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Inheriting a parents home with a right to use clause in the will I will be inheriting my fathers home, which he currently shares with a partner. The original will states that the partner can continue to occupy the home for three years following his death. After the three years, she will move out and I can/will sell the home. I assume she will be paying all the expenses. He has recently added a twist...he will transfer his IRA to me, and I will share the homeowner expenses 50/50, with her, up until the IRA is exhausted, or she decides to move out. At that time, I will be able to sell the home. My concern is that none of this is in writing, but an agreement on the honor system. Nothing in writing and no rental agreement. He does not want to change the will. My concerns: 1. She gets ill, exhausts her life savings, and cannot afford her share. 2. She decides not to pay her share. 3. She does not adequately preserve the home. 4. Who covers major expenses..painting, appliances, furnace, etc? As I am the homeowner. 5. I cannot evict her if needed, as she is a senior citizen, living in my home, with no lease. 6. The potential financial burden in case of a catastrophic loss or my inability to quickly sell the home at the end. A side note....she would like to remain in the house, but acknowledges that the yearly expenses are too costly to do so without help. I understand his desire to accommodate her request to stay in the house, but, I think it is unreasonable to burden me with this very generous agreement. My suggestion: sell her the house at a discounted rate and provide her with three years of expenses.....or....give her lifetime use of the home, at her total expense, and the house reverts to me upon her death or abandonment. Desperately need some advice. | This is going to depend very much on exactly what is in writing. Note that your father could, if he chose, directly leave both the house and the IRA to his partner. If you become the homeowner after your father's death, and the "3-year right to use" and the cost sharing provisions are not in writing, then neither is legally binding. You and the partner may choose to honor your father's wishes, but if he does not put them in the will or another legal document, neither of you is bound. The question says: I cannot evict her if needed, as she is a senior citizen, living in my home, with no lease. I do not know of any jurisdiction in which there is a general ban on evicting a senior citizen in all cases. There will be some restrictions no doubt, but they will depend on the local laws. And of course you may not wish to exercise all the legal rights you may have. You would ultimately, have the right as homeowner to evict the partner. I don't what procedures would need to be followed legally -- that will depend on the specific jurisdiction, which the question does not list. As the homeowner, you would be legally responsible for maintaining and paying taxes and other expenses on the house. The partner would be either your tenant or your guest. Once you have title (and that will take some time after your father's death, in all probability) if the "right to use" was never put in writing, you could ask the partner to sign a lease. The terms could be whatever the two of you choose to agree on. If she becomes a tenant under such a lease, she has both legal rights and legal responsibilities, and each of you has the protection of a clear agreement. You would be wise to consult a lawyer to learn exactly what the local law does and does not permit. Your father might well be wise to put his wishes more clearly in writing while he still can. | Since this seems to have been viewed a lot, an update/answer. I can't comment on the normalcy of such clauses since this has been my only experience. But the Estate Agent immediately struck the clause without any fight, so it seems like it was just there "in case I let it slide". It turned out to be a great decision, since I ended up finding my own buyer in the same week that the agent acquired a suitable offer, which I would then have been liable to pay the fees for. | The relevant law in California is here. In your situation, it is presumed (as you both agree) that you have a month to month agreement. §1946 states that A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of that party’s intention to terminate the same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days; In other words, the landlord has to give you 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease, and you have to give 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease (and it must be written notice). The section continues: provided, however, that as to tenancies from month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days’ written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and payable to and including the date of termination. which effectively says the same thing, specifically appliedd to month to month leases. There is some leeway on terminating a lease: It shall be competent for the parties to provide by an agreement at the time the tenancy is created that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by sending a copy by certified or registered mail addressed to the other party. But you would have to establish that there was such an agreement (I assume there was not). §1946.1 asserts that a hiring of residential real property for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her intention to terminate the tenancy, as provided in this section. That is, a lease is automatically renewed in your situation unless notice has been given. Moreover, A tenant giving notice pursuant to this section shall give notice for a period at least as long as the term of the periodic tenancy prior to the proposed date of termination. What you are proposing contravenes this provision of the law – from your description of the facts, you did not give notice 30 days before now. So your obligation to the landlord exists to the end of May. Bear in mind that the law imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant: just as the landlord cannot throw you out without proper notification, you cannot walk away from your obligation without proper notification. §1951.2 addresses breach of lease and abandonment by lessee (you) if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee: (1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination; (2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided; (3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and (4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee’s failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom. There are, also, no special exceptions about landlords selling their property that allow instant termination. That is, you still owe the month's rent, even though the lease is ending at the end of the month. You could of course ask the landlord to forgive you that last month's obligation. I am assuming that the lease was terminated properly by the landlord. If it was not, the landlord has not legally terminated the lease and it will continue until someone does properly terminate the lease. That might provide incentive for the other party to just forget the last month's rent, but it also might not. | This will depend on the exact wording of the will. If the will is well-drawn, it will provide alternative recipients in case the primary recipient of a bequest dies before the testator (will-maker) does. But as a general rule, if A makes a will leaving particular property to B, but B dies before A does, that bequest is void. If the will specifies an alternate recipient, the property goes to the alternate. If not, or if all specified alternates die before the testator does, the property becomes part of the residual estate of the testator. (The residual estate is that part which is not subject to a specific bequest.) The testator can specify a line of descent for a bequest: "I leave my house to Joan and her heirs". In that case, if Joan died before the testator, the house would go to whatever person or persons inherit from Joan. This was once a somewhat common form of bequest, but now is much less common. A will normally includes language leaving the residual estate to some person (or several people) or some entity (it can be an organization, such as a church or a charity). This is often done with language such as "I leave all the rest of my estate to ..." OR "Everything not include above i leave to..." or "I give all the remainder and residue of my estate to...". The executor does not choose, but rather follows the directions of the will on who gets the residue of the estate. I am not sure what happens if the will does not name a residuary legatee, or if the person so named dies before the testator. That will depend on the specific law of the jurisdiction. In the US, this means state law, and will vary from state to state. The comment by Dale M says that assets not provided for in the will are inherited as if the person was intestate, that is, as if the person had no valid will. The law in each jurisdiction specifies exactly what rules are followed in the case of intestacy. In general this is that property goes first to the teatator's spouse and children, but if there are no living spouse and children, to more distant relatives. Eventually, if no relatives close enough can be found, property escheats, that is, goes to the government. The exact rule varies by jurisdiction -- in the US by state. | The Probate Estate v. Non-Probate Transfers First off, keep in mind that only the "probate estate" is probated at all. Assets held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, assets held in trust, and assets with a death beneficiary, for example, pass by non-probate transfer. Some states also have a rebuttable presumption that all tangible personal property which is not part of a business owned by someone in a married couple that is not subject to a certificate of title is owned in joint tenancy by right of survivorship in favor of a surviving spouse. The probate estate consists only of property held in the name of the decedent with no beneficiary designation and no joint tenants (although there could be tenant-in-common co-owners or co-owners as part of a general partnership). The Primary Domicile Probate The primary probate is generally conducted in the state and county in which the decedent was domiciled at death. Intangible property, including interests in entities, and the legal rights of the decedent are generally deemed to be located at that domicile for probate purposes. The common law choice of law rule is to have moveable property also governed by the law of the state of domicile. While it doesn't have constitutional standing, it is widely adopted. The unsecured claims (i.e. claims not secured by collateral) of third-parties against the decedent are deemed located at the decedent's domicile at death. A will contest is almost always conducted solely in the primary domicile state, and that resolution has collateral estoppel and arguably full faith and credit clause binding effect in other ancillary probate cases. Almost every state, however, recognizes the validity of a will that was valid where executed at the time it was executed. Estate plans of individuals with property in many states that would be subject to many ancillary probate proceedings are routinely devised so that the property subject to ancillary probate is either not subject to probate at all, because it is in a revocable trust or joint tenancy with right of survivorship or has transfer on death beneficiary, or it at least in an entity whose shares are handled in the primary probate rather than in an ancillary probate, when the decedent was represented by counsel (and it verges on malpractice not to recommend that this be done if estate planning counsel is aware of the facts). Of course, not everyone hires a lawyer to do their estate plan before they die (even if they meant to do so), so ancillary probates still happen. Ancillary Probate Proceedings When there is real property in the estate owned outright by the decedent, and not subject to a joint tenancy or other non-probate transfer (such as a transfer on death deed) and not owned via a trust or entity, then an ancillary probate must be opened up in that state to probate that parcel of real property. One if left in an ancillary probate dealing with real property and debts for which that property is collateral in the ancillary probate. But the ancillary probate is largely a formality and mostly defers to the rulings of the court in the primary probate case. Sometimes closely held business which is a sole proprietorship or general partnership (as opposed to an entity), with a state or local specific license, must be the subject of an ancillary probate. But more often, the closely held business is an entity with a license and tangible personal property held in the entity. In those cases, the stock or membership interest is intangible property that can be probated at the domicile of the decedent, rather than in an ancillary probate where the business is located. In other words, let's say a person lives in Maine, but has property in 20 different states. Various houses, boats, bank accounts, brokerage accounts, you name it. Does the will have to then be probated in every one of the states in which the various property resides? The bank accounts, brokerage accounts, and most of the etc. that are part of the probate estate would be probated in Maine. The houses outside of Maine and possible the cars and boats and sole proprietorship inventory, equipment and license transfers outside of Maine would be resolved in ancillary probate proceedings. Conflicts Of Law Between Primary And Ancillary Probate Laws What happens if the probate laws of the states conflict? The procedural rules of the forum state govern the ancillary probate, rather than those of the primary probate case. Every state adopted the general rule that the directions of a will are valid and enforceable subject to only a handful of exceptions, and in most cases, intestacy rules when there is no surviving spouse are likewise identical. Almost all states would honor a will admitted to probate in the primary probate state (and are arguably required to do so under the full faith and credit clause), even if it would not have been admitted to probate in the ancillary probate state. While it is theoretically possible to have a conflict of law regarding general partnership property, inheritance of general partnership property is largely governed by the Uniform Partnership Act and this model state law is, in fact, a law that has been adopted in every U.S. state and is uniform on this point in every U.S. state. The main circumstances in which there could be conflicts between the state probate laws are: quirky intestate situations (differences between per stirpes and per capita at each generation, or differences between treatment of half-blood or multiple line of descent heirs), exemptions from creditors (e.g. homestead rights, tenancy-by-entirety rights, special legacy property rules in some Southern states), details of slayer statutes (e.g. does negligent homicide count?), divorce revocation laws (not every state revokes will provisions in favor a divorced spouse), community property rights in property, mandatory inheritance rights of disinherited spouses (dower, curtsy and force share laws, some states treat this as a creditor's claim, others don't), and provisions for what happens when a specific devise fails because an asset no longer exists if the will doesn't specifically state what happens. It is fairly rare for this to come up in practice, however, since normally the ancillary probate forum state court defers to the primary state appointed executor's requests, and it is quite rare for that to be disputed by other parties to the estate in the ancillary proceeding. It happens, I've been there, but it is very uncommon. In those cases, there is little formal guidance. The forum state's law is presumed to apply, but that presumption can be overcome by showing that some other state has the most significant connection to the legal issue over which there is a conflict. The analysis is handled by the forum state court on a case by case basis in the rare cases where it comes up. The primary probate court can also sometimes make an end run around ancillary probate court rulings applying substantive ancillary probate forum probate laws to property in the ancillary probate state by ordering a compensatory adjustment in how property in its jurisdiction is distributed to conform to the laws of its state. A recent case from New Hampshire discussed how choice of law works in probate cases: We first address whether the New Hampshire probate division erred in applying Massachusetts’ pretermitted heir statute, rather than New Hampshire's RSA 551:10, to the testator's will. On appeal, the petitioner argues that, despite the language of Article Ninth in his mother's will, RSA 551:10 applies because his mother was domiciled in New Hampshire at the time of her death and her estate consists of only personal property. The respondent argues that “[t]he intent of Marie G. Dow is clear,” (bolding and capitalization omitted), pursuant to Article Ninth of her will, that Massachusetts law should apply and asserts that New Hampshire “give[s] effect” to choice-of-law provisions in wills. We agree with the petitioner. The probate division's findings that the testator's estate consists of only personal property and that she was domiciled in New Hampshire at the time of her death are not challenged on appeal and need not be disturbed. We review the probate division's application of law to undisputed facts de novo. Under New Hampshire law, personal property of a testator generally passes according to the law of the state of domicile. Compare Eyre, 37 N.H. at 120 (“The general principle of the common law is, that the right and disposition of movables is to be governed by the law of the domicil of the owner.”), with Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 199, § 1 (West 2012) (stating that Massachusetts, when administering the will of a non-inhabitant of the Commonwealth, will dispose of the estate “according to his last will, if any; otherwise ... his personal property shall be distributed and disposed of according to the laws of the state or country of which he was an inhabitant”). Our law comports with Section 263(1) of the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, which provides: Whether a will transfers an interest in movables and the nature of the interest transferred are determined by the law that would be applied by the courts of the state where the testator was domiciled at the time of his death. Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws § 263(1), at 121 (1971). Compare id. (pertaining to transfers of personal property by will), with id. § 239(1), at 48 (“Whether a will transfers an interest in land and the nature of the interest transferred are determined by the law that would be applied by the courts of the situs.”). Because the testator's will disposes of only personal property, i.e., “movables,” the nature of the interests in this property will be determined by the laws of New Hampshire — where she was domiciled at death. Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, supra § 263(1), at 121. The law in New Hampshire is clear, and we are not persuaded that there is a reason to deviate from it in the instant case. The respondent relies upon our decisions in In re Farnsworth's Estate, 109 N.H. 15, 241 A.2d 204 (1968), and Royce v. Estate of Denby's, 117 N.H. 893, 379 A.2d 1256 (1977), in support of her position that Massachusetts’ pretermitted heir statute applies to the will because New Hampshire law honors the testator's intent, as expressed in Article Ninth of Marie G. Dow's will, to have her estate “administered and enforced according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” This reliance is misplaced. The respondent emphasizes that the court, in In re Farnsworth Estate, “gave effect to the choice of law provision in [the testator's] will.” However, our review in that case was limited to the testator's designation of New York law as the law to apply to her testamentary trusts. In In re Farnsworth's Estate, the testator was a domiciliary of New Hampshire at the time of her death though her will was “drawn and executed in New York City.” The testator's will stated that it shall be administered in the State of New York and shall be construed and regulated by the laws of the State of New York.” We noted that the administration and validity of a “ ‘trust of movables ... created by will’ ” is generally governed by the law of the state of the testator's domicile at death, but explained that there are “ ‘two situations in which the law of another state may be applied to the administration of the trust. The first is where the testator has designated the law of another state as the governing law. The second is where the testator has fixed the administration of the trust in a state other than that of his domicile at death. We determined that the will “created both of these situations” and, thus, held that “these trusts were intended to be and should be administered in the State of New York.” Here, the testator did not establish a testamentary trust. The fact that the will at issue in In re Farnsworth's Estate disposed of the testator's property via testamentary trusts was essential to our reasoning and our decision in that case. see also In re Lykes' Estate, 113 N.H. 282, 284, 305 A.2d 684 (1973) (holding provision of will that testamentary trust be construed according to laws of Texas was “a valid provision which must be respected by this court” (citing Scott, supra §§ 574-75; Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, supra § 268(1), at 143). The pertinent rules to apply to dispositions of property via will are dependent upon the form of the disposition and the form of the property. See, e.g., Haynes v. Carr, 70 N.H. 463, 463, 480, 49 A. 638 (1900) (“There is a wide distinction between a gift to charity and a gift to a trustee to be by him applied to charity.” (quotation and emphasis omitted)); Eyre, 37 N.H. at 120 (a decedent's personal property passes according to the law of the state of domicile, while real property passes according to the law of the state where it lies). Therefore, in the instant case, In re Farnsworth Estate does not support deviating from New Hampshire law as the law governing the disposition of personal property in Marie G. Dow's will. cf. Robbins v. Johnson, 147 N.H. 44, 45, 780 A.2d 1282 (2001) (“The pretermitted heir statute, on its face, applies to ‘wills,’ not to trusts.”). Similarly, the fact that the testator in Royce became a domiciliary of New Hampshire after she had become incapacitated and never regained capacity before her death was essential to our reasoning and our decision in that case. “The Royce holding was limited to the facts of that case, which are distinguishable from those before us.” In Royce, we recognized that, because the testator had no opportunity due to her incapacity to change her will after her move to New Hampshire, it was inequitable to apply the New Hampshire rule that the law of the domicile controls the succession to personal property when the testator had no opportunity to respond to New Hampshire law. Here, the testator had an opportunity to change her will after relocating to New Hampshire approximately a year before her death.3 Therefore, Royce does not support deviating from New Hampshire law as the law governing the disposition of personal property in Marie G. Dow's will. We note that our prior case law, contemplating the applicability of New Hampshire's pretermitted heir statute where the facts implicated more than one jurisdiction, has not expressly dealt with a provision like that of Article Ninth in Marie G. Dow's will, expressing her intent to have her estate “administered and enforced according to the laws” of another state — the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rubert, 139 N.H. at 276, 651 A.2d 937 (applying Virginia law to determine whether the plaintiff was a pretermitted heir entitled to an intestate share of the testator's personal property where the testator was domiciled in Virginia). While it is true that we attempt to give maximum effect to a testator's intent, our law does not support the application here of another state's pretermitted heir statute independent of the governing law of the testator's domicile at death with respect to dispositions of personal property. Section 264 of the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws supports a testator's ability, in bequeathing interests in personal property, to select the rules of construction of another state for use in construing the language of her will. See Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, supra § 264(1), at 125 (“A will insofar as it bequeaths an interest in movables is construed in accordance with the local law of the state designated for this purpose in the will.”); id. § 264 cmt. e at 126-27 (“The forum will give effect to a provision in the will that it should be construed in accordance with the rules of construction of a particular state.”). We have not expressly adopted this section of the Restatement, and we need not consider doing so here because even assuming without deciding that Article Ninth designated Massachusetts’ rules of construction for application to the will, neither Massachusetts’ nor New Hampshire's pretermitted heir statute constitutes a rule of construction. As will be discussed in section III, not only is RSA 551:10 not a rule of construction, it is a conclusive rule of law. We, therefore, hold that New Hampshire's pretermitted heir statute applies to Marie G. Dow's will because she was a domiciliary of New Hampshire at the time of her death and her will disposes of only personal property. Accordingly, the probate division erred in applying Massachusetts law to determine that the petitioner is not a pretermitted heir. In re Est. of Dow, 2019-0752, 2021 WL 199619, at *2–5 (N.H. Jan. 20, 2021) (caselaw citations omitted). The Role Of Federal Courts Notwithstanding the fact that parties to probate cases are frequently diverse in citizenship, there is an obscure court created doctrine that provides that probate cases are a matter of state rather than federal court jurisdiction. (The "well pleaded complaint rule" largely prevents federal question jurisdiction from applying.) Part of the legal justification for this is that probate cases are in rem proceedings that primarily adjudicate rights in a particular collection of property (everything owned by the decedent) rather than primarily providing in personam relief between citizens of different states or countries, the way that a lawsuit for breach of contract or a tort or an injunction might. So, unless title to the real property arises under the conflicting claims of two different states (which almost never happens for obvious reasons in the modern era of accurate surveying of state boundaries), diversity jurisdiction is not implicated. | No. As long as it is owned by him he is free to do as he likes. The wife / children do not have any claims as it is ancestral property and they can have a claim only after his demise. Until then, he is free to do as he likes legally. | Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this. | You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with. |
Is furry cub porn considered pedophilia? So, I was talking with a friend on Discord and they told me that digital drawings of furry cubs that display sexual/fetish content is both pedophilia and zoophilia and punishable by law, but this confused me as there are sites like InkBunny and e621 that host this type of content with servers based in the United States. For anyone unfamiliar with the furry fandom, a "furry cub" is essentially a young/adolescent animal of some sort that hasn't reached adulthood. So, is this considered legal in the United States? | Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred. | canada The term "child" is expressly defined for various offences. For example, for s. 172: child means a person who is or appears to be under the age of eighteen years. The offence of "child pornography" is expressly defined to relate to "a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years." The offence of "child luring" has several variants, for luring those who are or who the accused believes to be under the age of 18, 16, or 14. They are all called "child luring." Other sections criminalize conduct in relation to a child without defining the term. See e.g. s. 243: Every person who in any manner disposes of the dead body of a child, with intent to conceal the fact that its mother has been delivered of it, whether the child died before, during or after birth, is guilty... For s. 243, courts had to conduct statutory interpretation in order to determine the meaning of the word "child." The Supreme Court of Canada held that "child" in this offence includes children born alive and fetuses that were likely to have been born alive. See R. v. Levkovic, 2013 SCC 25. I know this is Canadian law, rather than Massachusetts law, but one thing you can take away from this is that terms can take on distinct legal meanings from one provision to another. And where a term is not expressly defined in statute, its meaning will be enunciated by a court. These meanings need not line up with the definitions you find in a dictionary. But, for a general description from a specialized dictionary, see Black's Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (2014): child. 1. An unemancipated person under the age of majority. 2. Hist. At common law, a person who has not reached the age of 14. 3. A boy or girl; a young person. 4. A son or daughter. 5. A baby or fetus. | That definition still applies, at least in federal law. Under 18 USC 2256: “child pornography” means any visual depiction ... indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct But the First Amendment limits its applicability in cases like Sabrina. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the law violates free speech and was overbroad, with a lengthy discussion of the threats it posed to legitimate artistic works: Under the CPPA, images are prohibited so long as the persons appear to be under 18 years of age. 18 U. S. C. § 2256(1). This is higher than the legal age for marriage in many States, as well as the age at which persons may consent to sexual relations. ... It is, of course, undeniable that some youths engage in sexual activity before the legal age, either on their own inclination or because they are victims of sexual abuse. Both themes-teenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse of children-have inspired countless literary works. William Shakespeare created the most famous pair of teenage lovers, one of whom is just 13 years of age. See Romeo and Juliet, act I, sc. 2, 1. 9 ("She hath not seen the change of fourteen years"). In the drama, Shakespeare portrays the relationship as something splendid and innocent, but not juvenile. The work has inspired no less than 40 motion pictures, some of which suggest that the teenagers consummated their relationship. E. g., Romeo and Juliet (B. Luhrmann director, 1996). Shakespeare may not have written sexually explicit scenes for the Elizabethan audience, but were modern directors to adopt a less conventional approach, that fact alone would not compel the conclusion that the work was obscene. Contemporary movies pursue similar themes. Last year's Academy Awards featured the movie, Traffic, which was nominated for Best Picture. See Predictable and Less So, the Academy Award Contenders, N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2001, p. Ell. The film portrays a teenager, identified as a 16year-old, who becomes addicted to drugs. The viewer sees the degradation of her addiction, which in the end leads her to a filthy room to trade sex for drugs. The year before, American Beauty won the Academy Award for Best Picture. See "American Beauty" Tops the Oscars, N. Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2000, p. El. In the course of the movie, a teenage girl engages in sexual relations with her teenage boyfriend, and another yields herself to the gratification of a middle-aged man. The film also contains a scene where, although the movie audience understands the act is not taking place, one character believes he is watching a teenage boy performing a sexual act on an older man. Our society, like other cultures, has empathy and enduring fascination with the lives and destinies of the young. Art and literature express the vital interest we all have in the formative years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach. Whether or not the films we mention violate the CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute's prohibitions. If these films, or hundreds of others of lesser note that explore those subjects, contain a single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work's redeeming value. This is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene. See Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U. S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he social value of the book can neither be weighed against nor canceled by its prurient appeal or patent offensiveness"). Under Miller, the First Amendment requires that redeeming value be judged by considering the work as a whole. Where the scene is part of the narrative, the work itself does not for this reason become obscene, even though the scene in isolation might be offensive. See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam}. For this reason, and the others we have noted, the CPP A cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the definition of obscenity. If the law were applicable to Sabrina, the fact that it's streamed wouldn't save it. 18 USC 2252A prohibits knowingly receiving, distributing, reproducing, advertising, promoting or presenting child pornography, "by any means, including by computer." | No. This would not be illegal. There is considerable case law holding that a mere link to a website is not itself actionable, either civilly or criminally, for wrongdoing by the operator of the destination site. This said, even though it would not be a breach of copyright, per se, in some circumstances one could imagine the link, together with other actions to give the link more context and substance (e.g. a revenue sharing agreement with the illegal website operator based upon clicks referred from your site) to support a claim of civil conspiracy to violate copyright laws, or even a criminal conspiracy to do so. But, it would be very hard to make out a civil or criminal conspiracy claim against someone who maintained a "warning" site. Similarly, it would not be actionable to have a webpage that linked to a website that used to be legitimate when the webpage was set up, if the link then rotted and the site at that address was replaced by a website that streamed videos illegally or promoted child pornography, without your knowledge. | There are federal laws against distributing obscene material to minors, or producing or possessing obscene material depicting minors. Other prohibitions against obscene material include mailing it (§1461), importing it (§1462) and producing it (§1465). Here is the DoJ guideline on laws restricting obscene material. As developed in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, Smith v. US, 431 U.S. 291, and Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, there is a three-pronged test Whether the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards, finds that the matter, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests (i.e., an erotic, lascivious, abnormal, unhealthy, degrading, shameful, or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion); Whether the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards, finds that the matter depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way (i.e., ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, masturbation, excretory functions, lewd exhibition of the genitals, or sado-masochistic sexual abuse); Whether a reasonable person finds that the matter, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. There is no prohibition against pornographic material, so we needn't be concerned with whether the material is pornographic, the pertinent question is whether it is obscene. This has to be determined by consulting "the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards" and whether a "reasonable" person will find that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. This can only be determined at trial. | The "Right to Party" as defined by the organization known as "The Beastie Boys" is not defined in any portion of their discourse on the matter of the "Right to Party". Rather, the entire discourse poetically describes a youth, presumably under the legal adult age of 18 (given restrictions on smoking cigarettes and owning adult literature in the second verse), who faces restrictions upon his or her rights by his legal guardians, in this case a mother, father, and teacher. Whereas the dictionary definition of the verb form of "Party" is defined by Oxford Dictionary as "Enjoying oneself at a party or other lively gathering, typically with drinking and music." As established, the subject of the proposed treaty on this right is legally barred from drinking, though a party may exist without alcohol and thus would not prevent the subject from engaging in an act of partying. A party or lively gathering would meat the definition of "Freedom of Peaceful Assembly" under the First Amendment Rights of the United States Constitution as well as "Freedom of Association" under the same amendment. Said party may additionally be for any purpose so long as it is peaceful. The state may impose reasonable restrictions on the party, such as noise ordinances, age based restrictions on minors including "Adult Contents", cigarettes and alchohol, as discussed. While typcial, they're absence does not prevent the assembly from rising to the level of "party" as previous defined. Beastie Boys contends that the restrictions place upon the subject of their discourse on the Right to Party is unreasonably restricted by the confiscation of several items, enforced school requirements, and dress code as defined by the legal guardian in their right as authority of the youth's rights. Beastie Boys offers little evidence that these restrictions are unreasonable or prevent the subject from "partying" as defined above. Beastie Boys do propose that the authority known as the father can not restrict the use of cigarettes by the youth as the father "smokes two packs a day". While Beastie Boys is correct that this meets the definition of hypocritical, the father is assumed to be of legal age to purchase cigarettes and is legal allowed to restrict access to them based on reasonable age restrictions and possible heath risks the father wishes to prevent in the youth that he may or may not be suffering from. As there are no formal requirements for a peaceful assembly to rise to the level of party, it can be presumed that these restrictions would not affect the party as defined. It should also be noted that in the Beastie Boys discourse, that the authority figure referred to as mother did not restrict the youths ability to listen to the content of the discourse, nor were any restrictions described tailored in such a fashion as to restrict the discourse specifically. While there is no amendment defining the right to party in the United States Constitution, the 9th Amendment does clearly state that citizens rights are not enumerated in the constitution and other rights not discussed in the constitution may exists and be claimed by the individual. From an originalist standpoint, it is widely accept that a good number of The Framers of the Constitution quite frequently met the accepted definition of the phrase "Drunk off their Ass" and thus, would not reasonably be against what can be defined as a "party". Additionally, many were participants in an event that was known as the "Tea Party", which was agreed by many to be quite the lively gathering at its time and was still viewed as quite the "radical" affair of the day, many wearing costumes such as those who attended in clothing traditional of Native Americans. They were also most likely not drunk during the course of this party. Thus, the intent of the framers was never to restrict or deniegn such a right Thus, a reasonable court in the United States would hold that the Right to Party does exist for all U.S. citizens and is inalienable. Beastie Boys also argues that it is acceptable to fight for one's right to party. This does not conflict with the First Amendment Right to petition government for grievances so long as it is again a peaceable affair. Given the poetic nature of the discourse, we can presume that "Fight" would mean to defend or struggle in a non-violent manor for such a right. This is backed up through originalism as the restrictions placed on many citizens of Boston for their actions during the Tea Party were subsequently fought against for many years, culminating in the Constitution. Thus, it can be assumed that the United States does recognize the right of the people to party and the right of the people to fight for the aforementioned right. This right would still be subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions so long as said restrictions are content neutral to the message of the party. | It is illegal in Morocco to possess or distribute pornographic material of any kind. This includes nudes of the hypothetical Vietnamese girl. | One way in which it holds legal water is that if you use the website in violation of the terms, then you may forfeit your right to take civil action against the company. Analogous language especially regarding the age of the user may protect the site against actions by third party governmental entities (COPPA-like laws), though nothing patently obvious springs to mind (insofar as this deals with firearms and there is also an age 21 restriction both on the web site and in terms of US firearms law, this is not a totally crazy idea). The citation of 18 USC 1030 non-probatively points to an issue which may be disposed of by SCOTUS in US v. van Buren, that knowingly violating the terms of service is a crime (a proposition rejected by lower courts, see US v. Valle). Facebook v. Power Ventures in particular clarifies how "being put on notice" may make such unauthorized access indeed "unauthorized access" in the statutorily-relevant sense. This does not prevent a legally-authorized law enforcement investigation, pursuant to para (f), but if the "violation of TOS = unauthorized access" theory is upheld, it limits how LEOs can legally access the website (and the limitations extend past LEOs). It is a separate and potentially interesting question whether there actually are any legal limits on the investigative powers of the government – if any law enforcement officer has the liberty to investigate anyone they want, with no supervision or requirement of justification, then this would be a rather gaping loophole in their legal strategy. Web pages involve massive copying of copyright-protected data, and the function of terms of use is in part to conditionally grant access to that copyright-protected content. When a person copies protected material from someone's web page having been explicitly denied permission to copy, they run the risk of an infringement lawsuit. |
Are there case law examples where a reseller was forbidden to publish the name of the item being resold? Are there case law examples where a reseller was forbidden to publish the name of the item being resold? For example suppose a computer reseller acquires a used computer made by HALCO, model HAL-9001 (fake brand and model). Can HALCO stop the reseller from publishing the brand and model, perhaps in an ad, on their website, or on a piece of paper taped to the unit, as both are trademarked? (There are no authorized HALCO resellers.) | united-states If the computer is in fact a HAL-9001 (no doubt running the Clarke-68 OS) then the reseller can so describe it without trademark infringement. This is a case of nominative use, where the trademark is used as the name of the thing, to describe and/or refer to it. In addition, under US law, an attempt to prohibit the reseller from using that term would run into first amendment issues, and would be subject to strict scrutiny. If the term were used in such a way as to disparage the brand, there could possibly be an action for tarnishment of the trademark. but such actions are now limited in the US on first amendment grounds, following the case of Matal v. Tam. See What is trademark tarnishment or dilution under US law? for more details. | Of course. Copyright law prevents you from making copies, and prevents others from making copies. It doesn’t oblige you to take extreme precautions against vague possibilities that others might break the law. And reading is not considered “copying”. So you don’t have to prevent others from reading your books at all. | OK, the prohibition on commercial use stems from either: The tort of passing off; this is a private civil matter between the model and the publisher, or Breach of s18 of the Australian Consumer Law which involve misleading or deceptive conduct; this is a public civil matter with strict liability (i.e. intention or negligence is irrelevant) between the ACCC and the publisher with fines of up to $1,100,000 for a body corporate and $220,000 for an individual. In both cases the cause of action arises from the possible presumption by a person who views the photograph that the model in it is endorsing the goods or services that you are selling. The standard is: Would a reasonable person, viewing the photograph in context, come to the conclusion that the model is endorsing the goods or services (either because they really like it or they were paid to show they really liked it). Context is everything here. Some examples: If you a photo studio selling the actual photograph then there is no endorsement. If you are using the photograph to promote the studio there is. If you are showing a crowd scene (e.g. at a football match) there is no endorsement. If you are showing a building and the people are incidental there is no endorsement. If you are showing individuals or small groups in a way that promotes your goods or services there is endorsement. So, look at the photograph and the purpose you are using it for: could a reasonable person draw the conclusion that the people in it are endorsing your application? | A trademark can't prevent you from using your own name. For example, see Canada's Trademark Act Section 12(1)(a): Subject to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is not a word that is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has died within the preceding thirty years; However, marks that are "primarily merely" a name or surname can eventually gain distinctiveness in association with a product. In that case, the registration may be allowed. Even so, Section 20(1.1)(a) provides an exception that lets you use your own name, regardless of whether somebody else has registered the mark: The registration of a trade-mark does not prevent a person from making, in a manner that is not likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching to the trade-mark, any bona fide use of his or her personal name as a trade-name. The US is similar. See 15 USC § 1052(e), which precludes registration of a mark that is "primarily merely a surname." This relatively uniform treatment of personal names is due in part to the TRIPS Agreement. See Article 24, paragraph 8: The provisions of this Section shall in no way prejudice the right of any person to use, in the course of trade, that person's name or the name of that person's predecessor in business, except where such name is used in such a manner as to mislead the public. | Good question. A trade mark simply protects the company's exclusive right to use it to identify their goods and services. (R) means that the trade mark has been registered, TM means that, while not registered, the company is claiming a trade mark. Trade marks do not have to be registered to be enforceable. You are certainly not infringing their trade mark by what you are doing and you are not laying claim to the trade mark, so there is no requirement to use the symbols. Best practice is to use the symbols and identify who they belong to: "Intel and Core are trade marks of xyz". | It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter. | In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any. | If such a case came to court, the court would presumably rule that merely publishing the advertising could not be considered to be doing something "commercial". (Otherwise the contract would be absurd, as the question points out.) The court would therefore define "commercial" as some act beyond merely displaying the advertising -- perhaps charging for the website on which it is displayed, or using it to sell goods. Moreover, since the company apparently wrote the contract, any ambiguity in it would be construed against the company, if there is another reasonable interpretation. Thus the contract would not be void, and could be sued on, but the company would win only if it established some conduct that the court was prepared to consider as "commercial" in light of the circumstances and the purpose of the contract. By the way it is not really on point, but it is a common misunderstanding that: some customers may be organized as nonprofit and they're not allowed to make profits Nonprofit entities may do business and make income that would be considered "profit" for an ordinary corporation. What they cannot do is distribute that income as "profit" to owners, shareholders, members, or other individuals. |
Can I serve my ex spouse an eviction notice before he signs a quitclaim deed? My divorce is finalized and I was awarded the house. Obviously I will need to refinance it and pay him his share of the equity to get the deed solely in my name, which will take time. My ex is dragging his feet about moving out, and our divorce decree says nothing about occupying the home. Can I serve him an eviction notice now since the house was awarded to me, or do I have to wait until I complete the refinance and get his name off the deed? If for some reason I can't refinance, the house would be sold. He has no interest in staying in the house either way. That's not documented anywhere though. He's also perfectly able to afford to live elsewhere. I found lots of info about getting temporary orders for occupancy during the divorce (which doesn't apply because it's already finalized), and evicting someone from a home if it's solely in your name, but nothing about the time period between those two events. | No. An eviction notice served while someone is an owner of record of a house would not be enforced. But, generally speaking, a divorce court retains jurisdiction to enforce its decrees after they are entered, and to clarify its existing orders. Obviously I will need to refinance it and pay him his share of the equity to get the deed solely in my name, which will take time. Usually, the ex's duty to get the deed in your name would precede the duty to refinance it. A deed from one owner of real estate to another co-owner doesn't violate a due on sales clause of a mortgage or deed of trust, and the fact that both of you are on the mortgage or deed of trust does not mean that both of you need to own it. Unless the decree says otherwise, the ex would usually have to transfer the property even if the mortgage is not yet refinanced. But, not all decrees and not all separation agreements have the same requirements and provisions. The exact language in the governing document would matter. If the decree doesn't say who gets to occupy the house, you could and probably should go to the court to have that issue clarified. Since violating a clear court order can give rise to contempt of court sanctions of incarceration or fines, often someone will comply with it without having to have the police intervene to remove someone. Conceivably, if the ex did not leave, you could seek to hold the ex in contempt of court for violating the divorce decree if it implies that the ex's right to occupy the house has ended. If the ex is found by the court to have willfully violated a court order following notice to the ex, an arraignment and a hearing if the violation was not conceded at the arraignment, the ex could face incarceration and/or fines (contempt proceedings are rather complicated and exactly how you do this is beyond the scope of a simple answer). You could also seek to hold the ex in contempt of court for not promptly signing the quitclaim deed (assuming that the decree does not condition the duty to do this on the refinancing of the house), but this would not be the best solution to that problem. This is because you could also go to the court and have it appoint the clerk of the court as the husband's agent to sign the quitclaim deed on behalf of the ex (assuming again that the decree does not condition the duty to do this on the refinancing of the house), if the ex failed to do so as required by the divorce decree by the deadline set forth in the decree, or a new court order, or within a reasonable time if not deadline is set. Then, after you were in title, you could bring an eviction action if necessary. It is much easier and faster to get an order directing the clerk to sign something on behalf of a party to a lawsuit than it is to hold someone in contempt of court. You could also ask the court to issue a protection order prohibiting him from occupying the house at any time prior to the title being put into your name pursuant to the decree. This could take effect as soon as the protection order signed/authorized by the judge is served upon the ex. A protection order (in most states) is directly enforceable by the police, unlike most court orders which are only enforceable by bringing contempt of court charges in the court that issued the order. But, a court would usually be reluctant to issue a protection order unless there was a clear and present risk of physical harm, or severe emotional harm to you from a violation of the decree. Also, while the ex wouldn't be committing the crime of trespassing by occupying the house, it wouldn't be unprecedented for you to persuade a police officer to remove the ex from the house after explaining the situation to prevent a breach of the peace between you, or because the ex's conduct in overstaying his right under the decree to be in the house constitutes "disorderly conduct" or "loitering" or "harassment" or some other minor offense in the opinion of the police officer, even if that charge might not hold up if prosecuted in court. But, there is really no way to compel a police officer to do that and it is close to the boundary of what a police officer does and doesn't have the authority to do. Most of these remedies would take several weeks, at a minimum, to complete. A protection order could be done in a day or two, subject to a prompt follow up hearing within a week or two after the fact. A court might also rule on a clarification order on an expedited basis by setting a shorter than usual deadline for the ex to respond given the urgency of the matter. | The co-tenants in any real property are entitled to possess and enjoy the entire property, "unless otherwise". The conveyance might say otherwise (it's on the deed), and it is most likely that you are equal co-owners. You and your brother could take exclusive possession of the property for some period of time, meaning that you can legally exclude your sister from the property during that time – if you all agree to that (I assume you didn't, maybe you did). In that case, your right to possess the property could be contingent on the prior agreement to pay rent (again, I assume there is no such agreement). Your sister also has the same right live in the house without paying rent. She cannot throw you out of your own house if you don't pay rent. The primary question is whether from a legal perspective, you and your brother have exclusive possession of the property, under the laws of your jurisdiction, so in a few jurisdictions you might have to pay rent. That's not the same as "living there". | No they can't. The lease says the premises need to be cleaned without going into details how. You cleaned them yourself before moving out. If the landlord was not happy with that, they should have raised their concerns and discussed options. The security deposit that the landlord holds is only supposed to be used when something goes wrong. When something goes wrong, the landlord is supposed to talk, not to silently chop off a slice of the deposit as they please (unless the lease allows it, which it does not here). If the landlord refuses to refund, read the manual and go to small claims court to tell them where to get off. | Yes. You go into the court of relevant jurisdiction, and file a lawsuit to "quiet the question". Usually there is a counterparty who has something to say on the subject; sometimes not. If there is an apparent counterparty, they must be served notice of all aspects of the case. Let's say I manage a pipeline property management company; we are wholly owned by a pipeline company and we buy the land and lease it to said pipeline company. I need a parcel of land to complete a pipeline connection, and as part of my offer I gently remind the landowner, Beth, that we do have the legal right to take the property by eminent domain, with the hopes this will inspire them to a sensible price. Beth says "Bunk! Your LLC doesn't run any pipelines! You don't have eminent domain rights! 500% market price, or go away." Well. So, for the sake of moving the negotiation along, I go to court and ask the judge to quiet the question of whether we have eminent domain rights. Mind you, I don't go any further than that; I don't want to actually take it by eminent domain if I can talk Beth out of a consensual sale. The judge will, of course, suspect this applies to an imminent case, and will ask... so I might as well disclose the Beth situation. As such, I will have to serve Beth and keep Beth fully in the loop, so that Beth has full right to make the other side of the argument. Since it could affect others as well, the judge will probably also require publication in whichever newspaper handles legal notices. (Many newspapers are propped up financially by being official legal-notice organs for their county. They have six pages of editorial content, and 18 pages of legal notices and other ads.) Most likely, the judge will cowardly refuse to rule on whether a pipeline's land holding company has eminent domain, and simply rule that the pipeline company itself does, and could simply buy the land itself then transfer it to my company as a trivial, taxless transaction. So the judge would grant eminent domain conditional on that transaction being done. Beth then offers 133% of market which we haggle to 120% of market + legal fees. Good enough! Or, Beth refuses, in which case we file an eminent domain action in the same court and before the same judge; being already aware of the facts of the situation, there is nothing left to litigate, and the gavel drops quickly and predictably. This is how "quieting a question" works. It is somewhat less confrontational with the counterparty, since you are going to court, sort-of together, to resolve a hypothetical question; once we know whether we are on solid legal footing, we then are able to continue negotiating. Courts love this, because they really want people to negotiate and make consensual settlements. And if a party insists on filing a suit to on the quieted matter, they can pay their filing fees and lawyer fees to get a lecture: "we already resolved this." (Or alternately, to present new facts which mean the past ruling is no longer on-point; e.g., Beth discovers we don't want the land for a pipeline at all, but for an access road.) You can also do this with the IRS. This is called a Private Letter Ruling, and it will set you back a $750 filing fee (and legal costs, of course). You'll still get audited, but then you wave the Ruling in front of them and done. Doing this preemptively in a criminal matter would be adventuresome. Your biggest problem would be the press: it would be impossible to do this discreetly, as the case would be fascinating; and it would put every cop and prosecutor on notice that you have a mind to do the potentially illegal thing. | The fact that you're not a native speaker of English doesn't alter the legal situation. If you literally had no understanding of English but for some reason you signed a piece of paper, then you might argue that there was no agreement in the first place, but obviously you do speak some English. Most people don't actually understand what contracts mean (on both sides). Contracts are still enforced, based on what the contract says. The move-in data is proposed, not firm, and it even indicates what the charges are if your circumstances change and the dates have to change (whereas is their circumstances change, they wouldn't have a basis for charging extra). It also does say that there will be no refund if you change your mind. So the piece of paper says "No refund". The problem seems to be that there's an "agent" whose statements you relied on, who is ultimately responsible for this problem, and s/he implied that you could get a refund. It's not clear what kind of "agent" this is (is he working for you, or for the owners?). You'd have a somewhat different legal basis depending on which it is, but you could sue someone in either event, assuming that you could actually persuade the court that you were given false information which you relied on. The statement "they will refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is false; the statement "they may refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is true. If the latter was the statement that you relied on, then you knew (or should have known) that that isn't a promise, it's just a guess, and if you read the piece of paper you know that it's a promise with no basis. So I would say it comes down to establishing what promise was made to you. Arguing that the agent "made" you sign isn't going to get you anywhere (unless you can prove actual coersion). | No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement"). | A spouse in Toronto, Canada can seek a divorce at any time by filing a petition in the appropriate court in Ontario Province, although it is only granted after the parties have been separated for at least one year (or sooner if adultery or domestic violence are present). A divorce court can order temporary support during the pendency of the case. The relevant law is national, but the relevant court is part of the provincial court system. Abandonment or separation from a spouse is not a concept recognized by criminal law in Canada, and abandonment has no relevance to entitlement to a divorce in Canadian divorce law which simply asks if parties are currently living together or not as a factual matter (although it may go to need for maintenance payments or access to property). If they are not living together, then they are separated, something that requires no court approval. Upon divorce, and during a separation (in fact) of the spouses prior to a divorce, a Court can enter orders regarding property division or maintenance (and child support, if relevant) if the husband can be served with process, and as to any property that the Court can gain control over. UPDATE: Contrary to my previous answer to this question, apparently there is a relevant criminal statute that I previously failed to locate because it was in part of the criminal code where I didn't expect it to be, which states in the pertinent part (the language in bold has been held unconstitutional and has no legal effect). § 215 (1) Every one is under a legal duty . . . (b) to provide necessaries of life to their spouse . . . (2) Every one commits an offence who, being under a legal duty within the meaning of subsection (1), fails without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on him, to perform that duty, if (a) with respect to a duty imposed by paragraph (1). . . (b), (i) the person to whom the duty is owed is in destitute or necessitous circumstances, or (ii) the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is owed, or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be endangered permanently . . . (3) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (2) . . . (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or (b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months. (4) For the purpose of proceedings under this section . . . the fact that a spouse . . . is receiving or has received necessaries of life from another person who is not under a legal duty to provide them is not a defence. Canadians call this crime criminal neglect. Some interpretative material and case law is provided here, although all of the easily accessible case law cited at the source involves child neglect rather than spousal neglect. More interpretations of the statute and procedural issues are explored here. Notably, the summary offense statute of limitations is six months. Under the statute: "Necessaries of life" are necessaries that "tend to preserve life and not necessaries in their ordinary legal sense". According to a case involving failure to provide medical care to a child who was also physically abused. Other cases have held that: Where the duty is found, the crown must prove:3 the culprit acts or omissions which led to the failure to provide necessaries of life were a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances, and it was objectively foreseeable that the failure to provide necessaries would lead to a risk of danger to the life or permanent endangerment to the health of the person to whom the duty is owed. The accused's conduct is to be considered on an objective standard and so the individual characteristics and experiences of the accused are not relevant. Neither abandonment nor separation are concepts involved in the statute which merely involves a "failure to provide." The lion's share of the cases involve what could be called child neglect (about half of the reported cases) or elder abuse, not infrequently involving an adult child and a severely unhealthy dependent parent. (These cases also hold that the spouse's duty to provide necessities takes priority over the child's.) "Lawful excuses" are a matter of common law and are not itemized in the statute. The decision to charge the crime as a "summary offense" (basically a misdemeanor) or an "indictable offense" (basically a felony) appears to be up to the prosecutor and there is no mandatory minimum sentence. In a couple hours of searching, I have not been able to locate any Canadian case under Section 215 with a fact pattern similar to that of the question. The elder abuse cases don't tend to involve spouses and involve neglect of personal care that a person cannot provide themselves or a lack of medical care, by and large. So, it seems that the conclusion, that one should bring a divorce action, still appears to be the correct one. It seems unlikely that this situation would be prosecuted when a civil action could secure another result. Also, incarceration of a spouse will ordinarily prevent the spouse from earning any income. | My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose. |
Is it legal to compel users to share data in order to access more features, when the features being accessed do not require the data being requested? Apologies in advance if this is not the correct exchange for this question. I am a developer working for a company that owns a healthcare application. They operate exclusively in the EU. As part of the data consent / privacy policy, users can agree to allow the company to collect additional data about their account, in addition to our standard terms. I have been asked to implement a set of new features. Part of this implementation involves making these features inaccessible to users who have not allowed the company to collect additional data. If the user agrees to share this data, they can access the new features. However, these new features do not need to use the additional data in order to work. I am concerned that this is illegal and am hesitant to carry out the project. I have spent some time trying to research this online but have been unable to find clear advice on the legality of leveraging feature access against data consent options. I do not think this is considered best practice, but I am unable to assess if it is illegal, or just a poor decision. Is it legal to compel users to share data in order to access more features, when the features being accessed do not require the data being requested? | Any processing of personal data needs a legal basis, for example necessity for some contract or legitimate interest. If no other legal basis allows the processing, you need to acquire consent. Consent must be freely given. If something is gated behind consent without that consent being really necessary, this might coerce users and they would not be able to consent freely. The GDPR does not have a hard ban on this, but it explicitly calls out that this case must be considered when determining whether consent is valid. So what your company is trying to do is in a dark grey area. Not necessarily wrong, but likely so. Consent could be made free if users have an actual choice. For example, some online newspaper sites had success with a “pay or consent” wall. (Success in the sense that some data protection authorities allowed this). In your case, this could mean that users either consent to extra data collection, or that they buy some reasonably priced premium mode. But none of this is for you to decide. You can voice your doubts that the software would be compliant. You could also ask if the Data Protection Impact Assessment document for this proposed processing is available (creating such an assessment is likely mandatory in this case). But in the end, it is the company's obligation to be compliant, and this responsibility is largely shouldered by the company's data protection officer (to whom you can turn with further questions). | The European Convention on Human Rights has an article about privacy (article 8). Note that this is from the Council of Europe, which is not the same as the European Union: non-EU member states such as Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are also part of the Council of Europe and therefore the ECHR. I'm not sure if you first have to go to a lower court, but the European Court of Human Rights is the authority on this (commonly mistaken for the European Court of Justice, but they are distinct entities). According to this ruling of the ECtHR, it is not illegal to monitor your employees' communications per se. However, the monitoring has to be: for legitimate purposes ("the employer had only accessed the account in the sincere belief that it contained only messages of a professional, not personal, nature"), proportionate ("it was the only possible way available"), and communicated to the employee (or, if the monitoring is not announced, at least the restriction on personal use should be communicated, for example through company policy). In the European Union, there is also the GDPR, but this does not change much. It applies to your employer the same as any other organisation and basically says that they have to be reasonable about it: collect only what they need, for a legitimate purpose, and tell you about it. I think you should be able to request a copy of any data they collected about you, ask a human to review an automated decision, and your other usual rights. They don't need your consent to start collecting data, as Esa Jokinen already commented: "GDPR doesn't even require consent to handle PII data, but the consent is just the last option when there's no other legitimate reason to process the data." In fact, your employer probably cannot ask you for consent: because of the employer–employee imbalance of power, the consent would probably not be considered to be freely given (where this article mentions "The GDPR states", I think they are referring to recital 43). | Yes. The license itself is really just one sentence long, and states explicitly that this is allowed. Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. | Simply use a cookie to store consent. First consider the opposite. If a user does not agree to store cookies, a cookie is the only way to remember this, as you want to avoid a new pop-up on every page-load. Because this use of a cookie is functional, you don't need permission to store that cookie. You seem have the impression that you have to prove towards the ICO if someone has provided consent. However I think it would be sufficient if you can demonstrate how your website works technically. In particular whether consent is handled properly. You might need to create screenshots or a screencast to do so. Add new proof after each major update of your website. Storing consent server-side would violate the data minimization principle of the GDPR I think. In particular because you would need to do something to be able to identify users. That would violate Art. 11(1) GDPR: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Notice it is possible to configure google analytics in a way so you don't need any consent. See my answer to this question. Just IP anonymization is not sufficient. | You are missing something. The fact that you have a tick box and its state is saved in the database is enough. The burden of proof is only "on a balance of probabilities", so someone arguing that they didn't consent would have to demonstrate that you falsified the database entry somehow. In terms of GDPR requirements in general you don't need a greater level of proof than this, the key thing is that you have a robust system in place to obtain proof (such as not allowing data into the database without a tick in the box). | The cookie consent requirement comes from the ePrivacy Directive, not from the GDPR. While the GDPR defines consent, cookie consent is required regardless of whether the cookie actually contains personal data. Instead, it says we can access information stored on an end users device under the following circumstances. Technical access to the information is used for the sole purpose of performing a transmission over a network, e.g. using a browser cache. Accessing the information is strictly necessary for providing a service explicitly requested by the user, e.g. session cookies or a consent-declined cookie. The user has given consent to the access, where consent is defined by the GDPR (freely given, informed, specific, …). The first scenario likely doesn't apply because your cookies aren't likely to be “technical storage or access” in the sense of ePrivacy, and because the tracking cookies wouldn't be used for the sole purpose of carrying out a transmission. The second scenario doesn't apply because tracking cookies are not strictly necessary to interact with the webshop, as evidenced by the possibility to opt out. The service explicitly requested by the user is the webshop or website, not the A/B testing. This only leaves consent as possible grounds for storing or accessing information on the user's device. It is already the storing or access that is covered by ePrivacy, not only later use as a persistent identifier. Your suggestion – to first set the cookie and then delete it if it shouldn't have been set – is more compliant than many set-ups I've seen, but is still technically non-compliant. It is also likely to fail in practice under non-ideal network conditions: if the request to see whether GDPR applies times out, or if the user closes the browser tab before the cookie will be deleted, the tracking cookie will remain without consent. I would instead suggest to consider the following points. It seems that by itself, Optimizely Web cannot be used in a compliant manner since it doesn't provide sufficient control over how cookies are managed. Thus, you should avoid loading such tracking scripts unless consent has been given, or unless this processing falls outside of EU/UK law. Currently, you defer loading of tracking scripts until you know if you have to ask for consent. This can be avoided if you always ask for consent :) This can also be avoided if you load the tracking scripts from a server that can independently determine whether the requests comes from the EU. For non-EU requests and for users with opt-in, the server can return the original tracking scripts. Otherwise, the server returns a dummy script. This server can be independent from your website's hosting. By combining the jurisdiction decision with the loading of the script, one roundtrip is saved and latency is reduced. Finally, no one is forcing you to use Shopify, and ePrivacy/GDPR is not required to accommodate their limitations. You do have different choices: use Shopify, at the cost of slow pages and limited A/B tests use a different A/B test provider that can be used without setting cookies use edge computing to do stuff in between of the browser and the original server use a different webshop platform ignore EU laws Well, one of them is clearly unethical. But you do have choices, and which choice you take is a business decision. Slow pageloads and consent banners are likely costing you conversions, but Shopify might be providing massive value that outweighs all that. | Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people. | There is no requirement about "data" in the GDPR, so provided this is just "data", no. An empty form with fields for personal data contains no personal data. On the other hand, if the form is filled in by the user with personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4), and you receive a copy of the filled in form and process these personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4) - then the answer is: Yes. However, if you do not process the personal data (i.e. the form is just printed out on paper and filled in with a pen, and nobody except the data subject has access to the piece of paper with the filled in form - then the answer again is "no"). |
Is Sword and a Shield a doctrine in the US? I'm working on a complaint to US federal agencies. One of the arguments I need to make is, a company cannot use existing laws or policies or instruments as both a sword and a shield. That is, they cannot apply an instrument as a defensible position in one circumstance, and then use the same instrument for offense in another circumstance. I know US law does not favor dual uses like that. For example, in the Anthem Data Breach settlement, Anthem tried to use security evaluation reports for defense by saying, "security firms that performed the evaluations said everything was OK" [sic]. Then, Anthem tried to say the reports were not discoverable because it was protected work production. Judge Koh disagreed and ordered the Anthem to turn over the reports stating Anthem could not use them as a sword and a shield. My question is, is sword and shield a doctrine in US law? If not, then what is it called? (I'm getting lots of hits explaining the concept, but I'm not finding the legal underpinnings). | No The term "sword and shield" is allegorical rather than legal and may be called up in any number of contexts. Such as ... Waiver of privilege In the particular instance, Anthem was claiming that the reports were privileged and hence protected from discovery, presumably because they were prepared in contemplation of litigation - this litigation, one supposes. However, privilege is lost or waived if the privileged information is disclosed, as it was by relying on the conclusion of the report in its defense. As such, the entire suite of reports is no longer protected. Basically, if you want to keep privilege you have to keep what is privileged secret. Note, the could have lost privilege if they had disclosed the findings of the report in any way such as by press release or by simply leaving the document in a public place. In this context, the judge is stating that they cannot use the "shield" of privilege to protect a report that they have used as a "sword" to make a attack their opponent. | The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute. | He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect. | Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork. | The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it. | Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide). | From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end. | Copyright does not protect the idea for a game, its name or title, or the method or methods for playing it. Nor does copyright protect any idea, system, method, device, or trademark material involved in developing, merchandising, or playing a game. Once a game has been made public, nothing in the copyright law prevents others from developing another game based on similar principles. Copyright protects only the particular manner of an author’s expression in literary, artistic, or musical form. Link https://www.copyright.gov/registration/other-digital-content/ |
Digital ownership in a peer-to-peer network Let's say that I share a file* on peer-to-peer network (such as BitTorrent). When other people download my file, do they own the digital copy on their machine? Or is the file considered as being released under an implied public copyright license? ** And can the terms of use of the peer-to-peer network specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network? If I attach a copyright notice to the file*, can the terms of use of the peer-to-peer network over-rule my copyright notice? . * Assume this file is 100% a product of my work or it is in the public domain, like Shakespeare or international treaties ** My understanding is that, as far as my question goes, the law is pretty much the same in most countries in the world, but please do correct me if I'm wrong | Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center. | are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright. | Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on. | You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction. | It's legal as long as you follow these guidelines: They [The Cached Files] are created only for the purpose of viewing (In Your case listening) content The copies do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holders. The creation of the copies does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the works. Source: http://www3.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/06/eu-court-rules-on-legality-of-in.html | Yes, except for the part where you say "thus". Copyright protection isn't limited to published works, though in the past this was the case with US law. Current US law defines publication as the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication. Web distribution is one way to distribute a protected work. The distinction between published and unpublished works matters in terms of registration requirements, it figures into the question of the nationality of the author, the duration of protection for a work for hire and (pseudo)anonymous works, as well as the duration of protection for works created before January 1, 1978 but first published between then and January 1, 2003, and so on. The US Copyright office provides guidance that derives from court cases, and they have this to say about published vs. unpublished. They give as an example of publication ("Offering to Distribute Copies or Phonorecords to a Group of Persons") Publication occurs when copies of a photograph are offered to clients, including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, agencies, wire services, and websites with a license permitting further distribution or display of the photograph. also An offer by the copyright owner on a public website to purchase and download an app that they developed and made accessible on that website constitutes publication of that app. German copyright law makes mention of "publication" as well, for instance The right of publication and of exploitation of the work accrues jointly to the joint authors; alterations to the work shall be permissible only with the consent of the joint authors. However, a joint author may not refuse his consent to publication, exploitation or alteration contrary to the principles of good faith. Each joint author shall be entitled to assert claims arising from violations of the joint copyright; he may, however, demand performance only to all of the joint authors. §6 says that (1) A work shall be deemed to have been published when it has been made available to the public with the consent of the rightholder. (2) A work shall be deemed to have been released when copies of the work have been offered, with the rightholder’s consent, to the public or brought to the market after their production in sufficient quantity. An artistic work shall also be deemed to have been released when the original or a copy of the work has been made permanently available to the public with the consent of the rightholder. One would have to inquire into the specifics of German law to know if "putting one copy on a website" constitutes being brought to the market after production in sufficient quantity. | The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use. | Yes. A license is a legal form of permission to do something (usually, to use a particular property, whether real or digital or intellectual) and the conditions applied to that use. Different licenses for the same property are extremely common, for example, a free license for hobby or non-profit work and a paid license for commercial usage. Other conditions can include the requirement to make the derivative work also available in some manner or to disallow restrictive conditions should the derivative work be licensed itself, even up to requiring the exact same license be applied to all works. Wording the license exactly so that it achieves the goals you intend is the work of a qualified and registered lawyer, and obtaining their services is definitely recommended for this task. |
Is there a boilerplate text to avoid legal liability for the content of a book? I am self-publishing a book on CreateSpace. The appendix contains some forms that readers are welcome to print out and use in their workplace. Although I don't offer any recommendation or description for how they are to be used, readers might assume that these documents could potentially protect someone from being wrongfully fired, or would be presented as records in a court case. Is there any standard boilerplate legal text that I can place in the front of my book that blanket protects me from any legal liability for the contents of my book? | You could include a notice that the forms are not legal advice, and you make no guarantees on their effects in particular situations, and that readers should use them at their own risk, and that they are provided "as is" with no warranties of any kind. You might also find websites that offer downloadable legal forms, or forms similar to the ones you intend to create, and see what disclaimers or waivers of liability such sites typically include. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. | Names of people, institutions, and events are not protected by copyright. Things that have occurred at events like math tournaments are facts, and may be recounted, in your own words, with no fear of infringing any copyright. Facts are never protected by copyright, although a particular description of facts could be, and so could a particular selection and arrangement of facts. Specific math techniques and their names are not protected either, and may be described without infringing copyright. The items you mention in the question are: video game / movie references and names No copyright issue here. common integration bee problems No copyright issue here. names of a university / math competition organizers No copyright issue here. integration techniques and formulas No copyright issue here, unless you copy an extensive description of a technique without rewriting it in your mown words.. using someone's Overleaf Latex package to format the book This depends on the license for the package, but there is not likely to be an issue. In short I think you are worrying over issues that are in fact non-issues. | If you are using just the names, there is no issue - you can't copyright a fact. If you are using actual images (you appear to say you are not, but you also asked "Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps) - then the answer is still yes within your usage case - provided you attribute them to Google. If you look at this link it specifies that you are OK to use this in Reports and Presntations, Books which are not guidebooks and which have less then 5000 copies and presentations. If you are using them online, you need to use the imbedded versions (ie you can't just screenshot them - you need to link to them). If you are still unsure, you can contact [email protected] to request specific permission. | In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any. | Not having immediate access to the source doesn't preclude a finding of copyright infringement. If you have seen the source material, subconscious infringement can happen. However, in this example, both the short phrases doctrine and the merger doctrine would likely prevent the is_prime function from having copyright. Words and short phrases are not individually copyrightable, so the name would be free to take. Regarding the implementing code, if it isn't an exact copy (i.e. copy and paste), courts will apply the abstraction-filtration-comparision test. They may find that you took the selection and arrangement of instructions from the original source, albiet using different names. That selection and arrangement would probably be considered a substantial similarity and, if not for the merger doctrine, infringement. However, given the limited number of ways to express the prime-detection algorithm means that the expression of that idea has merged with the idea, and thus is not protected by copyright. (Or in some jurisdictions, merger is a defence to infringement rather than a bar to copyrightability). | As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold. | That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this. | A mnemonic like CRAAP is not protected by copyright. The Copyright office says "Copyright does not protect names, titles, slogans, or short phrases", so you do not run afoul of copyright law using that or any other abbreviation. There is a registry of copyright-registered works, maintained by the copyright office, where authors may register their works, but legal protection exists regardless of registering. Some abbreviations are protected under trademark law, which you can search here. There are 50 registrations that include "AAA" and three that are just "AAA", also you'll find WTF and LOL. Trademark protection doesn't forbid all uses of an registered abbreviation. It turns out that "CRAAP" is not a registered trademark, but it could be the registered trademark of a manufacturer of crab traps, so you would not likewise call your crab trap company CRAAP, but it would be okay for plumbing supplies (trademark is relative to business uses, which are described in the registration). The only other imaginable scenario that would impede your plan is a non-disclosure agreement. For that to be relevant, there would have to be a valid contract between you and the teacher which specifically prohibits disclosure of the acronyms. The chances that there is a contract between you and the teacher is so low that it is hardly worth considering, but let's explore that for a moment. A contract is an agreement between parties where each party promises to do something that they are not already obligated to do, in exchange for getting something that they do not already have a right to. You had a contract with the college, not with the teacher. The college clearly would not prohibit "using any information gained in the course of study here", and the courts would not enforce any such "don't use" wording in a contract as unconscionable (why else do you go to college?). Your contract with the college allows you to take classes and use the knowledge that you gain. The teacher's contract with the college requires her to teach some content, and probably allows her to set certain rules of class conduct. She might have been able to toss you out of class for disseminating her methods, but at this point she has no legal recourse. NDA enforcement is generally limited to protecting "trade secrets", which are defined in terms of information with independent economic value deriving from the fact that the information is non-obvious". Also, an NDA will have a time limit associated with it except in the case of highly-sensitive personal information (social security numbers), so the courts will not enforce language saying "you can never make use of this information, or these names". |
Can a private school refuse admission despite the student having the requisite cut-off? My brother is being refused admission to a school that I attended for 9 years. This is because when I was in school, the teachers traumatised me and we complained about it in a feedback form. The principal of the school called me to her office and gave me a earful for "not being grateful" to the school for all the opportunities they gave me. This year, my brother applied to the school (because they have good facilities and provide the subjects that he wants). But the principal refused to give him a place in the school because of how "disrespectful" I was even though he has the marks to get in. Is this legal and if not what can I do against it? | This sucks. It is also legal. It's a private school, they can admit who they like (provided they don't discriminate on the grounds of protected characteristics like "religion" or "caste"). | No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant. | please explain the answer. i chose option c but the answer is option e Option C is wrong because it excludes the possibility that most students might have received exactly a B minus. The question permits dividing the group in two subsets. One is {students | grade < B_minus} and the other is its complement {students | grade >= B_minus}. Option C is in terms of the set {students | grade > B_minus} whereas option E is in terms of the set {students | grade >= B_minus}. Only the latter matches the description. | OK, I talked to a lawyer (in Massachusetts) and these are the answers I got. One can draft a confidential exclusion letter to state wishes regarding excluding certain people from being guardians. In the letter you can explain in detail why you think somebody is unfit to be a guardian. Execute this document as you do for your will and tell your family that it exists so that they can access it if you die (or give them a copy). The advantage of a stand-alone document is that it is not public, differently from the will which is public. The lawyer also suggested to also have a separate stand-alone guardianship document (and so to not include the guardian section in the will). The reason is that a will can be executed only if somebody is dead. But if somebody is e.g. in a coma (or missing), he won't be able to take care of his children and yet his will would not be able to executed. A separate guardianship document would instead apply also in these situations thereby minimizing the chances that somebody, whom you do not consider fit, becomes a guardian of your children. | Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect. | I found a number of news stories and official documents about public schools with such policies including: "Parents face more fines and rules if their children miss too much school" from Public Opinion; "School Adopts Strict Policy on Parents Picking Up Children Late" from the Los Angeles Times; "If you're late to pick up your kid at school, expect more than embarrassment" from The Oregonian; "Late Again? This School Fines Kids Who Aren't on Time" from Parents; "Late Pick Up Policy" from Hazelwood Elementary; and "School Issues Terrifying Threat to Parents Who Pick Up Kids Late" from Yahoo Parenting The last story is about a school that threatened to call the local child protection authorities to take children into custody if parents were late, even by a short time. This was rescinded and apologized for. None of these stories mentioned any source of authority to impose such fines, nor any parent who had legally contested such fines. Public schools do not generally have authority to fine parents unless a law or ordinance grants such authority. Usually a school would need to file a report with law enforcement, and any fine be imposed by a court. But it may well be that parents are simply paying in such cases, rather than insisting on legal authority. If a student is left unsupervised, a school would pretty clearly have the right, and in some cases the duty, to notify the police or the appropriate child protection agency. Parents might fear that resisting the fines would lead to that far more drastic response, and so not challenge any fine. I did not include any of several news stories about similar practices in the UK, as the legal basis would be different there. But there were several such stories. There were also several stories suggesting that such fines can be counterproductive. It seems that some parents tend to come to regard them as fees, and are perfectly willing to pay, and the fine replaces the feeling of social obligation which might have been stronger. But that is not really a matter of law. | Theoretically, a court could order the awarding of a degree. However, the probability that this will actually happen is extremely low: in general, courts only order specific performance when money awards are no substitute. To get anything, you would have to prove that the university was in some way negligent, that they had some duty of care to you which they breached. You could read the judgment in Siddiqui v. Oxford, where plaintiff lost and was only asking for money, to get a grasp of how courts deal with the question of educational negligence and failed exams / bad grades. It is possible that there is a cause of action based on breach of contract, given the seeming unilateral change in scope of examination. But you would need your attorney to study whether there was any contractual "promise" as to the scope of the exam. | What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. |
What's the best way to include e-mails as evidence from a technical perspective? It probably would be easiest to copy and paste quotes from emails into my evidence submission. But of course text could easily be changed in this format. I could take a screen shot of the email as I received it, and include the screen shot as evidence. The problem with this is highlighting certain lines of text would be harder. The tribunal I am going through requests documents be submitted electronically. At one point a person who tried to help mediate entered the conversation by e-mail. Out of privacy to him, can I redact his name or email address? The point would be the defendant did agree to something, but he sent it to the mediator and told him to forward it to me. (this wasn't a professional mediator, more like a mutual friend). | Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them. | Sexual intent is proven (or disproven) like any other form of intent. A confession is not necessary, although that is one available method. It may be inferred with proof from circumstantial evidence. Any combination of direct and circumstantial evidence is allowed. There isn't a formula for it. The prosecution or defendant, as the case may be, simply has to convince the trier of fact that there was or was not sexual intent. Any otherwise admissible evidence that could rationally show that sexual intent is more or less likely can be presented. If it happens in a gynecological appointment, or because the defendant slipped on a banana peel after the defendant's glasses were splattered with mud so he couldn't see what he was doing, this is going to be exceedingly hard to prove in the absence of a pattern and practice in multiple cases that couldn't be a coincidence, or with something like bragging to a friend in private. If this happens at a festival celebration, or after a dinner date, or intent is corroborated by perverted photographs on the defendant's phone, or is accompanied by sexual language, any other intent is going to be highly implausible and circumstantial evidence will strongly point to a sexual intent. One way to disprove sexual intent is for the defendant to testify that there was some other intent. There is risk in that approach. You can't simultaneously testify that sexual contact never happened and that sexual contact did happen but without sexual intent, for example. Testifying that there was sexual contact without intent basically admits some other element of the crime. But it also forces the prosecution to prove that the defendant is lying, which depending upon the evidence, may be easy, or may be hard. In real life, most of the cases that get prosecuted are easy cases. But, there will always be cases that are closer and circumstances that one wouldn't easily foresee in advance, and that is why we have courts and trials. Ultimately, the prosecution presents evidence and the finder of fact has to decide if it proved that element of its case. | National security letters can compel the production of some kinds of (non-"content") user data, and (according to Wikipedia) typically contain a nondisclosure requirement forbidding the recipient of the letter from disclosing it. I assume that a witness has received and complied with a national security letter, and a non-government party wants to ask the witness questions which outside the courtroom, the witness would be forbidden to answer by the national security letter. The witness, or the government if represented in the lawsuit in question, may object to the questions. The purpose which justifies the secrecy requirements of a national security letter is also likely to justify the exercise of state secrets privilege. If the judge thinks a statute might otherwise be violated, they might intervene in the absence of any objection, or consider alternative remedies like an in camera hearing. If the court does not intervene to prevent the evidence being given, and the witness is charged with breaching the secrecy law, this would raise complex questions about the interpretation of the law imposing criminal penalties. The common law doctrine of absolute privilege for witnesses giving evidence in judicial proceedings applies in the United States, and could be raised in defence to any criminal charges. | There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all. | You could include a notice that the forms are not legal advice, and you make no guarantees on their effects in particular situations, and that readers should use them at their own risk, and that they are provided "as is" with no warranties of any kind. You might also find websites that offer downloadable legal forms, or forms similar to the ones you intend to create, and see what disclaimers or waivers of liability such sites typically include. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. | The defence sees the prosecution evidence; witnesses don’t From context, it appears that Ms. DeCoutere was a prosecution witness, not the defendant. As such, she would not be privy to the evidence that either the prosecution or defence had or intended to present. No doubt both the prosecution and the defence would have known about the photograph and, I would imagine, it was introduced by the defence precisely because it contradicted the witness’ testimony. Further, revealing such evidence to her by either side would be misconduct - witnesses are supposed to recount the facts as they recall them without prompting or aide memoirs (police are an exception - they are allowed to refer to their own notebooks). | I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible. | Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on. |
UK - Working without a contract. I resign and guy wants to sue me I am a foreigner from overseas I just arrived in UK 3 months ago. I have been working for a small startup in UK as CTO, my employer didn't want to give me an employment contract of any type, or founders agreement, he said he had given me so many vested shares but I have given him no info/passport/id for him to put the shares against or sign anything, he pays me weeks late. I received a better offer at another company. The CEO has been sending me unethical messages and now wants to take me to court to try and get back everything he paid me, unless I submit to his mutual agreement and send back all the money he paid me. What should I do? | What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this. | I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney. | None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim. | First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties. | If you are the CEO of a public company, this might be a problem if it causes less profits for the shareholders. They could fire you if your actions cost them money. If you are the owner of a business, then the CEO of your company (you) can do anything legal that all your shareholders (you) agree with. Nobody can force your company to deal with anyone, especially with no business, except for existing contracts or if there is illegal discrimination. Now all this is not “your personal opinion” but “the ceo running the company according to the wishes of the shareholders”. You are allowed legally to discriminate against a company whose business practices you don’t like. You have to do nothing, just don’t deal with them. If Facebook sends you a million dollar order, just don’t accept it. Make sure that no sales contract is created. It is remotely possible that you have problems if such a decision causes you to go bankrupt and you can’t pay your taxes or debt, like a debtor could claim you could have paid your debt and want your personal money instead of your broke company’s money. | People are laid off all the time when sales are down, the market is bad, etc: there is no legal "right to a job" except whatever is in your employment contract. There is a legal concept of promissory estoppel which boils down to promises being binding. However, there has to be a clear and definite promise, not for example a statement like "we hope to bring you back after this is over". Normally, the employer can argue that they have the right to fire you regardless of performance, and that would be the end of it. Let's say you have it in writing, and it is clear that they unconditionally promise to hire you back: you would want to (e)stop them from arguing that they have the right to fire you. The underlying idea of promissory estoppel is that such a promise keeps them from making that argument. But: it is not enough that they made the promise, you also had to rely on the promise and act / forbear from acting in some way because of that promise. It could be, for example, taking another job, or moving to another country, or simply looking for another job. The hard part, then, would be getting a clear and definite promise. | The "Severance Agreement" is a contract between the company and you. It spells out what the company will do and probably what they expect you to do going forward. Simple enough. The statement you referenced merely says that you are not being forced to sign the agreement. That's all. You don't, presumably, have the option of remaining employed at this company but you DO NOT have to sign this agreement. But if you don't, it's likely that any benefits being promised in the agreement will not be delivered to you. So specifically in answer to your questions: It protects them against a claim that they somehow forced you to sign the agreement. Likely anything that the agreement says the company will do such as pay you a certain amount of money and the like. Bottom line is that if you don't like the agreement, don't sign it. If you want the benefits they are promising in the agreement, then sign it and move on. | could they make a realistic claim that I had voluntarily terminated my contract before the year was over? The employer's act would forfeit its entitlement to reimbursement of bonus. The clause clearly indicates that the triggering event is termination, not the anticipatory notification thereof. Furthermore, the employer's act would be a breach of the [contract law] covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That would be in stark contrast with your compliance with, and/or kindness in, giving a two-week notice. The employer's termination of your employment seems improper in equity insofar as it was aware of your notice and thus took advantage thereof. |
What is the difference between personal contract, business contract and full-time contract? I'm applying for an open vacancy and the HR is asking me: What type of cooperation are you interested in: personal contract, business contract, full-time contract? I spent some time searching on internet but it's not easy for me to grasp clearly the difference. | What is the difference between personal contract, business contract and full-time contract? There is no formal definition, but it most likely refers to whether you intend to be hired as independent contractor, as a corp-2-corp, or as employee in the company's payroll. Each option has its tax, administrative, and legal implications. Some of these are: whether your compensation will be from payroll vs. invoicing the company; an employee might be statutorily entitled to benefits that outside contractors and companies are not; servicing them in a capacity of contractor or company might make it easier for you to take side projects; under some of these three alternatives the company might be more flexible when negotiating raises; you might be hired on a project basis (that is, if you are not in their payroll); in case of liabilities or when one of the parties commits a tort or breaches the contract, the "administrative remedies" could be different. | There is nothing in that contract that says anything about 3 months notice period. The 3 months is the legal default for contracts that do not expire on their own, unlike yours, that has all properties of a limited time contract. I would personally see the detailed description of how you can end this contract as overriding any legal default. But as always, with this specific contract in the original language, you need to see a lawyer to know for sure. Your contract clearly states: you can leave your appartment whenever you want, even before the agreed upon time. If you leave between the 15th and the end of a month, you have to pay for that month in full. If you leave between the 1st and the 14th of the month, you have to pay the fair share of the rent for the days you where there. So for example, on a 30 day month if you lived there for 10 days, you still have to pay a third of the rent and the landlord will return the rest if you paid for the month in advance. If you live there for 16 days, you have to pay for the full month and nothing will be returned if you paid for the month in advance. Please note that you need to "hand over" the vacated rental object during normal business hours. So don't go in there on the evening of the 14th at 16:59. And don't try to "hand it over" when you haven't moved your stuff out yet. At the hand over, you give the keys to the landlord and that is it, it is the last thing you do. Very likely your landlord will want to have a look at the rental object while you are there, so they can make sure it is all in order, you did not damage it or did not leave any of your stuff. Generally speaking, there is nothing your landlord could do to you if you decide to leave early. They cannot make you leave even earlier or any other retaliatory shenanigans you may have heard of in other countries. In Germany, such contracts are not adversarial. You don't need to keep it a secret to the last second. If you know you want to leave on a certain date, inform your land lord, make an appointment for the "hand over" well in advance and save yourself (and them) all the stress from doing things last minute. | There is no contract One of the requirements for a contract to exist is agreement between the parties - there is no agreement here. Here is what happened: AA asked for IT to make an offer subject to standard terms. IT made an offer subject to different terms. AA rejected IT's offer and made a counter-offer on the original terms. IT rejected the counter-offer. Since no one has accepted any offer, there is no agreement and no contract. Also, the rejection of an offer (by counter-offer or directly) kills the offer so, right now, there are no live offers that could be accepted to form a contract, for example, AA cannot now accept IT’s original offer. | Washington State is an "At Will" employment state meaning that, with exception to some protected classes and bargaining, the employer may terminate the employee for any reason the employer can cite, or no reason at all. If the firm used it as a benefit of the job but it wasn't agreed upon on the contract, its not a deception as if you can hold the job to the down season, you have less work to do. If a promise was made for employment into the down season during the negotiating of the job, and this was documented, it could be. It could be that he did all the work required of him, but another higher went above and beyond and he got the ax because he was the newest and the lesser performer. Either way, the employer is well within their right to fire an employee for any reason they choose absent discrimination based on protected class status. | No The intent of the proposed bill is to codify existing case law. You are an employee now and you will be an employee then. You are an employee now because a) you are not free from the company's control and direction or b) the work you are doing is the company's main business. If you read the bill you will find out that c) involves "an independently established trade, occupation, or business" so your business qualifies for this but you need to qualify for all three factors to be an independent contractor. | Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble? | Don't do it. It is of course breach of contract when you signed a contract with no intention to fulfil it. However, you are talking about Germany. German employers take a very dim view of this. While a UK employer would say "good riddance" and do nothing, many German employers would see that as a personal insult. It's something that you just don't do in Germany. There's a good chance that they will do what they can to make you miserable if you do this. For example, inform authorities that you just cancelled your contract which may get a visa cancelled. Or tell the company that you want to start with, which will also take a very dim view of this. Or sue you for damages, not because they want to get the money, but to make you miserable. On the other hand, if they send you a contract, and you sign it, you have a contract. | Is there any significance to "Inc." vs "Corp."? does it matter if Bob's construction business is Bob's Construction Inc. or Bob's Construction Corp.? No. "Inc." is an abbreviation for "incorporated" and "corp." is an abbreviation for "corporation" which are really just different grammatical variations of the same word. Limited is a term that can include both limited liability companies and corporations in some contexts, so this is less desirable if you want to make clear that you are a corporation rather than a limited liability company. Making the distinction between a limited liability company and a corporation is desirable because a 1099 has to be issued for payments to an LLC but not for payments to a corporation. The word "company" is even broader and can be used to refer to any business firm regardless of its form of organization. |
Is it lawful for a police officer to order you to put down your baby and submit to arrest? Are you required to comply with a police officer's order to put your baby down in an uncertain situation and allow yourself to be handcuffed? I am thinking of the recent incident in Phoenix. Although I could not watch the whole video, I am told that at one point, the officer ordered the mother to put her baby down. I can't imagine Mom was able to think about the law at that point, but it made me wonder: is there any scenario where it's legal for an officer to make that demand? Why it's not a duplicate: The other question to which this seems to be a duplicate is a broader question. The answers addressed personal rights: consent to search, right to remain silent, and broader subjects. None of these apply--nor can they be extended to apply--to my specific question. | Are you required to comply with a police officer's order to put your baby down in an uncertain situation and allow yourself to be handcuffed? Of course. If holding a baby could immunize people against arrest, every criminal would have a baby around whenever possible. Similarly, suppose an officer legitimately fears for his or her life or safety, or the lives or safety of others, on the basis of a suspicion that someone carrying a baby is about to produce a weapon and use it against someone. Courts, at least in the US, give wide and explicit deference to police officers in stressful situations like that, and they recognize that even if, in hindsight, it is perfectly clear that there was no danger, the officer must be allowed the leeway to act on his or her suspicions in case they are correct. The officer will of course have some obligations to ensure the welfare of the child after separation from the adult, but the only immediate recourse the adult has is to appeal to the officer directly, or perhaps the officer's supervisor if he or she is available. Any other enforcement of the officer's obligation will have to take place in the courts after the fact. | Yes, your best bet for immediate relief is to call 911 and ask for a supervisor. Generally speaking the police are not legally obliged to explain themselves to you on the spot. They are obliged to explain themselves to the courts and their supervisors. | In general, police have no special protection from being recorded; if it is legal to video or audio record a person in that jurisdiction then it is legal to record a police officer in that jurisdiction. Anything that it is legal to do with the recording of a person is legal even if that person is a police officer. As to if it is legal to record a person see: Is it legal to post a photograph that I captured of a stranger in the street? Model release for image without faces How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame? What are the legal repercussions of taking a stranger's picture in public? What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings? | In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do. | How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small. | There is a state law that requires you to obey the police: ORC 2917.13, which says you may not Fail to obey the lawful order of any law enforcement officer engaged in the law enforcement officer's duties at the scene of or in connection with a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind. If you do, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. If a violation of this section creates a risk of physical harm to persons or property, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the first degree. You also cannot Hamper the lawful operations of any law enforcement officer, firefighter, rescuer, medical person, emergency medical services person, or other authorized person, engaged in the person's duties at the scene of a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind "Hamper" is not defined statutorily, but the plain meaning of "hamper" is not the same as "fail to assist". We have not established that the order is lawful, however, which is crucial. The police cannot just freely search a residence without permission. If they have permission from the occupant, they can search and seize. If they have probable cause to believe that a crime exists and the circumstances make a warrant impractical, they can search and seize. I don't know what you mean by "wellness check", but that seems plainly to be unlawful entry. However, if the resident calls 911 and reports that he is having an issue, that is sufficient consent for entry. In the case of a fire alarm, the fire code authorizes a fire department official in charge of an actual emergency response incident to order the evacuation of a building, and occupants are required to comply. If we suppose that the smoke detector in a room has gone off, the fire department is authorized to inspect for fire, and there is a provision under the law about failure to obey a lawful command (to open the door so that they can look for fire). Problem: you cannot know whether the order is lawful. The officer doesn't decide what is lawful, the courts do (after the fact), and typically a command is found to be lawful unless it is clearly unlawful. The order from your supervisor is not "enforceable" in the sense that you cannot be arrested, imprisoned, or fined for disobeying your boss. However, there is a potential club they can use against you, namely firing you for disobeying the order. Normally, you can be fired for wearing the wrong shirt. But there are laws about employers doing illegal things, such as ORC 4113.52, which provides recourse when the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety etc. In which case you report this to the supervisor, they have 24 hours after getting the report to correct the situation, and after that you would report the situation to the county prosecutor. (Read all of the details in the linked law, don't just skip steps: this is an executive summary). Having done this, you are protected from being fired, demoted. reassigned etc. The employer will be strongly motivated to not incur the penalties for violating the whistle blower statute. Additionally, you can sue the employer if they fire you for refusing to violate the law (termination in violation of public policy). | That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism. | Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing". |
Are parking lots allowed to ticket for a higher price than listed I recently received a parking ticket when forgetting to pay at a parking lot. However, it seems they increased their ticket price without changing any of their signage. The sign at the entrance clearly states a $70 ticket for failure to pay, but I was charged $80. Are they allowed to do this? Didn't the signage infer an agreement on the terms of using the parking lot, and any applicable fees? | Technically the signage implied an agreement, and allowed you to infer one. But yes, I think that management could not legally insist on more than the posted price, whether for a lost ticket, or for a particular duration. (Unless the sign included "prices subject to change without notice" or something of the sort.) As a practical matter, challenge this is going to be a pain. The employees on the spot probably have no authority to vary the price merely because the amount programmed into the register differs from the posted sign. At least they will claim not to have such authority. And they won't release the car without being paid the $80 that they will insist is the proper price. To challenge this, a person would probably have to pay under protest, and then sue for a refund, I would hope in a small claims court. Most people will not go to that trouble for $10, which perhaps the management counts on. Publicity might be more effective. | State law may provide for criminal prosecution for vandalism, which could result in a fine or even imprisonment. The state can prosecute you, private individuals cannot. Fines imposed by a private organization are only enforceable through contracts, where damages could be recovered, but penalties cannot be assessed. ("Late fees" are in the class of "liquidated damages", where the agreement says what the late fee is – they don't just make up a number). Ga. Code § 44-3-223 does require you to "comply with all lawful provisions of the property owners' association instrument", but if it isn't in the instrument, you do not have to comply. | Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me. | Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible. | Nope, the seller can't refuse "to sell". They have sold it. They sold it right at the moment the contract was created (which, depending on where they were, would not necessarily even need to be in writing). The deposit is irrelevant. What is relevant is that now your friend must pay the full balance, and the seller must hand over the car. If the seller does not do that, that is a breach of contract which can be fixed by going to the court and obtaining an order to hand the car over. | The term "The Property" does not intrinsically include or exclude a garage in this situation, so the answer has to come from other considerations. The lease is unclear, so the courts will need to look at other factors (such as the picture) to decide which interpretation is correct. Insofar as the landlord wrote the contract and could have included a clause explicitly excluding the garage, but didn't, the courts may rule in your favor under the doctrine contra proferentem. The physical arrangement does support the conclusion that the garage is part of The Property, in particular the access to the part constituting your yard. This assumes that there actually is access to your yard from the garage. Scouring the entire contract, there may be some subtle indication of how the garage is to be treated, such as a clause presupposing that you have access to the garage ("shall clean the garage..."). Then we come to the matter of the key. You say the landlord changed the key: does that mean you used to have a key that gave you access to the garage? If you used to have access to the garage, using a key provided by the landlord, that would support the conclusion that the garage was not a separate item governed by its own contract. If you have never had and were not given access to the garage (no key), that would support the contention that the garage is separate. Similar questions would be raised about the actual use of the garage: has the landlord been using it to store equipment? That would support his contention. Had you been using the garage previously and now months later the landlord wants to charge rent for the garage? That runs counter to his claim that you didn't rent the garage. In other words, since the wording does not answer the question, the full set of circumstances would have to considered. | It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state. | Interesting question! I believe all of the examples can be addressed by the following rules: A vehicle on a roadway has the right-of-way over a vehicle not on a roadway. Therefore, the vehicle leaving a parking lot always yields to a vehicle in a parallel road. Absent another rule, the vehicle on the right always has the right-of-way. So if two vehicles are leaving adjacent parking lots, the left one waits for the right one to go if there is any potential conflict. Of course, not enough people know these rules, so in practice if you can't get the vehicle with the legal right-of-way to take it I teach drivers to be as decisive and cautious as possible: I.e., take the right-of-way, but not so fast that you can't avoid the other vehicle if it decides to go after all, because legally you will be at fault in a collision. (Though it's anyone's guess how police and insurers would settle the tricky scenarios you illustrate.) |
If a person is court ordered to pay child support in the state of Ohio does that person have the right to claim said children on taxes Who has the right to claim children. On federal taxes in Ohio? | For US federal purposes, the rule is that the person who provided 50% or more of the support for a child can claim that child as a dependent, whoever has custody, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. Most states follow this rule. But a custody agreement can provide that one party or the other can make the tax claim. If both parties claim the same person as a dependent, the IRS will be annoyed. | I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction I demand you give me your hat! You're not going to, are you? The point of that is that you are not obliged to do anything just because someone demands that you do. Now, if I had a court order that required you to give me your hat ... It appears that there is some confusion over who owns some land in Nebraska. This is a problem; it is not your problem. From my understanding which is entirely based on this: A warranty deed is a type of deed where the grantor (seller) guarantees that he or she holds clear title to a piece of real estate and has a right to sell it to the grantee (buyer). you would be extremely unwise to sign such a deed since it is in no way clear that you (or anyone) does have clear title. Now I take it that you are not interested in owning land in Nebraska and even less interested in getting into a legal battle over it. If that is the case then I suggest that you consult a local lawyer and ask for his advice on the following plan of action: You and your wife will renounce any claim that you may have if: You do not guarantee that you have any claim or title, The person to whom you are making this grant indemnifies you against any legal action that may result, They will prepare the documents, Your lawyer will review them, They will reimburse you for your lawyer's fees. Come back and tell us how this works out. Edit to address subsequent questions Can you be responsible for costs? Well, anything is possible but it would be extremely unlikely. If there was any wrongdoing it was many years ago by someone else! If you approach this in a reasonable way and attempt to assist in reaching a resolution (so long as it doesn't cost you time or money) then it is highly unlikely a court would award costs against you. What about background checks? This would be a civil case. It would not appear in your criminal history. While it is a matter of public record all it really means is that you and someone else had a dispute that required a court to settle; happens all the time. | I'm not sure there would be any need - or any ability to bring - any civil action. Forgery would appear to count as a Category D felony under Section 205.090 and, "In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.", so person "a"'s damages should have been met under the process of the criminal prosecution of person "b" for forgery, with nothing further to claim. Person "c" will have stolen a car. Whether that car was legitimately owned by person "a" may only be relevant if person "c" is using their belief that it belonged to person "b" as mitigation (for example recovery of a debt - though it won't help much as this should have been done through proper channels), which again would be a criminal proceeding. | It depends on the jurisdiction. The term you are looking for is “paternity fraud”, and depending on where you are in the world, you can challenge paternity even after accepting the child as your own. The wikipedia page lists several examples where the man has been successful. It also lists several examples where the man has been unsuccessful and has been ordered to continue paying child support. | A divorce settlement must be approved by the court. A Judge might well refuse to approve a settlement with such a provision in it, although I do not know of any law specifically barring such a term. But once the settlement is final, one party could certainly offer a separate contract to the other, under which one party would agree to remain outside the state (or metropolitan region, or county, or wherever) in return for an agreed recurring payment. There would be no compulsion to accept such a contract, but if the payment offered was large enough, it might be accepted voluntarily. However, if there was a child involved, and such a move would significantly hinder that child's contact with both parents, and this were not in the child's best interest, such a contract might be attacked as against public policy. | Yes. American descendents of African slaves filed several lawsuits in the early 2000s seeking "monetary relief under both federal and state law for harms stemming from the enslavement of black people in America," i.e., reparations. Those cases were consolidated into a single case heard in Chicago, where the judge ruled there was no standing to bring the cases, given the many degrees of separation between the defendants' conduct in the 1800s and the 21st Century plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: If there were a legal wrong, it would not be a wrong to any living persons unless they were somehow the authorized representatives to bring suits on behalf of their enslaved ancestors. With some exceptions to be noted, the plaintiffs are suing to redress harms to third parties (their ancestors), without being authorized to sue on behalf of those parties. It is like a suit by a descendant of a Union soldier, killed in battle, against a Civil War era gun manufacturer still in business that sold guns to the Confederacy in violation of federal law. A federal court could not entertain the suit because the plaintiff would be unable to prove a harm to an interest of his (such as his bank account) that the law protects. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit permitted one very small portion of the case to proceed, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. | The question didn't mention marital status, but since states formally recognize that relationship it's helpful to start there. tl;dr: The Supreme Court decided state laws that required a woman to notify her spouse were unconstitutional. Thus it's unlikely there'd be grounds for suit. Background The central mechanism of Roe v. Wade (U.S. 1973) was a balancing act between what it decided was a 14th amendment right to privacy and the state's interest in both the health of the woman and the potentiality of life. Because Roe explicitly recognized a state interest, Pennsylvania passed a statute in 1982 that required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period. It also mandated parental consent for minors (with some exceptions) and spousal notification. This reached the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of SE Penn. v. Casey (U.S. 1992). There, the court upheld most of the Pennsylvania law (reinforcing its statement in Roe that a state does have an interest) but struck down the spousal notification portion. To do that, it determined the appropriate test was whether a state was placing an undue burden---a significant obstacle---in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability. It reasoned that: state regulation impacts a female's liberty more than male's during pregnancy (by way of biology) if a man and woman disagree, only one can prevail not all women are equally impacted by a notification mandate (for reasons of domestic violence, etc.) Combining this with the notion that women do not lose any constitutionally protected liberty upon marriage, it decided spousal notification would be a significant obstacle and thus an undue burden. In other words, unmarried women don't have spouses to notify, so placing a notification requirement on married women creates an additional burden that the court found undue. To get back to the question, the father certainly has a right to file a suit against the female (...and it happens from time to time). However, it likely wouldn't go far. Since unmarried women were the baseline in Casey, it's unlikely there'd be grounds for either married or unmarried fathers to sue their female partners. This comes up frequently under the moniker of "Father's Rights," which has gained less traction in the U.S. than in other countries. That said, Wisconsin recently introduced a bill that would allow fathers to proceed against abortion providers. | In the U.S.: To my knowledge all states and jurisdictions that with a "sales tax" technically have a "use" tax, which means the tax liability falls on the purchaser. However, they require "businesses" (whose exact definition varies by jurisdiction) to collect and remit that tax on behalf of "consumers" (which can also vary, e.g., to exclude businesses that resell). Historically consumers have avoided paying use taxes by purchasing from out-of-state businesses that are not subject to their home states' laws on withholding the use tax: while technically a violation of the tax law neither consumers nor states have had an interest in calculating or auditing use taxes owed, except in the case of very large and unusual transactions. There is a large effort underway by states and "brick-and-mortar" stores that lose business to this virtual "mail order tax exemption" to subject out-of-state businesses to the requirement of collecting use taxes on behalf of the state. A few online businesses (notably Amazon) have acquiesced to this demand. To answer your question: In the U.S., an individual who is not making a "business" of selling items or services is generally exempt from the requirement to collect sales tax. It is the purchaser who has the legal obligation to declare and pay tax on such transactions. But purchasers rarely do. |
Is a red arrow equivalent to a red light? Scenario: A traffic light with a standard red yellow green array, and a second red yellow green ARROW array. Example: In the picture, the green arrow is on, but the red light is on, meaning you may turn left, but not go straight (presumably because the green arrow is on for the opposing traffic as well). But it will also occur that the green light will be on, but the red arrow will be on. I've been in plenty of situations like that where there is no oncoming traffic. Now, I've had a former judge in NY traffic court tell me that in that scenario, the red arrow is NOT the same as a red light, it's a sign that you do not have the right of way. If the main light is green, and there is no oncoming traffic, and you may turn safely, you are allowed to turn left. Is that correct? | There is a national standard that requires states to treat traffic control signals in a consistent manner. The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways defines nationwide standards for all roads open to public travel. States were required to adopt this standard as their legal State standard by 2012 or have in place a State standard that is in substantial conformance with the National Manual. In this manual you can find the standards for all traffic control devices, how they're to be placed and their meaning. Section 4D.04 Meaning of Vehicular Signal Indications, section 3C, describes what CIRCULAR RED and RED ARROW are meant to indicate (the bottom of page 451): Vehicular traffic facing a steady RED ARROW signal indication shall not enter the intersection to make the movement indicated by the arrow and, unless entering the intersection to make another movement permitted by another signal indication, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line; but if there is no stop line, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection; or if there is no crosswalk, then before entering the intersection; and shall remain stopped until a signal indication or other traffic control device permitting the movement indicated by such RED ARROW is displayed. When a traffic control device is in place permitting a turn on a steady RED ARROW signal indication, vehicular traffic facing a steady RED ARROW signal indication is permitted to enter the intersection to make the movement indicated by the arrow signal indication, after stopping. The right to proceed with the turn shall be limited to the direction indicated by the arrow and shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a STOP sign. Later in the same document, page 453, the language is more direct and indicates that turning shall not be permitted when facing a RED ARROW signal indication except as outlined above where other devices permit the movement: A steady RED ARROW signal indication shall be displayed when it is intended to prohibit traffic, except by a pedestrian signal head, from entering the intersection or other controlled area to make the indicated turn. Except as described in Item C.2. in Paragraph 3 of Section 4D.04 [the quoted text provided above], turning on a steady RED ARROW signal indication shall not be permitted. Unless there are other traffic control devices (signs) allowing it, one may not enter an intersection when facing a red arrow. Of course, someone authorized to direct traffic can override the traffic control devices. You can examine the standards adoption practice of the various states to see how any particular state has implemented the standard. New York, in particular, has adopted the national standard along with a State supplement. As an example supplement, New York's supplement for "Application of Steady Signal Indications" deals with protected U-turn movements where right turn on red is permitted by inserting the following language: If a protected U-turn movement is provided, and right turns on red are allowed from the conflicting approach from the left, a RIGHT TURN ON RED MUST YIELD TO U-TURN (R10-30) sign (see Section 2B.54) may be used to advise road users making the right turn on red of the operation. | I doubt that you will find an official answer to that question. No law allows you to block passing (even if passing is illegal). Therefore, you must allow passing. There are laws against obstructing traffic. Japanese law addresses this, defining obstructing progress as starting to move or continuing to move in circumstances that would likely cause another vehicle or streetcar to have to suddenly change speed or direction in order to avoid danger You'd have to specify how you intend to "not let" a person pass you, but I can't imagine what you could do that would not be "obstructing progress". A recent anti-road rage law allows license revocation for violation. | It's illegal to (temporarily) break an item The commercial car park owner may not aim the camera at Alice garden. However, even if it does so, breaking the camera or damaging it is still illegal - as one of the various forms of destruction/damaging of property colloquially called vandalism. Do note that the very article and the clasification of laser OP links to points out that *even a low-powered "pet-safe" IIIb/3R laser leaves out burnt-out pixels with a pinkish surrounding. These might not be enough to prevent identification when not aiming the laser into the camera, but they are damage to the sensor. The very article also describes how the camera damage progresses even after exposure, possibly due to the high power lasers. However, even if no such damage occurs, the owner of the camera is (temporarily) deprived of its legal uses while the laser is pointed on it, which is in many jurisdictions enough to count as theft. | Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence. | In general, yes, police could do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which requires an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police would act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way. If police think a person's actions are "suspicious" and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing. Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time. | Stop: possibly The standard for initiating a traffic stop is named after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Terry stop. The standard is rather simple: Initiating the stop only requires reasonable suspicion. If their computer claims that the driver's license of the car owner is expired or suspended, that is reasonable suspicion to at least stop the car to check if the owner is driving it and if the license really is expired. Arrest: possibly To facilitate an arrest, the next level of scrutiny is needed: probable cause. Generally, there is little requirement on when a police report is to be written, but contemporary reports (at the same time or close to) are typical. Example of rising through the ranks Alice, 16 years old, dent in the fender from a fenderbender. That is not even a warning's worth and does not rise reasonable suspicion. Bob cop's computer still reads the license plate and Bob gets a flashing light: the car owner's license is expired. That is reasonable suspicion that there is an offense if the owner and Alice are the same person. But Bob needs to verify that. The reasonable suspicion can go away if for example the car was owned by Charles, a 60-year-old gentleman, then the suspicion that Alice's license is expired goes away. But the stop in itself was reasonable! Bob starts the ticket after stopping Alice, then passes the car to get to Alice. Looking in he sees that behind Alice lies a box stamped "Top Secret - US President's Eyes Only" all over. Bob arrests Alice for the probable cause of possibly possessing those documents illegally. The documents were in plain sight, so no search was needed btw. | The rules about use of lights, and keeping hands on the steering wheel are not new, but they may have been rephrased. It has always been the case that you should be in proper control of the vehicle (both hands on the wheel), and not to use the lights for thanking, or for inviting. Here are two extracts from the 1999 edition of The Highway Code. Flashing headlights. Only flash your headlights to let other road users know that you are there. Do not flash your headlights in an attempt to intimidate other road users. If another driver flashes his headlights never assume that it is a signal to go. Use your own judgement and proceed carefully. Once moving you should keep to the left, unless road signs or markings indicate otherwise. The exceptions are when you want to overtake, turn right or pass parked vehicles or pedestrians in the road keep well to the left on right-hand bends. This will improve your view of the road and help avoid the risk of colliding with traffic approaching from the opposite direction keep both hands on the wheel, where possible. This will help you to remain in full control of the vehicle at all times The recent changes concern vulnerable road users, and their priority. | In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split" |
Can police search people and vehicles on my property based on third-party report of drug use? Someone called the police to report someone doing drugs in a vehicle on my property. What right does the officer have to ask questions and search people and vehicles? | Various cases heard by the US Supreme Court have established that an anonymous tip can indeed create reasonable grounds for probable cause, allowing the police to search and detain persons involved. For example, the case of Navarette v. California where a suspect was stopped on the highway after an anonymous tip was given to police - the court ruled that the tip established reasonable grounds for probable cause which allowed the persons to be stopped in the first place. The precedent set in that case would apply to the situation you are describing. | In the U.S., Law enforcement favors going after the distribution of narcotics over the use. Going after the users just means dealers will seek out new customers whereas going after dealers means eliminating the supply chain. And Law Enforcement would much rather have a dealer flip on a manufacturer at that. The bigger the fish they bring in, the more damage they can do to the supply chain. The U.S. has recently been moving towards treating the use of illicit substances as a disease rather than an crime, especially when the use is tied to addiction. To this end, the current trend is to get the users to clinics that can specialize in breaking addiction rather than jailing a user. Prisons and jails do not have a strong track record for this, but they do have programs for substance abuse. The U.S. also favors plea bargins rather than taking every case to trial. 90% of all legal cases are settled out of court with a negotiation between the prosecution and the defense. Usually this acts in a "you scratch my back" arrangement where the offender will plea to a lesser charge and in exchange, help the investigators find that bigger fish. This may be testifying against them or giving them the supplier or even acting as a mole. This also benifits the state as the prosecution doesn't have to pay for all the costs of arguing a case a trial. For example, if the cops bust a user, he will be charged with Possession, but they might drop charges if the user can name the dealer and will testify against him. If the cops bust the dealer, the dealer is charged with Possession (with intent to sell), but if he's low on the totem pole, they can ask him to name the supplier he gets his goods and testify against the supplier and in exchange, they drop the charge to Possession. They will be less inclined to bring this fact up, but Possession is easier to prove in court than Possession (With Intent to Sell) because the former requires finding drugs on the person and his property. The later needs to prove that the drugs were not for personal use but instead for distribution to others. Almost universally, anyone convicted on mere possession charges probably did something a lot worse. Law enforcement tends to charge as many crimes as possible... as long as they can prove guilt on one, they can put someone away for a while. Al Capone famously went to one of the most notorious prisons in the United States for Tax Evasion (a very white collared crime that typically results in fines and very minimum jail time. While we're on the subject, the IRS has a 98% conviction rate, and ties with Secret Service (the guys who protect the President) for most successful Federal Law Enforcement Agency, to give you an idea of where the priorities lie in the United States. All Federal Law Enforcement is ridiculously good, to the point that bringing charges against anyone is almost as good as saying they're guilty). Another reason Use of drugs isn't pushed is that, well, producing that evidence is difficult. The common user bust is drinking and driving (since alcohol is legal in the U.S., use based crimes are the top level of enforcement. You legally cannot hold a firearm in the U.S. while drunk, even if you could do so while sober). A brethalizer is built to measure the amount of alcohol is in one's system and if it is over the limit for what is safe. Most illicit drug tests don't do this and rather look for chemicals in general and will ping if there's any trace... even if the last use was a month ago. Certain substances linger for a while, especially if they can deposit in hair folicle. You could be six months sober and still ping the test. Other issuses include drugs that contain components of legal substances. Opiods (the big problem drug right now) are manufactured from the Poppy Plant... which also is grown for legal consumable products. There are cases where the Opiod tests pings positive on people who have consumed Poppy-Seed Bagels (perfectlly legal and quite common) for breakfast the day of the test. Other tests aren't reliable and will give a false positive from time to time. Edit: Typically, Possession of a controlled substance assumes you will use it. Reasonable Doubt is harder to make for having the stuff then it is for using it. Someone under the influence could claim they were drugged and law enforcement would have to prove that they weren't to convict (There's actually a known problem where law enforcement agents can get dosed by accident while handling contraband evidence. There was an episode of CSI: Miami where one character had this happen to her... and they realized where the drugs were hidden in a warehouse she served a warrant on but didn't find any evidence. DVD extras featured a police consultant who explained that the whole sequence was thought up because it happened to her for real.). Having the stuff in your possession is much more difficult as they have to show you had it (someone slipping it into your pocket without your knowledge is your job to prove). In the U.S., Prosecution Discretion means that the Prosecutor can choose not to press the case for any number of reasons, they don't have the resources to fight it, to they don't think they can win with the evidence they have, to political motives (they don't agree with the law... this can be risky depending on the nature of the crime). Typically a simple possession charge where the amount is clearly small enough that it's only for personal use and no other crimes are charged wouldn't be worth the amount of resources to fully prosecute. TO give an example, while Marijuana is legal in the State of Colorado, it's still illegal under Federal Law, so smoking for recreational use in Colorado is still a crime, but not one enforced by the State of Colorado but the Department of Justice (U.S. Federal Law enforcement department... usually). Remember the Feds generally deal with bigger crimes than someone getting high under the bleachers while listening to Jimmy Hendrix, so it only really comes up if you did something bigger (kidnapping a girl, driving over state lines into Colorado, go to a school to get high under the bleachers while listening to Hendrix would get you a Federal Possession charge... but the real concern is the Kidnapping, not controlled drug use). And most crimes that occur in entirely one state, Feds are content to let those states deal with the problem and rarely get involved. | There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf | Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing". | In the United States . . . Scope of Search Warrant: To what extent can they search you and your belongings? The scope of a search is limited by what is stated in the warrant. Not only must a warrant be supported by probably cause, it must also describe with particularity, "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See U.S. Const. Amend. 4. For example, they cannot search a house if the warrant specifies the backyard, nor can they search for weapons if the warrant specifies marijuana plants. However, that doesn't mean that officers can seize only those items listed in the warrant. If, in the course of their search, police officers come across contraband or evidence of a crime that is not listed in the warrant, they can often seize it. When it comes to containers, the police are allowed to search anything that items could be inside. So, if they're looking for stolen TV's, they can't search a jewelry box or under the floor boards. However if they looking for something small, like bomb parts, just about everything is fair game. To search you, the warrant would need to authorize the search of your person, or the police would need an independent justification to search you. For example, if they found explosives that were illegal to posses, they could conduct a search incident to arrest. Can they search your entire computer? Yes, assuming computers are within the scope of the warrant. Compelling people to produce passwords of encryption keys: If they find encrypted files can they detain you until you decrypt them? This depends on your jurisdiction as it is a developing area of law and deal with 5th amendment. This is something that would not be done through a search warrant and would involve a separate proceeding. In this situation, constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. V, may be implicated. Case where Court held producing passwords violated the 5th Amendment: The government's postindictment grand jury subpoena ordering the defendant to provide all passwords associated with his computer in order to secure evidence of child pornography allegedly contained in the computer, which spawned the three counts contained in the indictment, required the defendant to make a "testimonial communication," and thus the subpoena violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, where the government was not seeking documents or objects but instead was requiring the defendant to divulge through his mental processes his password that would be used to incriminate him, the district court in U.S. v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010), held. The court explained, an act is "testimonial," and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the accused is forced to reveal his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the government. It is the extortion of information from the accused, the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind, that implicates the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the court said. Case where Court held producing passwords did not violate the 5th Amendment: The district court in U.S. v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012), recognizing that production of a document may fall within the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination since it acknowledges that the document exists, that it is in the possession or control of the producer, and that it is authentic, held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not implicated by requiring her to produce the unencrypted contents of a computer where the government knew of the existence and location of the computer's files; a preponderance of the evidence established either that the computer belonged to the defendant or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she had the ability to access its encrypted contents; and the government had offered her immunity, precluding it from using her act of producing those unencrypted contents against her. The court determined, also, that a preponderance of the evidence, in a motion to compel production of the unencrypted contents of the computer, found during a search of the defendant's residence, showed that either the computer belonged to her or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she could access its encrypted contents, supporting the decision to compel her to produce those unencrypted contents, where the defendant acknowledged, during a telephone conversation with her ex-husband, that she owned or had such a computer, the contents of which were accessible only by entry of a password, and the computer, which was found in her bedroom, was identified with her name. This issues probably will not be decided one way or the other until the supreme court rules on it. If they find a password safe can they force you to give them a password and >then can they log into all accounts you have stored in it? When you say password safe, I am assuming you mean password management software. If so, see above. If you don't give them the password but they find it written down somewhere, can they still use it? Yes, assuming their warrant allows them to search papers or it is in plain view. Out of curiosity, do police ever actually do this? Find a password protected file on a computer and go through all the papers in the desk and try all possible passwords until they find one? I'm not sure, but it wouldn't surprise me. Even if they don't have a warrant that covers papers, police have been known to bend the rules. I think someone with police experience could have a better answer for this. | NO It is decided state-by-state (for state-wide agencies like state troopers), and county by county, and city-by-city whether or not to buy and use cameras. Also, they are not usually always running. Policies as to when officers are required to turn them on vary as well as when the public and the involved officers get access to the recordings. | Generally, no Police cannot enter private property subject to a number of exemptions: they have a search warrant, or when in close pursuit of someone the police believe has committed, or attempted to commit, a serious crime, or to sort out a disturbance, or if they hear cries for help or of distress, or to enforce an arrest warrant, or if invited in freely by the occupant, or under various statutes which give the police powers of entry (not necessarily by force) into a number of different kinds of premises. | In addition to compelling a store to produce evidence such as video footage, via a search warrant as described by bdb484, police can request access to information in the possession of such information. The store may voluntarily comply with the request, or not. Especially in the case of online transactions, there may be a privacy guarantee that information about a customer's transaction will not be revealed to a third party unless required by law (ergo, a warrant), but security camera recordings are not protected by such guarantees. |
Displaying a website in a webview inside a mobile application - copyright infringment Is it a breach of copyright to create a mobile application which simply displays another website in a webview as it is available online? | No. That would be in no way a bigger breach of copyright than creating yet another web browser. | No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com. | It is hard to say: this article sketches the legal landscape. So-called deep linking that bypasses the main page for a site is not believed to be infringement, following the reasoning of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146. The URL itself does not have the bare minimum of creativity required for copyright protection, and storing a URL on a computer is not storing the contents that it refers to, so no copy was made in violation of copyright law. It is unlikely that competing theories would develop in other US districts (there don't appear to be any at the present). However, such a link could create secondary liability for infringement, see Erickson Productions, Inc. v. Kast, where a party "has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement". If I link to a file on a pirate website, I am secondarily liable for that infringement. However, if I link to a legally-uploaded file which the author did not intend to make public, there is no infringement. Copyright law requires permission of the copyright owner, which is more than just "explicit denial". The problem is that a person can put a file out there and not say one way or the other whether you have permission to copy the file. The US Copyright office says that "A copyright owner must have expressly or implicitly authorized users to make retainable copies of a work by downloading, printing, or other means for the work to be considered published" (let's not care at the moment whether it is important to be "published"). The court may infer implicit permission from a copyright owner's conduct, but there is no rule "if it's on the internet, you've granted permission". A rights-owner may make a valiant but insufficient effort to block access to the work (except via a password), so in that context, the courts would infer that the rights-owner had not given permission, therefore the copying is infringing and you have secondary liability for your direct link to the material. | You don't have to, but you probably want to for a couple of reasons: It's courteous, and in the spirit of open source It's someone else's work, and you're using it. The least you can probably say is "thank you." It will also probably help you stay in the clear: since you're using software in binary form, where the notice isn't immediately accessible, then by providing a copy of the license, you respect that licensing term in another way. It tells your users what's up with the program Let's admit it, having the license accessible to the users tells them what's in the program and so on. It's another way of providing attribution, like I listed in the first reason above. Many apps, desktop and mobile, have a screen or panel to indicate the projects and licenses that they use. They don't have to be straight in the user's face, they can be a little button in the "About" screen of the program. To answer a little confusion: the binaries are still a derived form from that source code. Analyse the heading: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. The software is still there, it's just there in a different form, a compiled form. Therefore, the copyright and permission notice should probably stick around, even if it's just a file somewhere. | I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use. | The images and text are copyright (if they are). What Google does with them is fair use/dealing. It works like this: if Google's bot can find them then you (the owner) have put them on the World Wide Web presumably because you want people to see them, effectively you have put them on public display. Google is assisting you in that endeavour by enabling people who are looking for what you are displaying to find it. Their use of your material enhances its value to you which is a rock solid defence. If you don't want your stuff on public display then a) don't put it on a public part of the web - there are plenty of private cloud storage facilities or B) stick a file in your website that tells bots not to index it. | When the question is "Can I be sued for..." there can't ever be a really useful answer, because anyone can be sued for just about anything. The suit may be tossed as pointless early in the process, but it can be filed. That said, could there be a valid ground of suit against a developer for creating a scraper? Possibly. Scraping a site could be against the site's TOS. It could be largely a way of committing copyright infringement. It could be unlawful in some other way. For most sites, scraping is not unlawful. Google does it all the time. If there is no legitimate use for the scraper, or very nearly none, so that any user is likely to be acting maliciously and unlawfully, and if the developer knows this, or any reasonable developer should know this, then the developer could possibly be found liable for the illegitimate actions of those who use the scarper. If there is a legit use for the scraper, or the developer would plausibly think that there is, then such development is not illegal, and a successful suit against the developer is unlikely. | Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on. |
Definition of privileged information in investor law Person X makes a scientific discovery about some new metallic alloy. She then reasons that as a result of its applications, the market for some other metal will drop. Is she allowed to short the stocks of some company trading in this other metal, before she publishes her result? I would appreciate pointers on this area of legal finance. | Is she allowed to short the stocks of some company trading in this other metal, before she publishes her result ? Generally speaking, yes. The main exceptions consist of her being under certain form of fiduciary duty toward the company of which she is shorting stock, or (2) her transactions being motivated by superior knowledge resembling insider trading or fraud. Absent an element of fiduciary duty or insider trading, what you describe is an entirely valid arms-length transaction. Indeed, this happens all the time in financial markets, except that a lawful asymmetry of information may come in forms other than the scientific discovery of new metallic alloys (example: statistical models developed by the entity). Searching for case law containing the terms in italics will show you how these concepts supposedly are applied. For instance, see Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust, 925 F.Supp. 1270 (1996): No fiduciary relationship exists ... [where] the two parties were acting and contracting at arm's length. Moreover, courts have rejected the proposition that a fiduciary relationship can arise between parties to a business relationship. (citations omitted) You will notice that the court in Procter & Gamble points to case law in the sense that a party's superior knowledge imposes on him a contractual duty to disclose that information. But the notion of superior knowlege as applied in case law seems typically narrowed down to situations where the seller conceals defects for which he is responsible (Haberman v. Greenspan, 82 Misc.2d 263 (1975)) or when the concealment resembles fraud. Haberman points to a case of fraud where (1) the seller of a boat before the sale took it from where it lay and placed it afloat in a dock to prevent the examination of the bottom which the seller knew to be unsound [...]; and (2) where the seller of a log of mahogany turned it in order to conceal a hole (citations omitted). That is different from the superior knowledge that a party obtains through the design of superseding techniques. It would be extremely inept for a court to rule against a party for trading without first bringing everyone up to speed as to her superseding developments. Not only that would contradict the tenets of trade secrets, perhaps patents, and so forth, but in the context you outline it would create inconsistencies with respect to other financial instruments associated to the same perception of downside risk that is inherent to taking a short position on stocks. | The law is here (too long to quote, or understand). There is a proposed modification of the law which may be enacted. In the section Justification, it is noted that under the existing law a global corporation may technically "own" five subsidiary corporations. Company A may own a winery in France while Company D may own a hotel containing a restaurant in New York. Under New York Law, the liquor license for the restaurant would be prohibited - and it could be subject to financial penalties. So the restrictions are broader that you mention (ownership of stock is an "interest"), but certainly what you mention is prohibited. The proposed law limits the effect to an interest in a restaurant or brewery "licensed under this chapter", i.e. in the state of New York (currently, a NY manufacturer cannot have an interest in an alcohol-selling restaurant anywhere). | It would depend on how the ownership contract is written. 30% sounds like a minority stake, so I don't know how they could block new investments unless the contract requires a super-majority to approve new rounds of financing. How does the remaining 70% of ownership feel about this? If they are abiding by the terms of the ownership contract I don't see that this is questionable behavior on their part. This is a business relationship. Business partners may come to have different outlooks on the future of the company, and the best way to protect their investment. Consider flipping the viewpoint: "I'm a minority owner in a company I no longer have confidence in. I would like to dissolve the company and sell off the assets to re-coup as much of my original investment as I can. The other owners want to chase this to the bitter end, and do a new round of financing, which will significantly dilute my shares, without (in my opinion) giving the company a real chance of success. What can I do?" When the founder of your friend's company accepted money for shares in the company, they gave up absolute control over the company's direction. Assuming none of the parties are acting in violation of the ownership contract, the most reasonable way to resolve a conflict like this is to buy out the dissenting shareholders. | She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove. | There is a legal dictum, de minimis non curat lex, which might lead to an exasperated court official refusing to issue your lawsuit (with or without providing the $1 out of his own pocket to save everybody's time); I recommend you look it up. But there is no official term for what you suggest, although many lawyers might off the record provide colourful descriptions. If you wish to waste your money on such a claim, then obviously in your view it is worth pursuing. Clients often say "the principle is more important than the money", though they say so more often before they receive the bills than after. | That means that a person cannot put a new cover or binding on a book, and then resell it or lend it, unless permission is obtained from the publisher. This has the effect of prohibiting libraries, which need to rebind most books, from carrying the book without the publisher's permission. This condition did not apply in the US, because under the US Law's First Sale Doctrine, the seller cannot impose such conditions on the buyer. The very standardize wording was, I think, once part of the Net book Agreement (NBA) used by Penguin and other UK-based publishers on sales in the UK and the Commonwealth. You will find it on many used books from such publishers. I believe the main aim was to prohibit discount resellers of used books, and to prohibit sale of "stripped books" (reported to the publisher as "unsold and destroyed"). I believe that this is no longer in effect, but I am not sure. The NBA was dissolved in 1995. | Sorry, what did I agree to? NDA means New Drug Application, right? Or is it Notre Dame Academy? Maybe it's Nebraska Dressage Association - don't want to cross those guys, their horses are mean. When you are trying to form a contract with someone, it's very important that you and they are talking about the same thing. What can't I disclose? That I had a phone call? What I said? What you said? Only the confidential bits? If so, what are they? Can I tell my business partner? My lawyer? My secretary? The IRS? Another important thing about making a contract is to agree on the terms. Post-facto contracts are not a thing After you paint my fence, you can't demand payment. We have to enter into a contract before the thing that happened happens. Elements of the call might be confidential anyway I am bound to respect confidences that were entrusted to me where a) the information is confidential b) it was imparted to me in a situation of confidence and c) disclosing it would cause harm. We don't need a Non-Destructive Analysis to document that. | Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...". |
How can the US president give an order to a civilian? I remember reading that the US president can give an order to a civilian via some special letter. (The example given involved an IT company employee ordered to install a back-door in the company's infrastructure.) However, I cannot find this described in the Wikipedia article Powers of the president of the United States. Is my memory failing me, or is this case missing from the Wikipedia article? | The executive branch of the US government, or specific parts of it, can demand that a person do particular things, when a statute has authorized such a demand. Such demands are not usually made at the level of the President of the United States, but the president could order a specific official to take such action. For example a National Security Letter orders a person to turn over specific information, and not tell anyone about doing so, as described in this article from The New Yorker. 50 USC 3162 provides that: (a) Generally (1) Any authorized investigative agency may request from any financial agency, financial institution, or holding company, or from any consumer reporting agency, such financial records, other financial information, and consumer reports as may be necessary in order to conduct any authorized law enforcement investigation, counterintelligence inquiry, or security determination. Any authorized investigative agency may also request records maintained by any commercial entity within the United States pertaining to travel by an employee in the executive branch of Government outside the United States. ... (2) Requests may be made under this section where— ... (B) (i) there are reasonable grounds to believe, based on credible information, that the person is, or may be, disclosing classified information in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power; (ii) information the employing agency deems credible indicates the person has incurred excessive indebtedness or has acquired a level of affluence which cannot be explained by other information known to the agency; or (iii) circumstances indicate the person had the capability and opportunity to disclose classified information which is known to have been lost or compromised to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. "authorized investigative agency" is defined as: an agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct a counterintelligence investigation or investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information; Accordingn to this ACLU page: In April 2007, the ACLU filed a FOIA request seeking information about the Department of Defense and CIA's use of National Security Letters. After filing a lawsuit, the ACLU received over 500 documents from its request. According to this ACLU page: An ACLU lawsuit revealed that the CIA has also used National Security Letters to demand Americans' personal financial records without prior court approval. The CIA has acknowledged using National Security Letters "on a limited basis" to obtain financial information from U.S. companies. According nto this NY Times article from Jan 13 2007: The C.I.A. has also been issuing what are known as national security letters to gain access to financial records from American companies, though it has done so only rarely, intelligence officials say. There are other circumstances in which an executive branch government official may order a private citizen to take specific action. Indeed, this happens in almost every case of a police arrest, except those done by an arrest warrant (which is a court order). During the Korean War, President Truman issued an order seizing a number of steel mills, to be operated by the government, in order to stop a strike which was, he said, impeding the military effort and thus the security of the United States. This order was challenged in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) and was overturned on the ground that the President was not only not-authorized by any law, but had failed to follow the provisions of a law dealing with situations of the kind at issue. In that case the Court made it clear that such a seizure would have been permitted if done in conformance with a statute, and might have been permitted had no law dealt with such cases. | An oath of office cannot be legally enforced through the courts, other than to demand that officials take it in order to take office, and to bar people who have taken it and then engaged in treason or sedition from holding public office in any federal, state, or local office, military or civilian, in the United States. This is something which is required of all federal and state and local public officials under the U.S. Constitution, which states in the third paragraph of Article VI: The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States. The U.S. President's parallel oath of office is found in the last paragraph of Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. It states: Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." But, while taking the oath is required, it is also the case that: An oath is not justiciable. The FBI cannot investigate adherence to oaths because they are not enforceable as codified law. A prosecutor cannot establish that an oath has been broken by proving certain legal elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judge cannot adjudicate it. There is one exception to this rule, however. Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. So, an oath of office does impose a justiciable duty to not engage in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or give aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, upon pain of not being able to hold any state or federal, military or civilian public office without a two-third majority waiver from Congress (in addition to any other consequences that may flow from this conduct without regard to having taken an oath). But, this is a very slight slap on the wrist indeed for committing treason or engaging in sedition (which are criminally punishable by decades in prison or death) after having sworn this oath. Justice Joseph Story noted in his "A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States" (1842) that: A President, who shall dare to violate the obligations of his solemn oath or affirmation of office, may escape human censure, nay, may even receive applause from the giddy multitude. But he will be compelled to learn, that there is a watchful Providence, that cannot be deceived; and a righteous Being, the searcher of all hearts, who will render unto all men according to their deserts. Considerations of this sort will necessarily make a conscientious man more scrupulous in the discharge of his duty; and will even make a man of looser principles pause, when he is about to enter upon a deliberate violation of his official oath. The purpose of an oath of office is simply to deny public offices to people who are not willing to publicly state that the legal system in which the people taking them will operate is legitimate. An oath to support the constitution is the modern equivalent of the feudal European ritual of "bending the knee" to one's legitimate feudal superior. This ritual was highlighted, for example, in the Game of Thrones books by R. R. Martin, which is based loosely on the fights over legitimacy in 15th century England's "War of the Roses". Another legacy of this historical tradition is the duty of someone in military service to salute his or her superior officer. As a historical note, these seemingly toothless rituals have, historically, been surprisingly effective a screening out hard core extremist leaders trying to bring down a government based upon claims that the whole system is illegitimate when new regimes are established, and following civil wars and insurgencies. Many regimes, democratic and non-democratic, in Western political history, have imposed similar requirements. When they have done so, this has seriously influenced the political tactics used by factions that deny the legitimacy of the state and its incumbent leaders. Simply taking the oath undermines one's credibility as an insurgent leader, even if one does so in bad faith. In the United States, oaths of office were also key preconditions to the post-conflict settlements if the Whiskey Rebellion, the Civil War, and some of the lesser known episodes of a century of Indian Wars. As a more recent example, the requirement of an oath of office has materially influenced the 20th and 21st century political tactics of Sinn Féin, a political movement in Ireland, seeking to make the U.K. political subdivision known as Northern Ireland, which it deems illegitimate, a part of the Republic of Ireland. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), distinguished between a Congressional determination that someone has not satisfied the constitutionally established requirements to have an oath of office administered to them after they have been elected, which can be made by majority vote, and a Congressional determination that a member of Congress should be expelled by a two-thirds majority vote of the house of Congress to which the member of Congress has been elected. A Congressional vote to expel a member of Congress is a non-justiciable question that is not tied to the content of the member's oath of office. Similarly, judicial and executive branch officials in the federal government may be impeached by Congress, and removed from office through that process, only for "high crimes and misdemeanors" and not merely for otherwise failing to live up to their oath of office in a non-criminal manner (although what constitutes "high crimes and misdemeanors" is also a non-justiciable political question). Some legal authorities, however, have held that in some contexts, the oath of office does reflect an intent to empower executive branch officials to refuse to enforce what the President believes to be unconstitutional legislation, when its constitutionality has not yet been definitively adjudicated yet. But, courts have also held, for example, that a member of the U.S. military does not have standing to bring a suit claiming that military action in which he is involved was unconstitutionally authorized. This decision was reached on the grounds that the claim that the service member was forced to violate that service member's oath of office does not constitute a justiciable "injury in fact" to that member for standing to sue purposes. Smith v. Obama, No. 16-843, 2016 WL 6839357 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) at page 10 (as discussed here). | If the Senate has convicted by the necessary majority, Trump would no longer be the President - Mike Pence would be. There is no legal difficulty in removing ordinary citizens from the White House. Of course, President Pence might decide that he didn't mind ex-President Trump remaining in the White House, and I think the law enforcement agencies would be obliged to respect that. | No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal. | An individual does not have authority to "issue" a restraining order. In the U.S. only judges can issue such orders. The guidelines and policies for obtaining a restraining order vary by jurisdiction, although in the end a judge can issue any order he wants. So in theory you might be able to find a judge who will issue an order for any or no reason. In practice I'd be surprised if many judges would abuse their office to gratuitously harass people in this fashion, though there are probably a few amusing/disturbing examples out there to the contrary. | Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments. | The show ignored the existing legal framework. Almost all U.S. police officers are employed by state and local governments and do not report directly to the President, even in an emergency. A small number of law enforcement officers are federal employees with a direct line of command to the President (e.g. the Secret Service and the security guards in the General Services Administration and TSA officers), but a law enforcement officer, unlike a member of the military or a CIA officer, does not simply follow the orders of the civilians to whom his superiors are responsible without the intervention of their law enforcement superiors based solely upon that civilian's whims and directions the way that a soldier would. The Secret Service has some limited authority to direct and even deputize local law enforcement officers in pursuit of their missions, but that would probably not extend to the kind of national security kill order contemplated in this episode. This said, lots of law enforcement officers are ex-military, most law enforcement agencies has a quasi-military organizational structure, and in the extreme circumstances of Designated Survivor, it wouldn't be shocking for law enforcement officers to follow their natural military chain of command intuitions rather than the law that actually applies in these situations. Law enforcement officers are personality types that are very deferential to authority which is a natural counterpart to support for their hierarchical view of the world that endows them with their own authority. There is no one in the loop to play devil's advocate for the suspected terrorist. But, strictly speaking, the proper protocol within the U.S. would be to have a CIA agent make the strike (because the military is prevented by the posse comitatus act from doing so, unless these events counted as an "insurrection" which they very well might in which case the military could be involved), rather than a law enforcement officer. Incidentally, the U.S. Supreme Court has basically held that the citizenship of the suspected terrorist is irrelevant, even though policy makers in all of the Presidential administrations since 9-11 have not been very comfortable with that state of the law and have sought to distinguish U.S. citizens from non-U.S. citizens in their own policies. | united-states In the United States, information released through the federal Freedom of Information (FoI) process, or any of the various state-level versions of FoI, is considered public information. The person who receives it may share it at will, or publish it. Indeed many such inquiries are made by news reporters who intend to publish the information, and many others are routinely posted to various web sites. I suspect that the law on this point in the UK is similar, but I have not checked it. |
Is it legal for restaurants to not pay their courier the tips we pay them? Is it legal for restaurants to not pay their courier the tips we pay them? I used SkipTheDishes and paid 15% in tip and the driver told me that the tip is given to the restaurant and not to him, which I didn't believe at all, but then the app said that the restaurant is managing its own delivery, so I wondered if there was a legal loophole that allow restaurants to not give the tip you intended to give the courier and fill their own pockets? Can SkipTheDishes or the restaurants doing this be sued? | We need to know your jurisdiction, as special local laws may apply. The general answer for the United States follows. It's routine for restaurants to pool tips for on-site employees, so that the waiters share with busboys and other less-visible personnel. Until recently, Federal law allowed the owner to be able to keep for himself tips that brought the waiter's salary over the standard minimum wage. (The Federal minimum wage for tipped employees is much lower, $2.13/hour.) Some states prohibited this, and it's no longer permitted. So the driver's tip might be shared with other workers, but not with the owners. Perhaps tip delivery drivers in cash? | I assume you're talking about this case: Bus lane camera mistakes woman's sweater for number plate. No he couldn't just ignore it - because that doesn't actually result in it getting put in front of a human (judge or otherwise). Instead the fine would escalate and ultimately be passed to a collections agency. Only challenging the Penalty Charge Notice (as this person did) would get a human involved. As a bonus, if the automated fine happens to come with a S172 notice to identify the driver ignoring that is an offence in of itself (irrespective of the original alleged offence), and in many cases carries a worse penalty (£1000 and 6 points IIRC). what if this item of clothing became fashionable and was therefore causing this person to receive hundreds of these fines every week? While it's unlikely to get to that stage - the item of clothing on its own wouldn't do it, there needed to be a specific partial-obscurement of the garment as well, it's not impossible, after all perhaps it's their favorite sweater, they always carry their bag like that and cut across the bus lane on their way to work etc. In those circumstances there's nothing legally that changes, I'd expect the poor vehicle owner to be on first name terms with the people at the council enforcement call centre in question sooner rather than later. Re edit: Suppose I want to annoy somebody as much as possible, what's to stop me from printing a t-shirt with their actual number plate on it, then walking around past all sorts of cameras, knowing that they will receive multiple fines every day and have no choice but to keep calling and explaining. After all, the council has no duty to make it easy for someone to get through on the phone, so, potentially, I could walk around bus lanes and car parks all day. I could get some friends to do this all over the country in different local authority areas and the victim could - literally - have not enough hours in the day to have to keep fighting false fines. Would they not have some recourse to sue for harassment or "vexatious litigation"? In all honesty I don't know for sure what would happen in this scenario - I can't think of a similar enough case. But I would expect targeting an individual in this manner would qualify as harassment pretty easily and for which there are both criminal and civil actions that can be taken. I suppose hypothetically you could argue that the "number plate shirt" is effectively being used to make false allegations that the car's registered keeper had committed crimes, which opens up avenues to prosecution for Perverting the Course of Justice or wasting police time. But I have no idea how likely that would be to be pursued. | You should file a complaint with the police. If you complain to the police then they might do something. If you don't complain then they certainly won't. Are food trucks licensed? You might try complaining to the license authority. However go to the police first because the licence authority are unlikely to do anything without a police complaint. Even being just another statistic helps increase the pressure for action on the wider issue of racism in society. If all else fails you can just post the incident on YouTube and see what happens. Its an unreliable method of enforcement and can backfire, but it has been known for international embarrassment to kick reluctant authorities into action. | No When I go into my grocery store, I can use the lettuce if I pay for it. The grocer does not explicitly state that I can't use the lettuce if I don't pay for it but that doesn't mean I can. Replace "lettuce" with "software" (or any other property you don't own) and you have the same situation. | When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints. | Junk mail is perfectly legal From Preventing unsolicited mail published by the House of Commons Library: It is not illegal for a company to send unsolicited mail unless the material is obscene or threatening. No legislation exists which can protect a householder from receiving it. If postage has been paid, Royal Mail is legally obliged to deliver all addressed mail, which includes mail that is addressed “to the occupier” as well as mail that is personally addressed. However, there are various options available to an individual who wishes to stop unwanted and unsolicited direct marketing mail. From you description, it appears that Dominos paid for the mail to be delivered “to the occupier” and the Royal Mail has a legal obligation to do so (unless you opt out). | No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement"). | This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best. |
Is it legal for a bar bouncer to confiscate a fake ID Background: I read a Reddit thread where someone had an international passport confiscated from them at a bar. I imagine that the bouncer probably didn't recognize what he was looking at and assumed it was a fake ID. From what I understand, the bar does not have the authority to confiscate such a real passport, but that got me to thinking, what if the Bouncer was right? Does he actually have the legal authority to confiscate the fake ID? The reason I ask, is because if he does have that authority, it feels to me like an awkward law, because a simple gap in knowledge can be what makes the difference between legal and illegal. | There are a couple of indications that a bouncer may not confiscate an ID. This policy document adopting licensing policies to Require licensees with fake ID violations to temporarily or permanently hire on-site law enforcement or certified security guards who are properly trained to check IDs during regular or peak hours to deter the use of fake IDs and give gatekeepers the opportunity to pass suspected fakes to an officer or guard for a second opinion and potential confiscation. Where appropriate, jurisdictions could empower the gatekeeper to confiscate fake IDs so they are not returned to the underage drinker and sent back into circulation. To ensure compliance with legal issues (e.g., property rights, bailment issues), arrange for the on-call or on-site presence of local law enforcement. Local bar and restaurant associations, especially those in concentrated entertainment zones, can join together to share the expense of law enforcement resources. That implies that the bouncer does not already have that authority, and also indicates that the confiscation should be performed by the police. This bouncer training manual says that Even though you may consider the ID to be fake, it is not considered the server's property. Therefore servers and sellers should not confiscate IDs they suspect to be fake. Rather... follow up with a call to the police to verify suspected false IDs. However, a jurisdiction may grant servers that power, as in the case of Colorado. Washington doesn't do that, so bouncers would need to call the police (not that they always do, since passing a fake ID is somewhere between a misdemeanor and a felony). The general principle is that you may not confiscate another person's property, but the police can seize property if it is reasonable to do so. A state may pass a law authorizing a licensee to do likewise (though it does raise questions about the bouncer's understanding of "reasonable cause to believe"). The Colorado statute is restricted to licensee and their employees, and does not apply to "anyone who suspects an ID", nor does it allow civilian confiscation of other property such as an automobile that is suspected of being stolen. | The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date. | In South Carolina for example the law says A permit holder must have his permit identification card in his possession whenever he carries a concealable weapon. When carrying a concealable weapon pursuant to Article 4, Chapter 31, Title 23, a permit holder must inform a law enforcement officer of the fact that he is a permit holder and present the permit identification card when an officer: (1) identifies himself as a law enforcement officer; and (2) requests identification or a driver’s license from a permit holder. In Washington, on the other hand, the law simply requires a permit (or the gun must be locked in the trunk), and you have no obilgation to volunteer such information. Some states allow local options, e.g. NY generally has no duty to inform law but apparently Buffalo, Rochester and NYC do. It's pretty complex, because there is variation in exactly what laws say depending on whether the gun is loaded, or whether it is concealed, or in the trunk. | Unless the notary personally knows the signer, the notary should, and normally will, ask for identification, and the name that the notary puts in the notarization certificate should be copied exact6ly from whatever ID is presented. For Alan Jones to sign as J7, he would need some sort of official proof, acceptable to the notary, that he is "J7". What would that be? I doubt that any notary would certify such a doccument. (If the document is signed as "Alan Jones" but the ID says "Alan J Jones" I am not sure if the notary must follow the ID or may follow the document, assuming that the notary is convinced that the two are the same person. Many notaries in practice will follow the ID.) I agree that the normal way would be for the document to say "Alan Jones, also known as 'J7'", and possibly include wording such as "I Alan Jones, am the person who posts on site XYZ.com as "J7", and specifically who posted a message starting {quote} at {timestamp}." (Or it could give the secure hash of the message, or of several messages.) This would clearly est6ablish a link between the document and the online conversations/acts that it is meant to refer to. The questions says: a need has developed for Alan Jones to sign a document using the name J7 I doubt that doing such a thing is either required or helpful. Rather I suspect he will need to sign a document in which he acknowledges being the particular "J7" involved in the matter. | People in the UK (who are not subject to immigration control or other restrictions) do not have to carry any form of identification. This doesn't answer all parts of your question, but s164 Road Traffic Act 1988 is appropriate to the part about driving. a person driving a motor vehicle on a road ... must, on being so required by a constable or vehicle examiner, produce his licence and its counterpart1 for examination, so as to enable the constable or vehicle examiner to ascertain the name and address of the holder of the licence, the date of issue, and the authority by which they were issued. (s164(1)) So it makes no difference why you were stopped: a constable or traffic offiver can demand production of your licence if you were driving. The same power exists if you're suspected of having caused an accident or committed an offence, even if you're not driving at the time of the production demand. Non-production is an offence: If a person required under the preceding provisions of this section to produce a licence and its counterpart ... fails to do so he is, subject to subsections (7) to (8A) below, guilty of an offence. (s164(6)) However, it is a defence to produce the licence (or a receipt for a licence) within seven days of the demand (s164(7-8)). In practice, the officer will give you a 'producer' requiring you to present your licence at a police station within seven days, after which you will be guilty of the non-production offence. The implication of this is that it is not required that you carry your licence; merely that you have it available to produce within seven days. 1 Presumably the reference to 'counterpart' will go away when the counterpart is abolished on 8th June 2015. | The precise details (and citations) will vary with jurisdiction, so this answer deals only with principles. If you pick up and "take possession of" property belonging to somebody else, you are a thief. [Note that 'taking possession' rather than picking up to restore to the owner/correct place is what makes the difference, which is why in real life nobody who cannot prove your intention will take action; but your question explicitly concedes the point.] If the property does not belong to the supermarket, you are not stealing from them, but from the currently unidentified owner: this makes no legal difference. You might conceivably have a defence if you can prove that the owner has abandoned the property, whatever the definition of "abandoned" is in your jurisdiction (note that it is up to you to show this, and possibly that you knew it before you picked up the property). If it belongs to the supermarket, this cannot be true; if a box of matches has fallen out of someone's pocket, it might possibly be (whatever the laws are, it is very unlikely that they have ever been applied in such a trivial case, so there may be some uncertainty). in any case, the shop is undoubtedly allowed to throw you out, ban you from returning to their premises, and inform other shops and the police that they believe you to be a petty thief, based on their experience. | I can't speak for Latvian law, but it's not unusual for someone to be expelled from or denied entry to a political party in the UK for supporting a rival party at the same time. As one example, Alasdair Campbell was expelled from the Labour Party after he admitted voting for a rival party in elections. From that link, Labour Party rules say that someone "who joins and/or supports a political organisation other than an official Labour group or other unit of the Party" will "automatically be ineligible to be or remain a Party member". So it's not about voting, which is secret, but about supporting a rival party. Similarly, at least one member has been expelled from Labour for supporting the Scottish National Party on social media. Such decisions may have an element of the political (using it as a pretext to getting rid of someone you don't like). But there is no suggestion that such an action is illegal, if it is in the party rules. Political parties have a lot of discretion as to who is allowed to be a member, and who they expel. It's not like buying a gym membership where you are entitled to gym services or your money back; legally you sign an agreement to follow the rules when you join, and joining doesn't entitle you to much. | As far as I can tell, that would be a criminal act. Georgia law § 16-8-2 - Theft by taking says: A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. Georgia law § 16-7-21. Criminal trespass says: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she intentionally damages any property of another without consent of that other person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without consent of that person. If you know the store is refusing to sell you a product, and you eat that product anyway, that is theft. If you don't eat the food but just open it, that's still criminal trespass. Even if you're leaving them money, you're still taking and/or damaging their property without their consent. Additionally, if they told you to leave, and you refused and instead started opening food items, you might be guilty of trespassing in the more traditional sense: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority... Remains upon the land or premises of another person... after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart. As to whether it was legal to give the candy to your daughter before the disagreement and refusal of service, that may depend on what the standard practice is. It seems to me that in most clothing stores you're supposed to pay before consuming the product - this isn't a sit-down restaurant. But if there's nothing else going on, I think the average store would refrain from calling the police if the person did not try to hide the evidence (for example, by stuffing the empty box on a shelf) and if the merchandise was paid for before the person attempted to leave the store, regardless of whether it's technically illegal. |
Car accident and now charged Assault This took place in NJ. So I was in a minor fender bender car accident with a mid age woman. I was at fault being that I hit the rear bumper. I right away asked her if she was ok and she asked me to call her husband since she didnt have her phone. So I dialed the number and gave her my phone (Galaxy s10 XL). She just walked off with it When I asked for my phone back she said NO...had to wait 30 min for the cops to come so I can get it back? At one point she was holding it by the edge I attempted to grab my phone. Now she's claiming I assaulted her, and she has a bruise. I didn't touch her, none of this is on the initial police report, but I received a summons for assault charges. Im freaking out, could anyone make an assault claim just like that? What is going to happen, could I get fined, placed in jail etc? | What is going to happen, could I get fined, placed in jail etc? Your summons should have explained the specific violation you're being charged with, and you could look up the relevant sections of the law. Assault is defined in Chapter 12 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. There are several types, and again, your summons should explain which one you are being charged with. My guess is it will probably be "simple assault", paragraph (a) (right at the beginning). This is defined as a "disorderly persons offense". Upon conviction, a disorderly persons offense is punishable in New Jersey by a term of up to 90 days in jail and probation, (section 2C:43-2 (b) (2)), and a fine of up to $1000 (section 2C:43-3 (c)). This represents the maximum. I do not know what kind of sentence is actually likely. It could depend on common practice in the state, the prosecutor's opinion of the severity of the crime, and the judge's discretion. A lawyer would be best qualified to help you find out how to contest the charge, or to receive a lesser sentence if convicted. | Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office. | Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice. | If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent? | The important question is: was the £200 a fine (which is paid to the state) or compensation (which is paid to you)? Assuming it was a fine He doesn't (at the moment) owe you anything. However you can sue him for damages. Usually a claim for damages is time-barred after six years (and it is now seven years). However you weren't able to sue him yourself until you were 18, so you may have a couple of years left. However the clock may have started ticking immediately after the attack, on the grounds your parents or guardians could have sued. Talk to a solictor about this possibility; they should give you a free 30 minute consultation, and would probably take a case on a contigency fee (no-win no-fee) basis if it has any chance. In principle, you could have applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation - but you are too late for that; you have to apply within two years (there are some exceptions, but none seem to apply to you). Assuming it was compensation He owes you £200. Now you need to enforce that payment - and again, the problem may be the six year clock. You will definitely need to talk to a lawyer about that. My gut feeling is that the £200 was probably a fine rather than compensation. | It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told). | You are completely in the wrong. It is against the law to operate a motor vehicle without a license. It is against the law to have a motor vehicle that is not insured. It is against the law to violate the conditions of your probation which almost certainly provide that you are not allowed to operate a motor vehicle until your license is reinstated and you have insurance in force. Your personal belief that you didn't break the law is not a valid reason not to pay a fine on a ticket that is ratified by a court. The cop was right when he told you that you were crazy. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. |
Why are emergency exits that don't immediately open legal? I was at Costco today and saw an emergency exit that looked like this: Why would an emergency exit legally be able to have a delay before opening? Being hurt in 15 seconds is very possible in an emergency situation (such as an earthquake causing pieces of the ceiling to fall, possibly blocking the exit while it's opening). | Washington's building codes can be found at https://apps.des.wa.gov/sbcc/Page.aspx?nid=14. They have adopted the 2015 International Fire Code (IFC) (with amendments that aren't relevant here). IFC Chapter 10 discussess "Means of Egress". (Sorry for the slightly messed up formatting.) A Costco store seems to be a Group M building under Section 202. The doors you describe are referred to as "delayed egress locking systems" and are explicitly allowed, with the maximum delay specified as 15 seconds: [BE]1010.1.9.7 Delayed egress. Delayed egress locking systems, shall be permitted to be installed on doors serving any occupancy except Group A, E and H in buildings that are equipped throughout with an automatic sprinkler system in accordance with [217]Section 903.3.1.1 or an approved automatic smoke or heat detection system installed in accordance with [218]Section 907. The locking system shall be installed and operated in accordance with all of the following: 1. 1.The delay electronics of the delayed egress locking system shall deactivate upon actuation of the automatic sprinkler system or automatic fire detection system, allowing immediate, free egress. 2. 2.The delay electronics of the delayed egress locking system shall deactivate upon loss of power controlling the lock or lock mechanism, allowing immediate free egress. 3. 3.The delayed egress locking system shall have the capability of being deactivated at the fire command center and other approved locations. 4. 4.An attempt to egress shall initiate an irreversible process that shall allow such egress in not more than 15 seconds when a physical effort to exit is applied to the egress side door hardware for not more than 3 seconds. Initiation of the irreversible process shall activate an audible signal in the vicinity of the door. Once the delay electronics have been deactivated, rearming the delay electronics shall be by manual means only. Exception: Where approved, a delay of not more than 30 seconds is permitted on a delayed egress door. 5. 5.The egress path from any point shall not pass through more than one delayed egress locking system. Exception: In Group I-2 or I-3 occupancies, the egress path from any point in the building shall not pass through more than two delayed egress locking systems provided the combined delay does not exceed 30 seconds. 6. 6.A sign shall be provided on the door and shall be located above and within 12 inches (305 mm) of the door exit hardware: 1. 6.1. For doors that swing in the direction of egress, the sign shall read: PUSH UNTIL ALARM SOUNDS. DOOR CAN BE OPENED IN 15 [30] SECONDS. 2. 6.2. For doors that swing in the opposite direction of egress, the sign shall read: PULL UNTIL ALARM SOUNDS. DOOR CAN BE OPENED IN 15 [30] SECONDS. 3. 6.3 The sign shall comply with the visual character requirements in [219]ICC A117.1. Exception: Where approved, in Group I occupancies, the installation of a sign is not required where care recipients who, because of clinical needs, require restraint or containment as part of the function of the treatment area. 7. 7.Emergency lighting shall be provided on the egress side of the door. 8. 8.The delayed egress locking system units shall be listed in accordance with [220]UL 294. The rationale, presumably, is a compromise between safety of occupants (so that people can get out without excessive delay) and security of goods (to hinder people trying to steal goods and run away). I'll also point out that the delay feature is required to deactivate under certain circumstances. If your hypothetical earthquake caused the sprinkler or fire detection systems to activate, or it caused the power to fail, the door could be opened immediately. If Washington's legislators thought this provision was a bad idea, they could certainly create an amendment that would apply within Washington. It seems they have not seen fit to do so. | The key statutory tool is §14-303 of Title 14. Having previously declared a state of emergency, (b) After proclaiming a state of emergency, the Governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, or regulations that the Governor considers necessary to protect life and property or calculated effectively to control and terminate the public emergency in the emergency area, including orders, rules, or regulations to: ... (2) designate specific zones in the emergency area in which the occupancy and use of buildings and vehicles may be controlled; (3) control the movement of individuals or vehicles into, in, or from the designated zones; (4) control places of amusement and places of assembly; | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. | How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management. | Providing the antenna was installed in accordance with the law it's hard to see what basis they could either void their lease or seek damages. The antenna poses no risk to health (non-ionising RF radiation is harmless) and you have no rights in any view it may be blocking there is no damage. The only thing that I can see is if there was misrepresentation at the time the lease was formed. That is, the developer knew that there was going to be an antenna and specifically said there wouldn't be. This falls flat if a) they never mentioned antennas or b) the decision to install it was made after the lease was formed. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of "breaking" Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage | Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes. |
Why aren't all people with warrants arrested immediately? I've been watching a lot of episodes of the TV series Cops lately. A common scenario in this show is that when the police catch somebody who ran from them and ask why they ran they get the answer that the person in question had a warrant on him/her. If somebody has a warrant on them, can't the police just go to their house and pick them up already? Or are all these people homeless/hiding from the law? | Seeking out every person with a warrant would take more staff-time and resources than many areas can afford. As such, only the most serious warrants are actively sought out. Others are either passively tracked (officers have a description or image, so that during normal duties, they would recognise such persons) or only heeded if a check of a person already detained shows one (of the warrant is very minor). As well as this, many of the people with "mid-range" warrants will make efforts to avoid police, such as by moving frequently; not reporting address details; staying with various friends or family, at their homes or businesses; being mobile as much as possible in public areas where few law enforcement personnel are likely to be present, let alone likely to recognise them as subject to outstanding warrants. | I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen. | Revised for clarity in light of comments State and local police can arrest anyone who they have probable cause to believe is breaking state or local law. Like all LEOs, Federal LEOs can break some state and local laws while enforcing Federal law. When they grab someone off the street and hold them in a cell, they are detaining them, not kidnapping them, and so on. However, to avoid arrest, the Feds have to identify themselves. That's because state and local LEO who know they are dealing with Feds on federal business no longer have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed. State and local police can arrest Federal LEOs who they: a) have probable cause to believe are breaking state or local; and, b) have no reason to believe are Feds enforcing Federal law. In other words: Any Fed who refuses to identify herself to a local LEO can be arrested if there is probable cause. State and local police cannot, however, arrest Federal LEOs just because they are not wearing insignias. That is because: a) there are no federal statutes requiring federal LEOs to identify themselves; b) the Supremacy Clause says federal law takes precedence over state and local law that conflict with it; c) at least in Portland, the feds were not operating under any sort of formal agreement with Portland or Oregon officials that required them to have identification. While it is hard to prove a negative, the question of whether Federal LEOs are required to identify themselves has been looked at recently by reputable sources. They all agree there is no such law. For example, the answer from Lawfare: Broadly speaking, law enforcement officers do not have a legal duty to disclose either their identities or their agencies of affiliation, even if asked directly. Certain municipalities require police officers to identify themselves if asked, but there is currently no federal statute requiring officer disclosure of such information. The article points out that the two main types of cases involving police identifying themselves really don't apply: police who are working undercover, notably in sting operations, and police searching and seizing property. They go on to point out: Separate from the question of federal law, several states have adopted laws and regulations requiring law enforcement to identify themselves. For example, under New York City’s Right to Know Act, a broad set of police reforms that went into effect in October 2018, officers must tell civilians at the start of some interactions “their name, rank, command, and shield number.” (Also, many departments have policies that generally require officers to identify themselves, although with exceptions. You can see examples of the policies here.) Again, these local laws do not apply to Feds because of the Supremacy Clause. NOTE: As several of the news stories note, the lack of identification will make it very hard to hold Federal LEOs accountable for their actions. Accountability requires identity. | Can the police seize your phone without a warrant UK? YES An arrest on suspicion of rape (an indictable offence) triggers two powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) to search premises for evidence without a warrant. Which power depends on where the arrest was made: s.32(2)(b) PACE: if the offence for which he has been arrested is an indictable offence, to enter and search any premises in which he was when arrested or immediately before he was arrested for evidence relating to the offence. Note that s.32(2)(b) does not have the power of seizure attached, but the officer can use the "General Power of Seizures" at s.19 PACE s.18 PACE: (1) ... a constable may enter and search any premises occupied or controlled by a person who is under arrest for an indictable offence, if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is on the premises evidence... (2) A constable may seize and retain anything for which he may search under subsection (1) above. IF... the phone is not on the suspect at the time of the arrest (say the police arrest the suspect in their home) but in another room on the shelf - either s.32(2)(b) or s.18 would apply IF... being outside at the time - s.32(2)(b) possibly if he had just left, s.18 otherwise. | At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances). | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | I'm assuming you are talking about "warrants in debt" and not arrest warrants. A warrant in debt is that the creditor has filed with a court for the repayment of a debt. The court will then issue a judgement (in default if you do not appear) either for the creditor or the debtor. After that, the creditor can then (if they win) seek things such as garnishment to repay the debt. Now in the UK, they have accepted the "Electronic Communications Act of 2000" which means that a Qualified Electronic Signature (QES) is as legally binding as a "wet ink" signature. Non-QES signatures may also be binding, but that requires additional evidence. Let's take an example of a small personal loan. Let's say you apply electronically for a loan of X amount. The loan is approved and the money is transferred into your bank account electronically. You spend the money but make no attempt to repay the loan. First the bank will make attempts to collect the debt via normal means, then they may sell the debt to a debt collector. The debt collector will apply for a "warrant in debt" to take you to court for the amount (possibly with fees). If you do not appear, a default judgement will be applied to you. If you signed the loan application with a QES compliant system, that signature is all the debt collector will need to show that you accepted the debt and the repayment terms. If you did not sign with a QES system, they can still submit the application but they may have to prove other things, like: Your intent to obtain money for some purpose Your action in keeping/spending the money No action on your part to return or rectify the transfer Any payments you may have made towards the loan (shows that you acknowledge the loan and terms) So no, as of at least 2000 most countries accept some type of electronic signature to be legally binding. An entirely different topic would be if the debt is legal without the paperwork. Many debt collection agencies buy debt in bulk that may not be much more than an Excel sheet with the amounts and names/addresses and other personal information. A lot of times the entire debt "paper trail" is not transferred with these debt purchases so a debt collector may have purchased $10 million worth of debt for $50,000 that is nothing more than an Excel sheet. I believe in the US this has held up, but I'm not sure about the UK/rest of the world. What the YouTube people may be saying is that they don't have anything regarding the debt as far as binding paperwork goes. That may be something completely different. | I can't prove a negative, but it seems quite clear from my research that providing name and badge number is policy, not law. i.e. Many departments have a policy that their officers will provide name and badge number on request, but the punishment for failure to do so would be at the employment level not the legal level. This site has a fairly good selection of various police department policies I will note that Massachusetts appears to be an exception as mentioned by jimsug in his comment to another answer, they do require police to carry and show ID upon legal request (I did not look up what a "legal request" is) |
Do I need permission to publish a FOI response in a blog post or open letter? I recently submitted a FOI request to my local council, and had a response. Part of the response stated the following: You are free to use this information for your own use, including for non-commercial research purposes. It may also be used for the purposes of news reporting. Any other type of re-use, for example publishing the information, issuing copies to the public or marketing, will require our permission as copyright holder. If you intend to re-use this information in this manner you must apply to us. I was hoping to use the information in the response as part of a petition to the local authorities to make a change. I was planning to do this by writing an open letter on my blog. Would I need to ask them for permission, or would it be covered under one of "own use", "non-commercial research" or "news reporting"? | They are claiming copyright protection so you cannot copy it unless fair dealing exemptions apply. However, there is no copyright in facts - only in they way facts are presented. If you present them in a different way ... | The easy part is whether there is copyright protection: yes. It does not matter whether the quotes are in a newspaper, a personal blog, a hardbound book, or on TV; it doesn't matter if the interviewee is right-wing or left-wing or wingless. An interview is protected by copyright. The question is, who holds that right, and in what exact manner? The interview could be a collaborative work; it could be a joint work; it could be the property of the interviewer. In Taggart v. WMAQ, the court points out that for a work to be protected (sect. 101 of the copyright act), it must be ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression ... or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. which interviews are not (assuming the answers were not pre-written). See also Falwell v. Penthouse. The interviewer would own copyright to the compilation of quotes, see for example Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington Regardless of who owns the copyright in each of the quoted passages in the article, there can be no doubt that Quinto owns the copyright in his compilation of the quotations As to ownership of the quotes themselves, Suid v. Newsweek Magazine observes that The author of a factual work may not, without an assignment of copyright, claim copyright in statements made by others and reported in the work since the author may not claim originality as to those statements and Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 likewise states that an author may not claim copyright in statements made by others and reported verbatim in the author's work What we get from this is that the interviewee cannot claim infringement by the interviewer (they could however claim some form of breach of contract, depending on what the parties agreed to in carrying out the interview), that the interviewer does own copyright of the interview, but not the specific quotes from the interviewee. This leaves unanswered a core question: can an interviewee claim control over their quotes and deny permission to reproduce the quotes? An alternative would be that the quotes are "data" which are in the public domain. I find the latter outcome extremely unlikely, but at any rate, I know of no case law on point. | united-states Is a personal text (like a diary), submitted without the consent of the author, admissible evidence? Usually, it is admissible evidence. There is no legal right to keep your diary private. Production of a diary may be compelled by subpoena and admitted into evidence subject only to general considerations regarding whether particular entries in the diary are inadmissible for some other reason (e.g. lack of relevance, they recite the contents of an otherwise privileged discussion, they contain hearsay, they recite the terms of a settlement offer, the recite inadmissible prior act evidence, etc.). If the diary revealed information that could place the diarist at risk of criminal prosecution, the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could arguably be claimed even in a civil case, but at the risk of an adverse inference to be drawn from that decision in civil matters. I haven't ever seen how that issue is resolved legally. | Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright. | The GDPR doesn't generally distinguish public from non-public personal data. If you have a good reason to contact the professor, do send them an email. GDPR does not prevent this. If you're sending this email for “purely personal or household purposes”, then GDPR doesn't apply anyway. There are rules in the ePrivacy Directive against unsolicited emails, but these specifically relate to emails for direct marketing purposes. A company is not allowed to send out spam marketing, regardless of whether they obtained the email address from a public data source. Companies can send email marketing to their own existing customers, or to people who have given consent. Consent is defined in a fairly restrictive way (as a specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes), so that mere publication of an email address cannot be interpreted as consent to receive marketing from a particular company. | If the website's processing of your personal data is within the scope of the GDPR, then you have a qualified right to request the erasure of your personal data. It is relevant whether: the website operates within the EU; the website is operated by a company established in an EU country; the website aims to sell goods or services to people in the EU; or the website is routinely processing the personal data of people in the EU (including non-citizens). Furthermore, it is relevant whether your posts: contain one or more identifiers from which you could be personally identified, directly or indirectly, including by only the administrators or owners of the website; and by their content, directly reveal information relating to you. For example, let's say you posted on a forum saying that "I am a keen supporter of socialism", and your personal email address was used to sign up to the website, then you would have revealed information about your political beliefs, which by reference to a username, the website owners could use to uniquely identify you by your email address. You would not necessarily have to have used your name. If, for example, you posted something factual, like, "The Porsche 911 GT2 RS MR recorded the fastest lap time for a road-legal sports car on the Nürburgring," then it is only personal as long as it is associated with an identifier through which you could be identified. As such, the removal of the relationship could easily anonymise the post. A data controller has an obligation to provide means by which the data subject can exercise the rights guaranteed under Chapter 3 of the GDPR. Article 17 grants the right to "erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay" where the grounds under Art. 17 lit. 1 (a) to (f) are met. It may be relevant what the lawful basis of processing personal data was in the first place, such as in determining whether you can withdraw consent (i.e. you cannot withdraw consent if consent was not given), or in determining whether there is a right to object under Article 21 lit. 1. Derogations permissible under local implementing laws may provide for other exemptions or requirements to the right to erasure, so it is also important to determine the country of jurisdiction. | What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states, copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright. | All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests. |
"no logs" website in eu - is it illegal? As title says, am I obligated as EU citizen / owner of website hosted in EU to log some data about users which would then make them identifiable? What if I do not collect any data about users of my website, can it be "illegal" in some regions, and could I get trouble for it as website owner/admin? What if I get request from police or other government agency to disclose data about my users / certain user and tell them I don't have anything? | There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement. | Most of the question has nothing to do with the law, it's about technical how-to or how-does, which should be asked in Information Security SE. There are two possible legal questions: is it legal to break into a computer system and take a database of passwords, and it is legal to acquire such a database obtained by someone else. As should be known in the US, per 18 USC 1030, breaking into a computer is illegal in the US. Given that, it is extremely unlikely that Google illegally breaks into other computer systems to obtain passwords. The aforementioned law criminalizes accessing computers without authorization, not (just) "taking" stuff from computers without authorization. The law does not criminalize receipt of illegally obtained material. Passwords are not protected by copyright. If Google were to induce someone to break into a computer system to get passwords, that would be legally actionable, however there is no law penalizing innocent receipt of illegally-obtained passwords (insofar as they are not protected by copyright). It is not illegal to access the dark web, at least in the US (probably it is illegal in Saudi Arabia). Using stuff gotten from the dark web can easily be illegal (e.g. logging in to someone's bank account, or forging a passport). There are many services which monitor the dark web and report breaches, which is totally legal. | No. As long as you don't see and have no means to access this data, but it is under the control of the user at all times, you are neither the controller or the processor of this personal data, and the GDPR does not apply to you. | Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing. | Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive. | This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta. | Of course it is illegal. You are attempting to access somebody's data without their knowledge and certainly without their consent. In the U.K. it is a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Serious Crimes Act 2015. The clue here should be in the term Serious Crimes. The Human Rights Act, and indeed the ECHR, should never come into it unless it was state sponsored or corporate spying. And even then certain states have given themselves Orwellian totalitarian authority to do as they please. | Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people. |
Bypassing website's paywall by modifying HTTP request headers Recently I see some debates about bypassing paywalls by modifying browser's HTTP request as stated on ghack. Most paywalled websites allow users to read a certain number of free articles before blocking them outside of the paywall. They do it by saving a record in browser's cookies or by checking the request referrer to identify whether the user exceeds his / hers daily reading limit. There's some browser extensions that clears the browser cookies and modify the request referrer before user send out a HTTP request. By this way they can gain access to unlimited articles since it's harder for websites to identify them. Are making or spreading these kind of extensions illegal? How about the users that use the extension? | This is relatively uncharted legal territory, so until multiple cases establish some sort of precedent, we can only guess. I know of no legal requirement that a Browser or User has to submit cookies or referrer data or other meta-information accurately. In that regard, a user is unlikely to be prosecuted just for submitting HTTP headers. It is likely closely related to Free Speech issues. The DMCA spells out that it is illegal to circumvent copyright protection measures. While this law is typically used to make it illegal to copy DVDs, video-games or streaming movies, it is possible that the "3-free articles" policy could be interpreted as a copyright protection mechanism, and defeating it by changing HTTP headers is a circumvention. A good summary is here. A specific site's TOS (Terms of Service) probably contains language that spells out it is a violation to use the site in a manner other than as it is intended. This is a typical anti-hacking, anti-screen-scraping provision. Altering a browser session to circumvent their services is probably a violation of the license to access the site, and may open a user to a civil lawsuit for damages or even criminal hacking charges (the details of which are different state-to-state) | This would probably fall under the "legitimate interest" basis. However the service provider would need to show that the processing they did was aimed at this objective and in accordance with the data protection principles, particularly of data minimisation and storage. They should consider what data they want to extract from the detailed logs, whether the logs can be anonymised, how long they need to keep them, and whether they can achieve their objectives by storing aggregate data (e.g. percentage of people who clicked this link when viewing this page) rather than individual clicks and key presses. They should also consider whether the logs might reveal special category data (e.g. health, sexuality, religion, politics). This can happen if, for instance, the site contains information about a particular disease; people who read it are likely to have that disease or know someone who does. | I'm only going to consider US perspectives, which may or may not answer your question entirely. Also, I'm not going to address the guesses in other answers because, and except to say, they don't appear to be based in law, but rather (mis)understandings of law. 17 U.S. Code § 512 provides protections for service providers when providing content, online. This expressly includes caching. In Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2012) at 39, the Court held that to exclude these functions from the safe harbor would remove protections for service providers under subsection (c). The answer, however, lies in Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006), in footnote 17, at 852: Local caching by the browsers of individual users is noncommercial, transformative, and no more than necessary to achieve the objectives of decreasing network latency and minimizing unnecessary bandwidth usage (essential to the internet). It has a minimal impact on the potential market for the original work, especially given that most users would not be able to find their own local browser cache, let alone locate a specific cached copy of a particular image. That local browser caching is fair use is supported by a recent decision holding that Google's Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searches own cache constitutes fair use. The case referred to is Field v. Google, Inc, 412 F.Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). Although the Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc. was overturned on appeal - Google was permitted to utilise thumbnails in their search pages - and the above is merely obiter, it is the closest to a ruling on browser caching I have been able to find. In short: Google's caching has been found to be fair use. It is unlikely that your local cache would not, as it is generally done automatically. | I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server. | According to the current version of the TOS: You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. This explicitly says you own your content, although Medium has some rights to do some things. And they won't sell it without permission, so unless Medium itself is publishing this book, it would seem to be copyright infringement. (Of course, I don't know what the TOS said when you originally wrote the article.) If what was copied was not copyrightable (like a quote from the Constitution, or a simple uncreative graph of something obvious) then it wouldn't be infringement. But your article was probably more than that. | Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on. | It is legal, and good policy, because the later explanation could create conflicting policies and notions as to what the "agreement" is. The TOS is probably created by a lawyer who interviewed the website owner to figure out what they wanted, then wrote legal language to do that. If you ask tech support how to interpret the TOS, you probably are not getting a legally-correct statement (assuming that the tech support guy isn't also a lawyer). Rather than take a risk that a customer would defend their action in court by arguing "they said I could!", the website may elect to not make promises that they don't want to keep. Instead, if you want to understand the agreement, you hire your own lawyer, then propose a hypothetical action, to see how the law interprets the language of the agreement. For example "can I rent out my Netflix password so that other people can use it?". The lawyer would then read the TOS and relevant cases law, and would advise you whether this is allowed under the TOS (it is not). Alternatively, you could read up on relevant aspects of the law and figure it out yourself. Website TOS is basically driven by copyright law, the technical necessity of some kind of automatic copying in order to use a web page, and the legal requirement that you can't copy without permission of the copyright holder. The TOS is the set of conditions that you must satisfy in order to be permitted to use the site. So many questions reduce to issues of copyright law and permission to copy *can you legally "permit" the copying of materials you upload?). | Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this. |
Purchase of alcohol with a minor present Hello people who know a lot more about alcohol laws than me, So a general gist of my question is, why is it legal for certain stores to deny the sale of alcohol to me (who is over 21) with a minor present (20 year old). So some background information on this, on my 21st birthday I went to Sam's club with some friends to buy alcohol for my birthday party, I heard from other people that they would deny sale if not everyone in your party at checkout is over 21, so to avoid that hassle I had my friends just walk right past the checkout line and I purchased it by myself. Yesterday afternoon I went to a Sam's Club near my place with one of my roommates (she is 20 years old). We were doing some apartment shopping for groceries and misc things for our place, and on the way out I was asked by my parents over the phone to pick up a few bottles of wine for dinner that night. Not thinking to much about it I grabbed a few bottles and threw it in my cart that was piled high with items. Once we shopped for everything on the list, we went to checkout, piled everything on the conveyor belt and had the sales associate scan it all. While I was standing there with my membership card and credit card and my roommate was loading stuff back into the cart, the associate got to the wine bottles and asked for the ID's of both myself AND my roommate for the sale of the alcohol. I argued saying that I was buying the alcohol for personal use not to give to the minor, and she called over her manager who confirmed what she said. That they have to ID everyone at the checkout lane and ensure that they are all over 21. Clearly my roommate couldn't meet that so they took the wine out and we continued our purchase. Over this past weekend, I went to a Ralph's with my girlfriend (20 years old and she wasn't going to drink) and purchased some beer and mike's hard lemonade. We had a few other things to pick up so she carried one of 24 packs of alcohol to the register while I carried the rest. She went in first, and set the alcohol down and gave it the cashier to scan, and walked right on past to pick it up at the other end. I dropped off my stuff and after that they asked for my ID (which I gave without an issue) and I paid for it all and left. No hassle, no extra questions, nothing else. I am under the assumption that stores "reserve the right to refuse service to anyone", but how does the denial of sale of alcohol work? Is this Sam's Club policy? Is it a California law? Is it a city/county law? Some questions(plus the ones right above) that I would like answered if possible: Where is the law/rule that states you can't sell alcohol to a legal adult if a minor is present? Why was I able to purchase it at Ralph's without an issue? Was Ralph's the one in the wrong here for NOT denying the sale? If this law/policy does exist? What is the point of it if I can just make the minor wait outside, purchase it, and give it to them? When I was a kid my Dad purchased alcohol (beer) all the time at Wal-Mart, Ralphs, etc (not at Sam's Club as far as I can recall), and never had this issue. If a minor went with him and he wanted to purchase alcohol, would they deny him for the exact same reason they denied me? If they wouldn't have denied it to him why would they have denied it to me (profiling)? Is the purpose of this law/policy just to make it more difficult to give alcohol to minors? It doesn't change the fact that the person purchasing it is over 21 (and they accept the liabilities if they do end up giving it to a minor) and can just go next door and purchase alcohol there? I am not pissed that they denied the sale as I should've paid more attention like I did the first time, I was just rather annoyed that I had to drive to another alcohol selling location and pay more there. I am mainly curious as to why this happened. | I think this relates to individual stores interpretation of California's "ABC Laws": § 25658. Sale to and consumption by person under 21 years of age; Use by peace officers to apprehend sellers of alcoholic beverages to minors (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away any alcoholic beverage to any person under 21 years of age is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in Section 25667 or 25668, any person under 21 years of age who purchases any alcoholic beverage, or any person under 21 years of age who consumes any alcoholic beverage in any on-sale premises, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (c) Any person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing any alcoholic beverage for, or furnishing, giving, or giving away any alcoholic beverage to, a person under 21 years of age, and the person under 21 years of age thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The last part is the part that scares business owners. Some interpret it as "if they furnish alcohol to you (a person over 21) and have reasonable suspicion that the purchase will be given to the minor, the person furnishing the alcohol is guilty of a misdemeanor". This is absolutely true in the case of bar owners/bartenders. If they sell somebody a drink, even if that person is over 21, and that drink is then given to a minor, they can be (probably not successfully) held responsible in some form for any injury that person sustains or commits as a result of alcohol consumption. Some stores take this much more seriously (because a violation can mean the loss/suspension of the liquor license) than others, and it is at the stores discretion to deny the sale based on any suspicion, whether based in reality or not. | Two people exchanging goods or services on a commercial basis and then pretending it was two gifts is tax evasion. It's not a gift. It's a commercial sale that you lie about by 'putting' a different 'label' on it. Sometimes two people will give mutual gifts, e.g. if you come to my wedding: I give you dinner, you give me some kitchenware. Yet there's nothing commercial about it. So that's not income for either party. However, if you're talking about two businesses making sales to each other, that is very much income, regardless of what you badge it. | I assume that "in Oregon" means that the donor (transferor) and recipient (transferee) are both in Oregon, also that neither party happens to be a licensed gun dealer. You turn to ORS 166.435. The answer (reflecting the logic of the statute) is "No", with some exceptions. There are conditions (subsections 2 and 3) where it is allowed if certain restrictions are satisfied. But you don't have to abide by those restrictions if subsection 4 is the case. Apart from transfers to and from the government, you can freely transfer a firearm under subsection (4)c to a spouse, domestic partner, parent, stepparent, child, stepchild, sibling, grandparent, grandchild, aunt, uncle, first cousin, niece, nephew, or spouse or domestic partner any of the above. And under (4d), because of the death of firearm owner if "conducted or facilitated by a personal representative" (probate) or trustee as created in a will and transferee is one of those relatives. Not a friend, not a second cousin, not an ex-spouse, definitely not a stranger. Otherwise, you have to comply with subsection (2-3). That means, you do the transfer through a licensed dealer and you must request a background check (you do not have to ascertain that the check was done). Under federal law (Firearm Owners’ Protection Act of 1986), you tell the police, they check if you are precluded by law from gun ownership, then they forget that you asked, they don't keep a record of transfers. It is illegal for a minor to possess a firearm ([ORS 166.250])3, but there is no prohibition against a minor owning a firearm. There are also specific exemptions where a minor can possess a firearm (e.g. temporarily for hunting or target practice). | The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions. | tl;dr It seems like a bad idea. Massachusetts's statutes don't seem to expressly prohibit it—and I didn't find any Massachusetts cases where the registered agent's age was at issue. But registered agents have some fiduciary duties, and the agent has to have the capacity to receive all forms of legal process. Some possible roadblocks are: "minor" is a broad term that courts don't seem to have interpreted in the context of registered agents, and each form of legal process sets its own requirements. Background First, the term "minor" encompasses extremes: a 1 year old doesn't have the capacity to receive and forward legal process to the intended party, but a 16 year old might. Some jurisdictions recognize a "suitable age and discretion" rule, though it hasn't been extended to the context of registered agents. See, e.g., Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 4(e)(2)(B). Massachusetts isn't one of those jurisdictions. See Mass. R. Civ. Pro. 4(d)(1). In the broader law of agency, minors do have the capacity to serve as "agents"—though their ability to affect the legal relations of the principal is limited. For example, the enforceability of minors' contracts is an issue, and minors can't enter into durable powers of attorney or serve as trustees. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.04. The problems associated with appointing a minor as an agent in Massachusetts are longstanding. In Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 143 Mass. 95 (1886), a mother had her minor daughter enter into a contract of sale for alcohol for the mother's use. While the court recognized the daughter as the mother's agent, it still characterized the transaction as an illegal sale "to" a minor. In the case of a registered agent, the primary action Massachusetts expects of the agent is the receipt and forwarding of the principal's legal correspondence. Courts have found that this creates a fiduciary duty on the registered agent's part. See Int'l Envtl. Mgmt. v. United Corporate Servs., 858 F.3d 1121 (8th Cir. 2017). This makes sense because the service of process satisfies constitutional requirements embodied in the Due Process clause. So in predicting whether a court would extend the "suitable age and discretion" rule to registered agents (or even needs to), it would likely consider that the agent has fiduciary duties, albeit more limited than those of a typical trustee. Second, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156B § 49 governs corporations and requires that the agent be capable of receiving "all lawful processes in any action or proceeding". When the agent is an individual (as opposed to a company), that person must be a resident of Massachusetts and have a "business address in the commonwealth". Mass. Gen. Laws 156C § 5 governs the process for LLCs, and Mass Gen. Laws 156D § 15.07 details it for non-Massachusetts companies. Massachusetts's statutes don't expressly prohibit minors from serving as registered agents, but the agent must have the capacity to receive all forms of lawful process. Thus if some lawful process requires delivery to an adult, the minor wouldn't be capable of receiving it. | My thinking is that there was no meeting of the minds, thus no acceptance. ( I can see that shipping the goods implies acceptance, however I understand that acceptance implies a meeting of the minds - and there would have been subterfuge to modify the return page with the lower amount - thus at the moment of apparent acceptance there was no actual acceptance) I doubt you would have a case against the other party criminally, but quite possibly in a civil court. | The law doesn’t “defines a minor as a legal person below (some age)” It defines it as a natural person below (some age). | In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do. |
Filing a Federal Criminal (not Civil) Complaint I want to file a Federal criminal (not civil) complaint in California under... Conspiracy against rights - https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/241 Frauds and swindles - https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1341 I see that the Complainant files the form at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao091.pdf but it requires it judge to swear to it. Do I make an appointment with a Federal Judge? | I want to file a Federal criminal (not civil) complaint You can't. Only the US government can do that. https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case Individuals do not file criminal charges in U.S. district courts. A criminal proceeding is initiated by the government, usually through the U.S. attorney's office in coordination with a law enforcement agency. Allegations of criminal behavior should be brought to local police, the FBI, or other appropriate law enforcement agency. There is an analysis of the relevant law in the case of Smith v. Krieger, No. 09-1503 (10th Cir. 2010). In his second claim, [Smith] sought to prosecute crimes allegedly committed by the defendant judges against the United States. Mr. Smith claimed he had “inherent authority” to raise his first claim under “the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 51, ¶ 255. With respect to his second claim, he contended he was “authorized to prosecute crimes committed against the United States by virtue of his inherent authority as co-sovereign, pursuant to powers reserved under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and crimes committed against his person and/or property in particular.” [p.13-14] [...] Mr. Smith’s second claim fares no better than his first. Congress has by statute conferred the power to prosecute crimes in the name of the United States on the United States Attorney General and his delegates. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519. The long-standing view of the Supreme Court is that such power is exclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”) (emphasis added); id. at 694 (“Under the authority of Art. II, [§] 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. [§] 516.”); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) (“Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney . . . .”) (emphasis added). Therefore, as the district court concluded, Mr. Smith has no right to initiate a criminal prosecution in the name of the United States under the Ninth or Tenth Amendments, or otherwise. [p.19] Smith was fined $3000 for bringing this frivolous and "abusive" case (which included several other claims besides this one.) Also of note is the 1973 US Supreme Court case Linda R. S. v. Richard D.. Here, Linda R. S. took a slightly different route: in effect, she sought a court order requiring her local district attorney to prosecute Richard D. for a state crime. (Or rather, she sought to enjoin the district attorney from declining to prosecute him.) The Supreme Court ruled: The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). Although these cases arose in a somewhat different context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. | I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983. | Probable cause is not required to issue a subpoena. But, a recipient of a subpoena (or a party to a case in which a subpoena is issued, or a person whose records a subpoenaed), may file a motion to quash the subpoena in the court that issued it, before the information is disclosed pursuant to the subpoena. A claim that the subpoenaed material is privileged is always a legitimate reason to quash a subpoena. A subpoena can also be quashed on the grounds that the materials sought are unrelated to the matter for which it is issued, or that it is unduly burdensome in a manner unrelated to a legitimate interest in obtaining the information sought (this list of objections is not exhaustive). You can see an example of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum from a federal grand jury, together with the subpoena itself attached to the motion at the end of the linked file as an exhibit, at this link. The federal court rule governing subpoenas in federal criminal cases is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17. In federal court civil cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 applies. Short of actually quashing the subpoena, the court issuing it could also modify the obligation by imposing a protective order on the materials to be disclosed (e.g. trade secrets or private financial information). This would prevent the materials disclosed from being shared with people other than the recipient. Incidentally, the penalty for failing to respond to a subpoena is for the person to whom it is directed to hold the person in contempt of court, punishable by incarceration or a fine (often a fixed amount per day). Often, if testimony is part of what is required, a warrant for the arrest of the person who fails to appear is summarily issued by the court. Footnote regarding terminology Strictly speaking, the word "subpoena" unmodified, refers to a subpoena directing the person to whom it is addressed to testify under oath at a certain place and time, sometimes a grand jury, sometimes a trial in a court, sometimes a deposition, sometimes an arbitration, and sometimes an interview with a government official. When a subpoena is asking for the turnover of records or things or data it is strictly speaking called a "subpoena duces tecum" (from the Latin duces tecum, meaning "you shall bring with you"). Historically, in response to the subpoena duces tecum, the custodian of the records would appear personally at a deposition or grand jury proceeding or trial with the records or things and would testify under oath briefly at that time to authenticate them. These days, the federal rules of evidence and most state rules of evidence provide that the custodian of records can sign an affidavit, or a declaration (i.e. a statement made under penalty of perjury which is not notarized), regarding the authenticity of the records (and their status as "business records" or "public records" where appropriate). Then, this affidavit or declaration is delivered along with the records by a courier or mail, in lieu of actually providing live testimony regarding the authenticity and business records status of the records. Delivery of documents by courier or mail or electronically, accompanied by an affidavit or declaration is what is usually done these days, except in exceptional cases where the authenticity and/or business records status of the records is genuinely in dispute and complicated in some way. For example, in person testimony of the custodian of records might be required in a case where there are allegations of forgery of documents or that digital files were hacked. | If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't "tipped off" by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for "good cause." Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers. | I don't know the situation in L.A., but most courthouses I've dealt with will allow you to just pay the fine online and be done with it. Try their website or call the clerk's office to get more information. | I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case. | You would think so, but no While at first glance, President Trump sending a staff member to testify under oath in his place (to nullify any personal risk of perjury?) appears to epitomize the concept of "hearsay"-- a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement --there are some subtle but important distinctions and exceptions in play. I'm going to list them off in increasing order of relevance. FOIA penalties are civil, not criminal The official DOJ website lists off the penalties for Freedom of Information Act violations: The court may award reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs against the government when the complainant substantially prevails. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(E). Action Against Individual Employees: Sanctions may be taken against individual agency employees who are found to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously in improperly withholding records. Additionally, the court must award attorney fees and other litigation costs against the government. When the statutory requirements are found by the Court to have been met, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) must promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against the office or employee who is primarily responsible for the withholding. The MSPB, after investigating and considering the evidence, submits its findings and recommendations to the agency concerned which then is required to take the corrective action recommended by the Board. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(F). Additionally, there now exists independent jurisdiction for such MSPB investigations under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1206(e)(1) (1982). Failure to comply with a court order to produce the records in question may also result in punishment for contempt for the responsible employee. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(G). So the strongest penalty against any individual government official who violated FOIA would be losing their job, or civil contempt of court. In principle the prohibition against hearsay applies equally to civil cases as criminal ones; in practice, because the stakes are lower, courts may take a somewhat looser attitude towards hearsay in civil cases than they would in a similar criminal case. Rule 807(a), "Residual Exceptions" Rule 807(a) gives courts large latitude to determine whether or not to admit hearsay evidence: (a) In General. Under the following conditions, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not admissible under a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness–after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence, if any, corroborating the statement; and (2) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts. In this situation, the presiding judge, Reggie Walton of the D.C. District Court, clarified what he would consider "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness": U.S. District Court Judge Reggie Walton issued the rare order to the White House last week after expressing dissatisfaction with a previous explanation submitted by the Justice Department’s top career official, Associate Deputy Attorney General Bradley Weinsheimer. Weinsheimer said he had checked with an unidentified official in the White House counsel’s office and determined that no new declassification was triggered by Trump’s latest tweets. However, Walton said given Trump’s suggestions of a rogue element undercutting his orders, some assurance directly from the president or someone who had spoken to the president was necessary. As Meadows had, one presumes, literally spoken to the president, this satisfied the presiding judge's own explicit standard of "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness" for when hearsay may be admitted into evidence. Rule 807(a)(2) is also relevant here, in its caveat that hearsay may be accepted into evidence when it is "more probative...than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts". Arguably, forcing the POTUS to neglect his duties running the country and "ending the pandemic" long enough to testify in what is, in many ways, a run-of-the-mill FOIA case, would take too much effort to be "reasonable". Which brings me to the next point: Rule 804(a)(1) and Rule 804(b)(5), "Unavailability of the Declarant" Rule 804(a)(1) discusses a specific exception to the hearsay rule when the declarant can't or won't personally testify: (a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant: (1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilege applies As POTUS, it makes sense that Trump would have some degree of privilege or immunity from being deposed. If a sitting President could be dragged into court at will over any government litigation, no matter how mundane, to personally testify, it would be impossible to perform the functions of their office. Think about all of the live issues winding their way through the courts right now that Trump has tweeted about. Now, imagine the demands on his time if he was dragged into court to testify regarding every single one: "Sorry Angela Merkel, I have to cancel our international summit this year, I'm giving a live deposition in 50 different court cases in the next three weeks and I don't have time to do 'foreign policy' right now. Hope no new World Wars break out! Good luck!" Of necessity, a POTUS has to be permitted to delegate 99.9% of legal representation on matters of public policy to other Executive Branch officials, when it comes to who actually needs to be physically present in court. And since he is privileged from personally testifying, that means exception 804(b)(5) applies: (b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: .... (5) [Other Exceptions .] [Transferred to Rule 807.] We discussed how Rule 807 applies in this circumstance up above. But I want to circle back to the idea that the President has to be able to delegate statements of official policy to other authorized government representatives, such as Meadows, because of the clinching exception: Rule 803(8)(A)(i): Public records of governmental policy aren't excluded by the hearsay rule Rule 803(8)(A)(i) tells us that: statements of public policy (such as, whether the government is going to declassify, or has already declassified, every document relating to the Russia investigation, specifically including Mueller report and FBI interview redactions) made by public offices or their official representatives (such as the POTUS's chief of staff, authorized to speak on behalf of the POTUS, clarifying the Executive Branch's stance on declassification) are not excluded by the hearsay rule: The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: .... (8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the office’s activities This makes sense given the purpose of the rule against hearsay. It's supposed to prevent innuendo and rumor from sneaking into the factual record when the facts are in dispute: "I heard the defendant's mom say the defendant said he did it," related by the defendant's mom's bingo buddy, would deservedly raise some eyebrows around the bingo table, but isn't the kind of solid evidence an impartial trial requires. Statements of public policy and government action by public officials, on the other hand, have a lot more authority and credibility than what a friend of a friend of the defendant heard the friend say the defendant said. Meadows isn't (just) some random golf buddy of the President who overheard what the President was thinking when he made these tweets; he's the President's official delegate to the court, conveying the Executive Branch's official position on declassification. Such official statements are ordinarily presumed maximally trustworthy and reliable, at least partly for logistical reasons. Similar to how we can't ask Trump to cancel all the COVID task force meetings to clear his schedule and testify about some tweets, we can't drag every government officer who makes an out-of-court official public statement or record into court to certify it--at least, not every single time. The judicial branch of the government takes the word of other branches of the government mostly at face value†, and does not consider public records or statements in an official capacity as "hearsay" to be excluded from evidence. So the TL;DR version is: No, Meadows coming into court to convey this statement on behalf of his boss would not be excluded by the hearsay rule. †Significantly, statements or records regarding policy might be excluded as hearsay, per 803(8)(B), if the opposition demonstrates that the statement or record is somehow fishy or unreliable: "(B) the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness." But in this instance, in order to demonstrate a "lack of trustworthiness", the plaintiffs in the case--BuzzFeed, CNN, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center--would have to show that the government was actually declassifying and unredacting all material related to the Russia investigation, contrary to what Meadows claimed in court. Since the government is not actually doing this, the President's social media rants notwithstanding, the plaintiffs would be unlikely to prevail if they tried to use 803(8)(B) to get Meadows' testimony excluded as hearsay. | This is covered by Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 11, which says that Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement). The judge is not required to include a disclaimer (like "other than the plea deal itself") in interviewing the defendant. By asking the question in an unqualified way, the judge will decide whether there were promises made that are outside the scope of the plea bargain. |
Is British Columbia violating the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic by requiring foreign drivers to exchange their license within three months? According to the 1949 Geneva Convention citizens of any country that signed the agreement are able to drive in any other country for up to one year with an international driving permit: No Contracting State shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding one year. (Article 1, paragraph 2) ... Each Contracting State shall allow any driver admitted to its territory who fulfils the conditions which are set out in Annex 8 and who holds a valid driving permit issued to him, after he has given proof of his competence, by the competent authority of another Contracting State or subdivision thereof, or by an Association duly empowered by such authority, to drive on its roads without further examination motor vehicles of the category or categories defined in Annexes 9 and 10 for which the permit has been issued. (Article 24, paragraph 1) The only requirement as set out in Annex 8 is... The minimum age for driving a motor vehicle under the conditions set out in Article 24 of the Convention shall be eighteen years. But at the same time British Columbia (which is a member state of Canada, which is a party to the convention) requires foreign drivers to exchange their licenses within three months of becoming a resident: a person who has become ordinarily resident in British Columbia and who has a validly issued and subsisting driver’s or operator’s licence or permit issued according to the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she was most recently ordinarily resident, for 90 days after he or she became ordinarily resident in British Columbia; Isn't there a conflict between domestic and international law in this situation? Or am I misunderstanding the 1949 Geneva Convention? | My own answer to the question is yes, but not directly. As with many other laws it would take a court ruling to definitively spell out how international agreements are applicable to a given situation. Unfortunately it doesn't seem that such a court ruling was ever produced so far: Google Scholar fails to list any US court cases relevant to the Convention on Road Traffic. The only somewhat relevant case is Busby v. State in which the court rules that one cannot drive in Alaska with an IDP after having been previously restricted from driving in Alaska. The court does stress out that: The Convention does forbid a signatory country (or subsidiary state) from imposing or enforcing license revocations in a manner that discriminates against residents of other signatory countries. But Busby does not claim that he was the victim of such discrimination. Busby's license was revoked for conduct that would have led to license revocation if committed by an Alaska resident. (Indeed, Busby's license was revoked while he was an Alaska resident.) And Busby does not claim that he was singled out for prosecution because he was a resident of a foreign country—i.e., that the State would not have charged him with the offense of driving with a revoked license if he had still been an Alaska resident. This could possibly mean that the court believes that the Convention only applies to foreign residents, but its not spelled out specifically. Searching for Canadian court cases likewise doesn't turn up anything useful. The only relevant case is R. v. Lawend where the person in question was trying to drive in Ontario on a foreign license after previously having had their Ontario license suspended. Here the court rules similar to the decision in Alaska in that having a foreign license does not allow one to circumvent locally imposed license restrictions. Searching for UK case law doesn't turn up any relevant court cases. Australian case law is likewise mute on the subject. There is also a relevant legal opinion by the Department of State quoted in the Digest of United States practice in International Law, 2002: Reading these provisions as a whole, we believe that the State of Georgia, consistent with the CRT, (1) must permit an alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license issued by a country party to the CRT only if the alien has been lawfully admitted to the United States; (2) must permit a lawfully admitted alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license of a CRT party only during the first year after the alien’s admission; and (3) may, in accordance with Georgia’s residency laws, require an alien resident in Georgia to obtain a Georgia driver’s license as a condition for continued authorization to drive. By the same token, nothing in the CRT would prevent the State of Georgia from applying more liberal rules with respect to the driving privileges of aliens. In Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 2014 the author further analyses how the 1949 Geneva Convention is applicable within the United States. First, to settle the definition of "international traffic": Nonetheless, the United States ultimately accepted that “the purpose of chapter II was to establish, in effect, an international code of minimum safety requirements. By indirection, the rules of the road set forth in the convention would apply to the pattern of domestic as well as to international traffic. The author the meaning behind Article I of the Convention: Article 1 states in part that no party “shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding one year.” This provision, on its face, indicates that the parties recognized that the treaty would benefit individuals. In no way does this recognition compel a conclusion that the Convention is self-executing, but it does suggest that the treaty is of a type that the Senate might have understood to be directly enforceable. And finally on the issue of whether or not the treaty is "self-executing": For these reasons, it is likely that courts will continue to treat the Geneva Convention as self-executing. Nonetheless, a court might conclude that, with respect to section II’s rules of the road, the governmental obligation is merely to “take appropriate measures” and that such an obligation is too vague to be enforced judicially. So it seems absolutely clear that the Convention intended for participating countries to allow foreign drivers to drive abroad for up to one year. However international treaties are not self-executing by default in Canada, unlike the US: Canada is bound by the terms of treaties that it enters into and breach thereof may give rise to international claims. However, in Canada treaties are not self-executing; they do not constitute part of the law of the land merely by virtue of their conclusion. So even though British Columbia is violating the 1949 Geneva Convention one cannot directly rely on said international agreement to enforce their rights. But another state party could theorethically sue Canada on behalf of its citizen to request that Canada rectifies its laws with accordance to the agreement. | Exact wording might matter here, so I looked up the law. It says "a permanent resident complies with the residency obligation with respect to a five-year period if, on each of a total of at least 730 days in that five-year period, they are physically present in Canada". Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 28(2)(a). If you visit the Canadian side of the park, you're "physically present in Canada". It would therefore appear that this would meet the requirement. I am by no means an expert in Canadian immigration law, though. | The Colorado Drivers Handbook says: Instruction permits: An instruction permit allows limited driving privileges for people learning to drive. Regardless of age, if you are driving with an instruction permit, you must be accompanied by a person 21 years of age or older who holds a valid Colorado license and is riding in the seat beside you. (Emphasis mine) So if you are an adult, regardless of your age, you are required to have somebody 21 years of age or older who has a valid Colorado drivers license. An 18 year old (or anybody for that matter) with just an instruction permit may not drive alone. In Colorado adults (21 years of age or older) are required to get a permit, but there is no time requirement to hold it before taking the written and driving test to obtain a regular (Class-R) drivers license. | New York has a "stop and identify" law which says that a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. However, there is no requirement to carry an identifying document or to prove your verbal statements of identity. For that matter, there is no requirement that you have your license in your possession when driving, you simply have to be duly licensed. In this case, the officer has reasonable suspicion of a crime, so you do have to tell him your name, address, and what you were doing. In Washington, there is no stop-and-identify law, so you don't even have to tell the police who you are. There does exist a requirement to identify yourself if you are stopped for an traffic infraction: (1) Any person requested or signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer for a traffic infraction has a duty to stop. (2) Whenever any person is stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction. (3) Any person requested to identify himself or herself to a law enforcement officer pursuant to an investigation of a traffic infraction has a duty to identify himself or herself and give his or her current address. However, the proposed scenario does not fall under this requirement because you weren't stopped. Also note that the limited ID law of Washington does not compel you to provide a document, it compels you to provide information. It is a misdemeanor to drive without a valid Washington license, but it is only an infraction to drive having been issued a license but not having it in your possession, as long as you provide an alternative ID document. So if you drive without a license in WA and are stopped, you have to show an ID document or suffer the misdemeanor alternative. But again, in this scenario you were not driving and were not stopped, you will not be forced to provide a document. Because driving without a license is a misdemeanor and the officer did not observe you driving, under Washington's arrest without warrant law, he cannot arrest you for suspicion of having committed the misdemeanor of driving without a license. (The arrest without warrant law is a bit more complicated, see the 11 exception subsections, none of which apply here). If your goal is to try to be forced to show your driver's license, you might try Indiana, where the law says A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide either the person's: (1) name, address, and date of birth; or (2) driver's license, if in the person's possession; to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C misdemeanor. But again, you were not stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation, so you may keep your license in your wallet. | The vehicle occupying the lane has right of way i.e. if you merge and cause a collision, you are liable. The fact that the other driver was in breach of the road rules as well as you is immaterial. If you rephrased the question to be "A vehicle behind you in that lane is exceeding the speed limit - can I exceed the speed limit too?" you would see why. "Because they were breaking the law I should be allowed to" is not a defence that has any prospect of being successful. The law says you must give way when merging, so give way when merging. | Yes for individuals, and yes for vehicles. They're customs laws rather than immigration laws. | Just wondering, in the plight of some recent news coming from Canada, and the Emergencies Act being evoked (protesters; thier right to protest in a certain area were vanquished and they were arrested); is there any justification for the current government to do so? There is legal justification for the current government to do so. As explained in the link above: In the weekend before the invocation of the Emergencies Act, Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, who also serves as the finance minister, met with the CEOs of the largest Canadian banks to discuss how they could help resolve the situation. On February 14, 2022, during the Canada convoy protest, the Emergencies Act was invoked for the first time in Canadian history by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's government, declaring a public order emergency. Under the Emergency Measures Regulations enacted after the declaration of emergency, participation in public assemblies that could result in a breach of peace by disrupting the movements of goods and people, interfering with the operation of critical infrastructure, or by supporting violence, was prohibited. Travel to and within places where these rallies were occurring was restricted, and foreign nationals were barred from coming to Canada to attend them. The regulations also specifically outlawed the bringing of children under the age of 18 to these assembles. Additionally the use, provision, collection, and solicitation of property and funds to support the prohibited assemblies or the people participating in them was banned. The regulations further empowered the federal government to protect critical infrastructure, Parliament Hill and the parliamentary precinct, official government residences and buildings, war monuments, and any other places that may be designated by the minister of public safety. The federal government was also given the authority to compel the towing and removal of vehicles, structures, and other objects used in blockades. Violations of the regulations is punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment and/or a fine up to $5000. Under the Emergency Economic Measures Order, also enacted pursuant to the declaration of emergency, crowdfunding platforms and their payment processors were required to register with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), and report large and suspicious transactions. Cryptocurrencies are also included in the expanded financial regulations. Banks were ordered to freeze personal and corporate bank accounts suspected of being used by people violating the regulations, and are protected from civil liability in enforcing the order. Insurance coverage for trucks being used in blockades will be suspended. Furthermore financial institutions had to determine on a continuing basis whether any persons violating the regulations were using their services and were required to promptly report findings to the RCMP or CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service). Background and links to other stories with background can be found in a recent article at the Washington Post which notes that: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on Wednesday revoked the use of emergency powers that he invoked to quell weeks-long blockades in the Canadian capital that spread to several U.S.-Canada border crossings and inspired copycats abroad. “Today, after careful consideration, we’re ready to confirm that the situation is no longer an emergency,” he said at a news conference in Ottawa. “Therefore, the federal government will be ending the use of the Emergencies Act. We are confident that existing laws and bylaws are now sufficient to keep people safe.” The move was a shift for Trudeau, who on Monday said his government still needed the sweeping powers even after the blockades protesting public health restrictions and his government were cleared over the weekend because it had “real concerns” that new blockades could pop up and that protesters might be regrouping at satellite hubs outside Ottawa. Trudeau last week became the first leader to invoke the 1988 Emergencies Act, and the House of Commons voted Monday to endorse the use of the law. But its unprecedented use also drew criticism from civil liberties groups, some opposition lawmakers and several provincial premiers, who cast it as government overreach. The act was written to be a last resort, to use when there were no other laws on the books that might end an emergency. Several legal analysts said that it wasn’t clear that the blockades met the threshold or that authorities had exhausted existing tools. Alberta Premier Jason Kenney is challenging it in court. The Emergencies Act allowed police to designate no-go zones where people participating in prohibited public assemblies or bringing minors to them could face arrest. One such area was Parliament Hill in Ottawa and the surrounding precinct. The fact that the House of Commons approved the use is pretty much the end of the line since the parliament in Canada has the authority of suspend individual rights in most cases under the Canadian constitution. And also to note, a State in the USA is trying to pass a bill for these oppressed Canadians to give them temporary asylum. This is clumsy and naked political posturing. States have no say in immigration matters including asylum and the people trying to pass that bill know perfectly well that such a bill is meaningless even if passed. Should Canadians be fleeing their country in light of what has happened in the past few days? No. I believe the CCLA stated, "Let's be clear: There is no legal justification for using the Emergencies Act." The CCLA's statement greatly overstates the situation. If there is no legal justification, could Canadians seek asylum in other countries on the evoking of the emergencies act and would other countries take in Canadians seeking asylum from this current situation? No. Asylum requires an individualized threat of persecution which the vast majority of Canadians who didn't participate don't face. Moreover, they would have to show that it violated their human rights without lawful justification which they would be unable to do, and it has to be so severe that it puts your life and ability to live in the long run in your country in danger. Not being permitted to fully protest at a particular place for a week and having your bank accounts frozen for allegedly engaging in illegal activities doesn't meet that threshold. | A variety of Canadian national laws have established general restrictions that impart largely universal rights upon all "employees", as well as certain duties upon all "employers" with regard to the definition of who qualifies as an employee and who must be paid. Despite the national framework, the provincial standards construed through case law are largely controlling. Employees in Canada are protected by the employment standards set forth by each province, which then will typically be given precedence over in the national rubric unless the latter gives greater rights to workers. These provincial laws apply to all “employees” and “employers” within the province unless a clearly defined exemption or restriction in the national framework applies, or unless there is not a provincial framework in place. The provincial, versus the national legislation, makes it necessary to determine whether he or she fits into the definition of an “employee” under either of these legal structures; chances are, if a person is working in any way they are employees who need to be paid. While the extended definitions vary, a person is an employee in all provinces if they generally appear to be an employee ( they perform the type of work a person would typically be paid for, they are controlled to some extent by the employer, etc.) As defined through these statutes and stare decisis, individuals who fit these definititoins and tests are employees, and hence, are entitled to receive wages. This is almost always true regardless of any signed contracts or verbal agreements suggesting otherwise - agreements of this type are largely unenforceable except in the rarest of circumstances. Thus, unlike the U.S. where an intern can form a contract with the consideration being the value of the educative environs, in Canada, not so. Hence, whether the intern is willing to not be paid, or has signed an agreement acknowledging that he or she would not be paid, if they decide to sue for wages (or even if the employer is audited without the employees input), the existence of a written waiver of pay is not determinative of employers' liability. Much like the FSLA, these national and provincial employment laws were adopted with the goal of preventing the exploitation and abuse of workers who are in a vulnerable position relative to their employers. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that provincial employment laws should be construed and interpreted in a broad and generous manner because they provide minimum benefits and standards to protect workers as a general class. However, this framework can also backfire and put young Canadian professionals at a disadvantage in this growing global economy. In some circumstances - especially in competitive professional employment markets where experience is an intangibly invaluable asset - and their neighbors to the south (the U.S.) have the benefit of entering into these relationships. In professions such as law, medicine, business, and many others, internships are an invaluable tool and a stepping stone to permanent lucrative employment, that these "protections" may serve to deprive parties the benefit of. It is nearly always illegal in Canada to allow an individual to work in an internship or volunteer like capacity if they do so unpaid, even in ways that would traditionally be exempt from the FSLA (Fair Labor Standards Act) in the United States. Despite their nearness geographically to the U.S., there are a number of statutory and common laws that differ considerably between the two sovereign nations. Canadian courts and provincial authorities apply both the provincial and national employment standards and provisions. Together and/or independent of each other, these laws act in such a way that the test for who qualifies as an employee will inevitably end up encompassing nearly everyone working unpaid, except student interns working few hours. If an intern is not specifically exempted, they are entitled to and must be paid at least the National minimum wage (if the provincial wage is higher, it is the applicable minimum). Interns who do the same work of "employees" or who are subject to any amount of substantial control and direction by their employers, must be paid according to the test that various cases of the Canadian Supreme Court has engrained into Canadian common law. Even in situation where a would-be intern enters into an contractual agreement that he or she will not be paid does not mean that the employer is complying with their provincial employment standards. Any such clause in an oral or written contract is null and void if it contravenes the respective laws, The following link will bring you to a professional publication that examines the history and reasoning for these divergent provincial statutes, as well as the few existing exceptions, citing the most important relevant cases that have determined these issues nationally: http://www.gowlings.com/KnowledgeCentre/article.asp?pubID=3190 |
Is it legal to upload a non-monetized movie to YouTube? My friend says that as long as you don't monetize/gain profit from the video, it is legal to upload it, but if the owner asks you to remove - you have to remove it. My stance on this is that whether the video is monetized or not, it is illegal to upload movies on YouTube and you could be prosecuted by law. Who is correct - me or my friend? | Everything you need to know about uploading to YouTube and copyright law is in their Terms of Service, particularly the section of Copyright: Copyright and rights management - YouTube Help and in the Frequently asked copyright questions - YouTube Help. It is simply illegal to upload movies for which you don't have copyright or a license to distribute. Monetization doesn't have anything to do with copyright itself. Also read I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? - Law Meta Stack Exchange Caveat: some laws in other countries could supersede US laws. | The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use. | If it was illegal to make the entire copy, it is illegal to copy half the file. See also, e.g., Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) In response to the question of whether moving it to someone else's servers makes a difference: it is the act of copying, not the possession of the copy, that is the violation of copyright law. As for the copy a service assists someone to make, contributory liability would be the issue. You don't need to be the person making the copies to be contributing to the infringement--material contribution to the copying process and knowledge of infringement run a serious risk of creating contributory liability. If seriously considering such a service as a business model someone would need to consult a copyright expert with technical knowledge or pay counsel with technical knowledge for a good bit of time to do some research. There are major civil and criminal consequences if the industry or the government decides to go after a service doing this, so legal expenses would be a significant and important cost of doing business that would significantly increase barriers to entry. In addition, the service would likely be in violation of its agreement with storage vendors, who would want to minimize their legal exposure and might well discontinue the service when they learned what it was doing. | Making a profit does not make the act illegal: it is illegal without there being any profit. The act of copying without permission is what makes the act illegal. Profit might maybe enter into the matter if you are talking about the "fair use" defense, since certain kinds of works can be partially copied for certain purposes. You could quote a few lines from a novel in a review, for instance. The judgment of whether a given act of copying without permission is allowed under fair use is complex and involves a balancing act. Profit becomes relevant in that a non-profit use favors fair use and a for-profit use disfavors it. Wholesale copying of works of art as you describe is illegal (is infringement). However... "illegal" is a pretty broad concept. If you infringe on my intellectual property, you almost certainly will not suffer any consequences unless I sue you. Taking "illegal" to mean "in violation of the law", infringing copyright is illegal because it violates the law, but I have to make a federal case out of your infringement – I have to sue you. As it happens, it can also be a crime to infringe copyright, and in that case, the government and not the copyright holder pursues the matter. If a person knowingly infringes copyright, he might be prosecuted, thus the Megaupload case which in the US is realized in the indictment US v. Dotcom. Moreover, profit motive is a required element for criminal infringement. (Also note that you don't have to actually make a profit for the profit element to be present). You cannot sue a person unless they have harmed you, so if you know that Smith copied Jones' work you can't sue Smith for harming Jones. (This is what they call "standing"). You might sue Smith, but not for infringement itself. If they sold you an illegal infringing copy, then you could sue. Or, their infringement could diminish the value of your legal copy. This website gives a multi-nation overview of criminal copyright infringement laws. | Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on. | You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders. | Using it without permission is copyright infringement and illegal. Legally, you can try offering money to the company for the copyright or for a suitable license. For example offer them $1000 for a copy of the code licensed under the GPL license. If they accept, you are fine. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. |
Jurisdiction of Texas Rangers in Louisiana? I understand that Texas Rangers are responsible for killing Bonnie& Clyde in North Louisiana. Is it lawful for a Texas Police Agent to engage a citizen in New York City? | Answering the question title, a Texas law enforcement officer can certainly make arrests in Louisiana these days under the right circumstances (I'm not about to look up the laws as of 1934). For starters, Louisiana law grants any person the authority to make an arrest when the person being arrested has committed a felony, whether or not that felony was committed in the presence of the person making the arrest. This is normally a legally risky thing to do (the arrest is illegal unless the person actually committed a felony, while a cop's felony arrest is legal as long as the cop had probable cause), but in this case the pair had been involved in a kidnapping and a robbery in Louisiana. Any person could have made a lawful arrest, and could have used necessary force to effect that arrest. But suppose the gang turned out to be innocent of the Louisiana crimes. In that case, a citizen's arrest would be illegal. But the Texas lawmen weren't at the ambush alone. They were there with the parish sheriff and a deputy, who were Louisiana peace officers with the authority to make an arrest on probable cause. And under Article 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, A peace officer making a lawful arrest may call upon as many persons as he considers necessary to aid him in making the arrest. A person thus called upon shall be considered a peace officer for such purposes. Neither of these things depends on the Texas officers' status as Texas officers. There are some arrests which are legal based on that (e.g. hot pursuit), and a Texas officer has some extra powers in Louisiana based on federal law that make an arrest easier (e.g. cops in the US can carry concealed firearms nationwide without needing a CCW permit), but under normal circumstances a Texas police officer has no special authority to make an arrest in Louisiana. However, it's not at all uncommon for police agencies in different states (or at the state and federal level) to cooperate on something, and there are ways to make it work out. With more planning, there are normally formal ways to do it instead of needing to rely on "we'll ask you for assistance" (for instance, officers could formally be appointed as deputies in the appropriate agency; this happens a lot on federal task forces, where a deputized state or local cop gets nationwide jurisdiction). If Bonnie and Clyde existed these days but the feds wanted to involve state cops, they'd just set up a federal task force, make Hamer a special deputy US marshal, and go from there. | Firstly, there is no jurisdiction in the US where rape is a potentially capital crime, and murder is not - so you are discussing a hypothetical (and rather implausible) jurisdiction. Given your jurisdiction is hypothetical, you can make the law be what you would like. Secondly, duress is accepted in almost all jurisdictions as a defence to a charge of anything except homicide (and some jurisdictions allow it to reduce the severity of a homicide charge). Courts can be reluctant to accept a charge of duress, but a bullet wound would probably be persuasive. I don't know if someone who had just been shot would be physically able to perform though. The precise crimes the perpetrator is guilty of would depend on your specific jurisdiction, but I would expect at least: rape (because they organized it) kidnap shooting the brother | Apart from hiring an attorney (who will, based on the specifics that you tell him, have a better recommendation), you can appeal to the district attorney, the mayor, a higher officer in the chain of command with the local police, and whatever TV-on-your-side news-guys there are. The decision to prosecute rests with the DA: the police make recommendations. The DA probably has investigators, and all of the above can persuade the police to take a closer look at the case. Ultimately, you cannot force the police to investigate, only the local government that the police are a part of can order the police. An attempt to sue the police for not doing what you think they should do will fail, because the courts have repeated held that barring an illegal basis for non-investigation, investigating purported crimes is discretionary. | Does the party have any legal leverage to engage the police (or other competent authorities apart from private investigators) to help locate the witness and serve the summons on them? Not really. Legal process is not infrequently served by a sheriff's deputy. But the deputy will not generally take any initiative to locate a person to be served beyond what it provided by the litigant. The main reasons to have a sheriff's deputy serve someone with process is the fear that the person served might react violently. Or is it just the party's bad luck that the witness cannot be located and served on? Pretty much. | In the USA, you must be found guilty "beyond reasonable doubt". As you describe it, I'd say there is an unreasonable suspicion of guilt, not guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the magician killed three people that way, then three unexplainable deaths following three spells might get him convicted. A jury might say that even though there is no way to explain how the killing worked, the correlation might be enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. | Does said police department have any obligation to ID, investigate and detain / arrest the false caller? No. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 (2005). Usually, police do investigate, but that is a matter of department policy and political expectations, not a legal obligation to do so. | The powers given to law enforcement professionals will be detailed in the relevant law that establishes them. I would suspect that the decision to cordon off an area would fall within the purview of the officer on the scene; the idea that a police officer would need to seek permission before cordoning off a motor vehicle accident or chemical spill is unworkable. I would also suspect that other emergency personnel (e.g. ambulance and fire-fighters) would have similar powers. However, such cordoning off would be a temporary measure and if it was maintained for an unreasonable period it would be open to challenge through an administrative or judicial process. If the police decided that a feature was a permanent hazard then they could seek a court order on the owner of the property to provide some measure to adequately protect the public, by either removing the hazard or providing some permanent barrier, under whatever laws seemed most appropriate. | It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot. |
American citizenship that got lost in the family I am a non-American individual and think I have a right for American citizenship. The father of my grandma (dead) was American (he was born there), but my grandma (alive) did not get citizenship for some reason. So neither my mother nor I have got American citizenship. Is there any way so I can get American citizenship from the father of my grandma? | There are two models for citizenship, by location of birth and by the nationality of the parent. The US chiefly follows the first model, which is why only your grandma's father is American, and your grandma is not. By the same logic, you are not. Countries like Spain are far more lenient, and do allow you to request Spanish citizenship if you can show any of your direct ancestors are Spanish. That's possible because each country can make its own laws within reason. The international norm is that everybody should get at least a citizenship at birth; statelessness should not happen. | Nothing will happen. Wait for the 2030 census and January 3rd 2033. Representatives are only recalculated after each census. The last census and recalculation was 2020. So no ordinary recalculation will happen till 2030. It's unclear if there could be an extra census, which then might lead to redistricting - the only rules (in the constitution) I can find are, that a census has to happen every 10 years. Current laws are, that it happens every 10 years. It's up to politics to introduce laws to allow an extra census, but to make it that obvious that it is needed, there needs to be an exodus/death toll of the scale of the black death in Europe (one in 4 dies/moves) or a total depopulation of an area like New York City. Which has 8 million inhabitants, something like 10 districts, and is growing. Back in 1918 H1N1 killed between 2% and 10% of those that got it and in total about 675,000 (of 103.2 million) in the US, mainly in cities that did lag in their reaction to the fall/winter wave in 1918. As three (not fully) random examples: Philadelphia lost 16000 for something around 941 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (the town had about 1.7 million inhabitants at the time), LA had a death toll of only 494 per 100,000, all of Nebraska lost between 2800 and 7500 people on a population of 1.3 million - for - for between 200 and 580 deaths per 100,000. Yet despite this very disparate impact it barely impacted the 1920 census. Not even the hurricane Katrina, which pretty much wiped out New Orleans, did not result in an extra census and restructuring - so it is very unlikely to happen. On the other hand, there is a formula for assigning representatives. We use the same setup since the 1940 census. Legal basis? 2 USC §2b dictates each state gets at least one: Each State shall be entitled, in the Seventy-eighth and in each Congress thereafter until the taking effect of a reapportionment under a subsequent statute or section 2a of this title, to the number of Representatives shown in the statement transmitted to the Congress on January 8, 1941, based upon the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to receive less than one Member. 2 USC §2c dictates how many representative districts exist and how many representatives it will have: In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress [1969] or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress). The Redistricting is State-Law - and there are roughly 5 types how it's done. So, one representative per district. One district per representative. District borders are to be redrawn based on the decennial census as demanded in Art. 1 §2 - where it is called Enumeration: The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; [provisional numbers] When will redistricting take effect? Redistricting lags one term behind, and it will not fire or remove a representative from office, whose district is scheduled to vanish - or elect new people. That's because redistricting on the state level can only happen after the reapportionment of the seats has been handed out by the clerk of the House of representatives. Reapportionment has a deadline of 25th January the year after the census. That's after the house term starts. Since at that moment the districts are still in existence, the term of the current holder first needs to run out before the new districts take effect. So the district ceases to exist the same day they leave office on January 3rd. A good example would be New York: The 45th district was redistricted from the 43rd District and elected first for in 1944, and was redistricted back into the 43rd District after the 1950 census. It was last voted for in 1950, well before the results of the census were handed out and redistricting happened. So the district ceased to be the same day Daniel A. Reed left the office on January 3rd of 1953. The 28th Congressional District was established in 1823 and eliminated on January 3rd 2013 as a result of the 2010 census. The last election for its seat was - obviously - in 2010. As a result, any changes to the district map stemming from the 2020 census will take effect only on January 3rd 2023, and a massive depopulation showing in the 2030 census will have an effect only in the elections for the house that begins its term on January 3rd 2033. | If a line in your will bequeaths something that you don't have the power to give (e.g. you bequeath something that you don't own at the time of your death), that line has no legal effect. If I died and left you the house at 10 Downing Street in London, for example, you wouldn't actually be getting it. If your will contains enough of those lines and/or they seem excessively unreasonable, it may cause the validity of the will to be challenged on the basis that you weren't competent to prepare and sign it. If the people reading it think it's reasonable, it may have a social effect based on what it conveys to them, which could lead to voluntary compliance with your wish (especially if the main obstacle to that being realized is a mistaken understanding of and desire to respect your wishes). That could help make peace, for example, if a surviving parent's remarriage would otherwise be opposed by children (or the surviving partner) or others based solely on a mistaken understanding of the wishes of the deceased. It could also make for a really awkward moment, depending on the views of and relationships between survivors. Addressing user662852's comment on the question: You can also use a will to name a guardian for anyone you have guardianship over, which is usually more important for children (e.g. see "Why Every Parent Needs a Will."). | According to the ACLU, there are certain questions you have to answer when entering the US, and in some states you may have to identify yourself when stopped and told to identify yourself. Nonimmigrant non-citizen may be required to answer questions about immigrant status posed by an immigration officer. Otherwise, you are not required to answer questions by police. A judge can order you to answer questions, but the police cannot. Also, "obstruction of justice" covers things such as destroying evidence, assaulting a process server, communicating with a juror, and can cover investigative demands by prosecutors, but not being uncooperative with police. | The same thing that happens to everyone else Being declared legally dead does not mean that you are dead; it simply allows your assets to be distributed as if you were. If you turn up alive, you go through a bureaucratic procedure to have the record of your death removed, get a new driver's licence, etc. You usually don't get your assets back. If you happen to commit a crime during this period you get arrested, charged and tried just like everybody else. | I guess you are interpreting the answer of the officer the wrong way. Minors do have rights. Plenty of them. But using a phone to contact people their legal guardian does not approve, or to consume media their legal guardian does not approve, is usually not a right minors have. And to make those restrictions stick, your mother took your phone away. Ask for it on your 18th birthday. But when one of you has called the police on a family situation like this, both of you have a problem that goes way beyond property rights. Do you have an adult you can talk to? A teacher? An uncle or aunt? A coach? Try talking to them. If they all side with your mother, consider that she might be right and you are wrong. But often both sides talk themselves into a corner, and a neutral viewpoint helps. If you are truly desperate about your situation, call Child Protective Services. But that could backfire if they believe your mother, and make the family situation worse. Taking a phone away is not neglect or abuse. | If the Attorney General has officially determined that you renounced US citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation, you have a lifetime ban under INA 212(a)(10)(E), and there is no immigrant waiver for this ban. See 9 FAM 302.12-6. I am not sure if the Attorney General has ever made such a determination about anyone. Otherwise, I don't see anything that would prevent you from immigrating to the US like any other foreigner. | You ask if your deceased brother's green card may be legally used by another person. The answer is: no. |
Does the federal government have authority to impose tax laws at the state level? I was reading IRS Stops Attempt To Bypass Trump Tax Law, MD Lawsuit Continues. The article states: ... The IRS said Tuesday that states cannot bypass a $10,000 cap on state and local tax (SALT) deductions imposed by the Republican tax law of 2017. That hurts taxpayers in high property tax states like Maryland. The IRS effectively nullified legislation in New Jersey and several other states that allowed municipalities to establish charitable funds where taxpayers can donate in return for a property tax credit. The legislation was intended to protect taxpayers from a potential increase in the federal income tax as a result of the Trump Administration's cap on the state and local tax deduction (SALT). The article is brief, and seems to lack the exact details how how the federal government is achieving its goals. Or maybe it is there and I don't see it (fiat?). In any case, I thought states are allowed to determine their own criteria for tax credits. It seems like the federal government is imposing tax law at the state level. Does the federal government have authority to impose tax laws at the state level? | They aren't "imposing tax laws at the state level", and the states are still perfectly free to award whatever credits they like. There's a more complete explanation here. Before 2017, if you paid, say, $30,000 in state taxes, you could take a $30,000 deduction from your federal taxable income, thus reducing your federal income taxes by some fraction of $30,000 (depending on your tax bracket). The 2017 tax bill placed a $10,000 limit on this deduction. Some states responded by creating a provision where you could donate $30,000 to the state and receive a $30,000 credit against your state taxes owed - so you end up paying the same amount to the state, but now you characterize it as a charitable donation, which is still deductible from your federal taxable income. The new IRS regulation says that such a "donation" will no longer be deductible from your federal taxable income; that's all. Your state can still issue you a tax credit for such a donation if they want - the federal government has no control over that - but any such credit will reduce the amount you are allowed to deduct on your federal return, making the whole exercise pointless. The federal government certainly has the power to determine how you should compute your income for the purposes of your federal income taxes, including what you may or may not deduct. That's the power they're using here. | No. A governor could not be held liable in a lawsuit on those grounds. Governors in every U.S. state have governmental immunity from liability in tort (and a lawsuit for wrongful death is a kind of tort lawsuit) for their official actions, and there is no U.S. state in which this kind of lawsuit would fall within an exception to that governmental immunity. There is not private cause of action against a state government executive branch official under federal law for a violation of "Trump administration official guidelines for reducing the covid-19 mitigation." Indeed, it isn't clear that a federal statute creating such a private cause of action that purported to pierce a state law official's governmental immunity from liability, even if it were enacted, would be constitutional. In contrast, if a corporation violated such a guideline, the violation of the guideline would be evidence of negligence, although probably not conclusive evidence, in a suit for wrongful death by a non-employee brought against the corporation. | No, it does not follow. Mostly, because that's not what is actually happening with sanctuary cities. First, there is no actual definition of a sanctuary city, neither in the law or, more specifically, in immigration policy. Here's what happens in sanctuary cities. Section 1373(a) of Title 8 of US Code states that local and state governments are prohibited from enacting laws or policies limiting the exchange of info re: citizenship w/Department of Homeland Security. So if you work for the local Department of Human Services, and someone shows up to sign up for public benefits and you find out they are undocumented immigrants, if you wanted to report that person to ICE, no government could forbid you from doing so. Conversely, the federal government can't force you to report that undocumented immigrant. Likewise, the detainers that ICE issues, which are requests to the local government to inform them when a given undocumented immigrant is to be released, are not mandatory. If that action is taken, the jail can hold the undocumented immigrant up to 48 hours for ICE to act. If ICE doesn't act, the person must be let go. A report by the DOJ's inspector general looked at a random sampling of cities that receive federal funding and found that each of them had certain policies in place that limited cooperation with ICE and ICE's detainers. However, the same inspector general found that Section 1373 is not applicable to detainers. In sum, the IG determined that, although there were no explicit policies forbidding state or local employees from cooperating with ICE, non-compliance with detainers in some jurisdictions at the very least were "inconsistent with ... the intent of Section 1373." Legal arguments abound. One argument is that the administration is interpreting Section 1373 too broadly in order to include both types of sanctuary cities. Another is that Section 1373 violates the anti-comandeering doctrine of the 10th Amendment. I guess the real answer is, "stay tuned," but for now, no it does not follow that it is a violation of federal law for a government official to declare a state/city to be a "sanctuary city." | No. A governor has no authority under the law of another state. The governor of West Sconsin can no more pardon a conviction under the laws of East Sconsin than can the president of Mexico pardon a conviction under the laws of the United States. | The relationship between a school board and the other state officials is purely a matter of state law. Generally speaking, a state can impose generally applicable regulations that govern public school districts, and to a lesser extent, so can the federal government. Whether this particular remedy is available in Florida would depend upon the relevant statutes. But, I very much doubt that this particular tactic is authorized by law. Instead, the normal course of action would be to apply to a state court for injunctive relief compelling the school district to follow the law, or to withhold funding for the school district as a whole. Normally, a state school board cannot directly control compensation of school board members or school district administrators. Of course, there could be some obscure provision of Florida law that authorizes this of which I am not aware. It is worth noting that Governor DeSantis, the incumbent Governor of Florida, has a track record of "not coloring within the lines" of what the law states that he has the authority to do. | Much of the Code of Federal Regulations consists of restatements of statutory provisions found in the United States Code. In the case of Title 8, CFR, these provisions are largely to be found in Title 8, USC, which codifies the Immigration and Nationality Act. To the extent that anything in the CFR duplicates a statute, it's legally binding, because it is in fact a statutory provision. That case is not particularly interesting to your question, of course. There is another law that governs the CFR, which is the Administrative Procedure Act. In short, this law requires the executive to abide by its promulgated regulations and not to change them without following certain procedures, and it gives the courts the power to enforce this. Therefore, the answer to the question Must the USCIS abide by the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)? Is basically yes. If you believe they haven't, you can take them to court. | Suppose I live in State A, but am on vacation to State B. While on vacation, suppose someone living in State C, but currently in State D, accesses my bank account to take money out illegally. The bank has a central headquarters in State E, although my branch of the bank is in State F. In which of these states could I file a lawsuit? Any of them? All of them? The thief would be the defendant in a lawsuit brought by you. The fact that you are on vacation in State B is irrelevant. You can always sue someone where they are domiciled, so State C is one forum where you could sue the thief. You can also always sue a natural person (as opposed to an entity) in a State where they are physically served with process, so if a summons from the courts of State D were served upon the thief while the thief was in State D, then State D could handle the case. You could also probably sue in State A on the grounds that intangible property is deemed to be located where the owner is domiciled and the theft of intangible property was a harm directed a State A. But, there is an argument that if the thief has no way you knowing that you lived in State A as opposed to State F where your branch is locate, that the thief's actions were targeted at State F. State E would not be a very plausible state to argue that there is jurisdiction. A federal district court has geographic jurisdiction only over cases that could be heard in the state courts of the state where it is located, so a federal court case would be brought only in the states where a state lawsuit could be brought. A federal court cases would either have to seek at least $75,000 (since there is diversity of citizenship between you and the thief), or would have to state at least one theory arising under federal law (which might or might not apply to this case). The you can choose which state to file in from those that are available. Which of these states could file charges against the person? A state can prosecute if the crime happened there, or if the crime caused a harm there. In this case the answer to both of those questions could be muddy. Basically, State A or F is probably where the crime caused harm, and it isn't clear from the OP facts where the crime was committed by the thief (we only know where the thief is now). These acts would also probably violate some federal crime that could be prosecuted in federal court, mostly likely the federal courts in State A or State F. Which of these states could file charges against the person? Could the federal government file charges as well? Would more than one prosecution violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment? What if these were countries instead of states? The double jeopardy clause applies to prosecutions within a single U.S. state, and in addition to any state prosecutions, a single prosecution can be made at the federal level. Likewise, prosecutions in different countries do not count against each other for purposes of a double jeopardy clause. Many U.S. states have a binding or non-binding policy of not prosecuting crimes that have already been prosecuted by another U.S. state or by the federal government, the U.S. Justice Department likewise has a non-binding policy of not prosecuting cases which have already been prosecuted by a U.S. state or another country. But these policies do not have constitutional dimensions and are not required by the 5th Amendment. if I use a Canadian Wi-Fi network without authorization from within the United States, would US or Canadian law apply? In criminal cases, choice of law and jurisdiction over the case are the same thing, because a state or country can only apply its own criminal laws. In civil cases, choice of law is a question distinct from jurisdiction. A court applies the law with the most significant connection to the disputed legal issue in question (sometimes more than one set of laws in a multi-issue case), even if it is the law of a different state or country, which is a standard that affords a judge considerable discretion. Either U.S. law or Canadian law could be plausible to apply in this case depending on the detailed circumstances and the legal issue that is disputed. | No. Reason: Taxes are not a contract for specific services, so even if the government did nothing for you in return for your taxes, you do not have recourse to a rebate for "breech of contract." The only recourse is political. Theoretically if the government failed to provide a service that was required by law or Constitution, there could be legal action to force the government to do that action but you still don't get your tax money back. It might be an interesting act of civil disobedience, but no not legal. That is the answer. But to address some of the other premises of your question (Note: these are irrelevant because see above answer): The U.S. government runs at a deficit anyway, meaning the amount spent each year is more than the amount of revenue collected. For example, in May, 2018 the CBO estimated that for FY2018: BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FY 2018 (As of May 24, 2018 ) OUTLAYS $4.1 Trillion REVENUES $3.3 Trillion DEFICIT $793 Billion DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC (End of Fiscal Year) $15.7 Trillion So even if in the partial shutdown, gov saved 20%, every cent of your taxes would still go to the expenditures; the deficit would just be a little less. The U.S. government is saving quite a bit of money by not paying some subset of its employees, etc. .... believe that many of those employees will not receive back-pay. Probably not true. In the past modern shutdowns, employees received the back pay, whether they worked as emergency employees or were home. A bill as already been proposed in Congress to ensure that all will be paid when this ends. Some contractors might not get paid because they get paid by their employers, not directly by the gov. So in some cases no work, no pay. There are bills proposed to get them paid also. Note- I do not at all mean to downplay the effect on people's finances and morale. Missing a paycheck today even if the money will/might come eventually is a real hardship. |
Ordered to hand over all messages with Plaintiffs name, though not being used in defense. Is this really allowed and enforceable in CA? My friend (Jane, NY resident) is being bullied by a high net worth person (John, father of her child) in family court(NY) but she is doing fine in that case despite having very little money and going up against extremely expensive lawyers. However, the child's father has brought civil criminal charges against her in California where Jane stayed on and off with him. We know that in reality, he is doing it as retaliation and abuse but, no way to prove that in court (yet?). He is a multimillionaire and has several law firms working for him,(her council in CA told her John must be spending ~$250k/month!) just on the criminal case (has one lawyer working on the custody case, but still an expensive one). Jane had an attorney in CA that helped her with a restraining order and recommended Arnold to defend her; Arnold is working on contingency. The problem is that I question his ethics and worry that John is colluding with him. Jane was going to use a few text messages in her defense but Arnold told her she would have to surrender every message taken off her phone. This sounded crazy and she decided to not submit anything. Arnold has recently asserted that the judge (CA) has ordered Jane to hand over any and all text messages where John is mentioned, even though she will not be using them in her defense. Is this really legal and part of discovery? | A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer. | Dale M is correct. Lawyers get calls all day long from people who want free advice and have no intention of entering into a paid representation. That is what your letter sounds like. I write separately just to add that you may have better results if you make explicit that you are aware of their rates and prepared to pay them. Even then, though, it may be that whatever you'd pay for the two hours to walk you through this is not as valuable as time they'd spend on other matters. If I have to prioritize between a repeat client and someone who will probably not pay for anything more than having one question answered, that's an easy choice. | It isn't 100% clear from the question if a case has been filed in court, or someone was just planning on filing a lawsuit, which is an important fact. It seems like the ex filed a court case and you hired attorneys who responded. If there is a court case filed, that can't just be abandoned until all the i's are dotted and t's are crossed in the eyes of the court. The lawyers can't quit unless the court gives them permission to do so. Usually, lawyers are entitled to be paid for all of the work they do and out of pocket charges they incur in a case, until it is wrapped up, even if some wrap up work happens after the event that determines the final outcome of the case like your ex deciding to abandon his arguments. But, otherwise, if there isn't a pending court case, you normally have the power to tell your lawyers to stop everything and give you the moment left (if any) in your retainer. At first read, it almost sounded as if your lawyers are willing to do that, but are warning you that your ex might continue to be a problem after the lawyers quit and that if that happens, it will be more costly and time consuming to start all over dealing with the threatened lawsuit that your ex made, than it would be to get it over and done with now. But, upon closer inspection, it seems that there is a pending lawsuit and that this is the issue. | The order of operations is important I assume that plaintiff filed for a Protective Order. To get this granted, the plaintiff has to allege some kind of wrongdoing and evidence of that. If the defendant responds, then the plaintiff can amend their filing. Then the defendant once more can respond to the allegations. If the plaintiff wants to amend the filing once more, they need to ask the court to be allowed to do so, and that opens the door for the defendant to answer once more. That's all history for the case presented: The court apparently found the evidence lacking and dismissed the application for a PO. Plaintiff can only file for reconsideration or appeal but not bring in new evidence at this point. Dismissed Cases are not automatically evidence A case that did not establish its burden of proof and was dismissed - especially with prejudice - has not established that the evidence in it is good. You have to ask each item to be admitted separately and re-establish that it is good evidence. A bulk filing "I want to bring this case as evidence" is generally denied unless you prevailed in that case. A dismissed case is one you didn't prevail in. Get a Lawyer! It seems like you are in serious need of legal counsel to clear up the situation. Contact a lawyer for at least a free consultation if you even have a case. | Unless your lease clearly denies the possibility of prorating, the emails are binding (and yes, emails count as in writing). The landlord ought to honor the conditions outlined in the emails, and it is not your fault that the manager was ignorant about his or her employer's/landlord's policies at the time the manager computed the prorated amount. Additionally, if the lease only speaks in terms of 20-day notice, then it implies that prorating may apply. It is possible that the lease contains language in the sense of when the notice becomes "effective". If so, that would require a more detailed review of the language therein, since even in that scenario you might prevail on the basis of the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here the difficult part seems to be that you are not in the US. Because the amount at issue is not high enough, the grievance/complaint would have to be filed in Small Claims court. And, as far as I know, the parties cannot be represented by a lawyer in Small Claims court. You might have to file your grievance once you are back in the US. | What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.) | If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent? | It depends. On what? On how a judge feels on a given day. That is to say, we are not sure. Conventional wisdom says that we should be cautious and assume that the law of the stricter state will apply. But some commentators argue that the law of the state where the recording device is located should apply. I found this discussion to be the most complete one-stop place for a nice summary. http://www.rcfp.org/reporters-recording-guide/interstate-phone-calls. I'm going to paste it here because I can and because SE likes that. Interstate phone calls Date: August 1, 2012 In light of the differing state laws governing electronic recording of conversations between private parties, journalists are advised to err on the side of caution when recording or disclosing an interstate telephone call. The safest strategy is to assume that the stricter state law will apply. For example, a reporter located in the District of Columbia who records a telephone conversation without the consent of a party located in Maryland would not violate District of Columbia law, but could be liable under Maryland law. A court located in the District of Columbia may apply Maryland law, depending on its “conflict of laws” rules. Therefore, an aggrieved party may choose to file suit in either jurisdiction, depending on which law is more favorable to the party’s claim. In one case, a New York trial court was asked to apply the Pennsylvania wiretap law — which requires consent of all parties — to a call placed by a prostitute in Pennsylvania to a man in New York. Unlike the Pennsylvania wiretap statute, the New York and federal statutes require the consent of only one party. The call was recorded with the woman’s consent by reporters for The Globe, a national tabloid newspaper. The court ruled that the law of the state where the injury occurred, New York, should apply. (Krauss v. Globe International) The Supreme Court of California in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney applied California wiretap law to a company located in Georgia that routinely recorded business phone calls with its clients in California. California law requires all party consent to record any telephone calls, while Georgia law requires only one party consent. The state’s high court, applying choice of law principles, reasoned that the failure to apply California law would “impair California’s interest in protecting the degree of privacy afforded to California residents by California law more severely than the application of California law would impair any interests of the State of Georgia.” In another case involving Pennsylvania law, four employees of The Times Leader, a newspaper in Wilkes-Barre, were arrested after they printed a transcript of a telephone conversation between a columnist in Pennsylvania and a murder suspect living in Virginia that was recorded without the suspect’s permission. The Virginia and federal statutes allow one party to record a conversation, while Pennsylvania, as discussed above, requires the consent of all parties. The man asked prosecutors to charge the journalists under the Pennsylvania law. The court eventually dismissed the charges against the newspaper staff — but on the unrelated ground that the suspect had no expectation of privacy during his telephone interview with the columnist. (Pennsylvania v. Duncan) Federal law may apply when the conversation is between parties who are in different states, although it is unsettled whether a court will hold in a given case that federal law “pre-empts” state law. In Duncan, the newspaper argued that the federal law should pre-empt the state statutes, because the telephone call crossed state lines, placing it under federal jurisdiction. However, in that case, the court did not address the pre-emption issue. Moreover, as noted above, either state may choose to enforce its own laws. |
What are some possible law suits or civil actions the Las Vegas shooting victims could take? I assume that many, if not all of the businesses, corporations and individuals who were operating and supplying services at the time of the Las Vegas Strip shootings (Wikipedia) - such as hotels, concert promoters, etc. - to guests and concert attendees had protected themselves against liability with contracts, entered into the customers by the purchase of tickets, payment for hotel rooms or verbal agreements. And those contracts absolved the provider of civil liability for injuries from ordinary circumstances (tripping/falling injuries) and also possibly injuries and deaths from extraordinary circumstances (force majeure) such as the shootings. But regardless of those contracts: are these some possible civil actions by the victims? (Yes, I know anyone can sue anyone in civil court). But why would any or all of these possibilities be thrown out - such as a lawsuit against a municipality re: governmental immunity - by summary judgment? 1) Could someone open a civil action against the city of Paradise (where the incident occurred near but outside the boundaries of the city of Las Vegas) for failure to provide security? Or are city/county municipalities immune? And is the state of Nevada immune? 2) Could someone sue the concert promoters for failure to provide safety? And/or was that safety limited to the actual physical area of the concert? 3) Could someone sue the hotel/casino for failure to provide general safety? What about failure to prevent the gunman from bringing weapons into the hotel/casino? 4) What about the store that sold the firearms (or ammo or accessories) to the shooter? Even though those sales appear to have been legal in Nevada? 5) Or one or more of the firearm companies themselves? 6) What about the shooter, his estate and/or his family? I assume it can be alleged that they might have known of the shooter's plans and/or failed to intercede. 7) And (possibly) more of an opinion: could a group of victims attain class action status against any of those government or private entities? | You can sue anyone for anything. I will answer these on the assumption that the real question is whether there is a legal basis for such a suit. 1) Could someone open a civil action against the city of Las Vegas for failure to provide security? Or are city/county municipalities immune? And is the state of Nevada immune? This would not prevail. There is governmental immunity and there is no duty of care. And there is also no plausible argument, factually, that somebody in the government did something wrong. Note also that a comment accurately notes that the incident took place in the City of Paradise rather than the City of Las Vegas, and the question has been revised accordingly. Some states have a general victim's compensation fund that helps partially cover losses of crime victims, but I am not aware that Nevada has one. 2) Could someone sue the concert promoters for failures to provide safety? And/or was that safety limited to the actual physical area of the concert? No. The risks were unprecedented, unforeseeable, and there would have been no cost effective way to prevent them. 3) Could someone sue the hotel/casino for failure to provide general safety? What about failure to prevent the gunman from bringing weapons into the hotel/casino? The hotel/casino is not a guarantor of general safety. The trouble with "failure to prevent" is that the weapons were legally obtained and owned. While it could have raised suspicions, there was no crime or illegal activity to report due to the lax guns laws of the U.S. and Nevada. Notably, in a similar suit arising out of the Aurora, Colorado theater mass shooting at a showing of The Dark Knight Returns, a court dismissed claims of those injured against the theater because the crime was not foreseeable at the time and because the crime was an intervening and superseding cause of the harm. The precedent is not directly applicable, since Nevada is in the 9th Circuit and is a different state, while Colorado is in the 10th Circuit. But, the principles of law that apply would be very similar and persuasive to a court in Nevada. 4) What about the store that sold the firearms to the shooter? Even though those sales appear to have been legal in Nevada? No. As you note, the sales appear to have been legal. If someone could show that the sales were made illegally, or worse, were made illegally with knowledge that this was intended, that would be a different story. 5) Or one or more of the firearm companies themselves? No. The guns were not defective and were in compliance with federal regulations. Specifically, this is governed by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act which would also apply to the conversion kits that he purchased to make some of the firearms more like automatic weapons. 6) What about the shooter, his estate, and/or his family? I assume it can be alleged that they might have known of the shooter's plans and/or failed to intercede. Claims Against The Shooter The shooter is dead, so he would be hard to serve with process (i.e. you can't sue dead people, you can only sue their estates). Another way that crime victims often receive compensation is from restitution awards in a criminal case. But, in U.S. jurisprudence, criminal charges cannot be brought against dead people and are automatically dismissed if a defendant dies before he is convicted or after he is convicted but before the conviction is final. Claims Against The Family Family is not legally responsible for other family member's torts and crimes simply by virtue of being family members (although claims against a decedent's estate may impact them by reducing the inheritance that they might otherwise have received) and there is no plausible reason to believe that anyone, other than possibly his girlfriend, would have had any knowledge of his plans. He appears to have had a distant relationship with his brother who knew nothing, his parents are dead, he was not currently married, he divorced each of his two successive wives long ago, and he has no descendants. Claims Against The Girlfriend His girlfriend might have knowledge and involvement (her ID was used, but apparently without her consent while she was out of the country, and the $100,000 sent to the Philippines, probably for her, could be construed as a unilateral dying gift) and the FBI is investigating that, but there is no terribly good reason to think that she could foresee what was going to happen or acted negligently in some respect. She has denied having any knowledge in public statements made by her lawyer - she says she thought he was just breaking up with her when he asked her to take a trip to see family in the Philippines and there is no immediate reason to doubt her statement. There is also not a general duty to report crimes which one suspects that someone you know will commit in the future. One could argue that the shooter had an arsenal of guns that could have clued in the girlfriend, but so does about 3% of the total population, and a much larger proportion of the population that is wealthy and has a hunting hobby. So even if she'd told authorities about the arsenal, this concern probably would have been dismissed, and without causation there is no cause of action. The $100,000 sent to the girlfriend could probably be recovered for the creditors of his estate as a fraudulent transfer action against the recipient. This has nothing to do with the fault of the girlfriend. But, any gift made while someone has liabilities or anticipated liabilities in excess of his assets are voidable, and the tort liability anticipated in this case would have been far in excess of the shooter's assets. Claims Against His Estate Claims for wrongful death absolutely can and should be filed in his estate. He was a wealthy man and there should be enough to at least make some payment to every victim. It may be necessary for a public administrator or a creditor to step forward to open the estate as it is unlikely that the shooter's family wants that job. They would not want the job because the heirs will almost surely get nothing from his probate estate because his tort liabilities almost certainly exceed his net worth. But, it is important that someone step up to serve as the executor of his estate, because otherwise his assets could be depleted by failures to pay debts resulting in penalties and seizures of collateral, and by failure to collect property to which his estate is entitled such as rent and mortgage payments owed to him or to companies he owns. There is a strict time limit for asserting claims against an estate that can often be a short as three months after the date of death. The relevant statute is as follows: 147.040. Claims: Limit on time for filing A person having a claim, due or to become due, against the decedent must file the claim with the clerk within 90 days after the mailing for those required to be mailed, or 90 days after the first publication of the notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020. A creditor who receives a notice to creditors by mail pursuant to subsection 5 of NRS 155.020 must file a claim with the clerk within 30 days after the mailing or 90 days after the first publication of notice to creditors pursuant to NRS 155.020, whichever is later. If a claim is not filed with the clerk within the time allowed by subsection 1 or 2, the claim is forever barred, but if it is made to appear, by the affidavit of the claimant or by other proof to the satisfaction of the court, that the claimant did not have notice as provided in NRS 155.020 or actual notice of the administration of the estate, the claim may be filed at any time before the filing of the final account. The period of 90 days prescribed by this section is reduced to 60 days if summary administration is granted under chapter 145 of NRS. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.040. It is possible, and even likely, that filing new lawsuits against the shooter or his estate after his death, other than by filing a claim against his estate in a Nevada state probate case, would be barred by Nevada probate law, so that claims are concentrated in the claims process. Also, while federal courts would usually have jurisdiction over a diversity lawsuit brought by an out of state plaintiff against an in state defendant, there is a probate exclusion from diversity jurisdiction that requires claims to be filed in the probate estate rather than in federal court. The hardest question for the estate once it is liquidated will be how to allocate the estate's limited assets among unrelated debts of the decedent, claims of the deceased victims and claims of those victims who were injured or suffered property damage only. There are, of course, rules to govern that in the Nevada probate code and in case law. The primary rule that applies is as follows: The debts and charges of the estate must be paid in the following order: Expenses of administration. Funeral expenses. The expenses of the last illness. Family allowance. Debts having preference by laws of the United States. Money owed to the Department of Health and Human Services as a result of the payment of benefits for Medicaid. Wages to the extent of $600, of each employee of the decedent, for work done or personal services rendered within 3 months before the death of the employer. If there is not sufficient money with which to pay all such labor claims in full, the money available must be distributed among the claimants in accordance with the amounts of their respective claims. Judgments rendered against the decedent in his or her lifetime, and mortgages in order of their date. The preference given to a mortgage extends only to the proceeds of the property mortgaged. If the proceeds of that property are insufficient to pay the mortgage, the part remaining unsatisfied must be classed with other demands against the estate. All other demands against the estate. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 147.195. Of course, often people end their lives and go on killing sprees when their situation is much worse than it appears and it could be that he has debts that left him on the verge of bankruptcy with nothing left for others to recover out of his estate. Claims Against The Shooter's Liability Policies The shooter almost certainly had comprehensive general liability insurance policies in his businesses and homeowner's insurance that cover him for liability for negligence. But, these policies are required as a matter of public policy, and do as a matter of commercial practice, have an intentional acts exclusion. So, there is no reasonable argument that he or his estate were covered by insurance for his acts. Claims Against The Shooter's Life Insurance Policies and Retirement Plans As a wealthy accountant, the shooter probably have life insurance and probably had retirement plans. If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was his estate, the analysis is unchanged (but the IRS has a priority claim for taxes due upon the distribution of the retirement plan assets). Also, the fact that he killed himself does not invalidate his life insurance policy if it is incontestable (which is usually defined in the policy to mean at least two years old). If the beneficiary of these financial instruments was someone other than his estate (particularly if the beneficiary designation is more than four years old, removing the fraudulent transfer act as a challenge to the designation), the default rule is that these assets are not available to his creditors including the shooting victims. Some states allow an insolvent estate to invade certain non-probate transfers. I would need to do further research to determine how this applies in Nevada, but his probate estate might have a basis to recover some of the life insurance and retirement asset proceeds with third-party beneficiaries for the benefit of the insolvent estate. (There is also a choice of law issue presented. Many life insurance policies and retirement plans state that they are governed by the law of a particular state. It isn't always clear if that choice of law provision, or Nevada law, would control the question of whether an insolvent probate estate may access funds otherwise payable in a non-probate transfer to another beneficiary.) The main statute in Nevada governing invalid non-probate transfers is Nev. Rev. Stat. § 155.093, et seq., and it does not allow an insolvent estate to secure those funds, but I am not an expert on Nevada probate law and there may be another exception that allows an insolvent estate to reach these amounts. A Nevada statute which could be applicable to override these beneficiary designations says: SB 454, § 51. Creditor claim: General power created by powerholder Appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or of the powerholder's estate to the extent provided in chapter 112 of NRS. Subject to subsection 1, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is not subject to a claim of a creditor of the powerholder or the powerholder's estate to the extent the powerholder irrevocably appointed the property in favor of a person other than the powerholder or the powerholder's estate. Subject to subsections 1 and 2, and notwithstanding the presence of a spendthrift provision or whether the claim arose before or after the creation of the power of appointment, appointive property subject to a general power of appointment created by the powerholder is subject to a claim of a creditor of: (a) The powerholder, to the same extent as if the powerholder owned the appointive property, if the power is presently exercisable; and (b) The powerholder's estate, to the extent the estate is insufficient to satisfy the claim and subject to the right of a decedent to direct the source from which liabilities are paid, if the power is exercisable at the powerholder's death. As used in this section, “power of appointment created by the powerholder” includes a power of appointment created in a transfer by another person to the extent the powerholder contributed value to the transfer. Nev. Rev. Stat. § SB 454, § 51. The beneficiary designation could be reviewed as a power of appointment. Chapter 112 of the Nevada Revised Statutes is Nevada's Fraudulent Transfer Act. 7) And more of an opinion: could a group of victims attain class action status against any of those entities? Against the shooter's estate, yes. Against anyone else, there is not a valid cause of action unless new facts are revealed. On the other hand, since the probate claims process consolidates claims into a single case at a single forum before a single judge, it would usually be unnecessary to file a class action in this situation. Other Possible Plaintiffs and Defendants The Hotel The shooter damages the hotel's windows and his room, and he may not have paid his bill. These would be claims of the hotel in his estate. Criminal Enterprise Victims Josh Marshall at the Talking Points Memo is among those who have suggested that his spending was far in excess of his apparent source of income, and that he may have been engaged in some form of illegal activity which could conceivably even have caused him to decide to end his life. The shooter reported his source of income in real estate transactions as $1,000,000 per year from "gambling", which as Josh Marshall accurately points out, is pretty much impossible given the type of gambling that he engaged in which is overwhelmingly biased in favor of the House in the long run. Professional gamblers play games like poker where it is possible, at least in principle, to win in the long run without cheating. But, he didn't play those kinds of games with any frequency. One of the more plausible explanations for why he would gamble so much is that it is a form of money laundering that allows him to turn ill gotten gains that he would use to purchase chips at casinos into gambling winnings, in exchange for the house's inevitable net gains from his bets in the long run (which can be a pretty small percentage transaction cost, on average, compared to other forms of money laundering). If so, others may have claims against his estate, that compete with the claims of the shooting victims, under statutes such as RICO, based upon this conduct if there was any. Criminal Conspiracies Of course, if evidence came out that this was actually done at the direction of some criminal syndicate (perhaps to raise the price of gun company stocks?), that would be another thing entirely and one could sue the other conspirators (as well as prosecuting them criminally), but there is nothing strong enough to file a case in court that would survive an attorneys' Rule 11 obligations to file claims with a genuine factual basis at this point. It would be an avenue to investigate on the long shot possibility that this conspiracy theory was true. Such conspiracies are not entirely unprecedented. One mass shooting incident in Germany recently that was originally believed to be a terrorist attack turned out to have been motivated by a desire to influence the financial markets. Life Insurance Policies Everyone who has a life insurance policy that was killed could make a claim against that policy. The harder legal question is whether people who had only "accidental death" life insurance policies could make claims in this case. Worker's Compensation Claims Everyone who was killed or injured while on the job at the scene (e.g. roadies for the concert, security guards, police, photographers working the show) could make a worker's compensation claim against their employer's worker's compensation policy. This would include medical costs, lost wages and funeral expenses. Health Insurance Everyone with health insurance who was injured who was not on the job could make a health insurance claim for their medical costs. CGL, Auto and Homeowner's Insurance Claims Most comprehensive general liability insurance (CGL) policies of businesses would cover property damage in this incident. Most automobile insurance policies (but certainly not all) would cover damage to a car in this incident. Most homeowner's and renters insurance policies would cover property damage to property other than a vehicle in this incident. It wouldn't be unusual for a CGL policy for the concert organizers or the venue would have a provision that covers medical expenses up to a small dollar limit for injuries sustained by invitees (i.e. concert goers) at the concert or venue as the case might be. But, it wouldn't be unusual for there to be no such coverage. Travel Insurance Claims From the comments: Many tourists from the UK would have travel insurance. Other European countries probably as well. I checked the online terms of a random UK company, they would pay for the cost of hospital treatment or funeral in case of "unexpected injury", and I seriously hope they wouldn't claim that if someone fires a gun at you, an injury would be "expected". Plus travel related expenses, like transport home, just losing your flight etc. The one I checked wouldn't pay for disability except for "personal injury", that is something you caused yourself. And no compensation, just the actual financial loss. Tort Claims Of People Not Personally Injured The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress tort, which is recognized by Nevada, while by its terms applicable only to "negligence" cases not at issue here, allows recovery by someone who had a near miss with physical harm and suffers emotional distress as a result. There is a reasonable chance that Nevada courts would allow this tort to be applied to "near miss" cases of intentional physical injury. Pretty much anyone on the scene (roughly 22,000 people) could arguably make such a claim against the shooter's estate. Spouses of people who are injured can often make a claim for "loss of consortium" in Nevada for physical harm to their spouse, even if they are nowhere near the scene of the incident. These claims could be made against the shooter's estate. This would allow claims by several hundred people in this situation. Many of the wrongful death claims would be statutory claims of next of kin, rather than claims brought by their estates. these would be brought against the shooter's estate. Trivia Point If this had happened on certain Indian Reservations, there probably would have been federal liability to all Indians harmed in the attack, as the federal government has liability for all criminal harm caused by "bad men" on the Indian Reservations in question to Indians under the treaties creating those reservations. But, obviously, the Las Vegas strip is not in Indian Country, even though many casinos in the U.S. are in Indian Country. | There's no question about what was done or who did it, but there appears to be a jurisdictional mess: the host country won't prosecute because everyone involved, on both the victim and perpetrator sides, is a US citizen and it took place on a US military base, and the military can't prosecute because the perpetrator is a civilian who is not subject to the UCMJ. The host country probably has jurisdiction because a military base, unlike an embassy, is not generally immune from domestic criminal law jurisdiction, although the host country is within its rights to decline to exercise that authority and the status of forces treaty with that country would control. The belief that the military cannot prosecute the perpetrator under the Uniform Code of Military Justice because the perpetrator is a civilian who is not subject to the UCMJ is mistaken, and the easiest way to address the issue may be to point this out to the responsible JAG officers and commanding officers with jurisdiction over the case. Generally speaking, as set forth more fully below, the UCMJ does apply to civilians on military bases. See 10 USC 802(a)(11) and 10 USC 802(a)(12). There is also probably U.S. civilian criminal law that is applicable to civilians on a military base much like other federal territories. Historically, these offenses could be presided over in ambassadorial courts of the U.S. ambassador to the country in question, but the current practice is for such prosecutions to be made by the Justice Department before a U.S. District Court judge (I believe from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, although I may be mistaken on that point). Who Is Subject To The UCMJ? Section 802 of Title 10, set forth in the block quote below expressly states who is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Mostly, the UCMJ applies to members of the U.S. military, broadly defined, with some of the potentially close cases described with specificity. A lot of the detail in this definition goes to the issue of when non-active duty military personnel (1) are subject to the UCMJ, (2) are subject to state versions of the UMCJ in lieu of the UCMJ, or (3) are not subject to the UCMJ at all. The UCMJ also applies to some civilians and people who belong to other military forces, most of which involve (1) people who are civilian employees of the military or civilian military contractors, (2) civilians and members of foreign militaries who are traveling with the military or present on military bases, and (3) prisoners of war broadly defined. These exception cases are emphasized in bold in the blockquote setting forth 10 USC § 802 below. (a) The following persons are subject to this chapter: (1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces, including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment; volunteers from the time of their muster or acceptance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of their actual induction into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it. (2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen. (3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States only when in Federal service. (4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay. (5) Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving hospitalization from an armed force. (6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. (7) Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial. (8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces. (9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces. (10) In time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field. (11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. (12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. (13) Individuals belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316), who violate the law of war. (b) The voluntary enlistment of any person who has the capacity to understand the significance of enlisting in the armed forces shall be valid for purposes of jurisdiction under subsection (a) and a change of status from civilian to member of the armed forces shall be effective upon the taking of the oath of enlistment. (c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person serving with an armed force who— (1) submitted voluntarily to military authority; (2) met the mental competency and minimum age qualifications of sections 504 and 505 of this title at the time of voluntary submission to military authority; (3) received military pay or allowances; and (4) performed military duties; is subject to this chapter until such person’s active service has been terminated in accordance with law or regulations promulgated by the Secretary concerned. (d)(1) A member of a reserve component who is not on active duty and who is made the subject of proceedings under section 815 (article 15) or section 830 (article 30) with respect to an offense against this chapter may be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose of— (A) a preliminary hearing under section 832 of this title (article 32); (B) trial by court-martial; or (C) nonjudicial punishment under section 815 of this title (article 15). (2) A member of a reserve component may not be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) except with respect to an offense committed while the member was— (A) on active duty; or (B) on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States only when in Federal service. (3) Authority to order a member to active duty under paragraph (1) shall be exercised under regulations prescribed by the President. (4) A member may be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) only by a person empowered to convene general courts-martial in a regular component of the armed forces. (5) A member ordered to active duty under paragraph (1), unless the order to active duty was approved by the Secretary concerned, may not— (A) be sentenced to confinement; or (B) be required to serve a punishment consisting of any restriction on liberty during a period other than a period of inactive-duty training or active duty (other than active duty ordered under paragraph (1)). (e) The provisions of this section are subject to section 876b(d)(2) of this title (article 76b(d)(2)) | A court can have jurisdiction over property in rem without personal service upon all persons who may claim an interest in the property. Typically, this is done by providing some form of service (such as notice by mail) upon people who are known to have an interest in the property, and an alternative to service directed at an individual (such as notice by posting at the property, by publication of a notice in a public place, or by publication of a notice in a newspaper where the property is located). Civil forfeiture often involves this kind of indirect notice to unknown parties by publication. what would be the remedy where the Court ordered the property of the other persons to be sold, again without issuing service to said persons The ruling of the criminal court is not binding on people who were not served with process in the original action (either personally, if known, or by publication or some other similar means, if not known to the court) in another legal proceeding. But if a claim becomes moot, there may be not remedy available of a violation of one's rights. They could conceivably bring an action to quiet title, or the equivalent, or an action in replevin, which would not be bound by the Court's findings since the third-parties weren't a party to it, and an injunction on the sale could be sought in that case, if it wasn't too late. But, if the third-parties had actual notice of the pending criminal action, the better option would probably be to file a motion in the criminal action to intervene with respect to disposition of the property. Takings of property in the context of the criminal justice system are not "takings" in the 5th Amendment constitutional sense, for which an inverse condemnation action are available, although there is still a due process requirement, which isn't met without some effort to give potential known or unknown third-party claimants notice of the sale. If there was a court ordered sale, any claim would probably be against the proceeds of the sale, and not against a bona fide purchaser for value at a court ordered sale regularly conducted. Of course, this presumes that the property is not contraband (you can't make a legal claim to cocaine even if you own it). If the defendants did not give you notice of your ownership interest, and this resulted in you not being able to intervene in the criminal action, you could also sue the defendant for breaching duties owed to you as a fellow property owner of the property disposed of in the criminal action. Ultimately, this is not an enviable position to be in, and the likelihood of a court effectively destroying your property interest in the property subject to the criminal proceeding in a manner that there is no economically efficient remedy to address is significant. Some of the relevant case law is discussed at another answer I wrote on a related topic. See also this answer on civil forfeiture. One of the leading U.S. Constitutional law cases on the topic is Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy.”). | As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar. | According to Nolo, which is usually a good source of legal information, yes, an HOA generally does have the power to place a lien on your property if you do not pay your HOA dues, and to foreclose the lien (force sale) if it is still not paid. They have a specific page for Nevada explaining procedures and restrictions. You'll also have to read your covenant (CC&R) to see exactly what you agreed to when you bought the property, but Nolo seems to suggest that whatever's in there is likely to be enforceable. In particular, the covenant may state that the HOA's lien can include penalties and collection costs, and the law seems to allow that. There's a note on the Nolo Nevada page that an HOA may not foreclose a lien based only on a fine or penalty, so it's not clear what would happen if you paid only the outstanding dues but not the other charges. Personally, it seems to me excessive to sue over $400. Being on bad terms with your HOA seems likely to cause trouble down the road. Also, if it were me, I'd want to consult a lawyer to get a sense of the chances of winning. The fact that you were out of state and may have missed communications from the HOA or bank seems like it may weaken your case; they might argue that you had a responsibility to check your bank statements and have your mail forwarded. If you lose in court, you might be liable for the court costs in addition to what you currently owe. | The bouncer is employed (or (sub)contracted) by the owner/lessee of premises - someone with the right to evict persons from their private property per the common law rights to exclusive use of one's property. When the bouncer evicts you, they are exercising this right on behalf of and as the agent for the owner, who could do it, but instead has assigned limited agency to the bouncer to do that for them. Entrance to (and remaining on) a property may be authorised and revoked at any time - at the time that consent is not given or is withdrawn, you become a trespasser and the police may be called upon to forcibly remove you from the premises. For example, I can have a party at my house, but if I don't like someone, I'm entitled to ask them to leave. I could also ask a friend to ask that person to leave, if I didn't want to do it myself. Note that bouncers aren't empowered to physically evict anyone except for the general right to use reasonable and proportionate force. For instance, someone that was just standing around in the nightclub probably couldn't be physically thrown out, but someone who was causing harm to themselves or others could be restrained or repelled as appropriate (and if restrained, you'd need to be very careful to do so in the course of effecting a citizen's arrest, otherwise you'd probably be committing false imprisonment). There may be statutory provisions that bestow additional rights and responsibilities upon bouncers, but this is the basic premise. I'm fairly certain that this would apply in all Australian jurisdictions; probably in all common law jurisdictions. | With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Applicable Law States have jurisdiction both over crimes that are committed in the state and over crimes that cause harm in a state. The classic law school example is a murder committed by shooting someone with a gun across a state line. Both the state where the gun is fired and the state where the person is shot have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction generally requires a purposeful act directed at someone or something in the state where the harm is suffered in most cases. But that isn't a hard and fast rule of constitutional law in other contexts, and there are few cases on point. I would consider this to be an open question. Certainly, however, the mere fact that the victim of a crime is transported to another state for medical treatment, where that victim then dies from causes relate to the crime, does not give the state where the death ultimately occurs in the hospital jurisdiction over the offense. Double Jeopardy Indeed, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not prohibit both states from independently convicting and punishing the same defendant for the same crime in this situation under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. As background, the Colorado Supreme Court decided a dual sovereignty double jeopardy case today. Application To Facts (The application to the facts has been revised upon closer examination of them.) The line about "Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada," is confusing because she was in California before and isn't described as ever being in Nevada. I presume that "still in California" was really meant. Mr. Y could be charged (at least) in Nevada or New Jersey from which the continuing course of communications was sent (undue emphasis on the final communication is probably inappropriate), and Wyoming, to which the bulk of the communications were directed and where the bulk of the harm was suffered. California and Nebraska do not seem to be places to which the communications were really directed or where the greatest harm was suffered. Momentary presence in Nebraska air space is probably insufficient. There are also a set of statutes that specifically address crimes committed during an airplane flight (see also here) that has been discussed in other answers at this website. To the extent that this is treated as a homicide committed while in flight, 49 USC § 46506, might also allow for a federal criminal prosecution. I'm not sure that this is really a crime committed in flight, however, as it involved a course of conduct. A single email or a single moment of death doesn't really capture it. It is more analogous to a poisoning taking place in many doses over a period of time. Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? No. First Amendment considerations do apply to crimes involving communications between people that are not false, but if there is sufficient intent to cause suicide or other harm, the First Amendment yields to other considerations. The freedom of speech is not absolute. The exact place that the line is drawn is a matter of ongoing litigation. This specific issue is explored in depth in Clay Calvert, "The First Amendment and Speech Urging Suicide: Lessons from the Case of Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand Brandenburg Application" 94 Tulane Law Review 79 (November 2019). This article is responsive to that case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). The article explains in its introduction that: In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender based on her urging Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem." In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her no refuge.' | Normally, making a poison is not in and of itself a crime. If a third party took the poison from the person who manufactured it without their knowledge, the manufacturer would generally not have criminal liability, at least in the absence of "gross criminal negligence" such as leaving the poison manufacturing location totally unsecured and letting people know that there was poison there for the taking. In a civil case, someone might sue the poison manufacturer for negligently securing their facility, but again, that would be a real stretch if even ordinary precautions (e.g. standard locks on doors and cabinets) were in place, or if it was an inside job theft. In the same way, a gun store owner is not usually liable criminally or civilly if someone steals a gun from his store and shoots someone with it. The police could certainly charge Person A with capital murder mistakenly believing him to have intended to kill and did kill someone with the poison, which would make the critical factual point establishing that Person B gave it to someone without Person A's knowledge. Person A might still be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to kill someone (not necessarily the person who was killed) with the poison but had not fully carried out the plot when the poison was stolen. Some places probably require a permit of some kind to make poisons, and if Person A didn't have a permit, he could probably also be charged with making poisons without a permit. |
Can an open source licence be revoked if it violates employer's IP? Suppose a developer's contract says that all intellectual property (IP) rights to her code belong to her UK employer. While employed, she develops a library and open-sources it under the Apache 2.0 licence. The employer is not initially informed, but later finds the library's public repo on GitHub. Questions: Can the employer force revocation of the licence? What would then happen to those who forked and started using the library before revocation? There are related questions on OS SE, such as https://opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/4012/are-licenses-irrevocable-by-default. But they do not seem to address the situation when a library is open-sourced in violation of an employer's IP. | The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case. | The MIT license is non-exclusive. If S is the sole copyright holder, S can issue any other non-exclusive license in parallel, and can also stop offering the software under the MIT license. However, open source licenses such the MIT license are generally understood to be irrevocable, so S cannot prevent other people from using the software who already received it under the MIT license terms. But: only if S is the sole copyright holder. There is no particular reason to believe that S would be the sole copyright holder. One does not gain a copyright ownership just by supervising other people, although an employer might gain copyright ownership over works created by employees (e.g. the US “work for hire” doctrine). That the copyright notices only mention S's name is an indication that S might be a copyright holder, but that's neither sufficient nor necessary for showing that S holds sole or joint copyright in the software. This leaves three relevant scenarios: S might be the sole copyright holder, in which case, yes, S can effectively discard the MIT license. This might be the case e.g. if there was some other copyright assignment, outside of the MIT license. What copyright transfers or assignments are valid depends on the local laws, e.g. some jurisdiction do not recognize copyright as transferable and at most allow the assignment of economic aspects of copyright. S might not be the sole copyright holder, but have additional permissions to the work. For example, there might have been extra licensing agreements, outside of the MIT license. Or S might have special rights for a work of joint authorship, if and only if the jurisdiction recognizes such additional rights. S might not be the sole copyright holder and not have any agreements outside of the MIT license. Then S has no additional rights, and is bound by the terms of the MIT license. This doesn't have to be a problem: S can still pretty much do whatever S wants with the code, as long as S fulfils the license terms. These are pretty simple: just keep a copy of the copyright+license notice with any copies of the software the students created. | The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a "reasonable time" is allowed. What is "reasonable" would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction. | This could be a problem if the consultancy agreement contains a provision that assigns to the client any copyright in any code created by the consultant. That is why there should be no such provision. In the absence of such a provision, the consultant owns the copyright in the code, so it would be impossible for the consultant to infringe that copyright. Even so, copyright protects a particular expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The idea of an "analyze data" class containing a "read data" function is not itself subject to copyright protection. It could potentially be patentable as a "process," but it would fail to meet the criterion of novelty. It would also fail to meet the criterion of non-obviousness. On the other hand, a software developer cannot (without permission) copy source code that is protected by copyright simply by changing the names. Changing the names would constitute the creation of a derivative work, and the right to create derivative works is also protected by copyright. | You'll want to read the actual licenses yourself and understand what is required. If you don't understand, then you'll want to consult an attorney. But neither of these licenses are all that complex in my opinion. MIT: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Apache 2.0: Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You meet the following conditions: (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices stating that You changed the files; and (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution notices from the Source form of the Work, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works; and (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or, within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed as modifying the License. Nowhere does either license require you to publish your application's source code, even if your application is directly based on the original code. | Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence. | When a company is dissolved, someone takes over the company's asserts, often the creditors, or they may be sold for what they will bring. Failing anyone else, it may be the crown. Assuming that the copyright was in fact owned by the company (and not by someone else and merely licensed to the company), someone owns it, (just as someone owns the physical property that the company had) but it may be hard to find out who. It is even possible that the owner is not aware of the copyright. As for Person A, that depends on the details of A's contract or agreement with the company. A may be a co-owner (unlikely). A may have rights to use the code to some extent. Or A may have no more rights than I do (that is, none at all). According to "Ownership of copyright works " an official UK government web page: Where a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or a film, is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work (subject to any agreement to the contrary). The expression “in the course of employment” is not defined by the Act but in settling disputes the courts have typically had to decide whether the employee was working under a ‘contract of service’ (eg as an employee) or a ‘contract for services’ (eg as a freelancer or independent contractor). Where a person works under a ‘contract for services’ he will usually retain copyright in any works he produces, unless there is a contractual agreement to the contrary. Thus if person A was acting as an employee of the company, the copyright would automatically be owned by the company, in the absence of any written agreement between A and the company. The page goes on to state: When you ask or commission another person or organisation to create a copyright work for you, the first legal owner of copyright is the person or organisation that created the work and not you the commissioner, unless you otherwise agree it in writing. However, in some circumstances, for example when copyright is not dealt with in the contract to commission the work, courts may be willing to find that there is an implied licence allowing the commissioner to use the work for the purpose for which it was commissioned. This does not necessarily result in a transfer of ownership. Instead, the commissioner of the work may only get a limited non-exclusive licence. ... Thus if A was acting as an employee in creating or co-creating the code, and there was no written agreement on the matter between A and the company, A would have no rights to the code, and the copyright would pass to whoever purchased or was awarded it after the company dissolved. Such a copyright might well have been included in a purchase of "all other assets" (or some such language) and no explicit or specific mention of it been made. The situation in the US would be basically similar. Work by an employee within he scope of employment is a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH) under US copyright law( See 107 USC 101), and the employer is legally the author (which is not true in UK law), unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. The natural person(s) who in fact created the wok have no rights unless an agreement grants such rights. On dissolution the copyright does not end, nor is it transferred to the creator, but passes to whoever bought it, or bought or was awarded the general assets of the company (such as in a bankruptcy proceeding). | A legal measure that can protect you is called a contract. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? A formal contract will codify that you own the IP, they are working for hire, they are not to use or share the code with anyone else, etc., and will outline the penalties under international and Pakistani law. But good luck enforcing your copyright or suing for damages if they do take your code for their own. See Copyright law of Pakistan - Wikipedia. |
Can job interview questions be confidential? Some time ago I had a technical job interview with Google. The invitation email had a line our interview questions are confidential, so please keep things under wraps Is this legally enforceable? I doubt that, as I did not sign any contract with Google. And this condition looks like "upon reading this you agree to following". | Can job interview questions be confidential? Is this legally enforceable? It is lawful, unless the nature of questions is outlawed or hinting at illegal activity. For practical purposes, though, confidentiality would be hard to enforce because Google cannot realistically prevent you from disclosing those questions. Whether or not Google can remedy any breach of that clause, that is a separate and uncertain aspect. Google's clause is binding only if you consent to it. Signing an NDA is not the only way to render confidentiality binding. Consent can be evidenced by anything that reflects your agreement to abide by that condition. It could be an email reply, or by subsequent conduct such as attending the interview with knowledge that constraint and without objecting to it. The fact that you attended the interview after reading that email makes their clause binding unless you objected and they nonetheless conducted the interview. | It is legal for a company to ask for any information they want as a condition of doing business with you, so long as their request isn't proscribed by law. I don't know of any jurisdiction where a request for banking or credit information is illegal. (In this case, however, it does seem like you are being phished. You could report the matter to your country's consumer protection agency.) | Well, as always, the answer is "it depends". It isn't illegal per se. If both parties agree, it's good business. You get paid for the work of compiling the report. For example, let's say you leave and are no longer working for them, and they call you and say "hey, you know those security vulnerabilities you were talking about last year? Yeah, the boss finally decided to give it priority, but it seems we kept no notes in that meeting. Could you compile a report for us? I know you no longer work here, but we would pay you a little more than the normal contractor rate if you are interested". That's perfectly fine. Now, not disclosing them when you found them could be seen as a breach of contract, which implicitely includes the duty of loyalty. Keeping it a secret to cash in on later is certainly sleazy. The compiled report might, depending on state laws, your specific contract, and who can pay the better lawyer, end up as their's. You can only compile that report because you worked there and you got knowledge of those vulnerabilites only as a part of your job. And finally, even if you did compile a report and it is waterproof and it is yours exclusively, it very much depends on the "else". What if they just say "no thanks"? Selling that report to someone else is illegal. So you have exactly one legal buyer and that buyer knows it. Does not sound like a great bargaining position. If you approach them, it takes a lot of skill and maybe a bit of legal training to make sure it does come across as an offer of "good business". I think it would be easy to be misinterpreted as either blackmail or selling them knowledge they legally probably already own. So unless you are certain you can fit into that "good business" model of selling your work compiling a report, instead of selling the knowledge of their secrets, it might be safer to not do that. If they approach you, it should not be a problem, but if you approach them, it will be a mess, no matter how well you mean it. | This would not be terribly unusual and would probably be enforceable. An NDA's restrictions would almost always survive the term of the agreement and keeping what you promised not to disclose secret forever would be a pretty common default. If you inherit nuclear missile designs in an old trunk from your grandfather from when he worked for a defense contractor, you can't give them to a terrorist group either. There is not "standard" NDA, but there are provisions which are more common to include in some form and those that are less common. If it was breached, there would be a statute of limitations running from the discovery of the breach to file suit, however. Also, damages would be minimal if the confidential information became outdated, for example, because the business in question ceased to exist a couple of decades ago, and no one would spend the money to enforce it. | Contacting a business email about a business matter is usually fine, but in this case we have an unsolicited marketing communication (spam), not really a business matter. The client's jurisdiction likely has more specific rules about spam. Also, it is unusual (read: presumably illegitimate) to contact individual employees rather than the company's official address with the offering. From the GDPR perspective, every processing of personal data (such as email addresses that might identify natural persons) needs a legal basis (Art 6). Let's go through them: consent? No. necessary for performance of a contract involving the data subject? No. legal obligation? No. vital interests? No. public interest? No. legitimate interest? Perhaps. The client has a legitimate interest to conduct their business. However, this legitimate interest must not be overridden by the data subject's interests, rights, and freedoms. Such as the interest in not being disturbed by spam mails. It is the Data Controller's (your client's) responsibility to balance the legitimate interest themselves to determine whether they have a legal basis, but I really don't think that they do. In conclusion, your client's idea is a bad idea: They likely do not have a legal basis for this under the GDPR. They are likely violating more specific anti-spam laws in their jurisdiction. They are working hard to get their domain put on spam filter lists. Note that already the step of collecting employee email addresses is personal data processing and needs a legal basis. Of course, the GDPR does not apply when the client is not established in the EU and only processes the addresses of persons that are not in the EU. | are employers legally allowed to punish (e.g. fire, reprimand, etc.) an employee who shares wage/salary information with their colleagues? No. Section 8 of the BC Labour Relations Code preserves for the employee "the freedom to communicate to an employee a statement of fact [...] with respect to the employer's business". More conclusively, section 64 entitles a person to disclose --except for purposes of picketing-- "information [...] relating to terms or conditions of employment or work done or to be done by that person". Wage/salary information clearly is a condition of employment. the only answer to that question relies on a law from a different province (Ontario) and so is not relevant in BC. That answer is relevant to Canada (also the question was about Canada). That answer cites a statute from Ontario because that is the jurisdiction that the asker specified. It would be tiresome as well as futile to provide the statutory equivalent of every province on a matter that the provinces are very unlikely to legislate materially differently. | You don't say what jurisdiction's patent laws you're interested in, and priority dates can differ in different schemes. I'm answering as to U.S. law only. In the United States, under the current hybrid "first-inventor-to-file" system, the priority date--the date that determines who "wins" if there are multiple claims to a specific invention--is, with some exceptions that I won't go into, the date of your first application. In other words, the date that the PTO got it in the mail. Once your application is submitted, it is--again, with some limitations I won't get into--prior art for the purposes of any later-submitted application. They can't get another application later, grant it first, and then deny your application based on the later-submitted application. Your application date would still win out. Could someone in the USPTO slip your application out of the stack, fudge the dates, and convince some other company to submit a similar application to get priority over you? Not as a practical matter, no. The USPTO isn't one guy in a room; it's a large organization, and the person who opens the mail, types in your application details, and sends you a receipt, isn't the same guy who knows whether your invention is any good or not. And, frankly, very few patentable inventions are going to be worth someone risking their job and/or jail time over--especially when there would be significant evidence of the misconduct--for example, your patent agent's files. So what are the chances that the examiner on your patent: 1) Is a nefarious character who has lived a life of public service long enough and wants to go rogue; 2) Has a friend in the mailroom who is also an expert in the field of your invention; and 3) Has a conduct in industry who is willing to break the law for the rights to your invention? Slim to none. And if you have an invention that is really so revolutionary that it's going to be worth so many people risking so much to steal it, odds are there will be other evidence that you were the inventor. | The essential parts of a trade secret are that (a) it is something that you keep secret, and (b) something that gives you an advantage in trade because you know it and others don't. A trade secret remains a trade secret if you give it to someone else under a non-disclosure agreement. If it is available where anyone can download it, either intentionally or by carelessness, then it isn't a trade secret anymore (as soon as it actually gets downloaded). If it gets made public through some illegal activity, well, that's too complicated for me. Anyway, YOU don't have to pretend anything. A claim that something is a trade secret doesn't make it one. And if something is a trade secret, no claim about it is necessary. If you download the software without doing anything illegal then it isn't a trade secret. To reply to the comment: If the sequence of events is this: I download the source code. I read the license. The license says "by using the software ..." then clearly I have the source code before using the software. At that point the trade secret status is lost. We don't need to discuss whether the license would have been enforcible, because the software is already downloaded before the license starts applying. I can tell anyone in the world about it. (I can't give the software to anyone, because that is copyright infringement, a totally different matter). |
Claiming self-defense and refusing to self-incriminate at the same time Bob shoots Rob dead. Noone saw what actually happened, no video footage, nothing. Bob does not deny shooting Rob but claims it was self-defense. He does not go into details — invoking his right not to witness against himself. Given that the mere fact of shooting a person dead does not itself prove murder/manslaughter beyond reasonable doubt, can Bob be convicted? Which legal doctrine would presume guilt unless he provides plausible explanation of the necessity of shooting for self-defense? Jurisdiction — anywhere where Bob would normally be acquitted if he convinces the jury of self-defense. | australia new-south-wales The prosecution must eliminate self-defence beyond reasonable doubt The common law of self-defence has been replaced by statute law in ss418-423 of the Crimes Act 1900. This part of the Judicial Commission of NSW’s Criminal Trial Bench Book spells out the law around it in detail. In particular: In order for self-defence to be raised or left to the jury there must be evidence capable of supporting a reasonable doubt in the mind of the tribunal of fact as to whether the prosecution has excluded self-defence: Colosimo v DPP [2006] NSWCA 293 at [19]. It is not essential that there be evidence from the accused as to the accused’s beliefs and perceptions: Colosimo v DPP at [19]; but it must be raised fairly on the evidence: Mencarious v R (2008) 189 A Crim R 219 at [61], [78], [90]; Douglas v R [2005] NSWCCA 419 at [99]–[101]. A tactical decision not to raise self-defence does not of itself foreclose the obligation of the trial judge, in appropriate circumstances, to leave the issue to the jury: Flanagan v R (2013) 236 A Crim R 255 at [76]. This means that while a jury can always acquit on the basis of self-defence, the judge only needs to give directions on it if it is an issue in evidence in the trial. That evidence may have been introduced by the defence or the prosecution, for example, the testimony of prosecution witnesses may raise the issue of self-defence. If it’s there, however it got there, the judge has to direct the jury to consider it. Quoting from the suggested direction: This right arises where two circumstances exist. The first is that the person believes that [his/her] … [specify act, for example, stabbing] was necessary in order to defend [himself/herself]. The second is that what [the accused] did was a reasonable response in the circumstances as [he/she] perceived them. Although “self-defence” is referred to as a defence, on a charge of murder it is for the Crown to eliminate it as an issue by proving beyond reasonable doubt that [the accused’s] … [specify act, for example, stabbing] was not done by [the accused] in self-defence. It may do this by proving beyond reasonable doubt that [the accused] did not believe at the time of the [specify act, for example, stabbing] that it was necessary to do what [he/she] did in order to defend [himself/herself]. TL;DR The defence does not have to plead self-defence or introduce any evidence about it - it’s something the prosecution has to eliminate. | As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for Murder, Manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him? There are basically two distinct issues here. What is the duty? And if a duty was breached, what intent is necessary to breach it? There is not a legal duty to be vaccinated. There is a duty to use reasonable care not to hurt others. The duty not to hurt others could be satisfied by not seeing Bob in person, by wearing a mask around Bob or by having other non-transmission means available, in addition to being vaccinated. But Eve didn't do any of these things. We don't know if Eve had any reason to think that she presented a risk of infection to Bob because she could have passed the virus to him while she was asymptomatic. We also know, by the assumption of the question, that Eve was the source of the infection. But, in real life, proving the source of an infection beyond a reasonable doubt is very challenging or impossible. This must be established for any homicide crime. There is no indication that Eve knew she was transmitting the virus to Bob, or that Eve intended to transmit the virus to Bob (if she intentionally spat in Bob's face intending to infect him that would be a different matter). At most, her conduct was reckless, but if she was asymptotic and has no idea that she was doing something that was actually putting Bob at risk, her intent could be as slight as negligent (for tort law purposes only) or criminally grossly negligent. Since she lacked the necessary intent to commit murder (i.e. either an intention to kill, or an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm), she could not be guilty of the offense of murder. There are three types of voluntary manslaughter in England, none of which apply here: "There are three types of voluntary manslaughter: that resulting from loss of self-control; that resulting from statutorily defined diminished responsibility; and killing in perseverance of a suicide pact." So, this leaves involuntary manslaughter as the most serious possible homicide offense. Involuntary manslaughter could encompass either reckless conduct (i.e. "the unlawful act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise it as an act which must subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm resulting therefrom albeit not serious harm") and is usually in furtherance of some other criminal offense, or in the case of "gross negligence manslaughter", negligent conduct that is a far greater level of wrongdoing than the negligence that would suffice for civil tort liability. Gross negligence manslaughter is the most plausible charge and is itself a hard call that involves judgement and discretion on the part of the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, and the jury in a jury trial) that is exercised on a case by case basis considering all of the circumstances. Also, to be clear, the wrongful act in a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter case would be transmitting the virus (which could have been prevented multiple ways) and not failing to get vaccinated itself. | Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that "force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is "of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack." Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, "with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant," is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), "[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity." More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense. | There was a case like that in 2010 in germany tl;dr synopsis of the German article: The police raided the private home of an alleged member of a criminal gang. This was performed as a no-knock raid. The police officers did not announce themselves as such when they started to break open the door. The suspect had reason to believe that a rival gang was planning an attempt on his life. So the suspect believed that the people trying to break into his home were actually members of said gang trying to murder him. The suspect used a firearm to shoot at the intruders through the door, lethally injuring a police officer. When the police officers then identified themselves as such, the suspect surrendered immediately. A court later ruled that killing the police officer was self-defense, because they were reasonably convinced that the defendant was unaware that he was dealing with police officers, believed to be in a situation where his life was in danger and where lethal violence was the only way to save his life. Here is the verdict. [In German, of course] | Illinois has a "Castle Doctrine" which includes dwellings and other qualified buildings, but not a general "Stand your Ground" doctrine. Normally, to claim self-defense one has to show that they were not able to retreat and had to use force, but in Illinois you do not have a duty to retreat if you are preventing criminal interference with a dwelling or with real property that you or a family member owns, or you have a legal duty to protect (see Ill Code 720-2 and Ill Code 720-3). In order to use deadly force in any case, it must be to prevent a forcible felony, which is defined as (720 ILCS 5/2-8): "Forcible felony" means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. So, assuming you have no legal duty to protect the 7-11, you would not be justified in using deadly force against rioters merely on the basis that they were committing a forcible felony against the building. On the other hand, if you were in the store or could see someone in the store being attacked, you may be able to successfully defend deadly force used to protect yourself or that person. | united-states This will vary somewhat by jurisdiction. But in most US states: Bob happily blabs to the media and exposes all the other jurors and what they've said and who they are. All for some clout, or money. If the authorities can trace these stories back to Bob (and they will put some effort into tracing them) Bob may well be found guilty of criminal contempt of court, fined, and sentenced to a short period in jail. He may also lose the right to be on a jury in future. Bob secretly tells the prosecution/defense that he'll do whatever they ask to manipulate the jury, for a favour. If this comes out, Bob could be convicted of soliciting a bribe, and if the scheme went forward, of both accepting a bribe, and jury tampering (or either, depending on the evidence). These are serious crimes, and Bob might well spend several years in prison. Bob is a nutcase, and acts in bad faith to manipulate the jury just for the hell of it. For example, "filibustering" and wasting everyone's time, without explicitly stepping into maliciousness. It is not unlawful to be a nutcase. The judge could order Bob removed from the jury if his disruptions were serious enough. If Bob actually violated th explicit instructions issued by the judge, he might be convicted of contempt, as in case 1, but this is rather less likely. A comment adds the scenario: Bob knows that the guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but still tries to sway the jury for a not-guilty verdict (whether he tells other jurors what's going on or not) and will hang the jury if that fails, because he doesn't believe the defendant should get in trouble for it This is an instance of "jury nullification". Bob is within his legal rights, and cannot be punished, nor removed from the jury. Bob can try to convince the other jurors that the law is unjust, or that the possible penalties are too severe for what the accused did, or of some other reason not to convict. If they agree, and acquit the accused, the acquittal stands, however contrary to the letter of the law. If they do not agree, there is a mistrial because of a hung jury. The prosecution may (but need not) retry the accused. | Under U.S. law the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed a particular crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it is not sufficient to prove that someone committed one of three crimes without proving which one it was. an alternative that I thought of later: someone is found somewhere where they can legally be, but in a situation where the only way they could have gotten there would involve trespassing through one of several properties owned by different people. Since the crime of trespassing requires the prosecution merely to show that someone was on the property of another without legal authorization to do so, it might be possible to prove this crime beyond a reasonable doubt without showing precisely which property was crossed, although I wouldn't be surprised if there was a split of authority among U.S. states on this question. | Legal Context This kind of argument is often called a "defense of others" defense which is available in every jurisdiction of which I am aware. Almost every state has a specific description of when this is permitted as part of their criminal code, usually in a general principles section at the beginning, or in the sections pertaining to crimes of violence. Some details vary from one state to another, but none of the facts presented in this hypothetical really push the envelope in terms of distinctions between one state's law and another. Most of the differences involve situations when the use of deadly force is allowed. For example, states differ regarding when deadly force allowed to prevent a burglary of your home or business which is in progress, particularly if it is possible to avoid a use of deadly force at all by retreating in a manner that puts you at no one at any significant risk of bodily injury. But, the scenario presented does not appear to involve the use of deadly force (although the definition of "deadly force" can be slippery and lead to some subtle variations in what is permitted from state to state). Another common nuance of variation between states involves the circumstances under which physical force or deadly physical force is authorized to make a citizens arrest, but this situation is also not implicated by your hypothetical. Once Thug is beat up, the scenario ends without any effort to detain Thug until the police arrive. Generally speaking, a defense of others defense that justifies a use of force under criminal law will also not give rise to civil liability in a lawsuit for assault and battery as opposed to a criminal prosecution for it. A Sample Defense Of Others Statute The pertinent section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (2016), strongly influenced by the language of the Model Penal Code (which never adopted in full by any state but highly influential stylistically in how U.S. criminal codes are drafted) is very typical of the majority rule regarding the defense of others and reads as follows (emphasizing the language relevant to the scenario in the question): § 18-1-704. Use of physical force in defense of a person (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204 ; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if: (a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or (b) He is the initial aggressor; except that his use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. (4) In a case in which the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as an affirmative defense, the court shall allow the defendant to present evidence, when relevant, that he or she was acting in self-defense. If the defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the court shall instruct the jury with a self-defense law instruction. The court shall instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly, with extreme indifference, or in a criminally negligent manner. However, the self-defense law instruction shall not be an affirmative defense instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall not have the burden of disproving self-defense. This section shall not apply to strict liability crimes. Analysis of the Hypothetical Facts Is Paul guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug, or would self-defense or some other standard defense apply? Paul is probably not guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug because a defense of others defense justifies his actions. Paul is using physical force to defend a third person (and presumably himself as well once once he is involved in the fray) from what he reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful physical force by Thug, and generally, under those circumstances Paul may use a degree of force which Paul reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. Paul is most vulnerable in this scenario on the question of whether he reasonably believed that the degree of force he used was reasonably necessary for the purpose of defending Emily and himself from Thug's unlawful use of physical force, or whether he went further than what was reasonably necessary for a few minutes that left Thug "incapacitated and thoroughly bloodied". For example, suppose that Paul had already caused Thug to try to flee the scene after the first minute at which point Thug was slightly bruised and afraid of Paul, but was not at all incapacitated. But, suppose that despite this fact that Paul, awash with adrenaline from the fight, continued to pummel Thug for a couple more minutes as Thug repeatedly tried to flee the scene only to be dragged back by Paul. Suppose that Paul continued the fight after it was no longer necessary because Paul wanted to punish Thug for his mistreatment of Emily and to discourage other people from trying to attack Emily in the future, even after Paul knew that there was already no real risk that Thug himself would continue to use unlawful physical force against Emily no or in the near future. Under these circumstances, which aren't inconsistent with the hypothetical facts, if this extra couple of minutes caused Thug to be much more badly injured than he otherwise would have been if Thug had been allowed to flee after the first minute, then Paul could still be guilty of assault and battery, even though his actions were legally justified for the first minute of the fight. There is no indication that either Paul or Emily provoked the attack on Emily, or that either Paul or Emily was the initial aggressor, or that this was actually a pre-agreed dueling situation. So each of these circumstances which would be exceptions to the general rule that the defense of others is justified do not apply to this case. There is likewise no indication that Paul used "deadly force" as opposed to mere "physical force" in handling the situation. It is likely that Paul would have committed a crime if he had shot and killed Thug instead of beating him up, if Paul knew perfectly well at the time that he was capable of beating up Thug and making Thug go away for good as a result without resorting to a firearm, unless the attack on Emily was severe enough for Paul to reasonably believe that the attack was putting Emily at a real risk of serious bodily injury. |
ISP is not hashing the password I log in with online. Should I take any action? I just phoned the customer support number for my ISP for the first time and was surprised to be asked the fourth and fifth characters of my password, specifically the one I used to log into my account on their website, not a special password for use over the phone. The fact that they know what the fourth and fifth characters are shows that they are not hashing the password. I believe the GDPR requires them to store the password securely, and if they're not hashing it then I'm sure it can't be considered secure, so should I report them to someone? The only thing that makes me think this might be acceptable is that it's common for organisations to ask for certain characters of a password over the phone. I think they normally set up a different password specifically for this though, rather than using the website login. | The GDPR does indeed require that the password be stored "securely". It does not specify the technology which must be used for that purpose. Hashing the PW is a common method, and should be sufficient if properly implemented (strong hash function, use of salt, etc). But other methods of securing the password might be sufficient. Encrypting the PW rather than hashing it, so that an authorized person could decrypt it temporarily might be OK. Or perhaps a security app can separately retrieve only the specified characters of the PW through some sort of encryption. Or perhaps the ISP is not using proper security. In the case of Knuddles in the linked news story, an actual breach occurred which led to the poor security being reported. You could send a report to the appropriate national Data Protection Authority. | If you merely provide software for your client to use, you are not processing personal data on behalf of the client. But if you have access to systems that store personal data, then you must consider the GDPR. Or more accurately: your client must consider the GDPR. Under what legal basis can they give you access to the data in these systems? The easiest way to solve this is indeed if you act as the client's processor. Processor status is never the default, but requires a binding contract with the data controller. This contract will require you to only process personal data as explicitly instructed by the client, and may require you to take certain security measures as a precaution. Without such a contract you aren't a data processor, but possibly a data controller of your own (with all the compliance obligations that implies). | Much of your ability to sue the email company for damages depends on local and Estonian laws, but the most important aspect is the TOS and user agreement you agreed to when you originally signed up for the service. Read it (though if the portal is now off-line, it may not be accessible). You may have agreed to hold the company not liable for any damages from loss or stolen data, and you may have also agreed to arbitration and to not pursue them in court. It all depends on what is (was) in that agreement, so find a copy of it; though it's possible that some local or Estonian laws may supersede any contractual agreement with the company. And FYI, the email you received concerning the video and demanding payment in Bitcoin is a common scam right now, and the threat may indeed be meaningless. | They are probably not required to provide online access at all. They are probably required to provide some sort of written statement, unless you have waived that in favor of online or electronic versions. The exact requirements will vary in different jurisdictions. | Yes, but it doesn't matter. This answer discusses gdpr implications. Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable person. The GDPR has an extremely broad concept of identifiability, also covering indirect identification using additional information and with the help of third parties. Even just being able to single out one data subject, i.e. being able to distinguish different users from another, counts as identification. If you already have a concept of user accounts, any information that is linked with the user accounts and somehow relates to those users would also be personal data. Since you have distinct push tokens per user, it seems like this criterion would be met. Additionally, those unique tokens might be directly identifying by themselves. The GDPR does not allow for semantic games like “it only identifies the device, not the user”. The key here is that the definition of identifiability does not hinge on your intentions, but on objective capabilities: if you or someone else who can come into possession of this data were to attempt to identify the user (such as singling out users from another), would they be reasonably likely able to do that? Since most devices are single-user, being able to identify a device would imply that you're reasonably likely to also identify users. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean you're forbidden from using that data. It means that you'd have to comply with GDPR rules, if you're otherwise within scope of that regulation (e.g. if you're EU/UK-based, or are targeting your services to people who are in UK/EU). For example, basic GDPR compliance steps include having a clear legal basis for your processing of personal data (such as necessity for performing a contract to which the data subject is party, or necessity for a legitimate interest, or consent), providing a privacy notice, and taking appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to ensure the compliance and security of processing. For example, TOMs regarding these push tokens could involve encryption, access controls, and a plan for installing security patches in order to prevent data breaches. Using push tokens is already a good measure in this context, since they are effectively pseudonymous and prevent linking additional information via that token (two sites/apps pushing notifications to the same person will have entirely different tokens). However, the push notification provider (e.g. Google, Apple, Mozilla) can resolve the pseudonymous tokens and link them to a person, indicating that these tokens are ultimately identifying (even if you can't perform that linking yourself). Note that if GDPR applies, then other EU/UK rules might apply as well. For example, sending electronic messages (such as emails) is subject to anti-spam rules (EU: ePrivacy, UK: PECR). These rules apply regardless of whether personal data is involved. Since the rules are not technology-specific, it is likely that regulators would consider user-visible push notifications to be equivalent to more well understood technologies like email and SMS. | In the question, you write: The GDPR requires consent of the subject for collection or storage of personal data (in this case, IP addresses in a log file). No, it does not. To quote Miss Infogeek: GDPR DOES NOT MAKE CONSENT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ALL PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA. Consent (Article 6 (1)a) is indeed one of conditions that can be used to comply with the GDPR requirement that processing must be lawful, but it is not the only condition available to the controller to ensure lawful processing – there are alternatives (before the list of conditions it says that "at least one of the following" must be satisfied). All the conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. One of alternatives are Article 6 (1)f. It says says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) As noted in the question, logging IP addresses for the purpose of security is an extremely widespread practice. It is a legitimate interest to comply with standard security practices. It is the default, and most (all?) web-sites do this. I.e. it is legal to do this without consent (if this is not the case, I am pretty sure the outcry had been heard all over the Internet by now). | The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization. | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. |
GDPR - reCAPTCHA with user's consent? This question is specifically about Google's reCAPTCHA, but may possibly apply to many other CAPTCHA solutions that are collecting "personal" data. I was reading briefly about ePrivacy regulations and I have found very good resource about PECR and cookies at ICO. I have tried to contact ICO via their Live chat, but unfortunately they don't provide any legal advice. However, they said - "If you're collecting personal data, then you must comply with GDPR." From what I could find online and from what I can see in browser, Google's reCAPTCHA is collecting client's hardware and software information in order to analyse if the client is human or robot. Some of the cookies are sent to google.com. Some unofficial sources say that Google even use their GA tracking cookie to identify human vs. bot. In my understanding this approach can be seen as tracking or fingerprinting. So I'm wondering how is it actually from legal point of view? Do we really need to obtain user's consent before we can use Google's reCAPTCHA on website served to EU citizens? ICO says, there are exemptions for session cookies providing security that is essential to comply with data protection security... Can be reCAPTCHA considered as tool for providing data protection security? My point is that no bot will ever give consent to reCAPTCHA, so what is way out of this riddle? UPDATE (2018-05-07) I noticed Google updated their EU user consent policy, that is linked from reCAPTCHA admin, located here: Their terms of service: ...it is your responsibility to provide any necessary notices or consents for the collection and sharing of this data with Google. For users in the European Union, you and your API Client(s) must comply with the EU User Consent Policy currently located at http://www.google.com/about/company/user-consent-policy.html. So assuming the consent is required, I would like to rephrase my original question: If I offer ways to give consent and/or deny reCAPTCHA; Is it legally acceptable to include and execute reCAPTCHA on website by default without prior consent? | “From your perspective you should not worry about asking permission to use reCaptcha as it is not you who is processing the data it is google and any GDPR compliance falls on them.“ This is plain wrong. If a user visits your website you are the controller of data collected on your website. Regardless of what entity collects that data. However in my non-legal opinion reCAPTCHA falls under Article 6 section 1d and 1f. Also Recital 49. 1d: “processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person;” While you could argue in some cases (most probably) reCAPTCHA is used to reduce spam to a business entity thus not a “natural person”. 1f: “processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.” Here is where the real ruling applies “Legitimate interests”. You as a business have a legitimate interest in reducing spam into your business. Not only does spam take up your time but it also takes up your resources. As to the extent in which spam takes up is dependent on the usage in question. But nearly everyone can safely assume reducing spam (one of the cornerstones of the GDPR) is a legitimate interest. Recital 49 (excerpt): The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, […] by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. | There are two issues with typical analytics solutions: they rely on visitor consent they involve processing in the US Some people believe that they can sidestep GDPR problems by only collecting anonymous data, but this doesn't matter for the consent requirement, and is also impractical in my experience. These aspects are discussed in more detail below. Before I go further, I have to mention that no common analytics solution relies on third-party cookies. While analytics services are often provided by a third party, that is neither technically nor legally relevant. Technically, these analytics scripts usually set some analytics ID on a first-party cookie – a cookie scoped to the domain where the website is running, not scoped to the analytics provider's domains. Legally, analytics services often serve as a “data processor” on behalf of a website, and don't use the collected data for their own purposes. GDPR allows outsourcing processing activities (such as analytics collection) to others. In particular, this means that there is no technical or legal argument for preferring self-hosting over using some analytics services, assuming other relevant conditions are complied with (data processing agreement, international transfers). In the past, ad blockers have also blocked a large percentage of self-hosted analytics servers. Self-hosting some analytics solution is primarily valuable because it gives you more control over where the data is processed. But it doesn't give you better analytics, and doesn't let you sidestep any consent requirements. Server-side tracking is quite limited in what kind of info it can collect, but it is the only collection method that cannot be blocked. Since you're only re-interpreting data that the server has anyway, no extra network requests are caused between the client and the server. Collection session- or user-level data can be challenging though, unless the visitor is logged in. Server-side data collection is very easy on traditional websites, but more challenging e.g. with single-page applications that communicate with the backend via GraphQL. Server-side data collection is most valuable when business-level events can be tracked – an event such as “placed order” is probably closer to the user's intent than “navigated to /checkout”. You will probably find that this is not an either–or situation. You will likely want some server-side analytics as a baseline (limited data, but less problematic legally, and limited impact of blocking software), but still want to use traditional analytics for those visitors that consent to it. When consent is needed By itself, there might be a legitimate interest for collecting analytics. But for collecting session-level data, it is necessary to assign some kind of identity to visitors. This is usually done by setting a cookie with a random ID. Per the ePrivacy Directive in the version from 2009, any access or storage to information on the end user's device needs consent, unless that access/storage is strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user. This is known as the “cookie law”, but is not technology-specific and will also apply to equivalent client-side approaches such as LocalStorage, tracking IDs in URLs, or fingerprinting. The consent requirement is also independent from the question whether the stored information qualifies as personal data. The GDPR didn't change anything with these rules. It only changed the definition of consent, invalidating “implied consent” approaches like “by continuing to use this site, you consent to …”. Consent means opt-in. Consent must be easy to decline and to withdraw, and users must understand what specifically they are consenting to. This has led to a decrease in percentage of people who consent to storage of analytics IDs. What you can do about it Consent is only explicitly required for client-side storage or equivalent technologies. That means you may be able to collect some analytics on an opt-out basis. You can collect some client-side data without asking for consent. And you can probably use server-side data for analytics purposes. That means you are able to get comparable page-level data, but not session-level data. For determining the country of the user, you just need the user's IP, and this is available server-side. Google's deprecation of UA and move to GA4 helps analytics customers to be more compliant, by making it easier to collect data without setting a ClientID. Why US-based services are a problem The GDPR expects that the entire data processing pipeline maintains a high level of data protection. This means that transferring personal data into non-European countries is only allowed if they offer an adequate level of data protection. Alternatively, contracts (SCCs) between the data exporter and data importer may be able to translate enough of the GDPR into an enforceable contract with the foreign importer, to ensure compliance of processing there. The US did have an adequacy decision called “Privacy Shield”, but this was invalidated due to concerns over the rule of law in relation to US mass surveillance laws. For the same reasons, contracts with US-based data importers are probably invalid. There are also increasing concerns of using EU-based services from US-controlled companies. In particular with relation to Google Analytics, there have been repeated warnings by data protection agencies that use of this service violates GDPR. GA does not guarantee that the personal data collected via the analytics platform is only processed in Europe. What you can do about it The international transfer problems can be avoided by using an analytics service hosted in Europe, or in any other country with an adequacy decision (such as Canada). Self-hosting on an European server is another popular option. Analytics data is rarely anonymous In your question, you write: I don't want to use PII data, but eager instead to find a privacy-friendly way to distinguish one user from another. It is important to mention here that the US concept of PII is substantially more narrow than the GDPR concept of personal data (PD). PD is not just directly identifying info, but any data relating to an identifiable person. A person is identifiable not only when you know their real-world identity or email address, but already when you can single them out in a data set, or otherwise distinguish them from others. Thus, per-session or per-visitor analytics data should be treated as personal data, and GDPR continues to apply (which may or may not mandate consent). Anonymization is possible but challenging. Anonymization tries to ensure that there are no reasonable means that could likely identify the data subject. The only widely used anonymization method is aggregate statistics, e.g. moving from per-user events to average values. In particular, aggregate metrics such as “pageviews per month” are anonymous. Other anonymization techniques I have seen: Tokenization: mapping the user's ID to an entirely random ID. After some time (e.g. 24 hours), the mapping is erased so that the random ID cannot be traced back to a user. Plausible uses a weaker variant of this that uses a hash function to derive a pseudo-random ID from the user's identifying info (e.g. IP address). While Plausible's approach avoids having to store a large lookup table, a malicious server operator could log the daily key and use it to recover the original data from the hashed IDs. The weakness of this approach is that it still relies on some identifying data. While it is a good compliance and security measure, it doesn't really change anything fundamental from the GDPR perspective. Differential privacy: individual records are distorted with an appropriate amount of noise, but the noise cancels out when calculating aggregate statistics. Such techniques are the state of the art, and the only class of general-purpose anonymization techniques that are likely to achieve anonymization in the sense of the GDPR. However, they are mathematically involved. I don't know of any analytics product that incorporates differential privacy techniques. From my own research into GDPR-anonymized analytics, I found it challenging to design solutions that both provide proper anonymization and are able to provide sufficiently accurate session-level statistics as expected from a typical web analytics solution. | Well actually... I think you'll just need to wait a little more. I monitor the situation quite closely and I can tell you that it's just a matter of time. Microsoft was one of the first (if not the first) to communicate openly about the GDPR and the changes that follow. From the blog post: If your organization collects, hosts or analyzes personal data of EU residents, GDPR provisions require you to use third-party data processors who guarantee their ability to implement the technical and organizational requirements of the GDPR. To further earn your trust, we are making contractual commitments available to you that provide key GDPR-related assurances about our services. Our contractual commitments guarantee that you can: Respond to requests to correct, amend or delete personal data. Detect and report personal data breaches. Demonstrate your compliance with the GDPR. Microsoft is the first global cloud services provider to publicly offer you these contractual commitments. We believe privacy is a fundamental right. The GDPR is an important step forward to further clarify and enable individual privacy rights and look forward to sharing additional updates how we can help you comply with this new regulation and, in the process, advance personal privacy protections. Microsoft has set up an informational site on GDPR here. If your eyes are on any other provider, I think the only way to learn more is getting in touch and inquiring about their progress and process. Hope this helps. | It's hard to prove a negative, and I'm not sure which specific part of the quoted Terms you object, to, but it specifically states that content access may be done to: Comply with the law Protect its customers; and Protect the security of its business; and Protect its business interests. It's unlikely that access of information to comply with the law is illegal. At least one EU directive, Directive 95/46/EC, sets limits on the collection and use of personal information. We're concerned with the first condition for lawful data processing, and the second principle of data quality. Data processing is only lawful if the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; or processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party; or processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection. The principles of data quality, which must be implemented for all lawful data processing activities, are the following: personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. They must also be adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, must not be stored for longer than necessary and solely for the purposes for which they were collected; special categories of processing: it is forbidden to process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. This provision comes with certain qualifications concerning, for example, cases where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or for the purposes of preventive medicine and medical diagnosis. So, let's say that someone has given their consent. It'd be at least a little questionable whether the inspection of private information could mean that they access personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. I'm a bit less clear on US laws, but you'd probably look for laws around Personal Identifying Information, as that's where a lot of focus has been. | There is a lot going on in this question, so I'll pick out some individual aspects. Last but not least, I'll discuss if GDPR even applies. Does the GDPR require consent for X? Almost always, no. Consent is only one of many legal bases of processing. A common alternative to consent is a “legitimate interest” where a balancing test is performed between this legitimate interest and your interests, rights, and freedoms. Consent is typically only appropriate if this balancing test fails, for example if you would not reasonably expect this processing activity to occur. It's worth noting that it's a reasonably common occurrence that businesses are sold or merged. This is not unexpected. In general, you would not be required to consent to such a transfer. What can a company do with personal data acquired through a merger/acquisition? The GDPR does not provide explicit provisions for this case. But it might be useful to think about the two cases where (a) the new company is a continuation or successor of the original one, and (b) where the data is transferred (“sold”) to an otherwise unrelated company. In case (a) where the business is continued as normal, there is no change. In case (b) where data is transferred to a separate company, things are more complicated. The original company would need a legal basis for transferring the data. But as mentioned above, there might be a legitimate interest. Arguably, such a transfer could also be based on Art 6(1)(b) if the transfer is necessary to continue to provide the service, for example if the original company would otherwise have to terminate service. Of course, activities like data brokering where access to data is granted to unrelated third parties would generally fail to be covered by contractual necessity or a legitimate interest, and would probably need consent – but that doesn't seem to be the case here. When a data controller (such as the new company) acquires your personal data from sources other than directly from you, then they are subject to the notice requirements in Art 14. They have to actively notify you about their processing activities. But because you received emails that mentioned the transfer, this condition might have been met. Of course the new company continues to be bound by the purpose limitation principle as detailed in Art 6(4) – they can only use the data for purposes that are compatible with the purposes for which the data was initially collected. Thus, the new company cannot arbitrarily widen processing purposes, though some change in scope is certainly permissible. How does the GDPR right to object and to restrict processing apply here? The Art 21 GDPR right to object means that if the legal basis for a processing activity is a “legitimate interest”, then you can ask for an opt-out. But in some cases, this objection does not have to be granted. An objection essentially requires the controller to repeat the legitimate interest balancing test, taking into account the “grounds relating to [your] particular situation” that you provided in the objection. The Art 18 GDPR right to restrict processing is an alternative to the right to erasure. It applies only in narrow circumstances, for example while an objection is being checked. It is likely that you were informed about the transfer to a new company about 1 month in advance, so that you would have been able to prevent this transfer by closing your account prior to the deadline. If the new company conducts processing activities based on a legitimate interest, then their presumably GDPR-compliant privacy notice about which you were notified will certainly explain that you have a right to object. Is the new company GDPR-compliant? That is impossible to tell, but nothing you've shown so far indicates that they're non-compliant. My largest issue with this story is that the new company is from Australia, a country with extraordinarily bad privacy protections (as of 2022). However, due to the way how the GDPR treats international transfers of data, this doesn't prevent Australian data controllers from being GDPR-compliant, although it does make it difficult for other companies to use services based in Australia. Does GDPR even apply? Whether GDPR applies to a non-European company depends only on whether they either offer goods or services to people who are in Europe (“targeting criterion”), and whether the monitor people's behavior that takes place in Europe. Factors such as your citizenship would be irrelevant. I'll ignore the monitoring criterion, and focus on the targeting criterion. I'll assume that you are in Europe (EU/EEA or UK). Whether a company is targeting people in Europe depends primarily on the company's intentions. It does not matter whether the service is accessible from Europe. Thus, it is quite possible that the original company was not subject to the GDPR. Then, any questions about GDPR, consent, and data transfers are moot. In contrast, the new company clearly mentions GDPR-compliance, which would only matter if they intend for people in Europe to use their services. So GDPR probably applies to them, giving you the full suite of GDPR data subject rights as (hopefully) outlined in their privacy notice. And as long as they notified you that they acquired your personal data in accordance of Art 14, I don't seen anything that they might have done wrong in respect to this acquisition/merger. | Yes, GDPR applies: you are a data controller established/living in the UK or are offering services to people in the UK you fall under the material scope of the GDPR. The Art 2(2)(c) exemption for “purely personal or household activity” does not apply since you're offering the service to the public. You must consider GDPR compliance here. This is especially important as you are showing personal data to the public. Don't do that unless you have a very good reason, appropriate safeguards, and are clear to users how their information will be shown. On a high level, GDPR compliance involves working on the following questions: For what purpose are you processing personal data? Context: purpose limitation principle per GDPR Art 5(1)(b) What is the legal basis for processing? GDPR Art 6(1) lists the available legal bases. Here, consent, necessity for performance of a contract, or a legitimate interest could be a legal basis. They may have further obligations attached. A legitimate interest requires a balancing test that considers the data subject's rights and freedoms. Consent must fulfil the conditions per Art 7 in order to be valid. What is the minimal data necessary to achieve the purpose? Per the Art 5(1)(c) data minimisation principle, it is illegal to process personal data beyond what is necessary and adequate. You must provide data protection by design and by default per Art 25. Special categories of data per Art 9 such as health data are illegal to process outside of narrow exemptions. You must delete data once it is no longer necessary. What appropriate safeguards and security measures should you apply? Per Art 24 and 25, you are responsible for determining and implementing appropriate measures. This depends a lot on your specific context, so there's no checklist you can apply. Per Art 25(1) you must pseudonymize the processed information if that is compatible with the processing purpose. What further compliance measures do you have to consider? There are additional GDPR and non-GDPR compliance measures. From the GDPR side: Use the answers to these questions to write a privacy policy, including the information that you must provide to data subjects per Art 13. Consider whether you have to maintain a Records of Processing document per Art 30, or if you have to make a Data Protection Impact Assessment per Art 35. If you use third party services, figure out whether they are a joint controller or data processor and apply appropriate safeguards. If you have data processors, ensure that you have a contract in place that covers the items from Art 28(3). If you share data with other controllers (not processors) you need a legal basis for doing so. If you transfer data into a non-EU/EEA country (after 2020: non-UK country) you need a legal basis per Art 44 and have to cover additional items in your privacy policy. Ideally, the target country is covered by an EC adequacy decision per Art 45. For US-based companies, this is the case only when they have self-certified under the Privacy Shield framework. Non-GDPR compliance steps could include cookie consent banners, or showing a VAT ID. How can you prepare for data subject requests? Data subjects have various rights per Arts 15–23, subject to the modalities in Art 12. For example, a data subject could request that their information is erased from your website. The exact rights also depend on the legal basis you selected. You should figure out in advance how to deal with such requests. | GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls. | The same page at the ICO website also lists what an organisation should do if they refuse to comply with a request: What should we do if we refuse to comply with a request? You must inform the individual without undue delay and within one month of receipt of the request. You should inform the individual about: the reasons you are not taking action; their right to make a complaint to the ICO or another supervisory authority; and their ability to seek to enforce this right through a judicial remedy. You should also provide this information if you request a reasonable fee or need additional information to identify the individual. Even if they did not inform you about this, the last two bullet points basically list your options. You can make a complaint (Art. 77 GDPR), or go to court (Art. 79 GDPR) requesting the online retailer to comply with your request. (Or do both). You can request a compensation for damages, but it is often difficult to prove if you have suffered (non-material) damages. |
What does Justice Anthony Kennedy mean by 'you're recused'? I refer to 71:31. 71:31 And Hugo Black stands up and stalks out 71:34 of the room, which is our polite way of saying, you're recused. 71:38 And so, the argument went on. 71:41 And at the end of the argument, the attorney 71:43 said, now, I don't know why Hugo did that, 71:45 because he's my cousin. Did Kennedy J misspeak by using the personal pronoun 'you're'? Isn't the Justice who 'stands up and stalks out of the room' the one who's recusing himself (no female justices then)? Please correct me if I'm wrong, but is Kennedy J implying a conflict of interest between the lawyer and Black J as they're cousins? | As I understand the story, Black recused himself because the attorney was his cousin. I think the joke is that the attorney thought it wasn't necessary for Black to do so, perhaps because the attorney didn't understand how seriously conflicts of interest are taken. I don't think Kennedy misspoke; I think he's just used the generic you construct, in which "you" is used as an impersonal pronoun instead of "one". His sentence could be rephrased more formally as: Hugo Black stands up and stalks out of the room, which among Supreme Court justices is a polite way to say that one is recused. In other words, Black's action is equivalent to him saying "I am recused". | I found the case in an episode of Amicus (podcast). Mark Joseph Stern was on the show and Dahlia Lithwick referred to an article he had written about the subject. Here is a quote from the article: In the 1990s, Thomas disapproved of race-conscious redistricting designed to empower black Democrats; today, he objects to race-conscious redistricting designed to empower white Republicans. In the 1990s, all the conservative justices voted to not allow taking race in to account to create solidly black districts. All the liberals said that it would be ok. Now (in Cooper v. Harris) all the liberals are saying it is not ok to take race in to account when destroying Democratic districts through gerrymandering and the all the conservatives said it would be ok, save Clarence Thomas, who remained consistent with the previous ruling, giving the liberal justices a victory. | If six justices decided that the case were sufficiently important, they could refrain from recusing themselves so as to be able to hear it. If that didn't happen, the lower court's ruling would stand, as you suggest. If I understand this rule correctly, if four justices had conflicts of interest, the court would lack a quorum. That's more likely, though admittedly very unlikely. However unlikely it may be, it has actually happened (for example, Shao v. Roberts). | From what I can determine, there has not been a legal challenge to the practice that reached a high enough level to get on my radar, so it's not clearly prohibited or allowed. Turning to the relevant federal regulations, the implementation of the Fair Housing Act, the law hinges in part on an Aggrieved person includes any person who— (a) Claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (b) Believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. In order to sue a university because they offer sex-separated halls, floors or rooms, a plaintiff would have to show that they have been harmed by being given such a choice. Reading the prohibitions in §100.50, there is no obvious "Discriminat[ion] in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities", and it does not "otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings". Cases like McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (a case putting an end to the "separate but equal" doctrine) include reference to the fact that appellant was harmed ("The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession"). Analogously, the relatively rare black-only residences of UC Davis and Cal State LA might be targeted in a discrimination suit, if plaintiffs can make the required legal argument that there is harm. | I haven't used the extension, but here are the concerns I would have: Does RECAP detect and handle documents filed under seal? Under some circumstances, IIRC, Pacer gives certain attorneys access to documents sealed from the general public. If you access these sealed documents through PACER and thereby submit them to the RECAP public repository, you have violated the Court order sealing the documents and might well be found in contempt. It is not unheard of for a Court to order a document replaced by a corrected version; this is most common when a document was inadvertently filed with information not redacted that should have been. As long as nobody but the parties and their lawyers have accessed it, this can prevent that information from being public. If you log on to PACER and see your client's personal information...you can no longer keep it private by asking the Court for that remedy, because you just submitted it to a public repository. Enjoy your malpractice suit. Does the use of RECAP constitute a waiver of work product protection? Under some (admittedly limited) circumstances, your use of PACER might constitute attorney work product, which would ordinarily be protected from disclosure in a manner similar to a privilege. Revealing your research pattern to a third party could waive that protection. | "Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent. | What are the things that I should prepare for this session, in terms of order of dress, language, content? Dress In an actual court room, suit and tie is preferred for men and formal dress for women for lawyers and professionals. Your "Sunday best" or what you would wear to work on a typical day would be appropriate if you don't have a suit and tie or the equivalent. Avoid nightclub looks, any garment or ornament with a message, or more than minimal jewelry or accessories. For a video testimony, solids come across better than complex patterns if the video resolution turns out to be low. Your clothing should not be a message other than that you are a respectful reputable member of the community. Language and Content You should avoid colloquialism or profanity (except in a quotation from someone else about what they said out of court), but should not try to affect an accent or dialect that you cannot speak naturally. If you grew up in rural West Virginia, don't try to pretend you grew up on the Harvard University campus. If you need an interpreter, you should let someone know in advance as this can be arranged. Generally, you should only speak in response to question, and should leave a "beat" between being asked and answering any question in case someone says "I object" before you start to answer. You should listen to the question you are asked, truthfully answer the question you were actually asked (not necessarily the one that was intended to be asked), and stop when you have answered it. (This is harder than it seems.) If asked an open ended question, take whatever time it takes to answer it completely. It is appropriate to instead ask for clarification of a question if you couldn't hear it properly or if you don't understand it because it uses a word you don't understand. If the question assumes something that isn't true, correct that wrong assumption. For example: "what did you see the defendant doing at the football game on Sunday?" "I didn't see the defendant doing anything at the football game on Sunday because he was having dinner with me after the baseball game on Sunday." Don't rush. Most people talk fast when they are nervous or try to over summarize. Everyone has gathered at this moment, in part, to hear what you have to say. Take the time necessary to say what you need to say to tell the whole story in response to the questions you are asked without summarizing the facts. A little emotion can be appropriate in your tone, but stay civil and don't blow your top. As a rule of thumb the person who seems most reasonable usually wins. The judge can be referred to as "your honor". Lawyers can be referred to as "sir" or "ma'm". In content, you will be normally asked to provide your opinion on things like "is there any reason he would be a flight risk" (ideally answering with not just a "no" but a "he owns a home and has deep ties to the community and would never flee."), "is he a threat to the public?", "does he have a good reputation in the community?" ("Yes, I'd trust him with my money and my children."). Don't make things up, but focus on facts that reasonably demonstrate that he is unlikely to flee because he has too much to lose, firm ties, and no place to go. | Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to "lawyer up" if we want to be safe? If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, if they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle. If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff. Otherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case. If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them. As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.) To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear. |
Can the entity storing my property indefinitely unilaterally decide to remove/discard it? Last year, a friend brokered an agreement on my behalf with a friend of his to store some of my property in their company's storage unit (he is the owner of the company). I was not a party to the original negotiation, and there was no paperwork signed, but I was under the impression that the deal was "for free, indefinitely", until I have the resources to move my property out and store it myself. Since then, the friend who owns the company has been dealing with me directly in regards to this matter, without a middleman. Recently, the owner has contacted me, unilaterally deciding that I have a month to remove my belongings from his unit, or he will remove and dispose of them himself, in addition to suggesting that he will begin to bill me during this time period as well. I'm pretty sure that he cannot suddenly start charging me (unless it were a month-to-month-type arrangement, in which case I would have the option to continue paying the increased rent to remain, but that's not an option here as he wants my stuff out, period). Given that there was no formal contract for this arrangement, what are the expectations as to how it legally should work, and what responsibilities/liabilities does/will his company have given that it's in possession of my property? Jurisdiction is New York City, if relevant. | what responsibilities/liabilities does/will his company have given that it's in possession of my property? None. There is no contract (implicit or otherwise) between the owner and you. The owner receives no consideration from you in exchange for storing your goods, and an essential element of contracts is an exchange of considerations. Thus, he has no obligation to continue storing your goods. Another essential element in contract law is that the agreement --meaning the conditions thereof-- be entered knowingly and willfully. Since the time of making the arrangement and up to now, you were reasonably unaware of the likelihood of an obligation to pay the owner. This preempts the owner's right to start billing you. If anything, you would need to prove special circumstances to avail yourself of a viable claim of promissory estoppel. See Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 171-172 (1994): To obtain recovery in promissory estoppel, plaintiff must establish (1) [a] promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his position (4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. However, the viability and duration of any relief pursuant to promissory estoppel seems very unlikely in the situation you describe. The hardship you are undergoing --and which prompted you to store your goods there-- is unfortunate. But generally speaking, a third party (such as the owner) who is unrelated to the causation or prolongation of that hardship cannot be lawfully forced to aid you for free. | When a contract states a thing that you get for a stated price, that means you should get the thing described, and you pay the stated price. If the landlord makes a mistake and wishes he had charged more, he can wait until the end of the lease period and then increase the price as he desires. He cannot raise the price until the end of the contract, and cannot retroactively charge that increase. (It's impossible to imagine there being contract language that allows that outcome, but we will assume there is no such clause). If the stated area is not as stated, especially if the area is actually smaller, the landlord is in breach of the contract, and could be sued for damages. It would depends on how different the areas are, when it comes to assigning damages. For example, 4 sqm in a unit with 800 sqm is not likely to result in any loss to the tenant. If the unit is bigger than stated, the prospects for damages are even less, perhaps a bit for added heating cost. Either way, if the size is incorrectly described, that is the landlord's fault, though probably not worth bothering with a lawsuit. | An LLC is a legally distinct entity from your person. Basically, if your LLC is sued, and you lose, you can lose only what you put into your LLC. Your personal assets are untouched. A very sophisticated plaintiff may try to get around this suing both your LLC and you personally. (I've done this myself.) Even so, if you are careful to keep the business of your LLC separate from your personal business (no commingling of assets, no use of your LLC to pay your bills, but only a salary), then the law will often absolve you of personal liability for the "actions" of your LLC. The reason I warn against "commingling" is because if you do this, you can lose the protection of the LLC as a separate entity, and become personally liable for what the LLC does. This is known as "piercing the corporate veil." If you have home rental operations in more than one state, you may want to establish LLC's for each state. That's because some states are more tenant- and other states are more landlord- friendly than others, meaning that you may want to defend yourself differently in one state versus another. | This is not theft, this is a contract dispute. You gave them money, they promised to do certain things, the contract says what that is. I surmise that they wanted a deposit to cover their costs in further dealing with you (moving is more complicated and costly than buying a loaf of bread), so in walking away from the deal, you've economically damaged them to some amount. The deposit is "liquidated damages". Your recourse is to sue them for that amount, because... Perhaps you didn't understand why you were giving them this deposit (an act that constitute some level of agreement), but any time you hand over a deposit, there is a circumstance under which you will not get that money back, and you have to understand what that circumstance is. | You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal. | the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it. | I assume you are already living there? No, you can't use that clause, specifically because the "previous renter" is the person(s) who occupied the apartment prior to your moving in (the "start date", or the first date that your lease is valid). That clause doesn't allow you to break the lease if one of the current renters vacates the apartment and leaves their stuff. This only means that if the apartment was not ready for you to occupy due to the previous tenant not vacating, that you are allowed to walk away from the lease without any payments (other than a credit verification fee). This pretty much requires you to not "move in" in the first place. If you've already moved in, you don't have a legal leg to stand on since you deemed the property fit to move in (and should have done a walk-through prior to accepting the condition of the apartment). If this is you "getting on" the lease, and the lease specifically says that you are being added and your "start date" is some date in the future that you intend to move in, you may have a leg to stand on since this is more like sub-letting individual rooms with a common area. It isn't clear to me if this is the case for you. Once the other person is off the lease they have basically abandoned their property and you may be able to dispose of it, or have the leasing company dispose of it. | See Brindley Twist Tafft & James LLP, "Focus on the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc.) 2010 [sic]". If the tenancy was an authorized tenancy under the terms of the mortgage: The Bank may still take possession of the property but they may have to do so subject to your occupation. The practical effect of this is that you would be allowed to remain living in the property subject to the terms of your tenancy agreement but you would see a change in the identity of the Landlord. It is possible for the tenancy to be brought to an end but in accordance with the terms of the tenancy agreement. If the tenancy was not authorized: Under the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc) 2010 [sic] (the “Act”) an unauthorised residential tenant is however entitled to request that possession be delayed for up to two months during which time they should try to find alternative accommodation. |
Does utilizing "copyleft" programs like git and gcc imply that the output has to be under the same license? GPL v2.0 states the following as git's license: b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License. According to this, any sort of "copyleft" license will stay with "derived" works. Does this apply in the case of utilizing "copyleft" software output within closed-source/non-"free as in freedom" project? | My understanding is that here "derived from the program" means "created by modifying the source code of the program" and not "created by running the program". Certainly that is the way all users that I have heard of treat the matter. Note that a commercial program, such as a word processor, will be fully protected by copyright, but the maker does not claim to have any rights over documents written using it. "Derived" here seems pretty clearly to mean "derivative work" in the sense in which that term is used in copyright law. In copyright law "derived work" is a term of art with a definition specific to that field. | The problem is that open source licenses incl AGPL have legal force because copyright prevents copying + modifying software by default (software is treated as a “literary work” and therefore enjoys copyright protection). But copyright on datasets and ML models is very different – if it is even recognized at all. Thus, similar copyleft techniques would only work in particular jurisdictions. For example, the EU recognizes “database rights”. A copyleft license that accounts for this is CC-BY-SA-4.0, meaning that in an EU context, databases based on the original database would have to use the same license. However, database rights are not recognized in the US (facts are not copyrightable, and the “sweat of the brow” doctrine is not recognized). Thus, the CC-BY-SA-4.0 license would not have any copyleft effect with respect to databases in an US context. Independently of copyright in the database as a whole, the data in the database might be copyrighted material, for example if the database contains text or images, complicating matters further. Machine learning models derived from a data set are much more difficult. Clearly, ML models that have been trained are not a creative work and are therefore not eligible for independent copyright protection. At most, it can be argued that the model is an automatically transformed version of the input data, so that copyright in the input data implies copyright in the model.1 Perhaps hyperparameter choices could reflect some creative input. This is very much an active topic of debate. Given this uncertainty, it would be impossible to create a public license that works reliably. 1. An interesting discussion topic is the potential effect on Microsoft's Copilot ML model which was also trained on GPL-licensed source code. Instead of deriving force from copyright law, it would be possible to impose conditions via a contract, i.e. EULA-like terms that only provide access to the material after the terms have been accepted. But again, this is difficult. Contract law differs wildly between jurisdictions. For example, a contract is defined by the “meeting of minds” in some jurisdictions; by offer, acceptance, and consideration in others. But how does such a contract ensure appropriate consideration? How can acceptance be ensured if the material is publicly available? For these reasons, I think that unless broad international agreement emerges about IP protections for machine learning models, such a copyleft system for ML models is impossible. It is worth noting that the lack of such protections is probably quite good for innovation and research, since researchers are free to improve each other's work without legal concerns. The idea of copyleft is a hack to subvert the “everything is forbidden by default” system of copyright, but “everything is allowed by default” might be better.2 2. To continue the Microsoft Copilot example: some copyleft advocates like Bradley M Kuhn are sceptical about Copilot's GPL compliance, but remind us that copyleft maximalism means copyright maximalism, and that this is not the goal of open source. https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2022/feb/03/github-copilot-copyleft-gpl/ | Yes, the SFC doesn't allow the usage of the term "git" for third-party products unless they have their permisison. From the Git Trademark Policy, 2.3 Prohibited usages of the Marks: In addition, you may not use any of the Marks as a syllable in a new word or as part of a portmanteau (e.g., "Gitalicious", "Gitpedia") used as a mark for a third-party product or service without Conservancy's written permission. For the avoidance of doubt, this provision applies even to third-party marks that use the Marks as a syllable or as part of a portmanteau to refer to a product or service's use of Git code. | 1) I saw that no where during registration you actually tell what your work does, you only fill up details, how exactly is it protecting you if you don't specify? For example I have a computer program/website that do something, how exactly the copyright protects you if you did not specify about it? A copyright protects a particular single expression of an idea and versions that are derived from that particular expression. When you copyright software you have to provide approximately 50 pages of printed code so as to make it possible to distinguish your code from someone else's and you generally deposit a full copy with the Library of Congress. The ideas in the computer program are not protected. You only protect the exact language of the code in the computer program and other programs that use that exact language as a starting point. If someone reverse engineers a way to achieve the same process or outcome with different code language (or even comes up with exactly the same code language without ever looking at the language used in your code) then their software does not infringe on your copyright. To protect the ideas in a computer program you need a patent. 2) If I am a non-us citizen, do I need to select in State "Non-US", or leave it blank on "Select"? Because it allows me to complete registration with either. State "Non-US" refers to where you are located, not to your citizenship. If you are located outside the U.S., then you select "Non-US" and if you are located in a U.S. state, but are a non-citizen, you select the state where you are located. The answer does not affect the validity of your copyright. It is used for economic statistics and to determine where the copyright office should locate its own offices to be maximally useful to the public. | Yes you can. What you do is called mere aggregation. Your app and the GPL container run isolated and do not share memory space: they are clearly separate programs vs parts of one program, so your app does not get infected by GPL. | Pseudo-code written down somewhere is protected by copyright, even if the article containing it doesn't say anything about the pseudo-code contained in it (i.e. doesn't mention "this too is copyrighted"). For example, let us assume that the following isn't actual compileable / executable code in some extant programming language: procedure bubbleSort( A : list of sortable items ) n = length(A) repeat swapped = false for i = 1 to n-1 inclusive do /* if this pair is out of order */ if A[i-1] > A[i] then /* swap them and remember something changed */ swap( A[i-1], A[i] ) swapped = true end if end for until not swapped end procedure It does nevertheless constitute an expression of an abstract algorithm. If it can be copied and pasted, it is an expression. If you run this through a filter to create executable code in some language, you will have created a derivative work (and possibly one with no copyright protection, if the conversion is totally automatic). If you read the lines and say "Ah, I know what that would be in Pascal", that has the modicum of creativity required to make your conversion protected, but you've still infringed the underlying work. On the other hand, a logical flow chart, which is a picture of the abstract idea of what to do, is copyright-protected only as a graphic object. If you look at it and it inspires you to write pseudo-code or actual code, you are not copying the flow chart. | Affirmative authority that this particular use (incorporation of the format of another program's textual data files into your own program) is protected is somewhat elusive in the US system; however there's a lot of observable evidence that reverse engineering data file formats without a license is widespread. My sense is that this would be analyzed under the same rubric as other kinds of reverse engineering and/or fair use. I'm sure there are others here who are better able to clearly and concisely explain that law than I am. However there may be limits — it seems Microsoft was able to prevent VirtualDub's use of the ASF format by patenting it. That said, it's hard to see how an unencrypted, unencoded ASCII data file file could be patentable (i.e. where the ASCII strings are the data, generated in response to user input, and the format is just their order and separators, etc). For the European arena, there is recent authority in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Limited that the format of a program's data files are not protected by copyright when reverse engineered without the source code. The following is from the digest and application of the CJEUs decision by the English court that referred it, in its subsequent judgment: The judgment of the CJEU On 29 November 2011 Advocate General Bot delivered his Opinion on the questions referred... Questions 1-5 The Court dealt with these questions together. It interpreted this court as asking "in essence, whether Article 1(2) of [the Software Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer program and the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive": see [29]. Having referred to recital (14), Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Software Directive, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of TRIPS, the Court went on: ... 39. [...] it must be stated that, with regard to the elements of a computer program which are the subject of Questions 1–5, neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250. 40. As the Advocate General states in point 57 of his Opinion, to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development. 41. Moreover, point 3.7 of the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for Directive 91/250 [COM(88) 816] states that the main advantage of protecting computer programs by copyright is that such protection covers only the individual expression of the work and thus leaves other authors the desired latitude to create similar or even identical programs provided that they refrain from copying. 42. With respect to the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program to interpret and execute application programs written by users and to read and write data in a specific format of data files, these are elements of that program by means of which users exploit certain functions of that program. 43. In that context, it should be made clear that, if a third party were to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating to the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own computer program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction within the meaning of Article 4(a) of Directive 91/250. 44. As is, however, apparent from the order for reference, WPL did not have access to the source code of SAS Institute's program and did not carry out any decompilation of the object code of that program. By means of observing, studying and testing the behaviour of SAS Institute's program, WPL reproduced the functionality of that program by using the same programming language and the same format of data files. 45. The Court also points out that the finding made in paragraph 39 of the present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of SAS Institute's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation (see Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace, paragraphs 44 to 46). 46. Consequently, the answer to Questions 1–5 is that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as such, are not protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive." Regarding the idea that the user has rights to access their output of a program held in a proprietary data file format there is some additional discussion in the that might be helpful in paragraphs 48 - 62 (of the CJEU opinion), discussing the right of a licensee to 'study and observe' the 'underlying' 'ideas and principles' of a program to accomplish 'acts of loading and running necessary for the use of the computer program.' | This can't be right. If I modify open source code as part of the work done, by nature of the open source license that code can not become intellectual property of the client. Certainly it can. That which is "developed or produced" would be the modifications to the pre-existing code, i.e the copyright on the derivative work so created. If the base code was under a share-alike or copy-left license, then the client can only distribute it under the same license (or a compatible one, perhaps). But nothing compels the client to distribute it, and for the client's use, the client owns the copyright, without fear of any future claims by the contractor. If I have my own code/scripts/settings/templates/etc that I use as a contractor, and I modify those in the interest of coding efficiency in the interest of serving the client, it hardly seems correct that these assets become property of the Client. Those are your work, and you can choose whether to sell the copyrights to the client or not. Again, only the work done for that client would be covered under the wording quoted above, unless there is another provision that grants the client a license to use the pre-existing work which you modified for the job, which there probably ought to be. Or I suppose the agreement could assign copyrights in pre-existing work to the client, but that seems an odd choice, and the language in the question would not do that. You and the client could agree on a different provision such as: The contractor grants to the client a fully-paid, non-exclusive permanent license to use all intellectual property developed under this agreement, and any pre-existing works that may be incorporated therein. The contractor warrants that s/he is entitled to grant such license, without infringing on the intellectual property of any other person or entity. That wording would have the contractor retain all copyrights and other IP, but provide a license to the client to use it without further payment or expiration. Many other ways to structure such a provision are possible, dividing the rights up however the contractor and client can agree. The price for the work might vary depending on what rights the client obtains. Both forms, and many others, are perfectly legal, it is just a question of what the contractor chooses to sell, and what th4e client chooses to buy. |
How to Prove, Legally, That a User Actually Clicked the "I Accept" for TOS, etc In a click-wrap scenario, how does one prove, legally, that a user actually clicked or checked the "i accept" or equivalent on a given site. e.g. what if the website owner doesn't track clicks, track TOS versions, etc. What if the whole user flow changed since the alleged acceptance of TOS, etc. What do the courts look for to determine whether the user did in fact take the action which confirms their agreement with the TOS, and what those TOS actually were at the time of the issue in question? ...and, with which party does the burden of proof rest and what constitutes proof? | The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony. | The answer depends in part what venue you're talking about, e.g. Reddit, Facebook etc. The details are revealed somewhere in the Terms of Service for that venue. The general pattern is that you are allowed to use that venue, provides you grant permission for the service to do what they do with your content. You cannot legally send them a take-down notice for your stuff, because a take-down notice requires you to say that the stuff was posted without your permission (and that is false – and you can be punished for making that statement). There could be a venue where they do not hold you to an irrevocable license, in which case you could revoke that permission (but not Reddit: you granted them a "royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, unrestricted, worldwide license to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, or publicly display your user content in any medium and for any purpose, including commercial purposes, and to authorize others to do so"). I've seen a site that actually asserts ownership of user-contributed content (I don't know if their TOS ended up being litigated) – if is not at all hard to write a TOS that includes transfer of copyright, rather than granting of a license. The only hard parts are (1) figuring out what you want in terms of permission to use and (2) whether your answer to (1) means nobody will use your service. SE and Reddit TOS probably are as close as you need to get for what you describe. | All oif those except perhaps the feedback seem to be "transactional" content to which the CAN SPAM requirements do not apply. The feedback request looks to me as if it first the 'other" class in the linked FAQ, and so also would not trigger the requirements. | Yes, it's illegal. 18 USC 1030 (a) (5) (A) [Whoever] knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer [shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section]. "Damage" is defined at (e)(8) to mean "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information". Your proposed attack would certainly cause impairment to the availability of the Stack Exchange system and the data and information which it hosts. Whatever else you may think about the Stack Exchange terms of service, they certainly do not authorize any user or moderator to "destroy the site" in any sense such as you describe. It's not necessary for the TOS to explicitly say "you may not do X"; it's enough that they don't say that you may do it. To use a firewall analogy, it's "default deny". "Protected computer" is defined in (e)(2) to mean, essentially, any computer that is used in or affects interstate commerce. Which means practically every computer that has ever accessed the Internet, and certainly includes Stack Exchange servers. So your proposed attack would include all the elements of a violation of this section. Such a violation is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment if it causes a loss of more than $5000 (see (4)(A)(i)(I)), which if such an attack were successful, it certainly would. Greater penalties are possible in certain circumstances. Even if the loss does not exceed $5000, or if the attack is merely attempted but without success, it is still punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine ((4)(G)(i)). There is nothing in the terms of service saying you will go to federal jail for destroying stack exchange. Irrelevant. It is not up to Stack Exchange Inc. or its TOS to determine who does or doesn't go to federal prison. Rather, it is up to Congress to determine what conduct deserves such punishment (as they did in 1984 by enacting this law), up to federal law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate and make a case against an alleged violator, and up to the federal courts to determine if the accused is guilty and how they should be punished. | The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details. | Most user complaints against Meta are subject to binding arbitration under the applicable terms of service (which is the principal contract between a user and Meta) and cannot be litigated in the court system. The example of a dispute in the question would not generally fall within the exceptions to the arbitration clause. It states, in part: The Instagram Service is one of the Meta Products, provided to you by Meta Platforms, Inc. These Terms of Use therefore constitute an agreement between you and Meta Platforms, Inc. ARBITRATION NOTICE: YOU AGREE THAT DISPUTES BETWEEN YOU AND US WILL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING, INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION AND YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT OR CLASS-WIDE ARBITRATION. WE EXPLAIN SOME EXCEPTIONS AND HOW YOU CAN OPT OUT OF ARBITRATION BELOW. . . . How We Will Handle Disputes. Except as provided below, you and we agree that any cause of action, legal claim, or dispute between you and us arising out of or related to these Terms or Instagram ("claim(s)") must be resolved by arbitration on an individual basis. Class actions and class arbitrations are not permitted; you and we may bring a claim only on your own behalf and cannot seek relief that would affect other Instagram users. If there is a final judicial determination that any particular claim (or a request for particular relief) cannot be arbitrated in accordance with this provision's limitations, then only that claim (or only that request for relief) may be brought in court. All other claims (or requests for relief) remain subject to this provision. Instead of using arbitration, you or we can bring claims in your local "small claims" court, if the rules of that court will allow it. If you don't bring your claims in small claims court (or if you or we appeal a small claims court judgment to a court of general jurisdiction), then the claims must be resolved by binding, individual arbitration. The American Arbitration Association will administer all arbitrations under its Consumer Arbitration Rules. You and we expressly waive a trial by jury. The following claims don't have to be arbitrated and may be brought in court: disputes related to intellectual property (like copyrights and trademarks), violations of our Platform Policy, or efforts to interfere with the Service or engage with the Service in unauthorized ways (for example, automated ways). In addition, issues relating to the scope and enforceability of the arbitration provision are for a court to decide. This arbitration provision is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. You can opt out of this provision within 30 days of the date that you agreed to these Terms. To opt out, you must send your name, residence address, username, email address or phone number you use for your Instagram account, and a clear statement that you want to opt out of this arbitration agreement, and you must send them here: Meta Platforms, Inc. ATTN: Instagram Arbitration Opt-out, 1601 Willow Rd., Menlo Park, CA 94025. Before you commence arbitration of a claim, you must provide us with a written Notice of Dispute that includes your name, residence address, username, email address or phone number you use for your Instagram account, a detailed description of the dispute, and the relief you seek. Any Notice of Dispute you send to us should be mailed to Meta Platforms, Inc., ATTN: Instagram Arbitration Filing, 1601 Willow Rd. Menlo Park, CA 94025. Before we commence arbitration, we will send you a Notice of Dispute to the email address you use with your Instagram account, or other appropriate means. If we are unable to resolve a dispute within thirty (30) days after the Notice of Dispute is received, you or we may commence arbitration. We will pay all arbitration filing fees, administration and hearing costs, and arbitrator fees for any arbitration we bring or if your claims seek less than $75,000 and you timely provided us with a Notice of Dispute. For all other claims, the costs and fees of arbitration shall be allocated in accordance with the arbitration provider's rules, including rules regarding frivolous or improper claims. For any claim that is not arbitrated or resolved in small claims court, you agree that it will be resolved exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court located in San Mateo County. You also agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of either of these courts for the purpose of litigating any such claim. The laws of the State of California, to the extent not preempted by or inconsistent with federal law, will govern these Terms and any claim, without regard to conflict of law provisions. While I haven't checked every single Meta service, I would strongly suspect that the Terms of Service for all of their online offerings have very similar provisions to this one. | Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG. | You tag the question with "criminal law", suggesting that by "illegal" you mean "is it a crime" -- that would depend on jurisdiction, but in the US or my state, it is not a crime. There are crimes that you could commit with such an account, but violating the TOS is not itself a crime. However, it is illegal, a breach of contract, as you can see from the TOS "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission". |
Is Legal to use characters from movies/games without license in a non related business? Suppose I want to use some character from Disney for a website offering something not related with Disney business at all (for example a service for software developers). Is this OK or Disney could sue me for that? (I know this is unlikely) What could be the penalty for something like that? Is there any case where this could be legal? (maybe some derivative work, not original image from Disney, or maybe depending on my country?) EDIT: to be clear, I have read similar questions about trademarks here, but I'm asking something different (I think). The core of the question is that the characters are not important for the business, is not like selling t-shirts or toys, is just like a decoration, maybe this is not important at all for a trademark, or maybe yes, or maybe in some conditions, that's the question. | No This summarizes the situation with Disney specifically. The Disney trademarks are so ubiquitous and recognizable as being Disney's and not, for example, yours that your use is bound to create confusion in the minds of the public that your business is in some way associated with Disney. That is the essence of trademark infringement. In particular, where your business has nothing to do with the characters it is clear that you are only using them for the cachet of the Disney reputation. Disney will defend their trademarks - this is not at all unlikely. | Your app is a simple case of copyright infringement. All the Pokémon are copyrighted, the lettering and names are also protect by trademarks. Trying to claim fair use will be outright impossible: you'll use huge portions of the individually protected Pokemon (the iconic ones like Pikachu) and you are usurping a market they are already in. They have given licenses for apps (Pokemon Go). Pokemon are artistic and some form of fiction. The last straw might be if you'd do a rather obvious parody, but even then, I see no way to show Fair Use with what you stated. No disclaimer can change that, and publishing your work might open you to a huge lawsuit with damages for each individually protected Pokemon you infringed on. With between 750 $ minimum and 150,000 $ absolute upper limit per infringed item (last is for willful infringement), you don't want to infringe on Pokemon, as you could be very easily liable for a number in the 6 to 9 digits! Even if Nintendo might only try to get the statutory damages for all the 900 Pokémon, that is a number of at least 675,4000 $. And that's before looking at Trademarks. Pikachu has about 6 live word marks and there are 111 different Pokémon trademarks filed (some expired or dead)! | Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ... | I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer. | Yes you can. The pieces of information you are going to include are facts. Facts are not copyrightable. The names will be trademarks but you will not be pretending to have any connection with them, so just using them for reference is fine. | I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images. | united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app. | Expression is tied up with fixation. Copyright subsists in a work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which they can be reproduced, perceived, or communicated. 17 USC 102 This expression is protected, not the idea. However, copyright infringement can occur even when there is not an exact copy. First, courts use a substantial similarity standard to determine if infringement has occurred. Second, when a character or plot is sufficiently developed, taking that character or that plot can be infringement, even if not expressed in the exact same manner. "We do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement [...] the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) Some characters or plot elements are so common to a genre that they are either not considered "original" enough to get copyright protection, or can be taken by others without being considered infringement. This is the scènes à faire doctrine. "Stock scenes and hackneyed character types that "naturally flow from a common theme"—are considered "ideas," and therefore are not copyrightable. But as plots become more intricately detailed and characters become more idiosyncratic, they at some point cross the line into "expression" and are protected by copyright." Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2001 See Amanda Schreyer's An Overview of Legal Protection for Fictional Characters: Balancing Public and Private Interests for many more cases and examples of the idea-expression dichotomy in action with respect to fictional characters. |
Are jurors ever told about jury nullification in the US? If not, why not? It seems that if jury nullification is a right, then jurors should be told about it. | In general they are not told. In fact, I am not aware of any jurisdiction where they are told by the judge officially. In fact judges will normally charge a jury that they must accept the law as stated by the judge, and ignore any other source of the law, whether they like it or not. But the Judge has no way to enforce such a charge. According to the Wikipedia article The 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. It was a 5–4 decision. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present legal argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, affirmed the power of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect. We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Nevertheless, in upholding the refusal to permit the jury to be so instructed, the Court held that: …by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to ensure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. It is not so much that jury nullification is a right of the jury, as that there is very little right for the prosecutor or judge to inquire into why the jury acted however it did. If there is a suspicion that the jury was bribed, or influenced by prohibited communications, that can be looked into. But otherwise a jury is like an oracle, its actions have no specified reason or justification, they are whatever they are. The judge (or an appeals court) can set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that no rational jury could find in a particular way -- this is mostly used to overturn convictions based on insufficient evidence. But a jury has almost total freedom to believe of disbelieve any witnesses, so if it disbelieves, it could acquit, regardless of whether it rejects the law under which charges are brought. So there is no way to tell if a particular verdict was based on nullification, or on disbelief of the witnesses, or some other possible ground. In any case, there is no provision -- that I k now of -- to set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that it was an instance of nullification, so inquiring into whether it was would be of little point. This attitude toward jury verdicts goes back to the very early origins of trial by jury, when it was a replacement for Trial by Ordeal. The Ordeal had been considered a way of asking God to decide the issue, and there was no way to ask God to clarify the decision. When it was replaced by jury trial, no way to ask for clarification was considered possible there either -- the jury was said to voice the decision of the community at large: the formal term for jury trial was "to be tried by the country". See C. Rembar's The Law of the Land and H.C. Lea's The Duel and the oath for more on this history. This article reports on recent cases where juries have refused to convict in Marijuana cases. | Jurors cannot directly disqualify each other. However, they can inform the trial judge if they have reason to believe that one of their peers should be discharged. The judge will then allow the lawyers for both sides to ask the juror questions before deciding to dismiss them. In some jurisdictions, the judge may be required to hold a hearing to examine the evidence. Jurors may also be charged with contempt of court for interfering with a defendant's right to a fair trial, and could be disqualified from jury service in the future. Your examples of juror misconduct point at bias or refusal to deliberate, e.g. when the juror has made up their mind ahead of time (but not because they are using faulty logic). Depending on the jurisdiction, the trial may continue with a smaller jury. In some jurisdictions, the judge will have to declare a mistrial if no replacement juror can be found. See: Juror misconduct | canada There are some degrees of anonymity available: The court can refer to jurors simply by their number ("Juror 5") when calling them to be seated at the outset of trial The court can order that no information that could identify a juror be published While the jury-selection cards are part of the court file, the court can order that they be sealed During the course of trial, jurors are to be referred to by their number In Canada there is no procedure available to have the jury be screened off from public view. The rationales for not having juries be completely unknown to the parties are: the open court principle it's a right of the defendant in a criminal case to be able to potentially challenge their conviction based on exceptional problems with the jury or its selection; a screened-off jury would prevent this practically, the defence and prosecution will have become aware of the jury through jury selection, including the ability to challenge their selection for cause there is a presumption that the ability to see directly and unmediated the demeanor of the witnesses is an important aspect of judging credibility; not everything would be seen via video There is likely much flexibility available for a court to allow a screened-off jury in a civil matter, but civil jury trials in Canada are not a right, and no court has seen it worth to experiment with such a thing. | The term "jury nullification" gets thrown around a lot, especially by non-lawyers. But your question doesn't really seem to be about jury nullification. There is a well-established procedure in the federal courts of the United States, and similar structures in all state systems I'm familiar with, that allows the judge to overrule a civil jury if it finds that no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict they did. In the federal system, this is formally known as a "renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law," and is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. It's universally called, by lawyers, a JNOV, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This is common and well-established in civil cases, such as most patent cases. It isn't commonly granted, but jury nullification--or, more frequently, jury screwups or misunderstandings severe enough to justify it--are not very common either. Jury nullification usually refers to criminal verdicts, and almost always to criminal verdicts of "not guilty." These the Court cannot correct by imposing a guilty verdict without the jury, and these are the only cases, in my opinion, properly considered as "jury nullification" cases. | Acquittals in criminal jury trials cannot be appealed (at least in a way that affects the outcome, Colorado and a few other states allow criminal appeals by the prosecution solely for the purposes of clarifying the law prospectively). Interlocutory appeals (i.e. appeals before the case is over) by the prosecution are allowed for pre-trial rulings (e.g. suppression of evidence rulings in a pre-trial hearing), in criminal cases, but not for evidentiary rulings made in the midst of a jury trial (which is when jeopardy attaches for the purposes of the double jeopardy rule, which is what prevents acquittals from being retried). An error in a ruling on an admission or rejection of evidence at trial may be appealed by a convicted defendant if the alleged misapplication of the evidence rule was an abuse of discretion by the judge, and was not "harmless error" (i.e. if as part of all errors made in the case there is a reasonable probability that it changed the outcome that the jury reached). | There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process. | How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established They largely stem from the rules of evidence which are complicated, vary from state to state and knowing which is a big part of what litigation attorneys are paid for. Parties to litigation become aware of all the evidence/topics that their counterparts wish to broach in the courtroom well in advance — during discovery. They will usually disagree whether some bits and pieces can be presented to the jury. In this case the court will hold admissibility hearings — again, well in advance before the trial. Despite all the preparations, some of these disagreements arise during the trial, and then they are resolved in place by way of voiced objections. The attorneys and the judge talk about them using professional jargon of the rules of evidence — having themselves seen all the evidence in advance. does the jury get to know them No, the jury doesn't need to follow the professional talk. In fact, they should hear as little as possible of it — which is the reason why admissibility disagreements are resolved in advance as much as possible. If serious issues arise during the trial, the judge will ask the attorneys to speak to them in chambers — away from the jury. Or they will ask the jury to take a break while the professionals talk. The jury just needs to listen to the evidence that is allowed in, and disregard any evidence the judge say they have to. is this also in the public record somehow? It is in the court record. It may be accessible to the public if the court allows. If someone wishes to see the record they need to apply to the court, provide reasons and a judge will decide if anything can be released. | Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called "jury nullification." And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you "roll the dice" there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move. |
Is it legal to prosecute someone for ulterior motives in the US? Suppose someone does something you don't like but isn't illegal. Can you (a prosecutor) prosecute them for something illegal with probable cause not because of their illegal action but because of the legal action you didn't like? Does this fall under abuse of process? Is it against the due process doctrine as the defendant isn't actually being punished for what they're being punished for on paper? Is it at least against a prosecutorial code of conduct? If so, how seriously are such codes of conduct taken? Example: Suppose someone cheated on their wife, can they be prosecuted for the possession of marijuana if the reason that the prosecutor is prosecuting them is the cheating? | Here's some of the law in the area of prosecutorial discretion: In the ordinary case, “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Of course, a prosecutor's discretion is “subject to constitutional constraints.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2204–2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). One of these constraints, imposed by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500, 74 S. Ct. 693, 694–695, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S. Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962). A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is “directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons ... with a mind so unequal and oppressive” that the system of prosecution amounts to “a practical denial” of equal protection of the law. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1073, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present “clear evidence to the contrary.” Chemical Foundation, supra, at 14–15, 47 S. Ct., at 6. We explained in Wayte why courts are “properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.” 470 U.S., at 608, 105 S. Ct., at 1531. Judicial deference to the decisions of these executive officers rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and courts. “Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Id., at 607, 105 S. Ct., at 1530. It also stems from a concern not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive constitutional function. “Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy.” Ibid. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996). | I want to file a Federal criminal (not civil) complaint You can't. Only the US government can do that. https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case Individuals do not file criminal charges in U.S. district courts. A criminal proceeding is initiated by the government, usually through the U.S. attorney's office in coordination with a law enforcement agency. Allegations of criminal behavior should be brought to local police, the FBI, or other appropriate law enforcement agency. There is an analysis of the relevant law in the case of Smith v. Krieger, No. 09-1503 (10th Cir. 2010). In his second claim, [Smith] sought to prosecute crimes allegedly committed by the defendant judges against the United States. Mr. Smith claimed he had “inherent authority” to raise his first claim under “the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 51, ¶ 255. With respect to his second claim, he contended he was “authorized to prosecute crimes committed against the United States by virtue of his inherent authority as co-sovereign, pursuant to powers reserved under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and crimes committed against his person and/or property in particular.” [p.13-14] [...] Mr. Smith’s second claim fares no better than his first. Congress has by statute conferred the power to prosecute crimes in the name of the United States on the United States Attorney General and his delegates. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519. The long-standing view of the Supreme Court is that such power is exclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”) (emphasis added); id. at 694 (“Under the authority of Art. II, [§] 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. [§] 516.”); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) (“Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney . . . .”) (emphasis added). Therefore, as the district court concluded, Mr. Smith has no right to initiate a criminal prosecution in the name of the United States under the Ninth or Tenth Amendments, or otherwise. [p.19] Smith was fined $3000 for bringing this frivolous and "abusive" case (which included several other claims besides this one.) Also of note is the 1973 US Supreme Court case Linda R. S. v. Richard D.. Here, Linda R. S. took a slightly different route: in effect, she sought a court order requiring her local district attorney to prosecute Richard D. for a state crime. (Or rather, she sought to enjoin the district attorney from declining to prosecute him.) The Supreme Court ruled: The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). Although these cases arose in a somewhat different context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. | Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record. | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | A district attorney has discretion to decide whether to prosecute. A district attorney may be appointed by e.g. a county board of commissioners, or they may be elected. The electorate has the exclusive power to chastise DA, but voting him out of office, so there is little to be done other than write letters to the editor. An appointed DA has some superior, so you can complain to that superior. There is no way to legally force a DA to prosecute if they do not believe that there is enough evidence to get a conviction. | This is called solicitation. A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime. Model Penal Code § 5.02. | The US legal system deals with this by punishing you for the crimes of which you are convicted. That is, those where the evidence (whatever it is) convinces a jury that you are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If there is insufficient evidence, for whatever reason then you would not be convicted. The prosecution can, subject to admissibility, put forward whatever evidence they like in order to convince the jury. This can include a pile of ash that they allege contained convincing and unambiguous evidence of guilt. Of course, if that's all they've got the prosecution would probably be censured by the judge for wasting everybody's time and money, more likely, a prosecutor wouldn't lay charges in the first place. As to punishment for an evidence tampering conviction: you have been convicted of evidence tampering, not drug production so you will be punished for evidence tampering, not drug production. The legislature sets different punishments for these for a reason, possibly a reason known only to them but a reason nevertheless. The judge has discretion to apply anything between the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed. A conviction for evidence tampering in a drug case rather than, say, a jaywalking case, is likely to get a more severe sentence all else being equal. | "Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent. |
Quoting from a book with "All rights reserved". Fair use? Is it considered "fair use/fair dealing" to quote a short sentence or two from a book who's copyright statement mentions only "All rights reserved"? I'm writing a book and explaining some concept. To drive the point home I add a quote from another book (the one one with "All rights reserved"). I mention from which author the quote is and from which of his book. I provide all the details of the book, ISBN, publisher, everything. The quote is short. A sentence or two. I will later be selling my book. Do I still need to get permission from the author or is this fair use? | (Note: the answer below deals with US copyright law only.) There are specific carve-out in the "fair use" law for "scholarship" and "research": Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The US Copyright Office has some more information about how courts have interpreted fair use, as does Nolo. Going through these criteria one by one: A work that is commercial is less likely to be fair use. A work that is "transformative", meaning that it serves a different purpose than the original, is more likely to be fair use. Quoting from a factual work (such as an encyclopedia) is more likely to be fair use than quoting from a creative or imaginative work (such as a novel). The less quoted, the better. If the quoted material is peripheral to the primary purpose of the quoted work, it is more likely to be fair use than if it's "the heart of the work". (As an example, The Nation was once found to have violated fair use because it quoted verbatim the section of Gerald Ford's memoirs that dealt with the Nixon pardon — even though the quoted section was less than 0.2% of the entire work.) If your work will be directly competing with the original work in the market, it is less likely to be fair use. Nolo also notes that Quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations would be deemed acceptable. An art historian would be able to use an image of a painting in an academic article that analyzes the painting. Finally: even if you check every one of these boxes, the law is not 100% crystal clear, and there's still a chance that you'll get sued. While you might prevail in court, you'd still have to go through the hassle of defending your work; or alternately, you'd have to pull it from the market. For this reason, it may be worth your peace of mind to seek permission from the copyright holders anyhow, or to consult a legal professional. | First off, the work is almost certainly not in the public domain in the US. Works are generally copyrighted upon creation or publication, but in this case the work was probably explicitly copyrighted. The fact that a work is out of print generally has no bearing on its copyright status. US copyright law changed several times in the last century. The 1985 copyright year means the board game was probably published then, and it's since it's a Disney copyright it's a corporate work, which would give it a copyright term of 95 years, meaning that it should be covered under copyright until 2080. See this factsheet on copyright from the US Copyright office. Works Created on or after January 1, 1978 For works made for hire and anonymous and pseudonymous works, the duration of copyright is 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter International laws will vary, but many countries adhere to the Berne Convention, which means that international laws will probably be at least similar. Either way, the work isn't very old from an intellectual property perspective. Fair use is an exception to copyright law that allows portions of copyrighted works to be used without permission or compensation in certain circumstances; academic or scholarly use is one of them. Generally, your use of the work has to be the minimum necessary amount to serve your purposes, and cannot harm the commercial value of the work. (The fact that the work is out of print may help with the latter.) The problem with fair use is that it's always determined on a case by case basis. The only way to know for sure if a particular use is fair use is to wait for the copyright holder to sue you and then make a fair use defense in court. I was going to suggest that you discuss this with the editor of your journal, but re-reading your question it looks like you're planning to publish to a personal blog rather than an academic journal. In the end, it's up to you (or your attorney, if you choose to hire one) to analyze the relevant legal concepts and rules and decide if and how much of the work to use. | Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly. | This is not (necessarily) copyright violation It's possible that Quora's usage falls within Fair Use. At the very least, the argument could be made. If it does, then there is nothing that Stack Exchange or the OP can do. Stack Exchange can choose not to protect their copyright Unlike trademarks, which lapse if not protected, copyright endures. Therefore Stack Exchange can pick and choose the copyright fights they want to get involved in and those they don't. If you have brought it to the attention of the copyright owner (or, in this case, licensee) and the copyright owner chooses not to act then you have done all you can and significantly more than you have to do. The OP has copyright I note that one of the examples is your question. As the copyright holder, you are free to issue a DCMA takedown notice on Quora if you feel your copyright has been violated. | "The rights to this work reverted to the author in 1951" means that back in 1951 the publisher's contract to print the book ended, and the author resumed full rights. (This might have been done by the author, or the publisher, depending on their contract.) It does not mean that the copyright lapsed or that the work entered the public domain. "Ms. Margaret Wilson" was presumably the author or the author's agent, or perhaps the publishers representative back in 1951. She may or may not be alive, and the firm of "Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc" may have been the new publisher (unless it was the old one, the question is not clear, and without the title I can't cross check). If DS&P was the new publisher, the rights might now be held by E. P. Dutton, as they seem to have acquired the rights to the bulk of the DS&P catalog. In any case, the copyright would (if it is in force) now be held by the author's heir, or whoever the author might have sold or given it to. Someone will be the legal owner. That it is not being marketed does not release the copyright or license the work for general use. If there was no other heir, it would have become government property. In the US, it would become the property of the state where the owner was a legal resident. If this was a work by a US author first published in the US, copyright needed to be renewed after 28 years, which would have been in 1959 (plus or minus one year, I believe). If the work required copyright renewal, and this was not done, then the work is in the public domain, and can be freely used by anyone. Records of copyright renewals, by year, are available for download from Project Gutenberg, or can be searched at the US Copyright Office. There is no way to be sure how the "scanning institution" determined that "No known copyright restrictions" apply, short of asking that institution. It is possible that they checked for a copyright renewal and did not find one. If you use content from this work, and the copyright is still in force, the copyright holder or an exclusive licensee could sue for copyright infringement. There is no way to tell if this would in fact happen. It may well be that the legal holder does not even know that s/he owns this copyright. Obviously, in that case, a suit is highly unlikely. But that would be entirely at the risk of anyone who used such content. Under US law, such use might or might not be considered "fair use". This would depend on several factors, and there is not enough information in the question to even guess. Fair use is an active defense, that an accused infringer may assert in court. It also does not apply in non-US cases. The odds are probably against any such suit being brought, but the amount at stake if one was brought could be large. | how would this differ between say ArXiv which is open access, and a publication that is pay-only, like Elsevier or Nature? It wouldn't. But if the equation is the creation of the author of some publication, as in the author is expressing some unique mathematical expression, obviously the publication should be referenced. But is referencing enough? Are there additional rights one must obtain from the publication and/or author in order to show this content? Laws of nature, including purported laws of nature, are not protected by copyright. So, usually, key equations in an academic paper aren't protected by copyright law. Referencing the work is important as a matter of academic ethics, but is legally irrelevant. Copying of exposition by the author beyond laws of nature is permitted as fair use if it is limited to quotations necessary for academic discussion and criticism, but copying of an entire work would not be permissible fair use in most cases and would constitute copyright infringement. Of course, there is a large gray area between those extremes. | The UK copyright Act has the concept of "fair dealing" which is more restricted that the US concept of "fair use". For your purposes, Section 30 appears to be applicable: 30 Criticism, review and news reporting. (1) Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or of a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement and provided that the work has been made available to the public. (1A) For the purposes of subsection (1) a work has been made available to the public if it has been made available by any means, including— (a) the issue of copies to the public; (b) making the work available by means of an electronic retrieval system; (c) the rental or lending of copies of the work to the public; (d) the performance, exhibition, playing or showing of the work in public; (e) the communication to the public of the work, but in determining generally for the purposes of that subsection whether a work has been made available to the public no account shall be taken of any unauthorised act. For your reviews, you would need to properly attribute the source of the image that you were using and that source must be legitimate. If you can't find a clear legal pathway from the image you have to the actual copyright holder you could be in trouble (e.g. an image from someone else's blog where that image may have been uploaded illegally). Your best bet is to go to the studio concerned and use images from their official public releases with proper attribution. | This topic came up as a sub-point to another question a few weeks ago, I ended up doing a fair bit of research with not much in terms of concrete results. I'll start with the USA since they're basically the only major copyright jurisdiction for which I could find a straightforward answer, then discuss internationally. USA In the USA, Bob would generally not hold copyright in modifications thus there is no copyright for Alice to violate, assuming no copyright exceptions like fair use apply. This is due to 17 U.S.C 103(a) (see also Anderson v. Stallone): The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. While I couldn't find any commentary on this point, the wording does seem to imply that portions of a derivative with additions far enough removed from the original work might qualify for copyright protection. International copyright law The main provisions governing derivative works in international copyright law come from Berne Convention Article 2(3): Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. and Article 12 (with a similar provision specifically for translation in Article 8): Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works. There's the argument that since unauthorized derivatives aren't explicitly excluded from protection that they should be protected, however, there's also the argument that granting unauthorized derivatives their own copyright is in itself prejudicial to the original copyright holder. Note I don't think it's debated that non-infringing derivatives gain their own copyright, including unauthorized derivatives that nevertheless fall into a copyright exception such as fair use. Dr. Daniel Gervais points out in The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better than Hedgehogs section III.B that there's a bit of history here. The original Berne Convention 1886 text stated that "Lawful translations shall be protected as original works." However, the word "lawful" was struck out in the 1908 Berlin Convention coming up with wording similar to today's Article 2(3). Gervais's article cites Étude sur la Convention de Berlin de 1908 pour la Protection des Œuvres Littéraires et artistiques by André Petit implying disagreement between the countries about whether or not to protect unlawful derivatives, thus leaving it unsaid. Unfortunately, I'm unable to locate any copies of this source. Additionally, thanks to a fortunate snippet Google Books displayed, I know that La conférence de Berlin (14 octobre-13 novembre 1908) by Georges-François-Joseph Martin also discusses this exact point on page 187, quoting someone who thought unlawful derivatives would be protected now, though I couldn't get enough context to really determine anything. While I could find available copies of this book, for now it's a little on the expensive side for me. Overview of various jurisdictions In the EU, the derivative right is not harmonized and so the question is punted to the Member States. There is no implementation of either Berne Convention Article 2(3) or Article 12 in the Information Society (Copyright) Directive, Article 12 being specifically acknowledged by the Court of Justice in the Allposters case. In the UK, infringing derivatives are probably protected, see Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappell & Co. Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 109 (Q.B. Div.) at 120. I can't find the judgement text outside a paywall, but an article by William J. Braithwaite (PDF) quotes the relevant part on page 209 (the square brackets are his): [T]he idea that [the owner of the underlying copyright] should be entitled to reap the benefit of another's original work, by exploiting it, however extensive such work might be, however innocently it might have been made, offends against justice and common sense. Additionally, the justice noted the argument that unlawful derivatives are not explicitly excluded from copyright protection and that parliament has declined to make this explicit. If I understand the English court system correctly, this decision was two appeals away from the Supreme Court (House of Lords back then), but there doesn't appear to have been any appeal. For what it's worth though, the justice who issued the decision ultimately became Senior Law Lord. In Italy, the Supreme Court has determined that derivative works can be simultaneously infringing and protected. |
How do free-speech protections in the United States apply in public to corporate misrepresentations? Last night, I was driving behind a truck that had a very official-looking sign like this: (Sign says, "WARNING STAY BACK 200 FT. NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR BROKEN WINDSHIELDS!") Some cursory Googling brought me to this page from an attorney (who is coincidentally in my home state) who claims: The simple fact is that we are all responsible for the damage we intentionally or negligently cause to others. If you (1) haul rocks, (2) fail to properly secure those rocks, and (3) one of those rocks breaks my windshield, (4) you are responsible for my broken windshield! Likewise, If I wear a t-shirt that says “Not Responsible For Punching You In The Face” and I walk up and punch you in the face, I am responsible for your broken nose. With respect to this information, what is the legality of these signs? They appear to be purchased and installed by the company that owns these trucks, but do restrictions exist preventing corporations from obfuscating their liability in public with false claims that are official in appearance? It seems like some kind of consumer protection might relate to the insurace/liability aspect; from what I understand, the three elements of fraud are satisfied here: intentional deceit, since the company almost certainly knows that this is not true; benefit to the deceiver, since the company may avoid paying reasonable damages by misrepresenting their liability; actual harm caused, since people with windshields damaged by the company won't follow through with reasonable damage claims when they've been misled by the sign. As an aside, these signs are far too small to be legible from 200 feet away. If they were legally-binding and drivers within 200 feet were at fault for any damage incurred to their vehicles, would there be a valid reasonableness argument against them (the signs) relating to their 'readability' at the prescribed distance? | It is legal to be wrong, it is legal to say false things in public (leaving out defamation), and it is legal to buy and manufacture signs that say false things. Moreover, the sign does not make a false statement, in that legal liability is distinct from moral responsibility. In fact, the sign helps to decrease their legal liability. Via this sign, you have been put on notice that the truck may spray a bit of gravel, so by following too closely, you are negligently contributing to the damage. This is what also underlies those disclaimer signs with "not responsible for theft from your auto". There is nothing "official in appearance" about this sign (a legal citation of a statute might have such an appearance). | OK, the prohibition on commercial use stems from either: The tort of passing off; this is a private civil matter between the model and the publisher, or Breach of s18 of the Australian Consumer Law which involve misleading or deceptive conduct; this is a public civil matter with strict liability (i.e. intention or negligence is irrelevant) between the ACCC and the publisher with fines of up to $1,100,000 for a body corporate and $220,000 for an individual. In both cases the cause of action arises from the possible presumption by a person who views the photograph that the model in it is endorsing the goods or services that you are selling. The standard is: Would a reasonable person, viewing the photograph in context, come to the conclusion that the model is endorsing the goods or services (either because they really like it or they were paid to show they really liked it). Context is everything here. Some examples: If you a photo studio selling the actual photograph then there is no endorsement. If you are using the photograph to promote the studio there is. If you are showing a crowd scene (e.g. at a football match) there is no endorsement. If you are showing a building and the people are incidental there is no endorsement. If you are showing individuals or small groups in a way that promotes your goods or services there is endorsement. So, look at the photograph and the purpose you are using it for: could a reasonable person draw the conclusion that the people in it are endorsing your application? | In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them. | Bad people are quite uncommon Most people behave in good faith most of the time - don't tie yourself in knots over the very few people who would be unscrupulous enough to try to do this. Burden of proof The person who makes the allegation has the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. So the person who claims they didn't receive it has to prove that. If there are two equally credible witnesses, one saying they packed and posted the thing and one saying the thing was not packed then the burden has not been met. If the person who packed it has a photo of it packed and addressed then the other person has definitely not met their burden of proof. Insurance Insure it against loss or damage in transit. Then you can just replace it and claim on your insurance. | All of this is illegal. You do not give a jurisdiction so I will use NSW, Australia as an example but many countries' laws have similar effect. Australian Consumer Law prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct: It is illegal for a business to engage in conduct that misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive consumers or other businesses. It doesn't matter that what you have said is strictly speaking factual - the way it has been said is likely to mislead or deceive. However, what you are proposing goes further and IMO crosses the line into fraud (s192E of the Crimes Act): 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. In addition to the illegality, stealing other people's money is morally wrong by any reasonable standards of morality. | In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful? | No. In the United States, lying is not a crime. Unless it is done: under oath (in which case it's called perjury) or to a law enforcement agent conducting an investigation (in which case it's called obstruction). There are also the civil torts of slander (oral) and libel (written) if someone lies and damages the reputation or business interests of a person or company. Collectively, and without distinction, these are called defamation. Lying also has a close cousin — the civil tort of fraud — which usually applies to inducement into a transaction or a contract. There are also consumer protection statutes (federal and state) that deal with truth in advertising, truth in lending, lemon laws, etc. But those are primarily civil statutes and the last two are pretty far afield from your question. But none of that applies to the Facebook case you described. So, no. | While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation. |
I committed a crime against the Weapons Act in Germany - Can I travel there? I bought a butterfly knife in Poland (where it is legal) and had an overnight stop in Germany. I checked my bags out from the airport that night, then checked them back in the morning. The knife was confiscated, and I had to sign papers, make a statement, etc. I am currently pending investigation. I have a business trip in Germany in a few months, which I am certain is sooner than my sentencing. Can I fly to Germany before my sentencing? USA citizen, if it matters. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/waffg_2002/BJNR397010002.html | As in most cases it depends on the details. The length of a blade (> 44mm and width > 10) is important and the circumstances. Assume a fine to something up to € 10000, but a sentence up to 3 years is also possible. In Germany it is not crime (anything that can be fined or minimal sentence is less than 1 year is not a crime). I assume that they took your home address and let you leave the country, which alone is a sign that it not a crime. Since you were so smart to place this in your luggage, where it garantied to be found by airport security, you will probably get something in the range of the minimal fine. You also cooperated by giving a statement, which will assist to lessen the fine (you were after all caught red handed). Having it on your person in a public space, the fine would have be higher. Swinging it around among peaple in a threatening manner, will lead you into the range of a sentence. When the fine arrives, there will be bank transaction form. Go to the next post office or bank and pay it, retaining the receipt. Border control will not be interested in you (they only get alerts for proper criminals). Customs (Zoll) could be interested to enforce the fine, show them the receipt. Pay the fine and get on with your life. As to the U.S. Consulate (forget Embassy, State Department: they deal only in diplomatic affairs) all they will tell you is you must obey the laws of the country you are in assisted in getting an English speaking lawyer when requested send you bill for their efforts A Consulate deals with citizen affairs (administration, assistance). Most Embassies have a Cousulate department inside, but not all. In Berlin it does not. The Cousulate is about 20 Kilometres away from the Embassy. The right to call them is based on the Vienna Conventions 1815 and 1961. All countries that reconised these conventions are required to allow a foreigner to contact their Cousulate. A dual citizen, when inside the country where they are a citizen, do not have this right. | Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials. | So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense. | Here is an excellent (and extensive) explanation of jurisprudence regarding the "good faith exception" to the admissibility of evidence found due to an error. In short: Yes, the contraband found in Unit B would be evidence admissible in court. (Of course, evidence found in Unit B would only support charges against whomever had a nexus to that property. If the owner of Unit C had no access to Unit B, then evidence in Unit B would not per se implicate him in a crime.) Law enforcement will not return seized property if it believes the property is "contraband." As an example, in Pennsylvania a person can petition a court for return of property seized by law enforcement: Rule 588 requires the petitioner to establish entitlement to lawful possession of the property, but the motion will be rejected if the State successfully argues that the property is contraband, or "derivative contraband" (which has been defined in case law to mean there is "a specific nexus between the property and criminal activity"). | If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts. | Don't do it. It is of course breach of contract when you signed a contract with no intention to fulfil it. However, you are talking about Germany. German employers take a very dim view of this. While a UK employer would say "good riddance" and do nothing, many German employers would see that as a personal insult. It's something that you just don't do in Germany. There's a good chance that they will do what they can to make you miserable if you do this. For example, inform authorities that you just cancelled your contract which may get a visa cancelled. Or tell the company that you want to start with, which will also take a very dim view of this. Or sue you for damages, not because they want to get the money, but to make you miserable. On the other hand, if they send you a contract, and you sign it, you have a contract. | If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech. | It should be pointed out that smuggling doesn't just involve illegal goods but also includes legal goods that are brought in without following proper procedures such as paying required duties. https://www.findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-charges/smuggling-and-customs-violations.html False Declarations; Exporting violations; and Importing violations. False declarations can happen when a person returns to the U.S. or enters for the first time. They must declare the value of any goods they are bringing in from overseas. You can violate the law by misrepresenting the value of the goods, omitting them from the declaration form completely, or making false representations. Also, if you fail to disclose leaving or entering the country with $10,000 worth of currency, you can be criminally charged. While I am not a lawyer I could see that the authorities might have an issue with someone pulling a stunt like that in order to "test" them. Even if there is no legal issue the person could be put through a lot while they run tests to confirm that nothing illegal is being brought in and there is nothing preventing them from making the process as long and painful as they can. Something else to consider they also have rules in place for brining other legal objects on board planes if they resemble objects that are not allowed. https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/items/toy-guns-and-weapons Squirt guns, Nerf guns, toy swords, or other items that resemble realistic firearms or weapons are prohibited. We recommend emptying water guns, which must follow the 3-1-1 Liquids Rule. Replicas of explosives, such as hand grenades, are prohibited in checked and carry-on baggage. TSA officers have the discretion to prohibit any item through the screening checkpoint if they believe it poses a security threat. It is also possible to be charged with selling fake drugs and the local authorities can bring those charges and it can become their word versus your word about what your intentions are. In this case you might not be intending to sell them but it would be impossible to argue that you are not trying to pass it off as fake drugs. https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/legal-advice/criminal-defense/drug-charges/jail-selling-fake-drugs.htm Question: I sold a baggie of aspirins that I said was OxyContin to a guy at a concert. After the show, I heard that there were undercover officers in the crowd. Could I be busted for selling fake drugs? Answer: Yes. States and federal laws make the sale of fake drugs illegal, and you can even be charged with an attempted drug sale under some laws. |
Meaning of a Memorandum of Understanding I recently watched a video of a controversial head-of-state expressing his views on MOU's in the context of international trade. It seems the view expressed boils down to "An MOU is not a contract/binding agreement". A senior negotiator responded asserting that an MOU IS an actual contract. Commentators poked fun at the head-of-state "not knowing that an MOU is an agreement". My belief loosely mirrored those expressed of the head-of-state's - ie that an MOU is more of a "guidance document" from which contracts/agreements follow. I expect a court might consider it as part of a understanding larger picture of an unclear agreement, but that an MOU is not a reliable legal document, often falling short of an agreement and are not binding to anything like the same extent that a contract is. (To the extent anyone may be aware of the specific MOU controversy in question, I do not believe that an MOU is meaningless, rather that it is an imprecise document with very limited enforce-ability. I do accept that the contents of the MOU make all the difference and some may be more enforceable then others depending the extent to which they contain all the elements of a contract) So 2 questions - Does an MOU have a different meaning/status/relevance in trade agreements to a typical MOU (a view expounded by some detractors of the head of state)? Is my understanding of an MOU flawed ? Is an MOU on trade equivalent to a Trade Agreement? | A contract is a legally binding agreement governing a commercial relationship under national law. A treaty is a legally binding agreement between nation states once ratified and given effect under each nations local law. MOU are agreements that are not legally binding. That doesn’t mean there aren’t consequences for breaking them - just not legally enforceable ones. | Most Likely Yes to both. It really depends on the nature of your agreement, oral agreements are as legally binding as written ones, but as a matter of evidence in court written contracts are of course better. So looking at your agreement: did you agree to pay the full amount, in return for a place to study? Or did you specifically agree to pay on a rolling basis, where you pay for however long you actually study? I would believe that you had agreed to the first type of agreement, since that is what most study contracts are. And if that's the case: You pay to be allowed to attend, whether you actually attend or not isn't important. And even if you pay on a rolling basis, I would think in a lawsuit the court would find that - judging on previous payments - you'd have agreed to pay on a per semester basis, meaning that the incomplete semester would round up and you would still have to pay for it. I would lean yes to the 2nd question (but im not sure so anyone with more info please chime in). This answer can be more useful if you be specific about the terms and conditions of your study | So is it correct to assume here "extradition" is not used in its most technical sense? It sounds like rather than actual extradition, these cases are about illegal activities in Thailand and the ensuing deportation. There is no technical sense without a law/jurisdiction in context. The plain meaning of extradition is to surrender a person by one state to another state for reasons of alleged or convicted criminal conduct. I would call a deportation an extradition if (a) the other state specifically requested it via official channels and (b) measures (arrests, detention, escorted transport etc.) are taken to ensure the person in question is effectively handed to the other state's authorities (and not just deported anywhere). How does/can extradition work without extradition treaties? As provided by the national law. While the U.S. law may require treaties for most extraditions, other countries may do things differently. Canada, for example, permits a case-by-case agreement in its Extradition Act, which you could probably call a mini "treaty" since unlike in the US the executive authority alone is competent to enter into international agreements: 10 (1) The Minister of Foreign Affairs may, with the agreement of the Minister [of Justice], enter into a specific agreement with a State or entity for the purpose of giving effect to a request for extradition in a particular case. Other countries like China do not require a treaty for an extradition to occur. Article 15 Where there is no extradition treaty to go by, the Requesting State shall make a reciprocity assurance. Extradition Law of the People's Republic of China Apparently, Thailand is also one of such countries. Section 8. The extradition shall commence with an extradition request from the Requesting State. The extradition request from the Requesting State that has an extradition treaty with Thailand shall be transmitted to the Central Authority. Where the Requesting State has no extradition treaty with Thailand, the request shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channels. Extradition Act of Thailand Now there is still the possibility that this is a simple deportation since the news sources or even police officers do not always use the technically correct terminology. But lack of treaties alone is not a basis to assume that it is not an extradition (and the existence of treaty is not enough to assume that it was an official extradition). | Other Authorities You are missing at least several important sources of authority, which include: (1) The United States Constitution; (2) the set of regulations issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations at Title 37, Chapter I; (3) applicable international treaties; (4) case law with the most important being the U.S. Supreme Court, followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, followed by U.S. District Court cases on point; and (5) case law from the administrative bodies of the PTO. All of the above and the sources you mention are "primary sources". These are interpreted collectively in "Treatises" on patent law which are often cited on issues where primary authority is either too thin, or so numerous that it is not easily summarized merely by resort to primary authority. A number of them are listed here. Chisum on Patents is the leading treatise in the field and should usually be your first destination. It will mention most of the relevant primary source authority in the subject area you are researching. Priority of Authorities The CFR is superior to the MPEP but inferior to Title 35. Treaties are co-equal with Title 35 with conflicts resolved by the date of enactment. Case law of the U.S. Supreme Court trumps everything (even, in practice, the language of the United States Constitution). Case law from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Federal Circuit trumps everything except the U.S. Supreme Court. Given the very long string of recent reversals of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by the U.S. Supreme Court (almost one or two a year for the last decade or so), however, every Federal Circuit case should be analyzed to determine if it has been implicitly overturned or limited by the applicable U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. The United States Constitution trumps everything except U.S. Supreme Court cases and cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (these cases impliedly provide definitive interpretations of the United States Constitution). Case law from a U.S. District Court is not binding on anyone but the parties to the case, but is highly persuasive and in practice is about on a par with the MPEP, but subordinate to the CFR and administrative case law of PTO bodies. One complicated aspect of case law is that it is only binding when it resolves a question of law necessary to resolve to decide the case before it. Sometimes opinions go off on tangents which discuss other questions of law not before the court and that is called "dicta" which is persuasive on that point of law, but not binding and not as authoritative. It is not always obvious what constitutes the binding portion of a court decision and what constitutes dicta. Another complexity in case law involves concurring or dissenting opinions in cases. Dissenting opinions, obviously, are not binding on anyone but sometimes clarify the scope of the majority opinion. If there is a plurality opinion and a concurring opinion in a case, they have equal weight and neither opinion's rule is definitive except to the extent that they agree. Generally speaking a majority opinion will be binding relative to a concurring opinion in the same case, but that status isn't really definitive and a concurring opinion should be considered even when it accompanies a majority opinion even though the concurring opinion shouldn't be considered binding in that situation. Of course, all case law (and for that matter all other authority) can be made obsolete by subsequent amendments to Title 35 or by the adoption of new treaties. A treatise isn't binding on anyone, but a well reasoned passage from a leading treatise like Chisum will, in practice, be given weight a little below a U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit case, but often greater than any lesser source of authority on a topic. A well reasoned passage in a lesser treatise is typically given a weight comparable to a U.S. District Court case that is on point. Loose Ends One of the important sources for prior art is the compendium of all patents ever issued by the United States (the vast majority of which have expired and entered the public domain). You can get them all for a very reasonable cost in electronic form. The compendium of patents which have not expired is obviously relevant when attempting to determine if a potential patent or technique or process of a client infringes on any existing patent. There are also some patent issues (e.g. jurisdiction and venue in patent disputes) which depend upon other Titles of the United States Code and have the same priority as Title 35 of the United States Code. There are circumstances in which the procedural rules of various courts which issue relevant case law are relevant. Each type of court has its own rules of procedure, and each particular court has its own local rules. (This is not hypothetical, I've had a case involving patent law in which three-quarters of the motion practice in the heavily litigated case depended upon the local rules of practice in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.) Precedents of U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, and precedents from U.S. Court of Appeal for Circuits other than the Federal Circuit, are sometimes relevant as well (e.g. interpreting procedural court rules, rules of evidence, or very general principles of law that aren't restricted to patent law such as the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution). But, for the most part, patent case law arises in U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court and the administrative tribunals of the PTO. Issues related to the relationship between an attorney and a client in patent law cases (e.g. attorney malpractice law in patent cases) is a question of state law rather than federal law. | No While you can be bound to terms you had the opportunity to read and didn’t, you cannot be bound to terms that you did not have the opportunity to read. That doesn’t mean that you don’t have a contract but it will be on different conditions to those in the undisclosed terms. For a contract to be valid, the parties must agree on the essential terms, for a phone contract, what service the phone company is giving and how much the consumer pays. Incidental terms can be left undefined and they will, if needed, be filled in by a court with reasonable terms. However, this only happens to the extent necessary to give effect to the primary purpose of the contract. For example, late fees or termination fees are not strictly necessary (common law principles of damages for breach of contract work just fine) so, if the undisclosed terms include them, they will be unenforceable. Notwithstanding, it’s quite likely that refusing to disclose in the advance violates state or Federal consumer protection laws against misleading or deceptive conduct. | Each directives page on eur-lex has a "national transposition" page. For example, directive 2009/65/EC, concerning UCITS, is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32009L0065. There is a navigation box at the top left with several relevant pages: Text Document information Procedure National transposition Summary of legislation (Before the recent site redesign, these were shown as tabs across the top of the page, so for the lack of a better term, I will call these "tabs.") The Document information tab shows, among other metadata, relationships with other EU acts. One useful section on this page is the All consolidated versions section, which is a set of links to consolidated versions of the document, indicated by date. The answer to your question is the National transposition tab, which shows "National transposition measures communicated by the Member States." It is worth noting the disclaimer: The member states bear sole responsibility for all information on this site provided by them on the transposition of EU law into national law. This does not, however, prejudice the results of the verification by the Commission of the completeness and correctness of the transposition of EU law into national law as formally notified to it by the member states. The collection National transposition measures is updated weekly. The list of national acts is in the form of links, which lead to pages that seem designed to present the text of the national legislation, but in the examples I have checked say nothing more than "Text is not available." Perhaps there are some instances, or will be in the future, where these contain links to national legal information sites. As it is, there is enough information to enable one to search the national sites to find the relevant legislation. | Agreements to agree are unenforceable The contract requires you to negotiate and, probably, to do so in good faith (or at least, not in bad faith). That means you must come to the table looking to do a reasonable deal. It doesn’t, and cannot, require you to make that hypothetical deal. That would be an agreement to agree and there is a long line of legal precedent that such terms are unenforceable. | It depends How good is your (legal) English? For example, do you know the legal difference between "will", "shall" and "must"? Or, the difference between "employee", "subcontractor" and "worker"? Or the difference between "bankruptcy", "insolvency" and an "act of bankruptcy"? Contingency What are you going to put in your dispute resolution clause? Do you prefer mediation, arbitration or litigation? Will it be a one size fits all or will it be escalating? What happens if one of you dies? Or emigrates? Or divorces? Or is convicted of a crime? A financial crime? A violent crime? A sexual crime? Or what if such is just alleged but not proven? What happens if the company ceases to exist? Or is sued? Or is acquired by someone else? Or by one of you? Who is responsible for insuring the subject matter of the contract (if anyone)? To what value? If the person who should doesn't can the other person effect the insurance and claim the premium as a debt due and payable? Not all of these will be relevant to your contract. Familiarity How familiar are you with this sort of contract? Is this something you do all the time or is this a one off? For example, I am happy to enter a construction contract without legal advice because that's my business and has been for many years - I know my risks and how to manage them, inside and outside the contract. However, when I set up shareholder's agreements, wills and business continuation insurance with my partners, we went to a lawyer. What is your relationship with the other person i.e. how much do you know and trust them? Stakes If the contract is not very important (which is something that varies with the participants, for some people a million dollar contract is not important for others a $5 one is), so that if, by screwing up, you are OK if you lose everything you've staked then write it yourself. Alternatively, if the contract is vitally important to you and your heirs and assignees unto the 6th generation, I'd get a lawyer to write it - its pretty cheap insurance. How long the contract lasts will be a factor in this - a contract that exposes you to risk for 3 months is different than one that does so for 25 years. Basically, its a risk reward calculation. TL;DR Contracts only matter when relationships break down. If you reach for the contract then you can expect that the other party will be playing for keeps and that contract is your only defense against the worst they can do. If you are happy with your skills in mitigating against a cashed-up opponent who wants to see you go down no matter the cost then draft it yourself. |
If I have 2 cars is it legal for me to insure each with a different insurance company I live in the US (Illinois). If I have 2 cars, and: For car #1, insurance company "A" has a better rate, and for car #2, insurance company "B" has a better rate. Assuming the difference in rates is more than the multi-car discount of either insurance company, it might be cheaper to insure each car with a different insurance company. Some time ago, I had heard that this was not allowed... that you had to use the same insurance company for all your vehicles. But, I don't remember where I had heard that, or if it was accurate, or if it might apply to Illinois, or not. Is it legal to insure each car with a different insurance company? To be clear, I am not talking about "Double insuring" a vehicle, and I'm not talking about splitting liability and collision/comprehensive coverage on the same vehicle between 2 different insurance companies... 2 cars, 2 insurance policies, one insurance policy with full coverage (liability and collision/comprehensive) for each car. Also, the question is not about whether or not an insurance company might not like you to do this, or whether doing it might be problematic. The question is, is it legal to do it. In other words, are there any laws or regulations that would prohibit this. And to further clarify, that could be laws or regulations preventing an insurance company from this, or laws or regulations preventing a person from obtaining insurance this way. | Look at companies such as Haggerty that insure only classic and low mileage cars. They have no issue giving full coverage on your classic car while at the same time you keep your daily driver with another company. Since this is the business model of an entire group of companies that specialize in specialty vehicles, I would think it would be legal. | Insurance doesn't work the way you think it does Insurance indemnifies Bob from any liability he has towards Mary up to the value of the insurance. So, if a court finds that Bob must pay Mary $200k then Bob must pay Mary $200k. Bob can then turn to his insurer to indemnify him and, under the terms of the policy, they will pay out $100k for personal liability leaving Bob to find the other $100k wherever he can. The insurance company would not be a party to the litigation (although it would handle the defence on behalf of the insured) so a court cannot order it to do anything. Further there are many, many cases where the insured is found liable for something which the policy (allegedly) doesn’t cover - this often leads to litigation between the insured and the insurer. In parallel, the policy will cover the property damage in accordance with its terms. Assuming the house is adequately insured then the insurer will pay for the demolition, design & reconstruction. It is possible that by agreement or at the insurer's discretion that the insurance can cut Bob a check and leave him to do what he likes with the money: rebuild the home, go on a holiday, or pay a debt he might owe to someone. If the house is not adequately insured then Bob is a co-insurer and the cost of rebuilding is split. For example, if the cost of rebuilding is actually $150k and the total damage amounts to $90k then the insurer will pay $60k and Bob will have to pay the remaining $30k. Co-insurance terms usually have an error factor built in. | What do the contracts with your suppliers and the policy with your insurer say? Changes in government regulation do not ipso facto relieve Parties of the obligations under a contract under common (English) law. Contracts are allowed to allocate the risk of force majeure (and indeed, to define it because it has no common law meaning) but if they don’t, then each party bears their own risk and if they fail to honour their obligations they are in breach of contract. Common law does have the doctrine of frustration, however, that is much narrower and must result in the inability of the contract to be completed at all. And then there are consumer rights which may apply. When the dust settles, we are likely to see a lot of litigation around force majeure. Your venue appears to be complying with both the law and their obligations under the contract so you have no breach of contract claim against them and no trigger for the insurance policy. If you choose to cancel, then you broke the contract. Importantly, the position is reversed in civil law jurisdictions - a party unable to fulfil their obligations under a contract is not in breach. | You can't sue her for not having insurance. You sue for the damage you suffered. You can name her as a defendant alongside her son on the theory that she contributed to the accident by letting her son use the car, and then let the judge sort out who gets landed with the liability. Depending on the rules in your jurisdiction you might have to pay her travel expenses and/or lost wages if the judge decides she wasn't to blame (and the same for her son, but that sounds like a slam-dunk). However you might be better off going for victim restitution. That way the order gets made as part of the criminal case against the son. Less hassle for you, and the state authorities are responsible for actually getting the money out of them. Edit: It turns out that Idaho has the Family Car Doctrine in its law, so the mother is legally liable for her son's accident (thanks to ohwilleke for the pointer). | It isn't uncommon to interlineate contract language, or to cross out contract language, with the initials of the parties to the contract. This is normally only done with smaller businesses, however, where there is someone who has the authority to do so. Some contracts, such as insurance contracts, for example, have to have their language approved by state regulators before they can be used and can't be modified in that fashion. | Yes But not because they are mandated, just because your car has one. Because there is one factory fitted and it is a piece of safety equipment anyone you pay to maintain your car would be negligent if they didn’t make sure it’s working. | In general, you don’t need an alternative defence. It is inherent in the common law that, unless the statute is explicitly retroactive (and legislators are reluctant to go there) it cannot make illegal that which was at the time of the act, legal. For example, assume the old sign had unlimited and the new sign reduces this to 2 hours. If you parked before the sign was changed you could leave your car there forever so long as you never move it. The NYC law give further rights - a period of grace where the owner can rely on the old restriction as a defense, even if they parked after the sign had been changed. | No, you cannot sue the expert for his errors. You can sue the insurance company for failing to pay out per the insurance contract. They will then introduce the expert's report as evidence, and you will contradict it with the following evidence: your two witnesses your testimony that the other driver admitted responsibility (this is normally an exception to hearsay rules - but beware, courts are unwilling to treat saying "I'm sorry" as admitting responsibility). your testimony that the conditions made wheelies impossible your testimony that you cannot perform wheelies anyway. |
Can a US citizen with dual citizenship travel without getting a US passport? Flying with my daughter next week to Israel. She was born in the US, has currently only Israeli passport. Her passport does have a US visa of course. We're nonpermanent residents. So I have to go and urgently get her a US passport? | There is a legal requirement for US citizens to have a US passport when entering and leaving the US, though there are some exceptions. (The exceptions mostly concern other kinds of documents that are acceptable when traveling by land or sea to Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean.) The law is 8 USC 1185(b): (b) Citizens Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. There is no penalty for violating this law. And, of course, US citizens have an inherent right to enter the US. In practice, therefore, if a border officer recognizes that you are a US citizen without the required documentation, they are supposed to inform you of the requirements and then waive the requirement of section 1185(b) so you can enter. For more discussion, see What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? on travel.stackexchange.com. There was formerly a regulation allowing US citizen children of foreign diplomats to travel to the US on their foreign passports. This was removed in connection with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. It was at 22 CFR 53.2, which read as follows in 2006: (e) When he is under 21 years of age and is a member of the household of an official or employee of a foreign government or of the United Nations and is in possession of or included in a foreign passport; However, in 2007, paragraph (e) concerned the NEXUS program, and the paragraph concerning children in the household of foreign officials and employees was absent. The change was published in the Federal Register on 24 November 2006. The Department of State's [Foreign Affairs Manual] indicates that they continue to follow this policy despite the change in regulations; at 9 FAM 202.1-2 VISA-RELATED ISSUES WTIH U.S. CITIZENS, item (c) appears to have been last modified in 2011: c. Applications for Visas for Certain Dual National Children: (1) You should advise parents who apply for visas for dual national children that regulations prohibit the issuance of a visa or other documentation to a U.S. citizen or national for entry into the United States as an alien. The children of foreign government officials, however, may use their foreign passport for entry into the United States. (2) After the U.S. citizenship of a child has been determined by a citizenship officer, the consular officer may, to avoid delay or difficulty, give a written statement to the parents for presentation to carriers or immigration officials. The statement should make clear that the bearer of the foreign passport is a dual national child of a foreign government official or employee who is traveling to the United States on official business and as such may enter the United States on the foreign passport as an exception to the provisions of INA 215(b) regarding valid passport requirement. (3) A child under 12 years of age who is included in the passport of an alien parent in an official capacity may be admitted if evidence of U.S. citizenship is presented at the time of entry. A determination of the childs citizenship should be made by citizenship officer prior to departure from a foreign country and the parent should be instructed to have evidence of such citizenship available for inspection by the admitting Department of Homeland Security Officer. If this is indeed how your daughter got her US visa then the State Department's willingness to issue the visa presumably implies that CBP should allow her to enter with her Israeli passport and that visa. | As a US Citizen, you don't get a I-94 recording of entries and exits but : The FOIA site of the CBP, mentions Information Regarding Entry and Exit Note: CBP does not have records on the entry and exit of persons arriving or departing the U.S. before 1982. To be filled with CBP However, this doesn't mentions if this is only applicable to Aliens or US Citizens are included or not. But this CBP help page mentions travel records for US Citizens | First, let's be clear. Under the relevant Australian law, this person is an Australian citizen, This is for two reasons. First, because he or she is descended from someone who was born in Australia in the time period from January 26, 1949 to August 19, 1986 (or who was a British subject born in Australia prior to January 26, 1949), and second, because a child born in Australia after 19 August 1986 (and who is not otherwise an Australian citizen) and who lives in Australia, automatically acquires Australian citizenship on his or her 10th birthday, if the child has not been granted or otherwise acquired Australian citizenship in the meantime. This occurs automatically (by operation of law), and applies irrespective of the immigration status of the child or his/her parents. So, the question is not one of status as an Australian citizen, but of proof of status as an Australian citizen. This individual is not truly stateless. Also, even if the parents (contrafactually) were stateless rather than being Australian citizens, which they were, children born in Australia whose parents are stateless and not entitled to any other country's citizenship may in some circumstances apply for and be granted Australian citizenship. One of the reasons that Australia allows this rule is that in order to deport someone you have to know that the person deported is a citizen of the country to which the person is deported. If you are a stateless person in Australia (as this person is not, but someone might suspect them of being), you can be denied rights the flow from citizenship, rather than merely from being a person or being a resident. But, you can't deport a stateless person because you have no place to deport them to. Related to this fact is that Australia is a party to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), a multilateral international treaty. In respect of contracting states: "Stateless birth" on their territory attracts the grant of their nationality (article 1). Otherwise stateless persons may take the nationality of the place of their birth or of the place where they were found (in the case of a foundling), otherwise they may take the nationality of one of their parents (in each case possibly subject to a qualifying period of residence in that State) (article 2). A stateless person has some time beyond attaining adulthood to seek to claim the benefit of the Convention. That time is always at least three years from the age of eighteen (article 1(5)). Transfer of territory between states must occur in a manner that avoids the occurrence of statelessness for persons residing in the territory transferred. When a State acquires territory, the inhabitants of that territory presumptively acquire the nationality of that State (article 10). Persons otherwise stateless shall be able to take the nationality of one of their parents (possibly subject to a period of prior residence not more than three years) (article 4). Absent circumstances of fraudulent application or disloyalty toward the contracting state, deprivations and renunciations of citizenship shall only take effect where a person has or subsequently obtains another nationality in replacement (article 8). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will issue travel documents evidencing nationality to persons, otherwise stateless, having a claim of nationality under the convention. Birth on a sea vessel or aircraft may attract the nationality of the flag of that vessel or craft (article 3). Disloyal or certain criminal conduct may limit an individual's ability to avail the benefit of the Convention (article 8). The benefit of the Convention may be claimed by guardians on behalf of children (article 1(1)). States may impose a period of residence qualification for granting nationality to persons who may be otherwise stateless. That period is a maximum five years immediately prior to application and maximum of ten years overall (article 1(2)). There is also the question of proof. What suffices as proof sufficient for an immigration and nationality official varies, and there are probably presumptions that would be relevant. The fact that you are currently resident in Australia, that you have no recollection of living anywhere else or being told that you live anywhere else, your own testimony under oath regarding your place of birth and ancestry, any documentation that exists of you being in Australia in the past, and the fact that you speak English in an Australian accent fluently and speak no other language, would also be evidence of your citizenship or might trigger a presumption in favor of assuming that you are a citizen unless proven otherwise. The government can also change its processes to fit special circumstances. For example, during the Vietnam War in which the United States was involved, a significant number of children were born to U.S. soldier fathers and Vietnamese mothers in Vietnam. Ordinarily, under U.S. law, it is necessary to establish that a particular person who is a U.S. citizen was your father. But, in the aftermaths of these births, there was a period of time at least, when anyone born in Vietnam to a Vietnamese mother, who was racially part-Vietnamese and part either European or African in ancestry, was presumed based upon appearance alone to be a child of a U.S. citizen present in Vietnam in connection with the war effort and granted citizenship by birth, with their place of birth and mixed race alone sufficing to establish their citizenship. It wouldn't be hard to imagine Australia adopting such a rule in the case that you describe. Also, even if such a per se rule were not adopted, usually the ultimate test in a proceeding to establish citizenship is proof by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that this person is an Australian citizen, and that standard could probably be met by any official who was not intentionally inclined to bear ill will to this person or their group. Competent legal representation and expert testimony would likely help the person to establish their citizenship. | There are no EU rules on whether and under which conditions unaccompanied minors are allowed to travel, and the competence hence rests with the Member States. You are probably more proficient with Slovak rules on the matter, but judging by the information provided by the UK Government, there should be no regulatory hassle. The most probable source of problems will be the airline, but at least BA lets persons 12-17 years of age travel alone. | Citizenship is essentially an imaginary label that sovereign states assign to people to say "this person is one of us". How those imaginary labels are granted, recorded, proved, maintained etc. is up to the sovereign state to decide. I assume that citizenship is any time period in which all officers of a given state would agree to issue identification documents for that human. Not accurate. Identification documents simply identify persons. They may or may not convey information about citizenship. Some (like driver's licences) do not. Other (like alien's passports) explicitly mean that the holder is not a citizen of the issuing sovereign state. Conversely, having troubles to get a passport does not necessarily mean that the person is not a citizen. In some circumstances it may be difficult to prove citizenship (e.g. emigrated as an infant with no birth record), and court proceedings may be needed to convince the authorities. | Under US immigration law, any person who at any point after February 27, 2001 meets all of the following conditions automatically receives citizenship the moment they meet the conditions: Under 18 Lawful permanent resident (i.e. has a green card) At least one biological parent is a US citizen (adoptive parents also count of some other requirements are met; stepparents don't count unless they have adopted the child) Lives in the US in both the physical and legal custody of said US citizen parent As far as USCIS is concerned, if a biological child lives with both biological parents, then the US citizen parent has legal custody. If the child was born out of wedlock, they must have been legitimated before they turned 16 to count as their father's child; the applicable law for that depends on where exactly you live. Source | The general rule Birth certificates, social security cards, and driver's licenses identify a person, but what happens if these are all lost? Say a homeless person loses all of their documents in the shuffle, what could they do to recover them? Even further, if this person has no family or work colleagues who will vouch for them, is it possible that their identity is lost forever? Generally, these can be replaced. For example, I was robbed at gunpoint a couple of years ago and the robbers took (among other things) my driver's license and Social Security card, which were never recovered (I did recover one prescription slip from a dumpster about a mile away that was wrapped around a syringe, because the robbers were also injection drug users.) I went by myself without any ID to the DMV which had an online record of my driver's license containing my age, height, weight, sex, race, noted that I needed vision correction and also had my most recent driver's license photo and a fingerprint. I explained what happened without any corroboration, and they promptly issued me a new driver's license. The same process would have applied had I had a state ID in lieu of a driver's license because I wasn't licensed to drive for some reason (e.g. if I was blind). The process in Texas would be very similar (I don't know if they have finger prints though). My daughter had to do the same when she lost her driver's license while camping. With the driver's license, I was able to go to the Social Security office and have them reissue a Social Security card. One of my children's birth certificates was lost, and I could simply go to the Vital Statistics department with a name and date of birth and get a new one. The replacement birth certificate and driver's license involved a modest fee (which would be pretty daunting for a homeless person), but the replacement Social Security card was free. It's a pain in the neck to do this, and it took several hours to sort out (the time lost would not be a problem for a homeless person), but loss of my identity was not a serious possibility. If you have (or had before you lost it) a photo ID such as a driver's license, or state ID, or student ID, or passport in a system, reconstructing your identity isn't that hard. If you don't know who you are either. If you have amnesia, so you don't know the information needed to recover your records, it can be much harder to work out a lack of any ID. This happens something on the order of several times a year. Sometimes it is resolved promptly when the person regains their memory or is tied to a recent outstanding missing persons report, or is identified after a local TV broadcast seeking input from the public. But, if the person is not local, no one filed a missing persons report, and the memory loss turns out to be permanent, it can take months or years to get it sorted out. But, you will generally be assumed to be legally present in the U.S. until proven otherwise if you speak fluent English. Also, you can't easily be deported if no one can determine your nationality (including you), even if you don't speak fluent English. For example, if the only language you spoke fluently was an Amazonian tribal language and no one could figure out this fact, it would be hard to deport you without evidence of your country of origin, which by assumption, does not exist in this scenario. Officials sometimes try to crowdsource recordings of someone speaking or writing in these situations to determine their place of origins, which can take many months and isn't always successful. But, if your first language was Klingon, you would be quickly identified and not deported, because that language is widely recognized and a Google search would reveal that it has only two native speakers, both of whom are children who were born in the United States (I know their father as a casual acquaintance). Citizenship, arrest and deportation Can a person lose their citizenship in this manner? Could they be arrested or even deported? You cannot lose your citizenship in this manner, although it can be harder to prove your citizenship, if you need to do so. You shouldn't be arrested for simply not having ID (although it does happen) if you aren't driving a car without a license. Also, lots of people without ID are arrested all of the time for other charges, and then refuse to provide anything but a false alias to the police. But, they are usually not deported unless there is some reason to suspect that they are not U.S. citizens. A modest but significant number of people every year (on the order of dozens to a couple hundred) are arrested and deported in circumstances like these and the system can put someone in that situation in a very Catch-22 situation for which there a few if any legal remedies after the fact by way of compensation. Deportations Of U.S. citizens with strong foreign ties The hard cases are usually those when you have someone who is a child who has never had a photo ID, or is an adult who never had a photo ID in the U.S., especially if that person is someone who has lived much of their life abroad despite being born in the U.S., or is most fluent in a non-English language because their parents spoke that language when they were growing up, or was born abroad and naturalized as a citizen later (often as a relative of the primary person who earned the right to citizenship by taking citizenship tests). Establishing that you are the same person as the one in a birth certificate or naturalization certificate is not always easy. Naturalizations often aren't accurately cross-referenced with immigration records. And, the track record of ICE agents meaningfully following up on claims of citizenship is very poor. Identity assumption cases Another much less common hard case that still happens sometimes, involves a situation where you are born in the U.S. or to a U.S. citizen, giving you U.S. citizenship, and you have a birth certificate, but you live abroad for a long time, and in the meantime, someone similar in age, sex and race to you has assumed your identity to claim citizenship status. Then, there is someone else with a long paper trail that supports your identity actually belonging to them including photo IDs and maybe even a passport, and you have only your birth certificate that someone else claims is theirs with doesn't have a lot of provable biometric features other than your parent's names, which may be hard to use to establish that you are the true person corresponding to the birth certificate if they are deceased, and may require DNA testing or testimony from them even if they are not deceased. Persons declared dead A third class of people who have a thorny time re-establishing their identities are people who went missing, were declared dead legally by a court as a result, and then resurface. This can pose a problem even after they undeniably establish their identity due to rules relating to the finality of court orders. A fictional example of this is the title character in the live action TV series the Iron Fist in the Marvel Comics Universe. But, there are also real life examples, such as a man in Ohio a number of years ago who was in a similar situation (except for the fact that he didn't have superpowers, was middle aged, and wasn't an heir to a billion dollar fortune). These cases are very rare. There is probably less than one per year in the entire United States. | Legally, they cannot just nab you. The usual (?) option is that authorities in the US request extradition pursuant to the US-Mexico extradition treaty via the Department of Justice, and if the paperwork is in order, this can result in a Provisional Arrest Warrant (and arrest) in Mexico, which will be carried out by the Mexican federal police. This is true whether or not you go to the US consulate. After a hearing in the Mexican courts you might be extradited (or not, but DoJ presumably doesn't proceed with cases that they will lose). Extradition is not possible for every offense, so you would have to look at the offenses listed in the treaty, and whatever the Arizona warrant is about. You can't be extradited for parking tickets, you can be extradited for murder: whatever it is, it has to be a crime in both places, and has to be subject to a minimum one year imprisonment. Also, if you are a Mexican citizen as well, you cannot be extradited unless the Mexican authorities agree to (whereas there is no choice if you are only a US citizen). An alternative is deportation, which would overcome limitations related to extradition, but it's not clear what the requirements for deportation from Mexico are (typically illegal presence, unclear whether Mexican authorities can or would try an end-run around official extradition procedure). Although consulates enjoy a degree of immunity from local law, a consulate in Mexico is still Mexican territory, subject to Mexican law. If you are in the consulate, Mexican authorities cannot enter without permission to arrest you. They also cannot arrest you without a warrant (see Art. 16 of the Mexican constitution). Consular staff also cannot arrest you (if you are not caught flagrante delicto). Nor are they authorized to execute a US warrant in Mexico (thus they have to go through the process of judicial review to send you back to the US, and why a Mexican warrant is required). See this Q&A, relevant to the status of embassies: what is relevant to us is that both the US and Mexico operate under the rule of law, so the issues surrounding Syrian refugees in the Syrian embassy do not arise here. |
Did my rights get violated I was sitting outside of the Sprint store today while waiting on my step daughter to come out.while I was sitting there I noticed that a guy that worked at the store came out looked at my car while talking on the phone he then went back into the store.about 10 minutes later two officers walked up to my car and asked me to cut off my vehicle and come inside only to find out that the store call the police because they have had people to come in and purchase phone and never pay the bill and that he felt that my step daughter came in to apply for service to do the same thing,she had qualified for service and payed for her devices at this point.so the store manager went on to say that people has been getting phones from them to sale on the black market and refused my step daughter service and asked for us not to come back to the store are we will be arrested for trespassing, I'm confused because I hadn't been in the store until the officer asked me to come in.I just feel violated | Your description of the facts is vague enough that we can't offer an informed judgment, but to remedy this, I will paraphrase your account of the facts (you can decide whether this is what you were trying to say). I was sitting outside of the Sprint store today waiting for my step daughter to come out. While waiting, two police officers walked up to my car and asked me to turn off my vehicle and come inside. When I voluntarily went inside, the store staff said that they called the police because they had had some sort of problems with people applying for service and absconding with the phone to resell on the black market, and they thought that was part of some such criminal plan. Because of that, they refused to give her a phone or service contract. But then they also told us to never come back, threatening arrest for trespassing. I have never been in that store before. Were my rights violated? No, neither by the police nor by the manager. The police, or the store manager, can legally request you to come in for a conversation: what matters most is whether you were forced to come in against your will. By your report, you were not, so your rights were not violated. The police are irrelevant to the remainder of the question. What remains is whether your rights were violated because the manager told you to go away and never come back under pain of prosecution. The store is private property, meaning that the owner has wide latitude to grant or deny permission to enter. If they hate pink hair and your hair is pink, they can legally "ban" you. If they suspect you of involvement in a criminal activity, that can most certainly legally ban you. That does not mean that it was a righteous or justified decision on their part, or a good business choice, but it is their legal right. So, no, your rights were not violated. | I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed. | Presumably, they at least took a report which could make it possible to file an insurance claim for the stolen phone. But, a good faith belief of law enforcement that is unable to figure out who committed the crime with the resources available to them is a legitimate reason not to investigate and prosecute a crime, even in countries with legal systems based upon the German one where prosecutors have an enforceable legal obligation to prosecute criminal offenses known to them. A prosecutor can't bring a case unless he knows who did it. And, the police may be wise not to try to investigate a crime that previous experience has proven to them is a dead end most of the time for a crime of modest economic value. Most cases of simple larceny are never solved. And, institutionally, the police have to balance the cost of investigating the crime against the seriousness of the crime. Murders and kidnappings are almost always going to take priority for police resources over stolen phones, particularly if investigating the phone theft may require international cooperation that makes the investigation more costly. A key point is that the mere fact that a phone is pawned doesn't mean that the person pawning it is necessarily committing a crime, so even if you find out where the phone is in some pawn shop (possibly in Albania or Turkey, by now), that doesn't mean that the job is over. That person could have bought it innocently and at fair market value from a flea market, from someone who could have gotten it from someone who received it innocently as a gift, from a friend of a criminal fence, who may have bought it not innocently from a true thief. In fact, because criminals respond to incentives like anyone else, it is far more likely that the phone was swiftly "laundered" along the lines I suggest in this example, than it is that it is still in the possession of someone close to the thief. But, only the fence and the thief would have criminal liability. It is a lot harder to solve the crime of a stolen cell phone than you would think, and the agency may simply not be able to justify the resources it would take to investigate that case properly to a situation where someone had a phone stole that was worth maybe 400 Euros in used condition. The more you can do to solve the crime, the more likely it is that they will find that it is worth further investigating until a thief can be identified and apprehended. For example, the company with the network that serves the phone might be willing to cooperate with its owner. Also, the more that you can do to show that this case might crack an entire ring of people involved in a black market in stolen cell phones might make it more attractive to law enforcement. | I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision. | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. | I am not a lawyer either, though I have been through Pennsylvania a few times. The relevant law is 18 Pa.C.S. 5703, which prohibits recording without consent of all parties (Penna is a "two-party consent" state, like Florida and Washington). Unfortunately, violation of that law is a third degree felony, which has a maximum of 7 year prison. A specific instance of someone getting in trouble for recording their boss is Commonwealth v. Smith (Smith used a cell phone to record his boss, then argued that a cell phone isn't a "device"; the court determined that it is, and that was Feb 16 2016 so who knows the final outcome). An attorney in Pennsylvania might be able to tell you how often people actually serve time for violating the law. You should call one. | In all honesty, this completely depends on the judge you happen to get that will hear your case. There's no straight-forward "yes this will work" or "no this won't work" answer in a case like this. But a couple things to keep in mind: The fact that he was from out of town doesn't matter. If signs were displayed, then he has to obey the signs. Your argument about the placement of the signs may or may not work, again depending on the judge. But make sure you take more evidence than just some numbers derived from guess work (you'll need pictures of where the car was parked, where the signs are at, and exact measurement between the two signs and the vehicle, pictures of obstructions, etc). It's up to you to decide whether collecting all of that is worth the $45. Someone has to pay the ticket. You cannot just go to court and get it dismissed because you weren't driving. By default, the parking ticket obligation falls onto the owner of the vehicle. If you know you weren't driving, you can then request the person who was to reimburse you, or even sue them for reimbursement if they refuse. Continuing from #2, in some jurisdictions and especially if the parking ticket was issued by a private company (like at a strip mall) that doesn't use police enforcement for parking, you can provide them with the name and address of the person who was driving and have them re-send the ticket to the correct person, but not always. However, relying on this is a bad idea. The ticket, while issued to another person, is still attached to your vehicle and if the other person refuses to pay, it's your vehicle that will be impounded, booted, etc if the ticket is left delinquent. Then you just have even more hassles to deal with. Having outstanding tickets for your vehicle could also affect your insurance premiums. Don't let this linger for too long. Get on top of it and decide what the two of you are going to do as soon as possible. | No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that. |
What is the legal structure of online "TOS"? TOS, also known as "terms of service" or "terms of use", is an agreement entered into by a user, usually before the user is allowed to use the company's product but is it an agreement(contract), or rules to follow when using the service. A contract is a predetermined legal relationship between two parties, that if one party is to be found in breach of this relationship damage will ensue. Example: Bobby gets married to Sarah, by doing so bobby and Sarah have entered into a contract that is broken by either party damages will ensue and the contract may be voided, or parts will be unenforceable. Rules to follow is more of a guideline of what to do to be able to continue using the service. (usually legally unenforceable) Example: A child is running around the store, the store and the mother of the child don't need to have a contract for the store to deny the mother and son service, because they aren't following the service's rules. This question of is a TOS a contract or rules to follow can have a major impact on how the user interacts with the company. Some company argues that agreeing to their terms is a contract and legally binding; Others argue that these are the rules to be followed when using our service. Is the TOS a contract, or rules of service? | A website's Terms of Service can be or include either or both rules and terms of contract. Which part is what depends on the circumstances and whether there is a contract at all. Like in case of any physical venue where the owner is free to impose rules on anyone wishing to visit the venue, a website owner is free to impose rules on what the visitors can and cannot do while visiting the website. If you are the owner of a physical store, you may require the visitors to take off any helmets or sunglasses when they enter, and/or present their bags for inspection when they exit. These are rules, or conditions of entry. Similarly, you may require your website visitors to be over certain age, only use certain devices/software for accessing the website, not to engage any robots/scrappers etc. As soon as a contract between you and the visitor is formed, the relevant parts of the ToS may well be terms of the contract. For example, if visitors buy something in your store/on your website, the clauses re shipping, returns/refunds and warranty will be such terms. | Does Bob have a case/standing? Yes, this is a reasonably straightforward contract dispute. Once you contract to do something and you then don't do it, you are liable for damages. Contractual damages are assessed on an expectation basis - the innocent party is entitled to be placed financially in the same position as though the contract had been completed without the breach. Bob is entitled to have the item and not to be out-of-pocket more than he agreed to pay. But ... There may not be a contract - see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? A contract is formed when the parties reach an agreement and most website terms and conditions are clear that this is NOT when the customer pays for it. For example, Amazon says: The Order Confirmation E-mail is acknowledgement that we have received your order, and does not confirm acceptance of your offer to buy the product(s) ordered. We only accept your offer, and conclude the contract of sale for a product ordered by you, when we dispatch the product to you and send e-mail confirmation to you that we've dispatched the product to you (the "Dispatch Confirmation E-mail"). So, here, two things have to happen before Amazon and you have a contract: they have to physically dispatch the goods and they have to send you an email saying they have. If they do one without the other, there is no contract. If your vendor has similar terms, you don't have a contract with them and are not entitled to contractual damages. You would not have a case in equity because they were clear that there was no contract until these things happened. You might be able to argue negligence if they sent the email without dispatching the goods but your damage basis would be different. Tort damage is calculated on a restoration basis, not an expectation basis, so you can recoup your losses but not claim any lost profits. It makes no difference here but if you had had a buyer who was going to pay you twice the price you paid, in contract you are entitled to the lost profit, in tort, you aren't. However, if the contract has a dispute resolution clause, that would normally have to be complied with before you can go to court. In some cases, this may prevent going to court at all, for example, if the dispute resolution clause included binding arbitration or expert determination. If there is a choice of law clause then this will usually be binding, however, if this is a consumer contract in New Zealand then NZ consumer law will apply in addition. Similarly, courts will usually observe a choice of venue clause. With what reasonable time lapse between (false) shipment notification of the original order and placing the eBay order? A reasonable time. Depends on what the product is and what normal delivery times are. For a 5mm screw, a reasonable time is probably measured in months. For an aircraft carrier it's probably measured in decades. Does this sort of a claim fall under the jurisdiction of small claims court (given that the amount is less than the threshold)? Neither New Zealand nor England & Wales (bearing in mind Scotland and Northern Ireland are different jurisdictions) have small claims courts. The correct venue in New Zealand is the Disputes Tribunal which is not a court, and in England and Wales it is the County Court. Procedurally, would it be more advantageous for Bob to file the claim in the UK or in New Zealand? Ask a lawyer in each jurisdiction. Now Bob wants to claim damages from the store in the amount "Total for the eBay order less total for the original store order" — on top of full refund of the original order. Bob is not entitled to a refund. He is entitled to damages. A more accurate way to state the damages is the total for the eBay order and to not make any mention of a refund. | Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc. | Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price. | In the real world, the contract could not be enforced, as being unconscionable. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445. This, from the ruling, seems particularly applicable to TOS conditions: Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices | What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal. | In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source. | That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow. |
Who owns the intellectual property of a contractor employed by another company? Suppose the following hypothetical situation occurring within the United States of America. Startup Sam wishes to contract Contractor Bob to invent a widget. Startup Sam and Contractor Bob agree, and state on their contract, that Startup Sam will own the intellectual property rights to the widget upon completion of the project. Unbeknownst to Startup Sam, Contractor Bob is currently employed by Company X. As part of the terms of employment, Contractor Bob agreed to an intellectual property clause which states that Company X will own the intellectual property of all inventions by Contractor Bob (whether or not they were produced on or off company hours/premises). In this scenario, would Startup Sam still own the intellectual property rights to the widget invented by Contractor Bob, or would Company X own it? | It is possible that a court would hold Comapny X's agreement with Bob to be unconscionable for overbredth and therefore void. This would depend on the state having jurisdiction, and on the specific facts of the case and the language of the contract between X and Bob. Some states do not favor such broad agreements on automatic assignment of IP rights. If the Contract between X and Bob was held to be void, then Sam would own the rights. Otherwise X would own the rights, as their contract came first. As the answer by Dale M says, Bob entered into the contract with Sam fraudulently, by concealing a materiel fact (Bob's existing employment with X). Bob would potentially be liable to Sam for damages. One possible measure of damages would be what it would cost Sam to buy the rights from X. | The copyright holder has the rights in whatever he created. If you have created something new based on his idea, the law will generally not be interested; but if your expression is recognisably a copy with a few changes, he can prevent publication or demand royalties. If you are uncertain which side of the line you fall, you should ask a lawyer (or, more cheaply, write to the author and ask if he objects). | Before the AIA in 2012 both companies could apply for a patent and if one of the applicants thought they were both trying to patent the same thing they could initiate an interference proceeding. In that proceeding before the board, they each present their evidence as to date of conception and diligent effort from that point to the date of the first filing. The board decided which application went forward. Now the U.S. is with the rest of the world in first-to-file. It doesn’t matter who conceived first unless one actually stole the idea from the other. There is a new derivation procedure to try to prove that. I don’t think it has ever yet happened. One of the "simultaneous" inventors could publish the invention, putting into the public domain. If published before the other's filing date, it would theoretically prevent the other from getting a patent. In any case a patent owner can stop the other from making their product or charge a royalty. There is a narrow case under the AIA where one company has been using a process that another later patents and can retain a limited right to keep using that process but can’t move or expand operations. This is called Prior User Rights. | The board rules. Companies usually go to great lengths to be sure the company owns the IP developed within and for the company. But the company is governed by its board of directors and that board can decide to take the company in a new direction where some IP that the company owns would no longer be a key asset for ongoing business. Selling that IP to another organization might, then, be logical. Boards are elected by, and represent, the owners of the company. | In order to use a trademarked logo on a product you would need permission of the trademark owner's, just like with any other trademark. However, you don't need permission to use a trademark outside the context of trade and commerce. For example, despite the fact that the Wi-Fi Alliance's own name is a trademark, you didn't need permission to use it in your question. Similarly Wikipedia didn't need permission to use the Wi-Fi Alliance's logo in their article on the organization: However, given your stated use, you'd be better served by not using the Wi-Fi logo on your web page. This logo is designed to be used to identify products that have been certified by Wi-Fi Alliance, not as a generic Wi-Fi symbol. Whether your page would infringe on the trademark or not, the use of logo could cause confusion and not send the message you're intending. | Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted. | Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors. | The designer/company owns the copyright to the original work, you own the copyright in the derivative work (the screenshot). However, your work is subject to whatever rights your license to use the game gives you and fair use/fair dealing. An example of a company attempting to enforce copyright from screenshots/screen recordings can be seen by the Nintendo Creators Program. |
Is abuse during custodial interrogation grounds for suppression? I assume that a custodial interrogation that involved the use of "torture" would be suppressed by any U.S. court. But I can't find a law that clearly defines custodial practices that would constitute torture, beyond the "Torture Act." In researching this I have found frequent references to "cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment." Is there precedent for suppression of interrogation conducted under conditions in which a detainee has been subject to "cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment?" One condition that is enumerated, at least by the DoD, is hypothermia. Another I imagine to be more common would be sleep deprivation, if for no other reason than that it impairs an individual's ability to assert one's Miranda rights. | Yes. 18 USC 3501 says that a confession is admissible if it is voluntary. If it was given during an abusive interrogation, that would generally show that it wasn't voluntary. There is some analysis at https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/voluntary-confessions.html and https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/compelled-self-incrimination.html. Any amount of violence used during the interrogation would generally make the confession inadmissible, whether or not it rose to the level of torture. Indeed, even if no actual violence is used, but only threats of violence, that would be enough to make the confession inadmissible, according to that article. | would this be illegal in the U.S.A.? This would almost certainly fail under the US Constitutions 8th Amendment as being a "cruel and unusual punishment": Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted While the inmate has been sentenced to execution, they are still afforded a lot of protection and are entitled to a stay of execution at any point (which is why there is typically an open telephone line to the state governor etc right up to the point at which the execution starts). Being deliberately put in harms way to catch a killer just because they have been sentenced to execution would be both a cruel and an unusual punishment. | That statute, which was struck down by the Supreme Court in US v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, does not define desecration. Case law on point is not forthcoming since there is no enforceable law on the topic and as long as the First Amendment holds, we can't test laws prohibiting flag desecration. The general meaning of the word is to treat disrespectfully, irreverently, or profanely, and that clearly is not the case in the present usage. A different statute yet to be written might outlaw "any modifications of the flag" (and would suffer the same fate as 18 USC 700), which could be technically violated in the application of a thin blue line to a flag. | It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up). | The purposes of criminal justice include (this list is based on the Sentencing Act 1991 in Victoria): Deterrence Rehabilitation of offenders Denunciation ('this behaviour is wrong') (Retribution can also be a purpose.) What the question is talking about is rehabilitation. As discussed in the book 'Starship Troopers', you can't expect a person to improve their behaviour if they are not shown how. Some simple examples in practice include violent offenders being sent to anger management classes, or bad drivers being sentenced to remedial training. Why aren't all offenders put into rehabilitation programs? Some reasons include: Cost. It would be very expensive to offer all the rehabilitation which would help all offenders. Often this kind of thing is court-ordered, so if the judge does not know about relevant programs or does not assess the offender's needs correctly, then the offender will not be sent to them. The offender is unwilling to participate in programs that are available, and there are limits to how much coercion a given society is comfortable applying. There is no 'one size fits all' rehabilitation. Some people need to talk about what makes them use drugs, others need to talk through their childhood issues, others need training so they can get a job and not fall back into bad habits when they are released from prison. Perhaps North Korea has a great curriculum for putting lots of people in a camp and they come out model citizens, but I'm not aware of the details. Can a person really be forced to do anything? Even the army can't do that. The army might put you in prison, but that's redundant for a person who is already a prisoner. You can always threaten to kill them, I suppose, whip them, or brainwash them with electrodes perhaps, but that depends on your principles as a society. I think it's fair to say that, these days, the trend is towards what the question suggests, which is putting as many offenders as possible into rehabilitation. In 2014 it was reported that Texas took the money it would have spent on building a new prison and used it on rehabilitation instead, and there were suggestions that that worked well. | Assuming that the age of criminal responsibility in your jurisdiction is more than five (I don't know any jurisdictions where it isn't), then you can't be arrested for this. It is possible that the therapist will have to report the information, and it will appear on your record if you apply to work with vulnerable people. On the other hand, if your parents put you up for adoption aged five (but kept a sister), they will have had to explain why - and that is likely to have been recorded (unless this is so long ago that record keeping was much more lax in those days). I would recommend finding a different therapist that is more comfortable being told about these things. You might also need to consult a lawyer for a short while (they will often offer a 30 minute free consultation). | If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal. | Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies. |
When can you no longer submit evidence in a civil case? I was wondering if there was a point in a civil case where parties are no longer allowed to submit evidence, to my understanding all evidence is submitted at a pretrial, and after that it is disallowed. If someone could shed some light on this question it would be greatly appreciated as I did my research and found nothing pertaining to the topic. For the sake of context; how does this apply in USA, more specifically California? | Overview This would not be uniform for all courts, even in a single state, nor would it be the same for all kinds of evidence. Also, few rules regarding the timing of disclosure of evidence are absolute. A judge's handling of a request to introduce late disclosed evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo, on appeal, so a judge is afforded some leeway in how the general rules are applied. In General Jurisdiction Courts In courts of general jurisdiction (i.e. those that handle large claims), disclosure of evidence well in advance of trial is the norm. The two big deadlines are usually the close of discovery (a deadline usually set in the pre-trial process), and to a lesser extent, the deadline for disclosing a final set of witnesses and exhibits shortly before trial in immediate pre-trial disclosures. (There are parallel deadlines at different steps in the process for adding new parties to a lawsuit and for raising new legal issues.) There are two main exceptions to that principle. Impeachment, Rebuttal And Authentication Evidence One is that evidence for impeachment of someone else's testimony or rebuttal to something offered by the other side, especially if the statement to be impeached or rebutted was unexpected (e.g. when the testimony to be impeached or rebutted comes from a third-party witness not in close coordination with either party), is generally allowed even in the absence of disclosure. Late disclosure of evidence solely necessary to authenticate evidence that has already been disclosed is likewise usually treated very leniently. The Good Cause Exception The other is that late introduction of evidence is usually allowed only for "good cause" (e.g. the evidence was only discovered or only came into being at the last minute). And, in "good cause" cases, often the other side will be given the opportunity to continue the hearing or trial to allow them additional time to prepare to respond to the new evidence (an opportunity that most litigants will waive in practice to avoid the long delay associated with getting a new trial date). An analysis of "good cause" also considers the prejudice to each side of excluding the evidence and the materiality of the evidence. For example, if the late evidence is something created by the defendant, even if it wasn't formally disclosed, a judge is much more likely to allow it to come in than a judge is if the other party has never seen the evidence before. Similarly, a judge will often be quite lenient about late disclose of exhibits that merely compile or summarize evidence that has already been disclosed because it is not prejudicial and could save time. Judges are also loath to exclude highly material "smoking gun" evidence that would otherwise be admissible and clearly resolve the case on the merits, but are likely to rebuff efforts to introduce evidence not disclosed in a timely motion if it is cumulative or secondary in importance or addresses only a satellite or collateral issue or credibility in general. A judge is more likely to admit late disclosed evidence if the other party was in some way responsible for its late discovery (e.g. by excluding it from an index in a case where the volume of documents disclosed was voluminous, or encouraging a third-party not to disclose it). Judges are less lenient towards late disclosed expert witness testimony than they are to admit late disclosed fact witness testimony. Limited Jurisdiction Courts and Special Proceedings In courts of limited jurisdiction (especially small claims court), in contrast, there is often little or no pre-trial disclosure of evidence and new evidence can be presented at any time until you "close" your case (either because you say you are done presenting evidence or because the judge limits the time you have to present evidence and cuts you off). Requirements to disclose evidence in advance also tend to be more lenient in specialized proceedings (e.g. probate disputes, evictions, foreclosure, mental health proceedings) and is usually absent in evidentiary hearing of pre-trial relief (like evidentiary hearings to determine if a court has jurisdiction, temporary restraining orders and pre-judgment attachments) in cases in general jurisdiction courts. Post-Trial Relief Proceeding Exceptions It is sometimes possible to introduce newly discovered evidence as late as a motion for post-trial relief (or even in an even later motion to set aside a judgment), but usually, the very latest point at which you can introduce evidence is the close of your case at trial (in the case of a plaintiff, often at the halfway point in a trial as a plaintiff is not always permitted to present new evidence after the defendant closes his or her case). Consequences Of Evidence Disclosure Deadlines Evidence disclosure deadlines provide important value by preventing the previously common practice of "trial by surprise" that often led to unjust results. But, the idea that there is a time limit on disclosing evidence is quite counterintuitive for the average person because it is contrary to how people usually prove things to other people in every day life which is more of a dialog and less of a one sided presentation. Failing to follow these requirements, or not realizing their importance and finality, is one of the most common ways that people not represented by counsel make mistakes that impair their chance of prevailing at trial. Many litigants who are unfamiliar with the courts have a very hard time understanding that there is a deadline for disclosing evidence prior to trial, and often, even in trial, will say things like "I have this evidence that I could show you to show that I'm telling the truth" when in reality, at trial, it is your last chance to present evidence and you can't supplement your evidence after the fact. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | Truth is a defense to defamation Bob must prove the truth of his statement if Rob sues - there is a reverse onus for this defense. Because this is a civil trial the burden is balance of probabilities. Provided Bob can prove Rob stole his bike he will win. A conviction for doing so is pretty good (but not necessarily conclusive) evidence. Absent that, Bob would need other evidence. Of course, if Bob has said that Rob was convicted of stealing the bike, he’s going to lose. | The common law adversarial system is just that: the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The defense is not obliged to call evidence at all. They are allowed to though: they will do it merely if they feel that the prosecution evidence needs rebuttal — in order to discredit the evidence or, at least, raise that "reasonable doubt". | I think you're referring to this image: This is the prosecutor pointing the AR-15 at the jury. Evidence, including guns, is allowed in the courtroom, but the prosecutor was widely criticized for his dramatic antics: pointing it directly at the jury, with his finger on the trigger (the rifle should have been checked for being empty, but not having your finger on the trigger unless you intend to shoot, no matter what, is elementary gun safety). | united-states Procedures differ on such things. The closest I know of to an outcome of "not enough evidence" is the classic "scotch verdict" of "Not Proven. In the US, the prosecutor can wait to proceed with a criminal case while s/he does (or has done) as much investigation as s/he thinks is advisable. But once the trial starts, it normally proceeds to a conclusion. If there is not enough evidence to convict, the result should be "not guilty" and that will bar any future trial of the same person for the same offense under the doctrine of Double Jeopardy. Circumstantial evidence, as described in the question, can be enough to convict, if the jury (or judge in a bench trial) is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. Exactly how much evidence it takes to convince a Jury varies, and there is not a clear standard other than the phrase " beyond a reasonable doubt". The judge, or a later appeals court, can set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, but only by finding that no reasonable jury could have convicted on the evidence pre3sented, taking it in the light most favorable to conviction. Judges are reluctant to set aside jury verdicts unless they appear badly wrong. If further evidence is found during the trial, which tends to show the accused is not guilty, the prosecutor can request that the trial be halted. This may or may not bar a future re-trial of the same defendant, depending on whether the dismissal is 'without prejudice", a decision the Judge makes. But once evidence has been started to be presented, dismissals are usually "with prejudice" meaning that double jeopardy applies. The defense can also request a dismissal, most often at the end of the prosecution case. In rare circumstances the Judge may dismiss without a request from either prosecution or defense. These will most often be "with prejudice" It is possible for the trial to be recessed while new evidence is evaluated or sought, but this is rare and usually only for a short time -- a day or two, perhaps. In general a prosecutor is not supposed to schedule a trial if there is any reasonable chance of additional evidence coming to light. It can and does happen, but the system tries to avoid it, and does not easily accept that it has happened. This answer is US-Specific, and different answers may apply in other places. | Are defendants legally obliged to provide all culpatory evidence to prosecution? The question here is whether or not all evidence requested by prosecution must be provided by the defense? If the defense plans on only using the evidence of the prosecution, does the prosecution get to demand evidence the defense would rather not release? No. Usually only specific kinds of evidence related to specific kinds of claims such as alibi evidence, an insanity claim, or expert testimony must be disclosed prior to trial by a defendant in a criminal case. A defendant in a criminal case does not have to disclose evidence harmful to the defendant's case prior to trial as a general rule. Sometimes there is a requirement to disclose witnesses anticipated to be called, or exhibits to be possibly used very shortly prior to trial, but that is more the exception than the rule. Does the answer depend on the whether or not the case is criminal or civil? Yes. A plaintiff in a civil case can compel disclosure prior to trial of all evidence in the custody, control, or possession of the defendant that is relevant or is reasonably calculated to be relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings (e.g. counterclaims, replies to counterclaims, third-party complaints, cross-claims, etc.). The scope of discovery is slightly different in jurisdictions that don't follow the federal model. This can include pre-trial depositions of the parties, although a defendant can claim the 5th Amendment at the risk of being exposed to an adverse inference communicated to the jury at trial if the defendant does so. Furthermore, most jurisdictions require the pre-trial disclosure of expert testimony that will be used at trial, of exhibits that will or may be used at trial, of witnesses who will or may be called a trial, of all documents that are relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings, of all insurance coverage that could cover the claim, of all persons with knowledge of the disputed facts, and of an expected damages calculation. In the federal system, however, one need pro-actively disclose only witnesses and documents that support your case without being asked. Is there consistency on this or is it at the discretion of the judge? The rules of procedure applicable to a case govern the scope of discovery, but judges have considerable discretion to determine that requests are excessive relative to what is at stake in the case, are irrelevant, or unduly burden some other legitimate interest of the person subject to discovery. Is there punishment for non-compliance? Yes. First of all, a failure to disclose when there is a duty to do so is a ground to exclude presentation of that evidence at trial. Secondly, in civil cases, attorney fees incurred to obtain the discovery can be awarded, facts that might have been disclosed can be declared to be true as a matter of judicial sanction where there is not disclosure, claims can be dismissed, etc. The main relevant federal rule in civil cases is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. It is an unlawful request that must nonetheless be followed with only a hypothetical remedy left to the defendant as is the case in most of these united states to comply with an obviously unlawful arrest that doesn't present an immediate threat to life? I don't understand this long and convoluted sentence. The part about an unlawful arrest seems divorced from the issues in the rest of the the question. It isn't clear what kind of unlawful request is involved either. | The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo. Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo. So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case, an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts "review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration." Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). "Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10." Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. "Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). "[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set "strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award." Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing (see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo. See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). "A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing. |
Is making a public comment about a girl's breasts illegal? From a Washington Post's article about Columbine HS: A similar event happened at a Columbine wrestling match at Arvada High School. Pyne, "in front of everyone," said Harwick, broadcast to all within earshot: " 'Her breasts are getting bigger.' They're laughing -- the jocks were." She told Coach Place; he told her to sit on the other side of the gym. She then went to a woman at a concession stand, who called the Arvada police. The officer issued Pyne a ticket. Because he was a juvenile, court records are not available, but Harwick said he pleaded guilty and paid a $50 fine. While it's obviously in poor taste, I'm surprised that a comment like "Her breasts are getting bigger" is actually illegal. What laws were being broken, and might not such speech be protected by the Constitution? | Without a witness willing to break their silence, we will probably never be certain. It is possible that this was harassment (current ordinance, not 1999 – version in force at that time not available), defined in Arvada if one has the intent to annoy (etc.) and "Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response" (the "record" indicates that there was a pattern of such conduct). We don't actually know that he was fined (hearsay...). | I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question. | That really depends what they lie about In the United States, there's no general law against lying. The fact that a statement is false doesn't inherently strip it of protection under the first amendment. Public figures lie to the public all the time. That's why news companies have fact checkers. Was it defamatory? It is, however, illegal to defame someone. If someone makes a false statement of fact (that is, not an opinion) about a person or company, they may be liable for that. Whether they are liable for that depends on a number of factors, including whether the target is a public figure (see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan), the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, and whether the target was damaged by it. Was it part of some other criminal scheme? False statements to the public could be part of some sort of fraud, for instance. Pump and dump schemes, for instance, are illegal. Was it under oath? Lying under oath (such as when testifying in court) would constitute perjury, which is a crime. There are many other situations in which lying could be a crime (such as lying on your taxes), but these are the main ones I can think of that would be about lying to the public. In this case (I'm unfamiliar with the details of what he said, so I'm just going off your description), I can't immediately think of any reason that could lead to liability. Mocking and calling something a "nothing burger" is pretty clearly an opinion, not a false statement of fact. I'm not aware of any securities law against saying you don't like something you're actually invested in (though I'm not especially familiar with securities law). | No, absent a state law to the contrary (and I am aware of no such law in this case) it is not illegal. Universities, as institutions, are permitted to express opinions on political issues, especially political issues that are pertinent to their operations. Indeed, they often do so. (Political candidates are arguably a different matter and certainly involve a more complex analysis to determine if the Johnson Amendment applies to a public university, but that isn't at issue in this case.) Governmental entities may not take religious positions, but may take political ones. Generally, even public colleges like Rutgers have this autonomy. Indeed, lobbying is frequently necessary for the survival of a public university - it has no choice but to lobby and a free hand regarding the issues upon which it does lobby. | Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water. | First of all, Sally can't charge Bob, or anyone else. She can file a complaint with the police, or with the District Attorney. It may or may not be investigated, and if it is, charges may or may not be brought, and she has no control over any of that, although she may be able to use persuasion or political pressure to influence the decision. In New York, persuading a child to make pornography is a class C felony. Possessing child pornography is a class E felony. Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child is a class D felony. Disseminating obscene material to a minor is a class E felony, unless the defendant solicits the child to engage in sexual activity, in which case it's a class D felony. All of these have 5-year statutes of limitation. (N.Y. Pen. Law § § 70.00, 80.00, 235.21, 235.22, 263.05, 263.10, 263.11, 263.16.) I can't find any NY law that makes it a crime to ask for a naked image of a child and be refused, although there may well be one. Note that it is not a crime in NY to posses sexual or nude pictures of a person 16 or older, although it is a crime to create them. There are also federal laws against child pornography, but federal policy is not to bring federal cases where the accused are under 18 and a state case could be brought. In fact, the federal authorities generally do not bring cases except against major producers when a state case can be brought instead. But that is a matter of policy, not law. NY has a pre-trial diversion program for teen-ages involved in "sexting". They can agree to take special classes, and avoid a criminal conviction or any jail time. The court must approve candidates individually for this program, but it is widely used. In the given scenario, the statute of limitations would not have expired (if the law I couldn't find makes this a felony, misdemeanor SoL is 2 years). In theory bob could be charged and tried for his solicitation. If charges were levied, the prosecution would need to prove at trial that Bob had made the request, and that it was serious, not a joke. It would also need to persuade a jury to convict when no sexual image had ever been transmitted. In practice I doubt that a case would be pursued after several years. That would depend entirely on the DA, or the relevant assistant DA who handled the case. Nothing would legally prevent such a case that I know of. | Does he have some kind of libel or invasion of privacy case? The description of the "art work" is somewhat inconclusive. I will assume that the red lipstick and blue eye shadow in the fictional poster are suggestive of that soldier's "makeup". If the World War Two soldier were still alive and a straight male, he might have a claim of defamation insofar as the poster portrayed him as having a sexual orientation which is inaccurate, detrimental to his reputation, and tending to dissuade others from associating with the soldier. Policies against sexual discrimination aside, no straight male likes being falsely characterized as to sexual orientation (in part because of the undeniably harmful, lasting impact something like this would have in his environment). The defendant's possible allegation that the "art work" was hyperbole would be unavailing. That is because the suggestive poster is likely to impinge on viewers a detrimental concept of the soldier even if it is obvious to those viewers that the poster was not an actual, color photograph taken of him during the World War II. In most jurisdictions in the US, the defamed soldier would need to file suit within a year from the publication of the poster (an exception is Tennessee: six months) because the statute of limitations for claims of defamation is shorter than most others. | I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed. |
Can liability for data disclosure be waived by T&Cs under GDPR? I live in Ireland, an EU county subject to the GDPR. I see in a service T&Cs the line: "Despite our use of commercially reasonable efforts to protect your Personal Information from unauthorized access or disclosure, the Internet is not an inherently secure environment and so we cannot guarantee the security of your Personal Information. We assume no liability for any disclosure of data due to errors in transmission, unauthorized third party access or other acts of third parties, or acts or omissions beyond our reasonable control." Is this legal? Or does "beyond our reasonable control" render this merely subjective? | GDPR defines the responsibility of Companies to ensure that Personal Data in their possession is maintained Secure ensuring Confidentiality and Privacy towards the Data Subjects to whom it pertains. Prior to the Articles themselves, there are notes and over (49) one may read that companies must have in place (where applicable) mechanisms like CERT and any other SECURITY assuring tools/ processes. (83) again is all about ensuring Security. (94) reads that if the Controller (company) find it cannot ensure Security it must stop processing activities and report to the Supervisory Authority for guidance and support. Then we have Article 3 (f) establishing that it is the company responsibility to "... ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organizational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’)..." Bottom line... T&C Companies must ensure that Personal Data is processed by them (and that includes communications) are Secure while ensuring Confidentiality and Pricavy towards the Data Subjects. The wording "...commercially reasonable efforts..." is wrong, because it is not something that may be a legal requirement or not depending on "cost"; it is a Legal Obligation. Then "... the Internet is not an inherently secure environment and so we cannot guarantee the security of your Personal Information..."; this is just "poor legal advice" for GDPR does expect companies to make the Internet safe, it expects companies to maintain their IT Landscape safe... an analogy can be made about going through a group of sharks in the ocean while just swimming or on board of a big boat... the ocean is dangerous due to the sharks, yet if you are in a big boat, you won't even notice them. Then the "cherry on top"; "... e assume no liability for any disclosure of data due to errors in transmission, unauthorized third-party access or other acts of third parties, or acts or omissions beyond our reasonable control..."; now i really do not know which lawyer has written this, but it basically reads something like: "the law obliges me to ensure you are safe... however I am not able to". Now, I have seen similar "statements", but I must confess it was like 2 or 3 years ago... most companies have corrected them over time and since they become aware that penalties were for real. Just a final disclaimer It is a fact that while in transit (over the Internet) a message being delivered through a T&C Company Services will travel through 3rd party infrastructure contexts, rendering it at risk ... however, if it is properly encrypted (as it should) the transition time will not be sufficient for a successful breach attempt. So, yes they are capable of ensuring all they have stated they can not. | The critical part is the nature of the relationship between you, the website provider, and the provider of the material you embed. If the embed-provider acts as your data processor, then things are generally fine. The GDPR does not really distinguish between personal data processing activities that you perform yourself versus activities that you've outsourced to third parties. However, you would remain responsible for compliance. This also means that per Art 28 GDPR, you will need a contract with that embed-provider (sometimes called a “Data Processing Agreement”, DPA). This contract stipulates that the processor will only use the personal data as instructed by you, but not for their own purposes. With the Google Fonts case, it must be highlighted that Google does not act as a processor for this service. Google does not offer a DPA that covers the Fonts CDN. While Google promises that it doesn't use the personal data collected in this context in any nefarious way, there are zero contractual guarantees for website providers. So we have to consider the scenario when the embed-provider is an independent data controller. We as the website provider have no control over what the embed-provider does with the collected data, our control only extends to whether or not we cause the website to disclose data to that third party. But this is still processing as personal data (see also the CJEU Fashion ID case), and we need a legal basis for this data sharing. In the Google Fonts case, the court in Munich found that there was no legal basis for using Google's CDN. There was no consent, no contractual necessity, and no necessity for a legitimate interest. After all, these fonts could all be self-hosted. (Technical remark: and given how modern browsers enforce cache isolation and provide HTTP/2, serving fonts from your main domain is probably faster anyway). Consent management services will typically act as your data processor. You don't need a legal basis for “sharing” data with them, because the processing remains under your control. As far as the GDPR is concerned, loading a script from your processor's servers is equivalent to loading a script from your own servers (which you're probably hosting via a another data processor anyway). Sometimes, the necessary data processing agreement is already part of the standard terms of service, sometimes it's a separate document that has to be signed. Figuring this out is your responsibility as the data controller, before deploying the service. Art 6 GDPR doesn't say that you always need consent. It says that you need a legal basis, for which paragraph 1 enumerates six choices. For a lot of use cases, a “legitimate interest” will be appropriate, though it requires a balancing test. Sometimes, other laws mandate that you use a particular legal basis. For example, the ePrivacy Directive says that you must get GDPR-consent when accessing or storing information on the user's device (such as cookies), unless that access/storage is strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user. | These documents constitute personal data and - in principle - you, as the subject, have the right to get a copy of them by issuing a "subject access request". The controller shall provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing. For any further copies requested by the data subject, the controller may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs. Where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless otherwise requested by the data subject, the information shall be provided in a commonly used electronic form. (Art. 15 (3) GDPR) GDPR applies to controllers of any kind, including government organisations. The subject access request can usually be a simple email. The ICO has a template for this: https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/your-right-of-access/ (but keep it simple, you can literally just ask for "all personal data" they have on you; no need to speculate on what kind of data they may have). The subject access request is sent to the actual controller, but if you don't get a response to your request after 30 days, you can file a complaint with the supervisory authority (see here for Germany; note that federal institutions are supervised by the BFDI, not the data protection authorities of the Länder). Also note that you may have to go through some trouble to be properly authenticated by the controller. They do need to be certain that you are the data subject. There are also reasons why a controller can refuse to provide some or all of the information (e.g. if your request is clearly excessive or unfounded, if it's impossible to comply without violating another data subject's rights), but I would be surprised if any of those applied in your case. Your rights can also be restricted depending on the legal basis for processing. This includes rights that are illogical as well as some that provide special protection for processors: You can't object to processing based on consent (but you can revoke your consent), fulfilment of contract (but you can cancel your contract), a legal obligation on the part of the processor, or a vital interest (but you still have the right to erasure) Your right to portability and right to erasure does not apply if processing is based on a legal obligation or a public task (justice, parliamentary or government functions, statutory functions etc.) your right to portability also doesn't apply if processing is based on vital interest (e.g to protect someone's life) or legitimate interest of the processor. It is possible that processing all or some of your data was based on the performance of a public task, in which case they will refuse your request. | From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info. | No. As long as you don't see and have no means to access this data, but it is under the control of the user at all times, you are neither the controller or the processor of this personal data, and the GDPR does not apply to you. | This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy. | Yes, but it doesn't matter. This answer discusses gdpr implications. Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable person. The GDPR has an extremely broad concept of identifiability, also covering indirect identification using additional information and with the help of third parties. Even just being able to single out one data subject, i.e. being able to distinguish different users from another, counts as identification. If you already have a concept of user accounts, any information that is linked with the user accounts and somehow relates to those users would also be personal data. Since you have distinct push tokens per user, it seems like this criterion would be met. Additionally, those unique tokens might be directly identifying by themselves. The GDPR does not allow for semantic games like “it only identifies the device, not the user”. The key here is that the definition of identifiability does not hinge on your intentions, but on objective capabilities: if you or someone else who can come into possession of this data were to attempt to identify the user (such as singling out users from another), would they be reasonably likely able to do that? Since most devices are single-user, being able to identify a device would imply that you're reasonably likely to also identify users. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean you're forbidden from using that data. It means that you'd have to comply with GDPR rules, if you're otherwise within scope of that regulation (e.g. if you're EU/UK-based, or are targeting your services to people who are in UK/EU). For example, basic GDPR compliance steps include having a clear legal basis for your processing of personal data (such as necessity for performing a contract to which the data subject is party, or necessity for a legitimate interest, or consent), providing a privacy notice, and taking appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to ensure the compliance and security of processing. For example, TOMs regarding these push tokens could involve encryption, access controls, and a plan for installing security patches in order to prevent data breaches. Using push tokens is already a good measure in this context, since they are effectively pseudonymous and prevent linking additional information via that token (two sites/apps pushing notifications to the same person will have entirely different tokens). However, the push notification provider (e.g. Google, Apple, Mozilla) can resolve the pseudonymous tokens and link them to a person, indicating that these tokens are ultimately identifying (even if you can't perform that linking yourself). Note that if GDPR applies, then other EU/UK rules might apply as well. For example, sending electronic messages (such as emails) is subject to anti-spam rules (EU: ePrivacy, UK: PECR). These rules apply regardless of whether personal data is involved. Since the rules are not technology-specific, it is likely that regulators would consider user-visible push notifications to be equivalent to more well understood technologies like email and SMS. | Since you are from Europe, GDPR applies to all your processing activities per Art 3(1) GDPR, regardless of where the users are located. If you would like to avoid GDPR compliance, you would have to manage your business from abroad so that you no longer have an European establishment, and would have to avoid offering your services to people who are in Europe. So let's assume that you have no European establishment. Then, GDPR can only apply per Art 3(2) to those processing activities that relate to offering goods or services to people who are in Europe. For determining this, IP-based geolocation is indeed common. Very likely, you do not need consent for this. GDPR does not require consent for everything, just a legal basis. There are six potential legal bases in Art 6(1), though the relevant ones are consent, necessity for performing a contract, legal obligations, and necessity for a legitimate interest. For things like security checks, it would be common to claim a legitimate interest. Complying with GDPR can hurt revenue. However, data subjects have a right to data protection, but you do not have a right to a particular business model. Similarly, paying taxes can "hurt revenue", but it's not really optional. If your business model can't deal with GDPR compliance (or with taxes), it might not be a sound business model. In Europe, many newspapers have since moved from advertising-only to a consent-or-pay model. That is, the user is given a choice: You can read articles without tracking if you buy a subscription. You can access articles for free if you consent to tracking. The legality of this is hotly debated. In principle, such an approach can be compliant, but the details are problematic, for example that you can only buy subscriptions rather than individual articles, and that these subscriptions are often orders of magnitude more expensive than what would be earned through ads. But this might actually be easier to solve for a mobile application than for a website, due to the availability of in-app payment and micropayment infrastructure. In any case, GDPR limits how much you can "encourage" consent – per Art 7(4), you cannot make access to your service conditional on consent. There must be a way to use your app without consenting to anything, unless that consent is actually necessary for the app to work. For example, consenting to camera access is necessary for a QR code reader app to work. It is extremely unlikely that ads would be necessary in this sense. Users also must not suffer detriment for declining or withdrawing consent. From this, the EDPB has developed the concept of "permissible incentive" in their guidelines on consent. In this post, "Europe" means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate. |
How are presidential pardons supposed to be used? When and how are pardons supposed to be used? Why does the Constitution even grant the president the power to pardon? Can it be used to pardon any crime? On the surface, it seems to make the president above the law. CNN just reported that president Trump promised to pardon the head of CBP if he broke the law. It would seem the president could just do this for any law or policy he doesn't like and thereby bypass Congress or the courts. | When and how are pardons supposed to be used? Why does the Constitution even grant the president the power to pardon? The Constitution provides very little guidance regarding this point, and it isn't clear that the Founders were of one mind about how it was intended to be used. Relieving Wrongful Or Doubtful Convictions One important point to keep in mind is that until about 1890 (a century after the U.S. Constitution came into force in 1789), there were no direct appeals of criminal convictions in the federal courts and collateral attacks on convictions via writs of habeas corpus were very limited. To this day, there is not a constitutional right to a direct appeal of a criminal conviction, although there is a statutory right to one and there are constitutional rules governing how appeals must be handled if they are allowed. Historically a writ of habeas corpus could be defeated simply by proving that someone had been convicted of a crime by a court with jurisdiction over that crime and the person convicted, without regard to the details of the proceedings. The pardon power provided an important safety valve to guard against wrongful convictions (and unduly harsh sentences) and was used frequently for that purpose even for a few decades after direct appeals from criminal convictions to appellate courts became available. Once direct appeals from criminal convictions became established as a means of relief from unfair convictions, however, the rate at which pardons were granted plummeted. The rate fell further as the scope of reasons for which habeas corpus review of a conviction could be granted was expanded. This was the main use of the pardon power described by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 74, which was a document used by supporters of the Constitution to help secure its ratification. It says with respect to this purpose: Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of men A Tool To End Insurgencies Another important historical use of the pardon power was to resolve once and for all instances of rebellions, uprisings, civil wars, and the mass protests to prevent ongoing criminal prosecutions (including convictions for treason) and detentions of figures whose cooperation was needed to secure peace from stirring up the public. This was done in the Whiskey Rebellion and in every almost ever major insurgency in the U.S. since then. Usually, pardons were only granted in these cases to people who swore loyalty to the U.S. in a public manner and renounced the insurgency. Federalist Paper No. 74 also discusses this justification for the pardon power: The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major party, they might often be found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President, it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable, whether, in a limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt. Restoring Civil Rights In modern, peacetime U.S. practice, the main use of the pardon power has been to restore the civil rights of people who admit to having committed crimes and have served their sentences and reformed, so that they can, for example, apply for a job not available to felons, or vote, or get a hunting license and use a firearm. Only a tiny share of modern pardons are granted to people who are currently serving sentences for the crimes of which they were convicted or to people who have not yet been convicted of crimes. This was not a major concern in the very early days of the Republic because, at first, most really serious crimes were capital offenses. In cases where capital punishment was not imposed, in those days, the weak government bureaucracies of the early United States did not have the bureaucratic capacity to meaningfully enforce collateral consequences of felony convictions. Moreover, in those days, there were fewer kinds of conduct that required permits or licenses or involved regulated occupations. For example, most formal qualifications to be a lawyer such as nearly universal law school and the bar exam, date from after the U.S. Civil War. Other Reasons For Modern Persons It is also a modern historical reality that a significant minority of pardons are granted as political favors to people connected to the incumbent President's political supporters. And, this has probably always been the case. Only the most Machiavellian law professors and political scientists would argue that this is an important or legitimate use of the power (although there is that argument to be made), but most would argue that the Founders acknowledged the risk but felt that it was an acceptable risk due to the expected good character of future U.S. Presidents. But, a small but non-zero share of modern pardons are granted to people who were convicted of crimes and are serving sentences that are morally unjust in some way and unlikely to be remedied by the courts. It also isn't unprecedented for a modern pardon that commutes a sentence currently being served to be granted not because there was any doubt about the correctness or severity of the sentences for the crime being served, but instead, as a reward for some exceptionally praise worthy conduct of the pardon recipient after the fact (e.g. saving the lives of one or more innocent people in some particularly selfless and self-sacrificing manner). Another small but significant share of modern pardons are issued to commute the death penalty either to life in prison or as a remedy for a probably wrongful conviction, in part, due to the official's opposition to the death penalty generally or in certain kinds of cases. Can it be used to pardon any crime? The pardon power can be used to pardon any federal crime that has actually been committed, whether or not someone has been charged with it or convicted of it. A pardon cannot prevent a federal government official from being impeached, however. A pardon also cannot be granted for a crime that has not yet been committed at the time it is granted. Pardons can be granted to identifiable groups of people, in addition to specific individuals. There is debate over whether the President can pardon himself. This singular issue is dealt with in another Q and A in this forum. In my opinion, the better reading of the law is that the President cannot pardon himself, but there are legitimate legal scholars who would disagree, and there are no precedents for this one way or the other at the Presidential level. | Once a person is sworn in as POTUS, there are only two legal mechanisms for involuntary removal of that person from the office: Article II Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides only that: The President ... shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The 25th Amendment was passed to establish clear procedures of official succession. Its Section 4 also provides an elaborate mechanism whereby "the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" can precipitate a process that would allow Congress, within 21 days, to transfer the office to the Vice President. Otherwise, there is no contemplation in the law of a "backsies" mechanism for removing a person from the office because "it should have gone to someone else." (The idea that a person who was in the designated line of succession, but in the wrong order, was sworn into office does not seem nearly as problematic as other events that have happened in real history. For example, in the 2000 Presidential Election it was conceivable – and some people probably maintain in fact – that the "loser" of the election would be sworn into office. The U.S. Supreme Court settled the legal questions before the inauguration. However, the realization at the time was that any legal challenges or decisions after that date would be moot, because "election error" is not a cause to remove a sitting U.S. President.) The question of a previous President reappearing, and his successor refusing to cede the office, takes us to the height of speculation. In this case I would merely note that I can find no law pertaining to Presidential Transition in which an outgoing President is "stripped of authority" or "removed from office." Rather, the acting POTUS is effectively the most recent person sworn to the office, and not removed from it. | Do I correctly understand that Federal employees, notably including the Armed Forces, pledge their duty first to the Constitution of the United States and only secondarily to carry out legal orders? And that they have no legal obligation to execute an illegal order? What process allows a subordinate to defy an illegal order if a superior gives the order? What legal protection does the subordinate have? All officers of the United States government (and for that matter also all officers of state and local governments) including soldiers in the armed forces are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Members of the armed forces are not only allowed to disregard illegal orders, they are obligated to not carry out illegal orders. Operationally, disobeying an order due to the fact that it is unconstitutional is a defense to an effort to fire or discipline a federal government civil service employee who may only be fired for good cause after due process. In the military, the issue would usually present itself in the form of a defense in a court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Of course, it would hardly be unprecedented for someone's firing from a job that was unlawful, or for a wrongful court-martial conviction, to be upheld on appeal. Suppose the Congress holds someone in contempt. The Congress, as I understand it, goes to a court to enforce the contempt charge. The court turns to Federal law enforcement to bring action. What if the President directs Federal law enforcement to ignore the court order? What if law enforcement complies with the President? The U.S. Justice Department is charged with bringing contempt of Congress cases at the request of Congress. But, an attorney retained by Congress could probably bring such an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia if the U.S. Justice Department refused to do so. Contempt may be civil or criminal, and unlike ordinary criminal charges (felonies can only be brought based upon grand jury indictments and grand juries are controlled by prosecutors) either civil or criminal contempt charges can be brought by a non-governmental employee attorney. The established practice is to seek contempt sanctions against the lowest level employee who has the authority to take the action requested, or to seek contempt sanctions against everyone from that lowest level employee up through the chain of command to the responsible cabinet officer. The President is generally not named as a party against whom contempt charges are sought. Defiance of the law in the face of a binding and immediately effective court order would be a constitutional crisis and you would need to move to the realm of politics and political realities, and away from the realm of what the law says that people should or should not do, to meaningfully predict how a constitutional crisis turns out. The law assumes that all government officials will obey a lawful court order duly enforced. If government law enforcement officers start defying court orders, then there is a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, the vast majority of law enforcement officers in the United States are civil servants who aren't beholden personally to the President. They were appointed on a merit basis, they are civil servants who can't be fired without good cause and due process, they are in agencies that have an institutional culture of obeying court orders. The civil servants with more seniority (and basically all senior military officers in the U.S. military) have served under multiple Presidents of different political parties. The number of political appointees supervising them is fairly modest. Likewise, most federal judges at any given time were appointed by prior Presidents and even judges appointed by a current President will not infrequently rule against the federal government when the facts and law demand that they do so. There is less politics and there is more unity in interpretation of the law among federal judges and federal law enforcement and legal officials than is generally assumed by more cynical members of the general public. Suppose Congress orders fines. What is to be done if no one will enforce the fines? A court can order that the fines be paid out of the U.S. Treasury. The order itself can have the force of law without the cooperation of any U.S. Treasury official. Sustained defiance of such a court order would lead to a constitutional crisis. Same scenario as 1 but this time it’s impeachment and conviction: the President defies any action to remove him. What if the President simply barricades himself in the White House and orders security and military personnel to protect him? Is there a protocol in the U.S. military hierarchy to deal with this scenario? This has never actually happened, of course, so it is hypothetical. The Treasury Department, General Services Administration and Secretary of State (and all other government officials) should revoke privileges that the President has by virtue of being President and provide them to the new acting President (realistically, in the simple scenario presented, current Vice President Pence). The military should stay out of it, but should immediately start treating acting President Pence, and not the impeached incumbent as the Commander-in-Chief. U.S. military forces are indoctrinated on the Presidential succession and it is unlikely that many military officers would disregard a Presidential impeachment. The Secret Service should stop defending the former President except in an ex-President capacity. In theory, one could imagine acting President Pence bringing an eviction action in the local courts of the District of Columbia just as one would with any holdover tenant. Since the local courts in D.C. are federal, this doesn't present the federalism problems that it would if the same thing were done in a state court with respect to federal real estate, and U.S. marshals would evict him and his family like anyone else. The trickier situation in terms of creating a constitutional crisis, honestly, is really one where the President is clearly and blatantly defying the law and court orders, but the U.S. Senate refuses to convict the President in an impeachment proceeding out of partisan bias. What should common citizens do if any of these scenarios play out? Whatever they want, in a lawful manner. Ultimately, this would be a matter for federal government officials (elected and appointed alike) to figure out. | Treason is basically the only crime explicitly defined by the Constitution. According to Article III, Section 3: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. So, no. What this hypothetical president is calling for is unconstitutional, is almost certainly grounds for impeachment, and may even be criminal, but treason it ain't. And that's assuming he actually does it. Simply calling for it, without acting (or directing others to act) to bring it about, may well be protected by the First Amendment. | So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds. | Under article II, section 1 of the Constitution: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th Amendment doesn't cover the case of the President and Vice-President becoming incapacitated simultaneously, so instead the original section of the Constitution can be consulted. And unlike the 25th Amendment, this is quite clear: Congress passes a law deciding who the acting President is. The current law is the Presidential Succession Act of 1947. | Both Congress and the state legislatures are expressly forbidden by the Constitution from passing bills of attainder. That means neither can ever pass a law that names an individual and says "they are suspended." It is so important that it's one of the very few restrictions on government that the original Constitution (before any amendments) prohibited in bot state and federal governments. (Also, a "bill" is not a law. It's what a legislature is considering making a law.) | Where the President explicitly tells a newspaper that they should reveal their sources. Is this not illegal in the US? It is not illegal. Well, it would be a U.S. Attorney, rather than the President himself. You're thinking of shield laws, but no such law exists at the federal level. Moreover, although some people might think that the First Amendment ("freedom of the press") would protect a journalist in such a case, the Supreme Court has held that it doesn't, though the government is required to "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest". So if a reporter were subpoenaed in federal court to reveal a source, and they couldn't convince a court to quash the subpoena under the Branzburg test, they'd have to either reveal their source or be held in contempt. In practice, many reporters have chosen the latter, and served time in jail rather than reveal the source. For instance, Judith Miller. There've been a number of proposals to create such a federal law, but so far Congress hasn't seen fit to do it. According to the Wikipedia article, every state except Wyoming has some sort of shield protection for journalists, either in statute or case law, though the protections are not necessarily absolute. So a state court or prosecutor would find it much more difficult to enforce such an order. |
Is a surviving spouse responsible for the medical bills of the deceased spouse My wife died last December and the hospital where she had been receiving treatment is sending bills to the home, in her name, asking for payment. I called them and told them that she was deceased and I had previously given them the documentation for that. The customer service person said they did have the information I had provided (death certificate) and also that I'm responsible since we were married at the time of her death. I told them the estate lawyer we had spoken to told us that I would not be responsible for the debt. Can anyone direct me to a statute, regulation or law (state or Federal) that shows I am responsible for this debt? I don't know if it makes a difference but she was in hospice care at home when she died, she was not admitted to the hospital. | If you lived in a community property state, that would create responsibility for your late wife's debts (but Kansas is not one). If you signed a financial responsibility agreement you would be liable (but I assumed you did not). No matter what, her estate is liable, and that could eventually affect you (her debts must be paid first). However, there is one last criterion, the "doctrine of necessaries". This ruling notes Kansas recognizes the doctrine of necessaries, under which a spouse can be held liable when the other spouse obtains necessary items, like food or medical care, on credit. See also St. Francis Regional Med. Center, Inc. v. Bowles for support that the doctrine survives in Kansas. | The question of a patient's legal responsibility would arise under a negligence lawsuit, where the patient "should have known". The standard for determining what things a person "should have known" is fluid, but obviously you can start with "could have known". If a patient's can't know a fact, they cannot be said to have negligently contributed to the damage. Doctors are given these warnings, but patients are not, uniformly. It is therefore possible that a patient was never warned of the effects of an opioid prescription (I can personally attest to that lacuna in the system). Your assumption about the bottle being so labeled is only valid for the original supply bottles from which the pharmacist dispenses. However, there is also a rather compelling argument to the effect that no person in the US can in fact be unaware of the addiction risk of opioids. It is a defeasible argument, possibly applicable to a hypothetical person who has lived in complete isolation for decades. A patient is not required to undertake independent research in order to validate the science that underlies statutorily-mandated FDA approval or drugs, instead, the burden is assigned to the manufacturers and distributors (primarily doctors and pharmacists) to convey the relevant information. Thus HR 1026 would, if enacted, mandate a different warning. But the bill does not assert a lack of liability on either side, therefore the question reduces to the "simple" matter of determining if a person knew or should have known. | You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court. | @Rick aptly answers your first question (and I totally agree with his answer including his conclusion that the cited provisions apply to single member LLCs). So, I'll touch on issues associated with your second one. Would there be anything legally wrong with my intentionally wasting the company's money or doing something similarly pointless and harmful to the business, considering I'm the only actual person (as in human, not legal person) who is harmed in any way? If the way you use the money wastefully is considered by a court to be a de facto distribution by the LLC to you, its sole member, and this renders it insolvent (as defined in ORS 63.229 (Limitations on distributions), you could have personal liability for the distribution to the company. See ORS 53.235. Creditors of the company could then garnish that obligation to collect their debts owed to the company from you (a garnishment is technically a right to obtain money or property from someone who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, usually a bank or employer, but not always as in this case). Intentionally wasting the company's money would probably constitute a "fraudulent transfer" on the part of the LLC which could expose you to liability to third-party creditors if those actions left the company unable to pay its debts as they came due, or with assets with a fair market value that was lower than the fair market value of its current and currently anticipated liabilities. This parallel liability would arise under the Oregon Fraudulent Transfers Act and related provisions of Oregon law found at ORS 95.200 to 95.310. If you were anticipating or in the process of divorcing, it could constitute economic waste that could be held against you (treating the wasted assets as if they still existed and were allocated to your in a property division). Likewise, if the waste reduced your income for child support purposes, a court would seriously consider imputing the income you could have had if you had not acting in that matter to the income you actually had, in order to calculate your child support obligation. And, you might be disallowed a deduction for the waste of the company's money, rather than having it treated as an expense, which could increase your income tax and self-employment tax liability. But, to the extent that you are the sole owner of the company, no creditor, spouse or child has rights impaired by your actions, and you don't claim the wasted assets as income tax deductions, there would be no one with standing to complain about your conduct in court. | I am unfamiliar with a "perpetual contract" and that phase does not appear in any reported appellate court decision of the State of Oklahoma. However, usually unpaid utility bills do constitute a lien against the property that is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, which has the same practical effect. This kind of obligation is also sometimes described as an "encumbrance". Usually, in an arms length sale of real estate through real estate agents, a title insurance company is hired and is responsible for determining if there are any outstanding liens, pro-rating utility bills, pro-rating property taxes, etc. at closing. If the title company fails to find a lien and there is one, the title company is responsible for paying off the lien that it failed to find (although it can often force the previous owner to indemnify it for the payment it has to make). It could be that since water service was not currently being delivered, that the title company did not search in the manner that it should have to find this lien, or it could be that there was no title company used and so no one ever checked. Also, if the property was conveyed with a "warranty deed" such a deed contains a promise from the seller that there are no liens or encumbrances not listed on the face of the deed that have to be paid, and the seller has liability for breach of the warranty of title. But, if the property was conveyed with a "quitclaim deed" there is no such warranty. | Of course she is living with you. Clothes, toothbrush, cooking and eating, sleeping, I suppose breakfast as well, that's living with you. And it's not illegal, but it is apparently in breach of your leasing contract. I'd study your contract carefully to see what the consequences are if she is living for you for more than 14 days. | You should really investigate the legally correct way to deal with the estate and the transfers of the assets; if not, you could have considerable legal and tax liability in the future with the bank (if they flag and investigate the transfers due to the death of the account holder and the size of the transfers) and the IRS (inheritance taxes), as well as other possible heirs who are not yet identified or notified of the death. Probate laws differ greatly according to jurisdiction, so either find a lawyer or Google for free or low cost legal help in your city/county/state in order to learn how to administer the estate in a legally sufficient way to protect everyone involved. Or go to the local county courthouse and inquire. It may not take much effort or cost much in legal fees, and it's a good investment of research and time to prevent legal and tax issues in the future. | This effectively comes under duty of care. Firstly, in England and Wales there is no obligation to be a Good Samaritan - in other words, there is no obligation to be a rescuer. Until you intervene to try and rescue someone, you do not owe that person a duty. As soon as you do intervene, however, you do owe them a duty. Specifically, you owe them a duty not to make the situation worse (Horsey and Rackley, Tort Law, 3rd ed., OUP 2013, p. 75). The specific situation Horsey and Rackley give is that of resuscitating a drowning child and breaking a rib as you do so: this may be 'making the situation worse' (Horsey and Rackley, pp. 75-76). Does this mean that you'll be liable if you give someone first aid and in doing so, you make the situation worse? Not necessarily, because, as Horsey and Rackley point out, duty is different to liability. Using the drowning child example again, they state: So, for example, while someone who intervenes may owe a duty not to make the situation worse, their actions would still be judged against those of a 'reasonable person' in the circumstances (and so if a reasonable person would have tried to resuscitate the child in the same way, there will be no breach of their duty and therefore no liability to pay compensation.) (p.76) The 'reasonable person' standard corresponds to what you mentioned in the question about lack of expertise. If a doctor intervenes in such a situation, the standard of care they'd be expected to give would be higher than, say, for someone who's simply done a basic first aid course. The question is whether or not you've acted as the reasonable person in your situation would have done. On that basis, then, your tutor is pretty much correct: so long as you take such care as is reasonable based on your expertise, or lack thereof, then under English and Welsh law, you're unlikely to be liable. |
MMA Fighter knowingly slays their opponent with a legal hit, is it manslaughter In an american MMA (Mixed Martial Arts) sanctioned match, one fighter executes a newly created technique, we'll call it the "five-point palm exploding heart technique" upon their opponent. Said opponent suffers the hit, takes a few steps, and drops dead immediately. In this case, it is purposeful. The fighter said they were going to do this prior to the match, describing their plan in great detail, and stated they knew it would result in certain death. The skill difference is absolute, the round lasts 2 seconds. He or she could've easily won any other way and they admit their actions were cruel and unnecessary. Not only that but they take great pride in what they've done, bragging to the press and mocking the deceased. For the purposes of MMA, the hit abides by all rules and no presiding officials intervened. Is the surviving fighter protected from criminal and/or civil liability? | As you describe it, the survivor knows that the action will result in death, and premeditatedly undertakes the action. So we turn to the murder statute in that (unspecified) jurisdiction, which will be like this: A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: (a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person So the charge is first degree homicide. Because the murder statute might leave a person wondering if "it counts" when the conduct follows somebody's rules, the jury is given instructions clarifying what words mean: for first degree homicide in general see these pages. Most relevant here are the elements of "extreme indifference", also the definition and elements of premeditation. In general, if I say "It's okay if you kill him", that does not make it legal to kill a person, so organizationally sanctioning the move does not legalize it. | None of the factors you list about Charlie committing a crime, about to commit a crime* or being responsible for the officer's injury apply to whether or not Bob can shoot Charlie on behalf of the officer. On the other hand, if Charlie's actions lead Bob to the reasonable belief that Charlie represents an imminent threat of death or grave bodily injury to anyone then Bob will be justified in using force, including deadly force, to stop Charlie. I'm aware of many states that also allow the use of deadly force to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A normal citizen can go to great lengths to assist the police and stories of citizens coming to the aid of police officers are easily found. There may be some reason the police officer felt the need to use deadly force against Charlie. Bob will need to make his own determination based on all the factors available to him, which may include communication from the officer. If Bob decides to shoot Charlie then an investigation will center on whether it was reasonable for Bob to deduce that the use of deadly force was justified given the information available to Bob at the time. Some states have laws that penalize refusal to aid a police officer. A list of them can be found on this wikipedia page. Notably, California just repealed their statute requiring assistance. *The statutes of some states allow the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of felonies, typically forcible felonies. However, just because a crime is listed as a forcible felony doesn't always mean that deadly force can be used to stop the crime. An example comes from Florida where the statutes state that deadly force can be used to stop forcible felonies, the statutes also define burglary as a forcible felony. However, the courts have ruled that the use of such force is not reasonable where the structure being burglarized is unoccupied. | I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police). | He is probably guilty of negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter, at most (a minor felony), and is possibly not guilty of a crime at all. The primary distinction between classes of homicide is mens rea (i.e. intent). The only affirmative act he took was to move the pillow. He did so both without intending to or knowing that he would kill Jane (the intent necessary for murder), and also, without clear actual knowledge that he would be creating a risk that Jane would die (a reckless state of mind that would support a conviction for manslaughter). Also, note that Walter himself, at this time, is not engaged in a felony, so he is not guilty of felony murder. We can presume he is present with the consent previously given of the owner of the property and did not mean anyone any harm. Likewise, this is not what is meant by "extreme indifference" for purposes of a murder statute, the paradigm of which is shooting randomly into a crowd knowing that someone will almost certainly be killed without knowing or intending that any particular person will die. The mental state necessary for negligent homicide is the equivalent of "gross negligence" in a civil case and is called "criminal negligence" in a criminal case. To be criminally negligent a person must fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur, and the risk must be of such a nature that the defendant's failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard of care. If a jury found that a reasonable person ought should clearly know that moving a pillow put Jane at risk of dying, then he might be guilty of criminal negligence. But, if a jury found that a reasonable person would not know that moving the pillow put Jane at grave risk of death, his action would not be criminally negligent. There are also at least three questions of causation which is not entirely independent of the question of negligence. First, generally an act is only considered a cause of a consequence if it is a foreseeable result of the action. If Jane's vomit caused death is not a foreseeable result of moving the pillow, then her death might not be legally caused by moving the pillow. Second, how likely is it that she would have died even if Walter had never entered the room. There are lots of ways that the pillow could have been jostled during the night leading to the same result. If it likely would have happened anyway, Walter's involvement might not be the legal cause of the death. Third, how much fault should be attributed to Jane? This is closely related to the second question. If her death was primarily caused by her getting dangerously high and placing herself in a vulnerable position, perhaps Walter's involvement is not a meaningful cause of the death. A New Mexico court has held that the defense that the victim was negligent has value only if it establishes that the victim's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. State v. Maddox, 99 N.M. 490, 660 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1983). But, what about Jesse's negligence? Under a relevant standard criminal jury instruction in New Mexico: The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was a significant cause of the death of __________________ (name of victim). Evidence has been presented that the negligence of a person other than the defendant may have contributed to the cause of death. Such contributing negligence does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for an act that significantly contributed to the cause of the death so long as the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's actions. However, if you find the negligence of a person other than the defendant was the only significant cause of death, then the defendant is not guilty of the offense of __________________ (name of offense). Caveat: A number of states impose strict criminal liability on drug dealers, often for murder, if someone died from using a drug sold by them, but often it has to be a child, and often the drug has to be the proximate cause of death, e.g. due to an overdose or impurity in the drug. I would presume that Jesse and not Walter supplied the drugs to Jane, that Jane is an adult, and it is not obvious that the drug itself (as opposed to the vomiting due to the manner in which the drugs were used) was the proximate cause of death, so a statute like this might not apply in any case. This brings us to the hard part of the question: Without the pillow Jane rotates on her back and starts to vomit and cough, still sleeping. At first Walter tries to react, running to the other side of the bed to help her, but then he stops and decides to do nothing as she dies. Note that if Walter had moved the pillow without knowing that he was creating a risk, left the room ignorant, and then this happened, surely Walter would have no legal liability for Jane's death. If Walter develops the necessary intent for criminal liability, this probably doesn't happen until he observes that she is starting to choke on her vomit and might die. Even then, he does not intend for Jane to die and probably doesn't even know for certain that she will die from his inaction, so he is probably, at most reckless, if he has a duty to rescue for criminal law purposes. Generally, under both civil and criminal law, there is no duty to rescue, even if you can do so without any risk of harm to yourself. But, there is an exception, at least in civil liability, for a duty to rescue that arises from the fact that you put the person at risk of peril through your affirmative actions. Does this apply here, at all, or in a criminal case? The first question is the exact language of the homicide statute. Some homicide offenses require affirmative acts, while others can arise from acts or omissions where there is a legal duty to act. Every crime requires some voluntary act or omission, and the voluntary act itself was not a crime and perhaps was not even a tort, at the moment it was taken, because Walter did not realize that his act created a risk of harm. He create a peril, but he did so innocently. A pretty standard formulation is that an omission is only a crime when the law creates a legal duty to act, but this is, of course, a question begging standard as it doesn't clarify whether there is a legal duty to act, which is at issue here. As the previous link notes, creation of a peril can give rise to a legal duty to act, but only sometimes. (4) Duty arising from creation of peril. If a person acts culpably to imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim. The cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or accidentally imperils another. This case would fall in the category of someone who innocently or accidentally imperils another, in which the cases are split, which which the linked article cites the following authority: Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923) (defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659, 148 S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant). A commentary that is part of a California standard jury instruction (for involuntary manslaughter, not murder for which this kind of liability is presumably not available) makes the following observation: A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant's behavior created or substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147-148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the floor]; Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent freeway creating risk].) These examples would suggest that an innocently or accidentally created risk is sufficient to create a duty sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter liability for an omission under California law, and would probably lead to involuntary manslaughter liability in the case in the question as well, under California law. New Mexico, unlike California, does not have a standard criminal jury instruction or really definitive section of its criminal code that clearly resolves this question, although the fact that California which uses a murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter distinction in the same way that New Mexico does, limits criminal liability for omissions to involuntary manslaughter suggests that New Mexico would as well. The New Mexico case State v. Greenwood, 2012 -NMCA- 017, 271 P.3d 753 (N.M. App. 2011), touches on the issue, suggesting that there may be liability only for involuntary manslaughter (or certain specialized crimes based upon a relationship such as that of a nursing home to a resident of a nursing home) based upon an omission, and that the liability for an omission can only arise when there is a legal duty, but almost implies that only contactual duties are sufficient. It does so at paragraph 35 which says: Importantly, even if the LINKS contract relating to Jared were to have been renewed and to have been in force at the time of Jared's death, we are not convinced that it would be the sole basis or even a controlling factor in determining Defendant's legal responsibility under the Act. Defendant's criminal liability must exist solely based on an omission— a failure to act when she had a legal responsibility to act. See Deborah A. Goodall, Penal Code Section 22.04: A Duty to Care for the Elderly, 35 Baylor L.Rev. 589, 594 (1983) (stating that " authorities have long agreed that before an omission can constitute an offense[,] there must first be a duty to act" ); see also People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907) (" The law recognizes that under some circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter. This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and direct cause of death." (citation omitted)). But, this could be dicta because it was a case where any legal duty would arise under contract rather than for another reason, and as is the case in many smaller states, there is simply no case that has ever been decided in New Mexico which is squarely on point. Under British criminal law, in similar circumstances, a homicide conviction was vacated: R v Khan & Khan (1998) CLR 830, confirmed that there is no separate category of manslaughter by omission unless the omission constitutes a breach of duty to act. The defendants supplied a 15-year-old prostitute with twice the amount of heroin likely to be taken by a regular user. The defendants left her unconscious in the flat, returning the next day to find that she had died of the overdose. Had medical assistance been called, the girl would probably not have died. The unlawful act was supplying the drug but the death was caused by the quantity injected by the victim. The trial judge invited jury to consider liability on the basis of the defendants' failure to summon medical assistance. On appeal, the conviction was quashed because the brothers had not accepted a duty to act before she took the heroin. A dissertation on when criminal liability is imposed for omissions in Scottish law can be found here. New Mexico, whose laws really should govern, has just two homicide statutes: § 30-2-1. Murder A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused: (1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or (3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony. B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder in the first degree. Whoever commits murder in the second degree is guilty of a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. Walter doesn't qualify for any of these prongs of the statute. § 30-2-3. Manslaughter Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Clearly, Walter also does not qualify as guilty of voluntary manslaughter. There is no quarrel or heat of passion. So, either Walter is guilty in New Mexico of involuntary manslaughter, or he is not guilty of homicide at all. New Mexico also has an unusual, and rather merciful "excusable homicide" provision at New Mexico Statutes § 30-2-5, that should also be considered: Homicide is excusable in the following cases: A. when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent; or B. when committed by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Arguably, Walter falls under "excusable homicide" part A, as moving the pillow was a lawful act done without unlawful intent and that is what caused the death. | You've got four cases there with four different reasons for substantial delays: In the case of the Aurora theater shooting, the shooter pled not guilty by reason of insanity. There's no doubt about who did it, but doubt was raised about the mental status of the shooter. Murder is not a strict liability crime, so the ability of the defendant to form the intent to commit the crime is relevant. In the case of the Charleston church shooting, the defendant was twice evaluated for competence to stand trial. Again, no doubt about who did it, but most if not all jurisdictions require a defendant to be sufficiently sane to participate in their defense. In the case of the Parkland shooting, the initial delay was confusion over who the defense lawyer would be. Florida will only provide a public defender to someone who cannot afford their own defense lawyer, and it took nearly a year to determine that the defendant had inherited enough money to afford a private lawyer. Due to this delay, the trial was initially scheduled for mid-2020, which caused it to be delayed by the COVID-19 outbreak. In the case of the Tree of Life shooting, it appears to be straight-up delaying tactics by the defense. There are a great many motions, appeals of motions, requests for delay, and other things a lawyer can do to slow things down. Since the defendant is currently being held without bail, the prosecution probably isn't strongly motivated to speed things up. | There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense. | That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism. | No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412 |
Is it illegal to make a puppy fur jacket? I watched 101 Dalmatians for the first time and wander: Can dogs or cats be raised like farm animals for the purpose of food or fur? What species of animal is not allowed for product other than endangered species? | USA: 19 USC §1308 prohibits the import, export, or interstate sale of cat or dog fur: (1) In general It shall be unlawful for any person to— (A) import into, or export from, the United States any dog or cat fur product; or (B) introduce into interstate commerce, manufacture for introduction into interstate commerce, sell, trade, or advertise in interstate commerce, offer to sell, or transport or distribute in interstate commerce in the United States, any dog or cat fur product. A brief summary of state laws can be found this article at the Animal Legal & Historical Center: A handful of states have laws concerning dog and cat fur. Alabama, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia prohibit trade in domestic dog or cat fur. Virginia also prohibits killing a dog or cat for its fur, while Florida prohibits killing a dog or cat with the “sole” intention of either selling or giving away the pelt of the animal. In Oregon, a person cannot buy or sell dog or cat fur that is obtained from “a process that kills or maims the cat or dog.” UK: In the UK, the trade in cat & dog fur was banned by the The Cat and Dog Fur (Control of Import, Export and Placing on the Market) Regulations 2008, which were in turn passed to follow EU Regulation #1523/2007: The placing on the market and the import to, or export from, the Community of cat and dog fur, and products containing such fur shall be prohibited. More information about the legal consequences and enforcement of this law can be found at this review article. Finally, note that Cruella de Vil's actions did not involve trade in dog or cat fur; she acquired most of the puppies via legal means, and was planning to kill and skin them for her own personal use, not to sell the resulting articles to other parties. As such, I believe that her planned course of action would have been legal in the UK and in all US states except Virginia. The only unquestionably illegal act she undertook was directing Jasper & Horace to steal Pongo's and Perdita's puppies. | It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary. | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. | It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement. | I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level. | There is no law against feeding birds, in Chicago or elsewhere in Illinois. The city does have a law against keeping pigeons whereby It shall be unlawful for any person to import, sell, own, keep or otherwise possess any live pigeon within any area designated as a residence district under the Chicago Zoning Ordinance. but this does not extend to feeding pigeons. Rumors may have gotten started because the DNR had recommended removing bird feeders for (bird) health reasons, but that is not a legal prohibition and anyhow has since expired. | It is the terms of the lease that govern what you may and may not do, so if pets are not disallowed, they are allowed. You are not a party to the contract between the landlord and the agent, so whatever the landlord may have told the agent is technically irrelevant to you. However, this may be an indication that the landlord plans to change policy; it might also mean that the agent misunderstood something. That is where you stand legally. | You can write anything you want (basic First Amendment protections): the question is whether one would be liable for damage that arises from what you're written, or whether you can distribute what you've written. Distribution may be restricted, thanks to the Commerce Clause (hence FDA regulations, which figure prominently in the analysis). Most software writers are not medical practitioners, and vice versa, and what the software writer does is implement something described by a competent medical practitioner. It is logically possible that a med. practitioner might also try to write software (no problem) and distribute it (possibly a problem); or, a software writer might read up on something on Wikipedia and try to implement it (again, no problem) or distribute it (possible problem). Damages can be sorted into two categories, implementation errors and scientific errors, and having ruled out deliberate sabotage, we are left with negligence. If the software writer failed to use suitable care in writing code that sums a set of numbers, the software writer has been negligent. If the person purporting to have the qualified scientific knowledge mis-states the formula, that person has been negligent. It is possible for many parties to be negligent (the programmer failed to be diligent in understanding the software requirements; the medical professional failed to adequately explain what was required of the program). The FDA does regulate medical devices, and "device" is construed pretty broadly (condoms are non-exempt class 2 medical devices). There is FDA guidance on medical software which makes it clear that the device manufacturer shoulders the regulatory burden. Anytime you manufacture a tangible thing (which is within the scope of FDA regulation for medical devices), you have to have the thing approved. Many (most?) medical devices implement software, and are thus within the scope of FDA scrutiny. It is not illegal to write software that ends up being implemented in an unapproved medical device, but the unapproved medical device itself is illegal. It is reasonably likely that purported medical software (not a gadget with software build in) would be held to be a non-exempt device. To know if something is exempt, you would look at the exemptions list, and determine that your program (or thing) is not on or implied by anything on that list. The visual acuity eye chart is a class 1 exempt item, as is the manual toothbrush. There is no way to specifically look for things that are only software, or that contain software, so the search through the list would have to be guided by knowledge of the subject area. Canada is helpful in explaining when software is a regulated medical device. This is non-probative w.r.t. US law but gives you an idea what is likely to be considered a "device". Under Canadian law, the software would be clearly a regulated medical device. The FDA has a power-point that attempts to say something about the matter which warns you that you are on your own and "You will need to go back to study and use the source regulatory documents" to make the determination. Eventually, slide 13, they hint that if you intend the software to be used in diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, then it is a device (so, yes, the aforementioned software would be a device, and probably not exempt from regulations). General purpose software (word processors, web browsers, communications software, etc.) are not indented to be used for a regulated purpose, although they can be so used, and thus they are probably not subject to FDA regulation. There is a murky relationship between regulatory approval and liability. Being approved by the government does not convey immunity to negligence suits (see Wyeth v. Levine), but being approved can have weight in determining whether a party was negligent, since regulatory scrutiny ostensibly filters out errors that could have been caught. Federal approval does not preempt state tort law, as the court ruled. Regulations pertaining to medical devices hold for anything that qualifies as a device, and is not defined (negatively) in terms of disclaimers. If you sell a medical device but label it saying "this is not a medical device, it is not created by a competent medical practitioner", that doesn't make it not a medical device. Unfortunately, what counts as a regulated device is based on intended use, and there is an obvious connection between disclaimers and intentions. Taking MS Word as an example, MS does not as far as I know say that "Word is not intended to be used as a medical device". It can certainly be used to diagnose, teat, and prevent medical conditions, but so too can a screw driver or pretty much anything else. The number of non-medical uses vastly outweigh the medical uses, so it would be deemed not to be a regulated device. A program which prescribed a set of prayers to be uttered in case of illness would be subject to First Amendment override of any FDA regulations. Quack medical devices are prohibited (that's why there is regulation of devices in the first place), but discerning the fine line between permitted actions based on nutty beliefs and forbidden actions is not easy. The FDA also has guidance on the distinction between "Complementary and Alternative Medicine", which does not clearly state that, for example, a software reading of your cakra-energies based on a computer program's questions is not a medical device. They do say of mind-body medicine (mentioning yoga, biofeedback and tai chi as examples) that "CAM practices in this domain would not be subject to our jurisdiction under the Act or the PHS Act", but then say "any equipment or other products used as part of the practice of mind-body medicine may be subject to FDA regulation, depending on the nature of the product and its intended use" (hence a yoga-enabling program may be subject to regulation). |
Repatenting a medicine What does it mean that a drug was "repatented"? From the New York Times: Albuterol, one of the oldest asthma medicines, typically costs $50 to $100 per inhaler in the United States, but it was less than $15 a decade ago, before it was repatented. I get that it means the patients will have to pay, however, how can you re-patent something? Intuitively, I believed that once the patent expires, it's over. And that you can only patent novel inventions. | This refers to adding a putatively useful feature to the thing. For instance, a drug can have a certain active ingredient, and the patent on the active ingredient can expire, but you may discover a way to make the drug more effective or in some other way more useful (e.g. by reducing side-effects) by coating it with a purple wax. This product can be patented. This is the situation with Albuterol: the delivery system is new. The active ingredient is now free for the copying, but the particular combination of drug and delivery system known as Proventil is protected by patent. | Yes, patents expire. The term is generally 20 years, but a patent can expire earlier if the owner fails to pay the scheduled maintenance fees. 35 U.S.C. § 154, 35 U.S.C. § 41 The patent owner could grant you permission to make, use, or sell the invention. This isn't the same as getting permission to call it your own, and it is completely separate from copyright. | Your app is a simple case of copyright infringement. All the Pokémon are copyrighted, the lettering and names are also protect by trademarks. Trying to claim fair use will be outright impossible: you'll use huge portions of the individually protected Pokemon (the iconic ones like Pikachu) and you are usurping a market they are already in. They have given licenses for apps (Pokemon Go). Pokemon are artistic and some form of fiction. The last straw might be if you'd do a rather obvious parody, but even then, I see no way to show Fair Use with what you stated. No disclaimer can change that, and publishing your work might open you to a huge lawsuit with damages for each individually protected Pokemon you infringed on. With between 750 $ minimum and 150,000 $ absolute upper limit per infringed item (last is for willful infringement), you don't want to infringe on Pokemon, as you could be very easily liable for a number in the 6 to 9 digits! Even if Nintendo might only try to get the statutory damages for all the 900 Pokémon, that is a number of at least 675,4000 $. And that's before looking at Trademarks. Pikachu has about 6 live word marks and there are 111 different Pokémon trademarks filed (some expired or dead)! | It is not insurance fraud to sell medical equipment which was paid for by an insurance company. Unless it was obtained fraudulently of course. Two warnings that probably do not apply to breast pumps: Make sure that you actually own it. Sometimes equipment is leased; the patient does not own it. Make sure that it is not a prescription item. You can't sell items which require a prescription. | We cannot advise you to pay the fine or contest it, but we can say that the law is. A notation like "no tag" is not the same as a formal charge that would be filed against you if you were prosecuted, under Georgia Code 40-2-8. The law says (b)(2)(A) It shall be a misdemeanor to operate any vehicle required to be registered in the State of Georgia without a valid numbered license plate properly validated, unless such operation is otherwise permitted under this chapter Hence driving with expired tags is against the law. The state indicates that the penalty for non-renewal is "10% of Ad Valorem Tax due + 25% of License Plate Fees", the latter being $20. There is also a fine of $25 for operating a vehicle without a valid county decal; you presumably know what the current ad valorem tax on the vehicle is. | This is pretty solid fair use territory. The court will consider how much you copied and whether you needed to, but I don't think they'd think you crossed the line with these facts. Even if they did, that's just one of four factors, and the others generally work in your favor. For a similar case in a New Hampshire governor's race, check out Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.Supp. 957 (D. N.H., 1978). | You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them. | It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter. |
I was banned from a roller rink for something I didn’t say I was accused of using profanity to an employee at a roller rink when I never called her names. The owners daughter told me “You’re banned forever!” Can I still show up if she’s not the owner? | The rink is private property; they can let who they like in, and they can refuse entry to who they like. They can ban you for any or no reason. (The only exception to this is that they can't refuse entry because of some protected characteristic like race or gender.) The owner doesn't have to personally issue a ban; any person they authorize can do so. (Consider the case where the owner is something like the Disney Corporation; bans aren't going to be issued by the board of Disney - they will be delegated to the local manager, and probably the shift leader). You can still show up of course, but you are quite likely to be thrown out. | The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one. | A. Yes it is clearly illegal to fire employees for unionizing. B. Companies get around this all the time by closing the facility. That means the managers lose their jobs too, which is incentive for management to keep a union from forming. | Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints. | Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice. | Most employment in the US is "at will". That means that the employer or the employee can terminate the relationship without notice for any reason or for no reason. There are certain statutory protections that limit this, however, such as federal protections against discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. Arizona may have other protections. So the first thing you need to do (or your lawyer needs to do) is determine whether your employment was at will. If so, then it doesn't much matter if the reasons they gave you were lies, unless you can show that their actions constituted illegal discrimination. (If they lied about you to someone else, though, you might be able to go after them for libel or slander.) If your employment was not at will, then you may be able to challenge the reasons for the firing if the firing violated the conditions under which your employment could be terminated. Even if your employment was at will, your firing might fall under one of the exceptions listed in the Wikipedia article: public policy, implied contract, or good faith/fair dealing (although the article gives conflicting information about whether Arizona has an implied contract exception; the text says that it does not, but the map shows that it does). To analyze the facts of your case in connection with Arizona employment law, you really need to talk to a lawyer with a practice in Arizona employment law. The lawyer will want to review your contract or other written agreement, if there is one. | It depends on what you mean by "clean." The police have probably made a record of the incident and included your name. If you're in the United States, the odds are that the public has access to that record under a freedom of information law. But that's a lot of work that few people will bother with. You haven't been arrested or convicted, so the incident probably wouldn't show up if anyone did a background check, if that's what you're worried about. | No. Absent some collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, you have no recourse because you have not been legally wronged. You have no right to privacy in this regard. You have no right to be free of humiliation based upon truthful statements. If the email is truthful and you were indeed suspended, then the manager is entirely appropriate in sharing that information, and indeed has a need to do so. You would have no recourse in Tennessee, even if your manager gave a national television interview on your suspension and truthfully stated all reasons for the suspension and threw in statements of opinion disparaging you. Humiliation is only actionable if it amounts to "outrageous conduct" beyond mere truthful speech (e.g. throwing your clothes in the toilet or secretly putting some self-disparaging statement on the back of your uniform) and was calculated with a specific intent to cause you extraordinary emotional harm that was not necessary for some legitimate purpose. |
Does one-way written communication bear legal standing? This question is based on this question over on Workplace SE. I am neither the OP of that question nor in any way related to the OP, I'm asking this question out of personal curiosity. In brief, the situation is that the OP has a medical issue, but his boss (verbally) threatened to fire him if he went to the doctor. Various answers in that thread are suggesting getting written proof that the boss verbally denied the trip to the doctor to use in court later. Now, here's my question: Clearly, this boss is a jerk. Also, this boss is probably not an idiot. If he's being asked to provide in writing something that he said verbally, he's going to know something's up. Furthermore, he's probably smart enough to know that what he is doing is of questionable legal standing, so getting the boss to provide a written statement that the doctor visit was denied is easier said (written? Because webforum? Hah!) than done. A solution to the above problem was suggested in a comment on an answer: In the very likely case that you submit your request in writing and your boss replies verbally, write back to your boss confirming his denial. "This message confirms that on Tuesday 10am you verbally denied my urgent request for time off at X." Send a Cc to HR and Bcc yourself at a personal email address. Every time you have a "conversation" about this issue verbally, confirm back in writing. Assume that the boss does not respond to any of these emails to confirm or deny the content as stated, and the "chain" of emails, such as it is, is completely one-sided, with the OP emailing his boss various things of this nature. My question is: To what degree are such emails admissable in court as evidence, and what weight do they carry? I'm tagging this question as united-states because the original question on Workplace SE was about the USA, but insight into the legal systems of other countries would also be interesting for me, just out of curiosity. I am Canadian myself, so insight into the legal system in Canada would be of particular interest (I am not in such a situation myself, I just find it interesting out of curiosity). | To what degree are such emails admissible in court as evidence, and what weight do they carry? Your own statement, when offered by you as evidence, is hearsay, unless it comes within an exception to that rule. Recorded recollection might be one of the better exceptions. There is also a chance that you could get it in as a business record of the company if you were using a company email account and the company stores all of its email communications. The documents also sometimes come in to provide fair context for a conversation with a party-opponent's statements that are admissible. It appears that Canada does not follow the modern British rule (which repealed the hearsay rule in civil cases in 1995), which if it were available, would come in without any difficulty at all. But, Canada does have what it calls a "principled exception" (which is somewhat broader than the parallel U.S. residual hearsay exception) that is generally available if the document can be shown to be reliable and there is an unavailable witness, or if there proponent of the document can show that it is reliable and necessary for other reasons. Even if the document itself is not admissible since it is hearsay, you could still testify as to what the boss said from your own recollection, and then have your lawyer ask you why you are sure that this is what was said. You would answer that you contemporaneously wrote a confirming letter to the boss spelling out what was said and you reviewed it to refresh your recollection before testifying at the hearing or trial. These kinds of confirming letters are used quite frequently in business and employment litigation. And, in my experience, these statements tend to be surprisingly effective and persuasive, because, while they do not foreclose the possibility that the person writing it was lying or inaccurate in the confirming email account, it does rule out the possibility that you forgot exactly what was said, and you provided the boss with an opportunity to dispute you which the boss didn't feel an obligation to correct. If one party has a coherent account in confirming emails of what was said, and the other party is trying to remember what happened a year or two earlier without notes from the witness stand, the person with the coherent, documented account is almost always going to come across as more credible unless the other side can show that your confirming emails are not infrequently gross misrepresentations of what really occurred. (I've also dealt with witnesses like that now and then.) | This looks very iffy. It purports to require you to consent unconditionally to medical examination. It further purports to demand unredacted medical examination irrespective of relevance. According to http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/n/9/B11_1.pdf The Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 requires an employer to obtain written consent from a worker before applying to his or her doctor for a medical report. The Act lays down a procedure to be followed and gives workers the right to see the report, to request amendments or to withhold consent to the report being supplied. The relevant provision is available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/28/section/3 While there may be theoretical loopholes to this, an employer would be unwise not to follow the norms laid out above. It would be ethically questionable for a doctor to examine without consent (where a person has that capacity); or to rely on a contract entered into some time ago under different circumstances as evidence for consent. In practice an Occupational Health professional will almost certainly want to protect themselves professionally by establishing genuine informed consent first. The TUC has more guidance on the complexities of this: https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/confidentiality-and-medical-records The contract term may also be unenforceable under GDPR insofar as it is a) processing data reliant on consent which is not freely given and b) processing more sensitive data than is strictly necessary for the task. Now just because you have the right to refuse consent doesn't mean the employer will do nothing about it. The employer might attempt to refuse payment under an occupational sick pay scheme, to which some reasonable additional conditions may be attached, but a) so long as you notify them and get appropriate doctor's notes in the usual way (see https://www.gov.uk/statutory-sick-pay for details) your employment contract cannot invent additional conditions to prevent you receiving Statutory Sick Pay, and b) it is questionable whether submitting to a disclosure arrangement as described would be reasonable. The employer might attempt to discipline or dismiss you for refusing to comply. The reasonableness of this is likely to depend on the existence of exceptional circumstances. There may be cases where there is a statutory duty to monitor for specific exposures which give rise to a refusal to consent being a sufficient reason for dismissal (and I do not know for certain) although the contract wording given does not lead me to expect that this is the case here. In the absence of such a reason, any detriment might lay them open to a claim of victimisation of an employee asserting their rights. If the employer takes any such detrimental action, you would likely need to submit a grievance and be willing to pursue to Tribunal to sort it out. If you are currently being required to submit to an examination under this term, seek advice without delay from your union representative. If you did not have the prior presence of mind to join a union, a solicitor specialising in employment law may be able to give advice (for which you should expect to pay). Having said all that, I notice the term does not specify that the employer may insist on who does the medical examination... I do wonder if you could meet this requirement by simply visiting your own GP, who will presumably be bound by the legislation above (definitely get advice before trying to use this!). | Termination is a matter of fact That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise. Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine. A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim. However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable. | The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work. | This is largely a contract law issue, with little to do with intellectual property. Let's take a closer look at Offer and Acceptance of a Contract. An Offer or Acceptance can be made: Orally In writing By conduct First, you offer your client a written contract, with terms and conditions. Your client refused to accept. There is no contract. Then, your client offers you another contract, orally: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. It is irrelevant whether $X and $Y are the same as in the written contract or not. This is a separate contract, and the original terms you proposed does not apply. Did you accept this contract? From Felhouse v. Bindley (1862): Acceptance must be communicated clearly and cannot be imposed due to silence of one of the parties. Since you accepted the deposit and began work, you have accepted the contract by conduct. This is a contract where there is no terms and conditions besides that one sentence mentioned by your client. Furthermore, you intent to carry on this contract (you wish to complete the project and get the money). This contract has benefits to you for Consideration. Would it have made a difference? Suppose that your client's response is: We are sorry, our company has a weird policy about accepting contracts in writing, 30 people have to approve it and it takes 3 months. Would you take a verbal acceptance? We will give you $X as deposit and you will begin work, after work is finished we will give you $Y, as stated in the contract. Then this would be an oral acceptance of the original (written) contract with terms and conditions. But that cannot happen, since the client explicitly refused your offer. An acceptance must be unconditional. Qualification of terms of offer means to destroy the original offer. Counter-offer means to reject the original offer. Can the client use the deposit as evidence that there is a verbal contract? Yes, certainly. But this contract is not the un-signed contract. Read this conversation, again, carefully: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. There is no mention that your proposed terms and conditions apply, is there? Even if the client, after 2 weeks, come back to you and says: Sorry for refusing your offer earlier. After due consideration, we think your company's proposal is best. We would like to move forward with you. It will be $X for the deposit, and $Y after completion. All your proposed terms and conditions apply. Deal? This time your client is making an Offer. If you accept, it will be a new contract, not the same one you offered to the client earlier. About the money. This is really a case by case situation. Depending on how much the entire project is completed and the nature of the project, results can be different. A deposit is necessary to begin work. The deposit secures the client's intention to carry on the project. The final payment is make after work is finished satisfactorily. Isn't the current situation exactly what a deposit is for? | In general you can dispute and negotiate any bill from a professional. The stronger your arguments for disputing it, and the more coherent your demands for adjustment, the more successful you will tend to be. This is like any business negotiation. One partner at a very large U.S. law firm once admitted to me that their corporate clients almost always ask for – and receive – billing adjustments. Of course, when push comes to shove, unless you're accusing the lawyer of fraudulent billing, then typically by contract you are liable for the bills. However, non-lawyers often assume that they will lose any dispute with their lawyers because it seems like lawyers have free access to the legal system. The reality is that there is a significant threshold that must be met before a law firm will sue a client for payment. That threshold will depend on the firm's opportunity costs, the costs of litigation, their assessment of reputational risks, how much they expect to actually collect, and sometimes just how ticked off they are. | Disclaimer: I am not familiar with US law, so this answer is from a general perspective. It should apply in most jurisdictions, though. Are there any laws or regulations which I can use to convince a hospital's billing department to talk to me, despite the fact that they have a clear policy otherwise? No, I don't think so. A company or organization is generally free to decide for themselves who will or will not communicate with you - I don't think there is any law giving you a right to choose. How would this even work? What if the people you ask to talk to are overworked, on vacation or just not qualified? However - you do have another, more important right: To be considered valid, a bill must provide credible evidence that the charges are justified. You cannot just ask someone to give you money, you must actually provide a reason why you are owed money. In this case, this means the hospital must send you a bill that you can understand and verify. To get this: First, stop bugging them over the phone. Once a point is reached where legal action seems likely (like in your case), any information you get is only really useful to you when in writing. So do everything in writing. It's fine to talk to them if it helps solve the problem - but insist on getting things in writing afterwards. The first thing you need to write is a formal letter that you refuse to accept the bill, because you cannot verify it. Outline in details what parts you cannot understand/verify, and ask for the information you need (such as what the codes mean). Once you have received a satisfatory explanation of the bill (which may take multiple letters), you go through it with a fine comb, and dispute any items that you think are unjustified. You may need the help of a lawyer to exercise these steps, but in principle you can probably do it on your own, too. Whether you get a lawyer is ultimately a trade-off (making a mistake may cost you money, but hiring a lawyer costs money, too). A first consultation with a lawyer is probably not too costly (ask first!), and may help you to decide whether you need more assistance. | Can an employer charge employee/contractor a processing fee for payment? No. The matter depends on whether the person qualifies as employee for purposes of the British Columbia Employment Standards Act. Your description suggests that you meet criterion (b) of the definition of employee insofar as you are (i.e., if you are) "a person an employer allows, directly or indirectly, to perform work normally performed by an employee". See section 1(1) of the Act. Section 21(1) prohibits an employer to "directly or indirectly, withhold, deduct or require payment of all or part of an employee's wages for any purpose", and item (2) prohibits the employer to "require an employee to pay any of the employer's business costs except as permitted by the regulations". There is no indication that the alleged business cost of e-transfers would be one such exception. do I have any recourse for such a small amount of money that isn't worth starting a law suit over? You have the option to file a complaint in "an office of the Employment Standards Branch". See sections 74 et seq for further details. You are not specifying the amount of the e-transfer that is being deducted from your compensation. The smaller the amount(s) at issue, the more important it will be for your complaint to persuasively explain how it is not "frivolous, vexatious or trivial". See section 76(c). Directing the employer's attention to the aforementioned statutory prohibition prior to filing a complaint tends to disprove allegations of vexation. That is because you are giving the employer an opportunity to mend its conduct and avert the proceedings that otherwise would take place. That being said, a very occasional cost of few cents is very likely to lead to a conclusion of vexation or bad faith regardless of your preliminary steps. In most other contexts, though, it is in your best interest to stay aware of the obligations that are being presented/proposed to you so that your actions do not constitute an acceptance of terms & conditions you would rather reject. Not all contracts come in the form of a written document signed by the parties. |
Can I make a game with the N64 SDK legally? Can I legally create a game with the Nintendo 64 SDK? I have seen several SDKs on the internet which are verified to be the real deal. My next question is if I can distribute it legally. I was going to give Nintendo a call to ask if I can develop for a console that is older than I am. Should I do this? I do not want to get sued. | This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement. | As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum). | The agreement linked in the question seems to be or to purport to be, for a non-final, non-production version of the board. I have seen such agreements used, both for hardware and software, used when beta-test versions of products are being distributed to those who agree to do such testing, often in exchange for a reduced price on the final product, or an early look. I have also seen similar language used when an evaluation version of a product is provided free, or at a much reduced price. In such a use, it would be a reasonable contract, it seem to me, and I see no reason why if it were agreed to by both parties in such a situation, it would not be binding. Often such agreements also include a non-disclosure aspect, but this one does not seem to do so. I cannot see how such an agreement could be made applicable automatically, without both parties having chosen to agree to it, and indicated this by signing, clicking, or in some other positive way. I doubt that it could be made automatically applicable, on an "by using this product you agree" basis. I don't know of any physical consumer product, or appliance, sold with such an agreement in ordinary commerce. I am not sure what would happen if a manufacturer wanted to require all purchasers to sign such an agreement. I don't know if it would be binding. I would think that the purchaser's rights under the First Sale doctrice, could be modified by a valid contract agreed to by the purchaser. I do not think that they could simply be revoked by a contract of adhesion, which the purchaser had no choice to decline before making the purchase. As the OP says this was not signed or agreed to in any way, I can't see how it binds the OP. | Some MP3 technologies are still under patent in the US: you can read the wiki page on that matter to see if it is applicable to what you intend to do. This assumes you write your own code – if you use someone else's conversion software, that would depend on the licensing terms for the software. | There are basically two kinds of things one could do. One could assign or transfer intellectual property rights and contracts related to the app to the entity, or one could license the intellectual property rights to the entity. Generally speaking, in a related party transaction, everything should be in a signed writing, and a notice of the transfer of an intellectual property right that has been registered or filed with a government agency should be provided to the government agency in question. Since there are potentially copyright, patent, trademark, publicity, and contractual rights that might be associated with the app, each aspect which exists should be transferred or licensed, as the case may be. While the forms to do this aren't particular long, the concepts involved and correct terminology are subtle, so this would not be a wise undertaking to attempt on a do it yourself basis. | No. Copyright does not have exemptions for obsolete works, use with credit, or non-commercial use. Depending on the purpose for the distribution, this could be fair use, but it is unlikely that a court will consider this fair use when the only reason is for other people to be able to play games. Perhaps you could try contacting Adobe; it's possible that they will give you a license to distribute the Flash Player. This isn't directly relevant to the legal aspect of copying Adobe's Flash Play, but to answer the underlying issue of legally playing Flash games, perhaps you/others could try Gnash, a libre reimplementation of Flash. I have not used it, but apparently Gnash can run some Flash software without using Adobe's player. | wouldn't this count as an unlawful clause in the license agreement, therefore, invalidating the entire contract? No. The excerpt of legislation you posted implies that the clause in the EULA is null and void --rather than illegal-- if your reason for reverse engineering meets the legislative criteria. For the clause to be illegal, the statute would have to outlaw clauses which prohibit the reverse engineering intended for achieving interoperability. The statute does not prohibit those clauses. Instead, it only authorizes you to ignore that clause, provided that your reason for doing so is to achieve interoperability. Lastly, an invalid clause does not invalidate the entire contract. Any portions of the contract which do not depend on the invalid clause retain their status of [being] binding and enforceable. | What you're talking about is called black-box reverse engineering. It can be done, and as long as you are meticulous in your record keeping the fact that it has been done should be an appropriate defence against copyright infringement. But that doesn't help against patent claims - while in copyright cases the fact that code has or has not been directly copied is critical, in patent cases it its irrelevant: if you use a patented method, it's a violation. You therefore will need to be careful about any patents that may have been issued to the original author, as well as avoiding copying. |
Should I sign apartment condition form before inspecting apartment? I am in the process of signing a lease on an apartment. Included in the lease documents is the standard Boston, MA, USA apartment condition form. https://www.lrgboston.com/pdfs/Apartment%20Condition%20Statement%20Form.pdf The form says we have 15 days after move in to return the form, completed and signed. Our move in date isn't for a few months, and we haven't had time to fully inspect the apartment, so I don't want to sign the condition statement yet (plus, the condition could change!). The landlord wants us to sign it now along with the lease because "there have been issues where the tenants do not sign [the condition form on time] and claim they didn't know the form had to be returned within 15 days." We have in an email from the realtor that when we move in we will be allowed to fill out the form. Should I sign this? My thinking is that I should not sign, because modifying a signed document after the signing date seems like forgery, but should ask if I can initial the page next to the opening paragraph to show that I have read and understand it must be returned within 15 days of move-in. Would this work? | It is not forgery to modify a signed document if you clearly indicate the date and nature of the changes, but the landlord could retain and rely on the original version, whoch would be to your disadvantage. I would suggest writing and signing a letter in which you acknowledge receipt of the condition from, and indicate that you know that it must be filled out, signed and returned within 15 days after your move-in date. That should deal with the landlord's legitimate concerns. Or you could write on the condition form "no inspection has been made as of {date}" and return it with that notation, which should protect you, retaining an unsigned copy for later use. | We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately. | Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed. | Agreement You say: my landlord added a clause stating: "All moving must be done in rear of driveway or pay $250 (near basement door)" Was this addition made at the time you signed the lease or subsequently? This matters because the terms of a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, they must be agreed. If the change happened after the lease was signed then , unless you agreed to it, it has no effect whatsoever. Since that resolution is boring; I will assume that it was always there. Enforcability Is this actually enforceable, since I did park in a public space and not necessarily on his property? Yes, it is enforceable. People can agree in a contract to do (or not do) anything so long as that thing is not illegal - that is what a contract is; a legally enforceable agreement for two people to do certain things. You agreed "All moving must be done in rear of driveway ... (near basement door)" and you didn't do what you agreed to do. Therefore you broke a term of the contract. It doesn't matter that you don't know why he wanted you to do this or if it was reasonable or if it meant that you couldn't use your parent's truck - if these were issues for you they should have been raised before you agreed to do it. If the clause said "When moving out you will wear a blue double breasted suit with a yellow and purple bow tie" then that is what you must do. Consequences There are a number of options open to the wronged party when the other party breaches a term of a contract. The most relevant in these circumstances is to sue for damages. So how much are damages? Well, they are an amount to restore the wronged party to the position they would have been in if you hadn't broken the agreement. In situations where damages can be hard to calculate, contracts can make a provision for liquidated damages; a pre-agreed amount of what the damage will be: in this case "$250". However: In the United States, Section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that, in contracts for the sale of goods: Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. This largely mirrors the common law rule, which applies to other types of contracts under the law of most US states. On the face of it, it would appear that $250 may be "unreasonably large" given the nature of the breach where it appears that the landlord has actually suffered no damage. | Probably not, although it is impossible to say without reading the lease. Usually leases are monthly. That means you pay for the entire month or lease term regardless of how much or how little you use the property. It seems weird that the lease ends on the 21st, but if that is the case, then you are legally obligated to pay for that time interval. That said, if you want to drive a hard bargain, you could threaten to reoccupy the apartment and stay in it until the 21st which are legally entitled to do, unless he refunds you some money. You would have to be a pretty serious hard-ass to pull this off, or be prepared to go to court. One possible course of action is that you demand return of the key and say you changed your mind and will be staying in the apartment until the 21st. Make sure the conversation is recorded and that he knows the conversation is recorded, or have a witness. He will refuse. You can then sue him for denying you the use of your property. | This would be pointless and wouldn't work. Eviction due to defaulting on rent requires the landlord to give 3 business days notice, in writing. This must include a method by which the tenant can settle their debt. Either the landlord would be forced to accept a payment or this would not be valid. Source Additionally, in this case, there is nothing stopping you physically handing an envelope of cash to the landlord as they live upstairs. However, there is no reason for your landlord to do this. If your landlord hates you that much it would be far easier for them to simply give you 60 days notice and terminate your tenancy that way. | It would appear, from the facts as stated in the question, that the tenant here has been deprived of some of the tenant's legal rights. Tenants have a right to notice, to a hearing, to appeal the result of the herring, and to obtain property after an eviction. The federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (12 U.S.C. § 5201 *et seq.) gives a tenant a right to 90 days notice before any eviction after a foreclosure, even if there is no lease. If the is a lease, protection will in most cases last until the end of the lease. According to the "Landlord/Tenant Issues" page of the NC court system, a lawful eviction in North Carolina requires that a hearing take place in small claims court before a magistrate. The decision in such a hearing can be appealed to a District court. Parties have 10 days to appeal, and the landlord must not try to remove the tenant before the end of those 10 days. If an appeal is filed the tenant may not be evicted until the appeal is heard. According to the court page after eviction: Depending on the value of your belongings left in the home, you have 5 to 7 days after the home is padlocked to arrange with the landlord a time to remove your belongings. Landlords are only required to allow tenants one visit to the home to collect all of the property. If you leave property worth a total of $500 or less in the home, you have 5 days to retrieve it; if it is worth more than $500, you have 7 days. If you have not yet arranged to move your things in this time period, the landlord can dispose of them. The page "Renters and Foreclosure" from the NC Department of Justice (NCDOJ) says: If your lease is entered into before the notice of foreclosure, the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act usually requires the mortgage holder and foreclosure buyer to honor your lease. If you do not have a lease, if your lease allows for the landlord to terminate it at will, or if the foreclosure buyer wants to move into the home, you must be given 90 days’ notice to vacate. These protections do not apply if your landlord is a close relative or if your rent is substantially less than fair market rent. ... If you have questions about your rights as a renter during foreclosure contact us for help or call toll free within North Carolina 1-877-5-NO-SCAM. The Nolo page "Protections for Tenants After a Landlord’s Foreclosure" says: The PTFA (12 U.S.C. § 5201 and following) provides protections to bona fide tenants who have a lease as well as those who don’t, like month-to-month renters. ... Renters who don’t have a lease, such as month-to-month renters, or those with a lease that can be terminated at will, get 90 days’ notice before having to move out of the property. Importantly, the PTFA also provides that if state law gives a more generous amount of time for renters to stay in the home, that longer period applies. Foindlaw's page "Tenant Eviction in Foreclosure: What Are Your Rights?" also mentions PFTA and the 90-day notice to tenants it requires The page "Tenant’s Rights in Foreclosure" from HCP l;aw says: One provision under North Carolina law that can protect a tenant before any sale or foreclosure occurs is to record the written lease in the Register of Deeds office. If that is done, any buyer, including a buyer at foreclosure, takes the property but is bound by the lease, just like the prior landlord was. When the lease is not recorded and when a purchaser obtains the property through a foreclosure sale, and the purchaser is not going to occupy the property as his primary residence, in most cases, the tenant can remain through the length of the remaining lease or one year from the date the purchaser acquired the title, whichever is shorter. The NOLO page "Tenant Defenses to Eviction Notices in North Carolina" indicates several defenses that tenants may have to eviction cases. The Nolo page mentions that: North Carolina law states that it is against public policy to evict a tenant by any means other than court proceedings. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.6.) Any attempt to evict a tenant without a court order constitutes a self-eviction or a “self-help” eviction. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.9(a).) Some common “self-help” methods include turning off utilities, changing the locks, or simply insisting that the tenant leave the premises. (See the Nolo article Illegal Eviction Procedures in North Carolina for more information.) A tenant subjected to “self-help” methods will have a defense to eviction. However, the eviction will only be stayed until the landlord commences a lawful action. The Nolo page advises that: For an overview of landlord-tenant law and eviction rules and procedures, see the Renting and Evictions section of LawHelpNC.org, the Legal Aid of North Carolina (LANC) Landlord-Tenant brochure, and HUD.gov. To read the law itself, see Chapter 42: Landlord and Tenant of the North Carolina General Statutes. The Nolo article has advice on how to find a lawyer and how to get legal aid. The "Guide to the Eviction Process in North Carolina" also mentions that tenants must be served with an eviction notice, at least 7-days notice for a monthly tenant. This page deals primarily with evictions because of non-payment of rent or other fault of the tenet. It also mentions notice for disposing of property saying: landlords must notify [Tenants] of their belongings before disposing of them. If the tenant doesn’t respond, you can dispose of the personal items after the time-frame on the notice expires. (NCGS § 42-25.9) and (NCGS § 42-36.2) NC statutes section 42-25.9 provides that: § 42-25.9. Remedies. (a) If any lessor, landlord, or agent removes or attempts to remove a tenant from a dwelling unit in any manner contrary to this Article, the tenant shall be entitled to recover possession or to terminate his lease and the lessor, landlord or agent shall be liable to the tenant for damages caused by the tenant's removal or attempted removal. Damages in any action brought by a tenant under this Article shall be limited to actual damages as in an action for trespass or conversion and shall not include punitive damages, treble damages or damages for emotional distress. (b) If any lessor, landlord, or agent seizes possession of or interferes with a tenant's access to a tenant's or household member's personal property in any manner not in accordance with G.S. 44A-2(e2), 42-25.9(d), 42-25.9(g), 42-25.9(h), or G.S. 42-36.2 the tenant or household member shall be entitled to recover possession of his personal property or compensation for the value of the personal property, and, in any action brought by a tenant or household member under this Article, the landlord shall be liable to the tenant or household member for actual damages, but not including punitive damages, treble damages or damages for emotional distress. (c) The remedies created by this section are supplementary to all existing common-law and statutory rights and remedies. (d) If any tenant abandons personal property of seven hundred fifty dollar ($750.00) value or less in the demised premises, or fails to remove such property at the time of execution of a writ of possession in an action for summary ejectment, the landlord may, as an alternative to the procedures provided in G.S. 42-25.9(g), 42-25.9(h), or 42-36.2, deliver the property into the custody of a nonprofit organization regularly providing free or at a nominal price clothing and household furnishings to people in need, upon that organization agreeing to identify and separately store the property for 30 days and to release the property to the tenant at no charge within the 30-day period. | If a candidate chooses to sign by simply typing their name as shown (as an example) in the first and second photos, they'd obviously have to stick to the same name and font when signing the contract and non-disclosure agreement. This assertion is incorrect. But what repercussions would it have in future? If the candidate has to sign any more company documents much later (signing physically with a pen on paper or even signing electronically), would it have to match with the signatures that were first made in the offer letter? No. Or would commonsense be accepted, that the signature is basically the candidate's acceptance of the terms of the agreement, and that the signature can vary? Yes. A signature is ritualized way of showing legal agreement. The content of the signature does not impact its legal validity. For example, it used to be commonplace for illiterate people to sign contracts, wills, and other documents prepared by someone else and read to them with an "X". So long as a signature is made by the person who is supposed to be signing it with an intent to legally agree to what they are signing, it is a valid signature. When a signature is obtained in a manner that does not reflect the intent of the person signing it to legally agree to what they are actually signing, that is a special category of fraud called "fraud in the factum". For example, substituting a deed to a house from a receipt for a package delivery at the last moment when the person signing it doesn't notice the switch, is "fraud in the factum". A court's conclusion that there has been "fraud in the factum" has the legal effect of causing the document signed to be treated as if it was never signed at all. In contrast, different legal consequences are present when someone signs a document, knowing what they are signing, for reasons that rely on false statements that have been made to them, which is called "fraud in the inducement." If someone tries to enforce an agreement that purports to be signed, and the person who allegedly signed it claims that the signature was forged by a third-party, inconsistency between the signature and other times that the person who allegedly signed something did so is evidence that the signature is a forgery. But it is not conclusive evidence. People's signatures change over time for a variety of reasons, sometimes dramatically in a short period of time, for example, in the case of a stroke or a hand injury. When signatures differ over time and there are allegations of forgery, then it is a question of proof for a finder of fact (i.e. a judge or jury) to decide if the alleged forgery is really a forgery. Many businesses that routinely accept small dollar value personal checks, for example, also take a thumb-print of the person signing the check in order to make it cheap and easy to litigate the question of whether a signature on a check is forged, and to discourage litigants from falsely claiming that a check was forged in the first place. This practice was established because lying and claiming that a check was forged used to be a tactic that was used on a recurring basis in civil cases and in criminal bad check passing prosecutions to escape liability. |
How come the nude protesters were not arrested? I read today about the Anti-Censorship Activists in New York (Warning! NSFW pictures inside link) who protested against Facebook while being totally nude out in the street. I'm also pretty sure public nudity is not allowed in the USA. How come they were not arrested or at least warned by police? Is there some exception to the law? | Public nudity is illegal in New York as it is in almost every U.S. jurisdiction. And, if the police had arrested the nude protesters, the arrests probably would have been upheld in court, because a ban on nudity in public would probably be viewed as a time, place and manner restriction on the freedom of speech which is constitutionally valid. For example, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld San Francisco’s public nudity ordinance in Taub v. City and County of San Francisco (2017). As the court in that case explains in a factually very similar case: Public nudity is not inherently expressive, but it may in some circumstances constitute expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion). Even if Plaintiffs’ public nudity at political rallies was entitled to First Amendment protection, however, we hold that the challenged ordinance is a valid, content neutral regulation as applied to Plaintiffs’ expressive conduct under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O’Brien is the applicable test here because the ordinance is aimed at “the conduct itself, rather than at the message conveyed by that conduct.” United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 299, 312 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). But, while a court would have made that distinction, the public, which is used to the idea that protesters shouldn't be arrested for protesting, might not. However, under U.S. law, the police are never required to enforce any law. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales. In this case, the NYPD probably just decided that the benefit that the city could have secured by enforcing this law wasn't worth it, in terms of costs to the city, making the city safer, and the public image of the NYPD. For example, the city would have had to pay to book and incarcerate the protestors in crowded and expensive jails, and then fight expensive legal battles in petty misdemeanor court prosecutions to defend the anti-nudity law, an issue that isn't a priority for the city's scarce resources at the moment. There is always a risk that any mass arrest could turn a peaceful gathering into a dangerous riot. And, those anti-nudity laws are on the books primarily do deal with drunks and flashers, not anti-censorship protestors. A loss in court in one of these cases (as unlikely as it might be) would undermine the ability of the NYPD to enforce the anti-nudity law in the kind of cases it was actually intended to address, in which a first amendment challenge would almost surely not succeed. Arresting a bunch of naked people wouldn't be fun and would look bad in on the nightly news, and getting naked protestors off the street wouldn't make NYC a safer place. So, they chose not to enforce a law that they could have enforced if they had decided to do so. Warning the protestors that they were violating the law would also not have served the NYPD's purpose. If they gave a warning and then didn't follow up when the warning was ignored, that would undermine the NYPD's credibility in future protests. And, even a warning could cause fear to spread throughout the crowd increasing the risk of a peaceful protest turning into a dangerous riot. Training materials for law enforcement officers reflect these concerns (see internal pages 55-56 in the linked materials): Mass arrests during demonstrations in Washington, D.C., New York City and other major locales have been criticized. In some cases, the protest activity, while unlawful, was not necessarily violent. Complaints included that law-abiding protestors and passersby were rounded up and detained along with violators in overly broad sweeps. The negative impact of these media images damages the public perception of the police operation, as it draws into question the reasonableness and proportionality of the police response. Subsequent litigation has proven to be particularly costly. In most instances only a tiny number of those arrested actually appear in court and most of those are charged with offenses that would not normally attract an arrest or detention (Temple 2003). Law enforcement agencies need to ensure that operational commanders have a clear and uniform understanding of the mass-arrest policy to be followed. Litigation has included criticism of understaffed prisoner processing operations that, when overwhelmed, led to inordinate detention without charge. This occurred at the Republican National Convention in 2004 and led to court instructions and fines for inordinate delay in processing detained persons (New York Times 2004). Research into recent mass-arrest operations shows that arrests are easily accomplished. The areas where problems arise with sudden, but now predictable, regularity are The quality of evidence available to pursue prosecution against each individual; The logistics of transporting and handling large numbers of prisoners; Allowing legal and medical access; An inordinate delay in arranging for release or bringing persons to court; Not enough police on duty to cope with the above—process centers are frequently overwhelmed at an early stage due to lack of resources; and In some cases, the courts have ruled that top police officials can be held personally liable for damages or actions. Mass arrests are generally advisable only when all alternative tactics have either been tried unsuccessfully or are unlikely to be effective under specific circumstances. When mass-arrest tactics are used, evidence against each individual prisoner must be available to support the charges. Arrest tactics training is a critical component of mission success. The training must address the spectrum of event types: non-violent protest, non-violent civil disobedience, passive resistance (including the use of chains, sleeves and other devices to impede arrest) and violent confrontation. Training must recognize the difference between two arrest scenarios: Arrest tactics where police are in control of the environment and have time to plan and implement the arrests or dispersal in a controlled manner, (e.g., at a sit-down protest); and Arrest tactics where police do not control the environment (e.g., when police are trying to re-establish control of the environment by arresting violent demonstrators). Pressure point techniques, in conjunction with empty hand control, efficient handcuffing, and arrestee escort methods should be included to remove protesters humanely while minimizing risk of injury to protestors and police. Such tactics should be part of ongoing and regular refresher training to ensure officers maintain efficiency. Tactical commanders present at many of the demonstration events reviewed by PERF agreed that unless the actions of certain protestors necessitate their removal, the better course of action is not to expend resources on arrests. For example, in instances where sleeping dragons are situated so as to disrupt traffic, it may be less of a drain on already-thin operational resources to simply monitor them and reroute traffic. Moreover, protest organizers have on occasion scheduled “officer intensive” diversions just before they undertake more violent or destructive actions elsewhere, calculating that the police would be too busy handling the mass arrest to respond to further actions. Pretty much anyone with common sense knows that it isn't smart to disturb a sleeping dragon in the middle of an intersection in New York City. Trying to try to arrest a dragon is very hard and dragons can afford to pay good lawyers with their treasure hordes. But, police also have to consider more difficult choices like the choices presented by this nude protest. | Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy). | Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - Camp David is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So: if you are in a place where you have permission of the lawful authority to be (public spaces give you this implicitly, private spaces require explicit permission), and the lawful authority has not placed restrictions on photography, and the subject does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (like they would in a public toilet), and the subject matter is legal (e.g. considering restrictions on sexual or commercial activities), then you can take photographs. | We can start by looking at the text of the law. US federal law 18 USC § 2252A(a)(3)(B) says: Any person who... knowingly... advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains— (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). I'm not sure how much posting the name without the link would protect you, given that you posted it with the explicit intent that someone would go and look at it. On the other hand, your intent was not to "advertise" or "promote" it, and you didn't actually "distribute" the material. | The relevant law in England and Wales is the Protection of Children Act 1978. Under section 1 of the Act, it’s a defense to distributing, showing, or possessing indecent images of children if you had a “legitimate reason” to distribute, show, or possess them. It’s also a defense if you had not seen the images, didn’t know they were indecent, and didn’t have any cause to suspect they were indecent. However, the 1999 case of R v. Bowden held that downloading a digital copy of an image counts as “making” an image. This is not subject to the “legitimate reason” defense by statute (although I don’t know if it’d count as “making” if you have no reason to know the contents, like if a computer repair shop backs up a customer’s hard drive without looking at what’s on the drive). However, it is explicitly still subject to defenses in sections 1A and 1B of the Act. 1A covers spouses and partners. If you are the spouse or partner of a child between 16 and 18, then with their consent you can legally make indecent images of them (although this doesn’t apply if anyone but the two of you is in the image). You can also possess those images with their consent and give them a copy. Section 1B covers criminal proceedings, investigations, etc., and was added after R v. Bowden. Because copying a digital image counts as “making” an image, it would generally be illegal for people to work with digital copies of indecent images even if done for a good reason. To avoid that, Parliament made an exception for making an indecent image when necessary to prevent, detect, or investigate crimes, as well as for criminal proceedings anywhere in the world. Parliament also exempted the UK’s intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6, and GCHQ) when carrying out their duties. These are specific statutory exemptions, so they can’t really be generalized to “if you have a legitimate reason.” | You acted illegally in assaulting your fellow student. When you are in public, a person can legally take your picture, and you are not allowed to assault a person because you do not like their legal actions. Any degree of force is excessive except in certain responses to illegal fource, and even the threat of force is excessive. You also have no right to demand that a person prove that they didn't take your picture, and certainly no right to enforce that demand with physical violence. | I believe there are courts that have affirmed convictions for obstructing official business or something along those lines, but the general consensus seems to be that conduct like this is not a crime, or that it cannot be criminalized without violating the First Amendment. The most recent decision on point came just a few weeks ago. In Friend v. Gasparino, No. 20-3644 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2023), a man sued police for arresting him because he had set up a sign saying "Cops Ahead" two blocks away from where they were running an operation to enforce distracted-driving laws. The trial court dismissed the case, holding (1) that the sign was not protected by the First Amendment because it was "of little, if any, public concern"; and (2) that even if it was protected, the officer's conduct in arresting him satisfied strict scrutiny because if police wanted to prevent distracted driving, there was no less restrictive alternative to arresting the plaintiff. But the Second Circuit reversed, holding (1) that speech remains protected even if it is not a matter of public concern; and (2) that there was no evidence that limiting the plaintiff's speech was necessary to permit the state to write citations and enforce the law, even if it would have been helpful. | There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement. |
Can one go to jail for not abiding by the letter of the law but abiding the spirit of the law? What if there is a clash between the spirit of law and the letter of law and my actions only abide by the spirit of law but not the letter of law?Is there a chance that I might go to jail? | Yes, there is a good chance. Ordinarily, the law as written is what is enforced. On occasion, the wording of the law is actually ambiguous, or vague, which means that the jury will need an instruction as to how to interpret the law. In fact, juries are not literally read the statute, they are given a set of decision-making instructions so that they can decide "If we find X, we must acquit; if we find Y we may convict". Your attorney will, if he is diligent, note the problem and strive for an instruction that favors the client. (The prosecution will of course object). Eventually, on appeal, a court will decide what the law "really means", and that decision might be strictly based on the letter of the law, or it might be based on a supposed spirit of the law, i.e. what the legislature "originally intended". That outcome is determined in part by the jurisprudential ideology of the prevailing justices of the appeals court. Usually, letter of the law prevails until a higher court rules that a particular "spirit" is what was originally intended. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. | There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law. | Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol. | The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed. | Whatever crime or infraction you are charged with, it applies to you personally however they spell your name and however you spell your name. Whether or not you should go depends on the alternative that you face (large fine or jail time for failure to appear?). An argument that you didn't commit the offence because they misspelled your name would hold zero water. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | A court would "dismiss" an action, a claim, or a defendant, but I don't know of any American court that would "dismiss" a motion. Instead, a motion would be "denied," or perhaps "overruled." If I saw this language in a motion, I would assume it was just a lawyer doing the stereotypical redundance thing. |
Are you allowed to put a customer's email address in an internal business email? Today at work I put a number of our customers' email addresses in an email that only people in the business were CCed on because we were dealing with a matter relating to these customers and their email addresses. A work colleague told me that it was illegal (breach of privacy) to put our customers' email addresses in the email. Is this true? The company operates in Australia. Note that the email I sent was internal. No one outside the company should ever see it. | Businesses do hold customers' email addresses. These are routinely stored and communicated between the businesses' internal IT systems. There is nothing illegal about this. The only difference that internal email communication makes to the above is that not just machines but employees see the customers' email addresses. So, essentially the question is: is it legal for a business to show its customers' email addresses to its employees? As per Australian Privacy Principles, personal information needs to be kept secure. Businesses therefore have duty to do their best not to leak customers' personal information (which includes email addresses). Limiting the circle of people who see personal information only to those who need to see it is essential to perform this duty. So, essentially, the answer depends on whether all those people CC'ed actually needed to see the email addresses for business purposes. If, for example, one of those people was your office cleaner, then you have done bad job in performing your duty to secure personal information. Should that cleaner leak the email addresses outside the business, you will be held liable. | You violated Facebook's Terms of Service, and it's entirely within your contractual agreement with them for them to close your account. You agreed to abide by the contract you "clicked through" when you signed up and opened a Facebook account. They didn't break any laws when you broke your contract with them. You clearly broke the contract by violating the TOS. They are not breaking any laws by not restoring your account. What you see as the value of your personal or business data doesn't really mean anything; it was your choice to use Facebook in the first place, and your mistake to break the TOS. You could try hiring a lawyer to make a case that you see a difference between the personal data you want to retrieve and the business data that caused the violation, but that's up to you; Facebook is under no legal obligation (this could be different, according to your jurisdiction and national laws) to restore any or all access to your account or data, but it's possible they could be persuaded. | That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure. | Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG. | Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed. | This follows from a term in your agreement: in opening the account, you agreed to a binding arbitration clause. The general reason why they can do this is because it is not prohibited by law to have such clauses in agreements (in fact, the Federal Arbitration Act protects such clauses from legal challenge). For the same reasons, the clauses can impose deadlines on opt-out or require opt-out by mail as opposed to email or phone call. The premise is that if you find such terms unacceptably onerous or unacceptable, you will not patronize that business. That assumes that the customer read and understood the agreement that they signed, which I grant is often untrue. | Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough. | You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room". |
Can U.S. Tax Forms Be Legally HTMLified? If I want to have a U.S. government tax form, like a W-9, be able to be filled out on my website, can I convert it to html (so that it looks as identical as possible to the original form), have the user fill it out, and then export the results to a pdf or image to submit to the IRS? Or does the thing that I submit to the IRS have to be a scan or physical copy of the pdf that the IRS provides? | There are no copyright restrictions, since tax forms are government works and statutorily not protected. The IRS in fact says that you can use a substantially identical form for W9, as long as you don't do certain things and do do other required things. You do not submit W-9 to the IRS, but they provide a document describing substitute tax forms. Basically, they say "The IRS accepts quality substitute tax forms that are consistent with the official forms and have no adverse impact on processing". You can't "just do it", without approval, but you might be able to get approval if your document follows the rules. If the output exactly reproduces the official form except for the parts which you must remove, then it would probably pass muster and it would not matter that the engine that you use is HTML. You can also remove the color screening -- read the rules to see what all is immutable vs. changeable. | "...the listing ad of property is not a property of website." Why do you think that? Just because a website exists does not mean you can legally scrape it. Read the Terms of Service of the site; there is a good chance the TOS forbids scraping or copying of any part of the website in any manner, including scraping. If the property listings are from a third party service that provides real estate listings to websites, then those property listings are licensed to that website, and by scraping them you will likely be violating the TOSs of those two services. By illegally scraping the content of a website, you are opening yourself up to being involved in copyright infringement and/or being liable to be the subject of a civil lawsuit. | What follows is a broad overview. I'm not an expert in this; I just have a bit of experience in this due to a tax situation my wife & I experienced a few years ago. Please do not rely on this advice except as a starting point for more Googling. Your obligations (and your assistant's) will depend on whether the assistant is an employee or an independent contractor. In general, an independent contractor is someone you hire to "get a job done"; you have minimal control over the manner, time, place, tools, etc., that the assistant uses. An employee, on the other hand, is someone you hire to come to work at a particular time and do the job a particular way. (I'm glossing over some details here; see the IRS link above for more details.) If your assistant is an independent contractor, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you must provide them with Form 1099-MISC, and file a copy with the IRS as well. Your assistant will then be liable for income taxes on this amount, as well as self-employment tax (see below.) If your assistant is actually an employee, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you are required to provide them with a W-2 form, as well as filing a copy with the IRS. In addition, if you pay them more than a higher threshold ($2200 in a tax year or $1000 in any quarter for 2020), you are responsible for withholding taxes from their paychecks, as well as paying the employer's portion of Social Security, Medicare, and/or federal unemployment taxes. How to figure these taxes is complex, but generally the employee must provide you with a completed W-4, and then you must provide them (and the IRS) with a W-2 at the end of the tax year. See Publication 15: Employer's Tax Guide for all the gory details. The self-employment tax is designed to effectively cover the employer's portion of these taxes for self-employed workers. As you might imagine, employers are often tempted to misclassify employees as "independent contractors", since this means that this tax liability gets pushed from them onto their workers, as well as just making the employer's life easier. The Feds will not take kindly to such misclassification if it is discovered. Finally, for the state of Connecticut, consult the CT 1009-MISC filing guide (if your assistant is an independent contractor) or the Connecticut employer's tax guide (if they are an employee). The distinction is pretty much the same as at the federal level. | That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life. | International organizations such as the UN are typically treated similar to foreign governments, and thus enjoy various privileges. One consequence is that typically, income from employment by these organizations is not subject to taxation by the host countries where the employee lives or carries out their work. However, the details depend very much on the tax laws in that host country. The employee might still be required to file taxes, but would then likely be able to declare the income as tax-free under the corresponding provision of the national tax law. This usually also depends a lot on the treaties which created the international organisation. For example, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations contains an explicit tax exemption for UN officials, though not necessarily for regular employees. As an example for how a country treats employees of international organization, the IRS has guidance regarding US tax law here. Other countries tend to have similar rules, albeit with less accessible online documentation :) | First, there's no tax credit (at least on the Federal side), just a tax deduction (and even that isn't guaranteed - depends on your personal circumstances). Second, you get to claim the deduction (you should keep your receipt, just in case). | would it be a problem to file both ways, or would there be no point and would it cause problems? File only once. Duplicate filing is likely to cause recurrent confusion and annoyance because everyone else will be uncertain as to whether both filings differ on anything other than the signature. If filing electronically does a physical copy signed in ink still need to be mailed or filed in person, or would that also just cause confusion? Filing electronically precludes the need for filing a physical copy. Even if filing a physical copy is allowed, it would impose on the clerk the needless burden of scanning and processing the physical copy. | If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability. |
Can a user sell my software (MIT license) without modification? Basically, I was just wondering if I release a piece of open source software under the MIT license, does that mean that someone could take it and sell it onto people without doing any modification to it? | Yes. The license itself is really just one sentence long, and states explicitly that this is allowed. Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. | This is unlikely to be a problem. There are many companies that have already registered software-related trademarks prominently involving an X or the name Xcom. That Twitter has changed to X branding does not substantially change this general situation. With trademarks, the general question is whether similar branding causes confusion. It is unlikely that someone would confuse the X display server / X.Org project / X.Org Foundation with the social media service now being branded as X or x.com. Of course, anyone can sue anyone, the real question is whether that's possible successfully. Here, I have my doubts that x.com could successfully demonstrate confusion in its favour. It is worth noting that the X.Org Foundation does not seem to hold any relevant trademark registrations at all. This is not unusual for Open Source software projects and doesn't mean that X.Org has no rights, but does make a defense a bit more difficult. However, there also doesn't seem to be a relevant registration by the ex-Twitter company or by the X Corp. The x.org domain name is unlikely to be threatened. If the x.org domain name was being used in bad faith it could maybe be seized, but the X.Org Foundation has a pretty strong claim on this name. For historical context, both x.com and x.org were among the six single-letter .org/.net/.com domain names when such registrations were stopped in 1993. But while x.com has been pretty much dormant since that company was renamed to PayPal, x.org has (I think) always been associated with the display server software, and has been used continuously by the X.Org Foundation since its establishment in 2004. | It is illegal to make copies of copyrighted materials without license. In the case of software, obviously it will be illegal to make copies by copying and installing the software without a license, but we are not talking about that. If I have a legitimate license of say Photoshop, and I start the application, parts or all of the code will be loaded into the RAM of my computer, which is a copy. According to copyright law, it is legal for me to make that copy. You are allowed to copy legitimately owned software into RAM to execute it. If your copy of Photoshop is illegal, and you start the application, the copy that is made into RAM is again copyright infringement. Having read the software license for the software that you get when you buy a Mac, it seems that if you steal my computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement, and it seems that if you buy such a stolen computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement as well, because the license that I received when I purchased the computer covers anyone using it with my permission, and covers anyone who legally buys the computer from me, but doesn't cover a thief. Now does this affect the work that you did? No, you have the full copyright on your work. Copyright law doesn't require that your tools are all used legitimately. | You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users. | Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either. | If you develop a program yourself and it wasn't a work made for hire, then the program is yours to do with as you please. You hold the copyright to it. Many developers choose existing licencing arrangements or they can choose to create a license on their own, or using an attorney. And sometimes they choose to release their programs into the public domain. If you release it into the public domain, you are essentially giving up your copyright. The IDE (Integrated Development Environment) you used to develop your program does not dictate what licenses you can use. There are some existing licenses that others use (which you are free to use or NOT to use) give varying protections to you regarding what you are allowing others to do; right of others to copy, right of others to modify, right of others to distribute, rights to sub-licence, and so on. One of the licensing schemes is the GNU General Public License (GPL). But there are many others, too many to list here. | Unless you have a legally valid IP right related to the specification that statement is meaningless. When a software license is granted it is based on the copyright of the code. The copyright of the spec. just stops people from copying the spec - it does not protect the information in it. You can restrict copying of the spec. under copyright, you can make up a name for the spec (like USB or Bluetooth) and get a trademark and only allow the trademark use in limited cases(doesn’t stop implementation of the spec), or get a patent that would be necessarily infringed if something complying with the spec was created and used, sold, made, etc. or you can keep it secret and only show it to people who contractually agreed with your terms. | While I agree that the license required for your use case isn't particularly obvious to me, the page you have linked to includes the following paragraph: Need help picking your license? Just shoot us an email at [email protected] and we’ll help you decide which license makes sense for your needs! So in this case, my recommendation would be to get in touch as described, that way you will know for sure that you are properly licensed. |
Is Uber acting unconscionably in Australia? Section 6 of Uber's Terms and Conditions for Australian customers requires that all disputes go to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in the Netherlands and that the contract shall be construed under the laws of the Netherlands. It seems to me that this has the effect of shielding Uber from most claims for damages, such as property which is damaged while on a ride, since: It prevents a claim from being lodged in the appropriate small claims court; and The cost for hearing before the ICC is approximately $5,000; and Dutch law is significantly different to Australian law; and Uber refuses to discuss or entertain claims for damages and in my opinion is not acting in good faith; and The relative bargaining strength of Uber to set the terms and conditions if you wish to use their services. Is Uber acting unconscionably as defined in the Competition and Consumer Act in requiring claimants to first go through the prohibitively expensive ICC procedure? If so, is there any applicable case law or precedent? Is Uber potentially violating any other consumer protection or Australian or ACT law? | Under Australian Consumer Law (ACL) the test is not unconscionably; for standard form consumer contracts its unfairness: A court may declare a term ‘unfair’ if: it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract; it is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party that would be advantaged by the term; and it would cause detriment to a party if it was relied on. However, an important caveat is that a term that is specifically allowed by Australian law is not unfair. To clarify slightly, the dispute resolution clause in Section 6 requires mediation before binding arbitration, both under the respective ICC rules and both with their seat in Amsterdam under Dutch law. A few things to say to start with: Choice of law clauses are supported by Australian law. However, the Australian Consumer Law cannot be excluded by contract so the proceedings would be under the ACL first and Dutch law where the ACL did not apply. Mediation and arbitration are both supported (and encouraged) by Australian law, including agreeing on the seat, so those terms are not prima facie unfair. Limitations of Liability clauses (such as that under Clause 5) are also supported by Australian law so that is not prima facie unfair. However, there are a number of issues with the Uber ToS that may meet the threshold of 'unfair' and/or may breach the 'misleading and deceptive conduct' provisions in the ACL. In no particular order: The costs under the ICC rules of USD 5,000 are considerably more than the costs of using and Australian service like the AUD 1,000 charged by the Resolution Institute. Similarly, the seat being in Amsterdam is likely to "cause detriment" to Australian consumers. I am not alone in this view but it has not yet been tested AFAIK. s60 of the ACL impose a warranty that services will be rendered with due skill and care: damage that arises from this failing to happen cannot be excluded or limited by contract. Similarly claims for misleading and deceptive conduct cannot be excluded following the decision in Brighton Australia Pty Ltd v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 246. The claim that Dutch law applies "exclusively" is patently wrong and therefore 'misleading and deceptive'. Even if Uber believes it (and I doubt their legal team does) misleading and deceptive conduct under ACL does not have a defence of genuine belief. the DISCLAIMER says "UBER DISCLAIMS ALL REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, NOT EXPRESSLY SET OUT IN THESE TERMS" - they can't do this. Even though they say at the end "... TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED UNDER APPLICABLE LAW" this is unlikely to be sufficient to claim that the initial statement was not misleading. It hasn't yet been tested but if I wanted to bring a claim against Uber I would just go down the the Local Court and file a Statement of Claim - I would feel pretty confident that the magistrate would rule against them and that Uber would be unlikely to appeal. | Assuming there is a contract (and it is not clear that there is), this is a purported liquidated damages clause. Alice is trying to dictate what Bob will owe her if he breaches his promise to not share the file. However, there are limits on what can be stipulated in a liquidated damages clause. Super Save Disposal Inc. v. Blazin Auto Ltd., 2011 BCSC 1784: The enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in an agreement engages two competing objectives: freedom of contract versus the right of the courts to intervene in a given case to relieve against an oppressive or unconscionable result flowing from enforcement of the liquidated damages term. It is well settled that the enforceability of such a term turns on whether it is a genuine pre-estimate of the expected loss that a party will sustain in the event of a breach of contract or a penalty clause so oppressive or unreasonable that equitable intervention is justified to prevent an injustice. Judicial interference with a liquidated damages provision will be justified if enforcement of the term results in payment of a sum which is extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach Oppressive liquidated damages clauses work against a person's freedom to breach and the possibility of efficient breach. Perhaps if the file were a trade secret like the Coke recipe, the $1,000,000 might be a genuine pre-breach estimate, but without much more information about the nature of the file, I predict a court would find the $1,000,000 to be extravagant and unconscionable in comparison to the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach. What follows is less researched. If it is not a contract then I think it is at best a licence, which would make Bob's agreement to pay $1,000,000 a free-standing unenforceable promise. I also agree with Matthew's position on the possibility (and limitations of) a claim in promissory estoppel, especially in jurisdictions following Waltons Stores or similar reasoning. | Under the law of common law contracts, posting a price is an invitation to treat and is not binding. However, in many jurisdictions, there may be (probably is) statutory consumer protection law that make this practice illegal. Whether this means the business must honor the price or merely makes them liable to prosecution and fines depends on the specific law. For example, in Australia the law refers to this as multiple pricing. The law requires that the business withdraw the product from sale until the multiple pricing is fixed (i.e. they take the poster down) or, if they are unable or unwilling to do this, they must sell for the lower price. If they do neither then they have committed an offence and are liable to be fined by the government; the consumer does not get any compensation. | Here's the thing: if the plaintiff/appellant/claimant are the same legal entity as the defendant/respondent, it's plain to see that one of them must lose. For instance, consider a case where two trains operated by the same corporation collide. Assuming that the drivers both performed their duties, the company is vicariously liable – such a case is frivolous and is likely to be thrown out for that reason. It's just a waste of time and money. Or your second example: If the woman was driving the city vehicle and crashed it in the course of her duties, it is the city that will be the defendant in the proceedings, not the woman. So essentially: while it's difficult to prove that something has never happened, these are good reasons to expect it would not happen. | The law that New York passed does not create any cause of action, it overrides existing rules regarding time-barring of civil claims, so the quick answer to the question "does this law apply in that kind of case" is "that law is irrelevant". There is a general legal question about the jurisdictional limits of a court. For example, a foreign insurance company will be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in a US federal court over a claim under a cargo insurance policy for a shipment to the US. The case Daimler AG v. Bauman seems to be similar to the type of case you are asking about. This case involves the Dirty War of Argentina, and the question of whether Daimler's business connection to Mercedes-Benz Argentina gives plaintiffs standing to sue in US courts over actions in Argentina. SCOTUS held in that case that Daimler is not amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by conduct of MB Argentina that took place entirely outside the United States The court first notes that For a time, this Court held that a tribunal’s jurisdiction over persons was necessarily limited by the geographic bounds of the forum but this has been modified to recognition of two personal jurisdiction categories: One category, today called “specific jurisdiction”...[which] encompasses cases in which the suit 'arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum' [and] distinguished exercises of specific, case-based jurisdiction from a category today known as 'general jurisdiction,' exercisable when a foreign corporation’s 'continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.' The court observes that "general jurisdiction has not been stretched beyond limits traditionally recognized". As I understand the hypothetical, the proposed wrong does not derive because of the defendant's connection with the jurisdiction, and the connection to New York (or any other state) would be that it might be forum convenient for the plaintiff to litigate in. This would fall under the category of "general jurisdiction" (assuming that New York is not the company's corporate home nor is it their primary place of business), and the state's courts would not normally have jurisdiction in that case (lacking any specific statute creating a cause of action and explicitly declaring extraterritorial jurisdiction). The underlying constitutional rationale is the Due Process consideration that a person (including a corporation) should not be be forced to defend themselves in courts in states where they have no real connection. The question that would be asked is whether the corporation had sufficient connection to the state that the state courts would have jurisdiction. We should also turn to three SCOTUS cases, Nestle v. Doe et al, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., where questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are considered. The Nestle court's analysis of the underlying principle starts by observing and citing from RJR Nabisco that First, we presume that a statute applies only domestically, and we ask "whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication" that rebuts this presumption. In Kiobel, the court states – reaching further back to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that [w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none, a principle which "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord) (EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co). The relevant statute under which these suits were initiated is the Alien Tort Stature, 28 USC 1350, which allows an alien to sue in US courts under certain circumstances, and states only that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States". ATS would clearly not be applicable to the case of a US person suing a foreign corporation, but the other cases have articulated a principle that transcends the specifics of the ATS – there would have to be a statute giving a state extraterritorial jurisdiction over the matter. | It is legal and quite common. Your choice as consumer is at the point of selecting insurance company. If you dislike ES enough, that would be a reason to select a different insurance company. It would be surprising if your ES contract disallows pharmacy pick-up, but even if it did, that would also be legal. This does not mean that the government doesn't have the power to break up Express Scripts, under anti-trust laws. There is no clear rule regarding how successful a company can be in attracting customers. | This is not illegal if the transaction has any relationship to the foreign country (this limitation is called the minimum contacts test). These agreements called choice of law or forum selection clauses are routinely honored. It usually isn't illegal for a clause to exclude a United States court as a forum as to the parties to the contract. The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws § 80 (1971), a source often relied upon by courts regarding common law rules upon which they have no binding precedents, states that: [T]he parties agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable. This doesn't actually divest the U.S. courts of jurisdiction over the case, but does mean that if you bring the case in a U.S. court in circumstances where there is no reason that the clause isn't valid and applicable, that your case will be promptly dismissed, possibly with an award of attorney fees and costs against you for trying to evade a valid contractual provision. The law concerning the scope of a choice of forum clause's application, and who decides that question, can be somewhat involved, but in particular cases, where the existence of a binding contract is undisputed and no exceptions to the general rule upholding these clauses is present, the enforcement of a choice of forum clause is often uncontroversial. As Wikipedia explains (in the forum selection clause link above): In Future Industries of America v. Advanced UV Light GmbH, 10-3928, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City affirmed the dismissal of a case that sent the parties to Germany because the forum selection clause made German courts the exclusive forum. By contrast, the same court in Global Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 08-1358, affirmed the refusal of the lower court to refer the parties to Ireland because the clause was not exclusive, and the litigation continues in America. The state of New York has a statute expressly dealing with those circumstances under which a New York court may not dismiss a case on the grounds of forum non conveniens if the parties' contract provides that the agreed upon venue is a court in New York and if the transaction involved an amount more than $1 million. Currently, a U.S. Circuit Court split is emerging over whether forum selection clauses in a contract supersede pre-existing arbitration clauses in regulatory membership rules, such as FINRA. Statutory exceptions may apply in some cases. For example, under U.S. law, a provision allowing a debt collector to bring suit in consumer debt collection cases outside the place where the consumer debtor resides is void as a matter of public policy under the Fair Debt Collection Act. But, as a general rule, such clauses are not prohibited. Two of the leading cases upholding such clauses in U.S. law are M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513, 92 Sup. Ct. 1907 (1972) (discussed in this law review article) and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). And, although both of these cases were in the specialty of admiralty law there is no reasoning in these cases confining the holding of these cases to a maritime law setting. More law review treatment can be found here. | Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence. |
What constitutional laws support a leader overriding his Congress? In other words, what thoughts regarding freedoms and rights from the founders of a nation support a leader taking supreme power over its Congress? I guess I'm asking, what's the point of having a law-making body and a judicial body, if there are laws allowing a single person to overrule both? But more than that, I'd like to find out what the exact laws are. What I've tried: look for similar questions, like this. But that question is in fact many questions rolled into one, and the answers do not directly address my more fundamental one. Isn't the executive branch supposed to just execute? I.e. Execute the bills proposed by the party he represents, as supported by that party's allies? (I realize of course that this is a challenge with only two parties. With only two, both are more or less bound to never negotiate; never agree with the other's bills.) Addition from comments (thanks Putvi): I'm actually not asking specifically about Trump and recent events, simply because I expect there to be well-established laws in the constitution that support this, and I don't know which they are. I'm asking for the United States, though, and there are many still in effect. It's not the only country, I guess I'm trying to get to grips with how the Congress wouldn't immediately support an actual emergency if one is evident. Surely it would? And how a law that lets a leader declare one himself came about. I've looked some more. This is all the same question in my mind, but to be the most specific I can be: For the U.S., how does the 1976 law override or amend the constitution? (As in: this law could have been passed for something that was needed then, but wasn't before and isn't now.) After two edits, I've made it as specific as I can. I hope you can answer, I'm new here :) | In other words, what thoughts regarding freedoms and rights from the founders of a nation support a leader taking supreme power over its Congress? Generally speaking, one doesn't take "supreme power over Congress", one instead, disregards laws duly enacted by Congress or express mandates of the Constitution, including those related to cooperation with Congress. The most notable recognized deviations from Congressional direction that are recognized (at least by some people) are: The authority of the President to direct the military as commander-in-chief, and to a lesser extent, to conduct foreign policy. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. This power is balanced with the power of Congress to declare war and regulate the military via the War Powers Resolution of 1973 which has never really been tested in a "when push comes to shove" kind of way so far. The War Powers Resolution (a.k.a. the War Powers Act) requires the President to seek Congressional approval for new conflicts that arise that could become wars and predominantly Presidents have done so without necessarily acknowledging that they are obligated in a constitutionally valid way to do so. The closely related power to unilaterally employ military force to ensure a Republican form of government or to respond to an invasion or insurrection or at the request of a governor, "domestic violence" without Congressional authorization. U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. Related to this is the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. In practice, however, this theoretically unilateral power of the President has never been very meaningful, because no President has ever sought to invoke it in circumstances in which he didn't already have solid and prompt legislative support from Congress. For example, the suspension of habeas corpus by President Lincoln during the U.S. Civil War was backed by legislation from Congress, the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863. But, the emergency power to limit the right of habeas corpus has been significantly restricted by U.S. Supreme Court case law: In ex parte Milligan, the United States Supreme Court held that the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act [of 1863] did not authorize military tribunals, that as a matter of constitutional law the suspension of habeas corpus did not itself authorize trial by military tribunals, and that neither the Act nor the laws of war permitted the imposition of martial law where civilian courts were open and operating unimpeded. The emergency powers of the President to use the military domestically are also limited by the Posse Comitatus Act and related legislation, which prohibits the use of the military to enforce civilian laws domestically in most circumstances, absent an invasion or insurrection. The authority to pardon someone who has violated the law. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. The authority to veto legislation subject to Congressional override. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7. The authority to not spend all funds that are authorized by Congress for a purposes that are not entitlements. This is implied in case law subject to limitations in a 1974 Act of Congress. This is called "impoundment of appropriated funds." But, one of the strongest limitations on Presidential power is that the President may not spend any money not appropriated by law by Congress. The President can constitutionally spend less than is appropriated by Congress, subject to the Impoundment Act of 1974, but not more. Since the Constitution prohibits many kinds of long term binding contracts and prospective appropriations that would bind future Congresses (except for the Naval contracts), see U.S. Constitution, Article I, this leaves the President on a fairly short leash and fairly accountable to Congress. The authority to exercise discretion in not fully enforcing all violations of the law. This is implied in case law, especially, the law of prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor's broad discretion in such areas as initiating or foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific charges, and terminating prosecutions by accepting guilty pleas has been recognized on numerous occasions by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. Ratzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965). This discretion exists by virtue of the prosecutor's status as a member of the Executive Branch, and the President's responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that the laws of the United States be "faithfully executed." U.S. Constitution, Article II § 3. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Complete executive branch control of prosecutorial discretion, however, has been limited by the creation of independent agencies within the federal government and by the enactment of laws authorizing the appointment of a special prosecutor, like Robert Mueller, in cases where there is a risk of a conflict of interest from the President. The authority to refrain from enforcing laws determined to be unconstitutional when that determination is not contrary to the controlling judicial branch ruling. This is implied in case law and in the duty to faithfully execute the constitution. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1. This is closely related to prosecutorial discretion. Sovereign immunity as applied to executive branch officials including the President, is mostly a product of case law although it has some statutory acknowledgement in relatively pedestrian claims like lawsuits for ordinary tort liability against the United States seeking money damages which must usually be brought in the U.S. Court of Claims, if they are allowed at all (with an important exception established in the Bivens case). Case law has also recognized an "executive privilege" against forced disclosure of certain information by the executive branch although the scope of this privilege, which arises only from case law, is disputed. Only a handful of cases have addressed this, the most famous of which is United States v. Nixon discussed at the link. There is also an unanswered question regarding when, if ever, a President's actions are clear and intentional violations of the law, and yet still might not constitute impeachable offenses set forth in U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 4, or what remedies are available when an impeachable offense is committed but Congress is unwilling or unable (perhaps due to Presidential action) to conduct impeachment proceedings. Other than these circumstances, the U.S. Constitution does not contemplate that the President has emergency powers of any kind. There are few precedents in which the President has defied the law and the will of Congress more generally based upon a claim of emergency powers. The emergency powers of the President, in particular, and government, in general, are qualitatively and quantitatively, different from emergency powers in most other countries, which are, generally speaking, more expansive and have more formal recognition in the governing documents and laws of the countries in question. For example, while a bipartisan coalition in the U.K. suspended elections during World War II, the United States has never, ever, under any circumstances suspended an election (except during the U.S. Civil War in the Confederate States, where the Confederacy that was the de facto regime there held its own elections instead). Specific Legislation Despite its name, the National Emergencies Act of 1976, doesn't really address the question. Analytically, this is just a law authorizing the President to do certain things under certain circumstances, just like any other law, and not a law that gives the President "supreme power over Congress". It is more like the laws governing disaster relief, which authorize the President, subject to specific criteria, to determine that a situation is a national disaster, upon which determination certain federal assistance is authorized. This is why, even though scores of "emergencies" have been declared, many of which are still in force, they don't feel, to the general public, like "emergencies." To the extent that the National Emergencies Act purports to go further, in ways not expressly authorized by the U.S. Constitution, it is an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine and isn't a valid law. So, for example, Congress cannot delegate all of its law making power to the President via regulations. The Supreme Court ruled in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States (1928) that: "In determining what Congress may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination." So long as Congress "shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." For example, Congress is not constitutionally permitted to give the President line item veto power. Clinton v. City of New York (U.S. 1996). Isn't the executive branch supposed to just execute? I.e. Execute the bills proposed by the party he represents, as supported by that party's allies? The Executive branch is supposed to "execute" although it has considerable discretion in how it does so and has some express instances of unilateral power like the veto power and the pardon power. But, the Executive branch is supposed to "execute" the laws enacted by Congress, not "the bills proposed by the party he represents, as supported by that party's allies." From a legal and constitutional perspective, until a bill is passed by Congress and duly enacted as a law, the Executive branch not only can, but must, ignore them, in any capacity other than as one more lobbyist before Congress among others, on a hypothetically equal footing as everyone else (except that the President has the veto power and the VP can cast tie votes in the Senate, per Article I of the U.S. Constitution). | Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing. | I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand. | The Commander-in-chief powers are quite broad. The War Powers Resolution limits his ability to engage unilaterally in military action, by requiring him to report to Congress within 48 hours, and if Congress disapproves, troops must be removed after 60 days. However, this law pertains to armed forces, and would not apply to remotely-launched missiles. Additionally, it is unknown if the resolution is unconstitutional (presidents say it is). No law at all requires POTUS to obtain permission from someone else, in order to engage in a military action. Article 90 of the UCMJ states that it is a punishable offense to "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer". The manual also states that An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. Murder of a civilian is an example. It also says The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge. "Shocking the conscience" is not a grounds allowing disobedience. One can only conjecture how a military judge would evaluate the lawfulness of a presidential order, when there is not a shred of legal evidence that such an order is in fact illegal: I conjecture that the order would be found to be lawful. | In the US, Congress may pass an act, and this creates one kind of law (if it is promulgated: signed, ignored, or re-passed with a super-majority). Some of those acts direct the executive branch to do things, and pursuant to that act, a regulation is promulgated. Together with case law, the whole thing is "law". A bill (in the House, or the Senate) may result in an act being passed by both houses. It may go through a number of drafts between the point when it is first introduced and the time it becomes an act. | Yes, the President can certainly veto such a law. Per the US Constitution (emphasis added): Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. This can have a very real effect: legislators are under no obligation to vote the same way on a veto override as on the original bill. The reason the President needs to supply written objections in the first place is that it lets legislators reconsider, see if they're swayed, or see if they think this is a matter where a Congressional majority needs to be respected even if they disagree (they can change their mind in either direction). They can also get a sense of public reaction. And because the threshold for this is "present and voting," it's possible that just more legislators show up. Even if legislators won't be swayed, it still matters for pocket vetoes. That's where the President neither signs the bill nor returns it within 10 days; normally this is equivalent to signing, but if Congress adjourns in the meantime, it means the bill does not become a law. Because "Congress adjourns" is a necessary part of a pocket veto, it's impossible to override the veto (you can't do it if you're not in session). And even when this doesn't apply either, it matters for politics. Example of a futile veto: Public Law 100-4. Passed 406-8 in the House, 93-6 in the Senate. Vetoed; veto was overridden 401-26 in the House and 86-14 in the Senate (note that at least 7 Senators who voted for the bill voted not to override the veto). Example of an effective veto: While technically there was a conference report agreed to by both houses, and it doesn't seem to have had a roll-call vote (my guess is it was agreed to by unanimous consent; side note: many, many laws don't have roll-calls to check on, because they're passed by voice vote or unanimous consent), H.R.10929 from the 95th Congress was passed in the House by a vote of 319-67 and in the Senate by 87-2. After President Carter vetoed it, the House voted on whether to override the veto. The motion to override was defeated 191-206: after the veto, they couldn't even get a simple majority to override the veto of the bill which had been passed by an overwhelming supermajority. I mentioned it above, but the two-thirds threshold is "present and voting." As a general rule, any time you see a fraction of something needed for a vote to succeed in a deliberative assembly, then unless it specifies some other denominator, it's talking about the fraction of members present and voting. Relevant CRS report on override procedure. | I believe that you will find something similar to this idea in the philosophy of John Locke. Locke was an early advocate of the governmental separation of powers, and his political works significantly influenced several of the framers of the US Constitution. (See Gary Willis, Explaining America for more on this.) There was also a maxim, several times quoted in The Federalist That "no man should be judge in his own cause". This meant that, insofar as possible, the rights and powers of any person or institution should be determined and limited by some other person or body. This is part of the "checks and balances" theory of the US Constitution. All these are, at best, rules of thumb for the design of governmental systems and legal structures. Such maxims are not themselves enforceable law, and they are not invariably followed. | Your gut feeling is reasonably close, but not precisely correct. The Constitution sets the baseline rules for the powers of and interactions among the branches of the federal government, as well as the powers of and interactions between the state and federal governments. With only one exception (the dilution of a state's representation in the Senate), the Constitution can be amended to basically anything. It can make anything legal and it can make anything illegal. It generally addresses fairly high-leval legal principles, but there's no reason that it couldn't be amended to include a 9,000-page law specifically addressing every conceivable aspect of the regulation of nuclear energy. As it stands now and as it always has, the Constitution permits the federal government to write laws only with respect to certain topics. The states, meanwhile, retain authority to write laws on virtually any other topic. There are a variety of legal and historical reasons why prohibition took the form of a constitutional amendment while drug laws are handled legislatively, but one important consideration is the scope of Congress's power to regulate "interstate commerce." At the time of prohibition, it was not clear that Congress could regulate commercial activity that took place entirely within a single state. So if you grew all the ingredients for your whiskey in Kentucky, and you distilled those ingredients in Kentucky, and then you sold your whiskey in Kentucky exclusively to residents of Kentucky, it seemed that your conduct was outside the reach of Congress, and that any attempt to regulate it would be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. The solution, therefore, was to amend the constitution and give that authority to Congress. About a decade after prohibition ended, though, the Supreme Court decided that the power to regulate interstate commerce includes not just transactions that cross state lines, but also any conduct that “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). This broadens the Commerce Clause authority to cover virtually any economic activity. So even if you buy marijuana seeds from your next door neighbor, plant them in your own back yard, grow them for strictly personal use in your own home, and never sell anything to anyone, the courts will hold that your conduct affects the interstate market for marijuana, and is therefore subject to federal regulation. This standard substantially lowers the bar for Congress to act without a constitutional amendment, which is a big part of the reason there hasn't been an amendment to address narcotic use. |
What is the legal term for coerced indecent acts (not including rape)? Say that a person were coerced into performing indecent acts of a sexual nature, such as nudity, masturbation, oral sex, etc. If intercourse occurs, that would be classified as "rape". What would the legal term be for these other coerced acts? | There is not a single legal term that encompasses all of these offenses in most jurisdictions. Instead, there are a number of different offenses that could apply based upon whether or not there is sexual contact, the nature of the coercion involved, and certain other details of the offense. To use a concrete and precise example, I provide the exact language of the most relevant offenses in Colorado's criminal statutes, since they are easily available to me and I am familiar with them, and they are typical, for the most part. I omit the language used to determine offense category within offenses when there are more and less aggravated versions of an offense that have different criminal penalties (e.g. kidnapping has a higher grade of offense if it is not possible to verify that the kidnapped victim has been subsequently released and is alive). But, the terminology used for the kinds of offenses that you describe in not nearly so uniform as the terminology used for sexual assault or rape (and some jurisdictions would include some or all of the conduct you describe as a subtype of sexual assault). In Colorado, there is an offense called "Unlawful sexual contact". Section 18-3-404, Colorado Revised Statutes, which basically means a rape that does not involve penetration. Any actor who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact commits unlawful sexual contact if: (a) The actor knows that the victim does not consent; or (b) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's conduct; or (c) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows that the victim is physically helpless and the victim has not consented; or (d) The actor has substantially impaired the victim's power to appraise or control the victim's conduct by employing, without the victim's consent, any drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose of causing submission; or (e) Repealed. (f) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority, unless incident to a lawful search, to coerce the victim to submit; or (g) The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices. There is also an offense called "Invasion of privacy for sexual gratification". Section 18-3-405.6, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link). A person who knowingly observes or takes a photograph of another person's intimate parts without that person's consent, in a situation where the person observed or photographed has a reasonable expectation of privacy, for the purpose of the observer's own sexual gratification, commits unlawful invasion of privacy for sexual gratification. It is generally used for peeping tom type offenses, but could conceivable involve forcing someone to expose themselves sexually without their consent but without physical contact with the offender. Similarly, "Internet sexual exploitation of a child", might apply to some cases, and is defined at Section 18-3-405.4, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link), although "importunes" and "entices" isn't really the same as coercion, and is instead more in the nature of deception than than coercion. An actor commits internet sexual exploitation of a child if the actor knowingly importunes, invites, or entices through communication via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message, a person whom the actor knows or believes to be under fifteen years of age and at least four years younger than the actor, to: (a) Expose or touch the person's own or another person's intimate parts while communicating with the actor via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message; or (b) Observe the actor's intimate parts via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message. In contrast, "Sexual assault" (a.k.a. "rape") is defined at Section 18-3-402, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link) as: Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: (a) The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will; or (b) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's conduct; or (c) The actor knows that the victim submits erroneously, believing the actor to be the victim's spouse; or (d) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim; or (e) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is at least fifteen years of age but less than seventeen years of age and the actor is at least ten years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim; or (f) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to coerce the victim to submit, unless the act is incident to a lawful search; or (g) The actor, while purporting to offer a medical service, engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than a bona fide medical purpose or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices; or (h) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows the victim is physically helpless and the victim has not consented. Colorado does not have a provision parallel to statutory rape for unlawful sexual contact, nor does it have a deception to make someone think that a partner is a spouse provision for unlawful sexual contact, even though that is a recognized form of sexual assault. These are clarified with definitions in Section 18-3-401, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link; definitions inapplicable to the offenses cited omitted): (1) "Actor" means the person accused of a sexual offense pursuant to this part 4. (1.5) "Consent" means cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will and with knowledge of the nature of the act. A current or previous relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent under the provisions of this part 4. Submission under the influence of fear shall not constitute consent. Nothing in this definition shall be construed to affect the admissibility of evidence or the burden of proof in regard to the issue of consent under this part 4. . . . (2) "Intimate parts" means the external genitalia or the perineum or the anus or the buttocks or the pubes or the breast of any person. . . . (3) "Physically helpless" means unconscious, asleep, or otherwise unable to indicate willingness to act. . . (4) "Sexual contact" means the knowing touching of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. (5) "Sexual intrusion" means any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue, or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. (6) "Sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse. Emission need not be proved as an element of any sexual penetration. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime. (7) "Victim" means the person alleging to have been subjected to a criminal sexual assault. Also closely related is "criminal invasion of privacy", Section 18-7-801, Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link), which is primarily targeted at "up skirt" photos, but could be used for the kind of offense described in the question. (1) A person who knowingly observes or takes a photograph of another person's intimate parts, as defined in section 18-3-401 (2), without that person's consent, in a situation where the person observed or photographed has a reasonable expectation of privacy, commits criminal invasion of privacy. . . . (3) For the purposes of this section, "photograph" includes a photograph, motion picture, videotape, live feed, print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, electronically, digitally, or chemically reproduced visual material. There is also offenses called "Human trafficking for sexual servitude" and "human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude". Section 18-3-504, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link), which could sometimes apply (human trafficking without sexual servitude is also a crime but not within the scope of the question). A person who knowingly sells, recruits, harbors, transports, transfers, isolates, entices, provides, receives, or obtains by any means another person for the purpose of coercing the person to engage in commercial sexual activity commits human trafficking for sexual servitude. This is clarified with many definitions at Section 18-3-503, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link): (1) "Adult" means a person eighteen years of age or older. (2) "Coercing" means inducing a person to act or to refrain from acting, if the inducement is accomplished by any one or more of the following means: (a) The use or threat of the use of force against, abduction of, causing of serious harm to, or physical restraint of a person; (b) The use of a plan, pattern, or statement for the purpose of causing the person to believe that failure to perform the act or failure to refrain from performing the act will result in the use of force against, abduction of, causing of serious harm to, or physical restraint of that person or another person; (c) Using or threatening to use the law or the legal process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed; (d) Threatening to notify law enforcement officials that a person is present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws; (e) The destruction or taking, or a threat to destroy or take, a person's identification document or other property; (f) Controlling or threatening to control a person's access to a controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5); (g) The use of debt bondage; or (h) The exploitation of a person's physical or mental impairment, where such impairment has a substantial adverse effect on the person's cognitive or volitional functions. (3) "Commercial sexual activity" means sexual activity for which anything of value is given to, promised to, or received by a person. (4) "Debt bondage" means: (a) Demanding commercial sexual activity as payment toward or satisfaction of a real or purported debt; or (b) Demanding labor or services as payment toward or satisfaction of a real or purported debt and failing to apply the reasonable value of the labor or services toward the liquidation of the debt; or (c) Demanding labor or services where the length of the labor or services is not limited and the nature of the labor or services is not defined. (5) "Identification document" means a real or purported passport, driver's license, immigration document, travel document, or other government-issued identification document, including a document issued by a foreign government. (6) "Maintain" means to provide sustenance or care for a minor and includes but is not limited to providing shelter, food, clothing, drugs, medical care, or communication services. (7) "Makes available" means to facilitate contact between a minor and another person. (8) "Minor" means a person less than eighteen years of age. (9) "Person" has the same meaning as set forth in section 2-4-401 (8), C.R.S. (10) "Serious harm" means bodily injury or another harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, which is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person to perform or continue to perform labor or services or sexual activity to avoid incurring the harm. (11) "Sexual activity" means: (a) Sexual contact, as defined in section 18-3-401 (4); (b) Sexual intrusion, as defined in section 18-3-401 (5); (c) Sexual penetration, as defined in section 18-3-401 (6); (d) Sexual exploitation of a child, pursuant to section 18-6-403 (3) (a) and (3) (d); or (e) An obscene performance, as defined in section 18-7-101. (12) "Victim" means a person who is alleged to have been, or who has been, subjected to human trafficking, as described in section 18-3-503 or section 18-3-504. An obscene performance, referenced above is defined at Section 18-7-101, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link) in the pertinent parts, to mean: (2) "Obscene" means material or a performance that: (a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (b) Depicts or describes: (I) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including sexual intercourse, sodomy, and sexual bestiality; or (II) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, sadism, masochism, lewd exhibition of the genitals, the male or female genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state; and (c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. . . . (4) "Patently offensive" means so offensive on its face as to affront current community standards of tolerance. (5) "Performance" means a play, motion picture, dance, or other exhibition performed before an audience. . . . (6.5) "Prurient interest" means a shameful or morbid interest. A person, as defined in the referenced language is defined as follows: "Person" means any individual, corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, limited liability company, partnership, association, or other legal entity. Sometimes false imprisonment or kidnapping would be relevant charges: "First degree kidnapping" is Section 18-3-301, Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link) would apply when someone else is kidnapped for purposes of coercing the person made to conduct the sexual act: Any person who does any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release of a person under the offender's actual or apparent control commits first degree kidnapping: (a) Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to another; or (b) Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to another; or (c) Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person. Sometimes the victim would also be a victim of "second degree kidnapping" per Section 18-3-302, Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link): (1) Any person who knowingly seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping. (2) Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian or with intent to sell, trade, or barter such child for consideration commits second degree kidnapping. One can also imagine this offense including "false imprisonment", Section 18-3-303, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link): Any person who knowingly confines or detains another without the other's consent and without proper legal authority commits false imprisonment. This section shall not apply to a peace officer acting in good faith within the scope of his or her duties. "Criminal extortion" (a.k.a. "blackmail") defined at Section 18-3-207, Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link) is likewise a plausible offense depending upon the nature of the coercion: (1) A person commits criminal extortion if: (a) The person, without legal authority and with the intent to induce another person against that other person's will to perform an act or to refrain from performing a lawful act, makes a substantial threat to confine or restrain, cause economic hardship or bodily injury to, or damage the property or reputation of, the threatened person or another person; and (b) The person threatens to cause the results described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) by: (I) Performing or causing an unlawful act to be performed; or (II) Invoking action by a third party, including but not limited to, the state or any of its political subdivisions, whose interests are not substantially related to the interests pursued by the person making the threat. (1.5) A person commits criminal extortion if the person, with the intent to induce another person against that other person's will to give the person money or another item of value, threatens to report to law enforcement officials the immigration status of the threatened person or another person. If drugs are used to induce the sexual conduct, assault charges could apply. The relevant offense in Colorado is "second degree assault", Section 18-3-203(1)(e), Colorado Revised Statutes (at the same link): A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: . . . (e) For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness, or other physical or mental impairment or injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance, or preparation capable of producing the intended harm; Notably, in Colorado, unlike many states and countries, intentionally causing bodily injury that is not serious bodily injury and does not involve a deadly weapon or a first responder injury, is a tort or municipal ordinance violation, but not a state law crime, except for some subtypes of disorderly conduct, harassment and hazing. "Disorderly conduct" includes assault in the context of fighting in public, in Colorado, but wouldn't be applicable in the circumstances of the question. Section 18-9-106, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link). A person commits disorderly conduct if he or she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly: . . . (d) Fights with another in a public place except in an amateur or professional contest of athletic skill "Harassment" is closest to bare physical assault in Colorado, and could apply in some of these cases. Section 18-9-111, Colorado Revised Statutes (same link). A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical contact "Hazing" is defined in Section 18-9-124, Colorado Revised Statutes, and could be implicated if the means of coercion are related to this kind of activity. (2) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Hazing" means any activity by which a person recklessly endangers the health or safety of or causes a risk of bodily injury to an individual for purposes of initiation or admission into or affiliation with any student organization; except that "hazing" does not include customary athletic events or other similar contests or competitions, or authorized training activities conducted by members of the armed forces of the state of Colorado or the United States. (b) "Hazing" includes but is not limited to: (I) Forced and prolonged physical activity; (II) Forced consumption of any food, beverage, medication or controlled substance, whether or not prescribed, in excess of the usual amounts for human consumption or forced consumption of any substance not generally intended for human consumption; (III) Prolonged deprivation of sleep, food, or drink. (3) It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in hazing. If the conduct causes serious bodily injury or the loss of a pregnancy, there are other charges that could apply. There are also offenses that might apply in certain situations that apply only to certain kinds of victims or certain kinds of relationships. For example offenses limited to minors like child abuse, domestic violence offenses, offenses related to abuse of "at risk" persons, offenses related to sexual offenses involving psychotherapists, sexual offenses involving abuse of a position of trust, solicitation of prostitution, child prostitution offenses, criminal conspiracy charges, criminal solicitation charges, criminal attempt charges, organized crime charges when there is a pattern of such conduct for profit by an organization or group of people, etc. | Regardless of the context of the first solicitation, Officer Jones' second solicitation was made in willful refusal to accept Betty's unambiguous "no" for an answer; this is sexually coercive behavior, specifically postrefusal sexual persistence. If this question is assessed from the perspective of the "average" woman, then after her initial declination, extraction of a "yes" cannot be considered uncoerced. Here's a question: how many times does she have to say no before it starts to count? Before it counts against her finally being exhausted, harassed, or intimidated into capitulating? Because by that logic, he never has to stop; he can continue to harass her until he finally accomplishes his objective (grounds to arrest her) - in which case, why bother with the pretense? If it takes 200 "no's" to wear her down to "whatever", then the first 200 "no's" just didn't matter as much as the first "whatever", so why bother with the formality of pretending like the first mattered when it clearly does not? To demonstrate the significance of her initial "no, thanks" and his subsequent refusal to accept it from another perspective: if Betty and Jones were coworkers in the same office, if he continued to solicit her after being told no the first time, that would be the definition of sexual harassment on his part and it would not matter how genial or friendly or casual he thinks he's being; furthermore, if her workplace failed to intervene on her behalf, they would be engaging in sexually discriminatory behavior by creating a hostile work environment, regardless of how genial / friendly / casual, etc. It's hard to see how this could act as evidence of her having committed a crime in one context while being grounds for termination of his employment in another context. HTH. | A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest. | The relevant law in England and Wales is the Protection of Children Act 1978. Under section 1 of the Act, it’s a defense to distributing, showing, or possessing indecent images of children if you had a “legitimate reason” to distribute, show, or possess them. It’s also a defense if you had not seen the images, didn’t know they were indecent, and didn’t have any cause to suspect they were indecent. However, the 1999 case of R v. Bowden held that downloading a digital copy of an image counts as “making” an image. This is not subject to the “legitimate reason” defense by statute (although I don’t know if it’d count as “making” if you have no reason to know the contents, like if a computer repair shop backs up a customer’s hard drive without looking at what’s on the drive). However, it is explicitly still subject to defenses in sections 1A and 1B of the Act. 1A covers spouses and partners. If you are the spouse or partner of a child between 16 and 18, then with their consent you can legally make indecent images of them (although this doesn’t apply if anyone but the two of you is in the image). You can also possess those images with their consent and give them a copy. Section 1B covers criminal proceedings, investigations, etc., and was added after R v. Bowden. Because copying a digital image counts as “making” an image, it would generally be illegal for people to work with digital copies of indecent images even if done for a good reason. To avoid that, Parliament made an exception for making an indecent image when necessary to prevent, detect, or investigate crimes, as well as for criminal proceedings anywhere in the world. Parliament also exempted the UK’s intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6, and GCHQ) when carrying out their duties. These are specific statutory exemptions, so they can’t really be generalized to “if you have a legitimate reason.” | england-and-wales There isn't a law that defines 'gaslighting' as an offence. Generally it isn't unlawful to mislead, deceive or lie - of course, there are exceptions such as fraud, misleading advertising, perjury and so on. So the answer to your question must depend on what is meant by 'gaslighting' and the circumstances in which it has been said to have occurred. It seems to me that people understand and use the word differently - for me it pertains to intimate or family relationships (as in its alleged origin, the film Gaslight), some people seem to use it for different serious behaviour and other people use it for relatively trivial behaviour. In the intimate or family relationship context, gaslighting might be part or all of the behaviour alleged to be the controlling or coercive behaviour contrary to s76 Serious Crime Act 2015: 76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship (1)A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive, (b)at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected, (c)the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and (d)A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B. Here is the Crown Prosecution Service guidance for prosecuting s76 Serious Crime Act 2015. Simply lying about one's job or income to have a one-night stand would not constitute the s76 offence. Behaviour that causes psychological injury that amounts to recognisable psychiatric illness could be assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) contrary to s47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (see CPS Guidance for ABH). | There are none. Damages against B’s clinic? A does not have a contract with B’s clinic. No duties nor rights without a contract. Damages against B? A does not have a contract with B. If there was a contract, we need details about it. Tort, § 823 Ⅰ BGB? No. B was neither negligent nor did he/she deliberately incur damage. Report B as criminal? A and B had consensual sexual intercourse. This consent (necessarily) comprises the risk of transmission. You cannot give “consent to facts” though. Yet here B had no knowledge of his/her contagiousness. He/she definitely did not deliberately infect A. Negligence is out of question, because there is no general expectation to get regularly tested before having sex with anyone. | Can a state declare: "any violence against insert a group here shall not be prosecuted," which is pretty much what Nazis and Communists did, and then claim non-involvement in the violence that would ensue? This would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. https://www.justice.gov/crt/guidance-regarding-use-race-federal-law-enforcement-agencies goes into exhaustive detail on the topic of what may constitute an illegal abuse of selective enforcement. A key quote is highly relevant to your question: [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. There is a lot of case law on this topic. This is frequently discussed in the context of race (especially profiling). | It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down. |
Consent to searches: Who wins "my-word-against-yours?" Hypothetical Officer testifies citizen consented to be searched. Citizen denies consenting to be searched. There is no other evidence (that weighs net in favor of either party). Question Whom does the judge believe? Clarifying Discussion from previous comments... Point The testimony of the officer and the citizen would be more complete than just the officer saying "The defendant consented to be searched" and the defendant saying "I did not consent to be searched". Each would give a narrative of the situation that could be cross-examined. This would give the judge more information on which to base a judgement of trustworthiness. Response Although everything you say is true, to put all that information into the question would miss the point. Which is: What is the standard of proof (for consent to searches)? And is their any "weight" advantage (in practice) for testimony from either side (all other factors being equal). For the purpose of this question, please assume all the other factors (the ones you mention and all the others) cancel out each other. Imagine both narratives agree except in one version the citizen gives consent. In the other he does not. | The Supreme Court has said that "when a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given".1 This needs to be "clear and convincing" proof.2 The "clear and convincing" standard is higher than simply "more likely than not" or "preponderance of the evidence".3 It has been equated with "highly probable".4 In your hypothetical, the prosecution failed to prove that it was more likely than not that consent was freely and voluntarily given. They are far from meeting the "clear and convincing" standard that is required. The evidence resulting from the search would be excluded. I also recommend gracey209's answer, which explains why this hypothetical is not realistic, and describes many other factors that go into the determination of whether a search is reasonable -- the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not consent. 1. Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543 (1968) 2. State v. Danby, 11 Ohio App. 3d 38 (1983): "Accordingly, a warrantless search based upon the consent of the defendant is valid if his consent is voluntarily given. [...] Furthermore, the degree of proof constitutionally required is proof by "clear and positive" evidence. [...] In construing the phrase "clear and positive" in terms of evidentiary proof, we observe that several courts have held that it is quantitatively equivalent to proof by clear and convincing evidence." 3. Calderon v. Thompson 523 U.S. 538 (1998) 4. Colorado v. New Mexico 467 U.S. 310 (1984): "Last Term, the Court made clear that Colorado's proof would be judged by a clear and convincing evidence standard. [... W]e thought a diversion of interstate water should be allowed only if Colorado could place in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are highly probable." | It does matter if you invoke your right to silence. First, if you do, that affects what police can do (they have to stop interrogating you). Second, it plays a role in "adoptive admissions". If the police are asking you questions (you are not under arrest) and they make some statement that implies that you committed a crime, your silence can be used against you: it can be taken to be a form of admitting that you committed the crime. The premise is that if they imply that you murdered X, such an accusation if false would be so outrageous to a reasonable, innocent person that they would protest, therefore your lack of protest (denial) is tantamount to a confession. However, you can protect yourself by preemptively invoking your right to silence. See Salinas v. Texas: a witness who “ ‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’ ” at the time he relies on it... the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” not an unqualified “right to remain silent.” Since any right can be waived, at any time, there is no magic expression that you can utter that nullifies a future waiver of a Constitutional right. The closest that you can come is asserting that you hereby exercise your right to an attorney and that you will not speak until you have consulted with your attorney (then you better shut up). Lawyering up only prevents them from further interrogating you. Don't hedge: say "I am asserting my right to silence and refuse to speak without a lawyer". "I think I should..." is not a definitive assertion of your rights. If you are (briefly) stopped, police may ask if they can search you or your property. If they have a warrant or probable cause, there's really no point in saying anything. In the case that consent is required, you just have to remember to not consent, and it would not be a bad idea to explicitly deny consent. Each and every time they ask. The same with their statement "It would really help us if you would come to the station to answer a few questions". If you are under arrest, then you have to go with them: ask "Am I free to go?". You can say "I do not consent to any search". Your proposed declaration of rights is pretty vague. Exactly what rights are you talking about? Your right to freedom of religion? Your right to bear arms? Your right to not have to quarter soldiers in your house? Your right to an education? Many detainee statements have been found by the courts to be ineffective because they were unclear. You could give it a shot and see if the Supreme Court accepts your "universal assertion of rights" as effectively invoking your specific 4th and 5th amendment rights. Unless you have something in mind (like, the 6th amendment), the most effective statement is a very specific one. Silence, lawyer, no search. | An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction. | Breathalyzer tests are distinct from blood tests because the former does not "implicat[e] significant privacy concerns" (see Birchfeld v. ND). A cell phone is like a blood test, because it implicates significant privacy concerns, especially the level of electro-snooping that would be required to determine if someone had recently committed a phone-use offense. As the court held, Because the impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. A breath test might (but also might not) also satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception (waiting some number of hours for a warrant can easily result in the destruction of evidence), but a cell phone case could not give rise to such an exception. It should perhaps be noted that the "implied consent" laws are misnamed, because consent is not the issue. The 4th Amendment ban is on unreasonable searches, not unconsented searches. If you actually consent, it is reasonable for the police to search. I am not aware of any ruling to the effect that "because the defendant consented, the search is valid". In the context of breathalyzer law and case-law, an essential component of what makes the search reasonable is that it is incident to an arrest. With or without consent, or an implied consent law, Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. Extending "implied consent" to cause-unrelated searches of cars, homes, or body cavities might not pass strict scrutiny. The state has a legitimate interest in public safety which justifies some minimal intrusion, but adding a provision that "when you drive, you give implied consent to searches of everything" is not narrowly tailored. But since driving is a privilege and not a right, the state has much more leeway to give you an ultimatum: if you don't cooperate with the search, you can lose your license. On the other hand, SCOTUS has not actually approved of this slogan about driving being a privilege. Something noteworthy from Birchfield is that the court also disapproves of blood tests because a less invasive method of achieving the result is available, and they grant that "Imposition of a warrant requirement for every BAC test would likely swamp courts, given the enormous number of drunk-driving arrests, with little corresponding benefit". There being no less-invasive alternative means of realizing the legitimate state interest in stopping distracted driving, I actually expect that when this comes to pass and the matter ends up at SCOTUS, there will be another important change in search law (but "implied consent" will still be irrelevant). | In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect. | Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree. | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. | An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to. |
Who's at fault for crashes while changing lanes if the driver who isn't changing lanes speeds-up beforehand? I live in Minnesota (USA). I have only had my Driver's License for about a year now, and I recently had a bad experience. I was moving into a turn lane, and someone revved their engine, sped up, and cut me off before I was able to move into it. If I hadn't been watching carefully, it could have been a crash. I think normally the one who is at fault in these situations is the person who's changing lanes, but the special circumstance confuses me. I am glad that nothing else happened. However, if we had crashed, who would've been legally at fault? Would it have mattered if I could've provided evidence that they sped up, or that I had my turn-signal on? What other factors may be considered? | The person who is changing lanes has the responsibility to make sure that they have space to move into. Suppose there was a person in front of you in the destination lane who hit the brakes suddenly - if you change lanes and rear-end them, that's your fault, because you failed to leave enough distance. I don't see how it's any different in this case, where the person is behind you and accelerates suddenly. A turn signal doesn't give you the right to change lanes at will, you are responsible for making the maneuver safely. It's poor driving etiquette for the other guy to cut you off like that, but it's up to you to ensure there's space as you move over. From your description of the incident, it sounds like your actions initiated the sequence of events, and it was also your actions that prevented the accident. From that, it seems highly likely you'd be found at fault if the accident had happened - in that scenario, your actions would have created the situation, and you also would have failed to take action to avoid the accident. | So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run). | If you are texting while driving and you kill someone, you can expect to be charged with vehicular homicide or manslaughter with an aggravating factor. The crime can potentially carry a penalty as high as any other manslaughter charge that arises from a gross indifference to the safety of others.It could be as high as 20 years in some circumstances. That said, it's usually much less. The penalty for such a conviction will differ based on the circumstances and the remorse/attitude of the defendant; the judge has wide discretion in sentencing. The charge may differ by state from vehicular homicide, to manslaughter, but the fact that you intentionally engaged in a distracting activity is an aggravating factor that gives rise to these type charges, where otherwise you may have been able to avoid the accident or limit the injury caused. In the state I practice in most, an 18-year-old was convicted just a couple of years ago for vehicular homicide, texting while driving, and negligent operation. He was sentenced to nearly 5 years, all but 1 suspended. He was 18 and he killed someone. In MA, texting while driving is its own offense, as it is in CA. In nearly every state in the union, texting while driving either is illegal under its own statute (or one is pending in legislature), or it is prima facie proof of reckless driving if you cause injury or death. In Santa Ana, just this past August, a 23-year-old CA woman killed someone texting while driving. After a first mistrial, due to a hung jury, she was finally convicted of manslaughter and inattentive or distracted driving causing injury or death as an aggravating factor. She got a similar sentence. The NTSB has recently released a report finding that more injury occurs in the 16-30 age group from texting while driving than drunk driving, causing nearly 3,000 deaths last year and nearly 300,000 injuries. There is no doubt with these statistics why nearly every state has either already regulated/banned this practice or has legislation pending. See these texting and driving statistics. | There are multiple questions on different areas of law, but I will answer purely on any criminal liability arising by the drivers concerned and leave the question(s) on civil liability to others. The general rule to avoid creating unsafe situations appears to be in the Royal Decree of 1 December 1975, at Article 7, which states (via English translation): 7.2 Users must behave on public roads in such a way that they do not cause any inconvenience or danger to other users, including the staff working for the maintenance of the road and the equipment bordering it, the surveillance services and priority vehicles. Here are some specific regulations/offences relating to the railway crossing incident: Under Article 4 of the 30 September 2005 Decree: It is forbidden to stop or park a vehicle on level crossings. Carol may have committed an offence under Chapter 2, Article 2 of the 1975 Decree: It is forbidden to stop a vehicle or park it in any place where it is obviously likely to constitute a danger for other road users or to obstruct them unnecessarily... Dave may have committed an offence under Article 20 of the 1975 Decree: 20.2. The user approaching a level crossing must be extra careful to avoid any accident: when the level crossing is not equipped with barriers or traffic light signals or when these signals do not work, the user can only enter it after making sure that no vehicle on rails is approaching. ... 20.4. The driver cannot enter a level crossing if the traffic congestion is such that he would in all likelihood be immobilized on this crossing. | Deliberately causing an accident is illegal. However, in some (probably many) jurisdictions there is a "necessity" defense against criminal charges. In Washington it goes like this: Necessity is a defense to a charge of (fill in crime) if (1) the defendant reasonably believed the commission of the crime was necessary to avoid or minimize a harm; (2) harm sought to be avoided was greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law; (3) the threatened harm was not brought about by the defendant; and (4) no reasonable legal alternative existed. The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has established this defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty [as to this charge]. It is possible, if B is attempting to kill the pedestrian, that you have defense of others available as well. | You (probably) did not commit a crime in Colorado. The answer to your question though is probably Driving an unsafe vehicle Colorado Revised Statutes Title 42. Vehicles and Traffic § 42-4-202 (1) It is unlawful for any person to drive...on any highway any vehicle...which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this section and sections... The above is not a crime , it is (5) Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction. A class A traffic infraction is a civil violation. Note that some driving offenses are crimes: In Colorado, driving more than 25 mph over the posted limit is a class 2 misdemeanor, and doing so in a constriction zone is a class 1 misdemeanor. Also note that I say probably because it is possible that they charged you with something more extreme- reckless driving? violation of noise or pollution ordinances?- but for a fine small enough that you don't say, 2 points, and you did not have to go to court (you could have if you wanted for the ticket, but not required) it is very unlikely. | Silence is not cause. However, this may not prevent a search. The officer does not need to tell you that he has probable cause, he must simply have it in order to conduct a search. If he obtained the probable cause before he pulled you over (this is likely), then he will order you out of the car and search over your vociferous (and silent?) objections. If the officer does not have probable cause, searches anyway, and can't come up with a convincing one in time for the court date, then yes you have a claim. But remember, just because the officer didn't inform you of the cause doesn't mean it didn't exist. Always consult an attorney before any legal action. | As has already been said, as far as the vehicle registration, the officer likely already knows who the vehicle is registered to and whether it's expired or not before he walks up to your car, or at the least, he can easily find that information out. The proof of insurance is a different matter. The officer will need to see it to know if you have insurance or not. To him, it doesn't matter what the reason is that you don't provide it to him. Left it at home, misplaced it, lost it, destroyed it, or just refuse to provide it because you feel you have the right to refuse. He can't "force" you to provide it (unless he is able to search your car and happens to find it there). He can only issue you a ticket for not providing it. But your attitude could play a part in what happens next. Being upfront and letting the officer know you have left your documents at home could help your situation. In my experience... one time that this sort of thing happened to me, the officer agreed to hold my drivers license and allowed me to bring the documents to the police station and retrieve my license. Another time, in a parking related matter, I was issued a ticket, but I was allowed to bring the required documents to the police station where they then "invalidated" (cancelled) the ticket. Of course this won't always work, and is not at all likely to work if you are far from home. Keep in mind, (as far as I know, in most states) the real infraction is that you "don't have insurance"... that you failed to provide proof when asked, is secondary. In many cases (likely nearly all cases), if you show up in court and provide documents that your insurance is current, and was current at the time the ticket was issued, the judge (or the prosecutor) will likely dismiss the case with no penalties. But, what the officer has written down on the ticket about your attitude and what you told him at the time, may have an effect on how this all plays out. |
Who is eligible to attend US public high schools? A teen who's a US citizen grew up and studied in a foreign country. He wants to return to US. Would he be eligible to attend public high school in the US (grade 10-12)? He isn't paying US tax (his parents aren't US citizens). But he's going to living in his friend's house though (who's a tax payer). | Public schools are open to all residents. There is no citizenship requirement and no "tax payer" requirement. Unless excepted for home schooling or attending a recognized private school, in most locations it would not only be allowed, but mandatory between certain ages. | At time of answering, the question is: What's the most crucial issue when deciding Senator Cruz's citizenship? The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, Section 1, states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States[.] Cruz did not go through a naturalization process. He was also not born within the territorial limits of the US. If either of those facts were different, those would be the crucial issue. Since they are not, we then look to the Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the first Congress, which states that children born to citizen parents outside the United States are also citizens, specifically: The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens[.] (emphasis added) According to the Wikipedia article and/or sources it cites, this is the only legislation to use the phrase "natural born citizens" and it seems clear this is intended to refer to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution which states a requirement: No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States. (emphasis added) The 1790 Act was repealed and replaced in 1795, but the new law also contained the language (lacking "natural born"): The children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States[.] The specific laws have been further changed, as the naturalization process has, reintroducing ambiguity about the "natural born" requirement, but birthright citizenship from parents is not in question and the "natural born" aspect is not in this question. So, to answer the question directly, the most crucial issue is: Were Cruz's parents citizens when Cruz was born? Cruz's Wikipedia page says his father was not naturalized until later, but his mother was born in Wilmington, DE, which is in the United States, and so unless she renounced her citizenship she would have been a US citizen at the time of Cruz's birth. This means there's a crucial issue: Did Cruz's mother renounce her US citizenship before Cruz was born? "Kaithar" commented on this answer with speculation that she voted in a Canadian election at a time (1947-1977) when Canada didn't recognize dual citizenship in that it required its own citizens to give that up if they acquired foreign citizenship; "user102008" refutes that. However, if we don't want to end this issue-identifying answer at that question, let's assume the answer is "no" and that Cruz's mother was a US citizen when Cruz was born. Then we have to see if birthright citizenship from parents extends to Cruz. For this, we can look to Public Law 414 (66 Stat. 236), passed June 27, 1952, especially section 301(a)(7): The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: […] A person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph. Side note: Section (4) (modern (d)) would matter if Cruz's father were considered a noncitizen national of the US, slightly relaxing the requirements so that the mother only had to spend only one continuous year in the US prior to the birth. The armed forces exemption was broadened Nov. 6, 1966 to cover the parent (or their parent's) nonmilitary employment by the US government or certain international organizations. If that's relevant, this answer can be edited to expand on this point. Section 309 of that law addresses children born out of wedlock, and says that section 301(a)(7) (quoted above) applies directly as if the parents were married, "if the paternity of such child is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation." To the best of my knowledge, section 301(a)(7) applies to Cruz. If I were wrong on that, we'd look to Section 309(c): A person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year. The equivalent of the first quote today is in 8 U.S. Code § 1401(g) if parents are married at the time of a child's birth, replacing "ten years, at least five" with "five years, at least two" (Nov. 14, 1986; see Section 12 in this law). The quote from 309(c) is now 8 U.S. Code § 1409(c). So then the crucial question is: Did Cruz's mother spent the requisite period of time in the US before Cruz was born? Apparently she did, regardless of marital status, and if that's true it means Ted Cruz is a US citizen and has been since at least birth*. Again, the "natural born" aspect is omitted from this now-answered question. The answer to the question you meant to ask (perhaps "What's the most crucial issue when deciding if Senator Cruz's citizenship makes him eligible for the Presidency?") is "What does the phrase 'natural born citizen' mean in context of Article II, Section 1 of the US Constitution?" (*) Which may mean that he hasn't been a citizen his whole life, using a Cruz definition for when life begins. That's a separate discussion, though, and not very relevant to this one. | The relevant law is encoded at 47 USC Ch. 7. The money doesn't "go" anywhere other than into the US Treasury. You are required by law to pay a percentage of earned income in the US forever. Independently, you might get an entitlement to draw benefits, depending on whether you are old enough (or are disabled or blind) and have enough "credits" (earned enough money). Certain people can receive money owing to your qualification (mnior children, spouse, dependent parent), see here. There is no individual balance, as there would be with an IRA or other savings plan. | Martinez v. Bynum 461 US 321 involves a US citizen child living with his parents in Mexico traveled to Texas in order to attend free public school. Under Texas Education Code 21.031(d), the district is allowed to deny tuition-free admission if the child lives apart from the parent or legal guardian and is present in the district "for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools". The court upheld such a residence requirement because it "furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for the State's residents are enjoyed only by residents", and "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor burden the constitutional right of interstate travel". Plaintiffs argued various constitional violations, including Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities, but not Full Faith and Credit. We may assume that if there were any hope of such an argument, it would have been made. In Vlandis v. Kline 412 US 441, it was held that a state cannot permanently relegate an applicant to non-resident status for having a legal address for any time within a year of applying for admission. But the court also explicitly states: Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents, for purposes of tuition and fees, just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. This pertains to recognizing the status of evidence and rulings, between states. If New York finds that Smith is liable for a sum of money, that finding is a legal fact in all states, and Connecticut cannot say "We do not recognize the judgment of New York". The only connection between Full Faith and Credit and non-resident tuition is that both include the concept "other states". | I wouldn't be surprised to see other states and jurisdictions with similar statutes. Fortunately, in the United States, there is a safe harbor against demands for state income taxes: For every dollar of taxable income, you can only be taxed by one state. (This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.) Therefore, if you show that the LLC (or its members if it's a pass-through) paid taxes to another state on the income in question (e.g., by sending a copy of the tax return), that's legally the end of the matter. | You don't say who is telling you that you need to do these things, and it does matter. Educational institutions are required to maintain a discrimination-free environment, so if a student makes inappropriate remarks to another student, they have to address the matter (if they ignore it, saying "Boys will be boys", they can get sued). They will have previously spelled out procedures for addressing such accusations, which probably include giving a good talking-to to the guilty party, and maybe some harsher sanction like suspension. The school district might then have in mind a parent-teacher conference, with the underlying threat being to turn the matter over to the police: did the letter come from the school district? A minor can commit a crime, such as assault or threatening: in Oklahoma, this includes Ok. Stat §21-1172, which makes it a crime to send a message that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, and a first violation of the law is a misdemeanor. For an adult, the penalty can be a year in prison and $500 fine, but that is unlikely for a minor. There may be a hearing in Juvenile Court with some disposition, and if the charges are proven then the court has wide latitude in meting out punishment. Did the letter come from the juvenile court system? The Oklahome law regarding children and juveniles is here. When the Office of Juvenile Affairs engages in "the intake process", they are investigating the case to make a recommendation to the DA. "Intake" is defined as a mandatory, preadjudicatory interview of the juvenile and, if available, the parents, legal guardian, or other custodian of the juvenile, which is performed by a duly authorized individual to determine whether a juvenile comes within the purview of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and if the filing of a petition is necessary Since "intake" is juvenile justice jargon, I assume this is a legal proceeding, not a parent-teacher conference. An actual criminal charge might result from the hearing, which is brought about by a referral. Because detention is a real possibility, consulting an attorney is wise. Whether or not it is a good idea to have the attorney present for the proceeding is something only your attorney can say (in his professional judgment). There is really no way to know in advance what they already know. | What is one supposed to do if they want to take an extended trip somewhere? Or is one basically not allowed to take such trips if they are a US citizen eligible for Jury Duty? In the US you are not required to seek permission to travel, or prove your past whereabouts to the government if you happen to miss some civic duty. They generally call up way more people than they need for this sort of reason. The length of time you are gone or where you choose to travel is irrelevant. In my experience you are given about a month heads up. If you didn't receive the notice until you returned from out of town, and they send a follow up, simply inform them of the fact that you were gone and didn't receive the notice until you returned. Jury duty is an obligation to some extent, but it is also a right and a privilege. It isn't a criminal offence you are liable for if you didn't get the notice. If it were that important to verify your availability ahead of time the notification would be sent registered mail with a signature required. | No It is not a fundamental human right to be able to become a resident of Denmark. Every country has the right to decide who is and who is not a resident and what criteria need to be satisfied. Having a residence is usually a pretty fundamental criterion for being a resident. At the same time, most countries have laws that state what areas and types of structures can be used as residences. There may be zoning requirements and building codes. You may argue that you should be able to decide what you will accept as your living quarters but that presumes, wrongly, that your decision doesn’t affect other people. As a simple counter example, emergency services might need to enter your “dwelling” and it must be, among other things, structurally sound enough for them to do so safely. So given that becoming a resident of Denmark is not a fundamental human right stated anywhere, Denmark can decide who is and is not. Of course, you can lie and say you have a residence when you don’t but lying to the government in order to obtain something you are not actually entitled to is likely to solve all your Danish residence problems; they’ll deport you. |
Can I translate a copyrighted book with the intent of publishing it? I recently read a book that impressed me so much I want to buy a copy as a gift for a friend. Unfortunately, the friend does not speak the language the book was written in, and no translations exist at this time. Fortunately for him, I am a professional translator. I could translate the book in my own spare time, and given that no translations exist yet I am thinking of either publishing it on my own or sending it to a publishing house. However, I am unsure about the legal aspects of such an endeavor. Obviously, if I just translate it for my friend there are no legal issues involved. On the other hand, I'm not sure what I risk by: self-publishing it and selling it, say on Amazon, and contacting a book publisher and telling them that I have a full translation of the book in my possession (without any agreed translation contract between me and the original author)? Am I at risk by translating a copyrighted book? | Copyright includes authorization of derivative works such as translations, so you must have permission of the copyright holder to create a translation. You could be sued for creating the unauthorized translation for your friend. If you attempt to further distribute the book, the chances of getting sued increase substantially. That path probably includes your legal obligation to foot the bill for the publisher and distributor having to defend themselves in court, since your contract with the publisher or distributor probably includes an indemnification clause saying that you indemnify them (pay their costs) against damages for your infringement. So your are at risk, and it increases if you do anything to distribute the translation. | In the US, the right to publish is vested in the copyright holder, who is initially the author. That right can be transferred for example by a transfer agreement, and it can be inherited just as other property can be inherited. Under the terms of the will, it is most likely that the copyright was transferred to the spouse even if the will didn not say "including all copyright". There is a small chance that it wasn't disposed of if the wording of the will is restrictive enough (for example "I bequeath all real estate and tangible property to my wife", which doesn't include intellectual property). If so, that would definitively require the assistance of an attorney, and a court proceeding to dispose of the copyright. If there was no provision under the will for copyright, then the copyright could be divided accounting to the rules of succession of your state, however, the courts would want to be persuaded that it was not his intent that his wife receive the copyright as well. Possession of the physical manuscript is largely irrelevant – it does not give the manuscript-holder the right to override copyright law, although if you are in lawful possession of the only copy of the manuscript, you may be able to thwart plans to publish. Publishers generally require decent evidence that the person submitting the manuscript does legally hold copyright, when a work is submitted by someone other than the author. | Under the Berne Convention, a copyright notice is not required at all, although using one is good practice. Using one usually eliminates the claimed status of "innocent infringement", which, if found true by a court, greatly reduces damage awards. It is usual to place such notices at or near the start of a work. That is where people tend to look for them, and I don't see any good reason not to follow this practice. The book tradition is the the copyright page comes before any part of the actual work, including the table of contents, sometimes with a continuation at the end of the work, if there is more than one page of notices. But that is not now a legal requirement, if it ever was. In short, there are no rigid rules on this, but putting a copyright notice at or quite near the start is good practice, and I would suggest sticking to it. | If the blog author holds the copyright on the ebook, they can distribute the ebook anyway they choose, either via download from Github or elsewhere, or sell it in an online store. They hold the copyright, they alone can decide how to distribute it. If they also sell the ebook in the Microsoft press Store, they may have an agreement with the store to also allow their own free downloads; it's hard to say without knowing the agreement. If there are ebooks on Githb available for viewing or download, the owner of the Github page should hold copyright of the ebook, both 1) for their own protection against copyright infringement, and 2) to not break GitHub's TOS against copright infringement: https://help.github.com/articles/github-terms-of-service/#f-copyright-infringement-and-dmca-policy | You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license. | Ultimately whether one work is derivative of another is a question of fact, and there is no absolute rule beyond taking it to a court. Many cases are clear. A Full translation is obviously a derivative work, The definition in 17 USC 101 is: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. A mere description of a work, such as a one-paragraph summary, is probably not a derivative work, but as the summary gets longer and fuller, it starts to approach an "abridgment or condensation". One test is if the summery could reasonably replace the original, at least for some consumers. But there is no clear cut place to draw the line. By the way, If something is a derivative work, it is infringing provided only that the original is in copyright and the creator of the derivative did not have permission from, the copyright holder on the original. Fair use may prevent an adverse judgement, but is still an infringement. As the question referred to fair use, a strictly US legal concept, I am assuming US law here. | Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.) | There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses. |
Is a Blood sample considered Personal Data under GDPR? Just that simple question: Is a Blood sample considered Personal Data under GDPR? | If you mean the actual sample - no. It’s a physical thing, not data. If you mean the results of testing then yes if they can identify an individual (like a DNA sequence) or are linked to an identifiable individual and no if they don’t (like they are part of an anonymised database of thousands of results). | Art. 17 GDPR, Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) requires “erasure of personal data concerning him or her”. That’s all personal data. However, this only applies when this article applies. Section 1 details when this is and sections 2 and 3 detail limitations and exceptions to the right of erasure. For example, you would be allowed to keep financial records that you're legally obligated to keep. So, if they have the right, you have to delete all their personal data that is not exempted. Aggregate statistics and other anonymous data in the sense of Recital 26 are not personal data and don't have to be deleted. Whether the kinds of data you have mentioned would be sufficiently anonymous would require further analysis. | The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization. | Under GDPR, can I request to be forgotten and re-register for a trail? No (unless they are stupid.) The "right to be forgotten" does not mean they have to delete your data. They can keep personal data about if they have "legitimate interests" to keep these data. Stopping clients from abusing their "free trial" system is a legitimate interest. | What does your Data Protection Officer say? It’s their role to be aware of and assess if you policies, procedures and processes comply with the principles. For the particular application is it: “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”? “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary” “kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed” “processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures” And can you clearly demonstrate compliance with the above? Just a personal observation: WTF are you using a spreadsheet for what is clearly a database problem? This is several dozen steps away from best practice data security. | Keeping logs of chats would not necessarily be against the GDPR as you have suggested. For the IRC service provider/operator: these chats/logs would be within scope if EU-based users are involved and this means the data controller/processors would have legal obligations to comply with GDPR. The IRC service provider/operator would be the data controller and would be held ultimately responsible for the data stored/processed through the IRC service, including backups and logs kept etc, and this would mean any sub-processors they select (such as hosting provider) would also have to be GDPR compliant. Due to the nature of IRC chats being entirely public in the same way forum board posts and comments are public, the contract terms between the IRC service provider and the IRC users would need to be very clear that this is the case, and the IRC users would need to give consent for this processing (this is more complicated for children, see Article 8 regarding consent from the holder of parental responsibility). For IRC users (personal use): If you wish to keep the chat records for personal use only (i.e. not in connection with a business or your employment at a business), then an exemption applies: This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; ... (GDPR, Article 2: Material Scope, Paragraph 2(c), p.32) For IRC users (commercial/business use): In this case I don't think you would have any legal basis to store/process these chats/logs if they contain personal data without a legal agreement with the data controller which would require you to put in place the same protections they have to under GDPR but then allow your business to access the data for specific purposes. While the information may be published or considered to be in the 'public domain', for you to take a copy of it without permission and use it for a purpose they haven't consented to would not be allowed under GDPR. Additionally, to go through the process of removing personal data from the chats/logs would in itself be considered 'processing' under GDPR and therefore would be unauthorised without a legal agreement with the data controller. Practically therefore, your best options under this circumstance would be if: The IRC service provider implemented a 'favourites' feature to save within their own system the chat conversations you wish to retain and refer back to in future. Since they hold the data and you already have a user agreement with them there is no further complications (this is probably the best option); The IRC service provider implemented a feature to download an anonymized copy of a chat conversation (not ideal as there are no guaruntees a user will not include personal data in their messages, though the user agreement could state that message content will be considered to exclude personal data, in a similar way to how StackExchange do for this website, see the paragraph titled "Information You Choose to Display Publicly on the Network" on the StackExchange Privacy Policy). Your business considered an alternative communications solution, such as hosting its own real-time chat system or forum boards system, in which case your business would be the data controller, and while subject to GDPR you could then define the purposes for which the data will be used in your own user agreement. | Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46". | In the question, you write: The GDPR requires consent of the subject for collection or storage of personal data (in this case, IP addresses in a log file). No, it does not. To quote Miss Infogeek: GDPR DOES NOT MAKE CONSENT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ALL PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA. Consent (Article 6 (1)a) is indeed one of conditions that can be used to comply with the GDPR requirement that processing must be lawful, but it is not the only condition available to the controller to ensure lawful processing – there are alternatives (before the list of conditions it says that "at least one of the following" must be satisfied). All the conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. One of alternatives are Article 6 (1)f. It says says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) As noted in the question, logging IP addresses for the purpose of security is an extremely widespread practice. It is a legitimate interest to comply with standard security practices. It is the default, and most (all?) web-sites do this. I.e. it is legal to do this without consent (if this is not the case, I am pretty sure the outcry had been heard all over the Internet by now). |
Intent to Vacate apartment before 30 days, do I need to be there for 30 days? I live in Alabama and I originally signed a one year lease and that expired and have been living month to month for the past 13 or so months. I have a job offer confirmed June 17 and want to vacate early. The new job is over 100 miles away. I realize I need to do a 30 day intent to vacate letter, but of course I won't be here since I will be living somewhere else because of my new job. I plan to give my landlord my "30 day notice" to leave June 3, which means I'm obligated up to July 3. My question is a general one, couldn't I just give the keys to the landlord June 14 and tell the property manager that I intend to pay rent up to July 3? Do I actually physically need to be here until July 3? | No, you don't need to physically be there. The landlord may be required to refund some rent if they rent it out early. They may also not be available for a walk through until your last day, so you may need to show back up. Technically if you pay rent for the month the apartment is yours until July 3. You can turn the keys in early. | You've signed a lease, which is legally binding, so you need to determine 1) what exactly was stated in the rental offer by the property manager and/or website about the available apartments, if a certain apartment was guaranteed, and if one could be substituted for another by the manager due to availability and other factors; and 2) you need to find out exactly what the lease says that you have signed, i.e. if there are terms that allow you to break the lease without penalty, such as misrepresentation by the landlord or property manager. If it turns out the manager did misrepresent the rental property, you may be able to break the lease. If the property manager stated at some point that the apartment represented by the photos may not be the actual property, you may be out of luck. Before confronting the property manager again, gather up all your emails, documents, photos and any other evidence - such as written descriptions of any phone calls and talks you had with the property manager before and after the move in - and talk to either a legal aid organization that specializes in rental aid (Google for your area in CO), or a lawyer who deals in leases and offers free initial consultations. Other than that, this site is not for specific legal advice, i.e. if you should sue the landlord to break the lease and move; that's your judgement and the advice of any legal representation. | Yes, you have to give 2 months notice and you have to pay £145 + VAT The first clause says your notice cannot end within 6 months of the start of the lease: that is long gone. You pay the lower fee because you will have stayed longer than 12 months by the time your 2 months notice expires. You can try to negotiate a shorter notice period - they have advantages in relenting if you move out earlier. | Yes, but not without notice KS Stat § 58-2557 (2015) 58-2557. Landlord's right to enter; limitations. (a) The landlord shall have the right to enter the dwelling unit at reasonable hours, after reasonable notice to the tenant, in order to ... exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, ... | You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over. | Can a business put whatever they want into a contract? No. There are some things a business cannot put into a contract. But I don't see anything stopping them from putting this into a contract. It's not reasonable to assume that you have to cancel before the 20th every month. It's not reasonable to assume that - except there's no assumption needed. The contract states it flat out. You are most likely stuck paying. Requiring cancellation about 10 days in advance of the month doesn't seem like it would be an unconscionable clause. (Requiring cancellation 10 months in advance would be a different story.) Michigan law does say the following is prohibited: Taking advantage of the consumer's inability reasonably to protect his or her interests by reason of disability, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of an agreement presented by the other party to the transaction who knows or reasonably should know of the consumer's inability. But I doubt that applies in your case. It also prohibits: Gross discrepancies between the oral representations of the seller and the written agreement covering the same transaction or failure of the other party to the transaction to provide the promised benefits. So if you were promised you could cancel at any time without notice or penalty, but you later found out the contract said differently, this law may apply. | If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house). | Can a landlord legally charge for pet rent even when no pets are present in the apartment? Yes. Absent any indication in the lease that your cats would not move in immediately, the landlord is right. I assume that your lease reflects mutual knowledge of your intent to bring your cats over (via a marked checkbox or in "d) Pet1 Details: ... Pet 2 Details ..."). If so, according to the lease, you officially have pets in the apartment. To avoid being charged unnecessarily, you should have (1) ensured that the contract reflects the intended delay regarding your cats, or (2) asked the landlord to amend the lease once it is imminent that you will bring your pets over. One or multiple administrative reasons justify a landlord to charge pet fees even if there are no pets in the apartment. For instance, the landlord might need to notify his insurer whenever an additional rental unit will host pets, thereby resulting in adjustments to a premium. Likewise, the number of pets might be a factor when a cleaning company bills the landlord. The lease was signed with the impression that the $40 would only be necessary if we brought pets. Hence the relevance of determining whether or not the lease objectively reflects that you notified the landlord of your intention to bring pets and, if so, when it would become effective. If the latter is not specified, it defaults to the start date of the lease. It also sounds like if we never mentioned pets until, say, 6 months in, they would charge us pet rent for the previous 6 months even though the pets were not present. It depends. If the landlord "busted" you, then he could sanction you in accordance with the terms of the lease. Instead, if you subsequently requested an amendment to the lease, then the landlord would only charge you from the date you officially bring the pets. But the effective date needs to be reflected in the lease/amendment. Should I take this to court and get a lawyer? No. First, for the reasons I mentioned above. Second, because lawyers want money, and they will detect right away that there is really not much to recover in a controversy like this one. Third, because complaining about a relatively small amount ($40/month) tells the lawyer that he or she won't get much money from you either (and lawyers want your money). And fourth, because the yearly total of pet fees indicates that the matter would have to be filed in Small Claims Court, where --if I am not wrong-- parties are not allowed to be represented by counsel. Going to court is not "peanuts". Even if your were allowed --and you managed-- to retain a lawyer, you would end up paying so much in attorney fees to someone who might not be forthcoming, let alone diligent. If you no longer plan on bringing pets, just ask the landlord to amend the lease accordingly. |
Would towels under floorboards (for sound insulation) be considered an unacceptable fire risk? I am a live-in landlord (UK), with two lodgers. My bedroom is on the ground floor, my lodger is in the bedroom above me. I want to reduce the noise from above, and this video suggests that folded towels make great sound-insulation. I want to put some folded towels under the floorboards in my lodgers' room for this reason. However, most towels are 100% cotton and so burn quite well. Would I get into trouble for doing something like this? | You would almost certainly be criminally liable if a fire were to occur and your insulation did not meet the Fire Safety Building Regulations, especially as you deliberately used a non-conforming material. Cotton towels are not one of the materials that have met or exceeded the EU and UK regulations. Edit to add - as an aside, should you suffer a fire for whatever reason, any landlord, housing or home insurance you have have will almost certainly become void should the insurance company discover your use of cotton towels as insulation. | Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease. | There's a lot of variables here, as many leases are built in different ways within the leeway allowed by law. You will want to contact a local lawyer to see how you can mitigate the damage to yourself, and contact your landlord and see if you can re-negotiate the lease. If the landlord doesn't want to re-negotiate, you're probably facing eviction if you can't come up with the full rent by yourself; many leases don't allow non-related adults to live on the premises if they're not on the lease (this can also result in eviction). However, your roommate will also get an eviction record and be responsible for any damages if the lease survives long enough to cause an eviction. Actually having a random person move in from Craigslist might also cause your roommate to suffer additional liability if they're not allowed to sublet their lease agreement, which many leases do not allow (landlords like knowing who's living on their properties). Having them move in might cause both you and your roommate to be evicted. You probably don't have any rights to sue your roommate until actual damages occur (in other words, after you've already been evicted). You should speak with your landlord as soon as possible to get a new lease. An eviction record will cause problems for your roommate as well, so you might urge them to consider staying long enough to get things sorted out legally. When you ask your landlord, simply ask something like, "My roommate wants to move out. What are my options?" They will tell you what they are willing to accept. | There are nuisance lawsuits and constructive eviction arguments--you can check with your local attorneys and perhaps tenants' rights organizations for detailed information. Just because marijuana is legal under state law (if certain steps were followed) does not mean that your landlord or another tenant can interfere with your use and enjoyment of your home. Civil consequences--such as a court order to the smoker to stop smoking, money damages, or a partial abatement of your rent until the smoking stops--may be achievable. It is important to follow the rules for your jurisdiction closely when starting a legal action, so you should talk to an expert in your jurisdiction if you want to pursue legal action. But where possible, most people deal with this kind of thing by moving. | I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire! | My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here. | Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it. | If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house). |
What would be Julian Assange's expected punishment, on the current English criminal law? Currently, the only charges form the British side against him are, that he avoided the criminal procedure (he was, on the British law, a fugitive) by his "visit" on the Ecuadorian Embassy. Meanwhile, the British police has spent £11million. Now consider the case if he wouldn't be extradited to the U.S on some reason, and any other "extra-judicial measurement" (for example, "committing suicide" in his cell) wouldn't happen. What is the punishment for that in English law? Update: he got 50 weeks, what nears the 1 year maximum. There is no news from financial punishment or extradition. | Up to 12 months in jail. Just by coincidence, only this week some guy who was given a jail sentence of several years for manslaughter, then jumped bail and left the country, and was extradited back to the UK, was given six months jail for jumping bail. The punishment is for jumping bail, which is an offence independent of whether the original charges are true or false. So the cases are somehow comparable, except Assange jumped bail for seven years, which would be worse, and Assange didn't leave the country but entered a foreign embassy, which I have no idea how that compares to leaving the country. | These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information. | Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about. | There is a relevant Q&A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News. | Legally, they cannot just nab you. The usual (?) option is that authorities in the US request extradition pursuant to the US-Mexico extradition treaty via the Department of Justice, and if the paperwork is in order, this can result in a Provisional Arrest Warrant (and arrest) in Mexico, which will be carried out by the Mexican federal police. This is true whether or not you go to the US consulate. After a hearing in the Mexican courts you might be extradited (or not, but DoJ presumably doesn't proceed with cases that they will lose). Extradition is not possible for every offense, so you would have to look at the offenses listed in the treaty, and whatever the Arizona warrant is about. You can't be extradited for parking tickets, you can be extradited for murder: whatever it is, it has to be a crime in both places, and has to be subject to a minimum one year imprisonment. Also, if you are a Mexican citizen as well, you cannot be extradited unless the Mexican authorities agree to (whereas there is no choice if you are only a US citizen). An alternative is deportation, which would overcome limitations related to extradition, but it's not clear what the requirements for deportation from Mexico are (typically illegal presence, unclear whether Mexican authorities can or would try an end-run around official extradition procedure). Although consulates enjoy a degree of immunity from local law, a consulate in Mexico is still Mexican territory, subject to Mexican law. If you are in the consulate, Mexican authorities cannot enter without permission to arrest you. They also cannot arrest you without a warrant (see Art. 16 of the Mexican constitution). Consular staff also cannot arrest you (if you are not caught flagrante delicto). Nor are they authorized to execute a US warrant in Mexico (thus they have to go through the process of judicial review to send you back to the US, and why a Mexican warrant is required). See this Q&A, relevant to the status of embassies: what is relevant to us is that both the US and Mexico operate under the rule of law, so the issues surrounding Syrian refugees in the Syrian embassy do not arise here. | The time between arrest and being presented to a judge depends on the country you are in: japan You can be in jail for 23 days before you even see a judge and are charged, and that clock resets whenever they officially start to investigate you for a different possible charge. You are not charged, you are just accused of this related and greater crime. This tactic even has a special name: Hitojichi shihō. Someone they want to investigate for murder can be first imprisoned to investigate the deposit of the corpse, then for the actual murder, for a total of 46 days maximum - and if the DA isn't creative to get some other lesser included charges in. Against some Yakuza, some DAs allegedly managed to chain up much more. However, those 23 days (per investigation) are all the pre-trial investigative confinement that the state gets before a trial - the moment the formal charge is entered, the trial has to begin soon after... However, the state also often has the arrestee's confession at that point - partially because a creative DA might manage to keep you nigh permanently and in part because you don't have the right to have your attorney at your side during questioning in Japan. This is partially the reason why Japanese courts have such a crazy high conviction rate: more than 99% of the cases brought by DAs are convictions, in most cases using the confession obtained in the pre-charge detention as a piece of key evidence. england-and-wales If you are a suspect of terrorism, you can be kept for up to 14 days before you need to be either charged or released, as Rick explains much better. Generally, 24 hours or 96 hours for serious crimes, starting at the arrest hours, apply. european-union The EU has the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 5 III): Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. However, what is Promptly is dependant on what the countries implementing say it is. As an example, let's take a (closer) look at Germany. germany While you can be in investigative confinement (Untersuchungshaft / U-Haft) for months or up to a year typically, you need to be already officially charged and a judge has to affirm you are in U-Haft. This decision that you need to be in confinement needs to be repeated regularily in case of long investigative confinements. This Investigative Confinement, "Untersuchungshaft", is defined in STPO §112 (~process regulations for criminal trials), and usually is limited to about 6 months before the suspect is to be released or be at trial, but in extremely difficult cases it can be extended by special motion in the layer of Oberlandesgericht, which is about the highest state court. Still, while an extension to 9 or 12 months is possible, there can be cases where this may be extended even further, even if that might not be entirely correct on other grounds - there had been appeals to the European court for human rights about such. On the other hand, once a trial starts and the court sees a flight risk or that you might pose a potential danger, you stay in (or are taken into) Untersuchungshaft for the duration of the trial. That is different from pre-trial Untersuchungshaft, in that you can't appeal on that your trial didn't start yet. In either case of Untersuchungshaft, any and all confinement is counted as time served, like the case of Fritz Teufel. In his case, his trial was seriously delayed and he was in Untersuchungshaft for 5 years before they convicted him to 5 years. In the end, he had already served all the due time due to the investigatory confinement, so he was released almost on the spot - just a little bit of paperwork and he was out.. Now, that is all court-ordered confinement. How far can we get without the court? What does Germany count as prompt? So, unless you have been put into investigative confinement by court order, you have to be released at the end of the day after you were arrested. End of the day is defined as midnight by the general rules. So if you were arrested Monday, 1st of January at 00:01, you are to be released on Tuesday, 2nd of January, 24:00. So, the absolute maximum confinement outside of the daylight-saving change day is 47 hours 59 minutes and 59 seconds until you need to have been seen by a judge, but because it is nigh impossible to get to see a judge between 16:00 and 24:00, the typical confinement till you are formally charged and possibly transferred to Untersuchungshaft is usually less. On a mere technicality, there is one day a year where you might be confined twice from 2 AM to 3 AM, but that is also always a Sunday. | Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter. | There is no answer to the question, as presented. The criminal law differs in various respects in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland: one cannot speak of 'UK law', because criminal procedure is really very different in the three separate jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the rules of criminal procedure are what govern the issue raised in the question, rather than the substantive laws relating to the various charges which might be brought; and while the substantive laws in England and Scotland are often fairly similar, the procedures are usually very dissimilar. In a trial at the Old Bailey, in London, a Jury has no role in the criminal procedure: once empanelled it performs its usual function of deciding the facts of the case, based upon the evidence presented, but it has no role in determining what charges are preferred against the accused (this is decided by a different court at a much earlier procedural stage), and the jury has no power to alter the charges on the indictment. Only the prosecution can decide what charges are made against an accused person. And if an amendment to the indictment is thought to be appropriate, only the prosecuting barrister can make such a change. If the case has come-on for trial, the permission of the Judge must usually be obtained to any alteration in the charges. The Judge might object to an attempt to add a charge carrying a more severe penalty at a late stage in the proceedings (as the case may of course have already taken many months to reach the Old Bailey). He will often be more accommodating to an application to reduce the charges, to a lesser offence, particularly if accompanied by an undertaking not to proceed on a more serious charge - e.g. due to a lack of evidence supporting it. Where several charges are brought in the alternative, then the jury has a function, since it can then convict of a lesser charge if the evidence on a more serious one does not satisfy it. But it cannot ask for the charges to be altered: the jury represents the layman, and jurymen are inevitably not legally qualified (at one time, being legally qualified was an automatic disqualification from serving on a jury). So the jury is assumed to be incapable of understanding the fine distinctions between different offences, and has no role whatsoever in deciding which offences shall be included on the indictment. Even the Barrister representing the accused has no role in determining which charges his client will face: that is purely a function of the Crown Prosecutor's office, and once the trial has come-on at the Bailey only the prosecuting Barrister and the Judge truly have a role in making any necessary amendments. The function of defending Counsel is to strike a plea-bargain, if he can, and where the opportunity arises: which is to say, if he can persuade his client to plead guilty to a minor charge (whether or not on the indictment), and can also persuade the prosecutor not to proceed on the more serious charge(s) on the indictment. A Judge will not usually object to a legally-represented defendant applying, by consent (i.e. through the prosecutor), to amend the indictment in order to enter a plea of guilty. He might refuse, if the accused has no legal representation, but not otherwise. The short answer, therefore, is that in England and Wales a defendant cannot be convicted on a charge that is not listed on the indictment, but a jury can convict of any charge on the indictment if the judge asks the jury to retire and consider a verdict - but the case may not get so far as that, if a plea-bargain is struck. There are rare occasions where a judge might withdraw a charge, if he desires, by directing the jury to acquit on that particular charge, but this only occurs if he considers that any conviction on that charge would be positively unsafe in all the circumstances of the case. |
Texas excessive fining I am just curious if it is legal for Texas to issue a ticket, once the ticket is issued you are automatically also required to pay a surcharge to keep your license from being suspended and on top of that you are also required to carry SR-22 insurence for a minimum of 3 years as I understand from the clerk that explained it to me and failure to keep the SR-22 insurence will result in your licences being suspended. How can it be legal to be fined twice and required to obtain special insurance for a minimum of 3 years just for a speeding ticket or some other driving infraction? | Yes. This doesn't remotely approach the threshold to which the excessive fines clause applies. Also SR-22 insurance isn't a fine, it is a requirement that you take extra responsibility because you are a high risk driver. In general, states have broad authority to regulate the right to drive a car. | They don't treat right-of-way persistence at all You are required to follow the car ahead at a distance that is reasonable and prudent, having regard for both speeds, traffic generally, and road condition (i.e. curves, rain). CVC 21703. This would apply to the other driver. You must only shift lanes left or right when possible with reasonable safety and only after signaling. CVC 22107. That applies to you. If you "cut them off" such that they must make adjustments to re-acquire a distance that is reasonable and prudent, then you are guilty of 22107. If you changed lanes properly, then it is immediately and continuously THEIR duty under 21703 to maintain safe distance despite whichever lawful maneuvering you may need to do. Note that 22109 forbids you to stop or suddenly decrease speed without first giving an appropriate signal, unless there is no opportunity to give that signal. 22109 is a civil infraction that assumes accidental or negligent braking. (i.e. me going for the clutch and not remembering the car is an automatic). Intentionally brake-checking someone is a crime with risk of jail and other more serious consequences than "fine and points". | In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work. | Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible. | It depends on the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, speed limits are implemented via Chapter 46.61 RCW, the very first section of which states: The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. (2) The provisions of RCW 46.52.010 through 46.52.090, 46.61.500 through 46.61.525, and 46.61.5249 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state We then turn to the question of what a "vehicle" is (this is the discussion of a number of legal treatises). Title 46 is about motor vehicles, but still you should look at the definition, if any, of "vehicle". We have two definitions of vehicle in RCW 46.04.670. Definition 1 says that "Vehicle" includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles Definition 2 omits the italicized bicycle inclusion, and explicitly excludes A bicycle, for the purposes of chapter 46.12, 46.16A, or 46.70 RCW, or for RCW 82.12.045((.)) This is a bit of a mess arising from legislative screwup, which should be resolved by appeal to RCW 1.12.025. The explicit-exclusion sections are about registration, dealers and taxes, and not speed limits. The latter version was recently reaffirmed effective July 23, 2023. The courts could therefore be somewhat inclined to not apply speed limits to bicycles, because bicycles were recently removed from the set of explicit vehicles. But as notes in the Eskridge's extensive discussion of a hypothetical ban on vehicles in Lafayette Park, there are multiple principles for interpreting laws, and "legislative intent to assure safety" would be one prominent consideration, in case the wording of the law is not crystal clear – as it is not, in this case. | The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home. | There are only two rules I am aware of that apply to rear-end collisions on a roadway (in which all vehicles are properly headed in the same direction): The first vehicle that hits another in the rear is at fault for the collision, and any collateral collisions. The preceding rule is always true unless there is evidence that the vehicle that was struck did something reckless or intentional to cause the collision. For example, "cutting" in front of a truck and decelerating unnecessarily and faster than the truck can brake. (Before dashcams became widespread this was a common tactic of fraudsters, who would subsequently sue the "rear-ender's" insurance company for "whiplash" injuries.) You seem to be asking whether there is a law or rule against coming to a stop too close to a vehicle in front. Tailgating is generally illegal, but I have never heard of the concept being applied to vehicles that are not moving. (Clarification on your question: "Stop far enough behind the car in front of you so that you can see the bottom of their back tires" is a safety heuristic that allows you to pull around the vehicle in an emergency without shifting into reverse. It's a "rule" of defensive driving, but I have never heard it written into law.) | Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy). |
International sexting: how often is sexting overseas prosecuted? (Please read details) I am asking for someone dear to me. This will be a hypothetical example. Hypothetically, if a 19 year old male (living overseas, say in Turkey) sexts/exchanges nudes with a female who says she is 18 (living in the US) and then it turns out that she lied about her age and she's 16 or 15, for example, and 2 years later her parents discover about this sexting and decide to take legal action against the person living overseas, what could be done? (Assume that there's no screenshots of when she lied about her age and said she's 18) Would he be extradited? And under which jurisdiction? I have contacted an expert on online security and he said that less than 1% of domestic cybercrime is prosecuted, and that international cybercrimes very rarely get prosecuted, except for fraud, because there's a lot of 'serious offenders' overseas. But I still would like the opinion of people well-versed in law please. Assume it happened on a fake Facebook account or the Kik app for instance. As you know, there's a lot of scams like this but my question assumes that the situation isn't a scam. So for the sake of example, please assume that there is no scam and that the situation is 100% real. Would you tell this guy to calm down, or that he should wait till the statue of limitations (7 years I guess) for this kind of thing is over, for example? He is legitimately considering hanging himself because his parents live in the US and he doesn't want his mom to see him behind bars for something he did 2 years ago. I talked him out of hanging himself recently and told him that nothing is going to happen and he should breathe easy. But he's genuinely afraid and keeps getting paranoid. If you have noticed, I keep posting here about related subjects trying to find answers for this guy. He contacted a lawyer who basically said that the chances he will be prosecuted are slim but not impossible. This even made him more paranoid. It could be a scam and it could be a 50 year old man who lied and said he's an 18 year old female, but I want to take a worst case scenario to calm my friend down and tell him the worst consequences possible. (Assume he owns the router and Wi-Fi connection but the rent is registered with another family member's name) Thank you. | There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office. | YOU NEED TO KNOW MORE FACTS The age of consent to sex in the United States, in cases not involving child pornography (which is federally regulated as well as subject to state regulation) is a matter of state law, although federal law criminalizes crossing state lines for the purposes of sex with a minor in certain cases. There is moderate variation from state to state on this issue. Many (probably most, but I haven't counted in a detailed survey) U.S. states have at least two separate components of a statutory rape law and a separate child prostitution law, to which different provisions regarding mistake of age apply. One component of a typical state statutory rape law, which usually pertains to teenagers above a certain age, is a misdemeanor and includes a good faith mistake of age after reasonable investigation exception (at least if it does not involve commercial prostitution). This component also often has an "age gap" limitation for at least part of the age range that is sometimes a crime, to make sex not a crime if the couple are close in age (typically four years apart or ten years apart). The other component of a typical state statutory rape law, which usually pertains to pre-pubescent minors, is usually a felony and does not have a mistake of age exception (this is sometimes called a strict liability statute even though you need to have an intent to do some things like an intent to voluntarily have sex). These laws have been upheld against constitutional due process challenges, at least as applied in particular cases. It is constitutional to have a statutory rape law with only a strict liability component. But it is relatively uncommon for a state to have such a law. You need to know you are having sex with the person you think you are having sex with (if you were blindfolded and someone replaced your intended and believed partner with someone else without your knowledge, expectation, or consent, you would also be a rape victim, not a perpetrator and the child would be raped by the person arranging it even though you carried out the act unwittingly), but you don't constitutionally need to know that the person you are having sex with is under the statutory age and ignorance or mistake regarding the statutory age is no excuse. In the U.S., state laws banning being a buyer of commercial prostitution by people under age eighteen, typically apply even if sex with that person would not be a crime if it was non-commercial, and typically do not have an exception for mistake of age, although statutes vary. Also, many states, in addition to a statutory rape law also have a law prohibiting certain people who are in "positions of trust" such as teachers and coaches, from having sex with people under their supervision, even if by virtue of age alone, the statutory rape law would not be violated. You can sometimes be guilty of attempting to commit a crime, or engaging in conduct believing certain facts to be true (as in the case of many child prostitution crimes), but plain vanilla statutory rape crimes are frequently not crimes for which an attempt is cognizable. | Hacking a website to take it down is not effective; the target can simply regain control of their machine or restart the service somewhere else. The objective of the FBI is to make arrests and obtain convictions, not play whack-a-mole. When the FBI targets a website and its operators there are a number of approaches that it can use, depending on the circumstances. For clear-web sites one simple approach is just to seize the domain name. When you type badsite.com into a web browser a system called DNS looks up the name in a distributed database and from that gets an IP address. The DNS database is managed by a number of national and international authorities, and most national authoritities will cooperate with legal requests from the FBI, possibly routed through INTERPOL or via a Mutual Legal Assistance treaty. Of course there are some countries that won't cooperate, and this on its own doesn't help the FBI to arrest anyone. The FBI can use an IP address to find out where the physical servers are located. If that is in the US then they can simply go and seize those servers as evidence, or use a subpoena. If it is outside the US then its back to INTERPOL or Mutual Legal Assistance. Servers on the "dark net" use TOR to bounce the packets around the Net a few times. This hides the IP addresses of both servers and clients, so the challenge for the FBI is to find out what the IP address of the target machine is. Once they have that they can proceed as normal. Getting the IP address generally means hacking the target machine via TOR, and then finding the IP address once inside. If the DNS and servers are hosted in a country that won't play ball with the FBI, well that is just too bad. The FBI can carry on investigating of course, and if someone running the website ever travels to a country where the FBI can get them arrested then they will do so. | There is nothing illegal about the child asking for nude images, but, depending on jurisdiction and circumstances, there is quite likely to be a serious legal problem with the adult providing such nudes. The exact laws that might be violated would depend a lot on the jurisdiction. The detailed facts would also be significant. But such a situation is fraught with danger, for the adult. Even if there is no ill-intent, such actions could easily be misinterpreted, and might be technically unlawful regardless of intent. Of course, not all nudes are obscene, or even "inappropriate for children". Which are so classified depends on the laws of the particular jurisdiction. | Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on. | united-states Messaging (and other online communication) are fixed media. A face-to-face conversation, or a telephone call, does not exist at all - except in the mental recollections of the participants. And those are always very problematic as evidence, because people's recall is inaccurate. Whereas communication in a fixed medium is durable: a newspaper, a sound recording, security camera footage. It stands on its own and can be examined by experts. What catches a lot of people off guard about the Internet is they are mostly fixed media. Prior to the Internet, investigation of harassment almost entirely depended on anecdotal evidence. It was difficult to prosecute cases which were entirely based on the victim's word. The closest any of this came to objective evidence was a polygraph, and that wasn't reliable. Of course we want bona-fide victims protected, but what keeps a malicious actor from putting someone else in jail with words alone? Now with the Internet, much of the evidence is rendered in fixed media. This is a "breath of fresh air" for such prosecutions! However, just like any other physical evidence, it must be brought into evidence by the testimony of persons, and that testimony gets to be cross-examined. And this is where your concerns about provenance get addressed. A party will assert that the messages are forged, and that will be examined. The validity of evidence is itself on trial. There are two evaluations: first whether the evidence is even valid enough to present to a jury, and evidence that makes the cut is then examined and cross-examined in front of the jury. Keep in mind that contrary to TV drama, there's no "surprise evidence". Almost any evidence - and certainly ALL evidence in a fixed medium - must be shared with the other party long before trial. Pre-trial, it will be challenged, the phone/device subpoenaed and turned over to experts for analysis. If it is evident that the party "has conveniently deleted or lost" the material, the evidence will be thrown out. And if the party is proven to have falsified the data, they're in much worse shape. A lot of chat services keep chat logs on the server/cloud, in the clear. Getting those is as easy as subpoenaing them, and that will be a canonical answer because the ISP would have no reason to lie. For a service where chat logs are kept in the clear only by individuals who choose to keep them, then "reading those logs into evidence" will involve a cross-examination of the parties involved as to their honesty and motivations. I don't know what and how WhatsApp stores when they log chats, so I don't know if there's any cryptographic information there that could be authenticated. But certainly if "he" presents one chat log, and "she" presents a different chat log, then we're clear around to "he said, she said". But all of it together can be examined. For instance, linguists can look at other chats, discern the writing styles of each party, and then look at the disputed lines and examine who is more likely to have written those. And they give testimony on that. So it is evidence, but it gets two rounds of possible challenge: First as to whether the evidence is reliable enough to even present to the jury, and then experts testifying in front of the jury their opinion of its reliability. | Yes When you enter the jurisdiction of a country, you are subject to its laws. You are not, in general, subject to punishment for things you did before you entered its jurisdiction but if possession of bitcoin (or anything else) is illegal in that country, then possessing that thing makes you subject to prosecution. | In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible. |
Clarify this legislation - electrical plugs I've just bought a portable welder in the UK from a large reputable online seller. The product came with no plug attached, just three bare wires. It says no one on the product description that there would not be a plug. I've tried to look into it and I believe it is illegal to sell a product without a plug. I think this is the legislation: here Can someone just confirm or correct me here please? I am in the UK and it was purchased from a UK website and UK seller. It was purchased brand new. Thanks! | ... this Part applies to the following devices namely any plug, socket or adaptor ordinarily intended for domestic use ... Welders are not “ordinarily intended for domestic use”. | Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...". | Neither law has precedence - manufacturers have to obey both. The FD&C says that they don't need to list ingredients which are trade secrets; the CFR says they must. If they list the trade secrets they do not break either law. If they don't, they break the CFR. Conclusion: they must list the trade secret ingredients. If the FD&C said it was forbidden to list trade secret ingredients, but the CFR required it, manufacturers would still have to obey both laws - which would mean they couldn't sell anything where one of the ingredients was a trade secret. | I should have done my research properly, hopefully this will be indexed and be helpful to someone else in the future. The specific legislation is The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 regulation 98: Stopping of engine when stationary 98.—(1) Save as provided in paragraph (2), the driver of a vehicle shall, when the vehicle is stationary, stop the action of any machinery attached to or forming part of the vehicle so far as may be necessary for the prevention of noise. (2) The provisions of paragraph (1) do not apply— (a) when the vehicle is stationary owing to the necessities of traffic; (b) so as to prevent the examination or working of the machinery where the examination is necessitated by any failure or derangement of the machinery or where the machinery is required to be worked for a purpose other than driving the vehicle; or (c) in respect of a vehicle propelled by gas produced in plant carried on the vehicle, to such plant. | It is their property, so keeping it without permission could well be seen as theft. I think you are obliged to make reasonable attempts to notify them you have their property before using it or selling it. Just like if someone left the item at your house after a party. If they want it back, however, it is at their cost, you should not be out of pocket for their failure to deliver within a reasonable time-frame; you may find they've already claimed the cost of the product from the courier and don't want it back. You are well within your rights to offer to buy it from them, and them to accept or reject that offer, this is a separate contract to the original sale. | Are online stores supposed to state the true “order cost”/value of an order on the package/envelope for the customs? Yes Is it common practice to slash 10x off of the price for the customs to not add various fees? Common? Probably no. Uncommon? Also, probably no. Isn't that illegal? Yes Of course, they can claim it was a mistake if ever found out, but if they do it consistently, that seems difficult... Not to mention there must be electronic proof of how much each order actually cost the customer? Yes Look, robbing banks is illegal but people still rob banks. Similarly, ripping off HM Revenue & Customs is illegal but people still do that too. In fact, far more people do that than rob banks. | If the Kenya legislature passes such a law, they can impose such a requirement on Kenyans who want to create such social media groups. Note that this is a license from the Kenyan government, not a copyright or trademark license. In effect, it is a tax on running a social media group, along with various regulations. I have no idea if this bill is at all likely to pass. If it does pass, it might be hard to enforce, as it would probably require cooperation from Facebook and other social media platforms, and the companies which run those platforms are not located in Kenya, and might not cooperate. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing |
What is the meaning of 'the rights reverted to the author of the book in 1951'? I am trying to show some illustrations and pictures from the pages of a 1931 book in my YouTube educational video. The author is dead with no known living descendants. A scanned copy of the book can be freely download in The Internet Archive site, where the following information is listed "No known copyright restrictions as determined by scanning institution". Then I looked for the company that published the book and it can be traced to a modern publisher. I wrote them and this is the answer I got: The rights to this work reverted to the author in 1951. The following is the referral information from then: Ms. Margaret Wilson, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc., 270 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016. and I have trouble understanding what that means. That the rights 'reverted to the author in 1951' means that (since the guy is dead and I can't find any living descendants, and the book seems to be offered for free to download in The Internet Archive) I can happily show images from the book in my YouTube video and get away with just printing "(C) 1951 [name of the author here]" in the end titles of the video? Remark: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc. can be traced up to Penguin Random House today, and they list many books by the same author in their catalog, but not that one. | "The rights to this work reverted to the author in 1951" means that back in 1951 the publisher's contract to print the book ended, and the author resumed full rights. (This might have been done by the author, or the publisher, depending on their contract.) It does not mean that the copyright lapsed or that the work entered the public domain. "Ms. Margaret Wilson" was presumably the author or the author's agent, or perhaps the publishers representative back in 1951. She may or may not be alive, and the firm of "Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc" may have been the new publisher (unless it was the old one, the question is not clear, and without the title I can't cross check). If DS&P was the new publisher, the rights might now be held by E. P. Dutton, as they seem to have acquired the rights to the bulk of the DS&P catalog. In any case, the copyright would (if it is in force) now be held by the author's heir, or whoever the author might have sold or given it to. Someone will be the legal owner. That it is not being marketed does not release the copyright or license the work for general use. If there was no other heir, it would have become government property. In the US, it would become the property of the state where the owner was a legal resident. If this was a work by a US author first published in the US, copyright needed to be renewed after 28 years, which would have been in 1959 (plus or minus one year, I believe). If the work required copyright renewal, and this was not done, then the work is in the public domain, and can be freely used by anyone. Records of copyright renewals, by year, are available for download from Project Gutenberg, or can be searched at the US Copyright Office. There is no way to be sure how the "scanning institution" determined that "No known copyright restrictions" apply, short of asking that institution. It is possible that they checked for a copyright renewal and did not find one. If you use content from this work, and the copyright is still in force, the copyright holder or an exclusive licensee could sue for copyright infringement. There is no way to tell if this would in fact happen. It may well be that the legal holder does not even know that s/he owns this copyright. Obviously, in that case, a suit is highly unlikely. But that would be entirely at the risk of anyone who used such content. Under US law, such use might or might not be considered "fair use". This would depend on several factors, and there is not enough information in the question to even guess. Fair use is an active defense, that an accused infringer may assert in court. It also does not apply in non-US cases. The odds are probably against any such suit being brought, but the amount at stake if one was brought could be large. | Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright. | There will be single frames from let's say "The Exorcist" that are highly recognisable. You say it's not the heart of the work, but it may be representative for a substantial part. If I wrote a book about the movie, then say 25 frames out of the movie would illustrate the book very nicely, so this is substantial. And there is a market for selling pictures, t-shirts, posters etc. all using a single frame, or selling single frames to book authors wanting to use it for illustrative purposes. You deprive them of income for this activity. So what you said is something similar to what I would expect your lawyer to say in court, but I would expect the opposing lawyer to come up with some very different wording. All in all, I find the argument for "fair use" not convincing. | I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations. | That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life. | Regardless of whether the first copyright holder is the author (always a natural person) or an employer (natural or non-natural), the copyright under British law expires 70 years after the death of the author. British law makes a distinction between the author of a work and the owner of a copyright that is not present in U.S. copyright law. This gives the author of the work "moral rights" which are absent in U.S. copyright law and also changes the analysis of how long a copyright lasts. Under Section 9 of the law, the author of the work is always a natural person according to the rules set forth there, and if no natural person can be associated with the work, it is a work of unknown authorship. Section 11 governs who owns a work, not who its author is, so the fact that a work is made for hire under a corporation does not mean that the author of the work is the corporation. Indeed, by definition, the author of the work cannot be a corporation. If no individual can be associated with a corporate work it is simply a work by an unknown author. A work by an unknown author enters the public domain 70 years after it is created, or 70 years after publication if it is first published within 70 years after its creation, pursuant to Section 12. The authorship of a work is fixed under Section 9 at the moment of its creation, so neither the first owner of the copyright (under Section 11) nor an assignment of ownership of the copyright from the author or first copyright owner to someone else (in your scenario where an author transfers ownership of the copyright to a corporation) changes the author of work. Hence, neither the fact that a work is made for hire, nor the fact that the author transfers ownership of the copyright, changes the duration of the copyright. | It is hard to say: this article sketches the legal landscape. So-called deep linking that bypasses the main page for a site is not believed to be infringement, following the reasoning of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146. The URL itself does not have the bare minimum of creativity required for copyright protection, and storing a URL on a computer is not storing the contents that it refers to, so no copy was made in violation of copyright law. It is unlikely that competing theories would develop in other US districts (there don't appear to be any at the present). However, such a link could create secondary liability for infringement, see Erickson Productions, Inc. v. Kast, where a party "has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement". If I link to a file on a pirate website, I am secondarily liable for that infringement. However, if I link to a legally-uploaded file which the author did not intend to make public, there is no infringement. Copyright law requires permission of the copyright owner, which is more than just "explicit denial". The problem is that a person can put a file out there and not say one way or the other whether you have permission to copy the file. The US Copyright office says that "A copyright owner must have expressly or implicitly authorized users to make retainable copies of a work by downloading, printing, or other means for the work to be considered published" (let's not care at the moment whether it is important to be "published"). The court may infer implicit permission from a copyright owner's conduct, but there is no rule "if it's on the internet, you've granted permission". A rights-owner may make a valiant but insufficient effort to block access to the work (except via a password), so in that context, the courts would infer that the rights-owner had not given permission, therefore the copying is infringing and you have secondary liability for your direct link to the material. | Under the Berne Convention, a copyright notice is not required at all, although using one is good practice. Using one usually eliminates the claimed status of "innocent infringement", which, if found true by a court, greatly reduces damage awards. It is usual to place such notices at or near the start of a work. That is where people tend to look for them, and I don't see any good reason not to follow this practice. The book tradition is the the copyright page comes before any part of the actual work, including the table of contents, sometimes with a continuation at the end of the work, if there is more than one page of notices. But that is not now a legal requirement, if it ever was. In short, there are no rigid rules on this, but putting a copyright notice at or quite near the start is good practice, and I would suggest sticking to it. |
Can Hilton claim that they invented the chocolate brownie? Recently on Good Morning Amercia, Hilton's CEO Chris Nassetta appeared to talk about Hilton's 100th Anniversary. It was discussed, amongst other things, how Hilton has had many 'firsts', including first hotel room TV, first room service, first piña colada etc. One of the things Nassetta claimed Hilton invented is the chocolate brownie - first baked by one of the chefs at Chicago's Palmer House Hilton. Looking at the wikipedia page for the Chocolate Brownie, this seems to check out: "Bertha Palmer, a prominent Chicago socialite whose husband owned the Palmer House Hotel. In 1893 Palmer asked a pastry chef for a dessert suitable for ladies attending the Chicago World's Columbian Exposition. She requested a cake-like confection smaller than a piece of cake that could be included in boxed lunches. The result was the Palmer House Brownie with walnuts and an apricot glaze." However, a quick read of the Wikipedia page for the hotel, we find that this Hotel did not become part of the Hilton chain until 1945, 52 years after the brownie was invented. "In December 1945, Conrad Hilton bought the Palmer House for $20 million and it was thereafter known as The Palmer House Hilton. In 2005, Hilton sold the property to Thor Equities, but it remains part of the Hilton chain." My question is: Is it legal for a company to claim ownership of a product if they buy the place in which it was created? | In the US, in general anyone can claim anything. Others are free to believe or disbelieve the claim. In theory, a person might base their decision to do business with Hilton partly on this particular claim (this is why some software companies start presentations about their new features with a Safe Harbor statement letting the audience know not to base purchasing decisions on unreleased features), and in that case they could argue that Hilton's claim damaged them by causing them to enter into a contract under false pretenses. I doubt such a case would be meritorious, but there could be some contrived situation where the point of whether Hilton owned the hotel when it invented the brownie was actually important. | If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.” | Yes, it is legal to sell something that uses another product as one of its ingredients. And yes, you can include the name of the product in the ingredients list. That said, if you do it and are successful enough you will probably get a cease and desist letter! The Supreme Court held a long time ago in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty that a buyer can purchase a trademarked good, repackage it, and then resell it. The defendant of course by virtue of its ownership had a right to compound or change what it bought, to divide either the original or the modified product, and to sell it so divided. The court reminds us that trademarks are not copyrights; they not confer a right to prohibit the use of a word or words. ...unquestionably the defendant has a right to communicate... that the trade-marked product is a constituent in the article now offered as new and changed. In this case the name of the original product was included on the package in non-distinct lettering; stating that the original product was contained in the new product. I mention this because the ultimate decision is fact-specific.* So the Supreme Court tells us that we can repackage trademarked goods. The court also tells us a bit about the label - we cannot call out the trademarked name as this might confuse consumers: If the [trademarked name] were allowed to be printed in different letters from the rest of the inscription dictated by the District Court a casual purchaser might look no further and might be deceived. So, what about that FDA, what do we need on the label? You find this answer in 21 CFR 101.4(b)(2). (b) The name of an ingredient shall be a specific name and not a collective (generic) name, except that: (1) Spices, flavorings, colorings and chemical preservatives shall be declared according to the provisions of §101.22. (2) An ingredient which itself contains two or more ingredients and which has an established common or usual name, conforms to a standard established pursuant to the Meat Inspection or Poultry Products Inspection Acts by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, or conforms to a definition and standard of identity established pursuant to section 401 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, shall be designated in the statement of ingredients on the label of such food by either of the following alternatives: (i) By declaring the established common or usual name of the ingredient followed by a parenthetical listing of all ingredients contained therein in descending order of predominance except that, if the ingredient is a food subject to a definition and standard of identity established in subchapter B of this chapter that has specific labeling provisions for optional ingredients, optional ingredients may be declared within the parenthetical listing in accordance with those provisions. (ii) By incorporating into the statement of ingredients in descending order of predominance in the finished food, the common or usual name of every component of the ingredient without listing the ingredient itself. Here is an example of (i): But also note the picture of the box. That Hershey's Kisses trademarked image indicates that there is an agreement between the companies. So only use this image as an example of 21 CFR 101.4(b)(2)(i) ingredients labeling - the box cover is not an example of nominative use. *This is nominative fair use and has been discussed in other questions on this site. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.: one party may use or refer to the trademark of another if 1) The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark; 2) The user only uses as much of the mark as is necessary for the identification; 3) The user does nothing to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. | Finding S seems to be hard and I have not much hope, if her siblings cannot provide any information. I think the "inhabitants registry" (Einwohnermeldeamt) is not allowed to give you her first address in Spain ("Zuzugsanschrift im Ausland") (§§ 44 and 45 Bundesmeldegesetz (BMG)). The best option I see is a court auction (Zwangsversteigerung), more precise a "Teilungsversteigerung". If one of S's siblings want money for the land, he can ask for a court auction at the local court (Amtsgericht). The court will get S's first address in Spain (§ 34 BMG) and if it cannot deliver its letter to S, there will be a "public delivery" (öffentliche Zustellung) through a posting in court. It would take a while, but in the end the land could be yours. Be prepared that the cost for the court auction will be much higher than the 1000€. If you plan to take this way, ask a lawyer for detailed advice. Also you need one of S's siblings to participate in the process. If the trees are really a danger for your house, the heirs could also have an obligation to remove them. Maybe this could help you too. | That depends on how you get the ingredient list. If the list is published and not protected by a patent, then anyone is free to use it in making the same or a similar product. If the product is patented and the ingredient list is covered by the patent, and the patent is currently in force, then making a similar product would probably be patent infringement, and the patent holder could sue and collect damages. If the list is secret, and has been protected as a Trade Secret, and if the would-be imitator gets the formula improperly, then the owner of the formula would have valid grounds for a trade secret lawsuit and to collect damages in that suit. Improper means would include breaking into the owner's files, or inducing an employee or contractor to violate a confidentiality agreement. But analyzing the product and figuring out its composition, a form of reverse engineering would be perfectly proper, and would give the formula owner no claim. Similarly, if the owner was careless and allowed the formula to be disclosed, the imitator would have done nothing improper. So the outcome depends on the details of facts not stated in the question. | Once you have left the hair on the hairdresser's floor, it is no longer your property. They can do what they like with it. In your first two scenarios, you are doing nothing to modify the assumption that you have discarded the hair - you're just letting the hairdresser deal with it. In the third scenario, you are asserting that the hair is still yours; you could gather it up. Similarly, if you had left an empty soda can on a cafe table, the cafe is entitled to assume that you don't want it any longer. They could put it in the recycling bin, or make it into a delightful sculpture, or whatever. If you stop them clearing the table, and say "actually, I'd like to keep that can" - then it's still yours. If you abandon it and walk away, it's not yours. The interpretation of whether you have "discarded" the thing is contextual. There are several possible legal theories about exactly what is going on when you leave objects lying around and wander away. These include the classical Roman view of res derelictae, that the thing becomes ownerless as soon as you physically abandon it with the intention of doing so - and conversely, views such as that of Sir Frederick Pollock, who considered it a "high, grave and dubious question" whether something stops being your property even after you throw it away while declaring that you want to get rid of it. But Pollock would allow that you had transferred ownership of the cut hair to the hairdresser, if only by silently acquiescing to them sweeping it up, rather than because they had claimed an ownerless substance. Either way, the hair is no longer your own, and once it is not yours its fate is not your concern. If you had some agreement with the hairdresser about what would happen, that's another matter, but the default position is that once the hair is theirs, they get to decide what happens with it. The late astronaut Neil Armstrong found out his barber was selling his cut hair as souvenirs. The letter from his lawyer asks for the return of the hair, or payment of a charitable donation, on the special basis of an Ohio law protecting celebrity rights in their 'persona'. It does not assert that Armstrong had any continued property right in the hair itself. The hair samples are still for sale, by the way. Even though your cut hair came from your body, it is not a human tissue to which special rules may apply. Hair is made of keratin and is not cellular, so nothing in the European Tissues and Cells Directive, applicable to Slovakia as an EU member, will kick in regarding your consent. Equally, this is surely not a "wrongful taking of organs, tissues [or] cells" under the Slovakian Criminal Code, sections 159-160. You may feel attached to it, in a continuing emotional sense, despite the result of the scissors: but it is not treated as specially as your actual flesh in terms of consent to what happens after it's removed. Also in EU law, the Waste Framework Directive covers "waste", by definition, "any substance or object which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard". Although there is no coding in the European Waste Catalogue for human hair, it's classed as B3070 in the Basel Convention, an example of a B3 non-hazardous organic waste; Slovakia is one of the parties to this agreement. The substance of the Directive, as implemented in local law, would affect the onward destiny of the hair - such as which bin the hairdresser could put it in for collection, how it may be recycled into another product, or treated as a by-product instead of waste as such. There is a large and confusing case law about all that. Thankfully for you, it is the hairdresser who would have to deal with the implications. | No It's a trade secret owned by FICO, formerly Fair, Isaac and Company (1956-2003) and Fair Isaac Corporation (2003-2009). As a trade secret, it is protected and breaches of the secrecy carry criminal and civil punishments. Btw: Releasing the formula would invalidate all scores based on it, as it would open doors to manipulate the own score. | If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft. |
Does a trademark application for technology like semiconductors or voting machines require an invention or embodiment? New York Times' China Grants Ivanka Trump Initial Approval for New Trademarks: HONG KONG — China granted initial approval for 16 new trademarks to Ivanka Trump, the president’s elder daughter and senior adviser, renewing questions about the Trump family’s intermingling of official roles and international business interests. Among the broad array of trademarked items were shoes, shirts and sunglasses — the sort of products that were sold under her recently closed fashion label. Other categories given initial approval were less obvious fits, like voting machines, homes for senior citizens and semiconductors. (emphasis added) Washington Post: China greenlights large batch of Ivanka Trump trademark applications (Mercury News also): HONG KONG — Ivanka Trump-branded semiconductors and voting machines? In China? (emphasis added) That’s an odd, if remote, possibility after Chinese trademark regulators awarded preliminary approval for 16 trademark applications from the president’s daughter and White House senior adviser, online Chinese government filings show. The approvals by Beijing on Oct. 13 were notable for their timing, coming just as Chinese and U.S. officials were seeking to restart trade talks that had collapsed amid acrimony. They also raised eyebrows for covering a grab-bag of products, including electoral hardware in a country not exactly known for its elections. Question: Do trademark applications for specific technological products like voting machines or semiconductors require the submission of a related patent, or a design, invention, or at least example of an embodiment as part of the trademark application? | In US law, a trademark application only requires that you are now selling, or intend to sell in the reasonably near future, a product (or service) using the specified name. You don't have to provide an example, or a design, and it does not have to be patented. The applicant might be planning to license someone else's patent, or to market off-the-shelf tech not protected by patent. The applicant might be planning to market tech still under development and not yet ready to be submitted for a patent. I do not know Chinese trademark law, but I suspect it is similar in this regard. I have not heard of any country that requires a patent, a design, or an example of a working product along with a trademark registration. However, there is, in many countries, a requirement that actual sales occur within a limited period after the trademark is granted, and if this does not happen, the trademark registration may be canceled. The time allowed varies. | First, "I've seen some people say it is legal to do so but I want a second opinion." This is not a legal opinion. This is only in response to the question "Can you use (TM) on a product that is not Trademarked"? Second, you did not specify a jurisdiction. Since you mentioned Apple, I will assume USA. tl/dr: Yes, you can used the TM mark and no, it is not fraudulent. In the USA, there are three "trademark" symbols, (R), (TM), and (SM). (R) - (Registered) The federal registration symbol. This may be used only once the mark is actually registered in the USPTO. It my not be used while the application is pending. (TM) - (Trademark) / (SM) - (Service Mark) - According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office: If you claim rights to use a mark, you may use the "TM" (trademark) or "SM" (service mark) designation to alert the public to your claim of a "common-law" mark. No registration is necessary to use a "TM" or "SM" symbol and you may continue to use these symbols even if the USPTO refuses to register your mark. Those symbols put people on notice that you claim rights in the mark, although common law doesn't give you all the rights and benefits of federal registration. | Both are to some extent correct, but as might be expected, the USPTO site is more accurate. Trademarks owned by virtue of use, rather than registration, are protected only in the market area in where actual use can be documented. Even state registration may be limited to a geographic market area in which use can be shown, and may not extend to the whole state unless use throughout the state, or at least in most major markets in the state, can be shown. As discussed in the news story "Burger King Is Banned From Opening Within 20 Miles Of This Original, Mom-And-Pop Burger King Sign" The owners of a small restaurant branded "Burger King" secured a state-level trademark on that name, but it only serves to exclude the well-known fast-food chain from a 20-mile circle. Remember, the prime purpose of a trademark is to identify the source of goods or services, and to prevent one supplier from benefiting by the reputation of another. In an area where the first supplier does not do business, there is considered to be no such risk of unfair competition. Also, nationwide protection is one of the benefits of federal registration. In addition, a mark is only protected for the same class of goods or services. Nationwide use of "Pear" as a mark for a brand of computer would not prevent use of the same word as a mark for a brand of automobile, say, or for a restaurant chain. Note also that trademarks are normally at most national in scope. A US Federal registration will offer no protection in Canada, or any other country. | Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”? | The 9th Circuit decision actually held that the challenged regulations constitute a prior restraint on speech that offends the First Amendment which is not the same as saying that computer software is speech. A crucial differentiation is that by prohibiting talking about the technology, the regulations imposed a "prepublication licensing scheme that burdens scientific expression", which distinguishes the TikTok case from talking about cryptography. The regulations burden business transactions, which have for a long time not been protected by strict scrutiny. The first hill one would have to climb would be showing that there is a real First Amendment issue. There is no First Amendment right for the Chinese government to spy on Americans. The second issue is whether narrow tailoring means that if someone can come up with an alternative to an outright ban, then the regulation is not narrowly-enough tailored. We may eventually get a clearer guideline on that, since state governments have imposed very many restrictions on constitutional liberties, in order to prevent the spread of covid, when a less restrictive action would be warning people that this is a dangerous disease. Many restrictions have survived strict scrutiny because they were believed to be necessary to achieve that governmental end. The executive order identifies the compelling government interest: TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users, including Internet and other network activity information such as location data and browsing and search histories. This data collection threatens to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information — potentially allowing China to track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage. In light of that, it is hard to see that a warning notice would be effective in the face of this threat. Seizing the company and its IP and handing it over to Microsoft would be a less restrictive measure that would probably be as effective and would be protective of the First Amendment rights of teenagers, but it would also be somewhat outside the scope of current US law, so it isn't an actual alternative. I conclude that the ban is the least restrictive effective response to the threat. But it is not entirely clear what the constitutional rules are regarding effectiveness of alternatives (does 20% less restrictive compel a 10% less effective solution?). | No. A trademark is specific to an industry or type of products or services. And, while it is virtually impossible to get a new trade name with a three letter acronym because almost all of them are taken, three words that start with the same letters as a three letter acronym is not infringement on the acronym. You might very well be infringing if you used "I.B.M." to sell computer equipment. But, "Internal brilliance method", spelled out, would not infringe I.B.M., even in the computer equipment industry, and "I.B.M." in the food service industry, for example, would not be trademark infringement on the International Business Machines" trademark of "I.B.M." for good and services of the type that it offers. | That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small. | I only address the core legal question. The first question regards where the review appeared: on the facility's own web page, or on some third party web page? In the latter case, there is the possibility that soliciting a modified review in exchange for something of value violates the terms of usage for that web site. There are also US federal regulations pertaining to advertising, as well as state regulations. The federal regulations are here. The main question is whether what you say constitutes an endorsement, as specified here. They define an endorsement as: any advertising message (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser. The regulation in fact gives some helpful examples (reading them helps to clarify what an "endorsement" is), the last of which involves a dog: Example 8: A consumer who regularly purchases a particular brand of dog food decides one day to purchase a new, more expensive brand made by the same manufacturer. She writes in her personal blog that the change in diet has made her dog's fur noticeably softer and shinier, and that in her opinion, the new food definitely is worth the extra money. This posting would not be deemed an endorsement under the Guides. Assume now that the consumer joins a network marketing program under which she periodically receives various products about which she can write reviews if she wants to do so. If she receives a free bag of the new dog food through this program, her positive review would be considered an endorsement under the Guides. The distinction at issue is whether the suggestion of receiving something of value might influence a person's statements. You can pay for a positive review, as a reward for saying nice things, as long as the reviewer had no reason to think that they would get get something in return for a review. Taking your review to be an endorsement, as required here, Endorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser. The regulation does not require you to reveal every thing that came into your mind in writing the review, but it is pretty clear that suppressing the concern about vaccination paperwork and the star count constitutes a dishonest statement of opinion of the endorser. Material connections must also be revealed: When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience), such connection must be fully disclosed. For example, when an endorser who appears in a television commercial is neither represented in the advertisement as an expert nor is known to a significant portion of the viewing public, then the advertiser should clearly and conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of compensation prior to and in exchange for the endorsement or the fact that the endorser knew or had reason to know or to believe that if the endorsement favored the advertised product some benefit, such as an appearance on television, would be extended to the endorser In the 7th example under material disclosure, they describe a blogger who received something of value in connection with a review: the blogger should clearly and conspicuously disclose that he received the gaming system free of charge I should point out that these regulations are written by the FTC, and the implied interpretation (such as that the blogger should disclose... with no clearly stated penalty for failure to disclose) is an FTC interpretation. 15 USC 52 prohibits false advertisements for services affecting commerce. This is the jurisdictional aspect of their complaint against Cure Encapsulations, where defendants paid for reviews on a third-party website (this case involves a relationship between defendant and a fourth-party company that apparently hunts for and pays reviewers). This is apparently the first instance in which the FTC has gone against a business for paying for reviews on a third party web site, so it's not a foregone conclusion that they will prevail in court. Still, Chevron deference means that they will probably win at least on the jurisdictional question. The main difference is that in the Cure Encapsulation case, the violation was even more egregious in that the individuals were not even customers, and in this instance the would-(not)-be review was not the honest opinion of the endorser. |
I believe this is too much, covering ALL of my windows These A4 notices where covering every window of my car, 3 on windscreen, 2 back widow, 1 one each other, i believe a simple don't park would suffice, this was over kill, can I do anything | (Converting comment into an answer) You could sue for criminal damage, if any actual damage is caused during the removal of those notices - however, that will cost you an initial outlay in solicitors fees and court costs and isn't guaranteed to have a successful outcome. You could also just take this as a learnable event and not park in other peoples spots? The owner of the parking spot may have the legal right to have your car removed at your expense, and/or issue you with a penalty charge if suitable notices have been posted, so you might consider yourself to have got off lightly here perhaps? | a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself. | This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied. | The route described is probably in violation of Section 22100 of the vehicle code: Except as provided in Section 22100.5 or 22101, the driver of any vehicle intending to turn upon a highway shall do so as follows: (a) Right Turns. Both the approach for a right-hand turn and a right-hand turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb The approach for the second turn is being made from the middle of the road. Neither of the exceptions apply, as 22100.5 is about U-turns at traffic lights, while 22101 is about turns controlled by markings or signs. Additionally, since you describe the route as a "curve to the street and turn right out", it's probably in violation of Section 22105: No person shall make a U-turn upon any highway where the driver of such vehicle does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon. Since the driver didn't make a complete right turn, it's likely that the forward view of oncoming traffic was partially blocked by the car's A-pillar or even the passenger seat, while the backward view of traffic was limited because none of the car's mirrors was pointed in the correct direction. It's certainly in violation of Section 22108: Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The side road's not a hundred feet wide. There's no way the driver could have given the required signal for the second right turn. There's a decent chance this is also in violation of Section 22102 of the vehicle code: No person in a business district shall make a U-turn, except at an intersection, or on a divided highway where an opening has been provided in accordance with Section 21651. The six lanes of the main highway make it likely that this intersection is in a business district. "Business district" is rather broad, including not only roads lined by businesses, but roads lined by apartment complexes and other multi-family housing developments. And finally, the catch-all offense of "reckless driving" (Section 23103) could probably be applied: A person who drives a vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. | They can charge you with anything they think you did. And yes, the circumstances play a large part in the decision to arrest, charge and prosecute. However, circumstances include you: Reputation is everything. If you are a 17 year old male troublemaker with a long juvie rap sheet, including 3 past instances of stealing golf carts, then expect to be charged with the theft. Honestly you would probably be charged with the theft if you had simply stayed away and called the cops to report it abandoned. If you came upon it in your vehicle and it's obviously blocking the road and your apparent motive is to figure out how to move it so you can get by, then you're probably in the clear. If you're a 44 year old owner of a golf cart business, PAL supporter, city councilwoman and know half the cops including one in the car that stopped you, then, they're going to pretty much listen to you as far as what's the deal with the cart. Probably ask you for help moving it safely, might even ask you to get your cart-hauler to take it to impound. You won't hear from the D.A. obviously; nobody will say "Sue Councilwoman stole a golf cart" because it would sound absurd and make the speaker appear to be a politically motivated liar. That's the power of reputation; no one would speak it even if you did steal it. (Of course if you got caught doing it on a Ring camera, well, the hero takes a fall!) Anything in between, they'll deal with it in proportion to both the facts about you and the fact about the situation. You do not have a right to get the same credibility as the councilwoman; that is earned. That's the power of reputation. | If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail. | Tell whatever lawyer is drafting the "official paperwork" about the problem and ask if it is covered or if you need to change the text or add a rider. If neither company competes, a mutual release/license of existing shared code should be perfectly manageable for an experienced attorney. | Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on. |
Incomplete building rented on commercial lease Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? [![enter image description here][2]][2] [2]: https://i.stack.imgur.com/3pezU.jpg?s=512 | Short Answer Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? Yes. Unless your lease says otherwise. Your sole source of legal protections is your lease. Without knowing the detailed provisions of your lease, it is impossible to know. Long Answer The General Rule In commercial leases, to a much greater degree than in residential leases, the principle of buyer beware (a.k.a. caveat emptor) applies. Commercial leases are typically negotiated between sophisticated parties, and if the tenant doesn't want to start paying rent until the certificate of occupancy is issued despite a lease that says otherwise, then that is tough luck and the tenant is bound to the terms of the lease. Commercial leases are generally rented in "as is" condition, sometimes with and sometimes without a tenant finish and improvements allowance from the landlord. Unless otherwise agreed, in a commercial lease, the burden is on the tenant to do "due diligence" including a physical inspection of the property by a professional inspector and independent review of the zoning status of the property to confirm that the tenant's business is allowed to operate at that location, much as a buyer of real estate would. If the tenant identifies an objection during the due diligence period set forth in the lease or contract to enter into a lease with the tenant, then the tenant can choose to get out of the lease obligation. But, there is only a due diligence condition if the tenant bargains for it. The lease allocates responsibility to maintain the building in good repair and may allocated this responsibility to the landlord or the the tenant. In one of the most common types of commercial leases, called a triple net lease, virtually all maintenance obligations are the tenant's responsibility: The triple net absolves the landlord of the most risk of any net lease. Even the costs of structural maintenance and repairs must be paid by the tenant in addition to rent, property taxes and insurance premiums. Some firms, such as WeWork build their entire business model around entering into the "as is", triple net commercial leases with landlords that are the norm, and then subletting the properties to smaller businesses on a furnished, all maintenance and building services provided, gross lease basis. Many states have statutory or common law implied warranties of habitability in the case of residential leases that require that a certificate of occupancy be in place and that other conditions be met by the landlord: An implied warranty of habitability is a warranty implied by law in all residential leases [ed. in states that have such a warranty] that the premises are fit and habitable for human habitation and that the premises will remain fit and habitable throughout the duration of the lease. New Mexico, in particular, has many statutory protections for residential tenants (statutes found here). But, almost none of these protections extend to commercial leases in New Mexico, because commercial leases are not leases of dwelling units, as defined in the relevant statutes. Note that not every state even has an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies. Colorado did not have one until the early 2000s, and it had only very weak protections for tenants regarding habitability until the current decade. Before then, in Colorado, a defective or unsafe condition of the premises was not a defense to paying rent under either a commercial or a residential lease in the state. In theory, a county or municipal government could impose a habitability requirement on commercial leases. But, this is very uncommon because, as the examples below illustrate, there are circumstances where it is sensible, even in a fair deal, to place the burden of making property subject to a commercial lease habitable. Examples Of Situations Where This Would Not Be Required In A Fair Deal Most commercial tenants insist upon terms that say that the obligation to pay rent starts when a certificate of occupancy is issued and the tenant is allowed to take possession of the premises. But, there would certainly be some times when a commercial tenant would pay rent on property that does not yet have a certificate of occupancy. For example, in what is called a "pad rental", a business rents a basically vacant lot with only a concrete foundation and utility hookups and zoning approvals in place, and then the tenant builds a shop or office building on the pad. See, e.g., this commercial lease offer on Loopnet, a major internet site for listing property available to be leased by businesses: ABOUT 4900-5100 N WICKHAM RD , MELBOURNE, FL 32940 Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Listing ID: 15146692 Date Created: 2/11/2019 Last Updated: 3/19/2019 1 LOT AVAILABLE - Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Lease Term 20 Years Service Type To Be Determined Date Available Now Space Type Relet Lot Size 0.69 AC DESCRIPTION Pad ready site with all utilities, parking field, ingress/egress, retention, and site lighting IN. Join Goodwill, Einstein's Bagel, Verizon, Twins Car Wash, Wickham Road Music, and Nail Salon in this 100% leased new retail center. HIGHLIGHTS Pad ready site. In a commercial pad lease, typically, a tenant would start paying rent immediately and the length of time needed to get the tenant's shop built and approved for occupancy by local government officials is their problem. But, even then, the terms would depend on what was negotiated between the landlord and the tenant which would depend to a great extent on how hot the local commercial real estate market was and on the other terms. A landlord will usually offer more favorable terms (such as a provision stating that rent is not owed until a certificate of occupancy is issued) in a weak rental market, but may also decide to have very tough lease terms with a somewhat lower monthly or annual rental rate. Also, as in the example above, conditioning rent payment on occupancy or availability for occupancy, is less common in a very long term lease such as the twenty year lease being offered for the pad rental above. Something very similar is done in an existing building that requires tenant finish. At one extreme, the landlord will do tenant finish to the tenant's specifications at the landlord's expense and the tenant will only start to pay rent when the tenant takes occupancy. At the other extreme, the tenant will start paying rent immediately and do the tenant finish at the tenant's sole expense. In between, the tenant may do the tenant's own tenant finish pursuant to landlord approved plans, with the landlord contributing a tenant finish allowance that will often be less than the full anticipated cost of tenant finish work, and the rent will be reduced or waived for a set period of time which may be less than the actual or anticipated time that it takes to complete the tenant finish. This gives the tenant an incentive to not waste tenant finish dollars and to push the contractors doing the work to finish as soon as possible. In yet another example, it wouldn't be terribly uncommon for a landlord to rent a commercial space that is already occupied by squatters, or holdover tenants, to a new tenant on a triple net basis. In a lease like that, the tenant is responsible for evicting the current occupants, rather than the landlord. The promise that the leased property won't be occupied by someone else when the lease commences is called the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" (which is "a covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants."). This provision is often, but not always, included in a commercial lease, although often, courts will imply in law a covenant of quiet enjoyment into even a commercial lease, in the absence of express language in the lease stating that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is not intended to be included in the lease. Conclusion It all boils down to the terms of the lease and a reasonable construction of the relevant lease terms. The fact that there is such a thin amount of legal protection from unfair lease terms is one of the reasons that most commercial tenants hire an attorney to help them negotiate the terms of a commercial lease, in addition to, or instead of, a commercial real estate broker. Footnote: Why Is Commercial Lease Law So Harsh? The duties of a commercial tenant are much closer to, and in some cases, almost identical to, those of an owner of real property and are not infrequently for long terms such as twenty, or even ninety-nine years. Why would a landlord and tenant enter into a commercial lease in these situations, rather than having the prospective tenant simply by the property subject to a mortgage? A lot of this is tax driven. Many businesses would purchase their buildings rather than lease them if taxes were not a consideration and the commercial lease is basically a tax favored alternative to a mortgage payment. When the commercial landlord is a mortgage lender in all but name, and a commercial tenant is a building owner in all but name, it makes sense to place the legal maintenance responsibilities of a building owner on the commercial tenant. A business can deduct every dollar paid in rent from its revenues when determining its taxable income, even the portion economically attributable to land value and depreciation in the structure of the building, as it is paid. But, if the business finances the purchase of the property with a mortgage, the business can deduct the interest paid, but not the principal payments. Depreciation of improvements on real estate (for most of recent U.S. tax history, over a straight line 39.5 year depreciation period) can counterbalance some of the principal payments, although often more slowly than the principal payments are actually made. Also, if depreciation deductions wipe out too much of the business's income, those depreciation deductions are disallowed or deferred. Furthermore, the portion of the purchase price of property attributed to land value can't be depreciated at all. In many cases, this quirk of the tax law is addressed with a business structure in which: (1) a non-profit that doesn't care about the tax treatment of its income leases the land to (2) another business that builds a multi-tenant building on the property which it owns even though it doesn't own the land the building is built upon, subject to a mortgage with a long amortization period similar to the depreciation period for the building, which in turn is (3) leased to businesses that actually used the multi-tenant building by the building owner. Second Footnote On Rent Control and Cooperative Apartments Even further afield, in places like New York City that have rent control, residential tenants become more economically equivalent to apartment owners, and residential landlords become more economically equivalent to a combined mortgage lenders and home owner's association. There was a strong demand for rent control in New York City at the time that rent control was adopted, because economic necessity meant that mostly people needed to live in one unit of a multi-unit apartment building, but the legal concept of ownership of one unit within a larger apartment building that is now commonly called a "condominium" in the United States, did not exist. So, there were a lot of renters in New York City who very much wanted to be de facto apartment owners who didn't have the legal tools available at the time to achieve this goal. The other work around which was used in the Northeast before the condominium was invented was a "cooperative apartment", in which all of the residents of a particular apartment building owned the entire building and were jointly and severally liable on the mortgage on the building, but then were allocated a unit within the building in exchange for economic obligations to the cooperative association that managed the building on a not for profit basis for its owners. | Let's analyse the landlord's claims: You have an assured shorthold tenancy agreement. The fact that there isn't a written contract doesn't change this as a verbal agreement is legally binding. That's true. A tenancy exists even if this was never written down, and it's an AST by default if the requirements for being one are met. Payment of rent constitutes acceptance of these terms. Payment of rent by the tenant, and its acceptance by the landlord, is sufficient for a tenancy to be regarded as existing. The tenancy can only be terminated early from the permission of the landlord. That's rubbish. A tenant can always end a tenancy, but there may be restrictions. In particular, a tenant cannot end a tenancy before the end of a fixed term without the agreement of the landlord, but the landlord has an obligation to find new tenants if this happens. However, I've been unable to find any information as to whether a fixed term exists if there's no written agreement. Assuming there is no fixed term, then for a month-to-month tenancy, the tenant must provide one month's notice to end the tenancy, with that month ending at the end of a rental period (i.e. the day before the next payment would be due). If you leave early this is legally abandonment and you are still responsible for paying rent for the duration of the tenancy That's true. ... if you do leave next month I'll consider you in rent arrears and pursue payment through legal means That is possible - but if you give notice as described above, then the tenancy will end, and (assuming you're up to date with the rent) you'll no longer be liable. | I got and answer from lawyer in Netherlands. To rent out to the company is not without risks. You rent out to the company and the company rents out to the actual user of the apartment. That is subletting. The sub-lessee is protected by law. So when the company fails to pay, you can end the contract with the company (you have to go to court for this), but then you will become the lessor to the actual user (=sub-lessee) then. If you feel that that is against your interests, you have to start a court procedure within half a year to end the contract with the actual user. Also note: it is forbidden to rent out to people that don't have a legal status. So you make sure you trust the company very well if you are going to rent out to them. I recommend to seek help from a real estate agent that is well known and member of NVM or other trustworthy organisation. | You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company. | You have acknowledged that the house was in "new" condition, which establishes a baseline for determining if the present state is normal wear and tear. The lease and California law agree that normal wear and tear is not the responsibility of the tenant. You may then need to sue the landlord in small claims court to get the remainder of the deposit (the above guide will be useful). The thing that is not clear is exactly what constitutes "normal wear and tear". The state guide tends to emphasize extreme forms of damage such as dogs chewing the woodwork, or cigarette burns. If you do ordinary cleaning on the walls, windows, carpets etc. then it is more likely that the judge will find in your favor. | Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner. | Consult a lawyer These issues are quite common and their impact depends on your jurisdiction (usually local governments handle this) and the attitude of your potential lenders/buyers. In most cases, local governments have the power, in extremis, of ordering the demolition of unpermitted work. However, this is normally done only when the work is irredeemably unsafe or adversely affects the amenity of neighbours. More common might be an order to make good any defective work, possibly to current rather than historical codes after which they will retroactively grant the permissions. Some lenders will refuse to lend if there are unpermitted works. Others will only lend against the unimproved land value less the cost of demolition. The same is true of insurers. As for buyers, well, its making you stop and think, isn't it? Common solutions are to make your offer contingent on the current owner cleaning all this up before you close or offering less to cover the risks you are assuming. This may cause you to miss the property but that's the risk you run. | What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. |
Schwab 401k 'hacked'; somehow they added/linked an unknown bank account and transfered out ~10% of my balance!! How I recently received a couple of 'notification' emails from Schwab re. the approval/completion of various changes I supposedly requested to an old 'inactive' (past employer) 401k account, including: the addition of a bank account linked to my Schwab 401k; the successful transfer of 10% of my 401k to the linked bank account; and the required IRS 'penalty' forms resulting from my 401k early withdrawl. Having significant Network/IT related experience, my first reaction was to 'trace/track' any info I could find to help ID the thief, however, I noticed that the transferred funds had just cleared that same day (literally, ~6 hours earlier) AND the added/linked unknown bank account was still active; so, I immediately set up a reverse transfer back to my 401k (~10% +$50 to cover any potential fees I might need to cover as a result). I contacted Schwab next, and explained what I had done. They all seemed to get a kick out of my reverse transfer, but also informed me that my funds would be returned regardless and they would handle reverting my account to its original status with additional security protocols. In the end, my reverse transfer went through and the unknown bank account was deleted. About a week later Schwab subtracted the extra $50 reverse transfer portion. I contacted them to find out why (-$50), and what the status was with my ID/Bank Fraud (victim) case. I was shocked to find that their position/policy in such security breach / fraud cases was; "these ID Theft rings are highly sophisticated and nearly impossible to catch....it very well may have been an 'inside' job scenario, and there really is not anything more Schwab can do unless the police get involved...which typically is a dead end anyway...". So...my general question(s): Is there any truth to Schwabs' responses or are they just trying to avoid any bad publicity? It's been over 3 months now and I am still feeling an excessive insecurity regarding all my internet financial accounts, and a continuous suspicion that it may have been a 'personal attack'. Any advice or suggestions on dealing with this situation or my options (legal or otherwise) should I choose to pursue this matter would be gratefully appreciated. And, where did the extra $50 go? Why does Schwab get to profit from my loss (do I still have to pay the penalty for early withdrawl or do I need some documentation from Schwab?). | In essence, Schwab is stating that they are not a law enforcement agency and they have neither the interest nor the legal right to pursue criminals. They state that they will assist law enforcement but also tell you that, from their experience, law enforcement while they have the legal right also don't have any interest in doing so. This is completely correct. I'm not going to comment on what you should do to protect yourself from identity theft. With respect to the reverse transfer: you are on very shaky legal ground here - you transferred funds without authorization and you are not legally allowed to do this even to recover your own losses. If you had limited this to just recovering your own funds then you would be extremely unlikely to be prosecuted but by taking more than was yours you have technically committed a theft of your own. That said, it seems unlikely that law enforcement will be interested - Schwab are not making a complaint and I doubt that the original thief will - for obvious reasons. However, its possible (even likely) that this was not the thief's bank account - this is likely to be an innocent third party's account that the thief was using to obfuscate their crime. If so, the money you took (both the original amount and the extra $50) you took actually belongs to that innocent party - your money had probably spent very little time in that account. | Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams. | If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back. | No The bank is not pretending in any way that the money received from depositors is guaranteed. If they had done, then that would be deceptive marketing. The bank held itself out to be a bank and to provide the services that a bank provides. They are allowed to assume that their customers know how banking works. It is clear that you do not because both explanations you have provided are wrong. | Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose. | The short answer is that a few individual trades would be legal (e.g. if you sell some to a friend), but doing so on a regular basis for profit (e.g. offering a sale price and a bid price to all comers) would not unless you get the appropriate licenses and comply with relevant laws. Doing this is onerous. Any kind of "money services business" is subject to federal regulation. The federal definition is a business trading more than $1,000 per day, so in theory as long as you keep below that you wouldn't have to worry about federal law. In practice you might find yourself having to prove to the Feds that you have not exceeded the threshold on any day in the past. There is also a separate licence regime for Virginia which you must also comply with. Finally, if you sell Bitcoins to someone when you have a reason to suspect that they are planning to do something illegal with them then you are breaking the law. Edit: While its not strictly a legal issue, some people who have traded Bitcoins outside of recognised exchanges have had their bank accounts closed because the activity has triggered the bank's money-laundering detectors. Edit 2: All the above applies if you are trading directly with people who you found on something like localbitcoins.com. Trade via an exchange such as BitStamp is legal: all the AML and KYC regulations are their problem not yours. You merely have to provide the necessary identification to open an account. | IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here. | Yes, you are then an online bank. This is an issue that computer games have had to figure out, when it was possible to move money both ways, cash to game gold and game gold to cash. (think Diablo's Real Money Auction House). If you allow people to store cash value in the game, and then take the cash value back out, then you are banking. Even though it's a game, you'll have people using it as a bank, and not playing the game at all but merely using it for funds storage and movement. Even if you surcharge significantly to deter this (i.e. $1 buys 90 game gold, and 110 game gold pays $1), there will always be people willing to pay the surcharge -- criminals. This is the whole point of the Homeland Security-driven "Know Your Customer" laws. The government doesn't want criminals using your real-money-trading platform to launder money. I know that you imagine a business model where this would be awesome. Actually you'll spend most of your time dealing with this kind of thing: Ann Onymous signs up and does nothing on your platform except load the account with money and send it to someone. Harold Hack is longtime customer who is active on the platform in all the normal ways. One day Harold adds a card, and loads an unusual amount of money onto the account. Both of them transfer money to Boris Badguy, who withdraws it. All fine, working as intended. But then, Ann and Harold's credit card payments reverse. They were stolen credit cards. But you're angry at Ann and Harold, and you dun them ferociously to make good their payment per your Terms of Service. Ann is unreachable. You don't believe Harold because deadbeats lie. It takes you awhile to realize this isn't first-party credit card fraud, and Harold's account was actually hacked. Harold doesn't normally post from Moldova at 3:30am. By this time, Boris is in the wind. Unfortunately, your business model doesn't let you make enough money to offset these kinds of losses. And it's hell on customer relations. You finally get arrested for using customer deposits to pay payroll, because you should've been keeping it in escrow. Being a bank is not for amateurs. |
Diplomas Must Be Under 10 Years Old? Full disclosure: This was a dumpster fire on Reddit, and I am just posting here to get a more nuanced opinion. I am not the original asker and I don’t know which US state. Supposedly, there is a tech company that has instituted a rule that, when making decisions about hiring or promoting, they will only consider degrees that were obtained within the last 10 years. Is this legal? I can certainly see an argument for this being age discrimination, but could there also be a counterargument that anyone can always go back to school, and in the tech industry there are legitimate reasons why a more recent diploma would be more valuable? | This policy would appear to have a disparate impact on workers age 40 and older, given that most workers obtain degrees in their 20s and few obtain a second degree later. Workers age 40 and older are protected from employment discrimination under the ADEA. Policies with a disparate impact may be considered discriminatory, but not necessarily. The EEOC rule as of 2012 is that such a policy is not illegal if it is based on a "reasonable factor other than age". It is not clear to me whether the 10-year degree policy would pass this test, and it might depend on how the employer justified the rule. Here is the discussion from the EEOC's FAQ: 8.What determines whether an employment practice is based on Reasonable Factors Other than Age? An employment practice is based on an RFOA when it was reasonably designed and administered to achieve a legitimate business purpose in light of the circumstances, including its potential harm to older workers. Example 1: If a police department decided to require applicants for patrol positions to pass a physical fitness test to be sure that the officers were physically able to pursue and apprehend suspects, it should know that such a test might exclude older workers more than younger ones. Nevertheless, the department's actions would likely be based on an RFOA if it reasonably believed that the test measured the speed and strength appropriate to the job, and if it did not know, or should not have known, of steps that it could have taken to reduce harm to older workers without unduly burdening the department. The rule emphasizes the need for an individualized consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular situation. It includes the following list of considerations relevant to assessing reasonableness: The extent to which the factor is related to the employer's stated business purpose; The extent to which the employer defined the factor accurately and applied the factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to which managers and supervisors were given guidance or training about how to apply the factor and avoid discrimination; The extent to which the employer limited supervisors' discretion to assess employees subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the supervisors were asked to evaluate are known to be subject to negative age-based stereotypes; The extent to which the employer assessed the adverse impact of its employment practice on older workers; and The degree of the harm to individuals within the protected age group, in terms of both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the employer took steps to reduce the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such steps. Here is the full text of the rule, 77 FR 19080. | Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section. | "As we know non-adults aren't allow to carry weapons" This is not something that we know or an obvious point. It is also not obvious that a knife would qualify as a weapon for these purposes. This would not be true in most jurisdictions in the world. I have no idea what knife control laws look like in China or Taiwan. A reference to why you think that this is the case would be helpful. Even if there are laws banning possession of knives (i.e. carrying knives) when one is in public for use as a weapon, it would be very surprising to me if teens weren't allowed to possess knives in a kitchen, or a work site where a knife was a necessary tool. It would similarly surprise me if a teen working on a knife design in a craftsman's workshop would be illegal. What makes you think that any of these things are illegal in China or Taiwan? This might have been illegal in Japan in the 1600s when metal blades were highly regulated (this is one of the reasons that most Japanese food is served with portions pre-cut to be bite sized), but I very much doubt that teen possession of knives for practical purposes is illegal in any of those places today. There is also, in general, nothing wrong with factories run by adults making knifes from other people's designs. They do that all the time and it wouldn't be illegal to do so just because the designer wasn't allowed to use the product of the factory in public. I would be surprised if a factory even asked how old the designer was, particularly if he was operating through a company formed for him (something an adult might have to do). The harder question would be whether the teen can enter into an enforceable and valid contract with a factory without having the co-signature of a parent or guardian. Many countries don't allow this so that the teen is not exploited into agreeing to a big contract on unfair terms. Also, many countries make a distinction between criminal acts committed by adults and the same acts committed by minors. A teen, particularly a young teen, may be under the relevant law, capable of only engaging in juvenile delinquency, rather than an adult felony. But, again, I don't know how this is handled in Taiwan or China. In general, the legal system in Taiwan strongly resembles that of the legal systems in Continental Europe not long after World War II (i.e. in the 1940s), with its own local developments since then. But, China's legal system is quite unique and is not very similar to the common law legal systems of England and former or current English colonies, or the civil law legal system of Continental Europe (or for that matter, Islamic law). China's legal system is different at the level of very deep concepts of legal process, of what is and isn't law, and of many core legal concepts. It also has piecemeal bits that are imposed by treaty even though they are not organically natural fits with the rest of the Chinese legal system (e.g. its intellectual property laws). | There is no generalisation. The "articles" are articles of clerkship. The context permits the implication of that specific usage, in the same way that talking about "cars" at a racetrack isn't a generalisation of the word "car" - it's an implication of specifically racecars. Ancestry.co.uk explains well what the articles actually are. Briefly, they are simply fixed-term apprenticeship contracts between an established practicing lawyer and a student who wishes to become a lawyer. | Yes. It is legal. Curriculum requirements are policy decisions of an institution, not binding contracts with students. It might be ill advised policy, but it is not prohibited. | You cannot be compelled to sign a form indicating that you agree to something. However, your lack of agreement does not override a policy that they have authority to set. There is a contractual way that this could work out for them, depending on what exactly the document is. To be a contract, the parties must agree to the terms voluntarily, and if you do not agree to the terms, there is no contract. A 10 year old child cannot be bound to a contract, anyhow, so the child's consent is legally irrelevant, though strategically a good idea in the sense of alerting the child to their obligation. To be a contract, both sides must offer something that they are not already obligated to provide. What is the school offering? On the school's side, they might claim "We offer an education", but as a public school, they already have that obligation. Schools have broad authority to impose rules in order to operate, so in lieu of a successful lawsuit that the district overstepped their authority and violated someone's constitutional rights, the school could have a policy prohibiting use of a cell phone in school. Paired with such a policy, they can grant conditional permission, subject to the parent (and symbolically, the child) agreeing to certain terms. Since they are not obligated to allow cell phones at all, they are offering something of value to you, and you have a contract. The cell phone owner could try suing the school for keeping the phone, but the suit would fail because there was a breach of the contract. A strategy probably not worth pursuing is arguing that the confiscation clause is unconscionable (which would void the contract, which entitles the child to have a cell phone at school). Confiscating the phone is not theft, since the intent is not to permanently deprive the owner of their property (just as it is not theft when you have to leave guns or recording devices at the security desk). If a student were to take a forbidden thing without the owner's authorization (such as a gun, or a phone) and it was then confiscated, the rightful owner might be able to sue the school – as long as their hands are clear (if they had no knowledge that the thing was taken and used in an unauthorized manner). In this case, the parent clearly knows and authorizes. | How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management. | You can be fired in Canada for criticizing the employer, or even complaining about the weather. There is a distinction between Termination Without Cause and Termination With Cause. In the latter case, which requires a serious reason related to the employee's conduct, you can be fired without advance notice and with no severance pay. If the employees actions are fundamentally inconsistent with their obligation to the employer or are substantially prejudicial to the business in a way that damages employer's business or reputation, they may be terminated with cause. Examples of cause would include insubordination, theft, or abusing customers. If you want to fire a person without cause (and assuming that this is an indefinite employment contract as opposed to a fixed-term contract), you have to give "reasonable notice". There is a statutory minimum, but the courts usually apply a higher common law standard which means that you need to hire a labor lawyer to know what that period is, though 24 months is apparently a relatively safe figure (not always safe). The factors entering into that decision are described here (kind of job, length of service, age, availability of similar jobs; plus, how the termination was handled). You may also owe severance or termination pay, related to length of service and wages. Here is a calculator for Ontario. This article covers some instances in Québec where social media criticism did result in successful suspension, indicating that the employee's duty of loyalty is not entirely null when it comes to social media. In the BC case of Kim v. ITU, the court found that the dismissal over social media posts critical of the company was not for cause. However, part of the company's failure in this case was that they failed to respond immediately to what they saw as inappropriate behavior (boorish Twitter behavior). Assuming that the statements made are accurate and expressed respectfully, the prospects for Termination With Cause are significantly diminished. The prospects for some disciplinary action (suspension for a period of time) remains high -- multiple terminations were modified to long suspensions. |
Can my neighbor post signs on my side of the fence? This is about a friend and not myself. The situation takes place in Alberta Canada. A friend of mine moved into his new home and the next-door neighbor demanded he pay for half the fence (Which was already existing) that separated their property. My friend obviously declined such an obnoxious demand. This caused somewhat of a feud between them which im my opinion certainly constitutes harassment, however the latest act was that the neighbor has reached over the fence to install a custom made "private property" sign that says: "NO USE OF FENCE; no attaching, climbing, pushing, pulling, leaning or bouncing of objects. NOT A BOUNDARY LINE" The neighbor did pay for the fence and it is (supposedly) on his property, but it feels questionably legal for him to be reaching into my friends property to post signs like this. Is it legal? | It is not legally reaching into a person's property if you post a sign on your property that can be seem from the person's property. If the fence is physically on / over your friend's property, the fence is encroaching and would be removable by legal means: a sign on the fence would encroach just as much as the fence does. Your friend can legally construct a fence on a portion of his property than makes the offending fence invisible; or your friend could ignore the sign. | Good fences make good neighbors :) https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/mending-wall But seriously, hedges were planted to form property boundaries between counties, church lands, private lands, communal grazing lands, etc. A tall, thick hedge obviously and clearly marks a boundary, stops grazing animals from straying, and provides privacy between farms. Hedges were fairly cheap, could not be carted off like a lumber fence, and required little maintenance. I'm also sure you saw freestone rock walls; same property line function, different effort and effect. There may have been laws that required property boundaries to be marked by hedges in years past. (Someone with more knowledge of UK laws can respond). But it may simply have been form follows function. There are current laws that protect hedges from being cut down without good justification, as well as laws that only permit trimming of hedges during certain times of the year to protect the wildlife that inhabit the hedgerows. | Mediation is non-binding Mediation and conciliation are non-binding methods of dispute resolution. If properly conducted, a mediator does not make any suggestions as to how the parties might resolve a dispute; they simply maintain a space where such a resolution might occur. If the parties reach an agreement, that agreement might be a legally binding contract. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? If it is, then it could be enforced by a court. If it isn't then compliance is voluntary. What you describe is not mediation However, the agreement facilitated by Bob & Fred's mutual friend either is or is not a contract and the same circumstances follow. | Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant). | Is this legal for the county to enforce? Yes. And can I sue if they try to enforce it? You could, but you would very likely lose your lawsuit. A more fruitful approach would be to go to the county planning board and seek a variance to permit you to do what you want to do. | You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal. | You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over. | Are there any legal terms which can make it clear that such questions are about the "outside of reach" rather than "outside of claim of reach" situations? Enforceability Laws that claim but cannot reach lack enforceability. Note that enforceability is case-specific and subjective. The US may or may not be able to reach out to those it deems to be criminals on the other side of the world; those may or may not care. |
Traffic ticket was never received by court, but I have to check on it forever I received a traffic ticket. It's been a month and the court has still not received the ticket. I have been calling every few days, and they tell me to call again in a few days everytime. The court date is approaching and they tell me if it's not received by the court date, I will not be in trouble, but to just keep calling every few days. I've told them I don't want to call for the rest of my life, but they have made it clear that if they ever receive the ticket I am liable, and they insist that I call until they receive the ticket, which may be never. I am on probation which makes this even more important to resolve. I have asked that they send an email or some proof that I am attempting to pay the ticket, but they refuse. The ticket did not include an amount to pay. This is Houston Texas, Harris County Constable, court of David Patronella. I live in Florida, so appearing in person is rather impractical. Ticket was running a red light. Ticket was before I started probation. Ticket does not break terms of probation. How can I resolve a ticket that was never received. | Original answer: I am on probation which makes this even more important to resolve. Because you are on probation, you really should consult a lawyer because you might be violating the terms or conditions of probation when you received your ticket. For example, some people's probation require them to tell their probation officer every time they have police contact. See page 2 condition 2 of Colorado's Standard Terms and Conditions of Adult Probation as an example of probation conditions that require you to report all police contact. I received a traffic ticket. It's been a month and the court has still not received the ticket. The normal procedure with traffic tickets in most parts of the country is: The officer writes you the ticket. If it is a violation where you must appear in court, it will include a court date and time. This is so that if you don't show up for court, they will have proof that knew of the Court date and can issue a warrant. This is also why you must sign a traffic ticket in most jurisdictions. If it is not a violation where you are required to appear in court, the ticket it will usually have instructions on how to resolve the ticket by paying a fine, OR request a court date to contest the hearing. The officer files a copy of the ticket with his department and the court (the police department usually files them with the Court to ensure chain of custody). The court clerks receives the ticket and open a court file. The court file almost always has a copy of the ticket. What you should do: If you don't want to get an attorney, show up to court at the date and time on your ticket and bring a copy of the ticket with you. When the court has no record of the ticket, it is safe to assume that the police officer or his department never filed it with the court. But talk to an attorney before deciding to plead guilty. You don't want this to be an issue with your probation and this site is not for legal advice. Are you completely off the hook for running the red light? No. Assuming this ticket for running a red light was a red light under Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.007, there is a 2 year statute of limitations here is a 2 year statute of limitation for class C misdemeanors under Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § art. 12.02. What a 2 year statute of limitations means is that they (the police) have 2 years to start the prosecution from when an offense occurred. In the case of a traffic ticket, they would start the prosecution by filing the ticket/complaint with the court. This means that if your ticket wasn't filed with the Court, the police will have up to 2 years to track you down and re-serve you the traffic ticket. Is this likely? No, not for running a red light. But that is me speculating. Why is a misdemeanor traffic offense treated as a class C misdemeanor under Texas Law? It's a little bit confusing, but here are the cross references. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 542.301 states that A person commits an offense if the person performs an act prohibited or fails to perform an act required by this subtitle" and "Except as otherwise provided, an offense under this subtitle is a misdemeanor. The "subtitle" that a red light ticket falls under is "Subtitle C. Rules of the Road." Next, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.03(b) state that: "An offense designated a misdemeanor in this code without specification as to punishment or category is a Class C misdemeanor." Therefore, running a red light (assuming you were charged with it under Texas' state statutes and not a local statute) has a 2 year statute of limitations. Updated Answer You edited your question after I posted my original answer . . . . however, I left the original post above because it may be helpful to others. To answer your new question, you cannot resolve a ticket that was never received because there is no ticket in the eyes of the Court until it is received. By not showing up, you take the risk that the cop will file the ticket with the court the day before your hearing and you will get a bench warrant for failing to appear. Your best bet is to write a letter to the Judge David Patronella and explain your situation. It is probably wise to leave out the fact you are on probation in a different state. Explain the repeated phone calls and attempts and ask him to have his clerk: notify you if the ticket shows up, or reschedule your court date. While you already know what the answer is your goal is to make a paper trail that you could show a judge if this ticket somehow does get filed and you miss court. So, be sure to keep a copy for your records and consider having it sent some method where you can confirm it was received by the Court. Being able to show this letter to a judge if the ticket ultimately gets filed makes you look responsible and responsive. The reality is that you are probably catching a break and don't need to worry about this--especially since it doesn't violate your probation. You could just sit and do nothing, but based on your comments, I think you are looking for "advice" on what to do; however, there isn't a "right" answer for this type of situation. | Law enforcement sometimes use "pacing" as a speed enforcement tool. The basic idea is that they consistently drive a certain speed - which is at or above the speed limit and notice that the "alleged speeder" is either keeping pace or exceeding the pace. The details are complicated and a police officer would know them much better than me. But basically They have to calibrate their speedometer - because if their speedometer is broken pacing is obviously worthless. They need to bring the calibration results to court. Not having those calibration records for your speedometer means that many police departments will be reluctant to issue a speeding ticket to the other motorists. They rely on the fact that most state laws allow law enforcement leeway to exceed the posted limit. Not being a lawyer or a police officer, I do not know the exact circumstances, but if they were not allowed to slightly exceed the limit for pacing then logically every pacing enforcement should result in 2 tickets - one being for the officer. If you can swear that your speedometer is good then they can use that evidence to write you a speeding ticket, because whatever allowances the law allows law enforcement for pacing are not granted to you. I am sure they can overcome the calibration issue with regard to a ticket issued to you by your certification that the speedometer is correct. If they issued a ticket to me based on your certification that your speedometer was correct, I would call bullshit. Talking to the police can only hurt you. | You are not obliged to say anything to a police officer during a traffic stop, in fact you are generally better off staying silent. This is your Fifth Amendment right to silence. The only exception to this is that the officer could ask for your name and you are obliged to give it under Arizona Laws 13-2412, but the answer to that is language-independent and is usually already answered with your driver's license in a traffic stop. If you did choose to communicate only in German, this may have the effect of frustrating the officer's investigation but if you only make truthful statements in German it is unlikely to be obstruction of their investigation. Arizona Laws 13-2409 is I believe the relevant section (emphasis mine): A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if the person commits the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. In general, a law that required you to give answers to a police officer during an investigation in English if you understand English and have waived your right to silence would violate your First Amendment right to free speech (as it is in effect "forced speech"). However, you would need to be careful not to tell the police officer that you do not understand English if that is not true, as it could be misrepresentation. Police officer training likely includes instructions for detaining someone that cannot understand them and the police can detain you and wait for an interpreter to continue their investigation if they determine that is necessary. You may actually be shooting yourself in the foot by doing this, because the time it takes for them to get an interpreter likely extends the amount of time the detainment can last while remaining "reasonable," so you may be waiting by the side of the road longer than you would have if you had simply told the officer that you were invoking your right to silence and followed the officer's instructions without speaking. As an aside, as more people are educated on their rights via the Internet and understand why they should always invoke their right to silence when detained, police officers will get more used to people they pull over immediately and politely telling them that they are going to invoke their right to silence. I doubt most police officers will hold it against you as long as you are otherwise cooperative and don't yell at them or berate them. | Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant). | The language that you're referring to, where it states that if they do not provide responses to legitimately served discovery requests in a timely manner, that they would be responsible for attorney fees, this does not refer to your attorneys fees that you incurred in defending the suit. It refers to attorneys fees that would (actually could) arise out of a hearing on a motion to compel, in the event they never answered. If that occurred, the law allows you to ask the court to award you reasonable attorney's fees as well as sanctions, but only those having to do with getting the court to make them answer. Importantly, despite the rule that states this is a potential repercussion for continually failing to answer, they rarely get awarded. This usually only occurs when the court has already warned them, after you (i.e., your attorney) has willingly given them extensions, the court has given them further extensions, and they still failed to produce/respond. Typically an attorney will allow the other side substantial extensions of time, and this is something you may not even know about. When you say they completely ignored the deadline, I'm assuming you mean the deadline on the discovery notice that gets served with the papers. Interrogatories and Requests for production of documents rarely get done anywhere near the deadline in the rules, which is a mere 3 weeks. Many times, it takes much more than this to track down everything that was requested. This is why extensions happen all the time and unless you're asking, this isn't something your lawyer will even discuss with you. When you say they "didn't offer a remotely reasonable settlement until after the deadline and didn't finally dismiss the case until months after the deadline," I'm assuming you mean they didn't make a reasonable demand (it sounds like you were the defendant). This is actually very common, and in fact, it is very early on to make (or reduce the original) demand low enough that the Defendant will accept it prior to the discovery deadline and all the depositions have passed. (When I say deadline, I don't mean the one you're talking about, I mean the actual discovery deadline, which is set forth in the scheduling order; this can easily be 9 months from the time an Answer to the Complaint is filed.) If you're referring to the token deadline put in the first set of interrogatories served, this not a "real" deadline anyone of the attorneys expects to be adhered to. Further, this a very quick settlement and you should be happy your attorney disposed of your case so quickly. As you pointed out, you are paying a lot of money every day the case lives on. In fact, the money you saved by settling early is substantial. If your attorney had gotten the documents and responses and had to wade through all of them, organize them, send follow up requests, take depositions, etc., you would be out easily another $10,000. Your lawyer did you a favor, because a less honest attorney would tell you to wait, to see if there is a defense, just so they could pad their bill. Many times when it is clear that the case is going to settle, the lawyers will serve pro forma discovery, and will say to each other not to bother answering while they attempt to settle. They are timely served if you cannot settle, but it's clear that settlement is the ultimate goal. This is very typical when the defendant almost certainly has exposure, but when the plaintiff's case also has some holes. Because of issues on both sides, they agree a modest settlement to dispose of the matter, quickly, is the best course. When you say the settlement explicitly involved each party paying their own attorney's fees, all settlements contain this clause. I have never seen a settlement agreement where a party agreed to pay the other's attorneys fees. It's just not done. In the rare case it is, it's part of the structure of the settlement and it flows to the Plaintiff, not the Defendant. This may occur in a civil rights case where there are no real damages, but the statute allows for attorneys fees to be awarded if even one-dollar is awarded. So, in a case like this, sometimes the plaintiff will accept their attorney's fees being satisfied as the settlement, (usually along with some sort of consent decree), so as to curtail the abhorrent behavior. If you want to discuss these issues with your attorney, they are not billable: they are administrative pertaining to your bill; hence, you can do so without fear of being charged. If you're nervous, tell him ahead of time you'd like to discuss your bill. He won't try to bill you for this, as he can't, and furthermore your case is settled so your file is closed. To answer your question explicitly: No - your fees are not recoverable. This is not only because you've already settled, but you were never entitled to them anyway. To answer your question about the point of sending discovery at all if you are not going to expect answers and the goal is to settle, (1) is to preserve the right during the discovery period, in the event settlement negotiations break down; (2) to give the other side a picture of how sharp your attorney is, and that he/she will be asking the right questions and they will be invasive; and (3) this is just how it is done. What you've described is how almost all low level cases proceed. Lastly, just to address what you said about it taking a few months from reaching a verbal or "handshake" agreement and having the settlement actually be recorded by the judge and a dismissal issuing, this is just something that takes a little while. Depending on the type of case it is, the court may need to approve the settlement. Even when it's not necessary for the court to approve the settlement, it takes a while to go back and forth on the language, draft the stipulations of dismissal and so on. A few months is right on target. It sounds to me like you had a pretty effective and honest lawyer who could've dragged this out for much longer. Advice for the future, in case you ever find yourself needing the services of an attorney again: If you have these types of questions, you should ask them as they come up. Again, it's not something that you can be billed for, and your lawyer should be happy to answer. Some lawyers are better than others in remembering to explain what the technical stuff means, and what the game plan is. However, the client has a responsibility too, which is to ask if you don't understand. | First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat. | You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not. | If he is still pressuring you for the money even after filing insurance, talk to your city or county prosecutor's office. If you call the police, they may say they're too busy to deal with it and that it's a "he said-she said" situation anyway. But if you go to the local prosecutor, they should be more interested, as this could be a felony, considering the amount of money demanded, and they can instruct the police to help investigate. |
How is a US political campaign supposed to verify that donors from abroad are US citizens? According the US laws, only US citizens may contribute financially to political campaigns - especially presidential campaigns. Suppose you are running a campaign. How are you supposed to verify that donations from around the world are actually from US citizens? For example, take a look at Pete Buttigeg's page. He accepts donations from every country on Earth. https://secure.actblue.com/donate/pete-buttigieg-announcement-day How can he be sure that they are actually from Americans? (The question applies to donations from within the US too. There can be non-citizens in the US with US credit cards and addresses. How does a candidate ensure that they are actually citizens? To what extent is this required?) | See https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/who-can-and-cant-contribute/, the section on "Foreign Nationals". The Commission stated, in AO 1998-14, that the use of any surname on a contribution check (or similar instrument) would not, by itself, give any reason to inquire as to the person’s nationality. Nonetheless, the Commission advised the committee to take the following minimally intrusive steps to ensure that the contributions it received did not come from foreign nationals: Ensure that public political ads and solicitations directed to audiences outside the U.S. contain a summary of the foreign national prohibition of 52 U.S.C. § 30121. Make further inquiry into the nationality of the contributor if the committee receives a contribution postmarked from any non U.S. territory. Make further inquiry into the nationality of the contributor if the committee receives a contribution indicating that either the bank or the account owner has a foreign address. In all of the these instances, if the contribution is submitted along with credible evidence (for example, a copy of a valid U.S. passport) that the contributor is a U.S. citizen, a U.S. national or a permanent resident alien, no further inquiry need be made. However, if the committee has actual knowledge that the contributor is in fact a foreign national, it may not rely on these documents as a defense. So, if the donor has been informed of the rules and gives a US address, the campaign can assume that they are eligible to donate, unless the campaign has actual knowledge that they aren't. If they give a non-US address, the campaign is supposed to get some other proof of nationality. By the way, that page also explains that the first part of your question is slightly wrong. It isn't only US citizens who are allowed to donate - US nationals (a rather rare category consisting mostly of people from certain US territories) and permanent residents are also eligible. | The first legal issue relates to the step where "Those state legislatures refuse to allow any Electoral College slate to be certified until the 'national security' investigation is complete". The "electoral voting" law regarding voting of presidential electors is ARS 16-212. First, On the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, 1956, and quadrennially thereafter, there shall be elected a number of presidential electors equal to the number of United States senators and representatives in Congress from this state. Second, After the secretary of state issues the statewide canvass containing the results of a presidential election, the presidential electors of this state shall cast their electoral college votes for the candidate for president and the candidate for vice president who jointly received the highest number of votes in this state as prescribed in the canvass. Finally, A presidential elector who knowingly refuses to cast that elector's electoral college vote as prescribed in subsection B of this section is no longer eligible to hold the office of presidential elector and that office is deemed and declared vacant by operation of law. The chairperson of the state committee of the political party represented by that elector shall appoint a person who is otherwise qualified to be a presidential elector. The replacement presidential elector shall cast the elector's electoral college vote as prescribed by this section. Notwithstanding section 16-344 and any other statute, the nomination paper and affidavit of qualification of the replacement presidential elector may be completed and filed with the secretary of state as soon as is practicable after the presidential elector's appointment. There is no provision for legislative "certification" and no authority to override the procedure set down in law. The appointment statute (344) gives sole discretion to the state party chairmen to appoint that party's electors: The chairman of the state committee of a political party that is qualified for representation on an official party ballot at the primary election and accorded a column on the general election ballot shall appoint candidates for the office of presidential elector equal to the number of United States senators and representatives in Congress from this state and shall file for each candidate with the secretary of state, not more than ten days after the primary election, by 5:00 p.m. on the last day for filing: Name, residence and postal address and an affadavit of residence in the state are needed. Again, there is no provision for "certification" by the state legislature. The certification that takes place is that the electors sign the presidential elector ballot certificate of vote, e.g. Arizona 2016, which simply notes that the electors have been "duly elected". In general, Arizona law does not require "certification" of any election. Pennsylvania law on the election of electors (25 PS 2878) similarly does not give the legislature any veto power over the electoral process. The law on the voting of the electors also does not provide for any legislative intervention. This does not mean that the legislatures cannot pass an act ceremonially "de-certifying" or invalidating the 2020 election in general, or the nominations of one or both parties. Or, they could pass an act amending the election process to require legislative certification in the case of presidential electors. There is no realistic chance that such an act would be found legally sound, and is outside the scope of the existing Newsweek fantasy. | Public schools are open to all residents. There is no citizenship requirement and no "tax payer" requirement. Unless excepted for home schooling or attending a recognized private school, in most locations it would not only be allowed, but mandatory between certain ages. | It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also. | The State Department is mischaracterizing the law, which requires only that the US citizen "bear" a valid US passport, not that the US citizen "use" the passport. This law, 8 USC 1185(b), used to have a fairly stiff penalty, and it used to apply only in time of war. When the wartime element was removed in 1978, so was the penalty. It now reads Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. If a US citizen attempts to leave the US without a valid US passport, there is a very small chance that the departure could be prevented by a CBP officer, but in the normal course of affairs the traveler would not even encounter a CBP officer, so the possibility is very remote indeed. There is nothing, however, that prevents a US citizen who also holds a passport issued by another country from using the other passport while also carrying a valid US passport. See also What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? at Travel and Can someone be penalized for an "unlawful" act if no penalty is specified? on this site. | When the person has been naturalised, that is, when the US government officially recognises them as a US citizen. There are many pathways to citizenship and the ones on the linked page are pretty typical across the world although the details vary: residence for a period with or without marriage to a citizen service descent. | In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws & regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this "How Stuff Works" article. | I'm assuming it would NOT be a good idea to just accept the funding as a person (sole proprietorship). Correct. Would the time be right to form the LLC first, before starting the campaigns on the crowdfunding sites? Or would it be permissible for the entity to be formed IF and once the funding is available? For instance, if the campaign on Kickstarter raises 800 thousand dollars, can an LLC then be created, a bank account opened, and the funds deposited there? Or must the entity be created prior to the asking for startup funds? An entity should be (really must be) formed before funds are raised. This is not a hugely expensive thing to do. For a lawyer drafted one, you are talking on the order of $500-$2000, plus some state filing fees which are modest. I know it's kind of a chicken-and-egg situation, but there isn't a lot of funds available yet for hiring attorneys and drawing up papers before the money is raised. Or should this be something for just forming a very quick LLC and then worrying about the right entity after the funds come in? If you can't afford the money necessary to hire a lawyer to form an entity without crowdfunding, you aren't ready to open a manufacturing company. You really shouldn't consider trying to start a project of this magnitude unless you have at least several tens of thousands of dollars of personal funds on hand prior to the crowdfunding effort. You should also have a detailed business plan in place with fact checked budget lines and reality checked revenues estimates before stating your campaign. If you plan to have patents, you need to at least begin the process of applying to protect them legally, with pre-campaign funds too. Realistically, most people at your stage do a small round of friends and family and personal savings fundraising and often also find an angel investor or two, before going to the general public in a crowdfunding effort. If you can't convince those people that your project is worth investing in, you are probably not ready to run a manufacturing company which will require you to successfully make many similarly difficult pitches to a variety of people. What legal entity(s) would be best for startup funded by kickstarter or other investment? At the state law level a C-corporation and an S-corporation are the same. The distinction is made with a separate tax filing with the IRS in S-corporations. Crowd funding is a term that is often ambiguous and can be used in a multitude of contexts. If it is more than a gift (i.e. in exchange for stock or bonds) there are also securities regulations exceptions that the offering must be tailored to. If the funds are donations for a charitable project, a non-profit corporation would usually be the right choice and 501(c)(3) status needs to be obtained in advance. If funds are raised in exchange for equity interests or non-U.S. citizens/permanent residents own some of the interests, a C corporation would usually be the only permitted choice. If the funds are raised in exchange for interest paying loans/bonds, or the funds are non-tax deductible gifts rather than investments, then financing isn't a concern for choice of entity, and either an LLC or an S-corporation is usually preferred (or perhaps a limited liability limited partnership in lieu of an LLC which has a different control structure). If funds are raised for an operating business with assets that are leased or tend to depreciate in value and has less than 75 owners, and has owners who are also senior employees of the company, an S corporation will usually be the best choice. If funds are raised for a business that will hold assets expected to appreciate in value, or has a financing or control structure more complex than equal shares of common stock plus bonds, an LLC will usually be preferred. Assuming someone is going to start a business that is to design, build and manufacture a small electronic handheld device. A C-corporation or S-corporation rather than an LLC or LLLP is probably preferred for a venture like this one, with the tax classification dependent upon the means of financing and the nature of the owners. Usually, you would use an S-corporation if possible, and a C-corporation if not. A two entity structure, with an LLC owning the IP (if any, other than a trademark for the products), and then licensing it to an S-corporation operating company, would also often make sense in this scenario. I live in Texas, but I assume that the business entity would or could be formed in Nevada or Delaware or anywhere there are more favorable conditions. Not really. A Texas entity would be just fine in this context. A Delaware entity has higher registration fees and legal fees to prepare one, and the advantages it provides for big businesses will often be disadvantages in the kind of entity you are considering. The benefits of Nevada and Alaska trusts are much greater than the benefits of Nevada and Alaska corporations or LLCs. Also, the Texas entity may be more suited to addressing Texas community property issues. |
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