction's laws regarding recording of communications. Many jurisdictions (such as California) only permit a private communication to be recorded when all parties give consent. Not only an illegally recorded conversation is inadmissible as evidence (with the exception to rebut a witness), it is also a crime to do so. Some other jurisdictions in USA allows one party to record the conversation without obtaining consent from the other party.
Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial.
There is no public place to “file” that. When privilege is claimed and the other side challenges it then the person claiming privilege needs to establish somehow that the attorney client relationship exists and is pertinent to the question. In the normal course of things there would be an engagement agreement in the attorneys files. And not everything communicated between a client and attorney is protected by the privilege. It only covers legal advice and specifically does not cover discussions planning criminal activity.
Does one have legal right to access possessions "land locked" in a co-tenant's room? Alice has possessions in a storage closet that requires traversing roommate Bob's bedroom to access. There was a preexisting oral agreement granting Alice reasonable easement. Bob eventually decides to deny Alice access to this room with posted notice. Obeying this is denying Alice access to her possessions, she now cannot remove them. There is no dispute over ownership of the possessions, both declare them to be Alice's. Q: Can Alice legally disregard this notice despite Bob's intentions? Does doing so constitute invasion of privacy or trespassing? Related questions: How legal is this for Bob to do in the first place? Can Bob do this indefinitely? Can Alice get the law to grant easement if she can't just enter-at-will? Does it matter if there was a preexisting oral agreement granting easement?
My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have.
With respect to 4th Amendment protections, which guard against unreasonable searches, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 held that "A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not". Cat burglar consent may be reasonable, depending on the circumstances, as could guest consent. The difference between the two is that with the cat burglar, you (as owner) can't overcome the reasonableness of the police assuming that the owner gives consent since you're not there, but with the party guest consenting, you can contradict the impression of control that the guest gave, and you can deny consent (if you are there and can contradict the guest). Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 addresses that point: "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". As far as I can tell, there is no specific obligation for police to verify that the person ostensibly consenting is authorized. They don't have to ask, and they don't have to independently verify implications (e.g. if the third party says 'our apartment', they don't have to ask 'does that mean that you live here?'). A third party could say something that would make the "occupant" assumption unreasonable.
The actual law in BC, the Residential Tenancy Act, guaranteed a tenant's rights to the rental unit and the common areas, and restricts the landlord's right to enter the rental unit. Common areas are distinct from the rental unit. A common areas is "any part of residential property the use of which is shared by tenants, or by a landlord and one or more tenants", and a rental unit is a "living accommodation rented or intended to be rented to a tenant". In this case, that would be the room. There is no restriction at all on landlord's access to common areas, and there is no requirement that landlord access to common areas be for specific purposes. Access to the rental unit, on the other hand, must be for a reasonable purpose.
This may be true of the Nooksack tribe, in a sense. There is a category of Indian land known as trust land, which is held in trust by the US Government for the benefit of a tribe (there is also land that is just plain owned by the tribe). A tribe can thus set rules regarding use of the land that they control, which could mean that nobody can live in a particular place (not uncommon). The tribe could rent out land, and the rental agreement could contain a tribal membership clause. This complaint by the Nooksack Indian Housing Authority alleges that defendant is not a member of the tribe, and that the rental agreement requires defendant to be an enrolled member of the tribe. Defendant was disenrolled, and the eviction action followed. Non-member evictions are not the most popular actions that a tribe undertakes, so finding those rules online is not going to be easy.
If it doesn’t cause substantial interference to the easement rights You need to look at the specific terms of the easement i.e. what right it gives to your neighbour. If you can build your chicken coop in such a way that it doesn’t materially affect those rights, then that’s ok However, for this type of easement, any ground level structure is likely to interfere with the use of the easement.
Trespass to land in most instances is a civil matter, and as such the police do not have the power to assist. Initially, the landowner should ask the trespasser to leave the land and if he/she does then all is well. If he/she refuses to leave the land then you will need to consider taking civil action. It could be dangerous for the landowner to try to remove the trespasser themselves. The owner of the land could commit several criminal offences if he forcibly removes the trespasser and his/her property from the land. The best and safest course of action is to obtain a court order, which, if breached, can then become a criminal matter. If the police do attend an incident such as this, they are merely there as observers for any possible criminal offences committed by either party. The police cannot assist in the removal of the trespassers or their property from the land in question. Emphasis mine. https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q56.htm
Typically the landlord will have a preexisting clause in the lease that says the landlord may choose to amend the lease at a later date. While that may be in contracts, I don't see that holding up in court. You can't unilaterally amend contracts to add new terms without acceptance on part of the lessee. Any clause in the contract like that will require notification of the lessee of the change and a chance for the lessee to terminate the contract without recourse on part of the lessor. Generally this must be done in the same format as the original lease (written). Most jurisdictions don't allow for a verbal amendment to a written lease. So in a way, yes, it is legal for a landlord to require payment via a certain method (like a direct debit from a bank account). They cannot however change the payment terms unilaterally without notification and acceptance. They can use language such as sending the notification (via registered mail) and then saying that a failure to respond is acceptance (because you are, by actions, accepting the terms by continuing to live there).
While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit.
Double Jeopardy: Can someone re-file a dropped suit? Scenario: Jane files restraining order against John due to alleged violent acts committed by John towards Jane John hires a lawyer: provides info that debunks all claims made against him John's lawyer presents evidence to Jane's lawyer Jane decides to drop the case in the realization that the malicious/false claim made were likely to result in her losing the case in court & to avoid having to pay for John's legal fees (which was requested in the response to initial suit) John is advised by his lawyer to sue for malicious prosecution. John does not pursue retaliation 4 years have come and gone with no contact between John and Jane since the initial restraining order was issued Question: Is there a statute of limitations preventing Jane from bringing this case again, and if so can Jane request a restraining order for that actions John had taken against her four years prior?
The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.
Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them.
You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all
It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example).
To start off, you appear to be confusing assault and battery. Assault does not require physical contact in order for it to occur. Verbal assault is still a crime, but in your situation it doesn't appear that any verbal assault has occurred - he is not actively threatening you with harm, and you are not in fear of being harmed. Yelling can sometimes qualify as verbal assault, but any form of verbal assault is very hard to prove because it leaves no evidence. Unless someone other than the two parties involved comes forward, it likely won't go anywhere. Assuming this has been going on for some time, what you appear to be experiencing is harassment which usually qualifies as a civil matter, and police will not take any action other than asking one of you to leave in order to resolve the issue. Most often, they will ask you (as the person being harassed) to leave, but that can also be in your benefit. If you can prove the other person's harassment caused you to have to leave in order to be comfortable again, then you can claim damages and can sue that other person for the harassment - basically suing for damages of not being able to live in and enjoy your residence which you pay for, as well as any additional costs you encountered by having to find an alternate place to live because of their actions. Again, this is difficult to prove without someone else who has witnessed the continued harassment stepping forward (e.g. your guest who might have only witnessed it once is probably not an incredibly strong witness, because harassment is often defined as having persisted over time, and they cannot testify to more than what they saw in one night). The case would likely just devolve to a matter of "he-said" between the two of you - he will likely claim you just didn't like him and are making things up to get money out of him. You'd need to make sure you have other evidence that supports your side of the story. As far as claiming self-defense, my completely non-legal and mostly combination of "I wish this were common sense" and "I hate when people try to justify unneeded violence" advice is never rely on the self-defense plea. Unless you are in fear of your life, your best course of action if he threatens violence or actually hits you is to leave and let the police handle it. If you have physical marks on you and he has none on him, the case becomes much more clear-cut. If you fight back, and you both have marks, then it again becomes a case of "he-said" and it's hard to prove who initiated the confrontation without cooperating witnesses, and you'd likely both end up being arrested when the police showed up if they can't determine who the instigator was. Just because you know something was in self-defense doesn't necessarily mean the police, a judge, or a jury will believe you. Ultimately, if you're uncomfortable with the place you're living, you should start planning to move elsewhere immediately (which you appear to be doing). If you can both a) avoid financial damages to yourself by preventing yourself being put into a situation that requires you to move quickly without much planning and b) prevent the continued harassment - then you should. Don't let the pot just keep boiling over until it explodes all over the kitchen. You have the power to make this stop too, and you shouldn't rely on other people making the situation go away for you (e.g. your landlord is bound by a contract, and evicting a tenant based on your word can open them to a lot of legal troubles - they have to be very careful with how they handle such a situation). Yes, it sucks that it's not your fault you have to go through the extra effort or move away to resolve the situation, but getting yourself out of the situation should be your number one priority, and doing it yourself is often the easiest solution.
Alice files a lawsuit against Bob This is a civil suit, it will not lead to any court punishing Alice, or anyone else. If facts come out showing that Alice violated the law, the local prosecutor could, but need not, file a criminal case against Alice. If the prosecutor does not file such a case, Alice's worst possible outcome is to get no damages, with costs and fees awarded to Bob (or his estate). If Bob dies and Alice wishes to drop the case, there is no obvious reason not to permit it, unless Bob or his estate has counter-sued. Bob (or his estate) might ask for costs and legal fees, and perhaps sanctions for a frivolous suit. The court might well asses whether to grand such a costs order before or as it dismisses the case. ; The question seems to confuse the idea of a civil lawsuit and that of a criminal prosecution. In an Civil lawsuit, one person (or company) (the plaintiff) claims that another (or several others) (the defendant) have violated an agreement, or have in some other way caused legal injury. For example, if Alice claims that she had a contract with Bob and Bob violated the terms that would be a civil suit. Or if Alice claims that Bob infringed her copyright, or slandered her, or falsely advertised something or any of many other possible situations. The case would be Alice C vs Bob D. However, if Alice accuses Bob of having stolen from her, or punched her, or raped her, that woulds be a criminal accusation. The police would investigate, and if they found evidence to support the accusation, the local prosecutor could (but need not) file a case, which would be something like State of Franklin vs Bob D IN THE CRIMINAL COURT. Alice would be a witness, but not the plaintiff. If the investigation found that Alice committed a crime also, the prosecutor might file, State of Franklin vs Alice C Or the prosecutor might file both cases, or neither. The prosecutor has wide discretion whether or not to prosecute in any particular case, even when the evidence is clear. Neither Alice nor Bob could insist that either criminal case be dropped. Only the prosecutor, or the Judge, could do that. A criminal court is a different court from a civil court, and in many places a given judge hears only one or the other type of case. In many other places a judge may hear both kinds, but any one case is still either civil or criminal.
The Fifth Amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;" which suggests that Crime B is still fair game under double jeopardy. However, if B is a lesser included offense under Blockburger, i.e. A is Aggravated Robbery and B is Robbery, then a prosecution could be barred by Double Jeopardy. Barring that, and jurisdiction specific law, the State isn't barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the 5th (and 14th) amendment. That does not foreclose Person C from finding an ethical, equitable, statutory remedy or controlling case enforcing a plea bargain. As far as I can tell, commutation is the equivalent of a conviction while a pardon is equivalent to an acquittal. I also imagine if the prosecution isn't barred and tried C for B, the Executive may just pardon/commute C again. Edit to add: Under Santobello, it would appear C may have an additional remedy enforcing a plea bargain. Santobello didn't involve a case dismissed in a plea bargain, nor commutation or pardon. A court might find that commutation or pardon are essentially a breach of the agreement.
The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address).
Suing a Police Officer Instead of the Police Department My car was towed in Seattle for an alleged parking violation. I paid $350 to get it back and then went to court and had the violation dismissed. The police officer who wrote the ticket and called for the tow did not show up for the court hearing, there was no evidence of a violation, and I testified that I was careful to park legally (and indeed I was conscious of the "No Parking" sign referring to one spot about 50 feet away from where I parked). So, I believe the officer made some mistake. Now, I'd rather not sue the government to get my $350 back (you could simply say that I prefer not to have tax-payers, including myself, pay for it), so intend to serve and sue the officer directly. I know where to find him and actually will first give him a demand note to pay me the $350, but I assume that note will get me nothing. So, what's the most likely result of my approach? Is there precedent for taking an officer to court for a small claims case like this? Am I likely to have the case dismissed and be forced to refile against SPD? (Please don't let this distract from my question, but my philosophy is that people hide behind groups/governments/companies too often, and I'd like to push society to take more personal responsibility for their own actions. I have no problem with the police, my problem is that one guy made a very careless mistake. I feel like he won't see the consequences for his actions if I make my case against the entire SPD. Whether it's to reduce taxes or to push my philosophy, I know I'm struggling here just for a Pyrrhic victory...so I'm 99% sure I will simply abandon this and sue SPD in the end.)
Even if you had grounds for a lawsuit, you could not make it come out of the officer’s pocket. Under Chapter 4.64 of the Seattle Code, the City of Seattle is generally required to defend and indemnify city employees who are sued for doing their job. If you sue a police officer, the city pays his lawyer; if you win or if the city decides your claim is legitimate, the city pays whatever damages there were. The provision does not cover “claims and/or litigation arising from any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts or omissions of officers or employees of the City,” but that requires a lot more than “I wasn’t parked illegally,” and in any event you cannot force that issue -— only the city can. That’s between the officer and the city, and has nothing to do with you. This provision is pretty common in employment, including government employment. If I’m working for you and am acting in good faith, doing things for your benefit under your instructions, it’s only fair for you to shoulder the costs if I mess up. When it comes to government employees (whose job often makes people very angry at them), indemnification is extremely common. If police officers faced the risk of financial ruin for innocent mistakes, it’d be very hard to find anyone willing to do the job.
"I have done nothing wrong" You got up in court and, when the judge asked if you had done anything wrong, you said: "yes" (guilty). So, in the eyes of the law, you are in the wrong. Police are entitled to make mistakes and, when they do, the accused can either accept the consequences of that mistake by pleading guilty and paying the penalty or they can defend themselves and show that the police made a mistake. Unfortunately, while you have a right to a defence, you don't have a right to a defence at no cost.
Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose.
Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.
What you are describing may be the crime of insurance fraud: to avoid that, you would have to admit to the insurance company that you put a "Please steal me" sign in an unlocked car with the keys in the ignition, in a high-crime area. If we remove some of the elements of the scenario and reduce this to "leaving the keys in the ignition", this would probably be be considered contributory negligence, meaning that you failed to act prudently to protect your property. This can reduce the amount that the insurance company has to pay you. At this point, it depends on what state you're in, since sometimes a little bit of negligence (in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) means that you may get nothing. However, negligence hinges on an assessment of the actions and intentions of a party, and what you describe isn't "neglect", there is the direct intent that the car be stolen. Insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional loss. So the bottom line would be that the person would be out a car, and could be in prison for fraud if they did not reveal what they actually did. One should assume that the thieves took a lulz video of the sign before they stole the car, and posted it on FaceTube where it entered the viral hall of fame and was used against you in a court of law, so fraud is the worst choice. An alternative if you have a car is to donate it to charity, and take a tax write-off.
As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.
I do not know what actually happened to anyone in the aftermath of this incident, but it is unlikely that there is a basis for civil or criminal liability in this case. Criminal liability does not generally attach to negligent conduct except in cases of homicide or criminally negligent motor vehicle operation. But, this case appears to have involved mere negligence. It appears that somebody made an honest mistake rather than acting recklessly or intentionally to cause harm. Governmental entities and officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacity have immunity from liability for negligence except in some vary narrowly defined areas (e.g. failure to maintain government buildings, medical mistakes in government hospitals, and car accidents) which seem unlikely to be implicated here. But, it seems likely that the responsible parties were all governmental entities or officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacities. So, it is unlikely that there would be civil liability either. Needless to say, however, this does not look good on the job performance record of any civil servant below the Governor (who doesn't get evaluated in that way) when being considered for promotion, demotion, unfavorable transfers or even termination of employment. Obviously, if new facts were uncovered and this was actually more nefarious than it seems, and this hidden truth was discovered, there could be a basis for civil or criminal liability. But, if this was the case, it would have made headlines.
They can charge you with anything they think you did. And yes, the circumstances play a large part in the decision to arrest, charge and prosecute. However, circumstances include you: Reputation is everything. If you are a 17 year old male troublemaker with a long juvie rap sheet, including 3 past instances of stealing golf carts, then expect to be charged with the theft. Honestly you would probably be charged with the theft if you had simply stayed away and called the cops to report it abandoned. If you came upon it in your vehicle and it's obviously blocking the road and your apparent motive is to figure out how to move it so you can get by, then you're probably in the clear. If you're a 44 year old owner of a golf cart business, PAL supporter, city councilwoman and know half the cops including one in the car that stopped you, then, they're going to pretty much listen to you as far as what's the deal with the cart. Probably ask you for help moving it safely, might even ask you to get your cart-hauler to take it to impound. You won't hear from the D.A. obviously; nobody will say "Sue Councilwoman stole a golf cart" because it would sound absurd and make the speaker appear to be a politically motivated liar. That's the power of reputation; no one would speak it even if you did steal it. (Of course if you got caught doing it on a Ring camera, well, the hero takes a fall!) Anything in between, they'll deal with it in proportion to both the facts about you and the fact about the situation. You do not have a right to get the same credibility as the councilwoman; that is earned. That's the power of reputation.