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Can illegal aliens claim sanctuary in a church? This tweet (as quoted in a Washington Post article), seems to suggest that illegal aliens can claim sanctuary in a church: #GuadalupeGarcia attorney says @ICEgov has lied to him and he will advise future clients to seek sanctuary in churches. (For context, Guadalupe Garcia was living in the US without documentation and was deported during a regular check in with ICE.) However, I did a search and only turned up articles saying this wasn't actually a law in the United States. Then I came across the case of Elvira Arellano, who sought refuge in a Methodist church for a year. I'm assuming the church didn't simply hide her whenever the police came around for a whole year, since she did interviews and such, but she was arrested when she left, so the authorities were clearly still actively looking to arrest her. Are police legally required to recognize a claim of sanctuary in a church?	The case you identify is not unique. For example, the Unitarian church in Denver has done much the same thing. There is not a legal right to sanctuary in a church. But, as a manner of law enforcement discretion and public relations and customary traditions of law enforcement respect for churches that long predate the formation of the USA, law enforcement routinely acts as if there was a right to sanctuary in churches (in the absence, for example, of an active shooter situation or a hostage crisis or a kidnapping with a missing victim). I am not aware of any case in which immigration officials have taken push to shove and breached a claim of sanctuary by a church protecting an illegal immigrant in a church. In England, where there was an established church, the established Anglican Church historically did have a right to intervene in certain ways in the criminal justice process (e.g. the "privilege of clergy"). UPDATE (February 21, 2017): My original answer was not entirely correct so I am updating this post. It turns out that in 2011 that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement made what was previously a mere custom into an official policy, something I was not previously aware of. The answer, it turns out, is policy and tradition. A 2011 Immigration and Customs Enforcement policy defines churches, schools and hospitals as "sensitive places" where enforcement actions should be limited. And the tradition of sheltering those who need it goes back to the Middle Ages, said David Poundstone with the Mountain View Friends Meeting. The official policy is set forth here. The policy is in the public domain and given the interest this post has generated I post it in full below: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have made available Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) to supplement existing guidance concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations and clarify what types of locations are covered by these policies. The ICE and CBP sensitive locations policies, which remain in effect, provide that enforcement actions at sensitive locations should generally be avoided, and require either prior approval from an appropriate supervisory official or exigent circumstances necessitating immediate action. DHS is committed to ensuring that people seeking to participate in activities or utilize services provided at any sensitive location are free to do so without fear or hesitation. Do the Department of Homeland Security's policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations remain in effect? U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have each issued and implemented policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations. The ICE Sensitive Locations Policy and the CBP Sensitive Locations Policy remain in effect, and these FAQs are intended to clarify what types of locations are covered by those policies. What do the Department of Homeland Security policies require for enforcement actions to be carried out at sensitive locations? The policies provide that enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations such as schools, places of worship, and hospitals should generally be avoided, and that such actions may only take place when (a) prior approval is obtained from an appropriate supervisory official, or (b) there are exigent circumstances necessitating immediate action without supervisor approval. The policies are meant to ensure that ICE and CBP officers and agents exercise sound judgment when enforcing federal law at or focused on sensitive locations, to enhance the public understanding and trust, and to ensure that people seeking to participate in activities or utilize services provided at any sensitive location are free to do so, without fear or hesitation. What does the Department of Homeland Security mean by the term “sensitive location”? Locations covered by these policies would include, but not be limited to: Schools, such as known and licensed daycares, pre-schools and other early learning programs; primary schools; secondary schools; post-secondary schools up to and including colleges and universities; as well as scholastic or education-related activities or events, and school bus stops that are marked and/or known to the officer, during periods when school children are present at the stop; Medical treatment and health care facilities, such as hospitals, doctors’ offices, accredited health clinics, and emergent or urgent care facilities; Places of worship, such as churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples; Religious or civil ceremonies or observances, such as funerals and weddings; and During public demonstration, such as a march, rally, or parade. What is an enforcement action? An enforcement action covered by this policy is any action taken by ICE or CBP to apprehend, arrest, interview, or search an individual, or to surveil an individual for enforcement purposes. Actions not covered by this policy include activities such as obtaining records, documents, and similar materials from officials or employees, providing notice to officials or employees, serving subpoenas, engaging in Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) compliance and certification visits, guarding or securing detainees, or participating in official functions or community meetings. Will enforcement actions ever occur at sensitive locations? Enforcement actions may occur at sensitive locations in limited circumstances, but will generally be avoided. ICE or CBP officers and agents may conduct an enforcement action at a sensitive location with prior approval from an appropriate supervisory official, or if the enforcement action involves exigent circumstances. When may an enforcement action be carried out at a sensitive location without prior approval? ICE and CBP officers may carry out an enforcement action at a sensitive location without prior approval from a supervisor in exigent circumstances related to national security, terrorism, or public safety, or where there is an imminent risk of destruction of evidence material to an ongoing criminal case. When proceeding with an enforcement action under exigent circumstances, officers and agents must conduct themselves as discreetly as possible, consistent with officer and public safety, and make every effort to limit the time at or focused on the sensitive location. Are sensitive locations located along the international border also protected? The sensitive locations policy does not apply to operations that are conducted within the immediate vicinity of the international border, including the functional equivalent of the border. However, when situations arise that call for enforcement actions at or near a sensitive location within the immediate vicinity of the international border, including its functional equivalent, agents and officers are expected to exercise sound judgment and common sense while taking appropriate action, consistent with the goals of this policy. Examples of operations within the immediate vicinity of the border are, but are not limited to, searches at ports of entry, activities undertaken where there is reasonable certainty that an individual just crossed the border, circumstances where DHS has maintained surveillance of a subject since crossing the border, and circumstances where DHS is operating in a location that is geographically further from the border but separated from the border by rugged and remote terrain. Are courthouses sensitive locations? Courthouses do not fall under ICE or CBP’s policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations. Where should I report a DHS enforcement action that I believe may be inconsistent with these policies? There are a number of locations where an individual may lodge a complaint about a particular DHS enforcement action that may have taken place in violation of the sensitive locations policy. You may find information about these locations, and information about how to file a complaint, on the DHS, CBP, or ICE websites. You may contact ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) through the Detention Reporting and Information Line at (888)351-4024 or through the ERO information email address at [email protected], also available at https://www.ice.gov/webform/ero-contact-form. The Civil Liberties Division of the ICE Office of Diversity and Civil Rights may be contacted at (202) 732-0092 or [email protected]. You may contact the CBP Information Center to file a complaint or compliment via phone at 1 (877) 227-5511, or submit an email through the website at https://help.cbp.gov. The policy is drafted in a manner that it doesn't actually prohibit enforcement in a sanctuary, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, but it does call for a process to be followed if this is done, and discourages doing so without prohibiting this action.	The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit people with no affiliation with the government from trying to convert people to their religion in a way not endorsed by a government official or agency. It could be that there is some content neutral prohibition on strangers accosting young school children if that person is so persistent that it amounts to content neutral harassment, or that the person might actually be a sex offender prohibited from contacting children. But, the facts of the question don't seem to compel this conclusion. Even if it violates any law to do this, it is not a violation of the U.S. Constitution.	This is a pretty good guide to the student's right to express their views on religion (for or against). For example you may pray in school, but you cannot compel others to listen to your prayers. You may discuss Jesus Christ and you may advocate a religious perspective, if it is on topic (e.g. in a class discussion abortion, but not in an algebra class). There are familiar ways of saying "Jesus Christ" which would be disruptive, but a general prohibition against uttering a name (on the grounds that the name is of a religious figure) is not a proper application of the separation of church and state -- as the ACLU statement says, SCOTUS did not make public schools religion-free zones. Whether or not the teacher was given the authority to forbid mentioning religious figures by some supervisor, that would not have been proper authorization. Official advocacy of religion in general, or a particular religion, is contrary to the First Amendment, as is official prohibition of religion in general, or a particular religion.	When a country makes criminal laws, these laws usually apply to anyone present in the country, and acting in the country. But the country is free to declare that some law might apply to its own citizens in a foreign country, or even foreign citizens in a foreign country. Assuming the laws about using marijuana say nothing about the country, that most likely means it only applies to using marjuana in the country itself. But if the US government decided that taking marijuana in Canada is illegal for US citizens, then nobody can stop them. In this case, Canada would not extradite you (unless Canadian law says that it is criminal for Canadians to use marijuana in another country), and Canadian police would likely not collect evidence. So even if illegal, it would be hard to convict you. PS. The "polygamy" case would be interesting, I think you would have to read the exact wording of the laws in every country. Some countries will say that you can't get married twice, and the attempt to get married a second time while already married is bigamy. In that kind of country you wouldn't have committed a crime within that country. Also, you would only be married to the first wife.	I don't see the contradiction. The ACLU article you link to explains that the Supreme Court found against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in principle in the 2018 ruling. Instead they found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had taken a dismissive attitude to the religion of the bakery's owners, and that in itself was religious discrimation and a violation of their First Amendment rights. I would say the 2018 ruling paved the way for the more recent one, which is why the article you link is titled: "In Masterpiece, the Bakery Wins the Battle but Loses the War"	It is almost totally legal. Federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability, and familial status, and Ohio law (ORC 4112) does extends the prohibition to ancestry and military status. So if the reason is "she's (not) a soldier", it's illegal, otherwise it is legal.	So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.	Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out.
Concealing Medical Conditions from Employer If an employer asks an employee or prospective employee to fill out and sign a health declaration form (very common in the medical field) like this. If the employee is afraid that revealing their health condition will subject them to discrimination or breach of privacy, may they conceal their condition? For example, Alex is being employed by Hospital X to work in their kitchen. Alex suffers from Bipolar disorder but is currently fully capable of work. Prior to beginning work, Alex is given a health intake form. May he fill out X to indicate that he has no conditions if he is afraid of the negative consequences that may result in disclosure? I am not asking if it is legal for the employer to give such a form. I am only asking about the employee filling out the form whether it is legal or not. Protesting or calling discrimination is often not effective in this case.	It is not legal to give false responses on such a declaration. The point of anti-discrimination laws is that they say when it is legal vs. not legal to discriminate against an employee, and Alex is expected to have faith in the legal system to protect his legal rights. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the law may be understandable, but still does not legally justify falsifying information given to an employer. In certain cases (look for the fine print and mentions of "penalty of perjury") you can be fined and imprisoned for lying. More commonly, your employment can be terminated when you are discovered. You may also be held liable for consequences of such lies. Your employer's health insurance contract might require truthful and accurate reporting of medical facts and a lie about your condition could result in termination of coverage.	Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.	It probably depends on whether the employer is covered by a relevant non-discrimination statute. Most employers in the United States are covered, but some are small enough to be exempt. Federal law exempts employers with under 15 employees and religious organizations. There might also be a relevant state law. It also would depend upon whether the EEOC or a court found that "be blessed" was a compelled religious statement in violation of a worker's beliefs, and whether allowing the worker not to say it would be a "reasonable accommodation." This is a strong case, and I suspect that the worker would win on both counts but it isn't a completely open and shut case. There is arguably a secular meaning to the word "blessed" and a court could conceivably find that there is a legitimate and indispensible business purpose for insisting that every single person in the worker's position need to make this statement, although I doubt that a court would do so.	Such a clause must be presented before or at the same time the offer is made. The (somewhat new) law NH RSA 275:70 says Any employer who requires an employee who has not previously been employed by the employer to execute a noncompete agreement as a condition of employment shall provide a copy of such agreement to the potential employee prior to the employee's acceptance of an offer of employment. A noncompete agreement that has not been disclosed to an employee as required by this section shall not be enforceable against the employee, but all other provisions of any employment, confidentiality, nondisclosure, trade secret, intellectual property assignment, or any other type of employment agreement or provision shall remain in full force and effect The question is whether such an agreement would mean you can't set up shop on your own and take a bunch of customers with you (it seems that such clauses are enforceable), or does it mean you can't work in that trade (competing for new customers, or as an employee of a competitor) – such an interpretation would not be enforced, in the analysis of this article. The clause must be "drafted narrowly to protect only a company's legitimate business interests, like customer goodwill and confidential information". A specific case of this interpretation is Merrimack Valley Wood Products v. Near, 152 N.H. 192, which finds that the law does not look with favor upon contracts in restraint of trade or competition...Such contracts are to be narrowly construed. Nonetheless, restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable, given the particular circumstances of the case In assessing reasonableness, three tests must be passed (must be answered "no"): first, whether the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer; second, whether the restriction imposes an undue hardship upon the employee; and third, whether the restriction is injurious to the public interest. As an example of a reasonable restriction: When an employee is put in a position involving client contact, it is natural that some of the goodwill emanating from the client is directed to the employee rather than to the employer. The employer has a legitimate interest in preventing its employees from appropriating this goodwill to its detriment. But restricting a person from working with any customers of the company (not just the employees work-related contacts) is unenforceable, because the company had no legitimate interest in protecting its entire client base from its former employee, because he had no advantage over any other complete stranger, possessing no special hold on the goodwill of the majority of Technical Aid's customers. See also Brian's Fitness v. Woodward for reaffirmation ("valid only to the extent that it prevents an employee from appropriating assets that legitimately belong to the employer"), and additional citations. The question arises whether there is a distinction between the former employee approaching former customers, versus those same customers approaching the former employee. I have not located any case that directly addresses that, but Technical Aid v. Allen, 134 N.H. 1 says A restrictive covenant must unreasonably limit the public's right to choose before it will be found to be injurious to the public interest. I think it is likely that the courts would find it to be an unreasonable limit on the public's right to choose, if a customer were prevented from choosing a different company to provide the desired service simply because the customer happened to have previously had a business relationship with the former employee. This "right to choose" is asymmetrical – the public has a right to choose any service provider, an employee does not have an equivalent right to pursue (seek out, woo) a customer, in light of a restrictiveness covenant.	There is a world of legal difference between a doctor or counselor "pressing" you to consider meds and even suggesting several and them actually writing a prescription. The line to cross is a non-doctor writing you a prescription for prescription meds; this has not yet happened. And 99.99% of the time, it won't happen. The counselor is licensed by the state and will clearly know their legal limits, which are an important part of their education and licensing; they are not going to risk their license or a lawsuit by doing something illegal. If the counselor is a doctor and is able to write prescription, then they will ask you about medical history and other meds during a formal clinical visit in order to write the prescription. If you feel the counselor may be pressing you too hard to consider meds, he may be crossing an ethical line, but that's entirely different than breaking the law. Determining if he crossed an ethical line is for his licensing board to consider, not you. You can ask the licensing board how to proceed. Ask the counselor for their license number; they will freely give it and tell you who to contact.	This is not legal advice, It is not even primarily a legal opinion. It is a legal position. The lawyer, acting on behalf of the agency from which you requested information, is giving the reasons why that agency is declining your request. The lawyer is presumably either an employee of the agency, or has the agency as a client. In any case, this is notice of the position that the agency would be likely to adopt if you took further legal action, such as a suit to compel disclosure. Lawyers provide such position statements ion behalf of clients or employers all the time. Such statements indicate why certain action is taken, what basis the client or employer has for taking or not taking certain action, and often indicate the nature of the defenses or theories that will be used should a lawsuit follow, although the client or employer is free to change the theory at the pleading stage. Not only is it not unethical for the lawyer to respond in this way, the agency is, I am fairly sure, required by the law to provide a valid reason when a request is declined. That is what they have done, provide a reason that they claim is valid, with some legal reasoning about why it is valid. Note that I express no view on whether the reason given is in fact valid, or would be sustained in a suit. That would be a different question.	Ask yourself... What are you trying to achieve? My understanding is an employer is not obliged to provide you a positive job reference. I believe at most, they are only to obliged to confirm that you worked there. Anything above that is optional. The fact that you have left British Columbia only makes it more difficult for the company to chase you - It does not alter your legal obligations. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. Why did you sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement if you still disagree? It leads me to believe there could be trust issues between you and others. Why do you think your old employer must abide by the agreement, but you have an exemption? Let's say you make noise - let's say your old employer in BC tracks you down. Ask yourself how an independent third party like your new employer would react when they read that you signed an agreement, then decided to ignore it. Both you and your previous employer have begun new separate journeys. You two crashed once - I suggest you not alter your path or you could crash again. Life is too short. Concentrate on making your new home in your new city and a new job a new start. It will bring you a greater benefit than breaking a signed, sealed non-disparagement agreement.	This is covered by the page Job Applicants and the ADA from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. There it is said: I have a disability and will need an accommodation for the job interview. Does the ADA require an employer to provide me with one? Yes. Employers are required to provide "reasonable accommodation" -- appropriate changes and adjustments -- to enable you to be considered for a job opening. Reasonable accommodation may also be required to enable you to perform a job, gain access to the workplace, and enjoy the "benefits and privileges" of employment available to employees without disabilities. An employer cannot refuse to consider you because you require a reasonable accommodation to compete for or perform a job. The page mentions as plausible required reasonable accomodations: providing written materials in accessible formats, such as large print, braille, or audiotape providing readers or sign language interpreters ensuring that recruitment, interviews, tests, and other components of the application process are held in accessible locations providing or modifying equipment or devices adjusting or modifying application policies and procedures. The page goes on to say that: You must inform the employer that you need some sort of change or adjustment to the application/interviewing process because of your medical condition. You can make this request orally or in writing, or someone else might make a request for you (e.g., a family member, friend, health professional, or other representative, such as a job coach). A letter from a doctor is not automatically required. But in some cases a prospective employer might reasonably insist on nsuch a letter. The page says: If your disability and need for accommodation are not obvious, the employer may ask you for reasonable documentation explaining the disability and why an accommodation is needed. There is no specified evidence or form that an employer need provide in rejecting a request for an accommodation. The employer is only required to provide "reasonable" accommodation, and is not required to provide any accommodation if it would cause "undue hardship" to the employer. If several possible accommodations would reasonably allow the potential employee to apply the employer may choose which one or ones to offer. It need not offer the one preferred by the prospective employee. All this also applies to accommodations for an employee after s/he has been hired or has a job offer.
What are the benefits of creating a corporation in Delaware? More than half of public and Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware. What are the legal benefits of creating a corporation in Delaware over any other state?	Court Of Chancery The Court Of Chancery is a court decided by a bench trial (trial by just a judge), meaning no jury is involved. Companies tend to try to stay away from jury trials for a number of reasons: Juries tend to vote more sympathetically than judges Juries tend to award more money for damages jury trails can affect public opinion juries tend to distrust corporation Tax laws Delaware has no sales tax (doesn't matter if the company is in Delaware, as long as it incorporated in the state of Delaware.) Delaware doesn't have a corporate tax Delaware doesn't have a personal property taw No value-added tax (doesn't tax business transactions) Privacy policy Delaware doesn't require companies to disclose information of workers in the company.	Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them.	No more than using your own phone, eyeglasses or underwear while working for the LLC. These are all tools of trade than one wold expect employees of the LLC to bring to their job (especially underwear). There is potentially a problem if assets of the LLC are alienated for personal use rather than the other way around. However, that would be subject to a reasonableness test - using your work computer to book a personal holiday is eminently reasonable. Where there is a real liability issue is if the use of that personal asset caused damage to third parties e.g. if the personal computer was hacked and damage resulted. This would allow a potential plaintiff to bypass the LLC and sue the owner directly (or, more likely, as well).	You are mistaken: The U.S. governments (both federal, and states that impose income tax) assert a right to tax both: Income earned within their jurisdiction (e.g., "on their soil"), and Income earned by citizens (or residents, in the case of states). So it is perfectly legal for a resident U.S. citizen to operate a foreign business entity, earn profit, pay himself, and even bank the money overseas. However, a resident in such a situation would be in violation of tax law if he failed to report his interest in the foreign entity and his earnings, as prescribed by the IRS, on his tax filings.	The Cayman Islands are well known as a tax haven. They have a corporate tax of 0%, and that includes income from abroad. So by moving your company officially to the Cayman Islands, you can avoid to pay a lot of taxes. Now of course most other countries will still send you a tax bill for any income you make with business activities within their borders. But there are accounting tricks to get around that. For example, many countries only tax profits, not revenue. So you can reduce your annual profits of your national subsidiaries to zero by having them pay money to your company on the caymans. For example, you can transfer your trademark to your subsidiary on the Cayman Islands and then have your subisdiaries in all other countries pay the Cayman company an annual license fee for using that brand name. And the license fee happens to be just so expensive that your national taxable profits become zero. And no, that's not just a Chinese thing. Corporations all around the world use that method to avoid taxes.	A member of the board of directors of a corporation does not have to be paid, and can likewise be paid only a nominal amount. Members of the board of directors in closely held companies are rarely paid for that service, although some pay for members of the board of directors is the norm in publicly held corporations. Most members of the board of directors in closely held companies are managers, owners, or representatives of owners of the company, who derived economic rewards from the company primarily in those roles. Compensation for outside directors in publicly held companies reflects the fact that these directors, collectively, typically own only a tiny percentage of the stock of the company upon whose board they serve and by definition are not employed by the company in another capacity. So, the value of their contributions is often not fully captured by other means of receiving economic rewards from the company. Payments for serving as a member of the board of directors of a corporation, at least when one is not also an employee of the corporation, are classified as self-employment income. Members of the board of directors who are not also employees of the corporation are usually considered independent contractors rather than employees.	Only with the approval of Congress. An agreement between states is called an "interstate compact" (a variety of existing compacts are listed in the link). The federal government can also unilaterally create an independent agency with authority in some states, but not others such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The relevant parts of the Constitution are Article I, Section 10, which states: 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. Also relevant are Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. and Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.	If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.
Is it an offence to spike someone's drink? Legally speaking (legal consequences), is it wrong to spike someone's drink? No dangerous or health-threatening substances, just a very mild pill that gives beneficial insomnia-curing effects. Also, is there anything wrong with spiking your own drink? (And someone else came along and drank from your cup, of her own accord.)	Giving someone a drug without their consent can be considered infliction of bodily harm in various jurisdiction. When it caused a negative effect on the person the perpetrator did not anticipate, it might be grossly negligent (if that effect was likely to occur) or just negligent (if one could not reasonably expect that this effect would occur). Details depend on jurisdiction and the mood of the judge. It might also be a factor if the court rules that the defendant acted in bad faith (for example, by expecting that the drug would make the injured party consent to something they wouldn't have consented to otherwise, regardless of if this actually happened). Additionally, if the intention was to cure the injured party from a medical ailment (as implied by "pill with beneficial effect") it could theoretically be possible that the perpetrator also gets charged for practicing medicine without a license (if that is illegal in the jurisdiction). Should the perpetrator have a medical license, they will likely get charged with medical malpractice, because in most jurisdictions it is illegal to treat a patient without their consent (if the patient is in a condition which makes informed consent possible). Regarding adding something to your own drink and inadvertently poisoning someone else who drinks from it: In most societies, drinking from the glass of someone else is considered against social etiquette, so a possible defense could be that the perpetrator could not reasonably expect that the person would do that. But it could still be judged as infliction of bodily harm through negligence depending on the circumstances and how likely it was to happen. For example, in an environment where many glasses with similar-looking drinks stand on a table, the risk that glasses get mixed up is quite high. Details - again - depend on jurisdiction.	I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers	Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you.	Is this illegal? YES Is there any specific law for this? YES: Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 says, inter alia, this: Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,-- [...] (b) ... possesses ... or uses cannabis, [...] shall be punishable,-- (ii) where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b),-- (A) and involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both... Note that these are maximum sentences, and that Section 2 includes ganja in its definition of cannabis.	There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.	It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody.	There are no small sexual assaults Indecent assault/sexual assault/sexual touching Different jurisdictions have different definitions but, wherever you are, the behavior you describe is a criminal offense and the appropriate course of action is to report it to both your employer and the police. The fact that the perpetrator is under the professional care of the victim does not change this although, if the positions were reversed, this would be an aggravating factor. That is, assuming you are willing to make a statement to the police and, ultimately, testify before a court. It may not come to that - the police may not press charges. You can also civilly sue for the damage you have suffered. Work Health and Safety Your employer has an obligation to provide a reasonably safe workplace. If this is a not uncommon occurrence then they should have analyzed the risk and determined appropriate mitigation strategies and trained you in these. Have they?	It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."
Does 18 U.S. Code § 1543 apply to foreign passports? Consider this An American uses a fake scan of a Canadian passport over the internet to open an offshore bank account The account is never used No quantifiable damages are incurred Is the American liable for criminal fraud? Also which federal agency would prosecute? The Diplomatic Service seems to only handle fraud of US passports, and only in immigration, drugs, terrorism and related crimes.	The Justice Department prosecutes all crimes prosecuted by the U.S. federal government regardless of which agency has jurisdiction over that kind of regulatory activity. The Canadian government could prosecute for passport fraud or forgery. The offshore account country could prosecute for bank fraud or forgery. The U.S. federal government, the Canadian government, and the offshore jurisdiction could probably all prosecute for attempted money laundering or attempted tax evasion (or worse, such as attempted material support of terrorism). Realistically, none of this is terribly likely to happen if there is no harm, and even if there was an arrest and a conviction, the sentence would probably be mild for such a victimless white collar crime (probably probation and a fine or a few months in jail at most unless there were larger aggravating factors). But, harm is not required for a criminal prosecution. Or, more precisely, the violation of the criminal law per se is the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 states: Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same may be used; or Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same— Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. This statute clearly applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. passports. But, it isn't obvious that the crime would apply in this case, because the crime may have taken place outside the U.S. and with a target outside the U.S., one or the other must be true for the U.S. to enforce its criminal laws - U.S. citizenship isn't sufficient. The offense in this particular statute is making with the intent that some use it, using or attempting to use a passport. The crime was directed at the offshore location. But, it wouldn't be such a stretch to assume that if the fake passport was made or used by the defendant in a U.S. living room that it was used there even if only to send it over the Internet to a foreign country. On the other hand, if the fake passport were made or used in a hotel room in Montreal by a U.S. citizen and was directed at the Cayman Islands, the U.S. might lack criminal jurisdiction over the case. The maximum offense would be 10 years and a fine for a first or second offense, but the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would very likely call for a much milder recommended sentence, and any excess punishment over this recommendation would have to be justified by the judge.	Foreign citizens are just as entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure as American citizens are. The case you cited was, in fact, a South Korean citizen who successfully had evidence suppressed from an unjustified border search.	No. Both your country of origin and your new home country will only care of your name as in the documents issued by each of them respectively. Mind though that absence of obligation to synchronize your names does not mean that you can freely use both identities within one country. For example, opening a bank account in the US using your original passport/name when you are already officially using another name there would be a very grey area bordering with identify fraud as it would effectively enable you to operate two different identities to gain any benefits not otherwise available.	Yes, and sometimes it even makes perfect sense that such an activity would be a crime. For many crimes, attempting the crime is a crime. The attempt may have no actual effect on any person or property, but is still illegal. According to 16 U.S. Code § 1538(a)(1)(C) it is illegal to kill an endangered species on the high seas. A whale in international waters cannot really be considered anyone's "property" (and since it's in international waters there can't even be some weird theory of it being the government's property) but it is still illegal. 18 U.S. Code § 700 purports to prohibit the desecration of a flag, although this was found unconstitutional. 18 U.S. Code § 708 makes it a crime to commercially use the coat of arms of the Swiss Confederation, for some reason. And 18 U.S. Code § 711a makes it a crime to use the slogan "Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute" for profit, except as authorized. (But maybe that sort of thing counts as intellectual property.) 18 U.S. Code § 342 makes it a crime to operate a passenger train under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This really only affects people and property if the train is driven improperly as a result; if you make it safely, you'd probably never even know. But the driver would still be facing up to 15 years in prison if he was caught doing that. And finally, according to A Crime a Day on Twitter: 33 USC §1232(b), 33 CFR §401.101 & §401.94(a) make it a federal crime to violate the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations by not having a copy of the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations while you pass through the St. Lawrence Seaway.	The primary question is whether you actually committed a crime in signing a credit card receipt, when you are not the cardholder nor are you authorized to sign on behalf of the cardholder: did you commit fraud? It is not possible to accidentally commit fraud, you have to have intended to deceived the other party that you are authorized to sign. For the sake of discussion, I will assume that you had no such intention. Presumably, the person who ordered the stuff will wonder "where is my stuff?", will complain to the vendor, they may then find the signed receipt and some evidence regarding where the goods were delivered. Whether or not they contact you asking for an explanation / return of the goods, the police would have to investigate the situation in light of some allegation that you committed fraud. The police will not just come knocking on the door and nab you (in the US: North Korean law is different). In many jurisdictions, there is a requirement for a warrant supported by probable cause. If the investigation provides sufficient credible evidence proving that you did intentionally falsely sign the receipt, to the point that given those facts you would be convicted of the crime, then there is probable cause for a warrant for your arrest. The fact of signing a receipt is not probable cause to support such an arrest, but other facts could be added to reach that level of evidence.	It is legal. 18 USC Chapter 17 contains laws regarding what you can/cannot do with US legal tender. It doesn't mention anything about buying, or selling US tender at or above the face value. And there are several businesses in the USA that do this (coin exchanges which purchase coins at less then face value and give you dollar bills in return, etc...). However I would be concerned that your action might look like money laundering to the customs official on your way back home. Or on the way going to the foreign country for that matter. Which could be very bad for you. I would talk to a lawyer about this.	Can I just go to the United States and marry him anyway, and still live in Canada? Basically, yes. But, if you tell the border patrol that you are engaged or headed to your wedding when crossing the border to attend your wedding, you may be denied entry, because you no longer qualify for a tourist visa or student visa, and now need a fiancee visa to enter the U.S. This can prevent you from crossing the border for a long time while a financee visa is processed. (I've seen this happen in real life more than once when I lived in Ann Arbor, Michigan which is near the Canadian border.) Once you are married, it is perfectly legal to live in Canada, although this may lead to tough questions from U.S. or Canadian immigration officials about whether you had a bona fide marriage if you later seek to gain U.S. citizenship, or he seeks to gain Canadian citizenship based upon being married, since not living together is circumstantial evidence that you have a sham marriage. This said, immigration officials tend to be more suspicious of sham marriages when one spouse from a poor country seeks citizenship in a rich country than they are in U.S.-Canadian marriages in either direction. Immigration officials are more suspicious if you do not have children together and are less suspicious if you have children together. Do I have to report this to anyone? You need a marriage license from the state or local government as applicable where the marriage takes place and it must be returned with signatures from the officiant and a couple of witnesses within the time set forth in the license. If you change your name upon marriage, you need to change it for purposes of all of your identification documents including your passport, usually by submitting your marriage license to the appropriate officials. If you are asked by a border crossing official if you are married or engaged to be married you are required to answer truthfully, but you do not have to volunteer the information. If either of you applies for a permanent residence visa or citizenship in the other country the immigration officials of that country must be informed on the application for the visa or citizenship.	I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days). Chase was likely indicating that the money will be reimbursed within 10 business days of completing their investigation; not 10 business days from the date you told the that someone forged checks on your account. This would make sense when you think about it, as they need to make sure that you were not complicit in the crime (you would be surprised how many people have had someone cash multiple checks from their account only to split the money with them and file a claim for fraudulent transfer/forgery). Further, checks are a negotiable instrument, unlike a credit/debit card, where specific protections exist pursuant to its terms and conditions of use. You have a duty to keep a negotiable instrument safe, and while most banks will reimburse you if it can be established that you had no involvement and you were not grossly negligent in the keeping of the instruments, it is a different animal in and of itself. It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA. Unless your bank indicated in the disclosures of the checking account application and acceptance documentation that in the event of a stolen check you will be reimbursed in X amount of days, they have the absolute right to complete their investigation before reimbursing any funds to your account. It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe? Federal banking regulations provide broad protections to consumers when it comes to fraud involving credit/debit cards, as these are easily stolen from all sorts of means. That said, checks do not carry the same protections, although oftentimes some. National banks may be required to reimburse customers for forged checks. However, based on individual circumstances, the bank can investigate to determine if the customer is entitled to a reimbursement. There is not duty to reimburse until the investigation is complete. This is why I think you've potentially misconstrued what they said about how long it would take. They cannot promise a time certain when they don't know how long the investigation will take. Whether the bank is liable for the customer's loss depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Generally, a bank is liable for accepting a check that has been forged, altered, or improperly endorsed. However, if the bank can prove two things — that it accepted the check in good faith and exercised ordinary care and diligence in handling the transaction — it may not be liable. If your actions — the way the check or checkbook was handled, issued, completed, or made payable — contributed to the making of the forgery, you may be at least partially liable. Generally, the bank will require you to complete an affidavit. It may also request that you file a police report. ** Addition: I forgot to mention that if the checks were not "cashed" (i.e. filled out to cash or cashed in person), but rather were presented to a 3rd party for payment in receipt of goods or services, you are also going to need to contact those individuals or businesses (their name is on the check) and alert them to the fraud, and allow them to contact their banks, lest you will be assessed fees by them for insufficient funds if your bank later takes the money back as a result of the investigation. Also, in the event the checks were recreated rather than stolen, or if you don't know exactly how many were stolen, you are going to need to close your account while you wait for the investigation to bear fruit (hopefully), and open a new account, as you now have a duty to account for any and all checks stolen at that event (so, if you know a book is out there and 10 checks have cleared you know there are 15 remaining that the bank is not going to cover if you don't take steps to protect yourself). One would think they've asked you this and have already done something to prevent further checks from coming in, but if not, you need to get on it. Also, you may want to hire your own investigator if you have the funds to do so. While stolen cards are often strangers, stolen checks (unless it's one washed check) is nearly always someone you know.
Can the door to a kitchen be locked? I was just wondering if it is legal for a restaurant to lock the doors of a kitchen where food is being prepared. The door can be opened from the inside It would seem that in case of a fire in the kitchen, the door would not open from the outside, creating a safety hazard. Thanks for the info.	There is a difference between emergency exits and ordinary exits Building codes (which vary by jurisdiction) require egress routes for use in an emergency. These exits are quite often different from the ones used in non emergency situations. Indeed, they are usually different exits, that is, the emergency exits are only used in emergencies and the normal exits are not emergency exits. Emergency exits are usually one-way - they allow egress but prevent access. Think of a cinema complex - you can enter through the front door but there will be several emergency exits which are locked from the outside. Providing the locked door is not blocking an egress route, it’s fine.	You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal.	How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small.	"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.	This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order.	I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks...	A store owner may ban any person from that store that s/he chooses, provided that the ban is not for a reason forbidden by applicable anti-discrimination law, such as banning all people of a particular race or religion. That does not appear to be the case in this situation, from the description. Since this is a franchise, the store has a local owner who is not the chain company. The company will have a franchise contract with the local owner, which will specify in what ways the company can and cannot control the store. They might or might not have the power to require the store owner not to ban you, or not to engage in verbally abusive behavior in the store. In any case, you, or any third party, cannot force them to exercise such power, even if they have it under such a contract. It is very unlikely that law enforcement the authorities will treat the verbal harassment as a crime based on a customer report. You could publicize the situation, as by an online review, which might cause the chain company to take some action, for fear of bad publicity. But be careful. You have already learned that your initial understanding of the situation was significantly incomplete. If any public statements you make are untrue, and harmful to reputation, you could be accused of defamation and sued, perhaps successfully.	You will probably have been presented with a form mentioning "Texas Food Establishment Rules (TFER) Section: §228.35", which requires you to report symptoms and diagnoses which include Salmonella Typhi. That does not guarantee that you actually got such a form or that you remember signing it, but theoretically you did. The regulations are given here and here. The model form includes the information above the signature line "I understand that failure to comply with the terms of this agreement could lead to action by the food establishment or the food regulatory authority that may jeopardize my employment and may involve legal action against me".
What constitutes a gambling app I am developing a game that has users playing live quizzes against each other for cash prizes. You can book to play a live quiz for a small fee. You have a chance of winning a cash prize if you perform well on the quiz. The quizzes include general knowledge questions with widely accepted and proveable answers. So the questions do not involve luck. But my app is getting rejected from the Play Store on claims that it violates the Gambling policy. How does the gambling policy apply to a quiz app?	The gambling policy to which the question links says that "gambling" under that policy includes: games of skill that offer prizes of cash or other value. From the description in the question, this exactly fits the app in question, so it ought to be rejected under the policy unless it comp[lies with the rules for an exception, which the question doesn't say it does.	Online conversations are generally allowed evidence. However, EVERYTHING in the chat should be considered, as well as any later actions. Were there later conversations that said something different? Did the lease you signed have different terms? One line in a WhatsApp does not make your case a "slam dunk". It may only be one piece of evidence in a much larger context.	A person who uses a name similar to an existing protected trademark may have committed trademark infringement. The trademark owner can sue, and possibly collect significant damages, and possibly also get an injunction against further infringement. Note that this is not a matter of a crime, but of a lawsuit by one person or business against another. (A point of terminology: A trademark, like a copyright, is said to be "infringed" when someone uses it without permission in ways that the law does not allow. The word "broken" is not used for this.) In many countries, only marks properly registered with the appropriate national registry are protected. In the US simply using the mark can lead to its being protected, although registration can give greater rights to the mark owner. Protection in one country does not give protection in another. In general, protection only applies in the same or a similar market area as that in which the mark is already being used. An electronic game may well be similar enough to a card or board game for protection to apply. A key question is how similar a mark can be and avoid infringement. The basic test is if a reasonable person could be confused into thinking that the products were from the same maker, or were affiliated, or that the maker of the original product or service endorsed the new one. This is always something of a judgement call. If a mark is similar enough that a judge or jury might think that some reasonable consumers would be confused or mislead, then there is risk of an adverse judgement. Note that even an unfounded suit may be costly to defend. If there is any question, consulting an experienced trademark lawyer may well be a good idea. I will not express an opinion of the similarity of "2oobbllee" and "Dobble". That would be legal advice. But if the OP were to change the name of the app, the whole matter would seem to be finished with no risk of court action. Note that the concept of a game, unlike the name, cannot be protected, neither by trademark law nor by copyright law,	If the stranger was aware of the reward offer at the time of the return you have a legally binding contract - you made an offer to the world, money for return of the phone, and they accepted it by returning it. If they were ignorant of your offer and returned the phone then there is no contract and you do not have to pay: albeit at the cost of being a jerk. Of course, if they obtained your phone unlawfully (e.g. by stealing it) the contract is void.	Your lawyers should understand that you're dealing with a private company that can make and enforce its own policies when it comes to allowing access to the their store. If Google's policy is to require you to do research and diligence on a possible trademark infringement of your App, that's legal, as long as Google's requirements don't not violate local or national laws of the variant of their store. The idea that another company or individual can allege infringement, yet not communicate sufficiently with you or Google, may not seem fair, but as a response to that, Google can play it safe and not open themselves up to liability by removing your App or making you resubmit under a new name. That is outlined in Google's TOS, which you agreed to. Your only recourse is to keep talking to Google and keep trying to contact the complainant.	The general idea of such an app is not subject to copyright protection. Ideas never are protected by copyright. So creating an app based on the functionality of a fictional app would not be a copyright violation. The logo might, if it is original enough, be protected by copyright. Any or all of the "name, the logo and the color scheme" might well be subject to trademark protection. (Names and other short phrases are not protected by copyright.) You would be wise not to use these identifying elements of the show, but instead create ones sufficiently different that no reasonable person would be confused into thinking that your app had been used on the show, or was sponsored, endorse, or approved by the show or its creators. An explicit disclaimer saying that you are in no way associated with the show or its creators, and your app is not approved by or endorsed by them would also be wise. Otherwise you might be accused of trying to pass off your work as affiliated with they show, or to trade on the show's reputation and fame. Whether you make your app an open source work is not in any way relevant to copyright or trademark claims. Whether you charge for your app is of only limited relevance to a copyright claim. Whether you sell or market your app, or use it to advertise some other product or service is relevant to a trademark claim, as trademarks are only protected against their use "in trade" which generally means commercially. However, non-commercial use of a trademark may constitute "dilution" of the mark, which may give rise to a cause of action against the person using it.	No First, gambling is not illegal - only illegal gambling is illegal. Lotteries are legal in the United States when operated by or under licence from a state (44) or territory (3). That's legal gambling. It's illegal when operated by somebody else. Clearly, Omaze isn't one of these; but they aren't running a lottery. They are running a sweepstakes. Not only is this legal, but it also isn't gambling because in a sweepstakes the players do not pay to play. If you look closely, you can see a link that says "enter without contributing". Look even deeper and you can see "NO PURCHASE, PAYMENT, OR CONTRIBUTION NECESSARY TO ENTER OR WIN. Contributing will not improve chances of winning. Void where prohibited." No stake means no gamble.	The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.
Double jeopardy Now that it has been reported that all charges against jussie Smollett will be dropped, does the federal government have the right to charge him on their own? Also, if it is found that there was impropriety in the state prosecutors office, will the charges automatically be restored?	Federal crimes and State crimes are different crimes - double jeopardy doesn’t apply, you can be charged with both. Prosecutors have wide discretion on who they charge and who they don’t. If it is demonstrated that a prosecutor has acted corruptly then that case will be referred to a different prosecutor - who has wide discretion etc.	The Fifth Amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;" which suggests that Crime B is still fair game under double jeopardy. However, if B is a lesser included offense under Blockburger, i.e. A is Aggravated Robbery and B is Robbery, then a prosecution could be barred by Double Jeopardy. Barring that, and jurisdiction specific law, the State isn't barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the 5th (and 14th) amendment. That does not foreclose Person C from finding an ethical, equitable, statutory remedy or controlling case enforcing a plea bargain. As far as I can tell, commutation is the equivalent of a conviction while a pardon is equivalent to an acquittal. I also imagine if the prosecution isn't barred and tried C for B, the Executive may just pardon/commute C again. Edit to add: Under Santobello, it would appear C may have an additional remedy enforcing a plea bargain. Santobello didn't involve a case dismissed in a plea bargain, nor commutation or pardon. A court might find that commutation or pardon are essentially a breach of the agreement.	That's basically correct. The Double Jeopardy clause prevents the federal and state governments from trying you again for a crime that you've already been acquitted of, no matter what new evidence turns up. Even if you confessed to the crime, you could still not be tried. The relevant text of the Fifth Amendment reads: No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The case of Mel Ignatow is probably among the most famous examples. He was charged with murdering a woman, but acquitted at trial. About a year later, a guy laying carpet at his house pulled up floorboards and found the victim's jewelry, along with pictures of Ignatow murdering the victim. Ignatow confessed, but the state couldn't charge him with murder again, though they could charge him perjury for testifying that he hadn't killed her. So the answer is yes, the Fifth Amendment generally prevents the government from trying you for a crime you've been acquitted of. There are two main caveats here. First is the dual-sovereignty principle, which accounts for the fact that almost anywhere that the Fifth Amendment applies, a person is subject to the laws of two sovereign governments: the federal government and that of whatever state the person is in. For example, robbing a bank in Los Angeles would violate the laws of both the United States and California. If California put you on trial, but you were acquitted, the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar California from trying you again, but it would not be a defense if the federal government wanted to try to charge you again. Second is the language about "the same offence," which is not as clear as it might sound at first. In the course of committing a crime, a person can easily commit many other crimes without thinking of it. In your bank robbery, for instance, you could easily break the following additional laws: trespassing, menacing, carrying a concealed weapon, brandishing a firearm, larceny, grand larceny. This raises the question of what affect your acquittal on the robbery charge has on the possibility of charging you on these other offenses. The answer can be found in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932): The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. This is easier to understand in practice than in theory. If you want to bring charges for the same conduct without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, you need to be able to make a Venn diagram where the first charge and the new charge each has at least one element that the other does not. So map out the following possible offenses involved in a robbery: theft: unlawfully taking the property of another person aggravated theft: unlawfully taking the property of another person, when the property is worth more than $1,000 menacing: threatening to injure another person aggravated menacing: threatening to injure another person while brandishing a deadly weapon robbery: unlawfully taking the property of another person, facilitated by a threat to injure another person aggravated robbery: unlawfully taking the property of another person, facilitated by a threat to injure another person while brandishing a deadly weapon So now you have a Venn diagram that looks like this: If you've been acquitted of robbery, a prosecutor who wants to charge you again needs to find an offense that (1) requires proof of a fact that robbery did not, and (2) does not require proof of a fact that robbery did. This means the prosecutor can't bring a charge for the "greater offense" of aggravated robbery, because the earlier robbery charge didn't require proof of anything that aggravated robbery would not. The prosecutor also can't bring a charge for theft or menacing, because neither requires proof of anything that robbery did not. These are called "lesser included offenses." But a charge for aggravated theft would be allowed. Although there's a shared element between aggravated theft and robbery (taking the property of another), there are also unique elements to both aggravated theft (property worth more than $1,000) and robbery (a threat to injure another). A charge for aggravated menacing would also be allowed, as it requires proof of brandishing a deadly weapon, but does not require proof of taking the property of another.	There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.	(assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions).	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court.	You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.
How Google Play Policy applies to different Developers I have a quiz game that was rejected from the Play Store on claims that it violates the Gambling policy because it currently allows users to win money for playing quizzes. On appealing, I asked the Policy team "How is my app different from Loco or Zupee? Basically, why can I not offer cash prizes for quizzes while they are allowed to?" Their response "Any perceived compliance or non-compliance of other developers’ apps does not have any bearing on the compliance of your own apps." Could this mean that Google Play's policies are applied differently for different developers or apps?	"Any perceived compliance or non-compliance of other developers’ apps does not have any bearing on the compliance of your own apps." Could this mean that Google Play's policies are applied differently for different developers or apps? No, it means that you can't break the rules even if others are breaking the rules or you think they are breaking the rules. I think it is worth noting that those apps are for the Indian market. I don't know which one you are in, but google will have different rules for different countries to comply with various regulatory requirements.	This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy.	By itself, a chess position is not personal data. Personal data is “any information relating to an … identifiable natural person”. Since the file in question includes the name of the opponent, it is clearly personal data about the opponent. If the files are used for “purely personal or household purposes”, the GDPR won't apply per Art 2(2)(c). If the files are shared more widely – especially if the files are published – then GDPR becomes relevant. The person/entity who is data controller has to consider GDPR compliance. Data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data (the “why” and “how”). The first question would be under which legal basis this personal data about another person can be shared. The GDPR offers multiple legal basis, notably “legitimate interests” and “consent”. Consent is always an option, but must be freely given (entirely voluntary). Legitimate interests can serve as a legal basis after a balancing test between your interests and the data subject's rights and interests. This balancing test also depends on the reasonable expectations of the data subject, which in turn depends on the more general context. For example, in a chess community where such sharing is completely normal there would likely be a legitimate interest for you to share games as well, if the games occurred in the context of this community. But if you play a game with a friend who is not part of this community, the friend cannot reasonably expect that their name and associated personal data would be shared. The second question would be how you would satisfy further GDPR compliance obligation, in particular the Art 13/Art 14 right to information. When collecting personal data, it is necessary to provide certain information such as your identity, what processing is being carried out, and how the data subject can invoke their GDPR rights (a privacy notice or privacy policy). This might be difficult or awkward to do. Practical solutions to these problems: If you want to share a game but aren't sure that the opponent is OK with this, remove identifying aspects such as names. For example, you could crop a screenshot, or describe the game in textual notation without listing the opponent's name. Play the game via a chess website that publishes the game. This way, the website is the data controller, and you and the opponent are the data subjects. This avoids having to act as the data controller yourself. This might work for private interactions, but not e.g. if you run a chess club and require members to play via that website – you might still be in a data controller role then and have full compliance obligations.	It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.	"...claiming that the license can be revoked at any time." Of course a game company can revoke their license at any time. The company grants you a license to use the product, and a license is not an obligation on their part to provide the product, or a right to use it on your part. There's nothing illegal about a license or TOS that has clauses which stipulate when the license or TOS can be revoked changed or revoked.	Jurisdictions vary but, in general, gambling involves wagering something of value in a game of chance to win something of value. “Something of value” is usually interpreted broadly but it must usually be something that can, at least in theory, be sold for money. So, skins in a popular online game qualify if there is a secondary market for their trade. However, a mother’s love isn’t. “Game of chance” versus game of skill is a continuum. So, for example, Snakes and Ladders is a game of pure chance - it can be played equally well by an automaton as a human. Go is a game of pure skill - it requires a human brain or an extremely sophisticated algorithm to play well. Sport is considered a game of skill so competing for prize money is not gambling even if there is an entry fee. However, wagering on the outcome of sports is gambling even though it requires considerable skill to do well. Arcade and carnival games avoid gambling laws by: primarily being games of skill (e.g. a shooting gallery); by giving everyone a prize, the vast majority of which cost less than the price of entry. This is the “loot box” solution and really nudged the line; by being exempt, either explicitly or by a long period of tolerance by the authorities.	Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one!	Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.
Class Action - which options I have? This is regarding to my question: Is this apparent Class Action settlement a spam message? From answers I understood that it isn't a spam. But what options I have? They offer only two: file a claim You will only receive a benefit if you file a Claim Form online by June 24, 2019, or if mailed, postmarked no later than June 24, 2019. exclude yourself If you don’t want to receive a cash payment or other settlement benefits and don’t want to be bound by the Settlement and any judgment in this case, you must send a written request to exclude yourself. But if I do nothing, just ignore this message, what happens? From text: If you don’t exclude yourself, you may object to the Settlement or to the request for fees and costs by Class Counsel. So I get nothing, but should pay fee? Looks strange.	A person who is nominally in the class and does nothing remains in the class. Such a person can file formal objections to the terms of the settlement, including the amounts to be paid to the lawyers who ran the class action and negotiated the settlement on behalf of the class. Any such objections will be considered when the judge decides whether to approve the terms of settlement. As a practical matter, there needs to be a good reason stated for any objection if it is to have any effect on the terms. A member of the class does not pay any fees, directly. However, the total fees paid come out of the money provided by the settlement, and may reduce the benefits available to class members, which is why members may file objections to th fee structure. A member of the class can get some of the settlement money only if that person files a claim on the proper form, and the claim is approved. A person who is nominally in the class may send in a written request to be excluded from the class. Such a person ceases to be a member of the class, cannot object to the terms of settlement, and cannot file a claim. However, such a person is not bound by the settlement, and can file a separate, individual lawsuit over the same issue, if such a person chooses to do so. This would mean paying a different set of lawyers.	When is a summons considered served in England if it was sent by second class post? Three business days after the date of posting. See the 1999 Amendments to Rule 99 of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules 1981 which makes no mention of the class of postage, only the relevant timeframe: (1) [...] a summons requiring a person to appear before a magistrates’ court may be served by— [...] (b) posting it to the person at an address where it is reasonably believed that the person will receive it... [...] (4) A summons served in accordance with paragraph (1) shall be deemed to have been received by the person— [...] (d) [...] three business days after it was posted [...] in accordance with paragraph (1)(b)... [non-relevant details omitted] Note that by picking a random council from Google, Oxford's Council Tax Debt Recovery Procedure which says: The summons will normally be served by second class post. It is entirely likely that this is the national norm, but all other local councils may be found via the dot.gov website, in case one would like to check specific policies for their own locality.	It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees.	I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	Although it's difficult to find exact numbers on class action settlements, there are some studies that suggest that the settlements are often of little value to plaintiffs. A Mayer-Brown paper was only able to obtain data on six settlements - in these cases, claims rates were 0.000006%, 0.33%, 1.5%, 9.66% and 12%. The same paper found that in one case of an $8 million settlement fund made available to 13,500 members, counsel received $5.5 million. Appendices A and B of this paper provide further examples where class action settlements are either a negligible amount, or benefited a negligible number of class members. Although the scope of this paper is somewhat narrow, its findings suggest that it is representative of many class actions.	Class action suits can be very costly for defendants, particularly pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, some such companies have been willing to make significant settlements, even when proof of damage and liability were far from clear. Such settlements can result in significant income for the law firms involved. Thus, some firms are willing to spend significant money to find and sign up potential plaintiffs, either in hope of a settlement, or in hope of an eventual winning case. Either is a gamble, but the potential payoff is large, so such firms (so-called "Mass Tort" firms) may find it worth putting up the money to seek potential plaintiffs. There is no rule requiring any degree of proof or assurance to run such a campaign. If only 1 in 20 such campaigns results in a good settlement, the sponsoring firm may do quite well.	In the small claims court cases I've been involved in the judge has dismissed all aspects of the claim related to time wasted, transportation costs, and attending court in the judgement amount itself. However the court costs one incurs should be a part of the amount that is judged in one's favour. Also the costs of enforcing any judgement (court bailiff fees) are usually considered recoverable. My thoughts are that if one is keen to ensure that the other party pays the full costs of time, collation of evidence, photocopying, phone calls, and anything else one believes they are responsible for, one will have much more luck if one is not self-representing. The predominant reason for self-representing is to keep costs, and thus one's financial risk from pursuing the case, minimal. disclaimer: this is only opinion, and not legal advice
GDPR data portability when no data stored My website is processing IP addresses to automatically select the language for the site, however these IP addresses are not stored in the database. Even though the visitors give consent, do they have the right to data portability? There's no data stored for me to send them. If a visitor tried to exercise this right, what should I do as the owner of such website? Just tell them there's no data?	You clearly cannot provide data that you haven't stored – and not storing data is a good thing under the Art 5(1)(c) Data Minimization Principle. Despite the Art 20 data portability right being conditional on that the data subject has provided data and not on that data has been stored, I think responding to such a request with “sorry, as per our privacy policy we do not store this data” would be perfectly fine. It is also curious that you are using consent as the legal basis for the purpose of selecting the website language. How do you obtain consent from visitors? How can you prove that you got consent? In many ways, consent is the legal basis of last resort, and I'd think that legitimate interest would be a much more straightforward approach in your case.	Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself.	First of all, in a GDPR contest, the process described is not strong anonymization. It may be hard for an outsider to go from the stored record to any PII, it is much easier for an outsider to "single out" an individual. This means that given a known individual, one can determine whether that person is among those listed in the records, or can determine this to a significant degree of probability. For this only the algorithm and the rotating salts are needed, one need not break the hash. Note also that the GDPR specifies that if a person can be singled out with the assistance of the site operator the data is not considered anonymized. Thus this data needs a lawful basis under the GDPR, and the various other GDPR requirement all apply. However, even if the data were totally anonymized, and say just added to a count of users with this or that User Agent, the process of reading local data (including but not limited to cookies) itself requires informed consent, and so a cookie banner or other interaction with similar info under the e-Privacy directive (EPD). The EPD, being a directive and not a regulation, must be implemented by national laws, and the exact provisions in those laws may differ somewhat from country to country. But I believe that all of them require consent before any local data is read.	There are a few different grounds under which PII can be handled. Perhaps the most discussed at the moment of GDRP introduction is consent, because of the wave of consent-seeking. But there are a number of other grounds. "Necessary for contract execution" is a trivial one, to deliver a pizza you'll need an address. The relevant ground for sanctions lists is also pretty obvious in hindsight, you may process PII in order to comply with legal obligations. Note that this is still an integral part of the GDPR, not an exception to the GDPR. That means you need to apply all the basic GDPR rules. You need to explicitly store where you got the PII from, for which purpose, and you need to document how you're using it. Note that this might be hard - why do you need to store this data? Why can't you just check the list as the moment it's relevant? The GDPR for a large part depends on you justifying your actions, not just in hindsight but already up front.	The GDPR has an exemption for purely personal or household activity. Creating a family tree seems purely personal as long as you don't publish it. You're also allowed to freely share the tree as long as it stays within that purely personal scope. Your proposed restriction of only showing data of blood relatives seems excessively strict. But assuming that this exemption wouldn't apply, there'd probably still be no problem. The GDPR does not require you to always obtain consent. It requires that the purposes for which you process personal data are covered by some legal basis. Consent is one such legal basis, but legitimate interest is another. You can likely argue that you have a legitimate interest to create a tree of your (extended) family. The legitimate interest must be weighed against the rights and freedoms of the affected persons. For example, contact information could be used for stalking. The balance of the legitimate interest check can be changed if you adopt suitable safeguards. Your idea of only sharing data with close relatives would be such a safeguard, but it might not be necessary. When you rely on legitimate interest, the affected person can object to further processing, furthermore they can request to be erased from your records. A request for erasure can be denied if there are overriding grounds to keep the data. E.g maybe only contact information has to be deleted but names, dates, and relations might be kept. You should notify persons when they are included into your records. It is your obligation as the data controller to make these decisions. If someone disagrees they can sue you or lodge a complaint with a supervision authority. Note that dead persons are not natural persons in the sense of the GDPR, and have no privacy. However, national laws may provide such protections.	Data can only be processed if there is at least one lawful basis to do so. The lawful bases for processing data are: the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes. processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract. processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject. processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person. processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. So unless you have some very compelling reason to need to process that person's data without their consent, you can't legally do it. Therefore it is hard to see how you could produce this "template", and even if you somehow did the person receiving it might not have a lawful basis for fetching (processing) that data anyway.	GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time.	By itself, a chess position is not personal data. Personal data is “any information relating to an … identifiable natural person”. Since the file in question includes the name of the opponent, it is clearly personal data about the opponent. If the files are used for “purely personal or household purposes”, the GDPR won't apply per Art 2(2)(c). If the files are shared more widely – especially if the files are published – then GDPR becomes relevant. The person/entity who is data controller has to consider GDPR compliance. Data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data (the “why” and “how”). The first question would be under which legal basis this personal data about another person can be shared. The GDPR offers multiple legal basis, notably “legitimate interests” and “consent”. Consent is always an option, but must be freely given (entirely voluntary). Legitimate interests can serve as a legal basis after a balancing test between your interests and the data subject's rights and interests. This balancing test also depends on the reasonable expectations of the data subject, which in turn depends on the more general context. For example, in a chess community where such sharing is completely normal there would likely be a legitimate interest for you to share games as well, if the games occurred in the context of this community. But if you play a game with a friend who is not part of this community, the friend cannot reasonably expect that their name and associated personal data would be shared. The second question would be how you would satisfy further GDPR compliance obligation, in particular the Art 13/Art 14 right to information. When collecting personal data, it is necessary to provide certain information such as your identity, what processing is being carried out, and how the data subject can invoke their GDPR rights (a privacy notice or privacy policy). This might be difficult or awkward to do. Practical solutions to these problems: If you want to share a game but aren't sure that the opponent is OK with this, remove identifying aspects such as names. For example, you could crop a screenshot, or describe the game in textual notation without listing the opponent's name. Play the game via a chess website that publishes the game. This way, the website is the data controller, and you and the opponent are the data subjects. This avoids having to act as the data controller yourself. This might work for private interactions, but not e.g. if you run a chess club and require members to play via that website – you might still be in a data controller role then and have full compliance obligations.
Prior to a divorce, can a spouse prevent the use of any saved assets? Lets say Bob and Mary are about to get separated and divorced. Bob has a 401K and a savings account that Mary can not access. To prevent having to give Mary half when they divorce, Bob decides he wants to go a luxurious vacation and spend his hard earned money. Can Mary legally prevent Bob from spending his money?	Mary has two options (that are not mutually exclusive). The stronger one is to file for divorce immediately and obtain an injunction against this activity in that case. In some states (e.g. Colorado) an injunction takes effect the moment that divorce papers are served upon a spouse. The weaker one is to ask the divorce judge to allocate the value of the imprudently spent funds to Bob in the division of assets. The doctrine that allows the judge to do this even in a state that otherwise has only "no fault" divorce, is often called "economic waste" or "economic fault." The same doctrine applies, for example, if one spouses destroys valuable property of the other out of spite.	That is, if my mom is sued by somebody for some reason, does that mean I am being sued, and my personal assets are at risk, rather than just hers'? Having power of attorney doesn't mean that you become "one and the same" person, it just means that you can stand in their place legally. If somebody sues your mother, you are authorized to act on your mother's behalf, but that doesn't mean that you are liable for any judgement. Of course there is a fiduciary responsibility to act in your mothers best interest, and violating that can open you up to suits that you are responsible for (because the suit would be against you, not your mother). And, what if she runs out of money, would I be personally financially liable for covering her expenses? No, you wouldn't be. Debts would be settled the same way as if she didn't have anybody acting as PoA. She (you) could declare bankruptcy on her behalf and have the debts discharged. This doesn't obligate you to pay them. And then, what if I simply don't have time to deal with her affairs, that is where I am being put in a position where I have to choose between keeping my job and my personal relationships at home versus going to deal with things over there, would having POA force me to do the latter? This is a personal decision for you. You could alternatively pursue having her declared as an "adult ward of the State". You need to consult a lawyer if you take on full power of attorney, to both protect you, your assets, and your responsibilities. This is something that you really need a lawyer to draft so that the lines are clear, and the expectations are as well. You may need to get a court involved if she is not of clear mind to sign these papers.	How does John protect himself from false claims (e.g. if the woman decides to roll down the stairs and blame him)? It would be very helpful if John has evidence of Oxana making false statements about him or others, and/or of Oxana threatening to make them. False accusations are common --and hardly ever prosecuted-- in a context of divorce. Examples of that are police reports (here and here) and excerpts of court proceedings that ensued during my father's (desisted) proceedings to divorce his 2nd wife (for additional excerpts, see also at 22:49-24:29). According to one of those police reports, my father's 2nd wife allegedly extorted him with "You'll have to pay me even until my ring!" (see page 15 of the pdf file) at the time they were going through the divorce proceedings he filed. Based on your description, it is not far-fetched that John could end up experiencing a similar mess as reflected in these police reports. Note: I don't know whether the poorly written quote from page 15 of the pdf was my father's translation of their interactions or whether he merely transcribed them to the police. Is there any downside to basically putting a camera in every room of the house except hers? John is strongly suggested to check Ohio law to avoid criminal charges. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 750.539d(1)(a) prohibits to "Install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place.". As a wife, Oxana would be reasonably entitled to that privacy in rooms other than --and including-- her room. Moreover, placing cameras in every room will not preempt false accusations. For instance, Oxana could still calumniate John by falsely alleging that he and the daughter went to a hotel to have intercourse. How do you find a good divorce lawyer? Before you even decide to retain a lawyer, see this report about New Jersey Family Court, where judges and attorneys allegedly are in the habit of dragging divorce cases for as long as it is profitable to the lawyers (obviously, at the expense of the parties pursuing the divorce). I don't really follow --and have never litigated-- divorce matters, but the multi-year divorce & custody case of Tsimhoni --formerly presided by Michigan infamous judge Lisa Gorcyca-- illustrates that NJ is not the only state where parties fall prey of legal malpractice. John should search for Ohio court opinions related to divorce matters and get acquainted with the applicable concepts, laws, and doctrines. For that purpose, one free, very useful resource is http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch . Court opinions usually cite relevant statutes, whence John can get an idea of what laws are decisive on divorce matters. Is it reasonable to ask for some sort of record of past outcomes (are there standards to provide full and complete records like for financial companies)? It is reasonable, but no, there are no such standards at all. An attorney will most likely allege grounds of attorney-client privilege, the extensive time that would be needed to redact court documents, and possibly other excuses to deny John's request. Instead, John should go to the court in his county and study as many files of divorce cases as he can. A number of courts display some information of cases in their website. For example, some Michigan trial courts have deployed Odyssey (see here and here), whence a party could search from home whether an attorney has litigated cases in that court and how long they've taken. To see the contents of complaints/motions/etc., John can read them only in the courthouse, unless the county court has configured Odyssey (or its equivalent) to allow the public to read the contents from elsewhere. I don't know what progress Ohio courts have made on this. Regardless of the attorney's transparency to share with John any redacted records about his performance, another important variable is the judge. In this regard, see the next item. Is it reasonable to ask to pay way less if the lawyer fails to get certain terms? Unfortunately, that is neither reaonsable nor realistic. Just from meeting with John, it is impossible for the attorney to know aspects such as: whether John is truthful and the meritorious party; how much trouble Oxana will cause during the divorce proceedings (see the aforementioned police reports); how vexatious the opposing counsel will be; whether John will weaken or sabotage his case during an unforeseen situation or lose control as a result of exasperation; whether the case will be presided by a judge who follows the law (instead of incurring personal bias or influence trafficking); if the judge engages in influence trafficking instead of following the law, whether the attorney is in cozy terms with that judge; whether the opposing counsel is in even cozier terms with that judge; in the event that the matter is appealed, any of the three previous items may apply; whether the parties settle (or John desists for whatever reason). Given the multitude of unknown/uncertain variables and possible outcomes, no person (attorney or otherwise) could establish beforehand the semi-contingent pricing that you have in mind. Do the lawyers even do anything other than fill out paperwork? Yes, they do, but that doesn't necessarily mean that what their work is any effective. Even if the lawyer is diligent, the court might negligently fail to enforce its own orders.	I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.	I do not have the phone number, email, or anything else associated with the account. Well, neither do I - so it must be my account. Unfortunately, the fact that you appear in most or all of the pictures on that account does not prove that you own it. It could be the photographer's account. Do I have ANY options here Can you reactivate the email account associated with the Twitter account? Or the phone number? Either would allow you to reset the password and access the account. You can go to court (in California) and seek an injunction ordering Twitter to delete the photos or give you access. Of course, you have the same issues proving ownership here as you did with Twitter but the court may have different priorities (justice) than Twitter does (corporate protection). I had an idea. If you (or your husband) own the copyright in the photos (i.e. one of you was the photographer) you could issue a DCMA take-down notice because the poster (who, according to Twitter, isn’t you) does not have permission (even if they did at the time: permission can be revoked). Twitter would be unable to contact the account holder and would be required to remove the images when they got no response.of course, if the photographer was someone else, they could do it. Or you could break the law and say it was you, although I would never recommend this even with a near zero chance of being caught.	Whoever signed the loan owes the money to the bank for the truck. So, in this case it is probably both your husband and his ex girlfriend. Whoever is listed on the title of the vehicle as the registered owner has the full exclusive use of the vehicle. That is probably your husband. Any person who co-signed for a loan owns nothing and has rights to nothing. Co-signing a loan just means that the signer agrees to pay off the loan. In this case the girlfriend does not, nor has ever owned the vehicle. If payments are not made on the vehicle, the owner of the loan (probably a bank) will repossess the vehicle and take ownership of it. At that point they will become the registered owner. Your main options are: Refinance the car. You take your own loan and buy out your husband and his girlfriend. Both of them and the bank would have to agree to this. You would become the registered owner of the car. Make a set-off agreement. In this case, you offer your husband a deal: you will make the payments on the car, if you get the use of the car and a percentage of the sale price in the event the car is sold. Try to get a judge to award you the car in the divorce. In this scenario, the judge would order that you become the registered owner of the car, but the girlfriend and your husband would still be responsible for paying the loan. The risk here is that both will default on the loan and the car will get repossessed.	Until the estate is settled and the interest in the house is definitively resolved, the estate has to pay property taxes. There is no requirement for the house to be insured, unless there is a mortgage and insurance is mandated by the lender. The duties of the personal representative generally include taking reasonable steps to protect the assets of the estate, which would include reasonable insurance coverage -- which the estate would pay for. Necessary maintenance would also be included in the things that are to covered by the estate, for example the cost of repairing a broken water pipe (which can cause serious loss, if not repaired). Freshening up the paint in preparation for selling the house, assuming that the house is to be sold and the assets divided, would also be covered by the estate. Utilities, on the other hand, are not within the realm of things that need to be done to protect the interests of the beneficiaries: that is a benefit to whoever lives there, making it their responsibility. The question is foot-dragging is a separate issue, one that should be resolved with the aid of your lawyer. I do not understand why he would maintain that the estate is responsible for paying the utilities.	If both parties are legal, permanent residents of California, their marriage is recognized under Californian law no matter where it originated (provided that the marriage doesn’t violate Californian law, e.g. if Alice were a minor). Alice and Bob would file for divorce in California and the matter would be adjudicated under a Californian court and under Californian law. After these proceedings, Alice and Bob would still be married in Afghanistan (and maybe other foreign countries? That’s a tricky question, so if someone else can figure it out please leave a comment!) but the US would cease to recognize the marriage. In no case would either a Californian or Afghan court make a ruling under the other’s laws. As far as child custody, property, etc. the divorce would essentially proceed as a normal divorce case, although things could become complicated if Alice and Bob own property in Afghanistan, which would usually still be able to be appropriated by a Californian court but, once again, the matter is complex since Afghanistan still recognizes the marriage. As you can tell, a divorce of this nature is not as complicated as one might think, but nevertheless could create some complicated legal situations. Also, marriage is regulated state-by-state, so other states may have different rules regarding foreign marriages. As always, the best path of action is to consult an attorney who specializes in divorce. Edit: A commenter brought up the issue of whether California would recognize a marriage where both parties weren’t present. While this varies by state, California generally doesn’t allow so-called “proxy marriage” unless one of the parties is deployed in the military.
In Texas, Can I sue if I was misled or lied to about the job I would be working I recently was recruited for a contract software engineering role with a bank. The recruiter on several occasions through emails and phone messages emphasized this was a software engineering role. The name of the role is even in the W2 agreement. However, after I started, I found out what I would actually be doing is significantly different and is really a different role altogether. Is this considered fraud? I was absolutely lied to. I know in sales selling a product using incorrect information would count as fraud. Does the same apply here in being recruited for a job?	Can I sue if I was misled or lied to about the job I would be working Yes, but only if you can prove that your reasonable reliance on the employer's representations prompted to leave your former job and/or decline other projects/positions. You would need to persuade a court that your current employment (1) has worsened your circumstances in terms of compensation and/or career-wise; and, if employment is at-will, also that (2) resigning from your current job would not undo the loss you incurred as a result of taking this job position. The particulars of your situation would determine whether your claim(s) meet the prima facie elements of fraud and/or breach of contract.	If you are given a paid job, and you do the work, then "consideration has been provided", and 1682 will not apply. As to "referral fees" those sound more like kickbacks, but it depends on what, if anything, the person gets for the fee.	The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available.	There are three answers here. First, as is common on this site, you are using the term, "legal" and "illegal." Those are not legally meaningfully terms. A good lawyer won't use those terms to mean allowed or disallowed. We talk in terms of potential civil or criminal liability, or other sanctions and consequences. To say that something is "legal" does not communicate much. Second, all contracts are governed by a duty of good faith. That means that you cannot try to "trick" someone with the terms of the contract and expect to enforce that contract against them and you cannot try to skirt your obligations by finding a tricky form of compliance not within the mutual understanding of the agreement. As with all things, defining good faith is not easy, and depends on the specific context of a situation. It is worth distinguishing between the duty of good faith, and the duties one owes to a fiduciary; good faith is surely far less, but nevertheless still meaningful. Third, a defense to non-performance of a contract is that the agreement as written is unconscionable. A contract that is a grossly unfair deal where the contract was not actively negotiated (i.e. Blindly signing a bad form contract), may fall under this category. Note: I am not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; contact a licensed attorney in your area; do not rely on my statements; I merely am providing a general answer that is academic in nature.	I am not a lawyer: If they sue you it will probably be for fraud, then the DA will investigate and can easily find out who you are. If they can prove that you signed the contract is another story. If the clause in the contract is valid yet another. Getting a lawyer might be wise, especially if your visa depends on a clean legal record. Have you talked to them yet? If you can afford it, you or your new company could pay off he months salary to the old company. In my opinion it's fair, they probably turned down a lot of other applicants an will either need to search again or find a good temp to replace you. Think there was something that you cannot quit a contract before it starts, but another option would be to start working for them and then realizing during the test period that it's a bad match. However, best lawyer up! Search for "Kündigung vor Beschäftigungsbeginn" (Cancellation before the start of employment) Quick google suggests that they might be right if they have it in the contract, but the lawyer will know for sure. Look for someone who does "Arbeitsrecht".	If you do not get anything from this "contract", and all it says is that you will pay someone a sum of money "on demand", it does not meet the basic requirements to form a contract, and in particular, there is no consideration being received by you. It would therefore not be a contract and would have zero legal force. If you do receive consideration, demonstrating that you signed the contract under duress will require specific legal advice, and you need a practicing lawyer in your jurisdiction.	Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.	I did not write "confidential" on my letter, but I assumed a business proposal is automatically considered as a confidential material. An incorrect assumption unfortunately. Unless you have a confidentiality agreement (NDA) with the first company, they and their agents are not under any legal obligation to keep information you share with them confidential. How is the legal situation here? There is none on your side. You lied about a direct question asked and were caught in the lie. Company A had no obligation to keep what you sent confidential. Even if they did, that may not (depending on how the confidentiality agreement is worded) keep the employee of company A stating that they had received the same proposal. Chalk this one up to a lesson on confidentiality and honesty in business. There are no reasonable assumptions of confidentiality in business unless you specifically state that they are confidential or are provided as part of a confidentiality agreement.
How should one interpret a Delaware judge's instructions? This is regarding a corporate matter in Delaware (the seat of a majority of U.S. corporations). A Delaware judge ordered a corporation to post a relevant notice "for two weeks in a widely circulated daily newspaper in Delaware." Questions: 1) Does "two weeks" mean 10 business days or 14 calendar days? 2) The two largest Delaware daily newspapers are the News Journal out of Wilmington, and the Delaware State News out of Dover. Wilmington is the larger and more business oriented city, but is at the northern end of the state, while Dover is in the middle of the state, covers a larger area, and is the state capital. The difference is like the difference between the New York Times and the Washington Post. Is either newspaper "better" (more acceptable) than the other, or are they comparably acceptable	A week is 7 days, so 2 weeks is 14 days. There is no general rule that weekends and holidays do not count as days, and "business day" is only a loosely-defined popular term (e.g. is a business is closed on Monday, that would not be a business day for that business). There is no significance difference between the NYT and the Post from the perspective of notice-publication, so likewise none between State News and News Journal, but HOY en Delaware or The Delaware Wave would not satisfy the requirements of the order (they are not daily).	Here is a link to the relevant Texas Statute: Title 7, Subtitle C, Chapter 545, Subchapter A: Sec. 545.351. MAXIMUM SPEED REQUIREMENT. (a) An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing. Combine that with: Sec. 545.352. PRIMA FACIE SPEED LIMITS. (a) A speed in excess of the limits established by Subsection (b) or under another provision of this subchapter is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful. This section mentions, as an example, among other points: (2) except as provided by Subdivision (4), 70 miles per hour on a highway numbered by this state or the United States outside an urban district, including a farm-to-market or ranch-to-market road; What this means is that if you are driving over 70 miles per hour on a type of highway mentioned in (2) above then you are, by legal definition, driving at a speed that is greater than is reasonable and prudent. When you are cited for speeding you are not charged for driving at a specific speed in an area posted at another speed. You are cited for violating a broader law, such as in Texas, driving in an unreasonable or imprudent manner. The mention of the speed is merely a recordation of the facts that support the state's case against you. Let's take the proposal to demonstrate the speed is too low to its logical conclusion. You plead not guilty and it comes out during testimony that you weren't driving 80 but really 85. The judge will still find you guilty of the underlying charge as the facts in the case still support that finding. I have personally witnessed mistakes in tickets result in dismissal. Those mistakes have, however, been related to other facts about the case though: time of day, date of offense, etc. I've also witnessed people attempt to claim a lower but still illegal speed. For example, "I wasn't going 85 I was only going 80." These resulted in findings of guilt.	English common law has centuries of experience on this issue, and has developed some settled principles that are applied by the courts. Prior to 1925, references in contracts to months were interpreted as lunar months. There are 13 lunar months in a year. By section 61 of the Law of Property Act 1925, references in contracts to months are to be interpreted as calendar months, unless the context otherwise requires. Calendar months are counted from a specified date. It is not necessary to consider the period from the 1st of a month to, say, 31st (unless the notice period starts on 1st of a month). This contrasts with the usual understanding of calendar year, which tends to be thought of as the period from 1st January to 31st December. The “corresponding date rule” requires that one looks at the same date in the diary the relevant number of months ahead. Thus a period of 3 months from 20th April expires on 20th July. In the case of Dodds v Walker [1980] 1 WLR 1061, in the Court of Appeal, Templeman LJ said: "…if an act is authorised to be performed on any arbitrary day in any month of the year, then one month elapses on the corresponding day of the next month, provided that the day of the act itself is excluded from computation." In the same case, in the House of Lords, Lord Diplock said: "The corresponding date rule is simple. It is easy of application. …all that the calculator has to do is make in his diary the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month." In the same case, Templeman LJ clarified that if the period expired on a date that did not exist in a particular month (eg 31st February), then the period would expire on the last day of that month. Source	We can assume there was a meeting of the minds when the contract was drafted, and both parties expected payments to me made based on product usage. Plaintiff alleges that this did not happen. Thus plaintiff is indeed alleging that the contract was breached. Now plaintiff alleges that defendant broke the contract, while defendant counters that plaintiff broke the contract. "[T]o be determined by tracking software" is woefully ambiguous. The court will want to know which party drafted the contract, as disputes arising from ambiguity are often resolved in favor of the non-drafting party.	New York State's sentencing laws do not have sentencing guidelines in the sense that the federal courts do. Donald Trump is an individual with no prior felony convictions who is charged with Class E felonies. The statutory sentencing range for these offenses under New York Penal Law Section 70.02(1)(d) is a determinate sentence of 1.5 to 4 years. Under some circumstances, alternative sentencing (like probation) might be authorized. Essentially the whole ballgame is the discretion of the sentencing judge and the question of whether the sentences of conviction would be served concurrently or consecutively. The sentencing hearing would happen only after a jury enters its verdict on guilt or innocence, and only in the event that there was a conviction on at least one count of the indictment. It would be an evidentiary hearing at which evidence regarding an appropriate sentence would be presented by the prosecution and the defense. I am not familiar enough with the facts of the complaint and the applicable New York State Penal Law provisions to know how the issue of consecutive v. concurrent sentences would be resolved.	Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).	The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.	The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.
Can criminal fraud exist without damages? If I fraud someone, invest their money and pay it back is there any criminal offense? Does fraud require damages? Will most judges realistically treat this a criminal case?	If a person is wrongfully deprived of money (or something else of value) for a period, that is damage, even if the money is later repaid. The victim might have used the money in some profitable or advantageous way during the period when it was taken. But the victim need not prove exactly how s/he might have profited, it is enough to show that the victim was wrongfully deprived of something of value. Of course, there are other elements to fraud. There must have been a lie or deception, on which the victim reasonably relied. There must have been intent that the victim so relay. The deception must have been material and must have directly caused or led to the damage. (Or have gotten the Fraudster a benefit that would not have been provided had the victim known the truth.) But assuming that all the elements of fraud are proved, restitution, even full restitution with interest, does not excuse the fraud. However, as a practical matter, if offered full restitution on condition of a release or an agreement not to prosecute, many victims will choose to take it, preferring their money back, perhaps with interest, to a legal case, even a winning one.	Generally (at least in the US), you cannot file criminal charges unless you are a prosecutor. Criminal charges are brought by the state on behalf of society as a whole; the goal of criminal charges is not to help or compensate the victim, it's to punish the offender and benefit society. The victim will often obtain restitution payments, but they are pretty much bolted on to a procedure not focused on compensating the victim. For instance, if the AG decides to drop charges (which they can do at any point), the charges are dropped. Instead of picking one or the other, you can do both. After the criminal case, if you want, you can file in small claims. You can't collect double, but since they have totally different purposes you don't have to do one or the other.	Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: "Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception" which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar.	"Fraud" is roughly lying to get something that isn't yours - for example, my money. It turns from attempted fraud to fraud at the point where I would be defrauded if we both take no further action. That would often be the point where I hand over the money, for example if you offer goods for sale that don't exist and that you don't intend to deliver. If you fill out a form and forge my signature to get money, and send it off to someone who will give you the money, it would be fraud at the point where I lose my money if we both take no further action. That might be the second where you drop the letter in the mailbox.	I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days). Chase was likely indicating that the money will be reimbursed within 10 business days of completing their investigation; not 10 business days from the date you told the that someone forged checks on your account. This would make sense when you think about it, as they need to make sure that you were not complicit in the crime (you would be surprised how many people have had someone cash multiple checks from their account only to split the money with them and file a claim for fraudulent transfer/forgery). Further, checks are a negotiable instrument, unlike a credit/debit card, where specific protections exist pursuant to its terms and conditions of use. You have a duty to keep a negotiable instrument safe, and while most banks will reimburse you if it can be established that you had no involvement and you were not grossly negligent in the keeping of the instruments, it is a different animal in and of itself. It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA. Unless your bank indicated in the disclosures of the checking account application and acceptance documentation that in the event of a stolen check you will be reimbursed in X amount of days, they have the absolute right to complete their investigation before reimbursing any funds to your account. It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe? Federal banking regulations provide broad protections to consumers when it comes to fraud involving credit/debit cards, as these are easily stolen from all sorts of means. That said, checks do not carry the same protections, although oftentimes some. National banks may be required to reimburse customers for forged checks. However, based on individual circumstances, the bank can investigate to determine if the customer is entitled to a reimbursement. There is not duty to reimburse until the investigation is complete. This is why I think you've potentially misconstrued what they said about how long it would take. They cannot promise a time certain when they don't know how long the investigation will take. Whether the bank is liable for the customer's loss depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Generally, a bank is liable for accepting a check that has been forged, altered, or improperly endorsed. However, if the bank can prove two things — that it accepted the check in good faith and exercised ordinary care and diligence in handling the transaction — it may not be liable. If your actions — the way the check or checkbook was handled, issued, completed, or made payable — contributed to the making of the forgery, you may be at least partially liable. Generally, the bank will require you to complete an affidavit. It may also request that you file a police report. ** Addition: I forgot to mention that if the checks were not "cashed" (i.e. filled out to cash or cashed in person), but rather were presented to a 3rd party for payment in receipt of goods or services, you are also going to need to contact those individuals or businesses (their name is on the check) and alert them to the fraud, and allow them to contact their banks, lest you will be assessed fees by them for insufficient funds if your bank later takes the money back as a result of the investigation. Also, in the event the checks were recreated rather than stolen, or if you don't know exactly how many were stolen, you are going to need to close your account while you wait for the investigation to bear fruit (hopefully), and open a new account, as you now have a duty to account for any and all checks stolen at that event (so, if you know a book is out there and 10 checks have cleared you know there are 15 remaining that the bank is not going to cover if you don't take steps to protect yourself). One would think they've asked you this and have already done something to prevent further checks from coming in, but if not, you need to get on it. Also, you may want to hire your own investigator if you have the funds to do so. While stolen cards are often strangers, stolen checks (unless it's one washed check) is nearly always someone you know.	The Example of Colorado Law In Colorado, a private individual who is a victim of theft can bring a lawsuit for civil theft in which a prevailing theft victim can recover the actual economic amount of the theft (including pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate from lost use of the stolen property per a separate pre-judgment interest statute), treble damages (i.e. actual damages plus twice that amount as a civil penalty), and their attorneys' fees and the costs of the litigation. Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-4-405. Rights in stolen property All property obtained by theft, robbery, or burglary shall be restored to the owner, and no sale, whether in good faith on the part of the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his right to such property. The owner may maintain an action not only against the taker thereof but also against any person in whose possession he finds the property. In any such action, the owner may recover two hundred dollars or three times the amount of the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and may also recover costs of the action and reasonable attorney fees; but monetary damages and attorney fees shall not be recoverable from a good-faith purchaser or good-faith holder of the property. Returning the property stolen doesn't change the fact that civil theft was committed, it only reduces the amount of the damages by the amount repaid and prevents interest from continuing to accrue. In practice, it would be very uncommon for someone to bring a suit for civil theft after they are repaid. But, nothing in principle prevents this from happening until the statute of limitations runs (in Colorado that is probably three years from the date that the theft is discovered), although there might be an argument that accepting the funds returned by mutual agreement might constitute a waiver of their claim, or might give rise to equitable defenses of estoppel or laches. Criminal Charges Of course, in the U.S., even if the company doesn't press charges, a prosecutor does have the authority to press criminal charges without their consent. A theft victim does not have the legal authority to relieve you of criminal liability for theft. There are some countries other than the U.S. where a theft victim can relieve someone who committed theft of criminal liability (if I recall correctly, Germany is one of them), but that is a minority position internationally as a legal matter (although actual practice is often different). Civil Lawsuits For Theft In Other Jurisdictions While most states do not have a statutory civil theft statute, almost every state and country would allow a civil lawsuit for "conversion" or the equivalent for taking property that does not belong to you for your own benefit (which is a tort). Other U.S. states and other countries would vary over whether repayment of funds converted prior to commencement of a lawsuit limits actual damages and exemplary damages based upon actual damages to pre-judgment interest, or even constitutes a complete defense, or not. Most U.S. states allow for an award of punitive damages in connection with an intentional tort (statutes of limitations and pre-judgment interest award rules vary greatly). Most non-U.S. jurisdictions would not allow an award of punitive damages in a civil action involving an intentional tort. In the absence of a statutory authorization of the kind found in Colorado, attorneys' fees and costs would normally not be allowed for a U.S. plaintiff in an intentional tort case like this one, but most non-U.S. courts would allow an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing party in a case like this one. Practical Considerations The fact that you repaid the funds makes some defenses to future civil or criminal charges very challenging. You can't truthfully deny that you repaid the funds and that comes close to an admission of guilt. But, if you state under oath that you engaged in this conduct, you make yourself vulnerable to criminal prosecution based upon that testimony under oath. In practice, one reason that the business is actually unlikely to sue you in this situation (unless they discovered that more than $50,000 was taken) is that having lost your job and paid them $50,000 you may not be able to pay even a large judgment if it was awarded against you (although such a judgment, if entered, would probably not be dischargeable in bankruptcy under U.S. law). So, the cost-benefit analysis of such a suit for the company might not make much sense. Also, while having a suit like this filed against you would certainly damage your reputation seriously in a way that could be located with a public records search, it might also moderately harm the reputation of the company which revealed that its internal controls were lax enough to make it possible for the theft to happen. In the case of a large business the damage that this could do to the fair market value of the business and its creditworthiness might outweigh the benefit it would receive from bringing such a lawsuit.	I am unfamiliar with specifically US laws on this but under common law (which US law is derived from) there is the crime of "Theft by Finding", however, because you turned it over to the authorities who, after the required time period were unable to find the rightful owner, the money becomes yours. However, you still have to pay your taxes on it: http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/07/03/found-money-is-awesomebut-must-pay-uncle-sam/ As far as I can see, income is income whether it comes as cash, diamonds or long lost antiques. As far as the money laundering aspect, that is something the authorities would need to prove - as opposed to you just being lucky.	The criminal case will only punish the perpetrator, it will not give any compensation to the victims. So if you are the victim of a crime, and the perpetrator is capable of paying compensation, you would go for a civil case to get compensation. There's also the fact that in a civil case, there is less evidence required, so the perpetrator may win the criminal case (not found "guilty beyond reasonable doubt"), but lose the civil case. In many cases, the perpetrator is not wealthy enough to make a civil case worthwhile. If some lowlife stabs you in the street, you might very well win a civil case, but would end up getting nothing because the person has no money. So taking them to court would only cost you money.
Can my landlord charge me a fee that does not appear in the lease? I was added as an occupant (not as the tenant) to the lease of an apartment in Alexandria, VA. I paid a $50 fee to management to run a credit check; all good so far. A few months later, I moved out of the apartment and removed myself from the lease accordingly. The apartment building now wants to charge my former roommate (the tenant in the lease) $400 to remove me from the lease as an occupant. This fee is nowhere to be found in the lease that my roommate initially signed, or the amendment we both signed afterwards when I was added to the lease. Can they legally charge this fee if it was not stated in the lease we signed?	Can they legally charge this fee if it was not stated in the lease we signed? No. The landlord's conduct is in violation of Virginia Code § 55-248.7, which in its item G reads: No unilateral change in the terms of a rental agreement by a landlord or tenant shall be valid unless (i) notice of the change is given in accordance with the terms of the rental agreement or as otherwise required by law and (ii) both parties consent in writing to the change. Per your description of the lease, the fee of $400 is an unilateral change (by the landlord) to which you and the tenant never consented, let alone in writing. You might still want to check whether Virginia Code § 55-248.37 applies to your situation at all, although the issue rather seems to be just the landlord's unilateral change.	Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.	The advertisement is simply an invitation to treat. The lease was the contract offer, and your signature and payment were acceptance of that offer. The advertisement doesn't bind either party (other than as prohibited by deceptive advertising statutes), and you are allowed to negotiate an offer that differs from the invitation to treat.	There are two issues. First, can the HOA deny access to its facilities and common areas for an unpaid HOA assessment. There might be exceptions in particular jurisdictions, but the general rule would be that it is not unlawful to deny someone who isn't current on their dues use of facilities and common areas. Second, do you have an unpaid HOA bill? This is obviously a factual question. The HOA takes the position that you do and is acting accordingly. You could sue the HOA for a determination that your bill is paid in full, or could try to work with the HOA treasurer to determine why the amount that you believe is owed differs from the amount that they believe is owed. I've seen cases where the HOA failed to credit payments that were made or miscalculated the amount due, and I've seen cases where, for example, the homeowner has paid the principle, but not additional amounts owed for late fees, interest and attorneys' fees incurred in collecting the balance that are also owed.	Overview The question sates that "stuff" was left behind on the day that the lease was terminated. It does not saw whether the tenant notified the landlord of this stuff, much less sought permission to leave it. It does not say when or if the tenant removed the stuff, how much stuff there was, or whether the landlord would have had to remove it before the premises could be cleaned and rented to a new tenant. The exact provisions of the lease are going to matter a great deal here. Chapters 91 and 92 of the Texas Property Code cover statewide laws on residential leases and landlord-tenant relation in Texas. These may be supplemented by county or municipal or other local laws, which may impose additional obligations on either party. In many areas the effect of the Texas law depends on what agreements there may be between landlord and tenant, particularly the provisions of any lease. Texas Property Code Texas Property Code 91.001 covers notices of termination of a lease. It provides that: (b) If a notice of termination is given under Subsection (a) and if the rent-paying period is at least one month, the tenancy terminates on whichever of the following days is the later: (b)(1) the day given in the notice for termination; or (b)(2) one month after the day on which the notice is given. ... (d) If a tenancy terminates on a day that does not correspond to the beginning or end of a rent-paying period, the tenant is liable for rent only up to the date of termination. (e) Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) do not apply if: (e)(1) a landlord and a tenant have agreed in an instrument signed by both parties on a different period of notice to terminate the tenancy or that no notice is required; or (e)(2) there is a breach of contract recognized by law. A failure to remove the tenant's belonging and leave the dwelling in "broom-clean" condition may well be "a breach of contract recognized by law." Code section 92.104 provides that: (a) Before returning a security deposit, the landlord may deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease. (b) The landlord may not retain any portion of a security deposit to cover normal wear and tear. Code section 92.109 provides that: (a) A landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit to recover the deposit. (b) A landlord who in bad faith does not provide a written description and itemized list of damages and charges in violation of this subchapter: (b)(1) forfeits the right to withhold any portion of the security deposit or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the premises; and (b)(2) is liable for the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit to recover the deposit.	Not all discrimination is illegal. For instance, landlords discriminate against those who can't afford to pay the rent. They might discriminate against former tenants who destroyed several walls during their lease period. They discriminate against those with bad credit, and often might discriminate against the unemployed. Landlords often do discriminate against frat students/college students in general. In fact, at least in the US, discrimination is generally allowed unless it's discrimination for one of a few specifically prohibited reasons (such as race). A lease is a negotiation on both sides; it requires both the landlord and the tenant to be satisfied with each other. As for why different places have different laws: Toronto is not actually in the United States. That means it has different people, a different culture, different primary values, and a different legal tradition. It's not surprising that laws are different; if laws were the same everywhere, the world would be a boring place indeed.	The term "The Property" does not intrinsically include or exclude a garage in this situation, so the answer has to come from other considerations. The lease is unclear, so the courts will need to look at other factors (such as the picture) to decide which interpretation is correct. Insofar as the landlord wrote the contract and could have included a clause explicitly excluding the garage, but didn't, the courts may rule in your favor under the doctrine contra proferentem. The physical arrangement does support the conclusion that the garage is part of The Property, in particular the access to the part constituting your yard. This assumes that there actually is access to your yard from the garage. Scouring the entire contract, there may be some subtle indication of how the garage is to be treated, such as a clause presupposing that you have access to the garage ("shall clean the garage..."). Then we come to the matter of the key. You say the landlord changed the key: does that mean you used to have a key that gave you access to the garage? If you used to have access to the garage, using a key provided by the landlord, that would support the conclusion that the garage was not a separate item governed by its own contract. If you have never had and were not given access to the garage (no key), that would support the contention that the garage is separate. Similar questions would be raised about the actual use of the garage: has the landlord been using it to store equipment? That would support his contention. Had you been using the garage previously and now months later the landlord wants to charge rent for the garage? That runs counter to his claim that you didn't rent the garage. In other words, since the wording does not answer the question, the full set of circumstances would have to considered.	If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice.
Is it illegal to repair vehicles in Ontario without a mechanic's license? I have a business license from the province of Ontario and an HST number so that I can file my taxes. I have an accountant who handles all of my taxes, so I don't think I will have any issues there. I'm wondering if there exists any legislation against repairing vehicles for profit without having a mechanic's license. If my customers are made aware that I am repairing their vehicle while unlicensed, am I allowed to proceed? Thanks.	According to the College of Trades website, a compulsory trade is a trade in which registration as an apprentice, journeyperson candidate or certification as a journeyperson is mandatory. Under the Ontario College of Trades and Apprenticeship Act, 2009, people working in these trade roles must meet the standards, gain certification, and be members of the College. Among others, the list of compulsory trades includes Alignment and Brakes Technician Auto Body (and Collision Damage) Repairer Automotive Service Technician Fuel and Electrical Systems Technician Motorcycle Technician Of special note is the Automotive Services Technician, which describes the work and duties one typically associates with a mechanic. Thus, you would be in violation of the law no matter whether you informed consumers or not, and regardless of whether you're paid if you work in this or any other compulsory trade without being certified and a member of the College. Offences of this type are subject to fines on conviction, of up to $5000 on the first offence and up to $10000 on subsequent offences.	It is legal to be wrong, it is legal to say false things in public (leaving out defamation), and it is legal to buy and manufacture signs that say false things. Moreover, the sign does not make a false statement, in that legal liability is distinct from moral responsibility. In fact, the sign helps to decrease their legal liability. Via this sign, you have been put on notice that the truck may spray a bit of gravel, so by following too closely, you are negligently contributing to the damage. This is what also underlies those disclaimer signs with "not responsible for theft from your auto". There is nothing "official in appearance" about this sign (a legal citation of a statute might have such an appearance).	The Kentucky restriction against "hit and run" is KRS 189.580, which says that The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle…is involved in an accident …shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance Notice that the legal requirement is for the operator to do something: the law requires nothing of the vehicle itself. Supposing that you are correct that the vehicle was operated by someone who hit and ran, then if the police gain suspicions that such is the case, and if those suspicions are reasonable, then then could obtain a warrant to obtain evidence from the vehicle, which could be used against the operator. The fact that you (might) now own the vehicle would not transfer legal responsibility to you – responsibbility goes with the actor, not the instrument.	As has already been said, as far as the vehicle registration, the officer likely already knows who the vehicle is registered to and whether it's expired or not before he walks up to your car, or at the least, he can easily find that information out. The proof of insurance is a different matter. The officer will need to see it to know if you have insurance or not. To him, it doesn't matter what the reason is that you don't provide it to him. Left it at home, misplaced it, lost it, destroyed it, or just refuse to provide it because you feel you have the right to refuse. He can't "force" you to provide it (unless he is able to search your car and happens to find it there). He can only issue you a ticket for not providing it. But your attitude could play a part in what happens next. Being upfront and letting the officer know you have left your documents at home could help your situation. In my experience... one time that this sort of thing happened to me, the officer agreed to hold my drivers license and allowed me to bring the documents to the police station and retrieve my license. Another time, in a parking related matter, I was issued a ticket, but I was allowed to bring the required documents to the police station where they then "invalidated" (cancelled) the ticket. Of course this won't always work, and is not at all likely to work if you are far from home. Keep in mind, (as far as I know, in most states) the real infraction is that you "don't have insurance"... that you failed to provide proof when asked, is secondary. In many cases (likely nearly all cases), if you show up in court and provide documents that your insurance is current, and was current at the time the ticket was issued, the judge (or the prosecutor) will likely dismiss the case with no penalties. But, what the officer has written down on the ticket about your attitude and what you told him at the time, may have an effect on how this all plays out.	Yes, police are allowed to touch your car or wipe snow off the windshield to view a parking permit. Indeed, if they just ticketed people because their permit could not be seen through the snow, there would be a huge public outrage. They are not allowed to search your car without permission or probable cause in an emergency, but wiping snow or touching the exterior of your car do not constitute searches. Likewise, towing companies are allowed to touch your car in order to tow it away for whatever legal reasons there are for towing a car.	2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me.	Not under that name In common law countries, like Canada, the concept is known by the delightfully visceral term price gouging or, in emergency circumstances, profiteering. This is not regulated at a Federal level in Canada. A brief overview of provincial level laws can be found here. Typically, they require prices that are not just excessive - they need to be unconscionable which is a very high bar.	Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.
Is it ever not legal to cause harm to escape non-institutionalised harm? Is there ever a case where your legal duty to care/not harm someone causes you to not be able to legally retaliate against non-institutionalised harm? Examples do not have to be specific to any jurisdiction or group of people, they can include such things as the attacker being a minor, the attacker lacking intent, etc.	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!	It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary.	Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.	I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").	Any parent may leave a child in the care of another responsible person. There is no special license required. The parent may use sound judgement in selecting the caretaker. Nor does a caretaker even have to be an adult -- teens are often used as baby sitters. If a reasonable parent would have known that a particular person was not a safe caretaker, then selecting that person might be negligence or child endangerment. Nor is there any legal requirement in most US states that a child be under anyone's direct supervision at all times. See "Free range parenting". Again, if in particular circumstances a reasonable parent should know that supervision is needed, failure to provide it might be child neglect or endangerment. Some US states set minimum ages for children to be unsupervised. NJ is not one, to the best of my understanding.	Charlie may or may not be guilty of murder or of attempted murder. It depends upon his intent and knowledge, which the question doesn't flesh out sufficiently to evaluate. Why did Charlie bodyslam Bob? The reason matters a lot. Did Charlie know that the building was on fire? Was Charlie trying to kill Bob? Was the thing that Bob knocked his head upon an intended result of the bodyslam, or an intervening cause? Did Charlie's initially less culpable act and his knowledge combine to create a duty to rescue and what offense (probably not murder) would it be if a death resulted from a failure to rescue? Alice is likely to be guilty of murder, but on a felony-murder theory, rather than on a transferred intent theory. In most, but not all, states if you are in the process of committing one of an enumerated list of specific felonies that pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as arson, you are guilty of murder in the event that anyone (even a co-conspirator) dies as a result of your felonious course of conduct, whether or not you intended that a death result. Alice might have been able to purge her felony-murder liability if she had tried to put out the fire and save Bob once she realized that he was in danger, under the exception to felony-murder for renunciation of a course of felonious conduct, but she didn't even try. The doctrine of transferred intent in a murder case usually applies when you intent to kill one person and instead end up killing someone else. But, Alice didn't intend to kill anyway, so this doctrine does not apply. Alice's best defense would be that the death was a result of the attack by Charlie, rather than by the fire, which she would merely have to establish a reasonable doubt regarding. But, ultimately that would be a weak defense for her.	To provide an initial answer, without getting to the specific of the 51 statutory standards for self-defense in U.S. states and the exact Canadian standard, as applied to your examples, I'll make some general observations: Self-defense is a justification for doing something that would otherwise be illegal (intentionally using force against someone else). Self-defense justifications include a sense of proportionality. It isn't proper to use more force than is reasonably necessary to achieve the defensive objective. There are basically two levels of self-defensive force: Deadly Force and Non-Deadly Force. Preventing some crimes and harms is statutorily justified to do using deadly force (e.g. to prevent a murder). To prevent other crimes and harms statutes only justify the use of non-deadly force (e.g. to prevent shoplifting). The exact list of crimes in each category varies somewhat. Historically, for example, there have been some U.S. states that have authorized the use of deadly force to prevent a rape that does not put the life of the victim at risk, and others that have not authorized the use of deadly force for that purpose (I don't know if that is still the case). Typically, law enforcement officers are also authorized to use deadly force in some circumstances in which a non-deputized civilian could not. As a practical matter, a use of force that causes death is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if the means used are not inherently deadly in all circumstances. Meanwhile, a use of force involving the use of a "deadly weapon" such as a firearm, is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if it doesn't actually kill someone. But both of these "presumptions" (and I am using that term loosely in this answer, rather than with its precise legal meaning), can be overcome with relevant evidence. Mildly shoving someone with hemophilia (or tossing a dish full of peanuts in the face of someone with a severe peanut allergy), without knowing that this person suffers from this condition, is not a use of deadly force within the meaning of laws justifying self-defense, even if it actually ends up causing their death. Similarly, proving that you intended to and did, shoot out the tires of someone's car, or shot their foot, instead of shooting to kill, would not always constitute a use of deadly force for purposes of statutes justifying the use of force in self-defense. Getting to the specifics of the question, the majority rule would be that the use of deadly force is justified in most circumstances to prevent a home invasion burglar from harming you or other people in the residence, and to repel the home invasion burglar from the residence, although some jurisdictions would qualify this in one respect or another. The case that the use of deadly force is justified would be stronger if the home invasion burglar was armed than if he was not, and would be stronger if the homeowner was not physically competent enough to be confident of an ability to dispatch the invader in a non-deadly manner. If deadly force was justified in that circumstance, it wouldn't really matter how you killed him, nor would it matter that you intended to kill him to defense your home and the people in your home. If the law only authorized the use of non-deadly force in the circumstances, for example, because the burglar had seized an envelope full of cash and was fleeing the house, so you were really only using force to protect your property, rather than to protect your home or the safety of the people in it, at that point, then the analysis would get tougher. If you intended to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, the weapon you used wouldn't matter. You intended to use deadly force, the force you used caused the intended death, and you did those things even though the law didn't authorize you to do so in those circumstances. If you didn't intend to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, but you ended up killing him anyway (so that you didn't have a prohibited intent behind your actions), then the question would be whether your intent and belief that your actions would not kill him was reasonable under the circumstances. If you caused his death with your bare hands, or with a less lethal weapon (in truth, there is no such thing as a non-lethal weapon), your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be more likely to be seen as reasonable. If you caused his death with a lethal weapon, your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be less likely to be seen as reasonable. If the jury (or a judge in bench trial) didn't believe you were reasonable in your use of force which you didn't intend to be deadly, then the jury (or judge as the case might be) would not allow a self-defense argument to prevent them from convicting you of some kind of homicide crime. So you would probably be convicted of some form of homicide (perhaps heat of passion manslaughter), although you might still not have the requisite intent for first degree murder in circumstances like that (so that your self-defense argument might end up providing you with an incomplete defense).
What's the next step if a debt collector doesn't respond to my debt dispute? A month ago I received a debt collection letter about an alleged unpaid tax bill. I did not recognize the bill, and had definitely never heard of it before this, so I sent them a letter within a few days disputing the debt. I sent it certified and got the return receipt, so I know they received it, but they never responded. Yesterday I got another letter asking for the same debt, now with interest, and threatening to garnish my wages. I know they were legally required to respond to my original dispute, but I'm not sure what the next step is now that they haven't.	The first step of a non-governmental debt collector would be to sue you and obtain a money judgment (if this debt collector is legitimate, something the comments touch upon). A tax debt is different, if this is a legitimate tax debt. There is usually an internal tax collection agency process that must be exhausted, resulting in an assessment of taxes which then results in a non-judicial imposition of a tax lien, upon which what is sometimes call a distaint warrant authorizing execution against assets pursuant to the tax lien is issued by a court in Oregon. Outside Oregon, the Oregon money judgment or the distaint warrant would have to be domesticated into California as a foreign judgment, which is a basically administrative process that might be possible to do without notice to you (I'm not a California law expert on these fine matters of procedure). Once there was a money judgment domesticated into California, your wages and bank accounts could be garnished, your property could be seized pursuant to writs, and liens in your personal and real property could be perfected and foreclosed upon. Of course, if this outfit is a sham, with a fake debt, this is unlikely to happen, and they might give up, or you might sue them for violating debt collection laws or engaging in fraud, or a law enforcement agency might do that based upon your complaint. It might take a civil action of some sort to set aside in invalid judgment, if it was invalid, but the process of setting aside an invalid foreign tax debt is very complicated even for an average small firm lawyer. Lack of notice of a lawsuit is generally a strong defense to a private sector debt, but is not always such a strong defense to certain kinds of tax debts (and the process for different kinds of tax debts is quite different).	Ultimately, if they force you into bankruptcy, everything, except: tools of your trade household items (clothing, furniture), however, if these are worth significantly more than a replacement then they can be sold and you get given a replacement. Short of this they can: garnishee bank accounts garnishee wages and other income seize and sell personal property acquire liens over real property The cannot force you to borrow money pay them, however, this may be a better option than any of the above, particularly bankruptcy. If you are in such a situation you should seek advice on how to best deal with it. Most creditors are willing to negotiate over amounts and timing: something latter on is better than nothing ever.	You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.	Based on the advice from @user6726, here's how I disputed the charge. First, I called FedEx customer service. They declined to waive the fee, and informed me that if I didn't pay, it would go to collections. So, I waited a few months and let the collection agency send me their version of the bill. Then, I sent the following reply (paraphrased) to the collection agency, by registered mail. On date, we received a letter from your agency demanding a payment for Federal Express Canada Co. I am writing this letter to dispute this debt, as I do not believe that we owe it. The debt claimed by Federal Express Canada appears to be related to FedEx invoice n, consisting of a Clearance Entry Fee of $X. I called FedEx on date to dispute this fee. It appears that they have decided to proceed with demanding payment anyway. The facts of the case are as follows: In month, we received an unsolicited birthday gift from a relative in the United States, which FedEx left at our doorstep, with no signature required, and no indication that accepting the package would incur an obligation to FedEx. As the value of the gift did not exceed 60 CAD, the package was admitted into Canada duty free. The Clearance Entry Fee is a fee imposed by FedEx, not on behalf of any government agency. “Clearance Entry” is an “unsolicited good or service”, as defined by the BC Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Chapter 2, Section 11. We did not order the shipment of the package, and did not consent verbally or in writing to the “Clearance Entry” service claimed to have been provided by FedEx. Therefore, as provided in Section 12 of the Act, we have no obligation to FedEx, and FedEx has no cause of action against us. The burden of proof that the service was not unsolicited rests with FedEx, and until such proof is provided, this debt is void under BC law, and you, as a collector, must not collect or attempt to collect money from a person who is not liable for the debt. Based on Section 116 of the Act, I am requiring you to communicate with me only in writing, at the address given above. At this point, I expect that your next communication would either contain: Proof that we consented to the “Clearance Entry” service provided by FedEx, or A statement that the debt is invalid, and that we are discharged from any obligation to your agency or to Federal Express Canada in regards to this matter. In addition, please inform any credit reporting agencies to which you have reported this debt to, that this debt is currently in dispute. I will require proof that you have done this. It has been over two months since the collection agency received the letter, and we still have not heard from them. Evidently they have decided that it is not worthwhile to pursue this case.	In the US, when a person has unpaid debts and dies, those debts are to be paid from any assets of the estate (as in, any assets). The executor has the responsibility to use those assets to pay the debts. Presumably the executor did that, and there are no co-signed accounts or anything like that, so your mother isn't responsible for these debts in some obscure way. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has a provision that you can tell a collection agency to stop communicating with you, and they must then stop communicating with you except to say they are stopping attempts to collect, to indicate possible remedies (i.e. lawsuits), or notify of an actual remedy (they have actually filed suit). Since they are no longer allowed to discuss anything with you once you give them the go-away notice, one should probably hire an attorney to exercise the nuclear option. You can also request proof that you owe the money: they are suppose to notify you of the right to dispute the debt with 5 days of first contact, which gives you 30 days to dispute the debt. Persuading a debt collector that they are pursuing the wrong person is probably easier than persuading a jury in a lawsuit.	what eventually... "Happens" if one fails to pay one's council tax? Short Answer: Ultimately... You can be sent to prison for up to 3 months if the court decides you don’t have a good reason to not pay your Council Tax and you refuse to do so. Long Answer: But before then... If you miss Council Tax payments Your council will send you a reminder notice giving you 7 days to pay if you miss a payment. If you don’t pay within 7 days, you’ll have to pay the whole year’s Council Tax instead. You’ll be sent a second reminder notice if you miss another Council Tax payment. You’ll only get a maximum of 2 reminder notices in a financial year - this runs from April 1 to March 31 of the next year. Your council will send you a final notice saying you must pay the whole year’s Council Tax if you miss a payment for the third time. If you don’t pay your whole year’s Council Tax within 7 days, the council may take legal action to get the Council Tax you owe. Legal demands for payment Your council can ask a magistrate for a ‘liability order’ if you owe them unpaid Council Tax. This is a legal demand for payment. The council’s legal costs, eg for hiring a lawyer, may be added to the money you owe. You’re allowed to go to the court and give your reasons for not paying if you want. If you receive a liability order you should speak to your council or your local Citizens Advice bureau about your options. If you still don’t pay Your council can get your employer to pay your unpaid Council Tax directly from your wages. Your council can also apply to take money from the following benefits: Employment and Support Allowance Income Support Jobseeker’s Allowance Pension Credit Universal Credit If this means you don’t have enough money to pay other bills, you can ask your council if you can make smaller payments. Your council doesn’t have to agree but will usually try to make an arrangement with you. Bailiffs Your council can send bailiffs (‘enforcement agents’) to seize your property if there’s no other way to recover your debt. They’ll tell you how much you owe before the bailiff visits you. The bailiffs’ costs can be added to the total amount you owe the council. Court Your council can take you to court if you don’t pay the money you owe and the bailiffs can’t recover enough property to cover it. The court will consider whether you: can afford to pay the bill have a valid reason to not pay You can be sent to prison for up to 3 months if the court decides you don’t have a good reason to not pay your Council Tax and you refuse to do so. If the court decides you have something to pay back you may be able to make an arrangement to pay your debt over time. Source, gov.uk's guidance Pay Council Tax arrears	With that much potentially at stake, you might want to discuss this with a lawyer. many lawyers will do an initial consultation for free or a low charge. However, you could simply write a letter saying that you do not agree that you owe the money and that you dispute the charge. You may give any reasons why you think you are not liable. It might be a good idea to add that there may be other reasons as well, so you do not foreclose any possible legal arguments that you may learn of later. Send the letter by certified mail, return receipt, and keep a copy with a note of the date that you sent it. It is not a bad idea to get the certified mail form first and include the certified item number as part of the inside address in the letter. Keep the copy, and keep the receipt with it when you get it. It is not a bad idea to send a copy by email, noting that it is a copy of a certified letter. This will put a record of the date and time it was sent in the email service provider's records. Normally it is up to the person who claims another owes money to file suit. If your former landlord takes no action, you need do nothing. However it is a good idea to check your credit reports and see if this was reported as a bad debt. if it is, you can file a statement of dispute with the credit bureaus. If there is any further correspondence on the matter, be sure it is in writing, and that you keep a copy. If you are called on the telephone about it, send a prompt followup letter summarizing the conversation, and particularly any statements made by the other party, and any agreements reached. Keep a copy, and send a copy by email as well as by postal mail. It should probably start something like "In our telephone conversation on {date} about {topic} you stated ..." If you are sued you will need to consider whether to retain a lawyer to represent you.	What do I do? Promptly hire a new lawyer. Dispute claims for fees to the extent that they were not earned or that no value was conferred.
Are fanarts, fansongs, etc not illegal? Then why aren't they being taken down? Youtube is plagued by works of this kind: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MRhRaWNaSPM Deviantart is plagued by works of this kind: https://www.deviantart.com/harwicks-art/art/Know-When-to-Fold-Em-274057023 Obviously, this is not limited to My Little Pony: https://www.deviantart.com/ver1sa/art/Fallout-4-cosplay-Piper-Wright-701013703 OK, enough examples. I think it is clear what I'm asking about. And my question is: Why are such works not being taken down? Do they not qualify as "derivative works" of intellectual property of other creators and are they not illegal as such? But if they were illegal, I think they wouldn't be tolerated so widespreadely as they are now? Or are they merely tolerated because the copyright owners didn't yet approach Youtube / Deviantart / Other such sites, asking them to take them down? Also - does the so-called Acta 2 (that is, EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market), which is already passed, change anything on this matter? Will it not require hosting websites to proactively take down such works even before copyright owners approach them? Or am I missing something?	First of all derivative works are not exactly "illegal". They are fully legal if the owner of the copyright in the original work has given permission. If no permission has been given, they may be copyright infringements. But they may fall under an exception to copyright. Under US law, the most common exception is "fair use". See this question and answer for more on fair use. But particularly relevant in this case is that a parody is usually a fair use, although as in every fair-use decision, there is pretty much no clear-cut, hard&fast rule on what is and is not fair use. In the UK and much of the EU (or maybe all of it, I am not sure) there is a somewhat similar concept known as "fair dealing". It is also an exception to copyright. So it is possible that such works fall under fair use, fair dealing, or another exception to copyright, or that the rights-holder has given permission. Secondly, copyright infringement is a tort, not a crime, under most circumstances. It is enforced when, and only when, a copyright-holder chooses to take action, sending a take-down notice or copyright complaint, of filing suit for infringement. Some rights-holders choose as a matter of policy not to take such actions, thinking that such derivative works actually benefit them. That is their choice to make. Some rights-holders don't have the time or money to track down and take action against most infringements, and will only act if they think the derivative work will in some way cost them a lot of money or harm their reputation. Some rights-holders may just not have heard, yet, of specific possible infringing derivative works. As for Acta2, it has not yet been approved, the Wikipedia article linked in the questions says: In order for the text of the directive to become law in the EU, it must be approved by the European Council on 9 April 2019 The article also mentions significant continuing opposition. If it is approved, it is not clear, to me at least, how it will affect sites hosting such content, nor how it will interact with the copyright law of individual EU nations. If approved, it will no doubt take some time before enforcement is widespread. And of course it will only apply when EU law applies. If both site and author are outside the EU -- say if both are from the US -- it seems that it could not apply.	I know of an app that did similar. They sold membership access and linked Youtube videos. One of the Youtuber's started to take legal action against them. I don't know what happened but the app blocked their content from being shown. Updated this comment to remove incorrect information. After looking at Youtube's recent terms and conditions; you aren't allowed to link, embed or use the API if you want to put content behind a paywall, or show it alongside advertising: Under the section: Permissions and Restrictions https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=GB&template=terms So long as your app is free, and doesn't contain advertising you are probably okay.	Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.	"Personal use only" does not excuse copyright infringement under US law. The uploader does not hold copyright, and neither gives nor denies permission to copy his creation. The law does not require a copyright holder to deny permission, it requires the user to actually obtain permission. So no matter how you slice it (even as fair use) it is infringement for you to copy that video.	Not very novel What you are talking about is a derivative work. This is arguably the most famous example: It's an interesting example because Leonardo da Vinci did not have copyright in the original but Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia do have copyright in the derivative. Even though the changes are physically small, they are enough. A crucial factor in current legal analysis of derivative works is transformativeness, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. The Court's opinion emphasized the importance of transformativeness in its fair use analysis of the parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" involved in the Campbell case. In parody, as the Court explained, the transformativeness is the new insight that readers, listeners, or viewers gain from the parodic treatment of the original work. As the Court pointed out, the words of the parody "derisively demonstrat[e] how bland and banal the Orbison [Pretty Woman] song" is. For an author to have copyright in the derivative they must: Meet the (low) threshold of originality for copyright to exist. Make their derivative lawfully - either because they have permission or because their use falls under an exception to copyright like fair use or fair dealing. However, they do not have copyright in the original elements. For example, I could take the Mona Lisa and give her different clothes, a different background or a hat I will not be infringing their copyright. If I give her a different style of moustache? However, there is an issue with "I have copyright on the contents of the post" when you don't. Even if your work is derivative, you do not have copyright in the original parts and do not have the right to licence them. So, for example, this post is a derivative work of the Wikipedia page linked to above and I have copyright in my original contributions because: They meet the threshold of originality I have permission to make the derivative either through the Wikipedia licence or because my use is fair use. I can give Stack Exchange a licence for my work but I cannot give them a licence for the original work including, for example, the image and quote above. So, someone could quote my entire answer subject to the licence or fair work, but they couldn't copy just the image or quote.	This is known as "film novelization"(For example, the novelizations of the Star Wars movies are film novelizations, created under license), and is copyright infringement unless made under a license from the copyright holder. Specifically, you would be making a derivative work of the original, by changing the medium. One of the rights provided by copyright is the right to control the transference from one medium into another. This, in my (non-lawyer) opinion, is unlikely to be found as fair use. There are four test factors for determining fair use(source), decided on a case by case basis: Transformative Character of the Derivative Work: Unlikely to be found in your favor, as nothing is transformed ("I don't change anything, the name are the same, everything is the same, it's just a conversion to textual form"). Nature of the Original Work: A narrative entertainment film, thus unlikely to be found in your favor. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Taken: You've taken all of it; not in your favor. Effect on the Potential Market: You are essentially providing a free version of what copyright holders can often charge for; negative effect on their potential market. Not in your favor.	An album from 2011 is pretty clearly going to be protected by copyright. Downloading such a work without permission would be copyright infringement, and therefore unlawful. However, it is not a crime in the US. If the copyright owner or the owner's agent learns of the download, you could be sued. Whether the owner would choose to bring suit is hard to say. However, for some content the Internet Archive has a program where a digital copy can be "borrowed" or "checked out" for a limited period of time. This is supposed to work like a library. The IA has made arrangements that will authorize this, or it is supposed to have done so. You only retain use of such a download for a limited period of time.	Social media platforms are not publishers under UK law (at present), as such, they are not legally responsible for the content they host providing that there is a mechanism for alerting them to infringing material and that, when alerted, they remove it. As to "why", that is a political question.
Virginia employer terminated employee and wants signing bonus returned A Virginia employee was terminated within 1 year of hiring because the on-site customer felt he was "too negative". Offer Letter: Along with this offer, you are receiving a $10,000.00 signing bonus, which includes $3,000.00 to be paid directly to you in your first company paycheck and the remaining $7,000.00 to be paid to you at 30 days of employment with xxxxx. A 1−year commitment required or the bonus will be repaid in full to xxxxx. Can the employer legally keep the employee's last check and send the employee a bill for the remainder ?	Virginia employer terminated employee and wants signing bonus returned Can the employer legally keep his last check and send the employee a bill for the remainder ? No, unless (1) the employee resigned and (2) his resignation does not amount to constructive termination. The employer may withhold the remaining $7,000 only if the employee did not meet the condition of "30 days of employment with xxxxx". Absent any language to the contrary, the requirement of "1-year commitment" is to be construed as the consideration expected from the employee (namely, "not to quit") in exchange for the bonus. Termination by the employer is self-defeating in the sense the employer himself made it impossible for the employee to fulfill the consideration that was expected from the employee. Therefore, the employer forfeits his entitlement to reimbursement. In the event that the employee met the condition of "30 days of employment with xxxxx", he would be entitled to the remaining $7,000 as well. Virginia labor law has no provision for treble damages (this is in response to one of the comments, per the OP's suggestion). The statutory provisions are only a civil penalty no greater than $1,000 for each violation, a portion of attorney's fees, and "all wages due, plus interest at an annual rate of eight percent". See Code of Virginia at § 40.1-29 A.2, F, and G. Item E of that statute determines which violations are misdemeanors and which are felonies. This statute would be applicable only if (1) the employer disavows the employee's entitlement to the remaining $7,000, and/or (2) the employer withholds a portion of the employee's earned compensation in an attempt to recover the initial payment of $3,000.	Washington State is an "At Will" employment state meaning that, with exception to some protected classes and bargaining, the employer may terminate the employee for any reason the employer can cite, or no reason at all. If the firm used it as a benefit of the job but it wasn't agreed upon on the contract, its not a deception as if you can hold the job to the down season, you have less work to do. If a promise was made for employment into the down season during the negotiating of the job, and this was documented, it could be. It could be that he did all the work required of him, but another higher went above and beyond and he got the ax because he was the newest and the lesser performer. Either way, the employer is well within their right to fire an employee for any reason they choose absent discrimination based on protected class status.	No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions.	The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.	Is this something that an employer can just do? That is very unlikely, although strictly speaking there is not enough information to answer either yes or no. Section 2810.5(a)(1)(C) of the California Labor Code provides that "[a]t the time of hiring, an employer shall provide to each employee a written notice [...] containing the following information: [...] The regular payday designated by the employer in accordance with the requirements of this code". This implies that the employer is required by law to issue the paychecks in accordance with the timing that pursuant to Section 2810.5 the employer should have informed your girlfriend. The fact that your girlfriend does not know when exactly her salary is due suggests that the employer did not even comply with this statute.	Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win. As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment. Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal.	The US Department of Labor Employer's Guide to Advance Notice of Closings and Layoffs states Can I pay my workers their salary and benefits for 60 days in lieu of notice? Neither the Act nor the regulations recognize the concept of pay in lieu of notice. WARN requires notice, making no provision for any alternative. Failure to give notice does a significant disservice to workers and undermines other services that are part of the purpose of the WARN Act. However, since WARN provides that the maximum employer liability for damages, including back pay and benefits, is for the period of violation up to 60 days, providing your employees with full pay and benefits for the 60-day period effectively precludes any relief. (emphasis mine) So from the Federal perspective, so-called pay in lieu is technically against the WARN act, but no penalty may occur. Note that payment in lieu is not unique to this situation at all. For regulated high-trust industries, such as banking and aviation, pay in lieu is basically required due to the risk of employee sabotage.	Is a firm required to arbitrate disputes arising after the expiration of employment contract? The wording of this question is problematic. From your description it is doubtful that the contract truly expired at the end of the first year. It is valid for a contract to encompass multiple phases with different provisions specific to each phase. Providing that "[a]fter the first year the employee may continue working for the company, until terminated, as an at will employee" is different from expiration of the contract at the end of the first year. The contract simply outlined what happens before and after that point in time. The employer's allegation that the contract expired at the end of the first year is inconsistent with outlining in that same contract the nature of the parties' continued relation after the first year. Said nature of the employment relation should have been outlined in a separate contract in order to preempt an interpretation of there being one same/ongoing contract. The employer's allegation is vague and untenable also in a scenario where the employer terminates the employee within the first year. The employer's allegation seemingly implies that the employee's deadline for arbitration proceedings expires at the end of the first year. That would give the employer the opportunity to evade the arbitration clause by choosing a timing that de facto prevents its employee from enforcing the clause. Questions regarding arbitration are unanswerable without knowing the exact terms of the relevant clause(s). Just like the contract provides a transition from fixed term employment to at will employment, it is possible --but not necessarily the case-- that the arbitration provision is applicable only to some of the phases that the contract encompasses.
Is it a crime to falsely claim to have committed a crime to someone not a legal authority? I've been wondering about this. I know that, say, it is generally a crime to file a false police report, and the motivation for this seems logical because that it wastes police time and resources - and thus takes them away from being able to spend them on real leads, and thus also to degrade the public safety by that little bit. But I also know that, if one admits to making a crime on a public forum, such as an Internet forum, it is possible that a prosecutor who is looking at such fora could potentially use the admission to bring charges, even if the admission is not specifically directed toward one. However, what I wonder about is if some of the above logic does not also, then, apply to a situation like this: if one were to, given this fact, falsely announce on such a forum that one had committed a crime that one actually did not, could it amount to having the same effect of wasting prosecutor/law enforcement time albeit in a more indirect way that sneaks through their attitudes, and thus potentially also be considered some kind of crime? (I want to point out I'm not referring to making a false claim to be the perpetrator of a known crime, or to falsely claim someone else is that perpetrator to, say, get reward money. I'm referring specifically to announcing an unknown crime one did not commit, a crime that does not exist, on a public venue like a forum that is not specifically a channel to police or other authorities. If a prosecutor got ahold of it and tried to pursue it, and it were during the course of that proven a hoax, what would happen?) FWIW, the country in question is the United States.	It could lead to investigation and wasting of government resources, but it is not a crime and not civilly actionable, under the circumstances described. The First Amendment right to say crazy things is pretty broad.	Yes Yes, telling lies is generally not unlawful, much less criminal, as long as you did not intend to profit by them, and there is no specific law violated (for example it is a crime to lie to a law enforcement officer about matters materiel to an ongoing investigation). Attempting to get the scammer to send you money on false pretenses, however morally justified some would consider it, is likely to constitute fraud.	No, filing a police report in good faith does not expose you to liability Of course, making false allegations or allegations where you are recklessly indifferent to the truth to police is both a serious crime in itself and defamation. Of course, breaking a contract is not a crime and the police are unlikely to take any action. If you borrow money from the bank and don’t pay it back, that’s not stealing or fraud unless it can be proven that you had no intention of paying it back when you borrowed it. This is a civil matter for the bank, not a criminal matter for the police.	Calling someone an "asshole" is, at least in the US, an expression of opinion and so is not defamation. Saying that someone has committed a crime may be defamation, but not if that person has in fact already been convicted of that crime. In general if a statement is provably true, it is not defamation. If all that this hypothetical firm does is to post facts as found in court decisions, along with their unfavorable opinions of losing parties who they did not represent, it is hard to see any defamation case being valid. And I don't see any other obvious legal problem with doing this. It would probably anger other lawyers, and might make it harder to negotiate settlements or do other deals. If this firm announce that they refuse to accept as clients "cheats, crooks and similar people" and then make it public that they refused to represent some specific person, A, then A might claim that this portrayed him or her as a "cheat or crook" and was defamatory. The exact wording of their publicly announced policy, and of any announcements that they decline to represent A, would matter a good deal, as would the jurisdiction's exact law of defamation. In some places, codes of ethics promulgated by a Bar Association might be violated by such a policy, but such codes are usually not enforceable in the general case. I don't see any obvious grounds for disbarment proceedings.	Apart from hiring an attorney (who will, based on the specifics that you tell him, have a better recommendation), you can appeal to the district attorney, the mayor, a higher officer in the chain of command with the local police, and whatever TV-on-your-side news-guys there are. The decision to prosecute rests with the DA: the police make recommendations. The DA probably has investigators, and all of the above can persuade the police to take a closer look at the case. Ultimately, you cannot force the police to investigate, only the local government that the police are a part of can order the police. An attempt to sue the police for not doing what you think they should do will fail, because the courts have repeated held that barring an illegal basis for non-investigation, investigating purported crimes is discretionary.	Partial answer (other parts of an answer would be jurisdiction specific): Would this constitute a slander lawsuit against the group of employees and outside agency? The employee falsely alleged to be mentally ill would be the plaintiff who would be the only person who would have standing to bring suit. The person allegedly making a false statement to someone other than the employee alleged to be mentally ill (an action which is called "publication" of a false statement) would be the defendant(s). Listening to an allegedly false statement about someone is not slander, nor is believing it to be true. In the U.S., in most cases, knowledge of the truth or reckless disregard for the truth (or at least negligence in getting the facts wrong in private persons cases not involving a public interest) is necessary to establish liability. Someone who doesn't know that a statement is false and has some basis to believe it is true, can't be guilty of slander. In many non-U.S. jurisdictions, slander liability is possible without knowledge that the statement made is false (and without reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement). Also, it matter who the "outside agency" is in this case. Governmental agencies are typically immune from liability for slander for statements made in the course of their official duties. Without a fuller understanding of who is saying something and why, it is hard to evaluate the claim appropriately.	Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.	You know that a judicial proceeding has been filed against you when you are "served" with notice. In fact, legal proceedings cannot generally proceed without somebody swearing that you were served notice. If a criminal complaint is being pursued against you then you might also learn of this fact when an investigating law enforcement agent contacts you to question you or arrest you. "Filed a case" could mean all sorts of other things. For example, it could be that they filed a police report, or filed a complaint with some company or non-law-enforcement entity. It could be that they have in fact filed a claim in a court of law and whoever is serving process just hasn't been able to find you. In any of these events I don't know of any way that you could proactively determine that without knowing exactly where and how the "case" was "filed." Actually, if a criminal complaint was filed against you and approved then a court in another state could have issued a warrant for your arrest. Contact your local police and they should be able to do a nationwide search for open warrants on you. Police will not typically release information on "open investigations." So even if you knew the exact agency where it was filed they may not tell you anything. If they decided not to investigate it then you might have a right to request the complaint under open-records laws – that depends on the state and the agency.
Can copyright of a book be extended by the authors relatives? The book in question is Dale Carnegie's "How to Win Friends and Influence People". This is a screenshot taken from the amazon listing of the book: https://i.stack.imgur.com/TRRLA.png This is the text as it appear in there, Copyright © 1936 by Dale Carnegie. Copyright renewed © 1964 by Dome Dale Carnegie and Dorothy Carnegie. Revised edition copyright © 1981 by Donna Dale Carnegie and Dorothy Carnegie. Dale Carnegie passed away on November 1, 1955. How was the copyright extended in 1964 and again in 1981 by Donna Dale Carnegie and Dorothy Carnegie (His wife and daughter)? Will they be able to do it again? I was of the opinion that there is a fixed number of years for the copyright to naturally expire. In this case it should've been 95 years after publication.	Copyright in the US has changed Prior to 1978 copyright lasted 28 years and could be renewed for another 28 (hence 1936 and 1964). Anything that was still under copyright then now has copyright for 70 years after the authors death so this will enter the public domain on 1/1/2026. The 1981 work is a derivative work with its own copyright by the new author(s). The original parts will enter the public domain on 1/1/2026 but the new parts will be copyright for 70 years after the new author(s) death.	No. Only the company owns the copyright, not its shareholders. A company is a separate legal entity with its own capacity to own property. Copyright is property, not infection that can be spread onto whoever is close enough. Pretty much like shareholders can't just share the use of the company's tangible assets, they can't wet their beaks in the copyright. As a shareholder, what you could do is to appoint a director/CEO that will give you license to copy (or even transfer the copyright) — if you have enough shares to fire the current CEO and put yours. The CEO will get into legal trouble with other shareholders/creditors, but you'll still enjoy your right to copy.	As mentioned in the comments, there is no general method for this, but there are certainly good ways to get started. Note that copyright status is determined on a country by country basis, so "the country" in this answer refers to one you are living in, in this case Canada. First, there's a quick test to determine if a work is definitely copyright. Most countries have signed the Berne Convention which provides for copyright lasting a minimum of 50 years after the author's death for literary works. In general, it also provides that a country treat works published in other Berne countries as if it were published in its own, with respect to copyright. I'll call this the equality rule. So we have that: If the country acceded to the Berne Convention before the publication date of the book and the author is still living, or died less than 50 years ago, the book is under copyright. If the above did not apply, there are still steps you can take: Look up the country's copyright term. Find the legislation that established the copyright term. If the country has changed copyright terms over the years, the legislation will often provide for how books published before term changes are to be treated with respect to the new legislation. For Berne parties, does the country apply the rule of the shorter term? This is the main exception to the equality rule. The country may choose to use the country of origin's term instead of its own if it is shorter. If this is the case, then, you must read the country of origin's legislation with respect to copyright terms. The vast majority of legislation introduced affecting copyright terms has served to increase its length. Thus, if you pretend that the current copyright term applied back when the book was published, and find that the book is no longer under copyright, you can almost always assume that is actually the case. For an example of how complicated this can be, see this analysis on whether public domain works in the US are copyright in the UK. The UK has been a Berne party from the start, but has at times changed its term length, and whether or not it applies the rule of the shorter term. The US has only been a Berne party since 1989. Before this, they required copyright registration and didn't always base the copyright term on the author's death. In general, the factors you mentioned have the following effect: For Berne parties (as of publication date), this is only relevant for those applying the rule of the shorter term. Important to know this date when reading copyright legislation, as the applicable term often depends on this. Mostly relevant to pre-Berne accession, especially in the US Same as 3. Important, to know what laws ultimately apply. An additional factor you usually need: date of author's death (longest living author in case of multiple authors), as the term is based on this for Berne parties.	It is hard to say: this article sketches the legal landscape. So-called deep linking that bypasses the main page for a site is not believed to be infringement, following the reasoning of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146. The URL itself does not have the bare minimum of creativity required for copyright protection, and storing a URL on a computer is not storing the contents that it refers to, so no copy was made in violation of copyright law. It is unlikely that competing theories would develop in other US districts (there don't appear to be any at the present). However, such a link could create secondary liability for infringement, see Erickson Productions, Inc. v. Kast, where a party "has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement". If I link to a file on a pirate website, I am secondarily liable for that infringement. However, if I link to a legally-uploaded file which the author did not intend to make public, there is no infringement. Copyright law requires permission of the copyright owner, which is more than just "explicit denial". The problem is that a person can put a file out there and not say one way or the other whether you have permission to copy the file. The US Copyright office says that "A copyright owner must have expressly or implicitly authorized users to make retainable copies of a work by downloading, printing, or other means for the work to be considered published" (let's not care at the moment whether it is important to be "published"). The court may infer implicit permission from a copyright owner's conduct, but there is no rule "if it's on the internet, you've granted permission". A rights-owner may make a valiant but insufficient effort to block access to the work (except via a password), so in that context, the courts would infer that the rights-owner had not given permission, therefore the copying is infringing and you have secondary liability for your direct link to the material.	The notice has a lot to do with legacy requirements in the United States to claim the copyright to a work. Up until 1989, the copyright notice was required. Today, the statements are mainly maintained to protect against "innocent infringement" which might reduce what a content owner can get in court. What exactly do those terms entail? That the owner stated owns all rights and you may do nothing with the content. My biggest concern is this: by writing that, is the company claiming to own everything on the website, even potentially copyrighted user-submitted material? That's exactly what they are doing. Depending on the terms of the specific site, content contributors generally either assign copyright to the site owner or license the content in a way that allows the site owner to do exactly what they want with it. Site creators with the smarts or money to do it right/get someone to do it right usually state something like: Copyright [Site Owner] and contributors. Other sites (like this one) state specifically what they hold the copyright to: site design / logo © 2015 Stack Exchange Inc THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. CONSULT AN ATTORNEY REGARDING YOUR SPECIFIC SITUATION.	This appears to mean that the author, while retaining copyright, is allowing anyone to make copies without asking permission from the author. This would seem to be similar to a CC-BY license, or perhaps more exactly a CC-BY-ND license, as the author has apparently not granted the right to create modified versions or other derivative works. This does not require one who makes such copies to distribute them free of charge, unless there is another provision not mentioned in the question. Amazon, or anyone else, would be free to sell copies at any price they cared to ask. If the author wanted to limit the sales price, that would take another provision, and might not be enforceable.	It is legal to rewrite a book that is out of copyright, although ethical considerations demand that the original author and source be credited. You need to derive your rewrite from a version that is out of copyright, however, rather than a translation whose incremental innovations due to the transformation arising from the translation is still under copyright. Certainly, the 16th century original would be out of copyright, and in all likelihood, so would many of the later editions, but probably not the one from 1971.	It depends on where you are For example, in USA copyright exists in a literary or artistic work stored in permanent form like a book, a movie, an audio recording, a building etc. In contrast, in Australia there is no requirement for the work to be stored - that means copyright can exist in a spoken lecture. The owner of the copyright (usually, but not necessarily the creator) has the right to choose if and how their work is copied and if and how any derivative works may be made from it. For your example, the book is an original work in which copyright vests with the author(s), your notes are a derivative work in which copyright vests in you. However, you presumably did not have permission to make your derivative work so that makes it prima facie a copyright infringement. Fortunately, in the USA there exists a Fair Use defence and in Commonwealth countries the slightly less permissive Fair Dealing defence (if you are somewhere else you will need to do your own research). Search this site or read the copyright article on Wikipedia to learn about these defences. Long answer short (too late!), taking notes to aid your own study is almost certainly Fair Use/Dealing. So is sharing it with your friends. Publishing it may or may not be depending on all sorts of factors; for example, if you were to write a study guide for say a Harry Potter book for use by English literature students this is probably OK even if it is a for profit activity, because criticism is Fair Use/Dealing. Citing work is not necessary to comply with copyright law. Failing to cite may be academic misconduct but that is not a legal matter; its a matter for your academic institution.
Do I need to give a months notice to LL at the end of a six months contract? Do I need to give a months notice to LL at the end of six months contract ? The landlord has not fulfilling some of the responsibilities they have, so is it necessary for me to give them notice of pme month before leaving. Also the letting agent said that it will be another six months contract and contract won't fall on monthly basis, is there anything I could do? I like in UK just outside London Update: The Tenant is obligated to give notice in writing to vacate the property 1 full tenancy month before the last date of their contract. I just found out this clause in my tenancy contract, would this cause any trouble ?	Assuming you have a six-month Assured Shorthold Tenancy, you don't have to give any notice at all. As long as you are not in occupation after the end of the tenancy (which means moving out before it ends), that's it. For example, this page from Shelter says: The general rule is that the tenant can leave on the last day of a fixed-term tenancy without giving notice, and this will end the tenancy.[2] If the tenant remains even a day longer than the last day of a fixed-term tenancy, a statutory periodic assured shorthold tenancy will arise, which the tenant can end by serving a valid notice to quit. [2] Right d. Flower v. Darby (1786) 1 T.R. 159; Cobb v Stokes (1807) 8 East 358. This is extremely bad news for landlords, who don't (necessarily) get any notice that they have a void. In general, I would say you ought to give a month's notice (full disclosure, I am a landlord), on the other hand, if they haven't fulfilled their responsibilities perhaps not (but you may have an exaggerated idea of their responsibilities). If you do this, don't expect to get a good reference from your landlord! (Which is going to make it harder to find somewhere else to live). You should also anticipate difficulties in recovering your deposit (you are legally entitled to it back, but that doesn't mean your landlord can't be difficult about it - possibly even requiring you to sue for it). I have just noticed the second part of your question. If you do nothing (in other words, stay in residence), at the end of your Assured Shorthold Tenancy you will switch to a periodic tenancy. The landlord can't force you to switch to another six-month contract, but on the other hand, if you don't, they are perfectly entitled to give you two months notice. If they are smart, they will give you this notice now, so that you can only stay for two months on the periodic tenancy. Note that the letting agent has an incentive to get you and the landlord to sign another contract (they can charge the landlord a fee for it), so they may not be being entirely honest about whether a periodic tenancy is an option. (On the other hand, a poor landlord may be more interested in locking a tenant in for six months.)	It is very unlikely that such a sentence ("A 6 month non-compete/solicitation is required") is enforceable, because it is way too broad. The reasonable interpretation of the sentence is that the employer has thereby put the employee on notice that such an agreement will be required, and the actual terms of that agreement will be spelled out at that time, but that sentence does not constitute an "agreement". Ad actual agreement has to be supported by consideration, and have a reasonable scope (including place and activities). Texas law disfavors restrictions on job-changing, so an agreement would have to go beyond just saying that "a non-compete is required". Since the letter asserts that it is not a contract, there is no clear contractual obligation (they can fire you anytime they want, it seems).	renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms means exactly what it says. What you are paying for is that room, plus shared access to the common areas. Without knowing exactly what your lease says, especially with respect to the common areas, it's difficult to give a proper answer. I suspect that the lease for your room says nothing about who can live in the other rooms. Unless the lease says otherwise, the landlord has full control of the common areas. (Compare with a large apartment building, with hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc., which must be maintained by the landlord.) This isn't an unusual arrangement, but I've never understood why anyone, landlord or tenant, would want it. There's far too much potential for conflict. You, yourself, could be a totally obnoxious person that the other three guys can't stand, but they'd have to put up with you. Their only alternatives are to move out or to ask the landlord to evict you. Moving out would be a lot of trouble for everyone. But, depending upon jurisdiction, as long as you're paying the rent on time and not causing damage to the property, eviction could be a very difficult and long process. And eviction is hardly in the landlord's interest. It costs a lot of money and time, and might not be granted even if she did apply. Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? I'd be concerned about the implications of a woman going out of her way to do yoga in an area rented to four men. That is the part that sounds most strange in this situation. How do I resolve this? I'd start looking for a room somewhere else.	the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it.	Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.	could they make a realistic claim that I had voluntarily terminated my contract before the year was over? The employer's act would forfeit its entitlement to reimbursement of bonus. The clause clearly indicates that the triggering event is termination, not the anticipatory notification thereof. Furthermore, the employer's act would be a breach of the [contract law] covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That would be in stark contrast with your compliance with, and/or kindness in, giving a two-week notice. The employer's termination of your employment seems improper in equity insofar as it was aware of your notice and thus took advantage thereof.	Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble?	No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated.
Do people born in unincorporated US territories have a constitutional right to non-citizen nationality? In Downes v. Bidwell, the Supreme Court concluded that the Citizenship Clause does not apply to people born in unincorporated territories of the United States. Instead, if they had no other claim to US citizenship, they were considered non-citizen nationals of the United States. However, Congress later extended citizenship to such individuals if born in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or the Northern Mariana Islands. Currently, non-citizen nationality at birth is provided to people born in American Samoa or Swains Island by 8 USC §1408. The Foreign Affairs Manual gives historical background on non-citizen nationality and contains the following curious note: The United States exercises sovereignty over a few territories besides those mentioned above. Under international law and Supreme Court dicta, inhabitants of those territories, (Midway, Wake, Johnston, and other islands) would be considered non-citizen U.S. nationals. However, because the INA defines "outlying possessions of the United States" as only American Samoa and Swains Island, there is no current law relating to the nationality of the inhabitants of those territories or persons born there who have not acquired U.S. nationality by other means. Did the Supreme Court state in dicta that individuals born in unincorporated territories of the United States are constitutionally guaranteed US nationality, or was the Court simply making a remark about what they thought was the intent of Congress regarding the nationality of hypothetical individuals born in unincorporated territories not otherwise provided for in the Immigration and Nationality Act?	There is arguably a legal right to non-citizen nationality either by statute or under customary international law, but the U.S. Constitution does not afford such a right and Article I, Section 8 grants Congress broad authority over the governance of such territories and over immigration and naturalization (i.e. to define citizenship beyond the minimum established in the 14th Amendment).	Under US immigration law, any person who at any point after February 27, 2001 meets all of the following conditions automatically receives citizenship the moment they meet the conditions: Under 18 Lawful permanent resident (i.e. has a green card) At least one biological parent is a US citizen (adoptive parents also count of some other requirements are met; stepparents don't count unless they have adopted the child) Lives in the US in both the physical and legal custody of said US citizen parent As far as USCIS is concerned, if a biological child lives with both biological parents, then the US citizen parent has legal custody. If the child was born out of wedlock, they must have been legitimated before they turned 16 to count as their father's child; the applicable law for that depends on where exactly you live. Source	18 U.S. Code § 700 was held to be unconstitutional in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. (Texas v Johnson) Mere flag burning is not illegal and is protected by the First Amendment. You may still be prosecuted for other crimes that happen while flag burning. For example, the flag may be somebody else's property. The Seattle appellees were also charged with causing willful injury to federal property in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1362. This charge remains pending before the District Court, and nothing in today's decision affects the constitutionality of this prosecution. (US v Eichman)	The 14th amendment guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens of the US. It's my understanding that this means from the Federal Government, and doesn't exactly apply when it's a "states' rights" kind of issue. Your understanding is incorrect. The primary original purpose of the 14th amendment was to prevent states from passing laws that treated former slaves differently from other citizens, and indeed to clearly declare that they were in fact citizens, thus reversing the decision in Dred Scot v Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). That decision held that black people could not be US citizens and had no rights granted to citizens under the US Federal Constitution. Of course the amendment is applied in a much wider scope than merely granting citizenship to the former slaves freed by the 13th amendment. The Equal Protection Clause** generally requires that laws not make arbitrary and unjustified distinctions between people, nor treat different people in the same legal situation differently. The clause does not, however, prevent laws from treating who are in some significant legal sense in different positions differently. What is and is not a violation of the clause has been the subject of many legal cases and much debate. The clause requires "state action" to be invoked. and is generally only applies to state and local governments, and those in their employ or acting on their behalf. However, the US Supreme Court held in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) that the 5th amendment imposes a similar requirement of equal protection on the Federal government. The amendment, and the equal protection clause, do not guarantee any particular outcome in judicial cases. It is not clear from the question what equal protection issue, if any, might be at issue in the particular matter described. If the issue is one of treatment under the laws of a country other than the US, even though the people involved are US citizens, the US constitution, including the amendment will not apply.	The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc.	Here is everything that I learnt throughout this process: I was not born a U.S. citizen, and I did not naturalise. Instead, I inherited U.S. citizenship at the moment I became an LPR (Legal Permanent Resident), because I both had a parent with citizenship and I was under the age of 18. There is no paperwork to file to inherit citizenship this way, it is completely automatic and as a result there are people in the U.S. that do not know they are citizens. In order to assert that I was now a U.S. citizen, I just had to apply for either a U.S. passport, or a Certificate of Citizenship. There is no deadline to do this, because I was a fully-fledged citizen from the day of approval of my Permanent Residence application. When I applied for my U.S. passport, I simply had to prove that I was a child at the time of receiving my Green Card, and that one parent was a U.S. citizen. This is exactly what I had to provide the German consulate. I provided my own birth certificate, my I-485 form (with approval date) and my father's naturalisation certificate. Those were accepted without question. To obtain a copy of my Form I-485, I had to file a FOIA request--I used a Form G-639 to make it easier--and I emailed it to [email protected]. I did attempt to get a copy of my passport application, as I filed that while under 18, but I was told by the State Department that they did not have a copy of it (curiously, several months later a full copy of my original passport application arrived by post from the State Department...). The response was not a surprise as when I applied for a passport at the age of 17, I was told by the official that they do not keep a record of my application, so I should also have a Passport Card in case my passport goes missing and I must prove citizenship. Under German citizenship law, one loses citizenship when "voluntarily" obtaining another citizenship. The reason that I did not lose my citizenship when I became a U.S. citizen was because: I was a child, and it happened automatically. Therefore, it is not considered voluntary. Luckily, I did not have to explain this, since it was a consulate in the U.S. (Houston, TX) that I visited, they were well aware of the way in which I inherited U.S. citizenship. However, I had some trouble when dealing with the London embassy as they did not understand all of the U.S. citizenship qualifiers. I hope this helps anyone else that finds themselves in a similar situation! I was completely lost when I started this process, but three months later I have my German passport in my hand.	The most commonly used definition for statehood is the declaratory theory, codified by the Montevideo Convention. This says that statehood doesn't depend on recognition by other states; it merely requires four things: A defined territory A permanent population An effective government The capacity to enter into relations with other states. You immediately run into issues around the defined territory (you don't really have one) and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. But let's ignore those for a second. Meeting these requirements in some abstract world doesn't mean you get treated like a state. If no one else agrees with your claim to statehood and they act inconsistently with it, you have little recourse. You might get them not caring enough to do anything about it, but if they decide you're not a country you're out of luck. You have some misconceptions about statehood as well. A country is allowed to forbid trade with any foreign country, even ones it recognizes as sovereign states. See: US embargo on Cuba. It is also entitled to deny foreign ships access to its ports. Ships flying the flag of a sovereign state are entitled to innocent passage through territorial waters of another state, but not to the use of that state's ports. A country can certainly allow people to be killed and still be a country. See: the US, which has the death penalty for certain crimes. But if you're killing nationals of a foreign country, that foreign country is likely to take a keen interest in your activities. If the killings are judicially-ordered executions based on violations of your penal laws, that's one thing -- Australia might consider it awful that an Australian citizen was shot by Indonesia for drug smuggling, but they recognize that Indonesia is a real country with its own laws that it has a right to apply. If it's just lawless there, the keen interest might culminate in a travel warning. But in more extreme cases, or where the killings are of people who didn't willingly enter your territory, you're looking at potential military action.	If a nation's constitution does not allow a legal means of secession, then the only possibility would be to appeal to a multi-national judicial body, but such bodies have negligible power to enforce. While numerous organizations recognise a generalized right to self-determination (for example the UN has declared that "all peoples have the right to self-determination"), this does not automatically translate into an internationally-recognized right to illegal secession. The International Court of Justice deftly avoided any finding on whether Kosovo had a right to secede, and there is no generally recognised (or denied) "right to secede". There are certain conditions under which one would have support for a claim to legal secession, for example peoples subject to decolonization, the territory was invaded / annexed after 1945, or the state flagrantly violates the rights of those peoples concerned. The "decolonization" angle has been applied to Somaliland (the premise being that the merger of British and Italian colonies into the nation of Somalia was invalid). The use of "peoples" reflect the importance of some sort of ethic division, which becomes a matter of controversy. There is reading on the topic, for example: Secession: State Practice and International Law after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia Secession (Bibliography by Theodore Christakis) The Remedial Right of Secession in International Law
Marital property in NJ: spouse have right to use car? The question is simple, but the situation is anything but. The bare bones info: my friend's son is a new driver who just had a minor, but scary, brush with the law. There is an extra car in this family, as my friend's husband kept his existing car when he purchased a newer one. Hoping to get her son's attention, my friend would like to store his somewhat sporty car at another location, while her son would drive her own 15 year-old car, and she would use her husband's older car. This way the stored car would be an incentive toward some improvement and responsible behavior on her son's part, before it would be his to use again. My friend's husband is refusing to "allow" her to use the car, as his way of forcing his own idea that the sporty car should be sold as a punishment. Does my friend have a right to the car as marital property, even though it's in the husband's name only? They've been married 25yrs, so everything mentioned here has been acquired during the marriage, and, if it matters, she is the primary earner, but did not pay for the car. I'm not intending this as a discussion of parenting, and no one is talking divorce or any other legal action, I would simply like to know whether the car is jointly owned (and hers to use) under NJ law, even though his name is the only one on the title. I hope this is an ok question for this site. Thanks much!	New Jersey is not a community property state, but it is an equitable distribution state. This means that in a divorce marital property is divided, not automatically 50-50, but in a way that seems financially fair to the supervising judge, or according to an agreement entered into by both spouses. This also means that the state considers a car bought during the course of the marriage "marital property". There are also special rules for property bought before May 28 1980, which do not seem to apply in the case in the question. However, "marital property" mostly applies when a marriage ends which the question says is not in view here. NJ does allow for a car to be titled to only one, or to both. A title with both names may read "John Doe OR Mary Doe" or "John Doe AND Mary Doe". In the AND case both spouses must sign to sell or borrow against the car, in the OR case either signature will do. If only one name is on the title, that person must sign to sell or borrow. If it comes down to a dispute, the person whose name is on the title can decide where it is to be garaged, and who has permission to drive it. If the "sporty" car is in the name of both parents, either could move it to some other location, and either could move it back. Going back and forth could easily get ugly. If both names are on the 'sporty' car's title with an OR, the husband could sell it without consulting the wife. if there is an AND he would need her to agree. If the older car is in the husband's name alone, he could deny the wife or the son the right to drive it. The wife could, of course, buy a different older (used) car and allow the son to use it. Obviously it would be a good idea if the husband and wife came to a voluntary agreement about all this, but no law requires them to do so.	A related post is here. Are police required to record in car dashcam video for traffic tickets in NJ, USA? Probably not. Is there any way to find out if they aren’t telling the truth? Ask and hope you are not lied to. Can I contact the police chief, mayor, or municipal judge? You can contact the police chief or mayor if you can get through to them. They are not required to answer you unless you make a formal discovery request or public records request. You cannot make ex parte contact with a judge when the other side's lawyer (in this case, the city's lawyer) is not present. How can I defend myself in court trial if the judge always believes highly credible police officers over defendants if I don’t have video? You can tell your side of the story under oath with any details that makes your story believable. You are correct that the judge will usually believe the police officer and not you. So, usually you will lose. This is one reason that most people try to plea bargain their traffic tickets, rather than going to trial. Due process rights give you an opportunity to tell your side of the story when contesting a ticket, but it doesn't give you a right to win (even if you are actually in the right) if the judge or other trier of fact doesn't believe what you have to say. It does not appear that you have a right to a jury trial in a traffic case in New Jersey, although this depends to some extent on the kind of violation being charged, so you are probably stuck with the beliefs of the municipal court judge about who is the more credible witness.	Probably moot considering how much time has passed but here goes. California 22349(a) states that no person may drive upon a highway at speeds of greater than 65 mph. So if you're going to be convicted under 22349(a), it doesn't matter if you're going 80 or 90. The charge is that you were doing greater than 65. The judge found you were going 90. 90 > 65. Conviction secured. The only sticky part is if the judge charged you the extra $150 because he alleges you went 90 instead of 80. You could appeal that, since even the officer argues you went 80, but since the officer testified that his radar clocked you at 90, you'd probably lose, especially since the officer's rationale for writing 80 was, by his testimony, your alleged admission at the scene, and you at the scene would have reason to downplay your speed. TL;DR: Yes, the judge, as the trier of fact, can do that. Something came out during the trial (radar at 90) that contradicted the ticket (80) so the trier of fact (the judge) resolved this by going with the radar. You might have been able to get out of it, if you asked the officer why he didn't write 90 when that's what the radar read. There was a reason the officer didn't trust that radar, and if he articulated it, then the judge would likely have stuck with 80.	Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".	2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me.	Check your local law. In Washington, the chapter RCW 63.21 says what you are supposed to do. The first part of the law has apparently been satisfieds: Any person who finds property that is not unlawful to possess, the owner of which is unknown, and who wishes to claim the found property Then you need to get a signed appraisal stating current market value from a qualified person engaged in buying or selling the items, or by a district court judge (I have no idea where district court judges get their qualifications to appraise bricks), then within 7 days, report this to the cief LEO where the stuff was found (and surrender it, if requested). You also have to serve written notice upon that officer stating your to claim the property. The burden now shifts to the government, which must publish notices in a local newspaper at least weakly, for 2 weeks. The notice might be publishable in a no-cost venue, in case the publication cost is greater than the value of the stuff. If the owner appears and establishes ownership, that's the end of the finder's potential interest. If the owner does not show up, the property will be released to the finder once he has paid the government's publishing expenses plus $10, but if the goods are appraised at less than publishing cost, there is no fee. As a finder, you have 30 days after that 60 days to pay required costs, otherwise it goes to the government. There are some exceptions, things not subject to finders-keepers (crab pots, secured vessels, motor vehicles, unclaimed property in the hands of a bailee). If you do not comply with these requirements, you forfeit any right to the property and you are liable to the property owner for the value of the bricks. Under the definition of theft, you have a defense that The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable since you presumably intend to claim ownership of the bricks under the lost property statute.	Hair is not personally property until it is removed from your body, it is just part of your body, just like your nose or your femur. After it is removed from your body, it is the property of the person it used to be attached to, although it is frequently promptly abandoned to a trash bin or the floor of a hair cutter. A married woman in Michigan is not now required to have her husband's permission to cut her hair (unless the husband has been declared her legal guardian for extraordinary cause due to something like dementia by a court with ample due process protections, in theory, anyway). This wasn't true even in 1850 and hasn't been true at any time since then. It may never have been true in Michigan while it was a part of the United States of America, although the state of territorial law under the Northwest Ordinance was not necessarily easy to determine with certainty. Almost certainly, there was never a statute to that effect on the books in Michigan or any preceding U.S. territory. The 1850 Constitution recognized the right of a married woman to have separate property that was not marital property (not unlike the law of community property states and countries at the time and not unlike states like Colorado). The 1855 statute, a 1911 statute not linked above, and the 1981 statute essentially put married women on equal footing with single adult women in terms of property ownership and legal status, with the 1981 statute basically just re-codifying the 1855 and 1911 statutes in more modern language. These legal authorities did so in order to abolish the common law doctrine that upon marriage, a husband and wife become one legal person who acts legally though the husband, called the merger doctrine a.k.a. coverture. Historical background for this wave of statutes can be found here. Justice Kennedy reviewed the history of this law in his 2015 opinion legalizing same sex marriage nationwide in the United States. One U.S. state was outside the common law tradition and a laggard, but it wasn't Michigan: In 1979, Louisiana became the last of the states of the U.S. to have its Head and Master law struck down. An appeal made it to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1980, and in the following year the high court's decision in Kirchberg v. Feenstra effectively declared the practice of male-rule in marriage unconstitutional, generally favoring instead a co-administration model. While these statutes are not directly applicable to the question, they do, more generally, disavow a legal worldview in which one could imagine that a woman would require a man's permission to cut her hair, although this is almost surely just an urban myth. Pre-1850, the government in Michigan, which was basically on the frontier at the time, was just too weak to maintain that kind of control over people.	You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer
Can a judge from another state bring legal action over comments online? Bob is watching Youtube videos and sees a video of a judge trying to enforce their authority in a public building. This enrages Bob and he begins to call the judge a slew of profanities online. The judge happens to see Bobs comments online. Can the judge hold Bob in contempt or bring any other legal action against him under his authority as a judge even thou its a different state?	Generally, No Contempt powers are rather broad, but not that broad. A judge has power to find anyone in the courtroom in contempt, if that person acts in violation of he rules or of the judge's instructions. A judge has the power to find any party to the case in contempt if that person violates orders from the judge, unless there is some overriding circumstance, for example if the person's action was an exercise of a constitutional right, or if the judge's order is held (by a higher court) to be unreasonable. A judge will have the power to issue orders to people not otherwise parties if this is needed to preserve the judicial process, such as "gag orders" to prevent bias from contaminating a trial. These often have conflicts with first amendment rights or other rights, and there have been various cases on exactly how far a judge can go in such matters. But if the Judge is within those rules, violations of the judge's orders may be punishable as contempt. But an ordinary individual who is simply expressing disapproval of the judge, even in a highly disrespectful fashion, neither in nor near the courtroom, should not be subject to a contempt citation, and few judges would try to invoke such a power. Note that a judge can always issue a contempt decree or citation, and may be able to have the person jailed, if the person is within the court's jurisdiction. But if the citation was an abuse of discretion, it can be overturned and the judge may be subject to a damage suit, in an egregious case. Charles Rembar in The Law of the Land wrote of one case where the judge had had a bailiff purchase coffee during a recess, and found it not at all to his liking. He had the coffee-shop owner arrested, and brought into his presence, and proceeded to scream at him over the poor coffee. The owner later sued the judge, and received a 6-figure damage award. as Rembar put it "The price of coffee is going up all the time, and it seems that the jury felt that Coffee with scream was extra."	I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.	I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.	It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.	Often, you aren't screened only for one trial, but for several trials. If you declare yourself biased for one trial, you might be asked to be considered for a second, or third, etc. If you continue to give answers that make yourself ineligible such that the judge does not believe you are telling the truth or acting in good faith, you can be held in contempt of court.	Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956.	Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.	I am not a lawyer either, though I have been through Pennsylvania a few times. The relevant law is 18 Pa.C.S. 5703, which prohibits recording without consent of all parties (Penna is a "two-party consent" state, like Florida and Washington). Unfortunately, violation of that law is a third degree felony, which has a maximum of 7 year prison. A specific instance of someone getting in trouble for recording their boss is Commonwealth v. Smith (Smith used a cell phone to record his boss, then argued that a cell phone isn't a "device"; the court determined that it is, and that was Feb 16 2016 so who knows the final outcome). An attorney in Pennsylvania might be able to tell you how often people actually serve time for violating the law. You should call one.
Subpoena vs Motion to Compel Are there clear rules on when to use subpoenas for discovery as opposed to requests? E.g., is it correct that subpoenas are supposed to be served for discovery from third parties to a legal action, whereas discovery on a counterparty is supposed to be through requests? My current understanding of custom is that a plaintiff should use requests to begin discovery – Requests for Production (RFPs), written interrogatories (IROGs), etc. When the counterparty objects to these the parties are supposed to "meet and confer" to try to agree on discovery. Only then is it considered proper for the plaintiff to file a Motion to Compel. Is my understanding so far correct? If a Motion to Compel a response is granted then isn't it legally equivalent to a subpoena? If not what are the differences? And if everything so far is correct then isn't it weird that the more "compelling" process is used immediately on third parties and not on the direct adversary?	In a civil action: If you are serving written discovery on a party, under the federal rules of civil procedure, or in any state whose adopted the model rules, (rules 33-37 typically), you need only send your requests for interrogatories, the production of documents, or for admissions to the party (through their counsel unless they are pro se), accompanied by the discovery notice, detailing the time frame in which they are due. It is typical that this time frame will get extended, sometimes by double or triple the original 21 day period plus 3-5 days for mailing. When the party is represented (this is 99% of the time) the attorney will just call you or email you for an extension and it is pro forma to assent to this. The court will not be happy if they need to seek permission of the court for this because you refused, as it is that common, and you will just get a reputation as a non-cooperative pain (not to mention, the time will come when you need an extension, and what comes around goes around). If they seek an unreasonable amount of time (I'm talking so close to the discovery cut off that you'd not have time for depositions after receipt), then you can limit it, but a couple of months is common. This need not go through the court. If they are not represented, they may just be late rather than calling, in which case you have a duty to contact them before involving the court. This is just because they don't know it is the norm, and it is nearly impossible to pull together everything needed from a full set of discovery in 21 days. When there is a true discovery dispute, you must show the court that you made all due diligent efforts to resolve it on your own. I don't have my rules in front of me (I will edit and add this when I do) ... but this is in the rules, it is not just practically speaking. Also, many jurisdictions require that you contact the court's clerk and get permission before filing any discovery motions. Sending a subpoena is not ever how this is dealt with. If the opposing party fails to respond, or if they are continually late and despite numerous contacts they still do not produce, then you would schedule a discovery conference with the court at which time you will seek a motion to compel. The court will typically give them even more time at this point. You are correct in that when a third-party is served with discovery request, since they have no obligation to take part in the case but for the presence of a subpoena; hence, in this situation you would use a subpoena to request whatever it is you are requesting. They may get their own lawyer who will try to limit your right to get anything from them as a non-essential party, but if it is really relevant you can do it. You would also use the subpoena for depositions, to ensure that witnesses present themselves. Otherwise, subpoenas are reserved for acquiring witnesses to appear in court or for custodians of records to bring records to court for hearings or trial.	What are the factors in weighting whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? In an adversarial system (such as that in the jurisdictions in the U.S.) the surprise factor is disallowed on trial. I am not knowledgeable on the procedural exceptions, but generally speaking the documentary evidence (including deposition transcripts) has to be filed during the discovery stage of proceedings. A discovery deadline is set up during case scheduling, and extensions of that deadline have to be requested via motion. There is the slightly related concept of sequestration of witnesses whereby inconsistencies may serve to impeach a witness's testimony, but that is different than withholding from the jury any pre-existing evidence that a plaintiff would like to be considered on trial (whether for impeachment or otherwise). Also, it is in the injured party's best interest that the jury get to see the evidence rather than have it merely rely on a witness's reaction of surprise. The wrongdoer's lawyer will try to confuse the jury and thus outweigh the jury's perception of a "surprised witness", but that attempt is likelier to fail if the jury has the evidence with which to compare the witness's testimony at trial.	In-house counsel is presumed to be intimately familiar, in a way that retained counsel is not, with both the day-to-day operations of the business and its longer-term strategic planning. So imagine that you're in an R&D intensive industry, and you've been sued by a competitor. The competition's in-house counsel has served you a request to produce documents relating to the research that you're working on, your plans to monetize it, your assessments of the market, etc. Do you want someone to reviewing those documents on their way in to C-suite conference? Courts recognize that providing those documents to in-house counsel creates an almost unavoidable risk that that information will be (mis)used for purposes beyond the litigation. If you've only got your in-house counsel on the case, you can expect a court to be much more reluctant to enforce those kinds of discovery requests than it would be if you had outside counsel who isn't involved in the business. Vorys wrote a good article about this in 2004: http://ccbjournal.com/articles/4159/exclusion-house-counsel-discovery-sensitive-data	The written document is given very high priority, so parties will be held to what is in the document. Both parties sign at the bottom, as a way of signalling their agreement with the terms specified in the document. If conditions are added or subtracted (by crossing out), especially with pre-printed forms, the "customer" (person who didn't write the contract) can initial such modifications, as a way of clearly signalling that they indeed agree to the deletion of such-and-such clause. Since both parties have a copy of the signed agreement, this is not strictly necessary. The potential issue would be that an unscrupulous person could cross out a clause after the contract was signed, and claimed that they aren't bound by that clause. A comparison of the two copies would then reveal that the unscrupulous person was attempting fraud. There is nothing special about handwriting in or crossing out conditions, except that it poses a potential evidentiary problem as to what exactly was agreed to, if for example one party threw away their copy and then maintained that the crossed-out clause had not been crossed out. (So, keep your copy). In case you are proposing a scenario where one party is unaware of a change, i.e. at the very last minute Smith crosses something out and signs it, and Jones did not see that happen, then both copies would be the same and Jones would be legally bound to what's in the paper. Smith should announce to Jones that a clause was being deleted. We might suppose that there are innocent reasons why Smith made changes without making an announcement to Jones, in which case the parties do not have an agreement. There may be amicable ways to deal with that situation, but push could come to shove, in which case the written form of the document is generally taken to be the most important piece of evidence (though not always the only admissible evidence, unless you're in Colorado, Florida or Wisconsin).	As I understand it, legal procedure in Common Law jurisdictions (e.g. the UK) is primarily based on evidence given by a person. Paperwork exists to verify that someone has not misremembered something, but even when you have paperwork you need to have someone testify that this is the right paperwork and it hasn't been forged. A piece of paper on its own means nothing. In practice of course the two sides will agree to accept routine matters rather than dragging lots of third parties (e.g. the post office employees) into court to no point. In the case of a letter where you need to prove it was received, the sender will testify that they sent the letter and that the copy they have introduced into evidence is a true copy. The proof of delivery merely shows that the item wasn't lost in the post. If one party testifies that they sent a letter and the other testifies that they merely received an empty envelope then someone is lying, which is a crime meriting further investigation.	Because the hosts are part of the defendants. A party in a lawsuit can demand documents to be turned over to them from the opposing party. That is called Discovery and participation is mandatory. Not turning over the documents requested and not providing a good reason why they should not be turned over is contempt of court. Discovery under the Federal Rules is very broad. According to Rule 26(b)(1), "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." The federal rules also provide several tools that can be used to get information from other parties, including interrogatories, depositions, and requests for admission. A party may also compel other parties to give them access to documents, real property, or other things for review or testing. See Rules 26-37. The Delaware rules of Civil Procedure mimic the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure very closely, and their Rule 26 is close to the Federal Rule 34. Especially interesting here is: Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 26 (b) (1) In general. - Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any documents, electronically stored information (EST), or tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial. [...] The hosts are employees of the defendant, the phones contain EST that is regarding the matter and relevant to Dominion's claim, and disclosure is proportional to the needs of the case. As such, The employer has to make them comply with discovery requests by the opposing party and hand over the text messages.	In a landmark document-production case, Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, it was held that The Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence, but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating ... A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to produce an accountant's workpapers in his possession without doubt involves substantial compulsion. But it does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the papers, on their face, might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications...The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to produce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else. By way of background (and as cited by the Fisher court), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 where the accused was intoxicated and blood was drawn involuntarily, the court held that The privilege against self-incrimination is not available to an accused in a case such as this, where there is not even a shadow of compulsion to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. In other words, the self-incrimination clause is about actual testimony, and not other physical acts (such as fingerprints, DNA, records) which are used as evidence of guilt.	The first thing you need is a lawyer. Your lawyer will need to understand the standard for granting the motion and be prepared with an explanation of why your case satisfies that standard. If the lawyer can cite to other cases where similar facts led to the outcome you're asking for, that will also be helpful.
Is it legal to discriminate due to the medicine used to treat a medical condition? I will present two different scenarios. Lets say Bob has PTSD from his time in the military. He wants to become an FBI agent. Here are the following requirements from the FBI to qualify; - Must be a U.S. citizen. - Must be able to obtain a Top Secret clearance. - Must complete form FD-887, Request for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). - Must pass an FBI polygraph examination. - Must pass an FBI-administered urinalysis drug test. - Must be in compliance with the FBI Employment Drug Policy: - No use of marijuana within the last three years. - No use of any other illegal drug in the past 10 years. - No selling, distributing, manufacturing or transporting of any illegal drugs. - No use of a prescription drug or a legally obtainable substance in a manner for which it was not intended within the last three years. - Must never have been convicted of a felony. - Must not be in default on a student loan insured by the U.S. government. - Must be registered with the Selective Service System (males only, exceptions apply) Scenario 1) Bob is prescribed a controlled narcotic for his PTSD condition. Scenario 2) Bob is prescribed medical marijuana for his PTSD condition. Is it legal to discriminate employment based off prescribed medicine in either situation? If the employer wasn't the FBI, does it change the right to discriminate?	1) Bob could disclose the PTSD condition and seek accommodation for it (in reality, controlled narcotics aren't actually used to treat PTSD but it isn't hard to imagine a situation where another controlled substance, e.g. ketamine, was used to treat this or some other Americans with Disabilities Act recognized disability and the absence of that disability was not a bona fide qualification of the job). The legal analysis in the case of the FBI (a federal government civilian civil service employer subject to special rules applicable to governmental employers), and a private employer, is not exactly the same, but it ends up in the same place. 2) Medical marijuana is, as a matter of federal law an oxymoron, because it is a Class I controlled substance that as a matter of law (contrary to reasonable facts) has no medical applications, and the FBI is charged with enforcing this law (among other agencies), so medical marijuana would legally disqualify someone from FBI employment. In Colorado which has legal under state law medical marijuana, employers have been allowed to discriminate based upon medical marijuana use because an employer is at a minimum allowed to treat federal law as enforceable. It is conceivable that some U.S. state other than Colorado which allows medical marijuana at the state level might reach a different conclusion as a matter of state law on the employment discrimination point, but potentially, the employer could appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court on a pre-emption argument so it would be a tenuous legal position to take.	ADA is about "disabilities", and not being vaccinated is not a disability under the law. Applicability of HIPAA is very complex and unclear. The Privacy Rule refers to and restricts the actions of Covered Entities. Healthcare providers and insurance companies are Covered Entities. The regulation 45 CFR 160.103 defines "covered entity" as (1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter 45 CFR 164.512 lists instances where authorization to disclose is not required, saying that "A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information without the written authorization of the individual". The employer is not likely to be a "covered entity", so these permissions are irrelevant. Furthermore, included in this section is a provision where disclosure is allowed in the case of (v) An employer, about an individual who is a member of the workforce of the employer with various conditions following such as (A) The covered entity is a covered health care provider who provides health care to the individual at the request of the employer: (1) To conduct an evaluation relating to medical surveillance of the workplace; or (2) To evaluate whether the individual has a work-related illness or injury However, these permissions apply to covered entities, not employers. ("Work-related" is not defined, but having a dangerous contagious disease does clearly relate to the workplace, thus it would be reasonable but not guaranteed to consider such a disclosure to be connectable to this section). 45 CFR 164.510 says that A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information, provided that the individual is informed in advance of the use or disclosure and has the opportunity to agree to or prohibit or restrict the use or disclosure, in accordance with the applicable requirements of this section §508, covering required authorization ("explicit yes") says Except as otherwise permitted or required by this subchapter, a covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information without an authorization that is valid under this section. There is no applicable provision whereby the proposed employer policy would clearly expose the employer to legal sanctions, since HIPAA does not purport to regulate everybody, only those entities where Congress authorized it to do so, via the concept of a "covered entity". Furthermore, the employer is not directly revealing any personal medical information: the employee (the other employee) is. A vaccinated employee is allowed to wear a sticker that says "I was vaccinated". An imaginable application of HIPAA to vaccinated employees would be a policy of requiring a vaccinated employee to advertise that they were vaccinated. One can reasonably guess that a person who does not wear a mask, given such a policy, has been vaccinated, but it is not a reasonable inference that a person who wears a mask has not been vaccinated (many vaccinated people continue to wear masks out of an abundance of caution). There is no legal basis for penalizing an employer who allows vaccinated employees to do things that weakly suggest that other employees have not been vaccinated.	Hospitals in the US that receive federal funding (e.g., Medicare, Medicade, FCHIP, etc.) are required to provide language services under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 52 U.S.C. §2000d et seq to those persons of limited English proficiency who receive services. This US Government Department of Health & Human Services page notes: Persons with limited English proficiency must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in programs that receive Federal funds. Policies and practices may not deny or have the effect of denying persons with limited English proficiency equal access to Federally-funded programs for which such persons qualify. Many HHS documents address this requirement. An overview can be found in the HHS Language Plan (2013), which contains sections requiring translation of oral communications as well as written documents when the patient has limited English proficiency. Given the pervasive presence of these federal programs in the provision of health care in the US, most (if not all) US hospitals will be required to comply and provide translation services.	Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.	BC employers are required to give workers three days of unpaid personal illness & injury leave per calendar year. However, this protection only applies to workers who have held a job for more than 90 days. If you have not held the job for that long, it does not appear that any protections apply to you. Note that (as of March 2021) there are separate rules concerning COVID-19 exposure & illness. There may also be protections that apply to you if you are a union member, or if you work in a federally regulated job (banks, national trucking companies, airlines, and some others.)	The Equality Act (2010) lists the following protected classes (emphasis mine): age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. It is unlawful for businesses to discriminate against anyone, in the goods or services (or physical access) that they offer, based on any of those characteristics. Some disabilities may prevent people from wearing masks, and those people cannot be discriminated against. I couldn't find a source in the law that says this explicitly, but according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission there is no legal requirement for people who have disabilities to be able to prove that they are disabled in order to receive accommodations for their disabilities. While you could, theoretically, ask people to prove that they have a disability if you don't believe them, you'd basically just be setting yourself up to have to pay a bunch of money in compensation when you eventually run in to somebody who actually does have such a disability, and doesn't have proof with them, who then takes you to court for discrimination and wins.	The cited provision is: A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex. This language originates in the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999. This statutory instrument was made in response to a 1996 decision of the European Court of Justice (P v S and Cornwall County Council, C-13/94) that Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 , regarding equal treatment of men and women, also covered discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment. The regulations were made in order to bring domestic law up to date with the EU requirement, by amending the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The definition at the time, found in the amended section 82, was: "gender reassignment" means a process which is undertaken under medical supervision for the purpose of reassigning a person’s sex by changing physiological or other characteristics of sex, and includes any part of such a process So the idea of "other characteristics" or "other attributes" comes from the 1999 version of the law. I expect that the change to "attributes" is simply because the Equality Act 2010 uses the term "characteristic" to mean something else, as it consolidates many different regimes about discrimination on the basis of sex, race, disability, etc., all of which are called "characteristics". The more recent text removes the part about "medical supervision", and explicitly includes people at any stage of transition. Explanatory Notes to the 2010 Act give the example: A person who was born physically female decides to spend the rest of her life as a man. He starts and continues to live as a man. He decides not to seek medical advice as he successfully ‘passes’ as a man without the need for any medical intervention. He would have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment for the purposes of the Act. (These notes are not binding in law but they do give a good idea of what the drafters meant to say. The concept of 'passes' is also not the most sensitive language to bring in, since trans people do not necessarily want to measure themselves by their ability to pass undetected, and may present differently in different contexts.) The example shows that someone can have the protected characteristic without having, or contemplating, any change to their body. So from this example, the other attributes of sex would include all those ways in which the man "continues to live as a man". From general knowledge of trans men, that could include using a masculine name and pronouns; wearing traditionally-male clothes; wearing a binder, baggy clothing, padding in the crotch, or other ways to suggest a more masculine than feminine body; having a traditionally-male haircut; using traditionally-masculine body language; pitching the voice lower; and so on. The situation for trans women would be parallel. These things are all attributes of sex, in that our society abounds in stereotypes of what is a "manly handshake", or a "girly drink", or otherwise associated with a particular sex. They are to do with behaviour more than the body.	Every State in the union has some form of involuntary mental health hold. Regardless of whether or not the patient claims it was an accident, it is incumbent upon the hospital or facility where the individual is held (which is typically at least 72 hours) to do an in-depth analysis of whether the person is a danger to themselves or others. While in this scenario it may've been an inadvertent overdose, the empirical evidence suggests it could have been intentional as the practitioner cannot see into the thoughts and motivations behind the patient's actions. Even taking the patient at face-value, addiction to the extent of overdose is also a mental health issue, which may cause a person to be a danger to themselves. From a clinical perspective, it is much more likely than not that one of the two scenarios occurred, versus a truly mistaken overdose. One would need to mistake their actions numerous times in a day to take so much as to overdose. If you look at it from the inverse perspective, if the facility failed to keep a person who'd just overdosed, or the first responder failed to initiate a hold and the person later died, minimally they would be liable if sued by the family in an action for wrongful death. The unfortunate facts are that if a person was set on committing suicide, it unlikely they would be forthcoming with that fact, for this very reason (the mandatory hold), so a person's word cannot be the determining factor. Even if someone was not intentionally trying to take their life, having taken enough Xanax to cause medical overdose would suggest the potential that even if not suicidal, the individual was at a minimum abusing the medication by taking much more than prescribed (or in a way that is contraindicated - such as with alcohol or other depressants) and potentially suffering from benzodiazepine addiction. Either way, if the hold was not initiated or cut short - and then someone ended up dying from an overdoes - the responsibility and potential liability is the same. A person who is suicidal can reassess what may be a snap decision, or have a chemical imbalance stabilized, or a severe addiction identified in that amount of time. For the person who ctually takes so much medication as to mistakenly cause overdose, this is certainly inconvenient; however, 72 hours is a short time in the grand scheme of things to potentially save a life. The law will nearly always err on the side of safety and prevention.
What is considered a reasonable time under the Turner v. Driver case? Turner v. Driver, No. 16-10312 (5th Cir. 2017), is a 2017 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that established a First Amendment right to record the police. The court found that: We conclude that First Amendment principles, controlling authority, and persuasive precedent demonstrate that a First Amendment right to record the police does exist, subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Place and manner are much easier to define. But how do you consider a reasonable TIME in the previous citation?	"reasonable time, place and manner" is a phase that should be read as a term of art that has a meaning as a unit in First Amendment law. There is a body of First Amendment law that defines reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions on First Amendment rights that is often not very specific about which part of the trilogy is being invoked. An example, which would involve time (as well as other factors) under this test would be that it might not be reasonable to record a police activity using bright spotlights on the scene of an imminent police raid on building in a manner that destroyed the element of surprise for the police raid.	A related post is here. Are police required to record in car dashcam video for traffic tickets in NJ, USA? Probably not. Is there any way to find out if they aren’t telling the truth? Ask and hope you are not lied to. Can I contact the police chief, mayor, or municipal judge? You can contact the police chief or mayor if you can get through to them. They are not required to answer you unless you make a formal discovery request or public records request. You cannot make ex parte contact with a judge when the other side's lawyer (in this case, the city's lawyer) is not present. How can I defend myself in court trial if the judge always believes highly credible police officers over defendants if I don’t have video? You can tell your side of the story under oath with any details that makes your story believable. You are correct that the judge will usually believe the police officer and not you. So, usually you will lose. This is one reason that most people try to plea bargain their traffic tickets, rather than going to trial. Due process rights give you an opportunity to tell your side of the story when contesting a ticket, but it doesn't give you a right to win (even if you are actually in the right) if the judge or other trier of fact doesn't believe what you have to say. It does not appear that you have a right to a jury trial in a traffic case in New Jersey, although this depends to some extent on the kind of violation being charged, so you are probably stuck with the beliefs of the municipal court judge about who is the more credible witness.	There is no hard rule that a strip search cannot be performed by a different-gendered officer. The hard rule is that the search must be reasonable (as required by the 4th Amendment) , which means that there have to be sufficient reasons for the search. Depending on the circumstances, a search of a male by a female, or in view of a female, could be reasonable – and in other circumstances it could be unreasonable. As the court in Cookish v. Powell, 945 F. 2d 441 said, In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted There are trends in the law which speak in favor of inmates right to privacy from cross-gender strip searches. Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors is a recent decision where given the circumstances, a cross-gender search was found to be unreasonable. Cookish v. Powell is one where it wasn't unreasonable. This resource file assembles numerous court rulings, classifying them for judicial circuit, gender of staff vs. gender of inmate, sorting according to who prevails. The "rule" would be that the more intrusive the staff conduct is, the less reasonable the search is: but the more of an emergency there is, the more reasonable the search is.	The circuits all over the place on this one but in short, no, police are not obliged to apprehend a suspect at the earliest opportunity. It is within the discretion of the police to decide whether delaying the arrest of the suspect will help ensnare co-conspirators, as exemplified by this case, will give the police greater understanding of the nature of the criminal enterprise, or merely will allow the suspect enough "rope to hang himself." U.S. V. Garcia 79 F.3d 74 (7th Cir. 1996) See also Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 (1966) A suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested when the police have probable cause. The police are not required to guess, at their peril, the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.	In general, employers in the United States are free to fire you for your speech. The First Amendment does not apply to anyone except the government (other than a narrow set of circumstances where private parties act on behalf of the government or take on government roles, like when private universities employ campus police). If the officer was being fired from a job at a private company, this would not be an interesting question -- the answer would clearly be "no, there is no First Amendment claim here." That’s not to say labor laws might not come into play (for instance, federal law prohibits firing an employee for organizing a union, and some states prohibit firing for off-duty political speech); however, labor law protections exist by statute and are not derived from the First Amendment. What makes this interesting is that the government is involved. Unlike private employers, government agencies are bound by the First Amendment. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that this does restrict them in their role as employer and that they can't necessarily fire an employee for speech. Pickering imposes a balancing test, where the harm to the employee's First Amendment rights is weighed against the government's interest in efficient operation. Courts have given particular leeway to police departments punishing speech that would undermine public trust and confidence in the department. A police officer expressing racist views, even privately, can seriously hamper the effectiveness of the department if the speech gets linked back to them. For instance, see Pappas v. Giuliani, where the Second Circuit upheld the firing of an NYPD officer for anonymously mailing racist diatribes from home in his off-duty time. Another answer suggests that the main question is a public safety one: whether the officer could be trusted to carry out his duties without bias. But that's not the only legitimate consideration for the government employer. The courts have repeatedly held that public perception of an agency is a legitimate concern, especially when it comes to agencies (like the police) whose job requires maintaining good relations with the community. In Pappas, the officer was assigned as a computer operator who had no contact with the public, but he was still a police officer whose speech had a high potential to undermine NYPD community relations.	California Vehicle Code chapter 11, division 7, article 1, section 22350: No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property. Section 22358.5: It is the intent of the Legislature that physical conditions such as width, curvature, grade and surface conditions, or any other condition readily apparent to a driver, in the absence of other factors, would not require special downward speed zoning, as the basic rule of section 22350 is sufficient regulation as to such conditions. Without knowing exactly what questions the officer was asked, it's impossible to know why you were ticketed and why you were found guilty, but "reasonable or prudent" and "endangers the safety of [others]" covers a great deal of ground.	The government must have reasonable suspicion to stop you and ask you questions. The government must have probable cause to arrest you. The government cannot question you if you have invoked your 5th Amendment rights The government must release you if you post bail which is set by a magistrate in some cases but can be posted without conferring with a magistrate for many minor offenses for which the amount is set in advance. Also, you can only be constitutionally held for a certain period of time without appearing before a court for an initial appearance at which you are charged and typically you have an attorney assigned for you if you cannot afford one. Generally speaking a lawyer for a defendant will either post bail on behalf of the client, or will seek to invoke the client's 5th Amendment right to silence and 6th Amendment right to counsel (including the right of a lawyer to visit his client in jail) making further detention much less useful, while challenging law enforcement to articulate probable cause for the arrest with the implication that a civil lawsuit and suppression of evidence and loss of credibility with the local judge could follow if they fail to do so. If the client is not brought before a court by the constitutional deadline (unusual, but not unheard of), the lawyer can bring this to the attention of the court and have the court demand that his client be brought before the court. Of course, strictly speaking the defense lawyer can't force the police to do anything. Instead, the defense lawyer persuades the police to do something based upon what a court is likely to do, or has already done, as a result of their conduct so far. Also, of course, it isn't always possible for a lawyer to get his client out of jail. If the police do have probable cause and the offense is not one for which bail is set in advance, it is not possible for the client to be released until bail is set by a judicial officer such as a magistrate and bail (if granted at all) is posted, which may be beyond the client's means in the case of a serious offense, particularly if the client is considered by the magistrate to be a flight risk. On TV and books, the person that the police have arrested is usually someone that the police had no probable cause to arrest but suspect of a crime anyway, and the police usually fold when called on the fact that they lack probable cause by the lawyer. Less commonly, on TV and in books, the lawyer facilitates the payment of bail on behalf of his client.	Assuming, pending information about the jurisdiction, that this happened in the US, the answer is it depends. As described in Justia's Vehicular Searches article and Wikipedia's Motor vehicle exception article, Under US law police can search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause. This doctrine was first stated by the US Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132 (1925) and later modified or repeated in Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court broadened the rule to evidentiary searches. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971) In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) the Court ruled that the search must be reasonably contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrant-less search at the convenience of the police. Subsequent cases have widened the scope of the exception, although the probable cause requirement has remained, and stops must have at least "articulable and reasonable suspicion". In the case of an ordinary traffic stop, the police may conduct a Terry-type search, based on "articulable suspicion". However, if the police arrest the driver, that is grounds to search the car under Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) Under Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.(and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 note 9 (1982).) police may remove the car for a search elsewhere if they have probable cause to believe that there is contraband (such as alcohol, drugs, or weapons) in the car. Thus the arrest justified a search, as described in the question. It might not have justified the tow if there was not probable cause to suspect contraband. But that depends on the detailed facts, and judging those is beyond the scope of this site. In Collins vs Virginia (2018) the Court ruled that a warrant-less search of a car parked on the owner's property and within the curtilage was not justified. (The "curtilage" is the area near the house which gets additional Fourth Amendment protection, almost as if it were inside the house). However, in that case no arrest was made at the time of the search, and the search was based on an officer recalling the car having been used to elude arrest some two months previously, not just a few minutes before, so that case may not apply in the situation described above. If there was no probable cause, any evidence found might be subject to suppression, and a suit for damages under sec 1983 might be brought against the officers and the police force, but that would depend on the specific facts, and would in practice require a lawyer skilled in such matters.
Would it be legal for a US State to ban exports of a natural resource? I am interested in whether a US state constitution could be legally amended to ban exports of specific natural resources (such as coal, lithium or copper) outside it's own state borders. If such a ban were successful, there would presumably be a fusillade of federal lawsuits from entities that had already invested in the mining of export-restricted resources in the state. What damages if succesful, could the state be liable for? Would the state have a defense against such lawsuits such as force majure? I am particularly interested in contract termination damages if a miner had force majure clauses in their contracts with customers.	No A state may not do that. The US Constitution Art. I section 8 says: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; Art I section 10: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. The power to regulate interstate commerce and foreign commerce is exclusive to Congress, no state may exercise it. The power to tax imports and exports is only given in vary limited degree to states, and only by specific permission of Congress. The Interstate Commerce Clause has been interpreted to mean that a state may not favor its own citizens over citizens of other states in taxation or in commercial privileges, although it may restrict state services to state residents, or charge non-residents higher fees, as for tuition at public colleges. Even with the consent of Congress, or if passed by Congress, such a law might well be precluded by the Equal Protection clause. Congress may prohibit specific items from being moved in interstate commerce, or it may limit, license, or tax them. But all such regulations must be uniform across the United states, and may not apply only to a specific state. Regulation of interstate commerce can include regulation of purely intra-state transactions, if they are held to "affect" interstate commerce. This power is very wide-ranging.	Eventually. This was a state matter prior to the enactment of the Constitution. Without the Copyright Clause, it would have been up to each state to enact such a law (apparently Delaware did not bother). This would have quickly led to inter-state disputes (a New York author being infringed by a New Jersey party), therefore the matter would have been heard by the federal courts. The current understanding of the Commerce Clause easily allows Congress to enact a copyright law, because copyright is quite commercial and potentially crosses state lines. It took a while for that clause to be interpreted by the courts the way it is now. This is a brief summary of historically shifting views on the Commerce Clause.	There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state.	If a nation's constitution does not allow a legal means of secession, then the only possibility would be to appeal to a multi-national judicial body, but such bodies have negligible power to enforce. While numerous organizations recognise a generalized right to self-determination (for example the UN has declared that "all peoples have the right to self-determination"), this does not automatically translate into an internationally-recognized right to illegal secession. The International Court of Justice deftly avoided any finding on whether Kosovo had a right to secede, and there is no generally recognised (or denied) "right to secede". There are certain conditions under which one would have support for a claim to legal secession, for example peoples subject to decolonization, the territory was invaded / annexed after 1945, or the state flagrantly violates the rights of those peoples concerned. The "decolonization" angle has been applied to Somaliland (the premise being that the merger of British and Italian colonies into the nation of Somalia was invalid). The use of "peoples" reflect the importance of some sort of ethic division, which becomes a matter of controversy. There is reading on the topic, for example: Secession: State Practice and International Law after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia Secession (Bibliography by Theodore Christakis) The Remedial Right of Secession in International Law	I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.	Can a state make a law that deputizes individuals to sue individuals in other states? This question (apart from the question below that implicates federalism concerns about a sister state court process in the secondary question below) would be resolved by the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and choice of law. A state can have a law that authorizes a lawsuit for non-judicial system conduct against a non-resident of the state if it meets the requirements of "long arm jurisdiction." The most succinct description of this requirement is that the person being sued "personally availed themselves" of the laws of the state whose law authorizes the lawsuit, in a manner that would reasonably be understood to subject that person to the state's legal authority. This could involve a lawsuit against someone outside the state arising from an incident that took place in the state. It could also involve a lawsuit against someone who took tortious action directed at a state or people in a state that caused harm, or a lawsuit arising from a business transaction that could reasonably be considered doing business in the state imposing that law. Constitutional law requirements on "choice of law" require that the state or foreign jurisdiction whose law is applied to a question in a dispute must have some meaningful connection to the disputed issue (subject to the backdrop rule that the law of a jurisdiction other than the forum where a case is litigated is presumed to be identical to that of the law of the state where the case is being litigated if no party provides any evidence or legal authorities to the contrary). Case law on state level qui tam litigation (which involve statutes that empower private individuals to sue someone who has wronged the government on its behalf for a share of the amount recovered for the government), the case law regarding private criminal prosecutions that are available in a handful of U.S. states, and some California consumer protection laws (which authorize suits without personal showing of actual damages in some cases when there are fraudulent advertisements) might also be relevant. So would the authority granted to bail bondsmen that is similar to law enforcement authority but limited to people authorized a person posting a bail bond for a criminal defendant who is subject to that authority. Concretely, if the constitutionality of the Texas law was upheld<1>, Texas probably can authorize a lawsuit against a California resident who would be involved in an abortion that took place in Texas that was illegal under Texas law. And, a judgment from a Texas court in a case like that would probably be entitled to full faith and credit in California. But, Texas probably couldn't constitutionally authorize a lawsuit against a California resident in connection with an abortion that took place in California. There would be, of course, many edge cases with no close past precedents, where the application of constitutional jurisdiction and choice of law limitations would be far less clear. <1> The majority opinion by five conservative justices other than the Chief Justice deciding not to stay enforcement of the law specifically limits itself to whether the proper parties were joined to the request to enjoin the statute and states "this order is not based on any conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law, and in no way limits other procedurally proper challenges to the Texas law, including in Texas state courts." A decision that has not been resolved on the merits. The Courts have merely declined to stay enforcement of the law pending the current litigation over the law's validity. Upholding the law on the merits would require courts to overturn existing precedents related to abortion restrictions and other legal issues. Is there any extra legal barrier that would prevent states with pro-choice legislatures from passing laws designed to counter the anti-abortion deputies? For example, California could pass a law that deputizes private California individuals to sue people who sue abortion providers, and could reimburse their court costs up to $10,000. This seems to be a separate question from the question in the title. A law of this character would probably not be upheld. Basically, it would make a state authorized legal process in one state's courts, actionable as illegal in another state. Generally speaking, interference in another state's legal process would either violate the "dormant commerce clause", or the "full faith and credit clause", or constitutional limits on jurisdiction and choice of law, or constitutional standing limitations (even though they don't apply in the same way in state courts as in federal courts, or the "due process clause" of the 5th or 14th Amendments, or the "privileges and immunities clause." The exact legal theory isn't clear because there is really not history of litigation over this kind of legislation and you'd need to resort to vaguely analogous cases. The effort of Texas to litigate Pennsylvania election law administration following the 2020 election was recently dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court for lack of standing and that is suggestive of how this case might be resolved, even though it isn't strictly analogous. It is also informed by the long standing common law rule, that could conceivably have constitutional dimensions, that litigants participating in a court process in good faith are immune from collateral litigation in another lawsuit over their conduct in the original lawsuit. There isn't a lot of precedent one way or the other with laws having this kind of purpose, and none on a law exactly in this form. Indeed, a dissenting opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday by the Chief Justice and two of the liberal justices (with which the third liberal justice states he agrees without formally joining that opinion) stated that: The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unusual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The last time there was significant litigation of laws with a similar purpose that were adjudicated was in the pre-U.S. Civil War period in abolition of slavery oriented legislation. But, the post-Civil War amendments to the U.S. Constitution and subsequent development of constitutional case law would render most precedents from that time period infirm.	It is possible: McCleary v. Washington is an example. Ground zero was the 2012 ruling McCleary v. State, 173 Wn.2d 477, which then took 6 years of further scuffling to resolve. That opinion is full of useful legal tidbits, but the argument boils down to a constitutional obligation (art. IX) for the state to provide an education. If your state has no constitutional provision mandating that the state provide an education, you may be out of luck. I should point out, though, that the issue reduced to funding and not content / method: that the state used to use a "local pots of gold" model rather that a "big pot of gold" model, and even then came up short of the funds required to do what they were supposed to do. The "argument" was, simply, "We can't can't agree on an affordable means of implementing this system", and subject matter or instructional methods were not debated. A lawsuit will be completely ineffective over a dispute about best methods. Since at least in Washington, school policy is set by an elected set of school officials, the only solution is to pick better individuals next time. Recall is not an option, except in the case of misfeasance or malfeasance – improper acts, not errors of judgment. But I would not totally discount the skills of a clever attorney to make the case that so-and-so is a violation of a constitutional duty, depending on what your constitution demands w.r.t. education. The constitutional provisions of Washington vs. California are significant. In Washington, It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex. and the Supreme court found that The State has not complied with its article IX, section 1 duty to make ample provision for the education of all children in Washington. Most of the education article is about the funding obligation, which is the legal point on which the Legislature was held in contempt. The California Constitution imposes a weaker duty on the legislature: A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement. The vast majority of the constitutional provisions in California are about electing and paying administrators, so there is little basis for arguing that a California school district has not encouraged such improvements. There is no "quality" requirement, just a desideratum to encourage improvement.	In the specific example you have given, Florida law could not be applied. A state has jurisdiction over a crime under constitutional due process limits on the scope of a state's criminal jurisdiction if the crime is either committed within the state (regardless of where the harm occurs) or is directed at or impacts the state (the classic example is a gunshot fired from the Ohio side of the state line killing someone located in Indiana, which could be prosecuted in either state, or in both states as it doesn't violate double jeopardy to be prosecuted for the same offense by more than one sovereign). Sometimes these issues are framed not as "jurisdictional" per se, but as "conflict of law" questions limited by the constitution. The proof that a crime was committed in the territory where it is applicable is called proof of locus delecti and depends upon the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. To determine where a crime is committed depends on what acts constitute the crime, something that leaves considerable room for flexible interpretation and a careful reading of the exact wording of the relevant criminal statute. The most important limitation on the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This applies directly in the case of federal criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and applies in state courts because it is incorporated to apply in state court cases through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 20th century case law applying the "Selective Incorporation doctrine." The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal trials be conducted “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” If a suspect is not present in a state to be criminally prosecuted, then the options available to a state are (1) to toll the running of the statute of limitations while the suspect is outside the state to the extent permitted by the relevant state statute and the U.S. Constitution, (2) to bring a civil lawsuit against the suspect instead of a criminal prosecution, or (3) to seek extradition of the suspect, which must be granted under certain circumstances under the United State Constitution and reads as follows in the pertinent part: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. (Note that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuit trials can be conducted in a state other than the state where the breach of contract or tort giving rise to the lawsuit took place for jurisdictional purposes and not infrequently is brought in another state, although constitutional choice of law rules limit the circumstances under which a particular state's laws can be applied to a particular set of circumstances in a lawsuit.) The Sixth Amendment, on its face, prohibits Florida from prosecuting a case in the example given in the question involving a crime that was committed solely in Washington State. Of course, the exact definition of the crime might determine where it was committed. In traditional "common law" "blue collar" crimes there is usually no ambiguity over where it is committed except in the most extraordinary circumstances, but in prosecutions of conspiracies and crimes involving economic activity (such as owning or mailing something), the question of where a crime is committed can grow much fuzzier. For example, one could imagine a differently defined crime prohibiting providing funds to finance a purchase of marijuana in excess of 20 grams being committed both in Washington State and Florida at the same time (e.g. perhaps a purchase of marijuana in Washington State was financed by a Florida bank by delivering cash to a courier in Florida who is bound for Washington State knowing that the cash would be used to finance a marijuana purchase). Similar ideas apply in international circumstances where the Sixth Amendment and Extradition Clause do not apply. But, in those cases, the more flexible and less well defined "law of nations" as interpreted by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court and the President still does impose some territorial boundaries on prosecutions for actions which are not crimes in the country where they are committed under that country's domestic laws. But, those boundaries are not so hard and fast and the idea that a crime is committed in places where it has an impact allow for considerable flexibility in prosecuting crimes committed outside the United States. It has also been well settled since the earliest days of the United States that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (U.S. Supreme Court 1825) and that this applies to states applying each other's penal laws as well. So, Florida cannot enforce a violation of the criminal laws of Washington State in its courts either. If you get in a bar fight in Seattle, you can't be prosecute for assault in a court in Orlando, even if both of the parties to the bar fight were Orlando residents and U.S. citizens. Some notable cases resolving the question of whether locus delecti is present in a particular case include the following: In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) although none of the defendants had entered the District of Columbia as part of their conspiracy to defraud the United States, they were convicted because one co-conspirator had committed overt acts in Columbia (225 U.S., at 363). So conspiracy is a continuing offense committed in all the districts where a co-conspirator acts on the agreement. Similarly, In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) the sending of letters from New York to postmasters in Connecticut in an attempt to gain postage on credit, made Connecticut, where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received, an appropriate venue (136 U.S., at 266—268). A typical state statute on the subject from Colorado's Revised Statutes (2016) is as follows: § 18-1-201. State jurisdiction (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state. Case law under this statute sometimes describes the issue presented under this statute a question of "sovereign jurisdiction." See, e.g., People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984).
Does vehicle information count as personal data? Does a car’s registration number count as personal data under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation? How about the VIN? (Vehicle Identification Number)	In Germany it's not so clear: https://www.lfd.niedersachsen.de/themen/datenschutz_im_kfz/kfz-und-datenschutz-148981.html The situation is different with regard to personal data collected in connection with the vehicle. Data is personal if it relates to a "specific person" or at least to an "identifiable person". A person is "identifiable" if, for example, he or she can be identified via the vehicle identification number or other additional knowledge. The Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) therefore applies in these cases. The BDSG in turn contains a clear statement: the data "belong" to the data subject. Related to the motor vehicle: The data "belong" to the driver or owner of the vehicle.	You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy.	There is no such thing, legally, as "an attack on someone's writing". The only way in which any use of one person's writing by another could be the subject of legal action would be if it infringed copyright. But individual words, short phrases, and individual numbers are not subject to copyright protection. In theory such things might be protected as trademarks, but that would give protection only if they were being used "in trade", that is, to sell or advertise something, and then only if it is in the same industry or market. But a license plate is not selling anything. You may have assigned code meanings to particular numbers. Many people have done this before, using many different schemes or codes. It would be hard to demonstrate that a license plate is referring to your coded meaning and not to some other code. But even if the user admitted an intent to reference your use of a particular number, you have no legal cause of action. You might as well ignore such references, because you cannot do anything to prevent them. Plagiarism is not a crime, nor a tort when there is not copyright or trademark infringement, even if it is openly admitted. If you could prove harassment or some sort of stalking you might have a case, but nothing you have described (in the question or associated comments) comes close to that. If a police car actually hit yours intentionally or negligently you would clearly have a case, but the plate numbers would be no part of it. Response to recent comment: The source of authority (which is not the same thing as jurisdiction) to place license plate numbers on police cars is state MV laws and regulations. To the best of my understanding, such numbers are assigned automatically and sequentially, and have no reference whatever to anyone's blog or political statements. No evidence seems to be cited to show otherwise. The question asks What jurisdiction authorizes these reappropriations of my work/writing/speech? But no one authorizes tjhings that did not happen, and as far as i can see no appropriation occured. Jurisdictions, by the way, do not authorize things, people and organizations do. The question asserts: For my writing I coined "317" and "037" but no one can "coin" a number, and people use numbers in many ways. Use of a similar number on a license plate need not be a reference of any sort to a particular blog or writing.	Art. 17 GDPR, Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) requires “erasure of personal data concerning him or her”. That’s all personal data. However, this only applies when this article applies. Section 1 details when this is and sections 2 and 3 detail limitations and exceptions to the right of erasure. For example, you would be allowed to keep financial records that you're legally obligated to keep. So, if they have the right, you have to delete all their personal data that is not exempted. Aggregate statistics and other anonymous data in the sense of Recital 26 are not personal data and don't have to be deleted. Whether the kinds of data you have mentioned would be sufficiently anonymous would require further analysis.	Generally speaking, what isn't illegal by law is legal. It's possible for law enforcement agencies to share crime rates, maps, and their data, but within any laws regarding access and sharing of that data. Such crime data may be publicly available, but that depends on local and state laws. The local or state agency would have to enter into a legal licensing agreement - if local and state laws allow such sharing - with the GPS company to provide the data, update it, and reasonably assure that it is accurate. The more realistic reason GPS systems might choose to not show crime data may be public relations. If a GPS user lives in an area that has been objectively identified by data as having a higher than baseline crime rate, i.e. for carjackings, that user may not be very happy with that designation. Worse, what happens to public relations when data errors show an area is wrongfully identified as high crime? What kinds of lawsuits could result? Real estate agents suing since bad data from a GPS unit soured the sale of a house?	Possibly, but probably not. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. The statement “Alice is sick” is information, and relates to Alice who is identifiable. Processing personal data is not inherently illegal, but does require a legal basis per Art 6 GDPR, such as a legitimate interest. Here, the information is data concerning health, processing of which is prohibited unless one of the explicit exceptions applies (such as explicit consent, or legal obligations). So it is legitimate to have concerns on whether disclosure of this information would be legal. If these rules were breached, that would be on the data controller. Here, the company would be the data controller, not Bob (unless Bob acted against training and instructions and processed the personal data for his own purposes). However, GDPR probably doesn't apply to this specific interaction. In Art 2(1), the GDPR says that This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. A conversation itself would not be subject to GDPR rules – there is no filing system or similar structured data involved. What GDPR would prevent is to keep records on Alice's health status, but doesn't necessarily prevent talking about it informally. For example, the EUR 35.3M fine against H&M in Germany was imposed not because managers talked with employees about personal matters, but because they then maintained detailed files about those personal matters. Data controllers are responsible though for ensuring security and compliance through appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). TOMs can include things such as non-disclosure agreements and training for staff. If Bob acts against such training, there could be repercussions along the Bob–Company employment relationship. But that would mostly be an employment law thing, not so much a GDPR thing.	Why does the name matter? Today, I entered into a contract to buy petrol and, later, beer and a Caesar salad. In neither case did I exchange names with the other party. If you entered into a contract under a false name with the intent to avoid your responsibilities then that would be fraud. But then, so would doing so under your real name.	This issue touches upon two distinct GDPR rights: Art 15 right to access: you have a right to receive a copy of all personal data concerning you that are undergoing processing (including storage). Access may only be denied where this would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” Art 20 right to data portability: if processing is being carried out by automated means, and processing is based on certain legal bases (consent or contract, but not legitimate interest), then you have a right to receive a copy of your personal data in a machine-readable format, for personal data that you have provided to the data controller. Whereas the right to access is fairly straightforward, the right to data portability applies under much more narrow conditions. Basically, it's a right that you can download any data that you've uploaded so that you can move to a different service. Google Takeout is primarily concerned with your right to data portability, and provides your data in a machine-readable format. Any photos that you've uploaded to Google Photos, you'll be able to download. Thus, it could be technically compliant to exclude information that they've inferred about your personal data, such as image-recognition results. Such results would still be personal data under the GDPR definition of the consent, and would be covered by your right to access. Google might argue that you already have access to this data through the web interface. In my opinion the GDPR clearly requires the data controller to provide a “copy”, i.e. the data in some durable form – not merely access through a web interface. Whereas your question is specifically about Google, the same issue applies to other services as well. E.g. Ruben Verborgh has an interesting blog series on trying to get access to all their data from Facebook, though unsuccessful so far. Similar to your scenario, Facebook offers a download for personal data but does not include all personal data in this download. In one of the documents provided by Facebook in the course of the exchange, they note that they allow access to photo tags through the web interface, but do not include this in downloaded data – without providing further justification.
How to enforce GPL if the copyright holder doesn't have access to the source code of violating software? I'd like to publish a C library project that I have written on GitHub and license it under GPL, so I am doing some research on open source licenses and some confusion comes to mind. Let's say Evil Corps uses and modifies my code in a commercial software without disclosing their source. I have come across their software, and realized that one feature it has is very similar to what my library does. Upon my inquiry, they deny that they have used my code but also refuse to show me their source. How would I have to proceed in order to enforce the GPL? How is it done in the past to prove that the GPL is violated?	If an infringement suit is filed, the plaintiff(s) would have rights of discovery. They could subpoena the source code in such a case for comparison. They could take the depositions of EvilCorp's developers and ask them about the libraries that they used. There might well be other ways to achieve the same effect.	If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case.	Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.	In general, unless the license contains a clause which allows it to be modified at a later date through some defined means (publication, revocation of existing license etc) then you are free to continue to use the existing version of the software under the original license terms. So make sure you pin your versions! Look out for clauses such as exists in the GPL which allow the recipient of the distributed binary or code to choose what version of the GPL to apply if the original author does not state (GPLv2 Clause 9) as they then allow recipients to bind you, the distributor, to versions you might not agree with (eg the switch to GPLv3 with its patents clauses).	Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.	You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.	To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code.	Am I correct to infer that content/data created by a US city have an open license (public domain if created by US city employees or open license if created by a contractor)? No. For example, Larimer County, Colorado created election administration software in-house rather than using an outside contractor to do so, and it would be lawful for it to license that software to other governments in a manner that helps recover its development costs. There is an issue over whether a city or state can copyright its municipal ordinances or statutes or regulations in a legally enforceable way when people have a legal duty to comply with them. Some courts have held that state statutes that are binding upon people can't be protected in that manner. Efforts of the West Corporation to protect its page numbering system that was widely used by courts to refer to public domain case opinions were mostly invalidated in litigation. An open question is that most municipal governments incorporate by reference in their ordinances Uniform Building Codes that are subject to private copyrights and are not terribly cheap to obtain copies of. Yet, every person doing construction work is bound to follow the enacted ordinance including the parts incorporated by reference.
Are contracts correct/legal with a wrong Postcode and City? Last week I signed a contract for a gym membership with the wrong location. I'm not really aware of how contract signing is handled in other countries, but here in Germany it always is a part of it. Out of sheer habit I wrote the postcode and name of my hometown instead of the location where I signed the contract. The other party, and me, did not notice at that point. I just noticed while filing it at home. Is such a contract correct/legal? Should I get a new contract and/or tell the other party about my mistake? The contract itself is totally fine, it's not like I gave a wrong address or something. Just the location of signition is wrong.	The date and location of the signature merely documents when/where the signature was made, and doesn't have a lot of legal significance for ordinary contracts. This information is probably only useful if you need to argue that you could't have signed the contract because you weren't in that town on that day. Despite this small lapse your contract is perfectly valid, in particular you are required to make any payments that are part of this contract. It doesn't make sense to get this corrected. However, if any actual information (for example, you address) changed, then you should notify the gym to update the information.	Preface and Caveats The question doesn't specify where this happened. I am providing an outline of the way that most U.S. states would handle this situation, if the fats are as they are much more likely to be and not as claimed in the question probably due to a misunderstanding of the underlying transaction. I identify areas where state laws most often vary and don't describe those areas of the law in detail since that is impossible without knowing where this happens. This is a matter of state law and varies from state to state, although most U.S. states are quite similar until you get to the fine details. Atypical language in the contract between the contractor and the client could also lead to a different conclusion. I don't know how this would be resolved in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Background: The Structure Of A Typical Construction Loan Financed Construction Project In business and contractual disputes you can only understand the answer if you understand the underlying business transaction, which the question itself doesn't spell out very fully. The fact pattern identified in the question is so unusual that I strongly suspect that there is a misunderstanding of the facts, or an inadvertent misstatement in the language used in the question due to sloppy writing that flows from not appreciating the importance of some key facts. The transaction was almost surely structures more or less as follows (for background, I'm presenting a more general very of this kind of transaction rather than the simple one with no subcontractors or material suppliers involved, because this context helps someone understand why the laws are written the way that they are written.) Usually, the client owns real property, takes out a construction loan from a bank secured by the real estate, and hires a general contractor. The client will usually make some down payment to the general contractor who will take care of paying the subcontractors and material suppliers, and will pay the balance of the amount due to the general contractor through proceeds of the construction loan disbursed by the bank which are drawn as the work is done and payment is earned. Typically, each drawn cycle, which is often monthly for a smaller project and weekly, biweekly or semimonthly in a larger project, materials suppliers and subcontractors submit invoices and lien waivers to the general contractor based upon the work done. If the work is complete, a complete lien waiver is submitted, if he work in only partially finished, a partial lien waiver is submitted. The general contractor substantively reviews the invoices based upon a physical review of the construction site and a review of the subcontract. If there are problems it is rejected and must be resubmitted by the material supplier or subcontractor. If it is approved, the general contractor attaches that invoice as a supporting document to a draw request for the draw cycle summarizing all validly submitted invoices from material suppliers, subcontractors and itself, and also attaching a partial lien waiver from the general contractor. Then, the general contractor submits that draw request to a bank officer handling the construction loan as an agent of the property owner-client, and also a client representative for approval. The bank officer and client representative make a much less probing review of the draw request, looking only for obvious irregularities or suspicious amounts, and if everything is in order, they approve the request. Then, the bank write a check in the draw amount approved to the general contractor. The general contractor then disburses the invoiced amounts to the materials materials suppliers and subcontractors and pays itself the amounts that it has earned. Sometimes, however, the general contractor gets a valid invoice from a material supplier or subcontractor, and receives funds from the client in the form of a downpayment or a loan draw, but doesn't pay the subcontractor or material supplier with those funds. Also, sometimes, the general contractor does work that it is entitled to be paid for or incurs an obligation to a material supplier or subcontractor, but the client doesn't pay or the bank doesn't disburse the funds requested even though the request is valid. When a general contractor, material supplier or subcontractor doesn't get paid for work that is actually done at a particular piece of real estate, the law gives the firm that wasn't paid for its work on that particular piece of real estate what is called a mechanic's lien encumbering that piece of real estate. The details of how a firm with a mechanic's lien gives notice to the world of its rights, the priorities of lien's vis-a-vis each other, and the way that mechanic's liens are enforced varies significantly from state to state. But typically the notice must be given very promptly and not long after notice of non-payment is given, a lawsuit to foreclose on the real estate encumbered by the lien is commenced. An unpaid material supplier or subcontractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the general contractor for breach of contract, and sometimes also for misappropriation of disbursements from the client or the bank. An unpaid general contractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the owner of the property for breach of contract. The Facts In The Question and Analysis The first paragraph of the question tells us what went wrong. The client paid an employee of the general contractor (probably a project manager) instead of the firm the employee worked for (basically embezzling the money by deceiving the client into thinking that the employee was authorized to receive a payment to the employee's firm on its behalf when that wasn't the case), and the firm of the employee who was paid now wants to get paid. This happens and lawsuits usually follows when it does. But exactly what happens next depends upon the facts in the next to paragraphs. The next two paragraphs of the question, however, are probably confused and incorrect. The next two paragraphs say: Two weeks later, the client received a letter from the contractor's lender asking the client for money owed to the contractor, saying that if it was not paid, the client could be double charged. Does the client owe the contractor's lender? What probably actually happened is that the finance office of the contractor submitted a draw request to the bank officer in charge of the client's construction loan with the bank, and also gave a notice of the draw request to the client. The client tells the bank officer not to approve the draw request because the client has already paid the draw request directly to the employee of the contractor (probably the project manager) without the knowledge of the firm the employee worked for. What Happens Next If The Facts Are As I Believe Them To Be? When this happens, the finance officer at the contractor firm talks to the client figures out what happens and then talks to the employee to whom the payment was made. If the employee promptly turns over the funds the the contractor firm, the finance officers at the contractor firm scolds the employee for screwing up the system and the client for making a payment to the wrong person and there is no harm, no foul, and the matter is over. But if the employee who took the client's money doesn't turn over the money which the client can prove to the contractor firm that he paid to the employee, several things are likely to happen. Non-Lawsuit Actions: The client will direct the bank not to pay the draw request. The employee who took the money from the client is fired (no big deal, he was probably long gone). The contractor firm and/or the client will often, but not always, report to the police that the employee embezzled the funds from the client, and if the police find it credible, will issue an arrest warrant. The main reason not to do so is that the facts are uncertain enough that the police and prosecutor don't want to touch it (e.g. the client paid the employee in cash and didn't get a receipt, or the employee when asked says that the payment was made but was a "tip" or was payment for something unrelated), or the client and/or the contractor firm don't want to harm their reputations by making public the fact that there was a theft on this job. Three lawsuits could be brought, although, in practice, these might be consolidated as claims against different parties and cross-claims between defendants, in a lawsuit brought by the contractor, or in some other configuration. The contractor firm sues the employee who took the money for converting money from a client intended for it (probably both as a tort and as a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent of the construction firm). The contractor firm sues the client for breach of contract. The question is about the liability of the client in this second lawsuit. The client might also bring a counterclaim against the contractor for negligent supervision of its employee if the employee did indeed abscond with the money and the facts support that counterclaim. If the client prevailed on that counterclaim, the judgment on the counterclaim for negligent supervision (e.g. if the contractor knew that the employee had a history of doing things like this and didn't warn the client) would be setoff against the breach of contract judgment, rather than being a defense to the breach of contract claim. The client sues the employee for fraud, conversion or theft. What Are The Rights Of The Parties In These Lawsuits? In the second lawsuit, the client has breached the contract. The contract said to pay the firm, the client paid someone else, and so the obligation under the contract was not satisfied. The disputes in the lawsuit between the contracting firm and the client will be over whether the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds as an agent of he contracting firm, over whether the payment that the client says was made to the employee was made at all, and over the purpose of the payment if a payment was made to the employee but the employee claims that it was a "tip" or a payment for something else (e.g. the employee also had a catering side hustle and the employee says it was for catering services). The issue of whether the client made the payment at all may be hard to prove if the payment was made in cash and the employee didn't provide a receipt and will come down to the credibility of the client and employee's testimony at trial. if the payment was made with a check or credit card, bank records will make it an open and shut case on that issue that will probably not be disputed at trial. If the facts reveal that the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds from the client for the contractor firm and that the payment was for work on the project and not something else, then the the payment made by the client to the employee satisfies the client's duty under the contract even if the employee wasn't actually authorized to receive the funds for the contractor firm. So, the client wins and the contractor firm's sole remedy is to sue its employee for misappropriating the client's funds. On the the other hand, if the employee did not have apparent authority to accept the funds from the client, or the payment was for something other than work on the project, or the client fails to prove that the payment was ever made, then the client owes the money to the contracting firm and must pay the contracting firm for the amount due (plus interest, litigation costs and possibly attorneys' fees depending on the terms of the contract). The client may pay that obligation out of separate funds of the client's own, or may authorize a the bank officer to make a draw on the construction loan to pay the amount owed. The construction loan bank of the client wouldn't sue the client or demand payment from the client for the amount that should have been paid to the contractor firm but was instead paid to the employee. It didn't pay money to someone it shouldn't have paid it to unless the client authorized the bank to do so. And, the bank won't pay the contractor without the client/borrower's say so. If the client authorized a draw payment from the construction loan to the employee rather than the contractor firm, the client still owes the bank for what it paid to the employee at the direction of the client (in addition to all other draws on the project), although the client may have a suit against the bank officer for negligence in administering the loan by failing to flag that the payee was wrong (which might lose but isn't a sure loss). The amount owed to the contractor firm proceeds under the analysis set forth above. What If The Facts Are Right? If, improbably, the facts as stating in the question are actually what happened, the client will owe or not owe the contractor money under the same analysis as above. But the client will not have liability to any company that the contractor got a loan from (which would not encumber the client's real estate), since the client has no contractual relationship with the contractor's lender. Post-Script On Double Payment Prevention Laws The question hinges on the unfairness of the client having to possibly pay twice for the same construction work. In some situations, where the general contractor firm is at fault for causing the double payment to happen, the law protects the client from double payment, even though those laws don't apply here. I explain why these laws don't apply below. Basically, the client has to eat the double payment when the double payment occurs because the client screwed up though no fault of the general contractor and the general contractor doesn't benefit from the double payment. Some states have laws designed to prevent property owners, often only residential property owners having work performed on their own residences, from having to double pay for work done in some circumstances. But these laws usually only apply when the client pays the general contractor firm as the client is supposed to, satisfying his contractual obligation, and the general contractor doesn't pay the subcontractor, causing the subcontractor to sue the general contractor for breach of contract and the owner to enforce the subcontractor's mechanic's lien. In those situations, the double payment prevention law eliminates the subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights when the client pays the general contractor in full, and the subcontractor is left only with a lawsuit against the general contractor who didn't pass on the client's or the client's bank's payment to the general contractor for the subcontractor's share of work to the subcontractor. In this case, the double payment laws usually wouldn't apply because the legal issue here is whether the client paid the contractor, or was deceived by the employee into paying someone other than the contractor in an act of conversion/embezzlement/fraud.	The contract remains valid. Most contracts don't need to be written at all. Even if yours did need to be written under the Statute of Frauds or some other law, you're saying that it was made in writing, even though you later tore it up. The fact that the contract is missing or destroyed doesn't change the fact that it exists and obligates the parties; it just makes it harder to prove what it said.	a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.	Per GDPR Art 12(5), “any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge”. The right to rectification is Art 16 and reads in its entirety: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement. Thus, I think it would be invalid to charge a fee for an address change if that change was made in exercise of your data subject rights. If you didn't invoke this right, it's debatable whether charging a fee would be proper. On the one hand, they can charge whatever service they want (provided that this was part of the contract you entered). On the other hand, they have an obligation to assist you with your exercise of data subject rights. This includes recognising a data subject request even if you didn't explicitly invoke the specific GDPR article. For example, refusing a request for erasure just because you didn't invoke some magic GDPR words would be clearly noncompliant in my opinion. If the company offers multiple customer service options, charging for some of them may be all right. Typically, the lowest-cost solution for a company to deal with GDPR requests is to offer an online self-service option. An email to the data protection officer would typically also be free. Charging for phone support might be fine though. In an insurance context, there could also be a legitimate claim that updating your address is not a mere correction of your personal data, but a modification of the contract (depending on what you're insuring). Another possible counterpoint (which I think is not valid though) would be that the company never stored inaccurate data and therefore doesn't have to satisfy a rectification request.	Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).	The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question).	If I enter into a contract that a previous contract I entered into says cannot be entered, what happens next? Your question is unclear on whether both contracts are entered by the same parties. Generally speaking, it is valid for parties A and B to enter both contracts unless the formation of the subsequent contract contravenes the rights of another entity who also is a party to the initial contract. If the initial contract only binds A and B, a subsequent contract between A and B is tantamount to mutually agreeing to modify the initial contract. If the initial contract between A and B prohibits entering a contract with C, A's formation of a contract with C constitutes A's breach of the initial contract. The specifics of both contracts and the circumstances would help determining whether the subsequent contract is void and null; whether it is valid at law or in equity for A to have indulged in forming a contract with C (for instance, if B breached the initial contract in a way that frustrates its purpose); or whether compelled performance of the [initial] contract between A and B results in A breaching his contract with C (or in the alternative, whether rescission of the subsequent contract is permissible). If both B and C an "innocent" parties, the court supposedly would look for a solution that preserved their rights to the extent possible, leaving A to carry the cost.
Liability from attaching a note with tape to an improperly parked car? I am a security officer for a private estate. I frequently deal with cars parking in a way that obstructs other vehicles. On a recent occasion I asked the various tenants of the estate and each denied that the problem card belonged to any of their visitors. I put notices on a couple of the cars with brown tape requesting that the owners move the cars. The notices said that the police would be called and the cars towed if the request was not complied with. The owner of one of the cars is now threatening to sue me for criminal damage. The tape left only a small amount of residue that can easily be removed with soap and water. Is there any liability associated with my actions?	You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here.	The ultimate legal liability for the damage is probably theirs, although the jurisdiction where this happened would impact the result in principle. Your car insurance may or may not cover third party damage to your car, depending upon what your insurance policy says, probably with a deductible. But, your car insurance would have a right to subrogation which means a right to sue the person who is legally liable for what the insurance company paid, even if it does cover the law. The homeowner's or renter's insurance policy of the homeowner with the dog would be responsible for paying damages and hiring a lawyer for the dog owner if the dog owner was sued, but you might have to sue the homeowner to invoke his insurance policy if it refused to pay upon receiving a demand letter.	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lien A lien is a form of security interest granted over an item of property to secure the payment of a debt or performance of some other obligation. So the garage might have held a lien on Wilson's car as a way to secure a debt that he owed them, such as payment owed for repairs. If so, it would have prevented Wilson from selling the car until the debt was paid. It would also have made it a little less clear who was truly in possession of the car if the garage had a security interest in the car. However, in this particular case, Wilson had a monthly credit account with the garage. I would assume that means he had come to some arrangement with the garage where they would do the work without demanding payment on the spot, and that he would pay what he owed at the end of the month, or something like that; perhaps on terms like net 30 days. They evidently trusted him enough to grant him unsecured credit, instead of demanding a lien on the car as security. So the issue of a lien did not come up in determining possession. This sort of arrangement would have been a lot more common in 1963, before credit cards were common, so I'm not surprised that your garage today doesn't offer it. Nowadays the garage is more likely to demand payment as soon as the work is done, but you can get much the same effect by paying them with a credit card; then you will have about a month before you have to pay your credit card bill (or begin paying interest on it).	You might suggest that the neighbor consult with their insurance agent, in case the insurance policy does not cover liability from damage caused by standing trees, especially when the policy holder knows that the tree poses a threat to property. The only thing you can do without the neighbor's cooperation is complain to the city, since it's possible that this situation violates a local ordinance, and the city might order him to remove the tree.	To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.	No. Causing someone "pain and suffering" is not against the law; it is merely one kind of damages that can be awarded when someone has done something that is against the law. You may, for instance, endure pain and suffering from a car accident or shooting, in which case you could collect damages for your pain and suffering after proving that the other party committed the torts of negligence or battery, which are illegal. But if you were enduring pain and suffering from the last episode of Lost, you could not collect damages for your pain and suffering because it is not against the law to write a crappy finale. So in your case, cannot sue for pain and suffering based simply on the existence of a secret audio recording. North Carolina allows secret audio recordings, and it does not make exceptions for audio recordings that hurt someone's feelings. But to go beyond your explicit question, there still remains the possibility that you could pursue a legal action. If the other party used that recording in a way that violated the law, that might give rise to a tort that would support an award of damages for pain and suffering. If they publicly distributed a recording of themselves having sex with someone, that might constitute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. If they edited the recording to make it sound like someone had said something that they had not and then gave it to someone else, that might be grounds for a libel action.	The simple answer is, get a lawyer and explain your case, and pay him to solve the problem (or tell you that it's hopeless). The two main questions would be whether the appraiser have any duty to you, and whether his action was within the scope of what he is supposed to do. If you hired the appraiser, he has a duty to you. I will assume it was you that hired the appraiser (if it was the bank, that's a different matter). Then the question is whether his action or non-action is within the scope of the job. If the place is infested with termites, that is probably irrelevant because an appraiser is not a termite inspector. On the other hand, if he failed to measure the structure, or erred substantially in the measurement, that kind of negligence could be legally actionable. The seller (not the appraiser) is required to "disclose", so it's not obvious that there is any thing that an appraiser could disclose that relates to a map.	To be able to sue the appraiser, he would have to have a duty to you. If he was hired by a bank, his duty is to the bank and not to you. Assuming that you directly hired the appraiser, then you would have to check the contract for limits on his liability – a clause that says "you waive your right to sue me for (certain) mistakes". Now supposing that you haven't waived your right to sue, you almost certainly cannot sue for misrepresentation, unless for some reason you can prove that he knew that he was lying to you. Your best bet is arguing that his mistake was negligent. You would have to establish that the first figure was incorrect (a disagreement in figures does not establish which figure is correct). A discrepancy between county records and an appraiser's estimate can be explained by numerous non-negligence related facts (unpermitted modifications of the structure, for example). Suppose that the source of the discrepancy is inclusion of finished basement space in the earlier appraisal, or perhaps measurement error. Then you would have to prove that that error involved a lack of professional care, which implies certain professional standards (not just your feeling that the error is egregious). This article explains the ANSI guidelines. The standard tends to increase square footage because it is measured from the outside. Then you would have to establish that you were damaged by the earlier figure. The law doesn't allow you to sue because someone does something that bugs you, you have to have suffered damage. You don't say how you were harmed – I presume the problem is that the buyer's bank is not willing to lend that much money, where you relied on an earlier incorrect estimate of square footage in advertising the house and setting the price. You may have contributed to the problem by relying on that estimate when you knew or should have known from the government records that the size is something less. There is some possibility of legal recourse, but it's not obvious (so gather all of your facts and talk to your attorney).
What is the difference between a private exhibition and public performance with regards to showing films? Most films for home video in the US begin with an FBI warning that includes some variation of this message: Licensed only for non commercial private exhibition in homes. Any public performance other use or copying is strictly prohibited. All rights under copyright reserved. What is the difference between a "private exhibition" and a "public performance"?	A private exhibition is one to which specific individuals are invited, as opposed to a public performance which is open to anyone, or perhaps to anyone who buys a ticket. A private exhibition will not usually charge admission, either, although some public performances are free of charge, so that cannot be the criterion. An ordinary commercial theater showing is a public performance. In this case, however, the further restriction "in homes" is added, so only private exhibitions in a private home are authorized. Also, the limitation "non-commercial" is added, so any gathering that charges admission will not be in accord with the license. In short, such recordings may be played for a gathering of family and friends in a private home, with no charge for admission, but not for some event open to the public, nor for any event in a public space, as opposed to a home.	To the best of my understanding: US copyright law does not have anything in particular to say about credits of this nature, for the most part. The law doesn't even say that you have to credit people at all. It just says you have to get a license (i.e. "permission") to use the item in question. Even that is only required when the work is not a "work made for hire" (i.e. any work by an employee of the production company, within the scope of their job). There are some weird situations where the law does require a credit (e.g. a compulsory license acquired under 17 USC 115 requires the licensee to preserve metadata identifying the original song and artist), but this is the exception rather than the rule. The exact wording and ordering of film credits (and TV/other credits) is typically the product of extensive negotiations between all of the people credited, the production company, and (in most cases) their respective unions. It is thus subject to contract law rather than copyright law. Copyright licenses usually mandate some sort of credit be given, except for certain specialized types of work such as ghostwriting (where the whole point is that you don't get credited). Some licenses are more flexible on this point than others. For example, Creative Commons licenses set out a specific list of things that must be included, and mandate that it must appear alongside other credits if there are any, but other than that, you can basically word and display the credit in any way that is "reasonable." However, one-off private licenses will likely be much more specific and restrictive about how the credit is displayed. Speculating: It may be the case that different attorneys drafted different licensing agreements with different credit phrasings wholly by accident, or for no particular reason, simply due to a lack of direct coordination. In other words, nobody was actively trying to make sure all the credits matched, so they didn't.	I gather that Fischer can claim copyright on its written form of public-domain music because the company adds interpretive markings to its sheet music, and those markings themselves constitute creative content? They can probably also claim copyright on editorial content. For example, a piece may have multiple sources that do not agree with one another, and the editor's choice of how to reconcile these inconsistencies is subject to copyright. Even the layout and typography or engraving are subject to copyright, so if the score is nothing but a faithful transcription of the composer's only manuscript, making a photocopy of the score is infringement. In that case the only contents of the sheet music covered by copyright would be whatever unique musical markings Fischer adds, and not the notes set down by the original composer? The notes themselves are not protected by copyright if the composition has passed into the public domain, but to make a score that does not infringe the copyright in the Carl Fischer edition, you would have to find another source. A copy made by hand might be okay because it would not reproduce the layout and other graphic design elements. Is there any reliable way to determine which elements of a work like classical sheet music are covered by a copyright claim, other than to infringe and have the claimant reveal that at trial? You can consult the sources that the editor used. Anything that isn't in the sources is editorial and therefore protected. If you can't find out what sources were used, find all the sources you can. Anything that's present in a source that is old enough to have passed into the public domain is in the public domain.	First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.	You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.	Who knows. It doesn't matter. 17 USC 102 lists the kinds of things protectable by copyright under US law. These are: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. A landscape feature is none of these and is not subject to copyright protection under US law, nor I think under the law of any other country. The "copyright notice" has no legal effect. 17 USC 120 Specifically prohibits copyright being used to prevent the taking of pictures of a building from a public place. In many countries Freedom of panorama (FOP) specifically permits publication of photos taken from public places. Se also this article on FOP. FOP is an exception to copyright protection, which applies to copyrighted architectural works and publicly posted works of art, such as sculptures. Since landscape features are not copyrightable at all, FOP does not strictly apply to them, but all the arguments for FOP would apply to them even more strongly. In US Law, particularly under the Fiest vs Rural case, only works with original content, created by a person, are protected by copyright. (Other countries generally have similar limits on copyright.) But a feature of the landscape is not the original creation of any person. (If someone carved the landscape into a designed shape, it might be protect able as a sculpture.) 3 and 4. If it were a building, you could take pictures of it from a public place or a private place where you have a legal right to be, under 17 USC 120 . But since a part of the landscape is not protected by copyright at all, this is not really relevant. No under the US First amendment there is generally a right to say even false things. But if the landowner attempts to enforce this "copyright" it would be considered frivolous and any court proceeding would be promptly tossed out. The sign gives the landowner no rights s/he would not otherwise have.	The subtitles would be protected by copyright, in general. In the US, temporarily downloading the subtitle text to create statistics would, I think, constitute a fair use. It is transformative, it does not serve as a substitute for the original sub titles, and it does not harm the market for the film or for the sub titles. The existence of the API for the subtitles might or might not be evidence for fair use, depending on who supplied the data and under what terms. In other countries that have an exception to copyright for analysis and criticism, such a download might be held to come under such an exception. One cannot be sure until there is case law on the point, and I know of none. The ruling might be different in different countries. Statistics (words and their counts) about the subtitles for a particular film or video would be facts, and as such would not be protected by copyright at all. A text discussing those facts would be protected.	Copyright always is global When you make a new work, you gain copyright everywhere the Berne convention on copyright was signed, to the degree that country provides. That's in all but about 10 countries, among them Iran, Kongo and Somalia. Now, the runtime of copyright is determined by two things: either the death of the author, in case it is with a natural person, or the publication of the company. Public Domain? The plates Your plates are well over 120 years old and were most likely company-made. As a result, we have to look back... So let's see... oh, actually it's easy: they were published before 1927. That means they are automatically public domain. Even if they were unpublished, and without known author, they're out of copyright: they were created before 1902, so they are automatically in Public Domain. Photographies of Plates? A photograph of the plates creates its own copyright, akin to a translation of a text. However, it is more narrow. Depending on the artistic choices of the photographs, and who made the digital copy, copyright might or might not apply. If copyright applies, then only in the artistic choices of the photographer, e.g. specific lighting or how the pieces are mounted, a text belonging to the picture... Anything that adds to the original work has its own copyright. As a reasonably safe example: the library of Congress and its employees would not hold copyright in a digital copy, as they are US government actors. Those copies are Public Domain. It looks entirely different in museums: the MET catalog is copyrighted, despite the items in it being at times thousands of years old. Those pictures are contextualized in the catalog of the collection with notes and such. The MET has a copyright on the collection and its texts. But... as long as the photos are just mere reproductions with no artistic input no new copyright was created.
Can a significant change in incentives void an employment contract? Recently over at The Workplace there was a question regarding an employee withholding valuable information that they developed in their spare time. According to their employment contract all intellectual property they develop, regardless of work hours, belongs to the company. The company also recently slashed the incentive program that the employee has been generating a significant amount of their income from. (A quick estimate provided a $60k/year difference in income for said employee.) Since the employee only spent their off hours developing this intellectual property for the obviously significant incentive money, is the employee entitled to any compensation or the right to retain the property? Since I don't have the actual contract I will simply assert for the purpose of this question that the contract has no stipulations regarding this. As I am in the United States myself, I am mostly concerned with answers from the US. However, I would be interested to hear how this would be handled elsewhere as well.	Can a significant change in incentives void an employment contract? Yes, because a party's unilateral, significant imposition which the counterparty did not expect strikes the premise of a contract/agreement being entered knowingly and willfully. Here, the contract or relevant portion thereof is voidable by the employee, because the employer's belated imposition is tantamount to a misrepresentation as contemplated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 164(1). The contract clause regarding an employee's off-work hours might be unenforceable as unconscionable, more so where the incentive being slashed represents a significant portion of an employee's income (since it reflects that the employee's salary is not that high so start with). See the Restatement at § 177, 178, and 208. is the employee entitled to any compensation or the right to retain the property? Yes, but the applicable alternative --compensation vs. withholding the IP-- depends on what agreement the employee reaches with the employer. I presume what prompts this part of your question is the mention --in the Workplace SE post-- that the engineer rejected the employer's bid (offer is somewhat of a misnomer) of $25,000 for the employee's off-work IP. The engineer's reluctance is rightfully cautious. Prior to accepting the employer's proposal, it is in the engineer's best interest to ensure (with enough specificity in a new contract) the terms and conditions of that proposal, lest the employer subsequently argue that the payment of $25,000 encompassed any and all subsequent IP produced by the employee during his employment there. Likewise, insufficient caution by the engineer regarding the aforementioned proposal may permit a finding that the parties' subsequent conduct reflects the engineer's acceptance of the new conditions (including the slashing of incentives).	This is a confusing issue in most common law jurisdictions and AFAIK, Canada and Australia still rely on common law definitions of this. First, any arrangement where someone provides services in return for compensation is a contract. If worker is an employee then the contract is an employment contract and is subject to whatever laws apply to employees (things like, workers' compensation, withholding of tax, superannuation etc.). If the worker is instead operating their own business that is independent of the principal's business they are independent contractors and employee law doesn't apply. In most cases it is easy to determine if someone is an employee or is a contractor. For example, if your business hires a bookkeeper to work set hours for which they are paid a salary from which you detect and remit tax, etc. then they are clearly an employee. Your external accountant who does your year end taxes, has their own premises and contracts to many other businesses is clearly an independent contractor. However, the dividing line is not clear cut in edge cases. Using British Columbia as an example: Calling a person an independent contractor, even if the worker agrees, does not decide the issue. In order to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor under the Act, it is important to consider the definitions of “employee”, “employer” and “work”. The Act defines these terms very broadly. The courts have developed some common law tests that may be useful, but they must be considered in a manner consistent with the definitions and purposes of the Act. Some of these tests include how much direction and control the worker is subject to, whether the worker operates their own business and has their own clients, whether the worker has a chance of profit or a risk of loss, whether the work they are doing is integral to the business and whether there is an ongoing relationship. The longer a person works for another, the more closely the worker’s duties are connected to the purpose of the business, the more the person who pays the worker controls the material and tools and directs the activities, the more likely it is that the relationship is one of employer/employee. So, deciding if a person is an employee or contractor is not up to the worker or the principal and what they may or may not have written on a piece of paper! The entire relationship must be considered. As an additional complication, legislation is not uniform between state/provincial and federal levels of government and even within the same jurisdiction. For example, in Australia, it is possible that a person is an independent contractor for Federal income tax law but an employee for state workers' compensation law.	"Reasonableness" is meant to be vague, because what is reasonable in one case or contract or industry is not always reasonable in another. Generally, though, you'll probably find courts interpreting it to take into account normal practices in your geographic area, in your industry, and between you and the other party. If one party looks like they're trying to unjustly enrich themselves or is asking for something that people just don't agree to in the real world, it's probably going to be unreasonable. If people are asking for the fair value of their work on terms that are normally agreed to when they're the subject of negotiations, it's probably reasonable. Dropping the reasonableness language would probably leave the assigning party in a bad position, as they're not required to make the assignment, with no qualifications as to the terms. The assignee could argue that they're free to take the IP on any terms whatsoever, though courts often read in a reasonableness requirement anyway. This answer is based on U.S. law, but there will be probably be pretty strong parallels if you're in a common law jurisdiction.	In general, in the US, Bob may do this. If the second company is a competitor of the first and Bob has access to confidential information from his first employer, then there could be an issue. Some employers require their employees, or some of them, to agree to "exclusive employment", that is to agree not to accept any other employment while employed by the company. If Bob has agreed to such a contract, he would be in breach of it if he took a second job and could be fired if his main employer learns of this. This is not a problem if Bob gets permission for the vacation work from his usual employer. In any case, Bob is not committing a crime, even if he is violating his contract.	First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages.	Anything that helps you with your business and that you keep secret is a trade secret. The "keeping it secret" is an important part. Competitors are free to discover the same information themselves and use it, but stealing it from you is illegal. If a contractor needs to learn this information to do their job, you make them sign a non-disclosure agreement or confidentiality agreement which forbids them to pass that information on. That way, it remains a trade secret. If the contractor gives your trade secrets away, that is breach of contract and you can sue for damages. If a competitor pays your contractor to give them your trade secrets, that's not just illegal, it's criminal. On the other hand, if the contractor puts the information on his blog for example where everyone can read it, without having been enticed by someone to do this, then I believe your trade secret is gone and competitors can use it. Same as if you left documents on a park bench and your competitor finds them and reads them. You have to keep a trade secret a secret; if you fail to do so you lose. Asked about patents: If there is a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement in place, then nobody can apply for a patent. The whole idea of a patent is that you get legal protection in exchange for disclosing your invention. Applying for a patent would mean violation of the non-disclosure agreement.	Quitting before the start date: is the non compete enforceable? The non-compete is unenforceable unless the employer has provided you with material information that you can use to the detriment of the employer. Even in that case, the non-compete as outlined in your description seemingly exceeds the legitimate interests of the employer (see art. 2089 of the Civil Code of Québec). This means that the non-compete clause would be curtailed in court because the employer cannot prove that his business (or market share) encompasses the area depicted in the clause. The reason of being of non-compete clauses is to protect the employer from a potential misuse of information the employee obtained pursuant to his employment, such as trade secrets and information about clients. The fact that you are a fresh graduate suggests that you are dealing with just some typical intermediary who really has no "trade secrets" and who is not providing you with key information, let alone for a job that is scheduled to start five months later. Non-compete clauses that are overly broad contravene public policy in that they would singlehandedly exclude civilians from the labor market and disproportionately impair free trade.	It is conceivable that A's employer would claim that the intellectual property was actually created by A in the course of their employment rather than B. That would be a question of fact for the lawsuit to determine. Realistically, assuming A and B both testify that B created the intellectual property with no input from A and A's employer had only the IP address as evidence, it is pretty unlikely that the fact finder would find that A created the intellectual property. A's employer would almost certainly need to provide some additional evidence that would show that the balance of probabilities favored the employer's position (i.e. A works at FedEx writing software for package logistics, B is a 12 year old kid with no formal computer science training, and the intellectual property in question involves the implementation of sophisticated graph traversal algorithms that would be common in package logistics applications).
Why register a logo as trademark if copyright protects it? If everything I created is protected by the copyright; No one can use it without my permission. Why would I need to register it as a trademark to protect it? If something is too simple to create, it cannot be registered as a trademark, it's the same as how copyright works. Therefore, if my logo (not logotype) can be registered as a trademark, then I have the copyright of my logo. So, what's the point to make a logo as a trademark? Only because trademark can be owned by a company not just a person?	Copyrights protect the mark as is, and derivatives of it, but does not protect the brand from look a likes or from new trademarks that would be confusing. Consider the Pepsi logo: I could easily draw a circle half red and half blue with a white line straight across, vertically, or diagonally. In fact: © 2018 A. K. all rights reserved. There it is my new logo for my cola company called Hep-C (I'm raising awareness). Under copyright law Pepsi could not come after me because the logo is my own creation. I could even call it Pepsi and it would not be a copyright violation as you cannot copyright words. However, Pepsi has better lawyers than that and with my trademark so similar to theirs and the name sounding so similar (and my new name being potentially disparaging to Pepsi) it would likely confuse consumers between what was Pepsi and what was Hep-C thus under trademark law it would be disallowed for commerce. Now you would have common law trademark protection by virtue of using your mark in commerce, but it would only be for the states in which you used it. Additionally a lack of a registered trademark would disallow you from seeking statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117.	This is a case of nominative use. In general, it is fine to use trademarks to refer to the products trademarked, provided that a reasonable person would not be confused about who creates or provides the product, and would not think that the trademark holder has endorsed, authorized, or sponsored the book or other product that refers to the trademark. It is common to include a disclaimer stating that trademarks are owned by specific parities, and the author or publisher is not claiming them, nor claiming any endorsement or affiliation. Such a disclaimer makes the nominative function of the trade mark use clearer, and would make it harder for the trademark owner to prevail in an infringement suit. See This law.se question and answer for more info.	All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on.	Yes, but... Trademarks generally have a particular class of goods or services they apply to. For a common word such as "sky", a trademark will only be granted for a very narrow set; there's no chance of getting an "all purposes" trademark like you could for a made-up word. For example, VuongGiaNghi Nguyen holds a trademark to "Sky" in the United States when describing "Eyelash Glue, Eyelash Extension Glue, False eyelashes, False eyelash perm kit, Lash Extensions", while Strange Loop, LLC, holds a trademark to it when describing "Downloadable software featuring conversational agents to facilitate communication between humans and machines in an electronic messaging platform for use in the healthcare and medical fields". I'm guessing that British Sky Broadcasting's trademark has a "goods and services" that overlaps or is very similar to Microsoft's use of "sky".	It is not required. The companies undoubtedly prefer that you include those designations, and they may even write to say that you should, but that is just them doing their due diligence in policing their brands. In the instances you cited, there is probably some agreement between those companies to include those markers. If you don't have such an agreement, there is no obligation to notify the users of your website that some third party has trademarked a name that you mention.	If the image is protected by copyright (as most modern images are), the uploading it as a profile picture or using it on a web site is copyright infringement unless one has permission from the copyright owner, or an exception to copyright applies. If copyright infringement occurs, the owner can sue for damages, or issue a takedown notice, or both, but does not have to do either. In the vast majority of cases, no one will do anything about such infringements if the owner (or the owner's authorized agent) does not. All the above is true in all of Europe and North America, ad in most other countries as well. Permission can be granted directly by the copyright owner to a user, or granted by the owner releasing the image (or other wrk) under a license. Google's general developer TOS Document](https://policies.google.com/terms#toc-content) reads (in relevant part): Google content Some of our services include content that belongs to Google — for example, many of the visual illustrations you see in Google Maps. You may use Google’s content as allowed by these terms and any service-specific additional terms, but we retain any intellectual property rights that we have in our content. Don’t remove, obscure, or alter any of our branding, logos, or legal notices. If you want to use our branding or logos, please see the Google Brand Permissions page. Other content Finally, some of our services give you access to content that belongs to other people or organizations — for example, a store owner’s description of their own business, or a newspaper article displayed in Google News. You may not use this content without that person or organization’s permission, or as otherwise allowed by law. The views expressed in other people or organizations’ content are theirs, and don’t necessarily reflect Google’s views. It would seem that each Google service has its own terms which indicate in what ways one may use Google content. It would further seem that content originally obtained from others and distributed by Google will have some set of permissions granted by the uploader. These must be checked for each image, I would think. There is no single one-rule-fits-all answer. I gather that the APIs will have methods for determining which images are from Google itself, and which from others, and some method for indicating the permissions that accompany an image. A user of these APIs must learn how to extract ownership and permissions metadata for an image obtained via the API, and how to use it (or not use it) in accordance with the available permissions. Now let us look at exceptions to copyright. These vary by country. Several European countries have an exception for "personal use" which might cover the profile pictures, but probably will not cover general use on a web site. There are exceptions for "news reporting" which might cover images illustrating recent news events. Some have exceptions for educational or instructional use. The UK (and several othe countries) have the concept of fair dealing which bundles several exceptions together. This might cover an image used in a personal profile, use of images in news reports, and limited educational use, but will probably not cover general use on a website. The US has the concept of fair use which is rather complex, but does not specifically include a "personal use" exception. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and other threads here tagged with fair-use for more on this. It is somewhat unlikely that any of these exceptions will cover general use on a web site of images obtained via Google APIs and used beyond the permissions listed in the metadata accompanying the image. But it will very much depend on the specifics of the case. If the image fetching is doe not by you in building a site or an app, but by your app's users who may then use them improperly, strictly speaking that is each user's own responsibility, you cannot effectively police what your users do, and have no duty to try. It will be a good practice if you include text explaining to your users that not all images are free for general use. You might want to link to the Google TOS. If the API returns metadata indicating the permissions status of each image fetched, yo0u might well want to provide this metadata in a useful form to your users. You might even want to allow a user to filter images obtained by permission status. But whether this is practical or useful to users will depend on the purpose and design of an app.	I can't answer this for all of Europe, but in the UK you can pick your company name as long as it cannot be confused with the name of another UK company (and some other rules, like you cannot name it Her Royal Majesty's Game Studio). Both companies may want to register trademarks, and if they register a trademark in the USA that you registered in the EU, then they cannot use their trademark in the EU, and you can't use yours in the USA. You can register your trademark in the USA if you're quicker. When you try to register a trademark in the USA, anyone with a valid interest can protest against it. If they notice the registration, they will most likely succeed if they object. If they don't notice – well, that's tough for them. I wouldn't say it's impossible to overcome your trademark, but it would be hard.	The register of trademarks can indeed be searched before an application is filed, and any prudent applicant will make, or pay an expert to make, such a search. Note that each country has its own trademark register (although some EU countries are working on a shared EU register, I understand). Marks registered in one country will not be protected under the laws of another, unless they separately qualify for protection under the laws of the second country. Note that in the US, marks that have never been registered but are in active use receive some trade mark protection, although not as much as those that have been registered. Searching for unregistered marks in current use is significantly harder than searching for registered marks. Application may be refused for conflict with an active, unregistered mark. Also in the US, registered marks may have their registrations canceled if they are not in use for a significant time, I believe at least 5 years. Many advise hiring a firm that specializes in trademark applications to do the entire application, including searches. This involves significant added cost. US trademark searches may be done via the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) Some information about doing such searches is provided at Search trademark database (an official USPTO page). That page states: Private trademark attorneys If you are an applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings domiciled in the United States or its territories, you are not required to have a U.S.-licensed attorney represent you at the USPTO. However, deciding what to search for and interpreting your results can be complicated. There are many factors to consider in determining likelihood of confusion. We can’t advise you on how to do a clearance search for your mark, do one for you, or interpret your search results. Therefore, we strongly encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney who specializes in trademark law to guide you throughout the application process. If you are a foreign-domiciled applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings, you must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the United States. See the why hire a private trademark attorney webpage to learn more about what an attorney can do for you and how to find one. For more information about conducting a clearance search, please watch the news broadcast-style video titled “Searching” (video #3 in the Trademark Information Network (TMIN) series). I am sure that similar searches of the register in other countries are available.
Can a city ban a person from filming in their own house? Jake Paul was apparently banned from filming in his own LA house, and it seems like ice Poseidon, another Youtuber has been banned filming (or in his case, streaming) outside and from within his LA house too, and now requires permits to film in his area or in any kind of business. Can a city legally do this, if so, does it require a specific set of Laws? Can other cities and states also do this?	Of course a city can enforce their own laws. The possible laws that LA (or any other city) could enforce against the video producers and vbloggers are many: zoning laws (enforcing laws against operating a commercial film set or business in a residentially zoned area); the requirement for an open burning permit, either all year or during times of fire danger; excessive noise ordinances, either 24hr or in a time span from late evening until morning; ordinances regarding excessive traffic and street parking; ID age checks for drinking, if police can get access to the property through warrant or other means; and investigations of criminal behavior shown in the videos. "Basically, after today, if we film in this house we could face up to six months in prison because we need permits," https://www.popbuzz.com/internet/social-media/jake-paul-banned-from-vlogging-in-house/ He could be talking about filming permits, traffic permits, burn permits, occupancy permits, etc. Cities and municipalities can quickly enact new ordinances that criminalize behavior that impacts the neighborhood as a whole after taking into account complaints from neighbors and advice from police regarding activities of the problem residents. Another aspect of the story is that it appears that Jake Paul is a renter. That means the city and neighbors can put pressure on the landlord to encourage Paul to obey the law; failing that, the landlord could possibly evict Paul in a very short amount of time due to possible damage and other clauses in the lease regarding illegal activity, if the lease stipulates anything like that.	You can take pictures of any buildings if you are in a public place, and can freely use such photographs without consent of a owner or designer of that building. [Japan Copyright Act, art. 46] BTW, external appearance of buildings in U.S. Armed Forces facilities are NOT confidential under US-Japan Security Treaty and related statutes enacted in Japan.	No, the minor cannot be in violation either being on the property of residence or the sidewalk in front of that property. Montgomery County Curfew Law: Section 1-2 (Offenses): (a) A minor commits an offense if he remains in any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the unincorporated areas of the county during curfew hours. Section 1-3 (Defenses): (a) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 that the minor was: (1) Accompanied by the minor’s parent or guardian; (2) On an errand at the direction of the minor’s parent or guardian, without any detour or stop; (3) In a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel; (4) Engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home from an employment >activity, without any detour or stop; (5) Involved in an emergency; (6) On the sidewalk abutting the minor’s residence or abutting the residence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the police department about the minor’s presence; (7) Attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or returning home from, without any detour or stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor; (8) Exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such >as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly; and (9) Married, had been married, or had disabilities of minority removed in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 (c) that the owner, operator, or employee of an establishment promptly notified the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department, or the appropriate Constable’s office, that a minor was present on the premises of the establishment during curfew hours and refused to leave. Your property is not public, so you cannot be in offense of this ordinance being on your private property. You also cannot be in violation being on your sidewalk (or a neighbors sidewalk if that neighbor has not called police on the offender).	I suspect this relates to the UK TV Licencing provisions as listed here, Specifically : Can I watch TV on my mobile phone without a TV Licence? If you’re using a mobile device powered solely by its own internal batteries – like a smartphone, tablet or laptop – you will be covered by your home’s TV Licence, wherever you’re using it in the UK and Channel Islands. However, if you’re away from home and plug one of these devices into the mains and use it to watch live on any channel, TV service or streaming service, or use BBC iPlayer*, you need to be covered by a separate TV Licence at that address (unless you’re in a vehicle or vessel like a train, car or boat). I've said "I suspect" as I don't know for certain what Starbucks are doing, but it looks like this is means that either they are not providing you with use of their Licence at those premises, or that they don't have one for those premises (particularly likely if they're not in the UK, also possible if they are). Without mains power connection (ie. batteries only) it would be the user's home Licence that was relevant. TV Licencing is covered by Part 4 of the Communications Act 2003. [Edit : The official source of the summary at my first link can be found at Schedule 1 paragraph 2(c) of the Statutory Instrument. Thanks to Carcer for the comment.]	It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down.	Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).	Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out.	This document is a handy summary of US laws. The primary distinction is between one-party and all-party consent states. In California, all parties must "consent" to recording, but in Georgia, only one party has to consent. "Consent" can be implicit, so if someone announces that they are recording, consent has been effectively given (that's not a hard and fast rule: you have to look at the actual case law and statutory language for that state, but usually this is covered by the "reasonable expectation of privacy" part of the law, where you don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy if someone announces that they are recording the conversation). As it happens, there was a case tried in California involving Georgia-to-California calls, Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., S124739 (Sup. Ct. Cal. July 13, 2006), declaring that California law must be obeyed by a person calling into California. The court declined to decide whether a person could be criminally prosecuted for such a violation of the law, but there is possible civil liability.
Is it illegal for a website's moderator/administrator to access your computer when you are posting comments? The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a United States cyber security bill that was enacted in 1984 as an amendment to existing computer fraud law (18 U.S.C. § 1030), which had been included in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. The law prohibits accessing a computer without authorization. I occasionally go online to visit news websites such as The Washington Post, FoxNews, ABCNews, Yahoo News, etc. Very often after I read a news story, I will read the Comments section of this news story and will post a few comments. On one particular news website, after I post a few comments, my web browser will freeze up, or it will automatically close, or my whole computer will lock up and I have to shutdown and restart my computer. I often will then go back to this news website and post other comments, and then once again my web browser/computer will crash again. This is very frustrating to me. If I could prove/gain evidence that it is one of this news website's moderators/administrators who is crashing my web browser/computer, would I have legal grounds to sue this news website based on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)?	Modern websites use large amounts of Javascript scripts. These are small programs that are run on your machine. By accessing the website you implicitly give permission for this to occur. (Aside: I'm not aware of any case law on exactly what this implicit authorisation covers. CFAA case law on "authorised access" suggests that this is going to be complicated if it ever becomes an issue). Javascript is supposed to be run within a limited framework which allows the website to control the rendering of the website and track how you use it. So they can track your mouse clicks when the browser window has "focus", but not clicks you make when accessing something else. Like all software, the Javascript programs and the web browser "interpreter" that runs them can contain bugs. Javascript has to work on lots of browsers, so its not surprising when things don't always work properly. Coming on to the CFAA, criminal penalties only apply to intentional access. 5 (c) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss. So if a website runs Javascript on your computer with the intention of crashing it, that is a crime. However if the crash is inadvertent due to ordinary programming errors then it isn't. In this case it is almost certainly innocent. To prove otherwise you would need to study the code they are sending in detail to see if it is doing something strange and unreasonable.	I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.	Yes. This is legal. The only possible liability for a truthful and accurate disclosure of fact is a defamation action (in the absence of a privacy clause in the contract) and this is truthful so it would not violate anyone's legal rights. Credit reporting agencies routinely collect such information and court actions to collect unpaid debts are also a matter of public record. Credit reporting agencies in this business also have some additional obligations (such as the obligation to remove an entry after a period of time and an obligation to present rebuttal statements from the person affected). But, you should understand that merely publicly sharing truthful information about a factual matter is not really what a "blacklist" means. Normally, a blacklist includes an implied understanding that certain actions will be taken as a result of placement on the list rather than merely sharing information for what it is worth. An example of a law prohibiting a true blacklist from Colorado is the following: § 8-2-110. Unlawful to publish blacklist No corporation, company, or individual shall blacklist, or publish, or cause to be blacklisted or published any employee, mechanic, or laborer discharged by such corporation, company, or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual. Incidentally, I'm not convinced that the statute would be constitutional if enforced under modern First Amendment jurisprudence, although one U.S. District court case from 1971 did uphold its validity in the face of a somewhat different kind of challenge. Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).	It is probably illegal under Indonesian law for you to launch a cyber-attack on a website that you believe violates Indonesian law, just as it is illegal for you to shoot a person for fraud. The Indonesian government reserves the right to judge guilt or innocence, and to mete out punishment, within Indonesia. It is definitely illegal under US law, also UK law and so on, to launch a cyber-attack on a website for some reason, so you can be prosecuted under the laws of that nation. You should then be concerned with the Law on Extradition (1979), noting that there might be a treaty but also Indonesian law allows extradition on the basis of the interest of Indonesia (as judged by government officials). Indonesian nationals do not enjoy immunity from extradition (as is the case in some countries). There is no extradition treaty between Indonesia and the US; there was one between the UK and Indonesia but I cannot determine whether it is still in force.	Mongolia apparently has a list of banned words (list is NSFW) that websites can't use. And according to this State Department report: Additionally, the regulation requires Web sites with heavy traffic to use filtering software that makes the user Internet Protocol addresses of those commenting or sharing content publicly visible. The report also says: The law places the burden of proof on the defendant in libel and slander cases, and both defamation and insult are criminal charges. NGOs reported that these laws were used more frequently than in previous years to control the press. Canada is probably a better choice, even if it isn't perfect.	I assume based on your reference to .edu and your can-spam-act-of-2003 tag that you are interested in United States law. The scheme you describe is illegal under the CAN-SPAM Act. 15 USC 7704 (b) (1) (a) (ii) (b) Aggravated violations relating to commercial electronic mail (1) Address harvesting and dictionary attacks (A) In general It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission, to a protected computer, of a commercial electronic mail message that is unlawful under subsection (a), or to assist in the origination of such message through the provision or selection of addresses to which the message will be transmitted, if such person had actual knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances, that— (i) the electronic mail address of the recipient was obtained using an automated means from an Internet website or proprietary online service operated by another person, and such website or online service included, at the time the address was obtained, a notice stating that the operator of such website or online service will not give, sell, or otherwise transfer addresses maintained by such website or online service to any other party for the purposes of initiating, or enabling others to initiate, electronic mail messages; or (ii) the electronic mail address of the recipient was obtained using an automated means that generates possible electronic mail addresses by combining names, letters, or numbers into numerous permutations. The last part (ii) specifically forbids what you propose ("combining names... into various permutations). Under 15 USC 7706 you may be liable for statutory damages of up to $250 per email. In addition to being illegal, I suspect your plan will also be ineffective: this sort of spam attack would be really easy for the university to detect and block.	If the tool circumvents Windows' copy protection (which is a computer question, not a legal one, but I cannot imagine a circumstance in which this isn't access-circumvention), then it is a violation of 17 USC 1201, which forbids "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title". It is both illegal to use, and to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic" in such a program.	Of course it is illegal. You are attempting to access somebody's data without their knowledge and certainly without their consent. In the U.K. it is a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Serious Crimes Act 2015. The clue here should be in the term Serious Crimes. The Human Rights Act, and indeed the ECHR, should never come into it unless it was state sponsored or corporate spying. And even then certain states have given themselves Orwellian totalitarian authority to do as they please.
Is attorney client privilege extended to a person not paying for the service? Consider this hypothetical situation: Say you commit a hit and run and a friend takes the blame for you so you don't lose your career. Then asks you to help tell his lawyer what happened. Can they turn the tables on you and disclose your crime?	First of all, there are 3 crimes here: the hit and run committed by you the accessory after the fact crime committed by your friend the "attempt to pervert the course of justice" (different jurisdictions call it different things) committed by you and your friend. Second, the lawyer is your friend's lawyer - they have no client privilege towards you. Third, your lawyer cannot help you break the law - any attempt to get them to do so by say, attempting to pervert the course if justice, is not privileged.	Bob personally has no duty to honor Attorney's demands of non-contact. Bob is permitted to serve Manufacturer directly, or he may request that Attorney waive service on Manufacturer's behalf.	If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment.	You don't need to have an existing relationship with a lawyer to refuse to talk to the police. You can tell the police you want a lawyer before answering questions. Generally speaking, this should result in the police leaving you alone, giving you time to reach out to an attorney on your own timeline. This is of course a bit more complicated if you've already been arrested, but in most cases, you'll still be able to make calls out of jail to try to find a lawyer. If you have serious concerns about this kind of situation, having an attorney on retainer would be a good idea. The business end of the transaction is fairly simple. You would likely sign an engagement agreement with the lawyer in which you agree to pay a modest sum -- $500 or $1,000, imagine, and the lawyer would agree to take your calls when they come in and swoop in to deal with the police as necessary. The lawyer would be required to place your money in a trust account and not touch it until you call him to use his services. If you're expecting the lawyer to go further by actually appearing in court for you, filing motions, defending you at trial, etc., the retainer would likely be substantially higher.	Are you at fault for the fact that Car C read ended you? Close call. A jury could go either way. Can this accident which is now appearing on your insurance be disputed as Car A did not report anything? Essentially I'm just wondering what the odds are that this can removed from Car A's record. I think that it is unlikely that the situation you suggest would happen, even though anything is possible. Usually there needs to be a claim of actual damage for an insurance company to treat it as an accident. The usual rule is "no harm, no foul" (unless someone is cited for a traffic violation). Insurance company accident records are not regulated to the same extent as say, credit reports. You could threaten to sue the company for negligent misrepresentation, or the driver of Car C for defamation, in order to try to get this statement removed, but those would be hard cases to win since you are at least arguably at fault and fault is to some extent a matter of opinion. It would be much easier to win a suit like that if the accident didn't happen at all. Here, it would be undisputed that an accident happened at a particular time and place involving certain cars and drivers, and the dispute is only over who was at fault.	Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.	Yes lawyers do this. quite often in fact. There are professional and publicity reasons of course, that should suffice to not give bad advice and harm your career. But there is also a legal reason. Lawyers are responsible for the advice they give (as most professionals). If they give bad advice, they may be liable for damages!	So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).
Laws "insulating" police from lawsuits In a news article describing a local attorney's multiple lawsuits against various officers in the police department of Salem, NH, the article said: Vogelman files the suits in federal court because he says it’s “almost impossible” to sue a police officer in state court, given statutes that insulate them from litigation. What statutes are these?	There are a few main factors that limit law enforcement liability in a civil lawsuit: 1. Governmental Immunity Statutes. Usually, a state has a governmental immunity act that bars tort liability of state or local governments and of governmental officials acting in their official capacity, except for some narrow exceptions, the most common of which are for negligence in situations that are very similar to cases in which non-governmental agencies are operating (e.g. car accidents, slip and falls at government facilities, medical malpractice by doctors at government owned hospitals, etc.). Usually there is not an exception for intentional torts by law enforcement officers acting in their official capacity. Usually, damages are limited and punitive damages are not allowed at all. In New Hampshire, this is found at Revised Statutes Annotated Chapter 507-B. See e.g. here. 2. Statutes of Limitations Usually, the kind of state law torts that could give rise to police liability have short statutes of limitations that are often further curtailed by special shorter deadlines that apply to suits against governments and government officials. New Hampshire is relatively liberal in this regard with a three year statute of limitations for most civil actions that could conceivably give rise to law enforcement action related liability. (In Colorado, in contrast, the statute of limitations to file a notice of claim against a governmental entity is six months and the statute of limitations for intentional torts in the event that a court finds that an police officer's conduct was outside the scope of his or her official duties is one year.) 3. Federal Liability Claims The main kinds of liability that the U.S. Constitution prevents state governmental liability statutes from providing immunity from are suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (i.e. civil rights lawsuits), and suits arising under the due process clause of the 5th Amendment as incorporated through the 14th Amendment and under the 14th Amendment directly (i.e. inverse condemnation actions alleging a taking without due process or compensation). A. § 1983 Lawsuits There are several barriers to recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a.k.a. the Third Enforcement Act (see generally, e.g., Allison L. Patton, "The endless cycle of abuse: why 42 USC 1983 is ineffective in deterring police brutality" Hastings LJ (1992)). Note also that the limitations below apply primarily to retrospective suits for money damages. Not all of these limitations apply to prospective relief in the form of an injunction prohibiting certain kinds of conduct in the future. i. There is no vicarious liability. See, e.g., here. So, a government is not responsible unless it as an entity, and not just an agent or employee, has an intent to violate someone's civil rights. This factor is somewhat less important than it seems in practice, because a law enforcement officer's employer or union will usually advance the costs of defense of a civil rights action (something not normally available for intentional tort lawsuits in the private sector) and will often agree to indemnify a law enforcement officer defendant in a settlement or after an award against a law enforcement officer defendant. The absence of vicarious liability also means that you can only prevail if you can determine that a particular named individual violated your rights. It is not sufficient to know, for example, that some unnamed police officer in a particular city's police department violated your rights. In contrast, if you are harmed by an unnamed employee or agent of a private business corporation, because of the much maligned doctrine of corporate personhood, the corporation can be held liable for that unnamed employee's acts anyway, which is usually better than proving liability on the part of the employee because usually the employer has a greater ability to pay a judgment than an employee. ii. There is only liability for intentional violations of civil rights. If mere negligence, § 1983 does not provide a remedy. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). If poorly designed systems cause someone's civil rights to be violated, it is usually impossible to identify someone whose more culpable than negligent conflict is responsible for this violation. iii. Police officers have qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 (a doctrine created surprisingly recently). This means that the police officer must have allegedly intentionally violated a well established right, which basically means that there must be controlling case law governing the fact pattern in question. If there is no prior controlling case law, the police officer does not have liability even if the court finds on the merits that the victim's civil rights were indeed violated. It is basically a "one free bite" rule. iv. Unlike most other legal issues in civil lawsuits (the main other issue treated similarly is jurisdiction), issues of qualified immunity can be raised at the motion to dismiss stage, before any other response to the lawsuit is required, even if it requires a judge to consider disputed evidence to resolve it, and if the judge rules against the police on the issue of qualified immunity, they can immediately appeal the ruling, rather than waiting until the case is resolved on the merits at the end of the case. Appellate case law on qualified immunity frequently analyzes facts in an unreasonable manner that a jury could disagree with, even though it is not suppose to do that. v. While local governments and state and local government officials can be sued in federal court pursuant to § 1983, the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution bars lawsuits against state governments in the federal courts in most circumstances, unless the state governments have expressly waived their immunity from suit. (N.B. I have linked to Wikipedia rather than just the text of the Amendment because the Courts, shortly after it was adopted and forever after that time, have interpreted the 11th Amendment to have a meaning contrary to its plain language and impossible to infer from its text alone.) For reasons that are doctrinally complex and obscure, the 11th Amendment generally bars § 1983 actions entirely against state governments although not against state government officials (in what is called a Bivens action), and not suits against local governments. B. Inverse Condemnation Actions There are barriers to inverse condemnation actions as well: i. Inverse condemnation actions can be asserted against entities (which have vicarious liability for acts of their agents) but not against officers of government agencies. Usually, holding an entity strictly liable for actions of the entity's subordinates is a good thing for a plaintiff harmed by the government, but this doesn't provide a civil lawsuit mechanism for holding particular bad actors responsible for their conduct so it can be a poor incentive for individual governmental employees to act properly. ii. Inverse condemnation actions apply only to property interests, not harms in the nature of lost of life, harm in the form of personal injuries, lost services or time, pain and suffering, emotional distress, or loss of dignity or other legally recognized rights. Punitive damages are also not generally available in an inverse condemnation action. See, e.g., here ("It is important to note at the outset that, under inverse condemnation, only damages to real and personal property are recoverable. The claim does not allow recovery of other damages.") (arguably intellectual or intangible property that is totally taken may also give rise to an inverse condemnation claim). iii. Inverse condemnation actions are available only in the event of a "total taking". Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Government action that reduces the value of property is not enough. For government action to be a "total taking" it must destroy all more than nominal economic value of the property in question. 4. Why Does A Federal v. State Forum Actually Matter? Vogelman files the suits in federal court because he says it’s “almost impossible” to sue a police officer in state court, given statutes that insulate them from litigation. This is either a misquotation or an erroneous statement. It is "almost impossible" to sue a police officer under state law, given the statutes that limit them from litigation such as RSA Chapter 507-B. But, it is not materially more difficult to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court than it is in federal court from the perspective of statutory law or civil procedure rules, since state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such actions. There are still good reasons to bring suit in federal court rather than state court under § 1983, and for these reasons this is how it is usually done. But, the reasons aren't statutory. Instead, they mostly pertain to the personnel involved. A. Jury Shopping Jury pool differences between state courts and federal courts are important. But, this factor varies from case to case and doesn't fully explain the strong pro-federal court choice of forum decisions made by Plaintiffs that we observe. i. Federal court provides a larger jury pool, which is desirable when the violation of rights takes place in a jurisdiction less favorable to civil rights plaintiffs vis-a-vis law enforcement defendants. ii. Further, the federal jury pool will typically include many jurors from outside the jurisdiction in which the law enforcement defendant are employed, while state courts will typically have jury pools that are drawn from the jurisdiction that employs the law enforcement defendants who will be among the people who may face increased tax liability for damages awarded for law enforcement misconduct. Like Congressmen, even if people are not favorably inclined towards law enforcement, in general, they are often more favorably inclined towards the law enforcement officials in their own jurisdiction who are protecting them (in theory) from crime. B. Implicit Judicial Bias. More importantly, in practice, state court judges presiding over § 1983 cases are usually more favorably inclined towards law enforcement defendants than federal court judges, and judges are unusually powerful in these kinds of cases. This, in turn, is a product of four main factors: i. Regulatory capture (state court judges have had law enforcement defendants testify before them in criminal cases on a routine basis and found them to be credible again and again, while routinely finding that criminal defendants, who are often demographically similar to or overlap with criminal defendants, to be not credible). ii. Most state court judges are biased in favor of law enforcement, in part, because a large share of them are state and local government criminal prosecutors. This is also true of federal court judges (about 40% were prosecutors before becoming judges) but to a lesser extent. Evidence of this bias at the appellate court level can be found here. See also here and here. iii. State court judges are part of a network of state and local government officials and politicians to whom they are favorably inclined who tend to strongly back the law enforcement officials who are also part of that network, while federal court judges, while still politically connected and not necessarily positively inclined towards civil rights defendants, have a much more attenuated connection to those networks of state and local government officials and politicians. iv. State court trial judges are typically more responsive to public opinion and civil rights plaintiffs are often unpopular individuals. Footnote Re Sources In addition to the sources linked, my first "real job" out of law school including defending county governments and county officials from government liability claims. The matters for which there are no links to sources largely reflect the conventional wisdom of myself and my colleagues in that context.	You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.	Is there a cause of action for "Outrageous conduct" that does not depend on the vulnerability to the emotional distress of an individual but might be properly applied to a public official (acting in official capacity) due to the effects on society as a whole? No. There is no such cause of action. A public official acting in the official's official capacity is immune from civil liability in tort for intentional acts that do not violate a clearly established constitutional right. There are some narrow exceptions to this general rule. For example, certain employment discrimination lawsuits are allowed. Similarly, for example, embezzlement of private funds held in a fiduciary capacity by a public official in charge of conducting foreclosures would be actionable in many states. But there are no exceptions that are in any way a fit to the fact pattern described. Furthermore, at least in federal courts, there can't be such a cause of action. An action that has an effect on society as a whole is, by definition, an act which no one has standing to sue regarding. Standing to sue, which is a subject matter jurisdictional requirement in federal court, requires a particularized injury to a legally protected interest of an individual that is distinct from the injury caused to the general public, or taxpayers generally, or citizens generally. State law, in principle, can give standing to someone who does not have standing under this federal constitutional law standard in state court, but most states make only the most narrow exceptions to the principle. For example, some states give someone standing to sue for violation of state constitutional budget and tax rules that apply to legislation generally. Often standing exceptions and exceptions from the federal court case and controversy requirement (which is also a matter of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court) are waived at the same time.	So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense.	It depends. The police and only the police decide what are and are not police matters. However, although it might not be a police matter, you still have lots of options at your disposal. For example, does your jurisdiction (city, town, municipality, etc.) have an animal control division? i.e., City dog catcher. Most do. If so, I would call the animal control division and file a report. They might possibly do a field visit and take the animal into custody if the animal is still roaming loose. If you sustained bodily injuries, you should get checked by a doctor and have those injuries documented in a medical report. If possible, you could drive by the property and take photos of the unchained dog roaming loose. Then, armed with your evidence consisting of: police report medical injury report animal control report and photographs of the scene You could (with the help of a licensed attorney) file a civil suit against the pet owner. You might be able to win an award for damages, pain and suffering and possibly punitive damages as well (check with your attorney). Also, your attorney could advise you if you might have a cause to move for an enforcement action against the dog and/or its owners that might or might not include having the animal removed from the owners custody or in extreme cases of negligence and bad behavior possibly "put to sleep." Your suit might focus on collecting from the homeowner's insurance policy of the pet owner and you could potentially collect a lot of money with the right set of facts and evidence on your side. You might want to look for an attorney who specializes in personal injury. Most PI attorneys work on a contingency. Meaning they don't charge an up front fee and will only get paid if you win your case or settle. In which case their fee is typically about 1/3 of what you get awarded in settlement or judgment.	Revised for clarity in light of comments State and local police can arrest anyone who they have probable cause to believe is breaking state or local law. Like all LEOs, Federal LEOs can break some state and local laws while enforcing Federal law. When they grab someone off the street and hold them in a cell, they are detaining them, not kidnapping them, and so on. However, to avoid arrest, the Feds have to identify themselves. That's because state and local LEO who know they are dealing with Feds on federal business no longer have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed. State and local police can arrest Federal LEOs who they: a) have probable cause to believe are breaking state or local; and, b) have no reason to believe are Feds enforcing Federal law. In other words: Any Fed who refuses to identify herself to a local LEO can be arrested if there is probable cause. State and local police cannot, however, arrest Federal LEOs just because they are not wearing insignias. That is because: a) there are no federal statutes requiring federal LEOs to identify themselves; b) the Supremacy Clause says federal law takes precedence over state and local law that conflict with it; c) at least in Portland, the feds were not operating under any sort of formal agreement with Portland or Oregon officials that required them to have identification. While it is hard to prove a negative, the question of whether Federal LEOs are required to identify themselves has been looked at recently by reputable sources. They all agree there is no such law. For example, the answer from Lawfare: Broadly speaking, law enforcement officers do not have a legal duty to disclose either their identities or their agencies of affiliation, even if asked directly. Certain municipalities require police officers to identify themselves if asked, but there is currently no federal statute requiring officer disclosure of such information. The article points out that the two main types of cases involving police identifying themselves really don't apply: police who are working undercover, notably in sting operations, and police searching and seizing property. They go on to point out: Separate from the question of federal law, several states have adopted laws and regulations requiring law enforcement to identify themselves. For example, under New York City’s Right to Know Act, a broad set of police reforms that went into effect in October 2018, officers must tell civilians at the start of some interactions “their name, rank, command, and shield number.” (Also, many departments have policies that generally require officers to identify themselves, although with exceptions. You can see examples of the policies here.) Again, these local laws do not apply to Feds because of the Supremacy Clause. NOTE: As several of the news stories note, the lack of identification will make it very hard to hold Federal LEOs accountable for their actions. Accountability requires identity.	I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply.	Police have discretion in the enforcement of the law Which is to say, police get to decide which crimes they make arrests for, which they handle with warnings, which they report and which they ignore. This applies whether they are in uniform, undercover or off-duty. If they abuse this discretion then they are liable to disciplinary action. If they apply it corruptly or otherwise illegally then they are liable to criminal sanction.
Can the Supreme Court perpetually deny petitions for certiorari? What, if anything, prevents the Supreme Court from perpetually denying all petitions for certiorari?	No law prevents this -- the court may use its judgement on which petitions to accept. Under the current rules, any petition which four Justices choose to accept will be accepted and given a hearing. The traditions of the court indicate various reason for acceptance, but these are not legally binding. No Court to date has failed to accept a significant number of petitions for "cert".	The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact.	The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions.	Constitutional matters can be, and often are, decided by a single judge in a garden-variety trial court. It's just that the judge's decisions may be reviewed and possibly overturned by a higher court, one of which is the supreme court. Furthermore, district courts are bound by precedent. If a case turns on a new statute, however, the trial judge can indeed find that new statute unconstitutional without a higher court first having done so. If a panel of judges is evenly divided on whether to overturn a lower court's ruling, the lower court's ruling stands, but no precedent is set. The supreme court often has an even number of justices hearing a case, whether because of a vacancy or because a justice has recused him or herself.	There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.	Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual.	There has never been a right to appeal directly, or discretionarily form a state trial court to SCOTUS. But, one can apply for a common law writ in SCOTUS with respect to a state trial court actions under the All Writs Act which is functionally an appeal, even though it is technically an original SCOTUS proceeding. But, original SCOTUS writs are extremely rare and I don't know if it has ever been used in the manner you describe. If so, it probably happened before the intermediate federal courts of appeal were created in the late 1800s. It isn't easy to do a search of cases to determine the answer. UPDATE WITH CORRECTION: After further consideration, I think that I have a better idea of what the question was getting at and want to elaborate on that. Most state courts (Utah, Texas and Oklahoma are exceptions to the general rule[1]), have either an intermediate court of appeal and then a state supreme court (sometimes given a different name such as "Court of Appeals" in New York State, in which the Supreme Court is the name of the trial court of general jurisdiction and the intermediate appeals court), or only a state supreme court from which appeals lie directly to the state supreme court. [1] In Utah there is an appeal of right in every civil case to the state supreme court and the intermediate court of appeals considers cases that it "kicks down" to the court of appeals rather than dealing with itself. In Texas and Oklahoma, there is a Court of Criminal Appeals in addition to the State Supreme Court, which operates much like a Supreme Court in criminal cases with the state supreme court that is nominally superior only rarely intervening in criminal cases (I don't know when precisely it can intervene in those states). In every state with an intermediate appeals court, there is an appeal of right to an intermediate appeals court which must be considered on the merits, and then a discretionary appeal to the state supreme court. Sometimes in these states there are a handful of exceptions. For example, in Colorado, there is a direct appeal of right to the state supreme court in death penalty and water law cases, and in municipal court and limited jurisdiction court cases (i.e. cases in courts limited to $25,000 in controversy or less), there is an appeal of right to what would usually be the general jurisdiction trial court and then a discretionary appeal from there to the state supreme court). But, there is still almost always one court to which there is a direct appeal of right. There are a small but non-negligible number of cases where what is usually a general jurisdiction trial court serves as an intermediate court of appeals of right for a lower trial court (e.g. a small claims court or municipal court), with appeal from there only in the discretion of the state supreme court. Those cases can and very rarely (but sometimes) do go on to be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court when a state supreme court denies discretionary review (in addition to being rare, few such cases are significant enough to justify the effort on the part of the parties to do so and are considered significant by the U.S. Supreme Court too), just as they would when an intermediate court of appeals rules and a state supreme court denies certiorari at the state level. But, in that case, the direct appeal still isn't a direct appeal of a "court of first instance" (i.e. a court where the original trial on the merits is held). But, there is no constitutional right to a direct appeal of right (there is only a constitutional right to a collateral attack via habeas corpus in criminal cases resulting in incarceration). The right to a direct appeal in state courts is a product of state law and state constitutions (in the federal courts it is a consequence of federal statutes). In some states without an intermediate court of appeals, there is also an appeal of right to the state supreme court. But, in other states without an intermediate court of appeals, appeals to the state supreme court are discretionary (much like appeals to the state supreme court from an intermediate appellate court and appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court). Thus, if you are in a state in which there is only a discretionary appeal to the state supreme court, and the state supreme court declines to consider your appeal on the merits, you can appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court once the state supreme court has declined your state level petition for certiorari. The actual pre-requisite at the state level in a direct appeal is that your state direct appellate options be exhausted. So, if you are in a state without intermediate courts of appeal in which the state supreme court reviews trial court decisions on only a discretionary basis, then you can make a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court if you have sought review on direct appeal in the state supreme court and it declined to grant certiorari to review your case on the merits. In practice, this is still very rare. States without intermediate appellate courts are universally small in population and hence have small case loads. Most states with only a single supreme court still have at least one direct appeal of right and have had that right for most of their history. And, state supreme courts usually do exercise their certiorari power in cases that are worthy of discretionary consideration in the U.S. Supreme Court. But, in this narrow situation, the U.S. Supreme Court may consider a trial court decision on a direct appeal, without it ever having been considered on the merits at the state level. This happens rarely (although the U.S. Supreme Court not infrequently, i.e. perhaps a couple of times a year, considers a case upon which there has been an intermediate direct appeal and a state supreme court has refused discretionary review), but it has almost certainly happened sometime. It is hard to devise a legal research search that would locate such a case, however, and strictly speaking, the denial of certiorari can be seen as a state supreme court ruling that is required in almost every case.	So, as I understand the decision, it's a little more subtle than that. By default, states have sovereign immunity and can't be sued without their consent. Congress can remove ("abrogate") this immunity by law in some circumstances. They tried to do so for copyright infringement cases with the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. However, in the present case of Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that this part of the CRCA is unconstitutional. The idea is that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state immunity when it's necessary to ensure people's right to due process, but only in a "congruent and proportional" way. Now if a state unintentionally or negligently infringes someone's copyright, that does not violate the person's right to due process, but an intentional infringement might. At the time the CRCA was passed, when Congress went looking for instances where states infringed on copyrights, they found several cases of unintentional or negligent infringement, and just a couple where they may have infringed intentionally. SCOTUS argued that to respond to this by completely abrogating state immunity in all copyright cases was disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. But the Court suggests in the opinion that Congress could pass a different law to abrogate immunity in copyright cases, if it were narrower. For instance, a law that only stripped immunity in cases of intentional infringement would likely be constitutional, especially if there were evidence that intentional infringement was happening enough to be a significant problem. So I think the answer is that as of right now, a state could deliberately infringe someone's copyright (e.g. by pirating software) and be immune from suit. However, Congress has the power to "fix" this, and most likely will, especially if there seems to be egregious abuse. (By the way, the decision contains an impressive quantity of pirate jokes. I guess since it's not only about copyright infringement (aka "piracy"), but actually alleges infringement of a video about a sunken pirate ship, the justices just couldn't resist.) Your "eminent domain" idea is separate from this. Seizing copies of the software wouldn't give the state the right to use them, as the software itself would still be copyrighted. The state would have to seize the copyright, and I don't know whether that is possible - it's not necessarily property in that sense. But if they did so, then they wouldn't be infringing the copyright at all (since the state itself would now own the copyright) and this case would be irrelevant. On the other hand, when a state uses eminent domain to seize property, they must as you say pay fair market value for it, and that means the market value before they seized it. So the value of the copyright in such a case wouldn't be "nothing" - it would be more like the amount a competitor would have had to pay the software maker to buy all the rights to that product. Likewise, if the state seizes your lovely house and bulldozes it to build a toxic waste dump, they owe you what someone would have paid for the house, not the value of a dump that nobody wants.
Why can't lawyers lower their fees to match unmet demand, rather than leaving legal practice? Benjamin Barton JD magna magna cum laude, 1996, University of Michigan. Glass Half Full: The Decline and Rebirth of the Legal Profession (2015). p. 49 Middle. Please see the last two sentences pinpointed by the red arrow. Why can't fees be lowered "enough on individualized, bespoke services to meet the unmet need at an aﬀordable price"? Why would lawyers "leave the practice altogether", "[b]efore these lawyers lower their prices further they will"?	I'll answer out of order for a more logical presentation. Why would lawyers "leave the practice altogether", "[b]efore these lawyers lower their prices further they will"? Only about 30% of people earn a four year college degree. A lawyer is a college graduate who had to be in roughly the top 50% of his or her undergraduate class to be admitted to law school, so that puts him or her in the top 15% of academic ability. To actually finish law school and pass the bar exam, a lawyer has to be in roughly the top 12% of academic ability compared to the general public. Lawyers have strong reading and writing skills, reasonable communication skills, understand complex business and family matters, and are reasonably well organized compared to members of the general population. They also come with background checks completed in advance to weed out risks of criminal or otherwise dishonest or high risk employees. These are highly transferrable skill sets and a J.D. is a good substitute for an M.B.A. in many positions. Newly minted lawyers who choose to work in business management or a kindred field can typically secure middle management jobs in business and finance without much difficulty assuming that they weren't disbarred or had their licenses suspended for dishonorable reasons, or in a field related to their undergraduate major in college. So, if a lawyer can't earn a minimum compensation as a lawyer that rivals what the lawyer could earn in middle management, the lawyer will leave law and work in a non-legal post. Many lawyers do just that. And, indeed, since grant based financial aid is very rare for law school, most newly minted lawyers who aren't independently wealthy have huge student loan debts ($200,000 at the completion of an undergraduate degree and law school wouldn't be unusual), so if they want to avoid a default or an extremely long repayment period for a debt that can't be discharged in bankruptcy, they aren't free to accept a very low income even if they are willing to live modestly. The floor of what a lawyer can make in terms of compensation before having to seek better paying non-legal work is on the order of $40,000 to $60,000 of net compensation before taxes per year depending upon the local cost of living. In the long run, average legal incomes need to be even higher, because if too many people end up earning only marginal compensation, more potential lawyers will choose other career paths (e.g. as loan officers at banks, in insurance sales, in real estate brokerage work, as small business owners, as middle managers in big businesses, as H.R. officers, as financial analysts, as management consultants, etc.) which provide greater or similar returns with less student loan debt, fewer years of education, and less risk. Why can't fees be lowered "enough on individualized, bespoke services to meet the unmet need at an aﬀordable price"? Lawyers have bills to pay - a fully furnished and equipped office, at least a part-time per lawyer staff person, suits and dry cleaning, bar dues, and compensation for themselves (the floor on which was discussed above). But, providing "individualized, bespoke services", rather than mass producing services with a paralegal heavy practice (the way most debtor oriented consumer bankruptcy shops run, and the way prosecutor's offices and public defender's offices run), then it takes a lot of hours to provide those services. (The average prosecutors office has expenses of about $50 per felony case or less, not including law enforcement efforts to gather evidence and put the facts together coherently, and public defenders have even lower expenses per average felony case, perhaps $35 or less.) Even the most basic legal services (e.g. writing a simple will, defending a simple residential eviction or collection case or a DUI) takes 4-8 hours of lawyer time to accomplish, and you can't spend 100% of your time providing legal services either, as you have to devote some time to marketing, evaluating potential clients, supervising bookkeeping and administrative tasks, continuing education, etc. So, at most, a lawyer can handle at most about 200 very simple cases a year, or fewer cases that have any sophistication, and sometimes people don't pay their bills or don't pay on time. A 10%-25% bad debt rate would be pretty typical in small firm practice. Realistically, each lawyer needs about $90,000+ of gross collected revenues to cover expenses and make a floor compensation amount. So, a lawyer has to collect at least $500 to make a very modest living and just barely get by on a typical very small case provided at an extreme discount. A lawyer needs more like double that amount of gross revenues per very small case to make a decent living, and that all assumes that marketing efforts can reach enough people to keep the lawyer busy. If a lawyer's marketing or AR collection rates fall, fee collections per case have to rise. The trouble is that lots of people can't afford to pay a lawyer $500 to $1,000. This isn't affordable to them. Keep in mind that 40% of Americans don't have the ability to pay an unexpected $400 expense, and that the percentage is much higher in a place like Alabama or West Virginia. A $500-$1000 legal fee expense for even a very simple matter is something that most people with "unmet legal needs" simply cannot afford to pay no matter how badly they need those services. These are the people with "unmet legal needs", and the cases they face are often cases like defenses of criminal charges likely to result in some sort of conviction, or no asset bankruptcies, or defenses of foreclosure or eviction or collection cases, non-employment related immigration cases, or child custody cases, or defense child support collection actions, in which case there is no significant pot of money from which fees can be paid, even if a lawyer's client wins. (In cases where there is a significant potential "pot of money" like money owed for work done or a personal injury case, legal needs usually are met.) Also, while lots of Americans can't afford even a $400 legal bill, there is a pretty significant group of businesses and upper middle class and wealthy individuals who can afford to pay tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars per legal matter, and for whom a lawyer can provide value added to the client even at that price. For example, businesses and landlords that need commercial leases to be negotiated, documentation of and negotiation of multi-million dollar business financing deals, tax planning for a complex conglomerate, personal injury litigation in cases with clear liability and serious injuries, business disputes, representation of clients in connection with the bankruptcies of medium and large businesses, employment litigation, white collar crime defense, etc. This kind of work requires a lawyer's marketing effort to be much more modest and dramatically reduces the time spent evaluating new cases. A lawyer may need only five or ten cases like that per year instead of 200 small potatoes cases, while earning much better compensation. So, the legal needs of those who can afford to pay are met, and the legal needs of people who can't afford to pay lawyers at any fee that a lawyer can break even at (realistically closer to $125-$175 per billable hour after bad debt and time generating work and idle time until new clients are secured is considered), and who don't have economic circumstances from which legal fees can be extracted in their cases, go unmet. Until such time as legal work can be provided with fewer attorney hours, or by someone who has less well paying alternatives to practicing law, and with less expensive educations, it will remain this way indefinitely without some sort of subsidy or insurance coverage. Also, keep in mind that practicing law provides an irregular income in small firm practice due to irregular payment timing and ebbs and flows of new clients, so to keep to any reasonable set of fixed living and overhead costs paid, a lawyer must have months that generate much more than the lawyer's "monthly nut" in order to generate savings for lean months. Finally, a lot of the very low paid lawyers are retirees, part-time employees who are also homemakers, are people moonlighting as lawyers in addition to another job, or are charitably inclined independently wealthy people. So, they have additional sources of income and aren't supporting themselves from full time work as lawyers. These are the only people who can afford to work as lawyers for lower amounts of income per year. But, even then, independently wealthy people normally have the best access through social and family networks to people who have an ability to pay them to work on high dollar matters, so they normally end up in high paying jobs where their "rain making" capacity is part of why they are paid so well, rather than giving their services away on a charitable basis. Observation An important corollary of this analysis is that the problem of unmet legal need cannot be solved simply by producing more lawyers, because if you produce more lawyers and all legal need capable of paying for the work is met, the new lawyers will simply pursue non-legal careers.	Your lawyer must act in your best interests; not follow your directions Lawyers are professionals and they are supposed to use professional judgement in how they run a case. While a client can suggest a course of action, the lawyer is not only not obliged to follow it, they would be committing malpractice if they unquestioningly did so. Just like a doctor would be if they unthinkingly implemented a patient suggested treatment plan. A panel of lawyers I was watching commentate on the hearing said it was a critical error and may have blown the case. So, a group of Monday-morning quarterbacks who weren’t chosen and don’t know all the facts would have done it differently? Perhaps it was a mistake. Or, perhaps the lawyer judged that there was nothing he could say that would help and considered that sounding desperate about the video would elevate its import in the minds of the jury.	There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.	The purpose is to avoid the possibility that the solicitor will inadvertently end up providing advice to more than one side of the same dispute or transaction, putting the solicitor in a conflict of interest situation. In the simplest case, the solicitor might already represent the landlord that the tenant is seeking to discuss legal rights vis-a-vis. Even if the advice is merely hypothetical, this is not O.K. A solicitor has a very high duty of loyalty to the solicitor's clients. Providing aid of any kind to someone adverse to the solicitor's clients that benefits that person, even if another solicitor would probably say the same thing, is a serious breach of that duty and is forbidden and sanctionable. It could get the solicitor kicked out of the profession in a worst case scenario. The duty of loyalty includes a duty to take reasonable care not to inadvertently or negligently act disloyally. There is also a risk of a more subtle sort of conflict that has to be evaluated since many disputes and transactions are not just two sided. For example, perhaps a solicitor a big commercial tenant client on the brink of a settlement with a particular landlord after lengthy and extensive negotiations (perhaps in a business lease renewal deal), and another prospective tenant client might, for example, have an interest in leasing the same property as your existing client at a higher rate. Representing both tenants/prospective tenants could creating a conflict between your two tenant clients. Screening clients based upon their landlord relationships helps solicitors to identify these conflicts and to prevent them from arising. More generally, the best practice is for a solicitor to make sufficient inquiry prior to providing any legal advice to a prospective new client, to avoid having clients that have a conflict of interest with each other. This regulation (to the extent that it is really as specific as suggested) is simply a codification of this general rule in a specific, commonly recurring situation. In large law firms, every single legal professional in the firm typically spends the first half hour or so of every day reviewing lists of new prospective clients and parties related to them in order to screen for potential conflicts of interest. (I used to have to do that when I worked in a large, international law firm for a while.) There would typically be one or more paralegals or administrators in the firm who do nothing but manage that conflicts of interest screening process. Obviously, however, this requirement is a lot less burdensome if you are solo practicing solicitor who almost entirely represents individual human being and family tenants with isolated residential leases, and works in a large city where few clients have any connections to each other.	It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.	Passing the bar exam allows one to get a license to practice law. It is to some extent like a certification exam. It is in all US states a crime to practice law without a license. Exactly how "practice law" is defined varies a bit, but holding yourself out as a lawyer, opening a law office, or taking money for representing people in court is petty much always included. Other related things are often included also. Even if one has passed law school and thus earned a law degree, it is a crime to practice law without a license, and one cannot obtain a license without passing the bar exam. In some states it is possible, but hard, to pass the bar without a law degree, in some a degree is required. so the main thing a law student cannot (legally) do that one who has passed the bar exam can is practice law. Legal Sources I found this definition of the practice of law on an official Maryland web page: The “practice of law” is defined in the Maryland Code as follows: (1) “Practice law” means to engage in any of the following activities: (1) (i) giving legal advice; (1) (ii) representing another person before a unit of the state > (1) > > > (1) (iii) performing any other service that the Court of Appeals defines as practicing law. (2) “Practice law” includes: (2) (i) advising in the administration of probate of estates of decedents in an orphans court of the state; (2) (ii) preparing an instrument that affects title to real estate; (2) (iii) preparing or helping in the preparation of any form or document that is filed in a court or affects a case that is or may be filed in a court; or (2) (iv) giving advice about a case that is or may be filed in a court Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-101(h). The Court of Appeals has interpreted the practice of law to include “utilizing legal education, training, and experience [to apply] the special analysis of the profession to a client’s problem.” Kennedy v. Bar Ass’n of Montgomery County, Inc., 316 Md. 646, 662 (1989). In addition, meeting with potential clients may constitute the practice of law. Id. at 666. The practice of law is “ ‘a term of art connoting much more than merely working with legally related matters.’” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 649 (1999) (citations omitted). “ ‘Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer.” Id. Therefore, the Court of Appeals ruled that a bar applicant who had served as a hearing examiner for the Maryland Department of Employment & Training was not engaged in the practice of law, and therefore not eligible to take the attorney’s examination. In re Application of Mark W., 303 Md. 1, 4-6 (1985). “The hallmark of the practicing lawyer is responsibility to clients regarding their affairs, whether as advisor, advocate, negotiator, as intermediary between clients, or as evaluator by examining a client’s legal affairs.” In re Application of R.G.S., 312 Md. 626, 632 (1988). Also relevant is RULE 19-305.5. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; Law Students Under Supervision Some comment mentioned assistance in pro bono work by law students. I found Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 19-220 - Legal Assistance by Law Students which provides in pertinant part, omitting the definitions of terms: (b) Eligibility. A law student enrolled in a clinical program or externship is eligible to engage in the practice of law as provided in this Rule if the student: (b) (1) is enrolled in a law school; (b) (2) has read and is familiar with the Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct and the relevant Maryland Rules of Procedure; and (b) (3) has been certified in accordance with section (c) of this Rule. (c) ... The certification shall state that the student is in good academic standing and has successfully completed legal studies in the law school amounting to the equivalent of at least one-third of the total credit hours required to complete the law school program. ... (d) Practice. In connection with a clinical program or externship, a law student for whom a certification is in effect may appear in any trial court or the Court of Special Appeals, or before any administrative agency, and may otherwise engage in the practice of law in Maryland, provided that the supervising attorney (1) is satisfied that the student is competent to perform the duties assigned, (2) assumes responsibility for the quality of the student's work, (3) directs and assists the student to the extent necessary, in the supervising attorney's professional judgment, to ensure that the student's participation is effective on behalf of the client the student represents, and (4) accompanies the student when the student appears in court or before an administrative agency. The law student shall neither ask for nor receive personal compensation of any kind for service rendered under this Rule, but may receive academic credit pursuant to the clinical program or externship. This page about the Univeristy of Maryland School of Law's public Servie program describes the program as: "one of the region’s largest public interest law firms" and states: Working alongside faculty, students provide 75,000 hours of free legal service annually to Maryland citizens in need[.] This is obviously a widely recognized and approved activity.	A Lawyer may hire paralegals, clerks, secretaries, and other assistants. The lawyer may hire as many as s/he pleases, and assign them whatever tasks s/he chooses. However, some kinds of documents may need to be signed by the lawyer (which ones will depend on the jurisdiction, in the US on the state). During the so-called "robo-signing scandal" it was held that, in some US states at least, a lawyer who signs certain kinds of documents without reviewing them has failed to perform the duties imposed on the lawyer by the law, and the documents may be invalid. Large numbers of mortgage foreclosure cases were dismissed when it became known that the lawyer signing relevant documents had not in fact reviewed them (or in some cases had not even signed them, but had permitted a non-lawyer to sign the lawyer's name). In addition, some functions in some jurisdictions must be performed by an actual lawyer. For example, paralegals and other non-lawyers cannot validly give legal advice. Only a lawyer can represent a client in court. And so on. I question whether one lawyer could in most kinds of practice keep up with the work of "hundreds" of non-lawyers, but that would depend on the kind of work done by the firm. In the US, some law firms are essentially collection agencies. There a single lawyer with many many assistants suffices, I understand, and that structure is not uncommon in the US.
Why aren't Lord and Lady abbreviated? I'm referring to the titles for UKHL Law Lords and UKSC Justices. Why aren't they abbreviated for brevity, when Justice is to J and Lord/Lady Justice to LJ? Eg: In Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17, Neuberger L dissented, but Hale L delivered a majority judgment. In Belhaj v Straw [2017] UKSC 3, Neuberger and Hale LL both concurred in Mance L's majority judgment.	The judicial rank of English judges is abbreviated to letters after their names, but not their personal titles. High Court judges always receive a knighthood or damehood on appointment, so, to take Tim's example, John Donaldson became Sir John Donaldson on his appointment to the High Court, but in court he was Mr Justice Donaldson, abbreviated in reports or written argument to Donaldson J, and on promotion to the Court of Appeal he was Lord Justice Donaldson or Donaldson LJ. (In person in court he would have been addressed as "My Lord", and in other settings as "Sir John".) Beyond that it becomes more complicated. For the time he was Master of the Rolls, the reports refer to him as "Sir John Donaldson, MR". The UK Supreme Court replace the House of Lords and the highest court for the UK (leaving aside the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) in 2009. The judges in the House of Lords were full members of the House, so they were peers, in fact, since 1887 as a special type of life baron (not hereditary) known as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. So they were always referred to by their titles, as in the case of Lord Donaldson (barons always being referred to as "Lord" unless it is necessary to make the rank explicit); however, letters after the the were used for the Lord Chancellor, as in Lord Hailsham, LC. (There was at one time a convention that the Lord Chancellor would get a promotion to viscount, the next higher rank in the peerage, as in the case of Viscount Cave, LC.) When the Supreme Court came into being in 2009, the existing Lords of Appeal in Ordinary became the first judges of the Supreme Court. Since they were already Lords, they were, of course, referred to by their titles. Subsequent appointments are given the courtesy title of Lord or Lady, though they are not made barons/baronesses, so they cannot sit in the House of Lords. (While the courtesy titles are comparable to the Scottish judges' titles, the immediate need was for parity between new appointments and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary: Courtesy titles for Justices of the Supreme Court.) The head of the Supreme Court is the President. This is abbreviated by letters after the name in the reports, so the current president (Baroness Hale of Richmond, having become a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in 2004) is referred to as Lady Hale, P.	Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.	In both common law countries and in civil law countries, words are given their plain meaning for legal purposes, unless there is an express definition to the contrary is provided. And, in Europe, the plain meaning is unambiguous and is what the plain language that you quote says. (The meaning would be ambiguous in the Korean language, or regarding a horse, in contrast.) While there are times when there are age groupings that aren't the plain meaning (e.g. eligibility for youth sports league divisions, school enrollment), it isn't usually stated so plainly. For example, a sports team might have a U10 division which has a defined meaning, but is unlikely to say "for children under age 10" when it really means "for children under age 10 as of the first day of the season".	Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.	england-and-wales - present day... Would the contents of the envelope be considered privileged? No Although it is possible to argue that the letter is a communication to the lawyer (albeit by mistake) its purpose is not in relation to seeking or receiving legal advice, so it fails to meet the definition of legal privilege: There are two forms of legal professional privilege: Legal advice privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and their clients for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice. Litigation privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers, clients and third parties made for the purposes of litigation, either actual or contemplated. Would the lawyer be required to divulge it if asked by the police or in a court? Yes, No, Maybe If the lawyer is a suspect/defendant then there is no requirement to answer any questions whatsoever. Similarly, there is no obligation on a witness to answer questions unless a statutory provision has been triggered, such as the lawyer being given a Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 Disclosure Notice. Would he be required to report the matter to the police on his own? Yes Although there is no general requirement to report a crime (of this nature) to the police, the lawyer's profession is in the "regulated sector" which requires Suspicious Activity Reports to be submitted to the authorities: ... in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering... What difference, if any does it make that the client apparently did not intend to send these contents to the lawyer? None that I can see ETA The status of legal privilege in 1925 seems to have been the same as now, and this Wikipedia article, under the heading History offers this in support: The common law principle of legal professional privilege is of extremely long standing. The earliest recorded instance of the principle in English case-law dates from 1577 in the case of Berd v Lovelace ([1576] EngR 10 (& Ors))	You can use academic sources when arguing in court if you like, but be aware of the following: Academic texts are not primary sources of law in Jamaica. What is in them may be persuasive but does not bind a court in the same way as statute law or case law. Sometimes, it's appropriate to cite works of legal scholarship to flesh out an argument. If the book contains a succinctly-phrased statement that matches what you want to prove, but prior case law isn't quite as neatly applicable, then you might cite both - subject to points below. Citing the book alone is weaker. At other times, when there is authority on both sides of a point, you might find academic argument tipping the balance, but again not to be used in isolation. Whether a text is persuasive may not be obvious, especially for older works. Sometimes, perhaps often, the law has changed since the book was published. Don't assume that an old book by a famous author will automatically be revered. You can check to see if newer books say something different from the older one, and in general start your search looking backwards from now in order to identify the current state of the law. It is more common these days to see references to current editions of textbooks than comparatively ancient authorities, no matter how illustrious the name of Blackstone might be. If a point of law is not actually contested, then there is no need to argue about it. It can form part of the background material that is agreed on between the parties. Basic principles of the way contracts work don't need elaboration or authority. Judges would prefer to have you limit the number and range of authorities you bring in, because they only have so much time in their day and they don't want to struggle through a lot of unnecessary background reading. In a skeleton argument, the strong preference is for only one principal authority to be mentioned in support of each point of law. You can mention a recent decisive case rather than reciting the entire history of case-law on the topic, and you don't need to include cases where a well-understood precedent was applied without difficulty. It may be that a textbook brings you to the relevant statute or judgement but then that is what you need to cite, not the textbook itself, especially if it simply quotes or restates what is found in the primary material. For filing court documents in general, pay close attention to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions, including PD No. 8 of 2020 on the format of the judge's bundle. If the judge is annoyed enough about non-compliance with the court's rules about submissions, then various sanctions are available to them. For example, they can refuse costs on the legal research that led to the preparation of the submission. In correspondence, which I think you allude to, you can be more free than when dealing with the judge's bundle. In a letter to the opposing party you can certainly bring in additional references that you think would be helpful to you as a matter of rhetoric and argumentation. Do note that doesn't mean it is a good idea to make correspondence too aggressive or lengthy. For one thing, a judge can end up reviewing the correspondence and will notice whether or not you are making a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, or at least identify the salient issues to bring to the court.	Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.	It means that the scholar (presumably you) and the guarantor/surety should each write their initials in that space, i.e. the first letters of their first and last names. John Smith would write "JS". This is a common way of acknowledging that you have read and understood the text on the page.
Why does the United States Supreme Court oppose cameras, when Australia's, Canada's, and UK's have permitted them? SCOTUS Justices' arguments against televising (like Alito J at 21:03 and Kagan J at 26:17 who interestingly voted TO televise when he was on the 3rd Circuit), also pertain to the HCA, SCC, and UKSC. They include misinterpretation by the public and media, behavioral changes from being filmed). Yet these other courts have televised. So why not SCOTUS? I can spot no distinction between televising SCOTUS and the HCA, SCC, UKSC. "The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has permitted television coverage of all its hearings since the mid-1990s". Check out this joint interview with McLachlin CJC and Ginsburg J where McLachlin CJC upholds their decision to televise. The HCA started televising on 2 Oct 2013. The UKSC started televising on May 5 2015: The new service will be funded by the Supreme Court until March 2016, at which point it will be reviewed in light of user feedback and the Court's other spending priorities. The UKSC has obviously continued it, but why don't the SCOTUS Justices adopt this idea of a trial period?	It's complicated. Rule 53 states Except as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom. This is applicable not just to the Supreme Court, but to all federal courts. Rule 53 applies to criminal cases, not civil suits. Over time, Rule 53 has been expanded. It has changed from merely "photographs" to include television and related cameras. Furthermore, The Judicial Conference of the United States prohibits the televising, recording, and broadcasting of district trial (civil and criminal) court proceedings. Under conference policy, each court of appeals may permit television and other electronic media coverage of its proceedings. Only two of the 13 courts of appeals, the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, have chosen to do so. So courts have the ability to choose whether or not they want to have their proceedings broadcaster/televised. It is technically allowed in the Supreme Court by all other legislation . . . but the decision ultimately rests in the hands of the justices. In the 109th Congress, five bills appeared that would change existing rules, at some level: H.R. 1751 H.R. 2422 H.R. 4380 S. 829 S. 1768 H.R. 4380 and S. 1768 would apply to the Supreme Court; the others would apply to federal district and appellate courts. Both bills would make television coverage is mandatory, unless the justices collectively vote against it. So, once more, the power rests in the hands of the Court. H.R. 4380 is brief, and would be merely an addendum to Chapter 45 of title 28, United States Code. S. 1768 is also brief, and would amend the same statute. Title 28, in all its glory, can be found here (Chapter 45). The proposed additions are noticeably absent, as § 678 is not there. So, addressing some quotes from your question, Are there any reasons against cameras restricted to the Supreme Court, but that don't apply to courts that already allow cameras (such as the UK Supreme Court)? There are no special laws, no. To wit, does the allowance of cameras in other highest courts refute arguments against cameras in the Supreme Court of the United States? Nope. It's purely the decision of the Court. The rationale of the justices themselves against cameras is outside the scope of the law.	For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.	"Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional).	The UK Supreme Court (as you tagged in the question) uses an odd number for this exact reason. A recent case, Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 58, further explains: it is a very common feature of appeals in the UK generally that the appellate court consists of a larger panel than the court appealed from. It not infrequently happens that a party to an appeal to the Supreme Court wishes the court to depart from an earlier decision of the Supreme Court or of the House of Lords. In such a case the practice is for the appeal to be heard by an enlarged panel of seven or more justices, precisely to clothe it with that greater authority The statute establishing this Court provides: The Supreme Court is duly constituted in any proceedings only if all of the following conditions are met— (a) the Court consists of an uneven number of judges; (b) the Court consists of at least three judges; (c) more than half of those judges are permanent judges. (with the possibility of some deviation in special circumstances). This practice was previously followed in the House of Lords, before being made statutory when the Supreme Court was formed. The UK court does not sit en banc, partly because there are twelve permanent judges and that is an even number, and partly because the legal tradition hasn't held it to be worthwhile. An exceptional case was R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, heard by eleven judges - a record! - which happened to be the entire Supreme Court at the time, since there was one vacancy. A panel of nine was used in Attorney General's Reference (No. 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68, for the first time since R v Ball [1911] AC 47. Smaller numbers are more typical, such as five. For the Supreme Court of the United States, there are nine judges but they do not use panels. It is fairly common for some judges to recuse themselves because they had been involved with proceedings at a lower stage, or if there is a vacancy, and so there are cases where there are an even number of judges actually involved. The US court also has a practice of fairly complex patterns of concurring and dissenting opinions, with justices potentially joining more than one opinion, so it can be subtle to identify where the majority position really lies. It is therefore possible for there to be a tie. If there is a tie on appeal, then the lower court's decision stands, without precedential effect. For matters within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, there is no consensus on what is meant to happen - see What happens if the US Supreme Court ties 4-4? for more.	I've never heard of a rule specifically addressing this in the united-states, but I expect most courts would disallow it. I suspect a court would believe that the note-taking would be a distraction to the witness, whose focus should be on listening to the questions and providing truthful answers. The note-taking may be perceived as a distraction from the testimony for others in the courtroom, as well. If I were examining the witness, I would probably be entitled to see what the notes say, dragging out the witness's examination. Then the witness would want to take notes about my questions about her notes, and I'd want to see those notes, and you can see how it can get out of control.	This case did not find that Two Live Crew's version was fair use. Rather it held that it could be fair use, contrary to the lower court ruling that its commercial nature precluded a fair use defense based on parody. The court remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding. The two parties settled without getting a final decision on fair use. It was never really contested that this work was parody. The issue was whether the commercial nature rendered it unfair. The Supreme Court told the lower courts to assess the taking under the full four-factor fair use analysis and that commercial use doesn't automatically make a parody unfair. One source of confusion is that you seem to be conflating parody and fair use. Parody is just one purpose (along with criticism, education, and others) that has been generally held to swing the balance in favour of fair use. Last, the "five word plagiarism rule" is not a legal standard.	This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.	There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.
Would a judge release a potential Juror who's only complaint was that he didn't want to be a juror? From what I have heard of the selection process for jury duty it seems as if anyone who makes an argument for why they can't or shouldn't be a juror is excused by the judge, no matter how flimsy the argument. I assume the reason judges are so lenient with exceptions is because they don't want to risk a juror being resentful of their position, as it could bias them against one side or keep them from putting in a proper good faith effort to fulfill their responsibility as a juror. I'm wondering how far a judge would take that mindset. Are they willing to let a juror go just to avoid resentment if the juror otherwise has no excuse to not be a juror? So hypothetically Lets say that I am called for Jury duty tomorrow and I don't want to be a juror. There are plenty of ways I'm sure I could get myself dismissed; From the obviously like constantly shouting "hang them all" to the more 'subtle' like giving a dissertation on why I think jury nullification is such a swell idea. However, lets say I am unwilling to do anything remotely unethical and admit I don't have any valid reason I should be dismissed as a juror. However, I tell the judge despite this fact I really don't want to be a juror because I think it would be boring and I prefer to sleep in on the mornings. What are the odds the judge would let me go anyways, just to avoid having an unwilling juror?	Nobody wants to be a juror. Well ... almost nobody. The pay is awful, the responsibilities are huge, the work is boring, and everybody else is telling where to go, when to go there and how long to stay. Plus you get the bonus of being in close quarters with 11 strangers with whom you (probably) have nothing in common. Judges know this. They don't let you off just because you don't want to be there. There are actually criteria that they apply (assuming it gets to the judge, most jurors who will be are excused before they get to the courthouse by administrative staff). For example, in NSW: In terms of the Jury Amendment Act 2010, you may have 'good cause' to be excused if: jury service would cause undue hardship or serious inconvenience to you or your family you have a disability that makes you unsuitable or incapable of effectively serving as a juror, without reasonable accommodation there is a conflict of interest or some other knowledge, acquaintance, or friendship that you have, which may result in your being perceived as lacking impartiality as a juror you have a permanent mental or physical impairment that makes you incapable of doing jury service, or that would injure your health if you were to do jury service. The sheriff may also consider excusing you in other circumstances, including if you: are a sole trader or contractor have care of school aged children and are unable to make other care arrangements are in an advanced stage of pregnancy and/or are having medical difficulties during your pregnancy have a medical condition which would make Jury service onerous are an emergency service operational employee are enrolled in education and need to attend lectures or exams, or you're living outside your jury district to undertake your studies have a mental or physical impairment are absent from New South Wales have transport difficulties, such as unsuitable or unavailable public transport are unable to read and understand English. If you don't meet the criteria, you won't be excused. Getting yourself "dismissed" There are plenty of ways I'm sure I could get myself dismissed; From the obviously like constantly shouting "hang them all" to the more 'subtle' like giving a dissertation on why I think jury nullification is such a swell idea. No. Those things will get you jailed for contempt of court until you agree to do your jury duty and not act like a dick. I tell the judge despite this fact I really don't want to be a juror because I think it would be boring and I prefer to sleep in on the mornings. So does the judge - if she has to be there, she's going to make damn sure you are too.	No. The government may not establish laws to keep members of a particular race out of the jury pool. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, (1879) (“The statute of West Virginia, which, in effect, singles out and denies to colored citizens the right and privilege of participating in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though qualified in all other respects, is, practically, a brand upon them, and a discrimination against them which is forbidden by the amendment.”). And once they are part of the pool, jurors may not be eliminated simply because of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986) (“The Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race”). But there is no requirement that the jury have any particular racial composition when it is finally seated. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) (“Purposeful discrimination is not sustained by a showing that on a single grand jury the number of members of one race is less than that race's proportion of the eligible individuals.”)	There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.	I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?	The phrase "reasonable doubt" was formed hundreds of years ago, and does not hold any mathematical or probabilistic meaning. It is for each individual juror to decide for themselves what constitutes "reasonable doubt", and whether the evidence presented to them has crossed that threshold. EDIT for extra clarity: As stated above, the definition of "reasonable doubt" is intentionally vague, and left to be decided by each juror for themselves on a case by case basis; as such there is no single rule that can be applied to jurors (also note barring accepting a bribe, a juror cannot be legally sanctioned for their conduct as a juror, nor their vote, regardless of the evidence before them). So one juror might judge by P(A\|B), another might judge by the defendant's appearance, another might judge by the majority of their peers (so that they can go to a ball game that evening, such as in the film 12 Angry Men), another might disagree with the law (see: jury nullification) and so vote not guilty on that basis, and another might bow to social pressure and convict despite overwhelming evidence that the defendant is not guilty (for example, at the end of To Kill A Mockingbird). A prosecutor cares about convincing the entire jury that the defendant is guilty(outside of Oregon and Louisiana, where only 10/12 vote is needed to convict, so the prosecutor only cares convincing 10 jurors). The defense only cares about convincing a single juror (or three in LA or OR), although more can be useful to prevent a mistrial. The defense (in theory) should not care whether or not the defendant is guilty. The origin of reasonable doubt was in Britain, where certain jurors would refuse to convict, despite any evidence, due to religious prohibitions of "Judge not, less ye be judged".	In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge.	The notion of a peer for purposes of the jury is someone who "walks in the same shoes" as the defendant or litigants. A freeman was to be juried by other freemen, a Peer of the Realm by other (capital P) Peers, a landsman by other landholders, and a marine by other sailors. The ancient origins of a judgment by jury were rooted in removing allegations by the defendant, alleging unfairness of the process, since the defendant himself was a party to the selection of those who would weigh his actions before the law and mete out punishments, the defendant could have confidence that he wasn't being railroaded. In the USA, we've done away with the codified, defined social definitions such as peerage and royalty and owned/indentured vs. free...so we are all, as far as the law defines, equal peers.	If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options: You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly. In this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining one case. If you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. Nobody knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk. All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.) Your state has a vexatious litigant list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate.
Is it considered breach of contract or advertising laws if a developer markets their game as releasing on digital store A, but then chooses store B? Recently, there's a lot of commotion in the PC gaming market over the Epic Game Store, a new digital-only PC games store and platform which is trying to break into the market. A lot of PC gamers are criticising Epic, the store owner, for being anti-consumer, because instead of providing some kind of benefit over competing platforms, Epic is simply using the large amounts of money they earn with their cash cow game (Fortnite) to bribe 3rd party developers to release their games as timed exclusives on the objectively inferior Epic platform, so they release first on the Epic store and then a year later on other platforms. Now, some of these games have been marketed as releasing on Steam, the biggest gaming platform right now, as well as other PC gaming platforms, either through marketing material or through statements made on crowdfunding platforms used to fund the development of the game. For example, a game called The Outer Worlds, was clearly marked as releasing on Steam in promotional material. and as another example, the game Phoenix Point explicitly stated in the launch FAQ for the crowdfunding campaign on Fig(https://www.fig.co/campaigns/phoenix-point/about) that the game would be releasing on Steam and GOG. To me as a non-lawyer, this seems fishy and maybe even breach of contract and/or advertising laws. Phoenix Point backers could have based their decision on whether to back the game based on the promised Steam release. Does a situation like this constitute breach of contract and/or a violation of advertising laws? Note that while this is tagged United States, I also welcome legal responses from other jurisdictions given the international nature of the Internet.	Does a situation like this constitute breach of contract and/or a violation of advertising laws? No. There is not enough information that would lead to a finding of either. It is unclear how customers would be allegedly affected (if at all) by the release of a product at a different store, let alone where the goods or services at issue are digital and require no physical presence at a venue or premise. Except for very specific factual circumstances, a change of sales venue would hardly be cognizable as deceptive or unfair practice. Also, prior to purchasing or reserving a game, there is no contract between the public and the developer/supplier. Potential customers typically are not entitled to a specific performance by the developer. Even if [Phoenix Point] supporters' decision were provably based on the prospect of release at Steam, your description nowhere reflects that there was a mutually conscious exchange (or promise of an exchange) of considerations involving the parties' support of a game and the counterparty's release of the game at a specific venue. Absent that meeting of the minds, either party's reliance or expectation on the other is irrelevant. Generally speaking, the sole cruciality of either party's motives does not create legal obligations.	The sale of in-game resources for real-world money is usually disallowed explicitly by a game's terms of service. One notable case was Blizzard's successful injunction against Peons4Hire, a World of Warcraft gold farming company. Setting aside terms-of-use considerations (which vary by game/platform), the sale of virtual goods for real money is broadly legal. Wikipedia has a short list of jurisdictions with notable decisions on virtual sales; see the page's references for the official news stories or government documents. Most of the rulings have been positive for virtual-goods vendors, though China has banned the sale of real items for virtual currency (the opposite of your proposed plan) and South Korea has banned the sale of virtual goods for real money outright. Such sales incur normal tax responsibilities, just as any other income does. I don't know if any jurisdictions have imposed special legislation that place income limits or special tax rates for income from the sale of virtual goods. In the case of Steam specifically, the sale of virtual goods is broadly disallowed in Section 2.G of the Steam Subscriber Agreement, but narrowly allowed in Section 3.D. All virtual Steam goods remain the property of Steam, and you have a license to use them, which includes sale in limited circumstances. The prohibition in Section 2.G reads: G. Restrictions on Use of Content and Services ...you are not entitled to: (i) sell, grant a security interest in or transfer reproductions of the Content and Services to other parties in any way, nor to rent, lease or license the Content and Services to others without the prior written consent of Valve, except to the extent expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use); ... And the narrow permission to perform trades in the Community Marketplace in Section 3.D (per the above "except to the extent expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement" exception of 2.G): D. Trading and Sales of Subscriptions Between Subscribers Steam may include one or more features or sites that allow Subscribers to trade, sell or purchase certain types of Subscriptions (for example, license rights to virtual items) with, to or from other Subscribers (“Subscription Marketplaces”). An example of a Subscription Marketplace is the Steam Community Market. You can use the Steam Community Market to trade items for real money; this kind of real-money sale is explicitly allowed and facilitated by Steam. Separately, you can also trade giftable games (N.B.: game trading does not support real money) using Steam's trading system. Applying terms to a game-trade (like requiring payment external to Stream's trading system) appears to be disallowed by the broad prohibition in 2.G, but it's not very clear. The mechanical transfer of the game from one account to another is allowed, but the fact that it is actually a sale in a way that is not explicitly allowed seems to make it against the terms of service. I have no idea to what degree this is enforceable nor to what degree Steam polices against trades that involve Stream-external money transfers (though a cursory search of conversations in the Steam forums suggests they might not care very much).	In the case of McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, we can tell because that case has been legally decided. As the court says, there was a contract and "the patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules", and plaintiff "failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel". They did not "represent to her that a bonus would be available if she played the game", and did not "promise to pay the $41 million after the notice was displayed". The (very complex) rules of the game are easily available on the machine, and there is a prominent disclaimer that "MALFUNCTION VOIDS ALL PAYS AND PLAYS". Under the rules, the winning configuration stated that she was entitled to $1.85. The problem was that it also announced "Bonus Award - $41797550.16". This was due to an inexplicable software error which in communicating with the central computer awarded a "legacy bonus", which is no part of the game in question. The maximum legacy bonus is $99999.99; the manufacturer knows of the possibility of this kind of error and has implemented a fix that is thought to eliminate the problem. The first point then is that the casino didn't just claim there was a malfunction, they proved that there was one. Second, the terms of the contract hold: she was entitled to $1.85, and the extraneous message was not part of the contract. That is, she did not actually win the large payout, the malfunction was in saying that she received a bonus. If a patron could likewise prove that they had actually won but the machine malfunctioned to represent the situation as a loss, they would of course be entitled to the appropriate winnings. The problem simply resides in the difficulty of a patron proving that.	The European laws have specific sections regarding digital goods. The following two passages are relevant to you: From Returning unwanted goods: Warning! Please note that you may not use goods that you have received before deciding to withdraw from the purchase. The right to withdraw exists to allow you to examine the product in the same way as you would in a shop, not to give you 14 days free use. Be aware also that more specific rules apply to digital content (e.g. downloading or streaming music or video). From Shopping online: Digital content Specific information requirements apply when you buy digital content online, e.g. when downloading or streaming music or video. Before you make the purchase, you must also be informed how the content operates with relevant hardware/software (interoperability) and about its functionality, including whether any geographical restrictions apply to the use of the content and if private copies are allowed. You also enjoy the right of withdrawal within 14 days from concluding the contract for online digital content. However, once you start downloading or streaming the content you may no longer withdraw from the purchase, provided that the trader has complied with his obligations. Specifically, the trader must first obtain your explicit agreement to the immediate download or streaming, and you must explicitly acknowledge that you lose your right to withdraw once the performance has started. So yes, the law specifically allows you to waive that right when purchasing digital goods. So long as Steam has correctly advertised the product's system requirements and other key details, you lose your right to withdraw from the purchase the moment you start downloading it to your system.	This is similar to giving a hammer and needing to state to one is not responsible if the taker uses it to hit their head with. I believe this is the wrong analogy to use here. It would be more like giving somebody a hammer and saying you are not responsible if the head flies off and injures you. There is a concept in "things" you obtain called "fitness for purpose", so if you download open-source software like a registry cleaner, and it deletes your entire registry, the "WTFPL" doesn't absolve the authors of liability. Explicitly denying any kind of "fitness for purpose" or warranty helps shield the author from legal claims (even if they are meritless) because it kills it out of the gate. It's possible that the WTFPL license granter/author could still be sued and have to defend themselves in court because it isn't explicitly stated that there is no warranty or fitness for purpose. Open source does not mean that it's "use at your own risk", which is why there are so many types of licenses and disclaimers. From comments: Thank you for this very clear answer. Does the fact that someone willingly retrieves free code with no control of the provider changes anything? (vs a software vendor which provides code suitable for A and B, in exchange for money) I think closer to your hammer analogy where I would sue the producer of hammer XXX, a hammer I found on the street or which was given to me without involvement of vendor XXX. No, this doesn't change anything. The software vendor here is the person who writes the code, even if they don't charge for it. They are the ones who license the software and they are the ones who take some level of responsibility for it. In this case, the software author is the "hammer producer" that you would sue... If you buy "Registry Cleaner XL" from Best Buy and it bricks your computer, you don't sue Best Buy, you sue the person who authored the software. In pretty much every case, the author is the responsible party, not the vendor, and it is the author who licenses it, not the vendor (the vendor just acts as an intermediary).	With respect to the two-year guarantee for faulty products, The Consumer Sales Directive does not apply to non-tangible products like softwares delivered by internet. (b) consumer goods: shall mean any tangible movable item, with the exception of: Relevant rules on faulty digital services are contained in the Digital Content Directive, which provides In the case of a lack of conformity, the consumer shall be entitled to have the digital content or digital service brought into conformity, to receive a proportionate reduction in the price, or to terminate the contract, under the conditions set out in this Article. The consumer shall be entitled to have the digital content or digital service brought into conformity, unless this would be impossible or would impose costs on the trader that would be disproportionate, taking into account all the circumstances of the case including: (a) the value the digital content or digital service would have if there were no lack of conformity; and (b) the significance of the lack of conformity. However, this is essentially irrelevant for free apps where no reduction of price is possible and it is likely an obligation to fix the app is disproportional given the price is zero. Notably, the directive also puts most responsibilities regarding the "digital environment" (e.g. computers and network costs) on the consumer, as the environment is not particularly tied to the digital service. In your comment, you refer to a 14-day rule. You might be confusing the guarantee laws with the cooling-off period provided by the Consumer Rights Directive. In that case, you have a right of withdrawal but are only entitled to the costs you paid to the trader, and not any other third party, which is zero in the case of free apps. In an analogy to physical goods ordered online, you don't get a refund for your bus ticket if you need to go to the post office to collect it. By the way, Google terms cannot override public law and in fact if you look into Google refund policy you'll see that EU laws are specifically mentioned.	would it be interpreted in favor of the person who did not draft the terms? Yes, provided that the interpretation is reasonable. That is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here, the term "deliverables and associated documents" might entail a contradiction if that term [allegedly or literally] encompasses "source code or content". That depends on what definition(s) of "deliverables and associated documents" can be adduced from the contract. The term could refer to items that are not "source code or content", such as the binary files (i.e., executables and DLLs), instructions & documentation on how to operate and troubleshoot the application, and so forth. In that case, there would be no contradiction because there is no overlap between these items and the source code. if term A) is written on line 10 and term B) is written on line 11, is it resonable to assume term B) takes precedence or modifies term A? No. The sequence of clauses/terms itself does not determine which one outweighs or qualifies the other. Instead, the language used in the contract is indicative of the parties' intent and therefore how the terms of that contract relate to each other.	Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.
What is the legality of "reverse grafitti"? I recently discovered several videos on YouTube talking about a new form of public art called Reverse Grafitti, the idea being that instead of adding paint to a wall, you form an image by selectively cleaning it. This creates a temporary form that will fade naturally within a short (few months) timeframe. Here is a video demonstrating the idea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ut96pkYUOiM Now I know that in most places, grafitti is illegal. However, here are my questions: Is "Reverse Grafitti" considered Grafitti? and Have any similar ideas been brought before a court? What was the result?	I don't know of any legal reason to care whether people consider reverse graffiti to be graffiti, since graffiti is not itself a legal concept. The act when done without permission is, however, trespassing, which is against the law. Painting a building is legal, if done with permission; painting a building in a pattern is legal, if done with permission. Strangely enough, cleaning a building without permission, whether entirely of selectively in a pattern, is illegal. There are in fact specific laws about defacing property, so the illegality of the act does not rely solely on trespass laws. The NYC law is here, the California law is here, and there are many similar laws. In Washington, illegality arises from a more general prohibition against causing physical damage, which is defined here, and boils down to "costs money to fix". These laws are not limited to "applying opaque material to a surface".	Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html	Monopoly is a trademark of Parker Brothers. You would need to get permission to use that trademark. The artwork of the game is copyrighted and cannot be duplicated without violating that copyright. In general, the labels meaning phrases like "Go to Jail" and "New York Avenue" are probably copyrighted and some court decisions have decided that labels are a copyrightable element. However, there is some gray area. The game mechanics are not copyrightable and can be duplicated. What this means is that if you clone the game and use new labels (like new property names and card titles) then you are probably fine. You would have to make a novel board design. If you clone the game, but use the game's labels, then you could potentially lose in court. Of course, remember that corporations will sometimes sue just to intimidate people, even if they have a losing case. Just because your clone is non-infringing doesn't mean they won't sue you. It costs them money to sue people, so if your clone is obscure or not used by many people it could fly under the radar and be ignored by the company. If your clone was a success and became widely used, that would significantly increase the chance you could get sued. In most cases a company will threaten infringers before they sue them, because it is a lot cheaper to threaten somebody than sue them. Therefore, you could make your clone and just plan on discontinuing it if they threaten you. Of course, there is a small risk they would sue you anyway. If you made no money then you are probably safe because it would be a lot harder for them to argue that you commercially damaged them if you made no money.	You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.	Copyright The photographer, not the subject(s) own the copyright in the picture. So, unless this was a selfie, you have no rights in the picture. Privacy If the photo was taken in circumstances where a reasonable person would expect privacy, then revealing it to others might be a tort of privacy breach. In most common law jurisdictions this area of the law is undeveloped. However, if the photo was taken from a public place (even if you were in a private place), or with your permission, this doesn’t apply. Intimate images In some jurisdictions, the distribution of intimate images without the permission of the subject is a crime. Intimate does not include a photo that is merely embarrassing. Bullying This is probably bullying behaviour but bullying per se is generally not illegal. It might be illegal if the bullying is motivated by a protected characteristic (race, age, gender, sexuality etc.) but that usually requires a context - employment, public accommodation etc. it might also be illegal hate speech even outside such an institutional framework. Similarly, within an institutional context like a workplace or school there might be policies around bullying; these might have the force of law but are probably quasi-contractural matters. However, a private person doing it because they don’t like you and want to humiliate or embarrass you is probably not doing anything illegal.	Short Answer Based on the facts you supplied, it seems the author's request for removal might be unenforceable. Explanation Section 2.a.1. of the license declares the license is irrevocable. [Emphasis added]: Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. Irrevocable means: "Unable to cancel or recall; that which is unalterable or irreversible." Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. So don't rely on my answer for anything. Hire a real attorney if you need help with a legal matter. Never take legal advice from strangers on the internet. Treat all answers on this site the same way you would as if they came from a bunch of strangers at a party who got all their legal information by watching episodes of Boston Legal, The Practice and Ally McBeal. But have lots of opinions they are willing to share on legal questions nevertheless.	Each episode of the show as a whole, and all the individual images in it, are protected by copyright, but the idea of a holophonor, or indeed any idea, is not. The more closely anyone else's drawing of a gadget resembles one from the show, the more likely it would be to be found to infringe copyright. The same is true of a character image. The more distinctive and original the image, and the more closely someone copies it, the more likely a finding of infringement would be.	united-states The composition of a photograph, a painting, or an image of any sort is one of the elements that can be protected by copyright, and indeed one of those aspects that make an image original and thus a proper subject of a copyright under US law. A new image that imitates the original and distinctive composition of another might be held to be a derivative work, and thus an infringement of copyright if done without permission. Note that the composition must be original. A photo of, say, two people standing side-by-side has been done many times, and would probably not have any distinctive element of composition. The images shown as part of the question look rather distinctive to me, but for all I know this is a cliche that has been done over and over. If this came to an actual lawsuit a defendant could present evidence showing the composition to have been previously used by others, and thus common coin, free for anyone to adopt. This would be similar to the Scènes à faire concept. Things that have been done over and over are not original and are thus not protectable by copyright. That would ultimately be a judgement for the court to make, dependent on the facts of a specific case. I suspect this answer is correct for the laws of many countries, but I can only confirm it for US copyright law.
Who can the EU fine? More broadly... what conditions must exist for a governmental body to enforce its laws on a foreign company? Concrete example: the European Union fined Google for what it found to be anticompetitive practices. What gives the EU power to enforce such a penalty on a US company? What if Google had no physical presence in Europe but did effectively serve and make money from Europe. I assume France could not successfully sue and enforce against John Doe Individual in the US for selling Nazi paraphernalia online on a site accessible by people in France. Where is the line?	The legal line is EU laws, with some considerations (at the time of enacting them) about what other countries and international organizations (like the WTO) reactions. The practical line is enforcement. As the country with the biggest stick (not only militarily but economically) the USA provides the best examples: the ongoing Huawei affair, with one tip executive arrested on the grounds of a Chinese company selling technology to NK. the Helms-Burton Act that punishes foreign companies trading with Cuba, and that asserts that USA courts can decide on issues of private property in Cuba. the Iran embargo. In the Google case, it is even simpler. If Google wants to do business in the EU, it must follow EU law like everyone else (same happens in the USA and elsewhere). The fact that parent company is registered in the USA is not relevant. And probably, the fine has been issued not to the parent company but to the subsidiary registered within the EU. In the John Doe CASE, France (not the EU) could try first to seize any of his assets in France and, if those are not enough, go to the USA courts and try to have them enforce its judgements. But if what John did was not illegal in the USA then the courts would probably refuse to do so. That does not mean that John is guaranteed to be immune to any consequences, as France could block international money transfers to John's accounts, force Amazon (or whoever) to make his shop unavailable in France, block his page, and even issue an international warrant that would mean that Jhon would have the risk of being arrested if he ever leaves the USA.	There is no possibility of legally holding a country "to account" for an action. An individual could be legally tried for a crime (murder), and a country could via a political process be made to suffer the consequences if a leader performs some act (it need not be illegal). Germany, Iran and Russia have historically suffered certain consequences of actions held to be "officially sanctioned", and individuals such as Adolf Eichmann have been specifically punished; Fahad Shabib Albalawi and 4 others were sentanced to death for involvement in Khashoggi's murder. Punitive recourse against a country is always via political / military action. Khashoggi, specifically, was apparently a lawful permanent resident of the US, which is probably sufficient connection to the US for a suit based in the Alien Tort Statute. There have been various suits filed against individuals under this act, some of which succeeded, for example Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. An individual could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, but a foreign government enjoys sovereign immunity (the US government has limited its liability on that grounds, but Saudi Arabia has not). His fiance might then sue some individual, but Saudi Arabia itself could not be "held to account".	Why is a business allowed to refuse a customer? Because also freedom of contract is a right. Except for discrimination on the basis of protected categories, a person or entity is entitled to discretion on whether or with whom to do business and enter contracts. The last sentence in your post reflects a misconception of "completely different set of values and laws" between the USA and members of the EU. Clearly there are many differences, but a comparison of the Wikipedia link you posted and, for instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reflects an overlap of protected categories in the laws of the Netherlands and of the US, such as religion, sex, race, or national origin/nationality. One would need persuasive evidence to support a finding of unlawful discrimination in the two examples you have experienced. Assuming the bank responded to your GDPR inquiry truthfully, the bank's refusal to open an account might have stemmed from profiling or decision-making that (1) does not precisely require specific data about you, and/or (2) uses information the bank does not need to log for purposes of compliance with the GDPR. Note that the GDPR does not outlaw algorithmic decision-making. Since legislation in the EU (as in the US) portrays an approach of market economy, both bank and landlord are entitled to made decisions on the basis of their inner policies for risk management. The policies might be unclear to you, but that does not necessarily mean they contravene principles of equal opportunity.	Laws of the host country do apply in foreign embassies, but the authorities of the host country may only enforce laws in a foreign embassy by invitation of the foreign diplomatic delegation. So the general question would be whether the German embassy in London is bound by German law or by British law? It is subject to both, but the embassy can decide to what extent British law applies. In the case of a mask mandate imposed by British authorities, the embassy may require its occupants and visitors to comply with the conditions imposed under British law. It could also refrain from imposing such a requirement. In fact, unless German law prohibits a mask requirement, it can impose a mask requirement on its own initiative even if there is none imposed by British law nor German law. Is the German embassy London bound by the Equality Act 2010 and cabinet office guidance on medical mask wearing exemptions? It is not bound, but it may comply voluntarily.	The US has jurisdiction because the systems that the accused allegedly attacked are in the US. To use an example with older technology, you can't escape criminal liability for defrauding someone in one country simply because you did so through the mail or by telephone from another country. The UK and the US have an extradition treaty. The UK might refuse to extradite the accused; in that case the US would most likely complain loudly. If too many extradition requests are refused on one side, the other side might start limiting cooperation in any of several areas.	are there any GDPR considerations that must be in place when an EU company stores personal information from citizens outside of the EU? Absolutely. The territorial scope of the GDPR is specified at Article 3: Article 3 Territorial scope This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law. As specified in point 1, the regulation applies to controllers and processors located in the EU. There is no exemption of personal data based on the data subject's nationality or location. In fact, GDPR Recitals 2 and 14 explicitly mention that nationality or residence shall not be a factor: The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence, in relation to the processing of their personal data. […]	Note that the answer to most of your questions has nothing to do with the GDPR specifically, but has to do with the legal force that an EU Regulation has. Here's a related answer on EU Regulations vs. Directives. That said, here are my answers to your specific questions: So member states can define a different age, even though the GDPR says that it should be 16. But is this an exception? Yes. Are there any other exceptions? Yes. Scanning the Regulation for instances of "Member State" is a good way to find them. In my opinion, the biggest area of the GDPR where Member States have influence is Article 6, "Lawfulness of Processing". In some circumstances, it allows Member States to specify what could be considered a lawful basis for processing. Must these exceptions be explicitly stated in the GDPR? Yes. As a Regulation, exceptions must be explicitly stated in order to be permissible because Member States have no authority to overrule EU law. I'd like to understand to what extent the GDPR must be followed by member states, and to what extent it could be amended in national laws. "Amended" is a fuzzy term. It can mean adding, changing, or removing from the law. Unless otherwise specified, Member States could not change or remove provisions, but there could very well be additions consistent with the GDPR. Some Member States dispute this statement when it comes to constitutional issues.	The main question is whether the US has jurisdiction outside the US, which means either "in another country" or "in no country" (viz. the high seas or outer space). It has generally been felt (legally) that the US has no jurisdiction over foreign countries, see especially Banana v. Fruit, 213 U.S. 347 "the general rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where it is done". This is known as the "presumption against extraterritoriality": it is a presumption, not a rigid absolute rule. However, there are exceptions. The Alien Tort Statute (one of the first laws of the US) says "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States". An application of that law is Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, where defendant tortured and murdered plaintiff's daughter, all parties being in Paraguay at the time: the court held that the US did have jurisdiction, under the ATS. Nevertheless, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 which involves an extraterritorial kidnapping, SCOTUS seems to have said that this law is primarily about granting jurisdiction, and not about creating new torts, and they indicate that the wrongful acts within the scope of the ATS are, specifically, "offenses against ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, and piracy" (at any rate, it's clear that damage arising from pollution would not be within the class of bad acts referred to by ATS). Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. reaffirms the limit on what torts can be pursued under ATS. In this case, the issue is whether RDP might be corporately liable for acts that could be illegal under US law, and the court says "[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none" (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.). Accordingly, Taylor Jr. was held liable for his role in torture in Liberia, since the Torture Victim Protection Act does specifically allow for actions against individuals acting in their official capacity, outside the US, for torture and extrajudicial killing. "Sanctions against" is kind of open-ended. The US government can (under some circumstances) prevent US persons from doing things with respect to some other country, such as the restrictions against doing business with or visiting Cuba, Albania, North Korea etc. as have existed withing the past quarter century. Were I interested in sending money to a person in Iran vs. a person in Canada, I would have more problems in the former case owing to "sanctions". I think we can safely conclude that the US cannot (in terms of US law) declare that "whatever acts of a foreign entity overseas offend the federal government shall be litigated as though the acts were committed within the proper jurisdiction of the US" (or, more simply, "the proper jurisdiction of the US government is the universe"). Congress has not yet passed such a law about extraterritorial pollution, so until it does, it cannot sanction overseas polluters. When/if it does, it presumably can, though enforcement is another (political) matter.
How are the interests of civil and criminal justice served when in conflict? Tom made an interesting observation: It is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two. What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? This does seem like a fundamental problem: To my knowledge there is little consideration in criminal code for victim compensation. I don't know what case law conventions exist for this. Every U.S. state has a "Crime Victim Compensation Board" which attempts to reimburse victims of violent crimes, but that is a bureaucratic process and it appears designed only to cover direct costs resulting from such crimes. Therefore: If a criminal has significant assets, and the civil law provides for significant punitive damages, then a victim stands to gain far more from a civil judgement or settlement (correct me if I'm wrong) – to such an extent that a victim of a wealthy defendant would likely refuse to cooperate in any criminal prosecution that could jeopardize his financial gains from a civil action. And without the cooperation of the victim, even if the state wanted to pursue criminal charges, presumably it would decline to because of the difficulty of succeeding. This situation runs somewhat counter to the interest of the criminal justice system, which is to punish the offender, not reward the victim. It also allows wealthy criminals to "buy their way out of jail," which is something the criminal justice system does not like. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict?	What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles.	This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.	It has been investigated, it simply has not been prosecuted. The investigation started when someone reported suspicious activity in Hastert's accounts. The investigation proceeded from a belief that he was being blackmailed. After listening to a wire of a conversation between Hastert and the alleged blackmailer, the officers investigating decided it was not a simple case of him being blackmailed--they or the prosecutors' office used their discretion to go after Hastert for illegally structuring his payments to avoid anti-money-laundering reporting laws, and to my knowledge have not yet pursued any blackmail charge. Police and Prosecutors have very wide discretion regarding what charges they bring. In addition, it is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two.	Even if unlimited resources were available, in order to have a fair trial, the prosecution and defense both need time to prepare their cases, research the law, conduct investigations, gather evidence, interview witnesses, seek out experts, order forensic tests, etc, etc. And there will be pretrial motions that have to be prepared, argued, and judged. You have to figure out what's going to happen to the defendant during that time, be it detention, release, bail, or some other alternative. Shortages of personnel obviously exacerbate the delays, but even without that issue, it's not like the courts could try every defendant on the spot. That would be something like the Wild West, or the Dark Ages; certainly not what the modern world considers justice.	(My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof.	Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.	There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.	Under U.S. law, a U.S. court can assert jurisdiction sufficient to enter a binding judgment (called "long arm personal jurisdiction") if the events giving rise to the lawsuit took place in the state where the state or federal court in which the suit is brought is located. Generally speaking, modern U.S. law allows the service of the summons and complaint that gives the court jurisdiction over the defendant if the events giving rise to the suit took place in the state, to be served anywhere in the world (or even in outer space, for that matter). But, the practical reality is that serving someone with process from a U.S. court in another country would be difficult and expensive, and enforcing the judgment if you win could likewise be difficult. There are also a couple of other problems specific to small claims court: Many small claims courts do not have the full jurisdiction that the U.S. Constitution allows them to have by virtue of the statutes that authorize them and their contemplation that proceedings take place predominantly or entirely in person. It isn't uncommon for the statute authorizing a small claims court to limit its jurisdiction to defendants that live in the same county. Most small claims courts are only allowed to enter money judgments subject to some very narrow and idiosyncratic exceptions. Most small claims courts do not have jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract to sell a car, even though they could award money damages for breaching the contract to sell the car if those money damage could be demonstrated convincingly. These barriers particular to small claims court could be solved by filing suit in another state court that has broader jurisdiction. (The federal courts would probably not have jurisdiction over this case even if there was "diversity of citizenship" between the parties because the amount in controversy would probably be less than $75,000 unless it was a very fancy car indeed to be worth that much used.) Different consideration would apply if these facts and circumstances arose outside the United States, depending upon the jurisdiction in question.
Is it illegal to access content on website hidden by CSS I am not sure if this is the right form to ask this question, so please tell me if I should post this somewhere else. There are some websites (like this) that have part of the page free to view, and the rest of the page is locked behind a paywall/subscription/trial/registration. Now, these websites send over all all the content, even content that is supposed to be behind a paywall, and just hide the content with a CSS class. This means that the page contains all the content, but some of it is hidden by the browser on my end. So, this means that if the CSS engine of my browser breaks, or the stylesheet is not received properly, or I analyze the source of the website, I can read the whole content, without any sort of payment. The whole content is buried in the source of the page, I am not accessing URLs that I am not supposed to. Now, I know that no website is going to care about this, but I am curious, am I breaking any terms and conditions/laws by doing this. On one hand, I am entirely within my rights to see the content that the website is sending in any form I see fit. On the other hand, I am not viewing the content in the way the original authors envisioned. Note: I am in India, and most sites are based in the US or EU. So, I am interested in whichever countries' jurisdiction will apply.	A web site that is serious on protecting some content behind a paywall will put the protected content, or a version of the page with both protected and unprotected content, on separate page or pages, so arranged that a user will not be able to follow the link until that user has signed in and been accepted as an authorized user. A site that merely uses CSS to hide "protected" content is not really protecting it. CSS is designed to be modified by the ultimate user -- that is part of its function. If the site chooses to send you content, you are entitled to read it. Even if some of the content has a CSS tag attached which suppresses or obscures the display of that content, they know perfectly well that any user can supersede this with local CSS, and so I don't see how they have any legal claim, nor any way of knowing if you have accessed the "hidden" content or not. If you attempt to bypass or hack a login screen, that might be circumvention under the US DMCA, or "Unauthorized computer access" under any of several laws.	We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.	This is relatively uncharted legal territory, so until multiple cases establish some sort of precedent, we can only guess. I know of no legal requirement that a Browser or User has to submit cookies or referrer data or other meta-information accurately. In that regard, a user is unlikely to be prosecuted just for submitting HTTP headers. It is likely closely related to Free Speech issues. The DMCA spells out that it is illegal to circumvent copyright protection measures. While this law is typically used to make it illegal to copy DVDs, video-games or streaming movies, it is possible that the "3-free articles" policy could be interpreted as a copyright protection mechanism, and defeating it by changing HTTP headers is a circumvention. A good summary is here. A specific site's TOS (Terms of Service) probably contains language that spells out it is a violation to use the site in a manner other than as it is intended. This is a typical anti-hacking, anti-screen-scraping provision. Altering a browser session to circumvent their services is probably a violation of the license to access the site, and may open a user to a civil lawsuit for damages or even criminal hacking charges (the details of which are different state-to-state)	It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.	The law in every country where your service is available prevails. That means that if your servers are in Estonia, your file storage is in Lithuania, your company is in Switzerland, you are in France, you hold Thai citizenship, your users are in the USA and the signal transits through the U.K., Belgium, Germany, Canada and Poland then you are subject to the laws of each and every one of them. In addition, if China has reason to believe that the stored files contain matters relating to their citizens then they can take an interest. And so on and so forth ... A country has jurisdiction wherever it wants to have jurisdiction subject to the limits of and its ability to actually enforce its laws. What you are proposing is certainly illegal in many countries and you need to seek professional legal advice - not rely on strangers on the internet.	"I am accessing the data through various API's that I have found through my research. All of the API's are free to use." The API's you "found" and are using may be "free" in a monetary sense - i.e., you don't pay for them and they appear to be public information - but those APIs will have a Terms of Service (TOS) attached to the use of the APIs and the data by the company which provides the APIs. A Terms of service (TOS) (Wikipedia) outlines the legal and acceptable use of the API and is a legally binding contract. Those TOSs may very well restrict the access and end usage of the data, so read the TOS for each API. A TOS is a contract; break the contract - by accessing the data without permission, without a license, by selling the data, or by any other activity expressly restricted - and you open yourself up to possible legal action, which could include copyright and trademark violations, among others. At very least, the companies that run the APIs can deny you access if you break the TOS; at very most, they can sue you. A company being "publicly traded" doesn't mean all the data about those companies is free and publicly accessible. Some may be; other data is compiled by the company which provides the API, and they can restrict access to that data through their TOS. If certain types of data are indeed factual - facts can't be copyrighted - the TOS may still legally restrict usage, because the company developed and owns the format that the data is presented in and the API the data is accessed by. It's possible that you could enter into a licensing agreement with the company that provides the API so you can access the data and monetize it, but that's up to the company, you and your lawyer.	At least as of 2011, when regulations under the Information Technology Act related to privacy and data security were issued (some of the relevant statute sections and regulations are linked in this answer at Law.SE), there was no non-contractual right to have your data destroyed, although a terms of service for a site could give you that right contractually. Instead, usually, a term of service agreement will do exactly the opposite and give a site owner an irrevocable right to keep your data forever. I am not aware of any subsequent statutory, regulatory or case law developments in India which have changed this situation, but that kind of tweak of IT Act regulations in India wouldn't necessary make headlines outside of the local IT industry press coverage in obscure trade journals. The EU is the only place of which I am aware that has any individual right to have data destroyed or suppressed even if it doesn't violated copyright, wasn't obtained illegally and isn't fraudulent or defamatory. Even then, as I understand it, in the EU this is not a unilateral right that applies in all circumstances and is instead a specific remedy for certain situations that have a particularly intense privacy aspect to them.	Social media platforms are not publishers under UK law (at present), as such, they are not legally responsible for the content they host providing that there is a mechanism for alerting them to infringing material and that, when alerted, they remove it. As to "why", that is a political question.
Can I refuse to integrate google/Facebook trackers on a website? I work as front end developer for a company in Germany and regularly get asked to implement trackers in the products. In my opinion it is immoral to sell out your users to tech giants (and probably to the gov't in some countries) to receive some marketing relevant metrics in return. As far as I know there is a thing called freedom of conscience in German workplace regulations. Would this fall under that category? Can I refuse to integrate trackers without getting fired?	You do have freedom of conscience but you do not have a blanket right to refuse work you were ordered to perform. You have to perform work you were ordered to perform. If you refuse, you can get an Abmahnung (disciplinary letter). A second Abmahmung would be grounds for firing. The Abmahnung is invalid if the work you refused would have been unreasonable – but you'd have to litigate this. Your freedom of conscience does affect what work you can be reasonably asked to perform. You have the burden of proof to show that the work would have been unreasonable. You are required to alert the employer in advance. If you took a job where you could reasonably have been expected to know that it might come into conflict with your conscience, you should have mentioned this during the interview. Taking the job anyway effectively waives your freedom of conscience. Of course this doesn't apply if your job changed after you were hired. If you successfully claim freedom of conscience, you are not entitled for pay for the work that you didn't perform. Here, your claim of freedom of conscience does not seem to stand on very strong footing. It is normal for web development to include analytics, ads, and social integrations (what you seem to call “trackers”). This is a bit like taking a job as a nurse and claiming “my conscience doesn't allow me to perform blood transfusions” or taking a job at a defense contractor and claiming “my conscience doesn't allow me to work on weapons”. Your personal conscience may be more strict than applicable laws, but don't forget that there are laws. You might reasonably see it as your professional obligation to alert stakeholders of their compliance obligations. You have a stronger case for refusing work than the difficult to prove “freedom of conscience” if the work you are asked to perform would be illegal. You'd have a stronger argument for exercising your freedom of conscience if your work would endanger users that live under oppressive governments.	The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case.	Yes, you can use such eye tracking if you obtain consent in a suitable manner. But obtaining consent is going to be very difficult for you. The processing activity in question occurs within the context of an EU establishment of the data controller. Thus, GDPR applies regardless of where the data subjects are located. Under GDPR, any processing activity needs a clear purpose and a legal basis. Typical legal bases are necessity for performing a contract with the data subject, legal obligations, a legitimate interest, or consent. Conditions for consent are listed in Art 7 GDPR. Once your have a purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can collect the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. For example, let's assume that the purpose is a scientific study for which gaze tracking is necessary. The study's subjects can be informed about the context of the study, about how the data will be used, and can then be asked for consent for proceeding. Of course, participation in the study is only possible when consent is given. This is perfectly fine as far as the GDPR is concerned. But things might be more difficult when data is used for a different purpose, for example in order to track user interests in a web shop. You do have a legitimate interest in optimizing the website, but this interest likely doesn't outweigh the user's privacy interests. Legitimate interest always requires a careful balancing test. If the user cannot reasonably expect the data collection to happen, that is an indication that consent would be a better legal basis than legitimate interest. Accessing a camera feed means accessing information stored on the end user's device. Per the ePrivacy directive, this requires consent regardless of whether the information in question is personal data. Cookies, mouse pointer tracking, or eye tracking with a camera are all equivalent in this regard. Consent must be specific, informed, and freely given. It is an unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes, and must involve some clear statement or affirmative action. Prior to starting the eye tracking, you must provide sufficient information about what is happening, and must make it possible to easily decline consent. You cannot bundle unrelated consent together (e.g. eye tracking consent + cookie consent). You cannot make access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. E.g. a web shop does not need camera access, but an augmented reality does. Still, consent must be specific so consent for AR purposes can probably not be used to authorize eye tracking, which might need separate consent. Browsers do not grant camera access by default, and instead show a permission dialogue where the user can allow access or block further requests. This permission dialogue cannot replace your compliance obligations such as providing the necessary information so that the user can make an informed choice. Since GDPR requires that consent is freely given and can be declined, you might find it difficult to convince anyone to give consent to this fairly invasive tracking procedure. You might be able to incentivize consent e.g. with small discounts on a web shop, but the incentive must remain small enough that there really is a free choice between giving or declining consent. The EDPB has issued guidelines that are relevant to your scenario. These guidelines are not law, but are well-reasoned official interpretations that are frequently cited by courts. Guidelines 05/2020 on consent Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices Practically speaking, I doubt you will find eye tracking to be useful. First, you can likely achieve your purposes through less invasive means. Recall that the GDPR only allows you to process the minimum data necessary to achieve a purpose. Second, eye tracking is difficult for technical reasons. Bad lighting and weird angles make it difficult to obtain a useful feed. Cameras might be in different positions relative to the browser window, so that the eye tracking would have to be calibrated before acquiring data. Eye tracking typically involves processing the video feed on the user's device, but this is computationally expensive that will make the website unusable on lower-end devices, in particular mobile devices. And of course, many PCs don't have a camera in the first place.	If GDPR applies, then no one can opt out. If it doesn't apply, then an IP block is superfluous. Whether GDPR applies is determined by Art 3 GDPR. For this, we must distinguish where the data controller is operating from. It is irrelevant where the site is hosted, but primarily relevant where the data controller (your colleague) has an “establishment”, e.g. where he resides or typically works from. Per Art 3(1), GDPR applies to all processing activities in the context of an European establishment, regardless of where the users are. So if your colleague were running this site from Europe, they wouldn't be able to circumvent GDPR by blocking European users. However, if your colleague is running this site from outside of Europe, then Art 3(1) doesn't trigger. Per Art 3(2), GDPR can apply to processing activities where there is no European establishment. There is the Art 3(2)(a) “targeting criterion”: if your colleague “offers” goods or services to people who are in Europe, regardless whether paid or gratis, then GDPR applies to all processing activities related to this offer. I'll discuss this more below. There is also the Art 3(2)(b) criterion: if your colleague monitors the behaviour of people that occurs in Europe, then GDPR applies. For example, an app collecting geolocation information or a website creating interest profiles for ad targeting might trigger this criterion. An IP block can help to establish that no offering/monitoring related to people who are in Europe is happening, but it might not be necessary. It may be worth talking a bit more about the targeting criterion. The GDPR explicitly says that mere availability of a website in Europe doesn't imply that GDPR would apply. Instead, it is necessary to establish the data controller's intention – are they soliciting users from Europe, or otherwise expecting that people from Europe might use those services? Recital 23 gives a couple of non-exhaustive factors that can be considered here, for example: the site uses a language or currency used in the EU but not used in the controller's own country the site mentions users or customers from Europe, e.g. in testimonials This means that a lot of US websites, written in English or Spanish, only mentioning payment in USD (if any), not mentioning any European countries, will not be subject to GDPR. Then, occasional European visitors are irrelevant. It wouldn't be necessary to IP-block potential European users. However, such an IP-based block would help establish that the data controller really doesn't intend for those services to be offered to people who are in Europe. My personal opinion is that it's wasted effort to block users from foreign countries in case their foreign laws claim to apply, but if such a block brings peace of mind that might be worth it. While geoblocking might not be necessary, is it sufficient? There is no clear guidance on this subject, but it seems to be generally accepted that IP-based geoblocking is fine, even though it is trivially circumvented using VPN services. Of course, if a website were to block European IP addresses but were to also advertise that people in Europe can use their services via VPNs, that would probably still be an “offer” and might defeat the point of doing any geoblocking. The Art 3(1)(a) targeting criterion is most easily applied to things like ecommerce where physical goods are shipped to the customer in return for payment – so essentially whenever the data controller participates in the EU Single Market. This is roughly similar to the concept of a Nexus in US tax law. But in principle the targeting criterion can also apply to other kinds of websites or apps such as blogs, even if they are gratis. GDPR does not just apply to for-profit commercial activity, and doesn't distinguish between controllers that are entities/LLCs and controllers who are natural persons. Things are slightly more complicated due to the Art 3(2)(b) monitoring criterion and the pervasive use of online trackers on websites, but this aspect of the GDPR is difficult to enforce and frequently ignored. In this answer, “Europe” means the European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), and the United Kingdom (UK). Note that countries like Norway are covered by GDPR, whereas Switzerland is not. Of course, the GDPR is not the only privacy law relevant internationally.	Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do.	The GDPR does not outlaw such processing of personal data. It merely regulates how and for what purposes you can process personal data. In general, you can conduct any processing activity as long as it has a clear purpose and a legal basis. Here, the purpose would likely be something like “conducting business with my clients” and the legal basis would be a “legitimate interest”. A legitimate interest always requires a balancing test that weighs your interests against the interests and rights of the affected persons. For example, can the affected persons reasonably expect such processing activities? In a professional setting, it can probably expected that business partners keep notes about contact persons so your intended processing could be fine. The GDPR does impose some general constraints. There are general principles like data minimization and storage limitation – you should only collect data that is necessary for your purpose, and shouldn't store it for longer than necessary. You should think about appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to protect the processing activity, for example about how your CRM is hosted, how backups are made and how security updates are installed, who has access to the personal data, and how the people with access to the personal data can be trained. For example, such training might inform your employees that they can only use the data in the CRM for business purposes, but absolutely not for personal purposes like asking Gina from reception out for a date.	There doesn't seem to be any legal requirement to show banners to announce the use of strictly necessary cookies ("functional cookies"). However, the GDPR's transparency principle requires you to disclose the purpose and legal basis for all processing of personal data. This could be done via a banner, but more commonly via a site-wide privacy policy. The GDPR requires such information to be provided at the latest at the time when personal data is collected. A layered disclosure approach could use banners to alert visitors to the privacy policy, but I'd want to avoid this to prevent confusion with non-compliant consent banners. Of course, GDPR only applies when the cookies are used for processing of personal data. Cookies are handled more specifically by the EU's ePrivacy directive, for which each country has it's own implementation. You should therefore check with local laws and guidance from your local data protection agency.	If you are purely a designer (and not contracted for the daily operation of the site), the answer is "no". GDPR Article 4 defines the "roles" responsible for complying with GDPR, and there are two: Controller and Processor. The Controller is the one who calls the shots. In particular: Decides what personal data to process. This is usually the owner of the web site. The Processor is the one that actually does the processing. This is usually some company providing some sort of data processing service (e.g. SaaS, PaaS, etc.). The relationship between the Processor and the Controller must be contractual. The contract is called a DPA (Data Protection Agreement or Data Processing Addendum). As a designer, you don't fit into any of these roles. If your contract with the client is silent on liability for GDPR compliance, then you have no liability. This goes for projects completed both before and after the May 25 deadline. Of course, if there are GDPR clauses in your contract, then you must fulfil them just as have to fulfil any other contractual obligation. But unlike the controller and the processor, there are no automatic legal liability for a designer or programmer.
Why does a word like "homemade" not constitute false advertising? I've been wondering why, when a restaurant says something is "homemade" but it's clearly not made in somebody's home, that's not considered false advertising. If homemade doesn't imply made at home then what's the difference between something that's homemade and something that isn't? (As another example, I imagine the case I'd similar with things like "sun-dried tomatoes" although I can't really prove it one way or another.)	Why does a word like “homemade” not constitute false advertising? It is not amount to false advertising when its mention in the advertisement matches the common, ordinary usage of the term. In that case, the advertisement does not deceive or mislead the customers. The law only sanctions practices that are deceptive, not those which are substantially truthful. From another standpoint, see Black's Law Dictionary entry for Home Office: As applied to a corporation, its principal office within the state or country where it was incorporated or formed. This legal definition reflects that the word home does not necessarily require or imply personal residence. If homemade doesn't imply made at home then what's the difference between something that's homemade and something that isn't? An item which is supplied (whether substantially or in its entirety) by an external entity would not be considered homemade. In the context of restaurants, it is obvious that the ingredients are supplied from outside and therefore are not homemade (or homegrown). But if most or all of the preparation of a dish takes place at the facility, it would reasonably meet the criterion of being homemade. This is in contrast with a scenario where the labor of preparation is minimal because the product is delivered to the facility practically in its final, consumption-ready state.	It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter.	The use may constitute trademark infringement if it implies sponsorship or endorsement I'm going to assume US jurisdiction for this question, because you've not provided one, and you haven't provided enough car manufacturer names to suggest that this wouldn't apply to the US. I'll also only cover Federal law (the cases were tried in state courts), so be aware that there may be additional responsibilities under state law that I don't examine here. 15 U.S. Code § 1114: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S. Code § 1125: (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. These actions - the use of the trademarked manufacturer logo within the app - is likely to constitute trademark infringement, if the trademark owner's permission is not sought prior to publication, and the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods. What this means, is that if the trademarks are used in such a way that a reasonable person is likely to think that: The product is an official product from the owner/brand associated with the trademark; The product is sponsored by the owner/brand associated with the trademark; or The product is approved or endorsed by the owner/brand associated with the trademark. Then an action in trademark infringement may be brought by the trademark owner. Consider the following two cases: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) In this case, judgement was made for the defendant, as the defendant's field was not considered close enough to the plaintiff's for there to be a likely chance of confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) In this case the trial judge decided that the trademarks Slickcraft and Sleekcraft were unlikely to cause confusion. This ruling was overturned on appeal and an injunction was ordered by the court. Possible defenses Nominative use of a mark When a mark is used solely to identify a product, this use is privileged. A descriptive mark used for its primary purpose Descriptive marks are a subtype of trademarks, which are descriptive in nature but have acquired a secondary meaning. Here, using a descriptive mark for its primary purpose has been found not to constitute infringement. General First Amendment protection Satire and parody are generally recognized as defenses if the primary purpose of the use is not directly commercial. If the products are not similar enough to be likely to cause confusion; and The use does not imply endorsement, sponsorship or approval of the product by the trademark owner then it should be fine. It seems that the situation in the question above would not give rise to confusion (unless the car manufacturer also develops an app, for instance), the second issue - endorsement - should be avoided. Many programs will have a legal section that includes ownership information and disclaims any association with the trademark owner(s). I have not been able to locate any cases where the effect of these sections have been tested. Further reading Overview of Trademark Law	The U.S. FTC gave extensive guidance on this subject in March 2013. (You may have noticed shortly thereafter that conspicuous disclosures of free samples and compensation started popping up in reviews and posts around the web.) The FTC's FAQ covers this question in such detail I would just encourage people to visit it directly. However, as is the custom on Stack Exchange, I will reproduce the most salient content here: If an endorser is acting on behalf of an advertiser, what she or he is saying is usually going to be commercial speech – and commercial speech violates the FTC Act if it’s deceptive. The FTC (ironically?) refers to 16 CFR §255 as "the Guides." The Guides, at their core, reflect the basic truth-in-advertising principle that endorsements must be honest and not misleading. An endorsement must reflect the honest opinion of the endorser and can’t be used to make a claim that the product’s marketer couldn’t legally make. In addition, the Guides say if there’s a connection between an endorser and the marketer that consumers would not expect and it would affect how consumers evaluate the endorsement, that connection should be disclosed. For example, if an ad features an endorser who’s a relative or employee of the marketer, the ad is misleading unless the connection is made clear. The same is usually true if the endorser has been paid or given something of value to tout the product. The reason is obvious: Knowing about the connection is important information for anyone evaluating the endorsement.	There is a general belief that a term being trademarked means that it's illegal to use the term without permission from the trademark holder, but that is false. It is illegal only if it is done in a manner that suggests endorsement by the trademark holder. For instance, selling a football as a "Super Bowl football" would be trademark infringement, as it implies NFL involvement in the production of the football. Simply talking about the Super Bowl, such as saying "Our construction company built the stadium the Super Bowl is being played in" is not trademark infringement. Simply using a trademarked term to discuss the thing it refers to, without implying endorsement, is known as "nominative use". However, even if one would be on solid legal footings and could win a lawsuit on the basis of nominative use, one might avoid using a trademark to avoid the hassle of being sued.	Yes you can, and you can even include "editorials or subjective content". However, if you include factual statements, or words that imply factual statements, the company could claim that they are false, and therefore defamatory. Indeed they might claim that in any case. If you make no false statements of fact, they should not be able to win a defamation suit, but you might need to spend time and money defending yourself if they choose to sue. The detailed rules on defamation vary by jurisdiction, in the US by state. But in no US state can defamation be found against a person who neither made nor implied a false statement of fact. Use of the name of the company, along with "boycott" as in "BoycottXYXCorp.com" would not infringe any trademark XYZ might have. It is clearly Nominative use, as no one could reasonably believe that such a site was run by, sponsored, or endorsed by XYZ. Again, XYZ could always sue, even if they are highly likely to lose quickly.	While not categorically illegal, there is a risk that using a trademark in an email name is something that is being done with a purpose to defraud people into thinking that you are affiliated with that company (and indeed, such emails are frequently used for that purpose as are misleading domain names). So, while it isn't outright forbidden, it is generally unwise.	First of all, anyone can sue for more or less anything, with a good case or without. We have no possible way to predict who will sue or for what. What we might be able to predict is whether in certain circumstances a suit has plausible legal merit, and if someone filed such a suit, there would be a reasonable chance of winning it. Even that often depends on detailed facts which cannot be discussed or addressed here. Trademark protection is limited in several ways. First of all, trademark protection is limited by country. Each country has a different set of trademark laws, and a different mechanism for registering trademarks or determining which marks are protected, although there are many similarities. If a mark is protected in the US, that does not give grounds for suit in Canada, although if Canadian products or services are sold into the US, there could be a suit there. Secondly, trademarks are protected for specific industries or kinds of products/services. for example, "Bass Ale" is a well-known trademark for a beverage. But that does not mean that "Bass Media" used to identify a media company, would infringe that mark, because a drink and a media company are very different things, and one would not be likely to be confused with the other. Thirdly, some marks are "descriptive" while others are "distinctive" or "original". For example, "Tasty burgers" is descriptive. It describes the product (or claims to, at least). "Quadzos Burgers" is original. It is a coined word that has no meaning except to name this product. Original marks get significantly stronger protection than descriptive marks. Fourthly, Trademarks only protect against uses in trade, or in commerce. If you are not selling anything, or doing business using a mark, you are probably not infringing that mark's protection. Finally, and most important, the key question is whether a reasonable person in the market would be confused into thinking that the alleged infringer is the same as the maker of the goods or services named by the mark, or is endorsed or approved by that maker. Trademark protection is supposed to prevent one person or firm from benefiting by the reputation and good will of a product or firm with which they have no connection, from, in effect, falsely advertising "I am the same as those guys". If no reasonable person will be confused, then there is probably no infringement. If reasonable people might well be confused, there might well be infringement.
What laws apply to transgender individuals using toilets and locker rooms? This Skeptics SE post regarding a transgender individual (male to female) using a female locker room brought up some interesting legal issues regarding the rights of transgender individuals in using the locker rooms appropriate to their mental but not biological gender. What laws apply in such cases? Are there any legal protections against abuse by non-transgender individuals, such as in this hypothetical claim by Mike Huckabee?	There are some national protections that are applicable: Employers are legally required to provide workers reasonable access to restroom facilities. The U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration requires that employers make toilet facilities available so that employees can use them when they need to do so, and the employer may not impose unreasonable restrictions on employee use of the facilities. No federal, state or municipal laws or regulations specifically pertaining to gender identity require employers to utilize one type of bathroom over another, or to construct new facilities to accommodate transgender individuals. However, some jurisdictions regulate aspects of these restrooms. For example, the District of Columbia requires single-occupant restroom facilities in any public space (e.g., restaurants) to be gender neutral -- restrooms designed for use by one individual at a time may not have a specific gender designation with "male" or "female" signage or icons -- but does not require employers to have single-occupant restrooms instead of another type. Colorado, Washington, and Iowa allow transgender individuals the ability to use whatever gender room they wish, based on their gender identity. California is the first state to do the same for schoolchildren, according to CBS news. This is confirmed by the ACLU (#8, related information on #23), which also mentions some specific cases. Overall, there are non-discrimination laws in many - if not most - states protecting transgender men and women.	In Texas, sex offenses are defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.01, et seq., and rape and kindred offenses are defined as sexual assault § 22.011 and aggravated sexual assault § 22.021. None of those laws prohibit the conduct described (assuming adults who are not in a teacher-student relationship with full mental capacity), nor do they prohibit the video as long as there is no intent or threat to disclose it. Of course, not recognizing that it is the same person both times in an in person meeting when they have sex is highly implausible.	No. The repeal of pro-LGBT legislation is not sufficient. To be a refugee you must have a real and imminent fear of persecution which is generally defined to include matters like bodily harm or arbitrary detention or seizure of property on account of your status. The generalized protections existing under the law from private violence and civil rights violations in the U.S., while imperfect, is not going to suffice as a general matter to establish refugee status, particularly because many of those protections arise under federal law. A generalized fear of a "civil war" someday, and a general dissatisfaction with the amount of corruption present in the government and the bad policies of the government, in the United States, is not sufficient. Also, the United States is a free immigration zone, which means that people can freely travel and relocate to other parts of the United States, and while some places in the United States might be quite unfriendly to LGBT individuals, there are other places in the United States that are much more welcoming both in theory, based upon enacted laws, and in practice. For example, in Colorado, there are state anti-discrimination laws, one of the leading candidates for Governor is a gay man who is currently one of our Congressmen, we have had lesbian speakers of the state house, a high official in Denver's school district is a gay man who was a former state legislator, and a DA in a fairly conservative suburb of Denver vigorously prosecuted and obtained a conviction against a man who murdered a transwoman on account of her trans-status including a hate crime count, and a transman serves in the U.S. military in one of the state's federal military bases. When I walk the halls of my children's high school in Denver, the walls are full of official administration proclamations of support for LGBT students that is backed up by action and reflected in how my children's many LGBT friends were treated in their school. Denver's clerk's office proudly proclaims that it marries hundreds, if not thousands, of same sex couples every year. This doesn't mean life is perfect in Colorado, but it isn't official persecution of the kind that would rise to refugee status either. And, since anyone in the U.S. can move to Colorado or other relatively LGBT friendly states, there would not be any ground to claim refugee status. Canada, for example, would not admit someone as a refugee based upon persecution for LGBT status if that person did not demonstrate that they could not escape persecution by moving to metropolitan Denver or San Francisco or New York City. The U.S. is not necessarily the very best place in the world to be LGBT, but it is certainly near the top, despite the fact that the struggle for LGBT rights is ongoing and will be indefinitely and it isn't perfect.	It is not legal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex anywhere in the US (see http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm). Exemptions exist where the discrimination is for bona fide occupational qualifications and, irrelevantly, religious reasons. It is completely legal for a consumer to discriminate on the basis of anything they want to. It is also legal for a business to assist the consumer in that discrimination. Bona fide occupational qualifications generally only apply to instances in which the BFOQ is considered reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business. Mere customer satisfaction, or lack thereof, is not enough to justify a BFOQ defence, as noted in the cases Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. and Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.. Therefore, customer preference for females does not make femininity a BFOQ for the occupation of flight attendant. However, there may be cases in which customer preference is a BFOQ—for example, femininity is reasonably necessary for Playboy Bunnies. Customer preference can "'be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the primary function or service it offers,' that is, where sex or sex appeal is itself the dominant service provided." None of the occupations you mention would, on the face of it, meet the requirements to be BFOQ. Allowing their customers to express a preference for a specific gender may impact on the capacity for the business to deliver on that preference but it would not generally allow a BFOQ defence if this impacted their hiring policies. A possible exception is if the business catered to that preference exclusively, for example, an all female gym with all female staff but I am not aware that this has ever been tested and if a male personal trainer wanted to take them on he may very well win. As an aside, there is no BFOQ defence for racial discrimination except for artistic works where the first amendment rights overrule the anti-discrimination laws.	I’m guessing you have seen a sign in a business that read - “Management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone”. At least in the US, they do not need a reason as long as the reason isn’t unlawful discrimination. They can decide not to serve you.	"Public place" is not a good description of a bar. "Public accommodation" would be a better description. But it isn't a public accommodation 24-7-365(366). It's only a public accommodation during the hours it is open to the public. Presumably the owner is free to close it to the public and rent it to some private group. During the rental period, it's up to the private group to decide who to admit. (The owner would have a veto for anyone who can't be admitted, for example, because the person isn't old enough to enter a bar.) The private group is not bound by the policies that prohibit unfair discrimination by public accommodations.	Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts.	Depends on where you are, and what law would be broken and why. In germany, there is the concept of rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying emergency). If there is a present danger to a Rechtsgut (legally protected interest), one can take necessary and proportional steps against another legally protected interest. Say I walk through a winter landscape and there is a person who has broken through the ice of a lake (a present danger of the loss of life). Nearby is a yard with a ladder leaning on a shed. I would be allowed to enter the yard (normally trespas) and take the ladder (normally theft) in the rescue attempt (life counts for more than a ladder, using a ladder is necessary/appropriate for an ice rescue). The details are, as usual for Law SE, complicated.
Who's legally responsible for vet bill in pet injury, owner or pet sitter? A friend agreed to pet-sit my dog, Taishi, while husband and I were away for 3 weeks. To compensate her for doing this, we told her she could live in our apartment and eat any food we had without question and use our TV and our internet as much as she liked without question. She agreed to this arrangement. I never told her not to take the dog on public transit somewhere but it never occurred to me that she would. She decided to take my dog to an off-leash park. While out, she claimed, "After we got off the escalator, I looked down and saw Taishi's paw was bleeding. I don't know how it got that way. I took him to the vet and it cost $XXX dollars. I paid the bill but you need to pay me back." (It was some amount $200 or less. I forget how much exactly.) She informed us of this while we were away and expected me to either find a way to send her the money from China, where we were, or give it to her the week we got back. I tried not to say too much about it because we were away and she still was caring for the dog and I didn't want trouble. When we got back, I refused to pay for the vet bill because I wasn't the one who injured the dog in the first place. I told her that her desire to walk my dog was correct and admirable but there was no requirement to take him to the off leash park nor did I ever instruct her to do so, so his injury was entirely on her. She said it was cheap of me to risk losing a friendship over a mere $XXX and if I really valued the friendship, I'd pay her back. I stuck by my attitude that she put my dog in an injurious situation, since this didn't happen in my own apartment, and thus I didn't owe her repayment. She then told me she borrowed the money from her mother and I need to pay her back so she could pay back her mother. I told her that if she was willing to give me her mother's address, I would write a check for the full amount, payable only to her mother, and include a letter as to why her daughter had borrowed the money in the first place, as I didn't trust this person to have told her mother the truth to the purpose of the borrowed money. She told me in a panicked tone not to do that, to just give her the money and she'd be sure to pay her mother back. I stood firm and said the only way her mother was getting this money was with a direct check in her mother's name only and a letter explaining the reason for this check. She got huffy mad and ended the friendship, making sure to tell people I was a selfish and mean person in the process. I don't regret the loss of the friendship. I explained what happened to other friends and they told me I wasn't a very nice person and that since I own the dog, it's my responsibility to pay for any vet bills he incurs when friends are looking after him. I then asked that if someone was babysitting a human child (under the pretended idea I had one, for illustrative purposes) of mine and the child got injured in their care, would I or the caretaker be responsible? They said that of course the caretaker is responsible but a dog is not a human child and I was comparing apples to oranges so it's not the same. What is correct? If a pet sitter takes your pet somewhere unnecessary and it gets injured, should they be required to foot the vet bill or is it the owner's responsibility for that bill? If you say the owner should be responsible, explain how that's fair when the pet sitter is already being fairly compensated for pet sitting and the pet only got injured because the pet sitter took it someplace that was entirely unnecessary?	You are responsible It is unlikely that the arrangement you had with the sitter amounts to a contract. Even though there was consideration on both sides, at first blush it seems unlikely that both of you intended to create legal relations. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Notwithstanding, if there is a contract it is silent on who is responsible to for injury to the pet so it would fall back on the law of negligence anyway. For the sitter to be responsible, she must have been negligent. She wasn't. See Is there liability for pure accidents? Looking at the elements: a duty to the plaintiff, such a aduty probably exists. breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), she didn't (see below). the plaintiff must have suffered actual harm, no question that you have. the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of that harm, and that harm was foreseeable, probably it wasn't (see below). Here are the facts: She took the dog on public transport - not unreasonable, many people do. The fact that you wouldn't is irrelevant since you did not communicate this prohibition to the sitter. She took it to an off-leash park - not unreasonable, that's what they are for. She rode an escalator - it is unclear if she carried the dog or expected the dog to ride the escalator itself. The first is clearly reasonable, the second may or may not be depending on the size of the dog etc. She noted the injury and had it treated - eminentely reasonable. So, in general, she has acted as a reasonable person would. It is also far from clear to me how any of the decisions made would result in foreseeable harm to the dog. Remembering that the standard is would a reasonable person foresee that there was a risk of harm barring extraordinary circumstances. By the way, the legal reasoning is exactly the same if you had entrusted her with your child or your car.	Landlord or tenant responsible for the furnishing damaged after a flooding? This brief analysis of Scandinavian Contract Law explains the difficulty of addressing with certainty matters of Swedish contract law. Despite the legal and factual ambiguities, it seems to me that the contract terms and landlord's conduct preclude his entitlement to a reimbursement from you. (Disclaimers: I have never litigated in Sweden's courts; I do not purport to be knowledgeable about Swedish law; and it is unclear to me whether Swedish contract law has evolved since the date of the publication of Ramberg's criticism of Scandinavian contract law) First, it appears that the landlord was negligent by waiting several days to ask tenants to remove moldering furnishings (as these were starting to smell). If that was the landlord's earliest reaction to the flooding, then the delay might evidence [landlord's] failure to mitigate damages. In other legal systems, failure to mitigate damages is an obstacle to recovery from the sued party. Second, the landlord's unqualified instruction to throw everything away --in response to your proposal of checking for salvage-- might forfeit his entitlement to reimbursement. In this regard, page 4 of the aforementioned publication points out that [t]he Swedish Supreme court [...] generally stated that a contract containing the standard terms was deemed to have been concluded due to the parties' behaviour. Obviously, not all of the contract would be void, but only the application of the clause about tenant's financial responsibility for missing or damaged items in this particular context of landlord's delay and reckless response to your proposal. Third, in the clause regarding tenant's financial responsibility "to replace missing or damaged items", I would say that the qualifier "missing" is key. Here, the usage of "missing" connotes a deliberate act of taking items away in violation of the landlord's proprietorship, regardless of whether it was the tenant or a third party who removed/stole them. That same connotation of deliberate act should govern the very next qualifier, "damaged", absent any language that expands the latter's connotation of causality. Also a criterion of negligence would fail, because you were not notified that a flooding occurred. The contract's clarification that their "insurance doesn't cover [your] personal belongings" opens --albeit weakly-- the door to the possible interpretation that instead the policy covers the counterparty's (that is, the landlord's) belongings. On the other hand, the landlord could avail himself of arguments such as (1) tenant should have made arrangements prior to leaving for the holidays; and (2) landlord's bed & mattress were not intended to be stored in the basement, and instead should have been notified toward procuring an appropriate storage for them. It is hard to make a more precise assessment without knowing more about the terms of the contract and the circumstances. Therefore, the best thing to do is to look at the subtleties in the language of the contract (as I did above regarding the deliberate nature inherent to the adjective "missing" and its interpretative effect on the adjective "damaged").	Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene.	Bill and Jane are free to enter into a contract where, among other things, each provides valuable consideration; in this case Bill provides valuable lawn mowing services and Jane provides valuable money. In week No 1 they have negotiated the terms and the contract is complete when Bill mows the lawn and Jane pays the money. If Bill turns up next week without Jane's instruction then there is no contract and Jane does not have to pay anything; I don't think this is what you are asking but I include it for completeness. If it is understood that this arrangement continue week after week then either there is an ongoing contract or, more likely, a series of independent contracts. If there is an ongoing contract, then it can be renegotiated but it cannot be changed unilaterally by Bill. That is, he cannot unilaterally increase the price to $2. If there is a series of contracts then the terms of each of those contracts will be the same based on the course of dealing. Basically, the parties have accepted over a long period of time that the rate for a mow is $1 and Bill would have to get Jane to accept the revised rate before he mows the lawn. For your example, Jane owes Bill $1 but if she wants him back next week she will have to agree to Bill's rate.	You missed a bit: Unless, of course, the patient was a private patient and the doctor accepted half a guinea for his trouble: As well as the state-run National Health Service (which is generally free to most patients) the UK also has a number of private health care providers where patients pay, for example, to be treated sooner than they would if they went with the NHS. Some NHS doctors also work on a self-employed basis in this private sector, called private practice, which creates the contractual relationship alluded to by Lord Devlin. Re: Don't NHS doctors receive consideration, even if patients don't pay? Yes they do. But not from a (non-private) patient - they are paid by the NHS (or related entity). There are different contractual relationships available, such as being on a salaried payscale or in a partnership but all remuneration comes from the NHS.	Legal answer A blanket "no pets" clause is unenforceable, and would remove even the requirement for you to ask before keeping pets (ref:landlordlawblog). This is why the clause contract has the phrase "the Landlord’s consent [...] will not be unreasonably withheld". You shouldn't take this phrasing to mean that the landlord is happy for pets given certain conditions; rather the landlord doesn't want pets, but has used the letting agent's standard contract which has been written with advice from lawyers. Withholding consent with no explanation is unreasonable (see landlordlawblog ref above). The landlord simply wanting no pets, in and of itself, is almost certainly unreasonable. Given that you proposed damage repairs and cleaning, I am personally convinced that the rejection is unreasonable. That said, the landlord might be able to reasonably withhold consent on noise grounds (parrots can annoy neighbours!), but can only do so by stating that to you (which he hasn't done). (Im)practical answer 1 You can try fighting it out in the courts if you like. You could well win, but this will cost you money (and probably a lot of stress) and antagonise your landlord. The landlord will then want to get rid of you (both because you're doing something he doesn't want to the property, and because you took him to court). He'll want to get rid of you with the minimum notice possible; if you're in a fixed term, that's the end of the fixed term; if you're in a periodic tenancy it's probably 2 months. In theory landlords can't carry out retaliatory evictions. But your only chance of fighting a retaliatory eviction is... the courts! Cue more cost and stress. And it's very possible that the landlord might successfully come up with another reason to justify the eviction, e.g. "I want to sell the property", "I want to provide my nephew with a home", or if he tries putting the rent up and you refuse "I can get more rental income by re-letting the property". (Im)practical answer 2 You could just get the parrot anyway. The landlord won't find out until his next inspection, and even then will find it difficult to evict you in the middle of a fixed term for such a minor breach of contract... but that doesn't stop him evicting you at the earliest possible "no reason" eviction date. This would again be either the end of the fixed term or 2 months if you're on a periodic tenancy. And you wouldn't be able to fight this as a "retaliatory eviction", as there will be no registered disagreement between you. Practical answer Your legal rights and your practical options aren't the same thing, unfortunately. Your best option is probably to give up on the idea of getting a parrot.	She has no legal right to your stuff, and every legal right to the apartment. The only way adjudicate such a conflict of rights is with a restraining order. A temporary order would expire in 3 weeks. Item 14 in the petition requests exclusive use, possession, and control of the property. However, that path of restraints is tailored to domestic violence, so item 27 has you describe the alleged abuse: Abuse means to intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, keep you under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), batter, telephone, or contact you; or to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Note that the description refers to destroying your personal property, not pawing through it. It's really impossible to know if the judge will exercise his discretion to include "reasonable fear of destruction (or theft) of personal property", since the ex-roommate has no further interest in the apartment. There is an alternative path of a harassment restraining order, which does not require a defined domestic relationship (such as ex-roommate), where "harassment" is violence or threats of violence against you, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed you and caused you substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct is more than one act and that seems even less likely.	It depends on whether "person" means "owner" If Bob is liable, it's not under the Impounding Act of 1955. In that Act, the occupier of land is allowed, but not required to impound trespassing animals. This is made clear in s 21 of the Act, which says "the occupier...may seize and impound any stock trespassing on the land." A quick search finds no sections of the Act requiring an occupier to impound trespassing cattle. So it seems Bob is free to send the cattle on their way, at least under the Impounding Act. However, liability for cattle and cars is also covered by the "Animals Law Reform Act of 1989." The two subsections of "Section 5" of that Act appear to broaden the class of people who could be held liable for damage “caused by an animal straying onto a highway.” Neither subsection explicitly mentions the owner. Instead, both talk about the "person" who is liable. The first, s 5(1) says the part of the common law that “excludes or restricts” “the duty that a person might owe to others to take reasonable care” to prevent damage no longer applies in New Zealand. The second, s 5(2), says a court must determine "whether a person is liable...for damage caused by an animal straying onto a particular highway..." Given that Impounding Act explicitly says "owner" not "person," common sense suggests the use of the word "person" rather than "owner" in the Animals Law Act of 1989 means that Act allows others besides the owner to be held liable for damages. Whether New Zealand courts agree, and whether they have interpreted the “Animal Laws Act” in a way that would include Bob is a matter of fact that can only be answered by someone who knows New Zealand law. Added: Something fun to read Law professor Robert Ellickson studied how people actually resolve disputes over wandering cattle in Shasta county in northern California. There's a readable summary of what he found here. (The title of his book, "Order without law," sums up his main finding -- there are rules that are enforced, but those rules have little to do with the formal law or law enforcement.)
Would Poker (with Zero real-world currency involved) in an M-Rated (18+) Online game be constituted Online Gambling? Players of Red Dead Redemption 2: Online (RDO from now on) have been requesting that Poker or other gambling activities be added to the game. These were expected to be included, as they are present in the Single Player, and in the predecessor Red Dead Redemption. Many players of the game are suggesting that Poker or other gambling activities can not be included because of legal restrictions on Online Gambling. Notably, RDO features two forms of currency. In-game "Cash", and "Gold". While Gold can be purchased with real money (Micro-transactions), the In-Game "Cash" has zero interaction with Gold, and can not be purchased with real money. “Cash” can also not be redeemed for real-world money, prizes, or anything else. Transferring of currency is currently not something available in the game. “Cash” is earned in all activities of the game, and no prizes would be tied specifically to the game of poker. If Poker was to be included, and restricted to only In-Game "Cash", would this be an issue regarding Online Gambling laws in a significant number of countries? Of note: RDO is an M-Rated (18+) game. With conservative Pot Limits gambling would be a vastly slower way to earn in-game “Cash” compared to other activities in-game.	If Poker was to be included, and restricted to only In-Game "Cash", would this be an issue regarding Online Gambling laws in a significant number of countries? It is hard to give a comprehensive answer because laws vary significantly among countries. I will focus on U.S. law, but other countries very likely adopt a more stringent definition of gambling (Muslim nations are at one extreme of the spectrum, since their religion prohibits games of chance). Under U.S. law (or at least in some of its jurisdictions) the scheme you outline would not meet the legal definition of gambling. The Black's Law Dictionary defines gamble as "[t]o play, or game [...] involv[ing],not only chance, but a hope of gaining something beyond the amount played". For a more formalized characterization of gambling, see Com. v. Irwin, 535 Pa. 524, 527 (1993): The three elements of gambling are (1) consideration; (2) a result determined by chance rather than skill; and (3) reward There, the court distinguishes between reward and entertainment in that in the latter "the player can never "win" anything other than a prize worth less than the amount he has played", Id. at 529. This is consistent with the case law from other jurisdictions. See Farina v. Kelly, 147 Conn. 444, 449 (1960): [A] lottery is characterized by three constituent elements, namely, a prize, a chance, and a price. [...] [A]s commonly understood, gambling involves not only chance but a hope of gaining something beyond the amount played Lastly, since In-Game "Cash" has zero interaction with Gold, and can not be purchased with real money it is evident that the purpose of adding Poker the game in the way you describe is pure entertainment, not for a player's expectation of reward as outlined in the aforementioned cases.	Potentially -- this is almost exactly how Pachinko parlors in Japan operate, with non-cash prizes being given out, but with "known" nearby establishments (sometime located in the same physical building) that will buy them for cash. Other options include the giving of vouchers/gift cards as prizes. Whether this is legal or not is a question of if the buyer is "truly" acting independent of the gambling establishment. The general legal term for this is "arm's length transactions". A completely unrelated organization is presumed to be acting in its own best interest, in an "arm's length" manner, though this can be overcome with evidence of collusion. If the casino is willing to "buy back" its marker at a given price (much like Las Vegas casinos are required to do), this can be done with independent intermediary negotiators in a legitimate arm's length transaction. In the Japan example above a "three-shop system" of nominally independent shops circle goods between them to effectively "legalize" (or at least not draw the ire of authorities over) cash gambling payouts.	The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures.	In general it is illegal to gamble on life. However, you might not even need to go to a bookmaker: A contract that pays money upon the death of a specific person is known commercially as "life insurance." In order to avoid the moral hazard (or reality) of creating a contract killing market, it has long been illegal to trade life insurance with any person or entity who does not have an "insurable interest" in the insured. (See also: The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, by Peter Swisher, who also has a good review of laws and regulations surrounding exceptions to the rule like viaticals and STOLI. Further reading on the subject here.) I don't know if it has been tested, but I think anyone could argue that they would face a significant financial loss if the U.S. President were killed or died in office: the stock markets plunged on JFK's assassination. Therefore, it could be both legal and possible for anyone to buy life insurance on the U.S. President. (Note that, in the U.S., the disputes about third-party life insurance have revolved for generations around the tax benefits associated with insurance premiums and benefits. See corporate-owned life insurance (COLI), a.k.a. "janitor's insurance.")	Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.	It is currently legal to barter goods or services in exchange for gold or silver bullion in the United States. Gold and silver do not have to be registered or certificated, although a prudent person would usually seek evidence confirming their authenticity and it would be common practice to keep gold and silver in a repository such as a bank or Fort Knox, and to conduct the transaction via negotiable certificates evidencing ownership of the gold or silver (basically warehouse receipts whose transfer is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code) rather than to physically transfer the gold or silver, in a large dollar value transaction. There are been periods of time in the United States where this was not allowed, unless done by a state government (which has a constitutional right to do so), or by a local government authorized by a state government to do so. But those laws are not currently in force and haven't been for a long time. Transfers conducted with gold or silver bullion in excess of $10,000 per transferee per year, probably have to be reported to the same officials to whom a cash transaction in that amount is reportable on IRS Form 8300, because it is considered a collectible cash substitute, even though it is legal to do so and no tax is specific to barter transactions in gold or silver. IRS Publication 1544 explains the rule.	The only issue relevant to your age is the (ir)revocability of the license. GPLv3 purports to be an irrevocable license. To be really irrevocable, the license would need to grant certain rights in exchange for something of value, that is, you need a license that passes muster as a contract. Copyright licenses are typically treated as contracts, but it is not clearly established in law that licenses are contracts or are not contracts. Out of the goodness of your heart, you can grant permission to use your property, but you can also withdraw that permission. If you have a contract granting perpetual permission to use your property in exchange for something of value, then you can't later withdraw that permission. In the case of Jacobsen v. Kratzer, the sides advances opposing theories that the license was a "bare license" vs. was a contract. (The matter was ultimately settled out of court). This article puts together the legal factors surrounding the notion of license as contract, see p. 21 ff, and esp. §IV for arguments that licenses should be contracts, to be fully enforceable. A contract for non-essentials formed with a minor is not enforceable, until you are 18. You could therefore revoke the license, until you are 18. Anyone who uses the software does so at their peril. However, if the license is not a contract, no existing legal doctrine (in the US) whereby the permission is irrevocable. In other words, yes you can, at their peril. The whole license-as-contract issue is very complicated, and I'm only focusing on the revocability issue. There is a separate question whether one can sue a user for both copyright infringement and breach of contract. The case of Artifex v. Hancom, see also this analysis, found that (in the particular case), plaintiff can pursue the matter as both infringement and contract breach.	If only the tip is left in such "fake" money, it would not be theft as there is no legal obligation to leave a tip at all (except in those establishments that add a tip or "service charge' to the bill.) If the "money" is not an attempt to imitate real cash, it wouldn't be counterfeiting (leaving monopoly money for example would not be counterfeiting). The server would be understandably angry. The restaurant might refuse to seat the people who left the "fake" another time, if the servers identified them to the manager, but nothing would require them to do so. This is all on a US basis, I have no idea if tips might be legally required in other countries.
Is age defined in the European Union? I feel https://travel.stackexchange.com/q/134011/4188 should have been asked here so I am doing it. To travel with a discounted Youth Pass, you must be aged from 12 up to and including 27 on the start date of the Eurail Pass. Is there a legal definition of what "age" is here? Some people in the linked Q&A insist it is based on birthdays but I can't find anything to back that up. In other words, if I was born on Feb 31, how old I am on Feb 30 legally? (nonexisting days are deliberate to avoid the discussion on me doxxing myself)	In both common law countries and in civil law countries, words are given their plain meaning for legal purposes, unless there is an express definition to the contrary is provided. And, in Europe, the plain meaning is unambiguous and is what the plain language that you quote says. (The meaning would be ambiguous in the Korean language, or regarding a horse, in contrast.) While there are times when there are age groupings that aren't the plain meaning (e.g. eligibility for youth sports league divisions, school enrollment), it isn't usually stated so plainly. For example, a sports team might have a U10 division which has a defined meaning, but is unlikely to say "for children under age 10" when it really means "for children under age 10 as of the first day of the season".	I presume that the document refers to "barn" and "barnebarn". Norway has forced heirship laws, which refers to offspring as "barn", not limited to those under the age of majority. Interpreted in the context of Norwegian law, there is no assertion in using the word that it grants a right to minors. When you add the additional condition that the recipient must have reached the age of majority, there is no conflict. In this kolonihage bylaws document, which is probably similar to the one you are looking at, §11.2.1 requires that a tranferee fulfill the criteria required for the allocation of parcels, and §11.2.2 addresses the non-necessity of paying the transfer fee in the case of death of the member, and does not create a special inheritance right. It also says that the new contract must be established. But a minor cannot establish a contract, and in general cannot be forced to fulfill the obligations of a member as spelled out in §9. You should check with a lawyer to be certain, of course.	"The EU" is a lot of different jurisdictions, and laws vary between them. The following answer applies to the UK. A: Alice is guilty of making and possessing indecent images of a child. The fact that the child was herself is irrelevant, as are her current feelings on the subject. The "making" offence was committed when she was under 18, so for that she would be treated as a child, but the possession offence would be be charged at her current age. If Alice has made recent copies of the pictures, for instance by moving her files to another computer, then she is guilty of "making" as an adult. B: As with "A", but with increased penalties for publishing it. C: As with "B", except that the offence was committed when she was under 18.	Under Albanian law, the situation is somewhat open to interpretation. Law No. 7850 of July 29, 1994 (English translation) Part 1 Title 1 spells out the law of capacity. Article 6 sets 18 as the age of full majority: The person who reaches eighteen years old wins the full rights so that by his acts he gains rights and holds civil obligations. Articles 7-9 place limits on capacity for those who are younger. Those under 14 can act with approval of their legal representative, but unconditionally can be member of social organization, posses everything he gains by his work, to deposit his savings and to posses these deposits himself. Article 8 says say that he "who has not reached fourteen years old, has no capacity to act", and Article addresses 14-16 in the special case of fourteen to eighteen years who is unable to carry out his own affairs because of psychic diseases or mental illness is deprived of the capacity to perform legal transactions a court decision. These transactions can be performed through his legal representative. There is no law covering mentally-fit people between 14 and 18. The capacity to contract is neither affirmed (as for 18+) nor denied (as for 14-). Albanian Supreme Court decisions could be accessed and searched here to see if there have been any court rulings on disaffirmation of contract when one is between 16 and 18 years old. (Better translations here, Albanian original here).	Who in the fraternity would be prosecuted if this became an issue? A lot of people could be held liable for this, including people who are not even in the fraternity. Anyone who has knowledge of the machine or the fact that it was possible for minors to access alcohol through it could technically be held liable if a prosecutor wanted to make that case. Presumably the building is owned by someone else and just leased out to fraternity members, and they very well could be held liable for sale to minors also. Would the machine be safer if it just accepted cash (so that no electronic paper trail was created), with a big warning sign WINK WINK that anyone under the age of 21 was strictly prohibited from purchasing from it? No. Payment method is irrelevant here. There are a number of states that legally allow vending machines to sell alcohol, but vendors are required to verify the age of any person accessing them and ensure that those cards aren't being used by people not authorized. What you describe is an extremely relaxed environment where admittedly no one is attempting to verify identities. The "accepting cash" scenario is no different than a liquor store selling alcohol to anyone that comes in just because they're willing to pay with cash instead of a credit card. Sales to minors laws are not "as long as you warn them, you're safe" laws. They require vendors to actively check IDs and ensure that alcohol is not landing in the hands of minors. Accepting cash just to erase the evidence doesn't meet that burden. There are a lot of legal troubles with the situation that could get a lot of people charged with multiple offenses. That you have underage fraternity members living there suggests you should not have alcohol readily accessible in the house at all, as most state laws expressly forbid providing access to alcohol, not just serving or selling. Them being there provides access to it, even if it's just a case in the fridge with a note on it. Not to mention, you technically cannot sell alcohol, as I highly doubt your fraternity has a liquor license to be able to do so. There's a big difference between asking everyone to pitch in to buy the case versus actively selling individual cans through a vending machine. The vending machine itself is violating liquor laws in your state merely by existing.	It's hard to prove a negative, and I'm not sure which specific part of the quoted Terms you object, to, but it specifically states that content access may be done to: Comply with the law Protect its customers; and Protect the security of its business; and Protect its business interests. It's unlikely that access of information to comply with the law is illegal. At least one EU directive, Directive 95/46/EC, sets limits on the collection and use of personal information. We're concerned with the first condition for lawful data processing, and the second principle of data quality. Data processing is only lawful if the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; or processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party; or processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection. The principles of data quality, which must be implemented for all lawful data processing activities, are the following: personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. They must also be adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, must not be stored for longer than necessary and solely for the purposes for which they were collected; special categories of processing: it is forbidden to process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. This provision comes with certain qualifications concerning, for example, cases where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or for the purposes of preventive medicine and medical diagnosis. So, let's say that someone has given their consent. It'd be at least a little questionable whether the inspection of private information could mean that they access personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. I'm a bit less clear on US laws, but you'd probably look for laws around Personal Identifying Information, as that's where a lot of focus has been.	Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here.	I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.
Who is rightful owner of Gmail personal email account? I had created a Gmail account for office use by providing my credentials (first owner). After quitting job, still I am using this account for my use. My ex boss demanded me to handover said account to company immediately. He called me a hacker. Does my former employer have any right to this Gmail account?	The Google TOS says, applicable to creation of accounts: You may create your own Google Account, or your Google Account may be assigned to you by an administrator, such as your employer or educational institution. If you are using a Google Account assigned to you by an administrator, different or additional terms may apply and your administrator may be able to access or disable your account. To protect your Google Account, keep your password confidential. You are responsible for the activity that happens on or through your Google Account. So the account wasn't created for you by an administrator, and it is your own Google account. The terms say that you are responsible for what happens with your account, thus if you were to turn over the password to someone else and they did illegal things, you would be responsible (at least with respect to your legal relationship to Google). Google does have business email, which your employer apparently did not utilize. In order to have actual ownership of the account, the business would need to set up the account for you and claim initial "ownership". If you create an account for the convenience of a business, that convenience – but not the account – is a gift from you to the business.	When you use other services, the question is whether that service acts as an independent data controller, or as a data processor who only uses the data on your behalf. When engaging a data processor they must be legally bound to only use the data on your behalf, for example with a contract / data processing agreement (DPA). See Art 28 GDPR. Data processor status is attractive because processors are seen as an extension of the controller. In contrast, when sharing data with other controllers you would need a separate legal basis to authorize this sharing. Google offers tons of different services, so this question needs to be considered on a case by case basis. For Google Cloud services or Google Workplace, Google generally acts as a data processor. For other services, Google acts as a controller. Notably, Google Fonts does not offer a DPA so that you cannot claim they're acting as a processor in that context, regardless of what other Google services you use. An equally important problem when using Google services is the data transfer problem. Google is controlled from the US, but the US do not offer an adequate level of data protection (see the Schrems II judgement). Comparatively few Google services allow you to select where the servers are located, as to prevent transfers of personal data to countries where privacy cannot be guaranteed. For example, this is why Google Analytics (GA) is problematic. Google acts as a data processor for basic GA features but makes no promises about the location of servers. Thus, using GA implies a (probably) illegal transfer of personal data to the US.	You ask the wrong question first What do you save in the database? Let's take an example of a door: Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save who passed this door? Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save when the door was opened? Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save both? Only now, once you have established that you have any interest in the door passing at all, you have to start to figure out if it is personal data - if you have no interest in saving it in the first place, there's little reason to figure that out. Let's say you have a legitimate interest to save both, because behind the door is the server room, and physical access is limited to authorized personnel and you want to know when who was in there for figuring out if or who was responsible for changes. Now, which of the data is Personal Identifiable Data for you? You know where the door is. That's in itself Location Data, but if you don't know who or when the door was opened, then it is not PII. It becomes PII if you connect it with a person. A pin-code used by the whole department is not always PII, but can become PII in a very small to medium-sized department. e.g. one of all the 20 000 employees in a facility is just saying "an employee" and is not identifiable, but one of 20 is much more likely is, as you can correlate that with other data to possibly identify a smaller group. The Employee ID or Card would be most definitely PII if saved. Similar, if the login date is saved to the account list on some server. The timestamp on itself is not a PII, if only the timestamp is recorded and no other information exists. Like, if the front door only logs "The door was opened/closed" but not who did it, to count customers or schedule maintenance. However, together with other information - such as the door being access restricted and the paystubs from timekeeping when all those access carriers were in the building and having a tight access restriction to a decently small group (see above) - that can quickly become PII. It is enough that the information from different information sources compiled can become enough to say "it was one of these few people", as that is enough to make it identifiable under GDPR Art.4. Once you know it is PII, you need to handle it as PII. As such, you need consent or a legitimate interest. That's why I pulled the other test before figuring out if it is indeed PII: Ic you have already figured out that this data is required for some legitimate reason, such as that you need to know the door operation log to ensure some other compliance, then you can proceed through the other parts of the GDPR compliance. Now, OP asked about a login timestamp. That is by necessity bound to an identifier, such as a login name. As such, it is the Keycard or Employee ID example and automatically PII because it is tied to a PII. Definitions The GDPR defines PII in Article 4 ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The US Department of labor defines quite similar PII is defined as information: (i) that directly identifies an individual (e.g., name, address, social security number or other identifying number or code, telephone number, email address, etc.) or (ii) by which an agency intends to identify specific individuals in conjunction with other data elements, i.e., indirect identification.	Both of your question are creatures of contract. Their disclosures when you set up the account (or potentially amended disclosures or terms they've mailed to you subsequently) control both of these questions. They don't have to share the results of their internal investigation against you (they do have to give you proof that the deposit/transfer was fraudulent), but that does not give you access to their internal investigative process or its findings. They cannot shut down your account based on protected reasons (race, class, gender, religion, etc.), but the can certainly close an account pursuant to their operating procedures, their rules, terms and conditions or disclosures - all of which you agreed to (implicitly or explicitly) when opening the account. There is likely nothing you can do about either of these issues, unless the contract you formed with them by opening the account gives you that right, which would appear in their terms of service, disclosures, etc., and these almost always protect their right to do most anything when it comes to protecting the overall best interest of the corporate entity.	The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case.	a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days.	Defamation requires communication to a third-party I can say (or write) anything I want about a person directly to that person and, unless it is a threat, they have no recourse at all. I can call them a liar, a thief, a Nazi, or a goat fornicator. Of course, I have to be careful – calling them a “bastard” might be a slur on their mother communicated to a third-party (them) which would give her a right to sue although that would require a literal and largely archaic use of the term. That said, you do need to check with your lawyer if you can redact names in the face of a subpoena - complying with a legal obligations is a legitimate use of personal data under GDPR.	I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?
Is it legal to flee the scene of an accident to get help? Let's say that I'm in an car accident in which the driver of the other vehicle is injured. I originally stop to render aid and do what little I can to help the other driver, but they appear to have suffered serious injury and I'm afraid to attempt to render further aid for fear I may cause more harm then good. The accident happened in the middle of the night on a remote mountain road where there are no witnesses, and I currently don't have cell phone reception. If I were to get into my vehicle and drive away in hopes of finding either an residence with a landline or a location where I have sufficient reception to call for an ambulance would I still be guilty of fleeing the scene? Does it matter that I first stopped to render aid before leaving? Would it matter rather or not I return to the original scene of the accident after calling for help? I'm looking for US perspective. I'm in Maryland if specific jurisdiction matters.	Taking the stated facts at face value (i.e. you can prove them in court). Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-102 § 20-102. Driver to remain at scene -- Accidents resulting in bodily injury or death (a) Bodily injury. -- (1) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall stop the vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident, without obstructing traffic more than necessary. (2) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall return to and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver has complied with § 20-104 of this title. So, you must stay there until you have complied with § 20-104. Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-104 § 20-104. Duty to give information and render aid (a) Rendering assistance. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall render reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident and, if the person requests medical treatment or it is apparent that medical treatment is necessary, arrange for the transportation of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical treatment. (b) Duty to give certain information. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give his name, his address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to: (1) Any person injured in the accident; and (2) The driver, occupant of, or person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the accident. (c) Exhibiting license. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give the same information described in subsection (b) of this section and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to any police officer who is at the scene of or otherwise is investigating the accident. (d) If no one able to receive information. -- If a police officer is not present and none of the specified persons is in condition to receive the information to which the person otherwise would be entitled under this section, the driver, after fulfilling to the extent possible every other requirement of § 20-102 of this title and subsection (a) of this section, immediately shall report the accident to the nearest office of an authorized police authority and give the information specified in subsection (b) of this section. So, not only is it legal to leave to seek aid, its required.	Depending on the bridge, you might be trespassing in some way. Railway bridges are the property of the railway company, they don't allow to go there unless specifically allowed and even the absence of a sign is not an ok in those cases. Similarly, highway bridges usually are communal property and they don't need to be marked as off limits if there are laws that prohibit being there. The absence of signs and fencing is not a carte balance to go there: If your starting point for the climbing is not easily accessible, they don't have to fence it. But besides trespassing, you might make a huge dookey: Depending on the attorney general, you might be, in Austria, in violation of § 46 StVO for being a pedestrian on the Highway, as the bridge in whole is part of the highway structure. Even if you are under the lanes, you are technically on or inside the highway structure. If the attorney really wants you in, they could pull out § 89 StGB "endangerment" as well as the § 176 / § 177 "endangerment of the commonality" (by reckless or negligence). After all, you might or might not be climbing the bridge to perform something to endanger all the people using it. In Germany, you will get fined for violating traffic laws if you go onto railway tracks or climb onto a railway bridge as you violate the railway code and the minimum charge is 25 €. You could get also sued for Reckless endangerment of the train traffic (§ 315 StGB) and locked up for between 6 months and 10 years. If you do delay trains in any way (and even if it is to allow a crew to get to you), you are also liable damages - this is very easy in the 5 to 6 digits. Similarly, if it was a highway, you'd get billed 10 € for being on foot on a motorway without special privilege under $ 25 StVO and again, you could get jailed in extreme cases under § 315b StGB.	Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office.	united-states I am skiing and cause unintentional injury to another slope patron/client. How would I protect myself from being sued? Use reasonable care to avoid harming others, and follow all applicable rules of the ski area. Keep your equipment in good repair. Don't ski when you are drunk or high or in circumstances you can't handle. Try not to collide with people. If you do collide with someone do what you can to mitigate their injuries, identify ways to document facts favorable to you, and promptly contact your insurance company. Is there insurance if sued that could protect my assets if found negligent and cover legal costs of lawyer and trial, regardless if found negligent? For this, you need liability insurance. In the United States, liability insurance is typically included in homeowner's or renter's insurance. These kinds of liability insurance typically cover the cost of a legal defense of a covered claim and any damages awarded or paid in a settlement of those claims (up to the policy limits). These kinds of liability insurance would typically cover liability arising from a skiing accident and most other claims for negligence, but would typically not cover claims related to intentional acts or a criminal prosecution. A homeowner's or renter's insurance policy would also not typically cover vehicle accidents (e.g. your liability while operating a snowmobile), claims related to a business or an occupation, or claims related to contractual liability.	I am aware of a view of the California law that if a pedestrian looks like they might want to cross the street, any car must stop, but this is not supported by the law, which is about "yielding". The law incorporates both "yield" and "stop", the former being "and allow the other person to proceed". Ignoring the photo for a moment, the requirement to yield (not stop) allows a car to continue driving when the driver is e.g. 10 ft from the crosswalk and the pedestrian is three lanes over when they enter the crosswalk, remaining in compliance with the law. The pedestrian and the driven can continue with their journey because there is no conflict. The requirement to yield states whose right to proceed is subordinated to the other person's, in case of conflict. Turning to the video which shows what is in front but not behind, it is evident that the vehicle did not actually conflict with the pedestrian, who did not slow down in order to let the vehicle pass. The violation of social conventions is clear, in that the pedestrian enters the crosswalk while the car is 5 or so car lengths back, and can safely slow down so that there would be zero chance of hitting the pedestrian (it starts to slow but only trivially one the pedestrian is visibly 'crossing the street'). As far as I can determine, California case law has not established any numbers that constitute "not yielding". While I would stop in this circumstance, I don't see that there is a conflict between the pedestrian and the vehicle.	Given there was no answer here, I will state what I know about child abuse response, but note I am not a lawyer nor am I in Illinois, so my statements are likely generalized for most US states (individual laws vary by state, and I reside in Pennsylvania). In most US states, the police and child/youth services (that's what it's called in Pennsylvania but all states have similar services) work side by side and a complaint by the child to a police officer will have an emergency action taken to protect the child. The child is identified as a victim and the police and child/youth services have the obligation to protect the child and to keep them from harm. This is the main goal of police and children/youth services - to keep the child safe and act in the best interest of the child. Usually, a complaint to a child abuse center can take time to process. When a police complaint comes in it is more immediate, with police having more 'influence' with CYS (child/youth services). Especially when the child is in deadly danger (they were just stabbed, after all), the police may arrest the mother or abusive sibling or intervene therein to remove the child from the parents care with CYS-equivalent services working to find suitable alternative living situations for the child as a result of a order of removal/protection authorized by a judge. (PA at least had emergency situation response plans for these situations where a judge is just a phone call away). As well, the child will likely be made a ward of the state if the courts determine the mother cannot care for the child or is a threat as such (not caring enough to stop the brother may count), insomuch that the child may be removed from the dangerous situation and placed in the care of a willing relative or if none can be found will be placed in temporary foster care in a safer environment. Note that nothing happens rapidly without the initial complaint to the police. At age 16 the child is likely going to be taken more seriously (compared to a 12 year old, for example), and has the right to be allowed to reach out to hospital staff to ask to speak to a police officer - otherwise it takes a child abuse complaint from someone who knows the child and situation and that can sometimes take longer to process (though, the distance factor in the original question may make a complaint from overseas given a lower priority due to not knowing the person on a more personal in-person level)	UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence.	If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules.
Is there any legal requirement to use the phrase "you've been served", as seen on television and in movies? Many American television shows and movies who have a character who is being served some kind of legal documents will have them handed some papers and then being told "You've been served". Is this a required part of the process service process? What laws regulate the wording that should, or must be used, when serving documents?	Service of process is jurisdictional, but specific phrasing isn't typically specified by statute. For example, here's the Illinois statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-203(a): Except as otherwise expressly provided, service of summons upon an individual defendant shall be made (1) by leaving a copy of the summons with the defendant personally, (2) by leaving a copy at the defendant's usual place of abode, with some person of the family or a person residing there, of the age of 13 years or upwards, and informing that person of the contents of the summons, provided the officer or other person making service shall also send a copy of the summons in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed to the defendant at his or her usual place of abode, or (3) as provided in Section 1-2-9.2 of the Illinois Municipal Code with respect to violation of an ordinance governing parking or standing of vehicles in cities with a population over 500,000. The certificate of the officer or affidavit of the person that he or she has sent the copy in pursuance of this Section is evidence that he or she has done so. The key is that the service of process be completed. Legally, this implies that the server will file an affidavit that describes the circumstances of the legal completion of service. For example, here is a sample affidavit. Like any other trade, process servers have an association that offers training, publishes a policy manual, and abides by certain best practices. All that said, the best practices don't specify any specific verbiage. Rather they elaborate a preference for the methods of service (e.g. personal vs. drop) and the like.	It is the duty of the witness to give the testimony, no matter what their nationality is. As a witness, a German citizen is not different from a French, Uruguayan, or even a stateless. The only letter the judge will usually give them in addition to a verbal thanks is a formal letter recognizing that they have, on suchandsuch day(s), been called as a witness to the court and appeared. This is usually given to any witness and pretty much a form. It does serve as evidence for example in cases of absence from work - and you are entitled to the losses you incurred for appearing in court if you formally request them. It isn't forbidden to request a different letter from a judge, but they might not give such an extraordinary letter of appreciation, because that might taint the case: it could raise the question if the testimony was bought with or made to gain such a letter.	Do I correctly understand that Federal employees, notably including the Armed Forces, pledge their duty first to the Constitution of the United States and only secondarily to carry out legal orders? And that they have no legal obligation to execute an illegal order? What process allows a subordinate to defy an illegal order if a superior gives the order? What legal protection does the subordinate have? All officers of the United States government (and for that matter also all officers of state and local governments) including soldiers in the armed forces are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Members of the armed forces are not only allowed to disregard illegal orders, they are obligated to not carry out illegal orders. Operationally, disobeying an order due to the fact that it is unconstitutional is a defense to an effort to fire or discipline a federal government civil service employee who may only be fired for good cause after due process. In the military, the issue would usually present itself in the form of a defense in a court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Of course, it would hardly be unprecedented for someone's firing from a job that was unlawful, or for a wrongful court-martial conviction, to be upheld on appeal. Suppose the Congress holds someone in contempt. The Congress, as I understand it, goes to a court to enforce the contempt charge. The court turns to Federal law enforcement to bring action. What if the President directs Federal law enforcement to ignore the court order? What if law enforcement complies with the President? The U.S. Justice Department is charged with bringing contempt of Congress cases at the request of Congress. But, an attorney retained by Congress could probably bring such an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia if the U.S. Justice Department refused to do so. Contempt may be civil or criminal, and unlike ordinary criminal charges (felonies can only be brought based upon grand jury indictments and grand juries are controlled by prosecutors) either civil or criminal contempt charges can be brought by a non-governmental employee attorney. The established practice is to seek contempt sanctions against the lowest level employee who has the authority to take the action requested, or to seek contempt sanctions against everyone from that lowest level employee up through the chain of command to the responsible cabinet officer. The President is generally not named as a party against whom contempt charges are sought. Defiance of the law in the face of a binding and immediately effective court order would be a constitutional crisis and you would need to move to the realm of politics and political realities, and away from the realm of what the law says that people should or should not do, to meaningfully predict how a constitutional crisis turns out. The law assumes that all government officials will obey a lawful court order duly enforced. If government law enforcement officers start defying court orders, then there is a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, the vast majority of law enforcement officers in the United States are civil servants who aren't beholden personally to the President. They were appointed on a merit basis, they are civil servants who can't be fired without good cause and due process, they are in agencies that have an institutional culture of obeying court orders. The civil servants with more seniority (and basically all senior military officers in the U.S. military) have served under multiple Presidents of different political parties. The number of political appointees supervising them is fairly modest. Likewise, most federal judges at any given time were appointed by prior Presidents and even judges appointed by a current President will not infrequently rule against the federal government when the facts and law demand that they do so. There is less politics and there is more unity in interpretation of the law among federal judges and federal law enforcement and legal officials than is generally assumed by more cynical members of the general public. Suppose Congress orders fines. What is to be done if no one will enforce the fines? A court can order that the fines be paid out of the U.S. Treasury. The order itself can have the force of law without the cooperation of any U.S. Treasury official. Sustained defiance of such a court order would lead to a constitutional crisis. Same scenario as 1 but this time it’s impeachment and conviction: the President defies any action to remove him. What if the President simply barricades himself in the White House and orders security and military personnel to protect him? Is there a protocol in the U.S. military hierarchy to deal with this scenario? This has never actually happened, of course, so it is hypothetical. The Treasury Department, General Services Administration and Secretary of State (and all other government officials) should revoke privileges that the President has by virtue of being President and provide them to the new acting President (realistically, in the simple scenario presented, current Vice President Pence). The military should stay out of it, but should immediately start treating acting President Pence, and not the impeached incumbent as the Commander-in-Chief. U.S. military forces are indoctrinated on the Presidential succession and it is unlikely that many military officers would disregard a Presidential impeachment. The Secret Service should stop defending the former President except in an ex-President capacity. In theory, one could imagine acting President Pence bringing an eviction action in the local courts of the District of Columbia just as one would with any holdover tenant. Since the local courts in D.C. are federal, this doesn't present the federalism problems that it would if the same thing were done in a state court with respect to federal real estate, and U.S. marshals would evict him and his family like anyone else. The trickier situation in terms of creating a constitutional crisis, honestly, is really one where the President is clearly and blatantly defying the law and court orders, but the U.S. Senate refuses to convict the President in an impeachment proceeding out of partisan bias. What should common citizens do if any of these scenarios play out? Whatever they want, in a lawful manner. Ultimately, this would be a matter for federal government officials (elected and appointed alike) to figure out.	Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either.	What does it accomplish? It guarantees that all corporations doing business in New York can be served. (A company's having an agent for the service of process does not prohibit people from serving the corporation directly. The secretary may be "the agent upon which process may be served" but is not "the sole agent upon which process must be served." And besides, process need not be served on an agent; it can be served on the company itself, at its office or on one of its officers.) With this requirement, New York makes it impossible for a company to avoid service of process by closing or moving its offices, by sending its officers and employees out of state, or by making itself unavailable by any means. No matter what steps a company might take to avoid service of process, the process server can always resort to serving the company's agent: the Secretary of State.	These questions are typically left to the discretion of the judge in whose courtroom the presentation is happening. It is very common to see these types of devices in trial courts, but they are much less common in appellate courts, and I doubt you'd ever see one in the United States Supreme Court, where the arguments are essentially limited to oral presentations.	It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal.	I infer from the use of the past tense "worked" that you no longer work for the company in question. Also, from the fact that you are wondering whether there might be negative consequences, I infer that you do not have permission to use the systems in question. The specific consequences will depend on where the company and its computers are located, as well as on the nature of the systems you log in to and on what you do with those systems, but it's certainly possible to receive a penalty of several years' imprisonment. The fact that you created the system in question makes no difference.
What is the point of filing a case with an absurd damage/loss amount? In light of recent college admissions scandal, a woman has sued Loughlin and Huffman for $500 billion. Here is a man who filed for $2 undecillion dollars, in case you need to look it up, it is more money than exists in the entire world. Dalton Chiscolm v BoA for $1,784 Billion Trillion What is the point of suing for such an absurd amount? For any of these cases it is obviously not recoverable from the defendants in this lifetime or the next 100. Why would a judge entertain such lawsuits with those damage amounts, and why would a lawyer even attach their name to that kind of case?	The amount requested has little or nothing to do with the amount, if any, eventually awarded. Once can sue "for 100 million dollars" and be awarded 100 dollars, and although it is rarer, one can be awarded more than the amount asked for when suit is field. That initial amount now serves as a peg to hang sensational news stores on, and nothing more. The plaintiff, and the plaintiff's lawyer, may consider that such publicity serves them well. Such inflated amounts are not grounds to dismiss the suit, so there is no downside to including them, except possibly negative publicity if people mock the demand.	Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.	Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).	Bankruptcy does not obliterate legal financial obligations (taxes that you owe, fines, etc.). Fines either do or do not (any more) accrue interest, depending on jurisdiction. Fines for criminal conviction can accrue interest. By law, no fine can be unreasonable, but there is no simple determination of what is reasonable versus unreasonable. The matter reduces to whether the penalty would be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. Federal law suggests a upper-ballpark of $250,000 for an individual felony or $5,000 for an infraction, but there is no actual upper limit, for example a crime resulting in pecuniary gain may receive a fine of twice that gain, so fines can be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The government can seize property including wages in order to satisfy a legal financial obligation. However, you can not be imprisoned because of an unpaid fine, although you can be imprisoned for willfully not paying a fine when ordered to do so (there is no legal clarity as to what constitutes "willful" non-payment). As noted in this article, seemingly small fines can balloon to large sums (they cite an example of a 4-fold increase in initial fine owing to interest and similar increases.	Here's the thing: if the plaintiff/appellant/claimant are the same legal entity as the defendant/respondent, it's plain to see that one of them must lose. For instance, consider a case where two trains operated by the same corporation collide. Assuming that the drivers both performed their duties, the company is vicariously liable – such a case is frivolous and is likely to be thrown out for that reason. It's just a waste of time and money. Or your second example: If the woman was driving the city vehicle and crashed it in the course of her duties, it is the city that will be the defendant in the proceedings, not the woman. So essentially: while it's difficult to prove that something has never happened, these are good reasons to expect it would not happen.	Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to "lawyer up" if we want to be safe? If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, if they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle. If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff. Otherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case. If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them. As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.) To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear.	You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all	If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options: You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly. In this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining one case. If you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. Nobody knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk. All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.) Your state has a vexatious litigant list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate.
GDPR treatment of a list of phone numbers How should a list of phone numbers be treated with respect to the GDPR? Assume each number is a personal number and will go to an individual, but that there is no other information stored related to the individual.	Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46".	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different.	GDPR defines the responsibility of Companies to ensure that Personal Data in their possession is maintained Secure ensuring Confidentiality and Privacy towards the Data Subjects to whom it pertains. Prior to the Articles themselves, there are notes and over (49) one may read that companies must have in place (where applicable) mechanisms like CERT and any other SECURITY assuring tools/ processes. (83) again is all about ensuring Security. (94) reads that if the Controller (company) find it cannot ensure Security it must stop processing activities and report to the Supervisory Authority for guidance and support. Then we have Article 3 (f) establishing that it is the company responsibility to "... ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organizational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’)..." Bottom line... T&C Companies must ensure that Personal Data is processed by them (and that includes communications) are Secure while ensuring Confidentiality and Pricavy towards the Data Subjects. The wording "...commercially reasonable efforts..." is wrong, because it is not something that may be a legal requirement or not depending on "cost"; it is a Legal Obligation. Then "... the Internet is not an inherently secure environment and so we cannot guarantee the security of your Personal Information..."; this is just "poor legal advice" for GDPR does expect companies to make the Internet safe, it expects companies to maintain their IT Landscape safe... an analogy can be made about going through a group of sharks in the ocean while just swimming or on board of a big boat... the ocean is dangerous due to the sharks, yet if you are in a big boat, you won't even notice them. Then the "cherry on top"; "... e assume no liability for any disclosure of data due to errors in transmission, unauthorized third-party access or other acts of third parties, or acts or omissions beyond our reasonable control..."; now i really do not know which lawyer has written this, but it basically reads something like: "the law obliges me to ensure you are safe... however I am not able to". Now, I have seen similar "statements", but I must confess it was like 2 or 3 years ago... most companies have corrected them over time and since they become aware that penalties were for real. Just a final disclaimer It is a fact that while in transit (over the Internet) a message being delivered through a T&C Company Services will travel through 3rd party infrastructure contexts, rendering it at risk ... however, if it is properly encrypted (as it should) the transition time will not be sufficient for a successful breach attempt. So, yes they are capable of ensuring all they have stated they can not.	You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though.	Possibly, but probably not. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. The statement “Alice is sick” is information, and relates to Alice who is identifiable. Processing personal data is not inherently illegal, but does require a legal basis per Art 6 GDPR, such as a legitimate interest. Here, the information is data concerning health, processing of which is prohibited unless one of the explicit exceptions applies (such as explicit consent, or legal obligations). So it is legitimate to have concerns on whether disclosure of this information would be legal. If these rules were breached, that would be on the data controller. Here, the company would be the data controller, not Bob (unless Bob acted against training and instructions and processed the personal data for his own purposes). However, GDPR probably doesn't apply to this specific interaction. In Art 2(1), the GDPR says that This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. A conversation itself would not be subject to GDPR rules – there is no filing system or similar structured data involved. What GDPR would prevent is to keep records on Alice's health status, but doesn't necessarily prevent talking about it informally. For example, the EUR 35.3M fine against H&M in Germany was imposed not because managers talked with employees about personal matters, but because they then maintained detailed files about those personal matters. Data controllers are responsible though for ensuring security and compliance through appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). TOMs can include things such as non-disclosure agreements and training for staff. If Bob acts against such training, there could be repercussions along the Bob–Company employment relationship. But that would mostly be an employment law thing, not so much a GDPR thing.	It seems clear that this is personal information under the GDPR. If you are subject to the GDPR, you need to have a "lawful basis" to store or process such information. (You are subject to the GDPR if you are locates in the EU, or if your users are. My understanding is that it is location at the time the app is accessed that matters, not a user's citizenship. I am not totally sure about that, however. Unless your app is limited to non-EU access, it it probably safest to comply with the GDPR) The degree of precision of your location data will not matter -- a specific city is quite enough to make it personal data if it can be tied to a specific person. There are various lawful bases that may be relied on for processing and storage, but explicit consent is probably the one with the widest applicability. To use consent as the lawful basis, you must present an OPT-IN decision to the user, and record the results. If the user does nothing, the result must record lack of consent. You may not use a pre-checked consent box or another mechanism that has the effect of an opt-out choice. You should be clear about what information will be stored, and how it will or might be used. You will also need to consider how your app will function for those who do not consent, and how to handle requests to withdraw consent. So if an app obtains user consent to store location data in a manner that complies with the GDPR, it may store user location data. The consent should make the possible uses of the data clear. If the data is to be shared, the consent should make the possible extent of sharing clear. Some previous questions and answers here on law.se dealing with GDPR consent that seem possibly relevant: User consent required under GDPR What provisions should I make regarding GDPR consent when users do not sign themselves up? GDPR - Withdrawn user consent Opt Out Consent under GDPR	This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy.
Is there a term for a set of laws where breaking one results in breaking others? Is there a term for laws or regulations that are written to refer to other rules in the set such that breaking one also breaks other laws? An example is easiest way to show what I am describing: Always drive at or less than 25 mph Always follow rule #1 Follow all rules in this set In this case, if one drives 30 mph, it breaks rule #1. However, it also breaks rules #2 and #3. Is this allowed? Is there a legal term to argue against it?	It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.	Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section.	Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.	I believe the answer you seek can be found by searching for the terms "(desired state name) statutes pedestrian crossing." In the case of the state of Florida, there are references to the situation you describe. Some of it appears slightly contradictory, but the ones that apply are not ambiguous: (10) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. (12) No pedestrian shall, except in a marked crosswalk, cross a roadway at any other place than by a route at right angles to the curb or by the shortest route to the opposite curb. The contradictory portion appears thus: (11) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. There appears to be no reference regarding distances between adjacent intersections. It's unreasonable for one to be expected to walk a half mile (0.8 km) if there's a mile between intersections. There's an area nearby in which the traffic control signals are spaced about that distance apart. Cities may have specific regulations regarding such activities.	No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket.	Your question isn't quite as simple as it sounds; some civil cases are tried before juries, and though a judge can give directions to a jury to give a particular verdict, they are not always required to obey; there are eighteenth-century English cases on the point that established that principle for most related jurisdictions. But your last sentence does have a simple answer: No. A judge usually takes an oath on assuming office, to administer the law without fear or favour. That means he will investigate the relevant law (with the assistance of the parties' lawyers), and enforce what it says. "This law would be unfair to the customer, so I will ignore it" would be just as bad as "The mechanic threatened to hit me with a wrench, so I find for him". Of course, most jurisdictions do have overriding principles of fairness; it may be that this contract term was not shown to the customer, so is not enforceable, or it may be that it is contrary to public policy to be uncertain what repairs will cost. But unless there is an explicit legal reason, the judge will have to find for the mechanic. It would be neither improper nor unusual for the judgment to include the sentence "This result is clearly unfair to the customer, and I urge the legislature to look at closing the loophole; nevertheless, the law is clear, and I find the customer must pay the increased price."	Here is a substantial collection of interpretive canons; this article discusses rules vs. canons. This article discusses contract interpretation from both the perspectives of drafting and litigating. These are all from the perspective of common law systems. This article (in English) and this chapter (English, paywall) reminds us that French contract law is different, to which I would add this which focuses on the French subjective theory of contracts – starkly distinct from the common law theory. This page (en français) will probably be of most interest to you. The 2016 modification to the civil code added art. 1190 (and other articles) which says Dans le doute, le contrat de gré à gré s'interprète contre le créancier et en faveur du débiteur, et le contrat d'adhésion contre celui qui l'a proposé which is contra proferentem. The Latin name is not officially assigned to this law, and being a new addition to French law, it's too early to tell if it will be so named in French legal practice.	Because breaking the law is not breach of contract (Necessarily). Were you to use the model to 3D-print a gun and rob banks with it, without this clause, you have not broken the contract. That would mean that the provider could neither sue you for any damages the use of their model in your crime spree might have caused them, nor can they legally terminate the licence with you.
How to act in name of company rather than natural person by e-mail etc? It makes a difference for tax and liability reasons if an action is done by a natural person vs a legal entity. How to make sure that actions are ascribed to the legal entity rather than one's natural person? What are the requirements by law and best practices? For e-mail, I guess a e-mail domain name with the name of the company would be advisable? Or an e-mail signature that is attached to every e-mail?	The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one.	That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal.	Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them.	This notice has no legal power what so ever. This has been, and is being, used as a legal backup and a scare tactic. For the most part, if someone gets some sort of "sensitive" information in an email, and it was not intended for them - this notice will serve as a scare tactic to make people get rid of it because of the legal sound of the disclaimer. Also, the senders are preparing themselves for a legal battle by having the notice in email’s body. In case that the sender sent some “sensitive” data to the wrong recipient, they can be potentially held liable for privacy breach of information similar stuff. So, when they show up in court they can potentially use the argument that they did everything within their power to protect the information by adding the disclaimer and the fact that the privacy breach happened is due to a natural human error. Basically, there is no disclaimer that can protect against actual libelous or defamatory content. The most a disclaimer can accomplish in this respect is to reduce the responsibility of the company, since it can prove that the company has acted responsibly and done everything in its power to stop employees from committing these offenses. [1] If you as an employee of a company shared sensitive information or personal information by mistake, you, and the company are still liable for your own action. It can be argued in court that the recipient’s email was not verified, that a human error is not an excuse because the information could have been encrypted with a password, the information could have been transmitted via a phone call or in person, and a bunch of other excuses that will hold the company liable for damages. There is no legal doctrine or theory under which an email confidentiality disclaimer is enforceable in a circumstance like this. There is virtually no scholarly analysis of the impact of email disclaimers and very little analysis by non-scholars. One of the few authors who have commented on the subject suggests that the misconception that email disclaimers have validity may arise from the mistaken belief that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) somehow applies. Michael Santarcangelo, “Do Email Disclaimers Matter?,” Sec. Catalyst (Oct. 17, 2007). But, as this author points out, the ECPA prohibits only “intercepting” emails. Emails that arrive at their destination—even if the sender did not intend that destination—are not emails that have been intercepted in transit, and the ECPA is therefore inapplicable. In short, the ECPA is focused on the criminal intent of the interceptor, not the ability of the sender to execute his or her own intentions. With regard to communications with lawyers, the rules are a little different. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) states, “A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.” It is noteworthy that the rule requires only notice and doesn’t require refraining from reading the document or prohibit other use of the document. And a number of states haven’t even adopted Rule 4.4(b), so there may not be a requirement even to notify the sender in certain states. Nonetheless, if a court is examining “fairness” in connection with waiver of privilege, a disclaimer on an email sent to a lawyer might help. [4]	I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.	Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.	No more than using your own phone, eyeglasses or underwear while working for the LLC. These are all tools of trade than one wold expect employees of the LLC to bring to their job (especially underwear). There is potentially a problem if assets of the LLC are alienated for personal use rather than the other way around. However, that would be subject to a reasonableness test - using your work computer to book a personal holiday is eminently reasonable. Where there is a real liability issue is if the use of that personal asset caused damage to third parties e.g. if the personal computer was hacked and damage resulted. This would allow a potential plaintiff to bypass the LLC and sue the owner directly (or, more likely, as well).	The common law is permissive That is to say that, in a common law jurisdiction, the law is about what you must not do rather than about what you must do. Now, particular statutes may be phrased as requiring certain actions but, if you read them the “common law way” to coin a phrase, they are really imposing sanctions for doing the prohibited thing that falls outside those parameters. Since there is no legal prohibition on using multiple names (simultaneously or sequentially) you are free to do so. Now, there are common law prohibitions of, for example, fraud or tax evasion. So, if you use different names for the purpose of doing those prohibited things, then that is illegal but it is the specific criminality that is sanctioned, not the use of the alias in perpetrating it. The UK has a law that makes it a crime to not register the birth of a child. It also imposes some (and by most country’s standards, very few) restrictions on the name a child can be registered under. But there is no legal obligation on the child or their parents to use the registered name in any particular circumstances. There may be difficulties (amounting to impossibility in some cases) in obtaining a passport, opening a bank account, or claiming social security under a non-registered name but that is due to the necessity to identify the individual for which the name serves as a proxy. However, outside the requirements of specific statutes or administrative procedures, the common law position is that your name is what people call you and you identify as your name. The second part is important - I have been called dickhead on many occasions but I do not consider it to be my name. The UK has a patronymic tradition for surnames so, usually, on marriage, the female adopts the surname of the male and that, through the marriage certificate, becomes her registered name. However, it is extremely common for women to continue to use their original (and now not registered) name in their professional life and her new name in her private life. This can be problematic. My wife, has on server all occasions been refused permission to board a plane because the ticket (booked by others) was in her maiden name - a name for which she has no official identification. However, that’s a procedural problem - she didn’t do anything illegal.
lying to lawyer illegal It's against the law to lie to a lawyer, isn't it? This will vary by state, but I understand that almost any attorney admitted to practice in at least one court (that would be most attorneys by far) is an officer of that court. If a particular lie is perjury (thus a violation of law, which defines perjury differently in some different jurisdictions) when uttered to the government, then uttering that lie to an attorney who is an officer of a court of the same government is perjury. This would not be limited to attorneys acting for a government such as prosecutors or private attorneys general. It would not matter whether the lawyer is representing the person who thus lied, under consideration to provide representation, or neither. It probably would not matter whether the lie is being told in the jurisdiction where the lawyer is an officer of a court, the lawyer was admitted pro hac vice, i.e., for purposes limited to one case, the lawyer does not have an active practice, the lawyer only advises other lawyers and does not represent anyone (such as by performing legal research without a confidentiality privilege), the lawyer is retired (but not diisbarred), the lie involves fraud, or the lawyer tells anyone else the content of the statement that is a lie without the lawyer personally intending to lie (as in "my client said . . ."). It probably matters whether the person who is lying knew or should have known that the person to be lied to is an attorney admitted to practice somewhere, or at least is an attorney. I don't think it's possible to distinguish between lying to the government and lying to an individual who is part of that government, because there is no other way to lie to the government. Even if the lie were told in a letter addressed only to "Government, State of . . ., [capital city, state, and Zip code]" and a machine opened the letter, scanned it into a computer, and used artificial intelligence to parse it with the AI having been written as free open-source software by a nongovernment programmer, if a human being on behalf of the government acts on the letter (including by deciding not to act on it), the lie is to a human who programmed the parsing system and/or to a human who acted on the parsed letter. Unless there's a law specifically exempting the liar from liability (criminal and civil) when lying to a lawyer (and it would be interesting to theorize about the rationale for such a law), how is it not illegal (unlawful) to lie to a lawyer under the above circumstances? I have no case involving this possibility. I'm thinking of writing about this, and I've seen various discussions that it's not illegal except for fraud (fraud has at least one additional element that makes it harder to prove than perjury), but none of the discussions I saw cited a source in the law. On the other hand, while I don't follow developments in the law with a practicing lawyer's diligence, I haven't heard of, say, a case against a client for having lied to their lawyer (viz., "I didn't go to the bank" while confessing to the police about robbing it in person without recanting the confession), and I imagine a few lawyers would gladly sue people for perjury to them. On the other hand, and this is just my speculation, maybe most lawyers don't think there's much of a problem and that letting the courts decide would create more problems than it's worth.	No A lawyer is considered an "officer of the court" in the sense that certain duties to the court are imposed on the lawyer. That does not give the lawyer authority as if the lawyer was part of the court staff, nor a law enforcement officer. A statement can be prosecuted as perjury only if it is made under oath (or affirmation) in court, or if it is made "under penalty of perjury". This is generally done by a statement in a document signed, something like "I declare under penalty of perjury that all statements in the above document are true to the best of my knowledge and belief." It can also be done verbally, with the person making the statement agreeing that it is true and that this is subject to perjury prosecution if it is false. The exact wording will vary, but it must be clear and explicit. Aside from that, false statements to a lawyer are not generally subject to prosecution for perjury, nor otherwise illegal. In some cases a lie in a business transaction may be fraud, which is actionable, and possibly criminal. But that will not have anything to do with whether the person lied to is or is not a lawyer. This Wikipedia article says: Perjury is the intentional act of swearing a false oath or falsifying an affirmation to tell the truth, whether spoken or in writing, concerning matters material to an official proceeding. ... The rules for perjury also apply when a person has made a statement under penalty of perjury even if the person has not been sworn or affirmed as a witness before an appropriate official. An example is the US income tax return, which, by law, must be signed as true and correct under penalty of perjury The US Federal law on perjury, 18 U.S. Code § 1621 says: (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States. Title 9 of the Maryland code, section 9-101 says: (a) Prohibited.- A person may not willfully and falsely make an oath or affirmation as to a material fact: (1) if the false swearing is perjury at common law; (2) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local law; (3) in an affidavit made to induce a court or officer to pass an account or claim; (4) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local government or governmental official with legal authority to require the issuance of an affidavit; or (5) in an affidavit or affirmation made under the Maryland Rules. (b) Penalty.- A person who violates this section is guilty of the misdemeanor of perjury and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years. Nothing about statements made to a lawyer not under oath or affirmation, or under penalty of perjury. Other US state laws are similar.	I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.	Lying may be wrong, but it in the United States, it is generally not illegal. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). For a lie to be illegal, it generally needs to fall into one of a few specific categories, usually involving either fraud or the frustration of legitimate government activities (as in perjury, falsification of records, or lying to a federal agent). In any of these cases, the First Amendment is generally going to prohibit any penalties unless the false statement is material, i.e., it had the potential to change the outcome of the event in which it was uttered. As you noted, it is generally illegal to discriminate against Asians, so I would expect a court to treat the tenant's ethnicity as immaterial and require the landlord to honor the rental contract. Of course, this assumes that the landlord is prohibited from disciminating against Asians, which is not always true. The Fair Housing Act has exemptions for (a) private clubs; (b) for buildings with four or fewer units, one of which the landlord occupies; (c) for single-family homes that the landlord is renting without the help of an agent; and (d) for religious organizations. In such a case, the landlord may be actually be permitted to disciminate against Asians, so the tenant's false statement about their ethnicity would become material the transaction, and a court may therefore permit the landlord to rescind the contract. (Note, though, that even though the FHA permits discrimination in those limited situations, it does not permit advertising discriminatory preferences. The landlord's "No Asians" language is therefore illegal, whether it is communicated on a sign in the window or in a classified ad or by word of mouth.)	My lawyer answers my question, thinking he is giving legal advice to a non-client when he is actually answering a client's question. But if you read the FAQ, posts at law.stachexchange are not legal advice. In fact, questions that are so specific as to risk becoming a request for legal advice are routinely closed. But let's go further: The issue at hand is not the one your lawyer is hired to help you with. He is not your lawyer for that issue. Even if we considered the relationship through law.stackexchange legal representation, the conversation would not be privileged. You are posting in a public forum, and expecting reply in the same way. You are free to waive the privilege of communication with your lawyer, and you are doing that by using this way of communicating with him. At this point, the only thing your lawyer would have done would be voluntarily giving for free some info that he could have billed you for. What exactly would be the issue here? It is exactly what pro bono is for. The only way to breach confidentiality would be if your lawyer were to convey things that you said to him confidentially to the public, but here it would not be relevant if the OPs author were already his customer or not.	We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.	This appears to be a complaint about lawyers using the legal process to achieve what their client wants. Forgive me, but this seems to be like complaining that doctors only want to cure the client's disease, architects only want to design the client's buildings and generals only want to kill the client's enemies. Your lawyer is not your business strategist or your life coach! A civil case is always about the money. If you are pursuing a civil case over a principle then you are going to spend a lot of money and probably lose. The use of a lawyer should always be part of your wider negotiation strategy in the same way that your armed forces are part of your diplomacy; in both cases the threat of use is usually better than the actual use. A civil case always follows a failure to successfully negotiate. Not all by any means, but most, civil cases would be better settled by agreement than litigation by all parties. If you believe that your objectives can best be served by a social media campaign, political pressure, etc. then go for it. Your lawyer can advise you what the risks are wrt to defamation etc. but ultimately how you choose to pursue your goal is up to you. Lawyers, understandably, look for legal solutions. A public relations professional is far better placed than a lawyer to inform your media strategy.	The answers to your questions are, generally speaking, contained in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. It's important to note these aren't mandatory across the country, although some states have implemented Rules that closely track them while others have their own Rules. Start with Rule 1(e), which defines informed consent as the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct Next up is Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer. Subject to two exceptions, a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. The two exceptions are in Rule 1.2(c) and 1.2(d): an attorney can limit the scope of representation with a specific client after obtaining the client's informed consent and an attorney is forbidden from counseling a client to engage or assist him in engaging in conduct the attorney knows to be illegal/fraudulent. Finally, as it was mentioned in 1.2, we turn to Rule 1.4, Communications. (a) A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules; (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. (emphasis added) Your question was Are the above distinctions more or less the correct ones? The answer is yes and no. As to the objective of the representation, the client makes that decision. How to arrive at that outcome is not as cut-and-dry. From the language in the above Rules, there is not one party or the other who has the "final say." (I say this notwithstanding the fact that, because the client can't go file something on his own, technically the lawyer has final say as he or she is the one who must file a document with the court). Major decisions in the litigation have to be explained to the client and, after that, the client must give consent approving the decision. How does this work in real life? Frankly, it will depend on the client and the lawyer. And don't worry, the phrase "a doctor or lawyer who treats themselves has a fool for a client" is not only apt, it's common sense. When a person is involved in a conflict, their point of view is skewed in their favor and to represent themselves is risk their blindspots leading to unnecessary potential pitfalls throughout the case.	Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority.
Does 'in writing' imply handwritten? My rental contract states that I need to give notice 'in writing' to my landlord prior to ending my tenancy. I'm new to legal terms and the country, does this phrase imply the notice needs to be filled in by hand and signed manually, or would an electronic copy of the notice with electronic signatures suffice?	No "In writing" does not at all imply "written by hand". A typed or printed document is equally "in writing" and indeed is often preferred. These days an email or other electronic document is also considered to be "in writing", unless a contract specifies that notice must be made by postal mail, or some such requirement. If a document must be in writing and "signed" there are various ways of executing an electronic signature which are legally fully equivalent to a manual written signature. What thye requirement of notice in writing really means is that the notice cannot be spoken in person or by telephone, nor in any other way that does not involve some form of writing. Electronic signatures See "Overview of electronic signature law and its legality in Canada". Also, this Wikipedia article says: Canadian law distinguishes between the generic "electronic signature" and the "secure electronic signature". Federal secure electronic signature regulations make it clear that a secure electronic signature is a digital signature created and verified in a specific manner. Canada's Evidence Act contains evidentiary presumptions about both the integrity and validity of electronic documents with attached secure electronic signatures, and of the authenticity of the secure electronic signatures themselves.	It means that the scholar (presumably you) and the guarantor/surety should each write their initials in that space, i.e. the first letters of their first and last names. John Smith would write "JS". This is a common way of acknowledging that you have read and understood the text on the page.	Can I just not renew their contract and go back to my place in 2 months or do I still need to give them 6 months' notice? Short answer: 6 months' notice Long answer: I'm assuming this is a fixed-term Assured Shorthold Tenancy. Unless a landlord is going down the Section 8 route where the tenant has broken the tenancy agreement, they will need to serve a "Section 21 Notice" under the Housing Act 1988 requesting the tenant to leave a property. The Act has been amended to extend this notice period to 6 months, and any fixed-term tenancy that ends during that period will roll over to a periodic tenancy until the end of the notice period. This is the relevant extract from the government's website: Section 21 notices requiring possession of a property under an assured shorthold tenancy Landlords can only use a Section 21 notice to ask their tenants to leave their property: If the notice expires at or after the end of the fixed term. During a tenancy with no fixed end date - known as a ‘periodic’ tenancy. From 29 August 2020, a Section 21 notice must give tenants at least 6 months’ notice of the fact that the landlord requires possession. This give some more detail about s.21 Notices.	You can read about your rights as a California tenant at http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/landlordbook/catenant.pdf This is rather ridiculous: 1) No judge will evict someone for paying rent by mail. (I assume you have the new landlord's address.) 2) If the landlord cashes the check you mail then he's not going to be able to claim you didn't pay the rent. If he actually refuses to cash your mailed check then that's all to the good for you. 3) You can ignore any requirements imposed by the new landlord that aren't in the lease, just as the landlord could ignore any new requirement imposed on him by you. Even some terms in a lease can be ignored, because not all terms in a contract are legal. (This is especially the case in tenant-landlord law.) If you think there will be trouble then use certified mail.	Typically the landlord will have a preexisting clause in the lease that says the landlord may choose to amend the lease at a later date. While that may be in contracts, I don't see that holding up in court. You can't unilaterally amend contracts to add new terms without acceptance on part of the lessee. Any clause in the contract like that will require notification of the lessee of the change and a chance for the lessee to terminate the contract without recourse on part of the lessor. Generally this must be done in the same format as the original lease (written). Most jurisdictions don't allow for a verbal amendment to a written lease. So in a way, yes, it is legal for a landlord to require payment via a certain method (like a direct debit from a bank account). They cannot however change the payment terms unilaterally without notification and acceptance. They can use language such as sending the notification (via registered mail) and then saying that a failure to respond is acceptance (because you are, by actions, accepting the terms by continuing to live there).	http://www.tenantslegalcenter.com/html/eviction_notices.html 3 DAY NOTICE TO CURE BREACH (sometimes called PERFORM COVENANT) OR QUIT is used to notify a tenant that he/she has 3 days to do or stop doing something as per the rental agreement or the law. The tenant can comply with the notice or vacate within the 3 days. If the tenant vacates within the 3 days, he/she is NOT relieved from the rent obligation under the lease or rental agreement. So, the notice must be based on a law and/or the lease agreement. Presumably, the law and/or lease provision must be cited in the notice. The City of San Diego has a GOOD CAUSE law (Right to Know Ordinance) protecting certain tenants in a residential tenancy of at least TWO years and that good cause must be written in the notice. You state that you've been there seven years, so this law applies. To count the days of a notice, you begin on the next day after service as the first day. Weekends and holidays are counted but the last day of a notice to act generally may not land on a weekend or holiday. If it does, and if applicable to that notice, the "last day" can carry over to the next business day. For example, if a 3 day notice to pay rent is served on a Thursday, we count Friday as the first day Sunday is the third day. Since the last day of this type of notice cannot be a Sunday, the "third day" is then Monday (giving the tenant four days instead of three) to pay the rent. If that Monday was a legal holiday, then Tuesday would then be the "third" day (giving the tenant five days instead of three) to pay the rent. http://www.rogerfranklin.org/Instructions_for_Landlords_2017.pdf B. SERVE THE THREE-DAY NOTICE 1. After the Three-Day Notice has been filled out and signed, you must serve it on the tenant. The Three-Day Notice may be served either: (a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, or (b) If the tenant is absent from is place of residence and from his usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years at either place, AND mailing a copy of the Three-Day Notice addressed to the tenant, postage prepaid, first-class mail, to his place of residence; or (c) If such place of residence and business cannot be ascertained and a person over the age of eighteen cannot be found at the tenant’s residence, then by affixing a copy of the Three-Day Notice in a conspicuous place on the property, AND mailing a copy of the Three Day Notice to the tenant at his residence. So if the notice was just left at your apartment, and was not delivered personally or mailed, then the service is invalid.	"Acknowledged" is fine. There is no "preferable" substitute with which to prefix your signature. As a precaution, never leave too much space between the end of clauses and your signature, lest another clause later on gets slid in without your consent (a public institution is unlikely to incur such misconduct, though). Also, always be sure to ask for a copy of the contract/agreement you sign.	Your contract is between you and your landlord. Separately, the landlord has a contract between himself and the agency. Your obligation to pay rent is owed to your landlord, not to his agent. Ask your landlord to send you an email (if you don't already have one) which requests you to pay rent from X date onwards to him directly. Then pay him the rent in the way he has requested. Barring some unusual terms of the contract (which you haven't provided a copy of), the agent will not have any grounds to sue you.
Is it legal to climb on public bridges when there are no prohibition signs? I like to climb around on the steel structures below public road bridges. I do it for no other reason than having fun. I do it only at night because I don't want to attract attention, but I'm wondering if I'm actually doing something illegal. Say it's a public road bridge across a river, there are no prohibition signs, I don't have to climb over any fences or other obstacles to reach the base of the bridge, etc... Am I breaking any laws in this case? I live in Austria (Central Europe) but I'm interested in more general answers and specifics of other countries as well.	Depending on the bridge, you might be trespassing in some way. Railway bridges are the property of the railway company, they don't allow to go there unless specifically allowed and even the absence of a sign is not an ok in those cases. Similarly, highway bridges usually are communal property and they don't need to be marked as off limits if there are laws that prohibit being there. The absence of signs and fencing is not a carte balance to go there: If your starting point for the climbing is not easily accessible, they don't have to fence it. But besides trespassing, you might make a huge dookey: Depending on the attorney general, you might be, in Austria, in violation of § 46 StVO for being a pedestrian on the Highway, as the bridge in whole is part of the highway structure. Even if you are under the lanes, you are technically on or inside the highway structure. If the attorney really wants you in, they could pull out § 89 StGB "endangerment" as well as the § 176 / § 177 "endangerment of the commonality" (by reckless or negligence). After all, you might or might not be climbing the bridge to perform something to endanger all the people using it. In Germany, you will get fined for violating traffic laws if you go onto railway tracks or climb onto a railway bridge as you violate the railway code and the minimum charge is 25 €. You could get also sued for Reckless endangerment of the train traffic (§ 315 StGB) and locked up for between 6 months and 10 years. If you do delay trains in any way (and even if it is to allow a crew to get to you), you are also liable damages - this is very easy in the 5 to 6 digits. Similarly, if it was a highway, you'd get billed 10 € for being on foot on a motorway without special privilege under $ 25 StVO and again, you could get jailed in extreme cases under § 315b StGB.	In general, permission is not granted to enter the premises of another by climbing a fence unless it is explicitly granted. That the fence is on your property, but adjacent to the school's property, is a complication. The school, observing that there is a boundary fence, might reasonably rely on that to exclude people from entering other than at desired entry points. So it might be that your entry over the fence would be unauthorized and thus technically trespassing. If you were to put a gate in your own fence, the school's reliance is probably less reasonable. Or if you were to formally notify the school that you intend to enter the school grounds over your own fence. However, in practice, you are not trespassing until you are notified by the owner or owner's agent or someone with proper authority. If there is no sign, there can be no claim that you were notified by one. So until a school official or employee notices you using the fence and orders you to stop, there is no issue.	It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody.	Not necessarily. Many jurisdictions prohibit admission of evidence of subsequent remedial acts to show liability, although it could be admitted to show that it was possible to do something. Also, the law of border trees is quite arcane and involved, and frequently subject to local ordinances, state laws, and common law rules all at once (and isn't terribly uniform from one place to another). But, usually, the bottom line for your liability to your neighbor will be whether you were negligent in maintaining the tree, which in the case of a healthy branch and an extraordinary storm, you usually would not be.	I know that in many countries, including the US, the UK, and most, perhaps all, of Europe, it is common for houses to be sold while still under construction, so no such legal prohibition exists (or at least is enforced) in any of those countries. I have never heard of any country which has a general law against such a practice, but I cannot be sure for all countri8es in the world. There are other was to "prevent contractor delays and/or construction malformations and even constructions deformations". Many counties have building codes, which make improper building techniques unlawful. In some countries failure to adhere to proper professional standards in such matters is unlawful, and it is usual for the purchase of an unfinished building to involve a contract, in which performance standards and dates are spelled out. Failure to adhere to such requirements would give the purchaser grounds for a lawsuit for damages.	Is this legal for the county to enforce? Yes. And can I sue if they try to enforce it? You could, but you would very likely lose your lawsuit. A more fruitful approach would be to go to the county planning board and seek a variance to permit you to do what you want to do.	What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.	Any country is their own sovereign There is no international law that demands any state to allow anyone free speech of all kinds. Remember that your rights end where the rights of others [incl. society] begin. And in Germany, the right of the society is defined as being not subjected to the symbols of illegal organizations, especially ones that try to violate the liberal democratic basic order Also, Germany is not alone in banning the sentence or the accompanying gesture. They are also illegal to various degrees in Austria, Switzerland, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, and Sweden. It also can be illegal in the US, if disturbing the peace. The sentence is an identifier for a banned organization The sentence is certainly illegal if spoken to express certain things. However, it is legal to be used for example in art (films) and is commonly found in lecture material, as one example of how the nazi party identified. But how? People are often confused, but the rule is actually somewhat easy: If you display any symbol of a banned, unconstitutional organisation (under § 86a StGB) like any of the logos of the Nazi Party and spiritual successors (those with a red bar: banned!) or even the PKK, then you are acting in an illegal manner. And unless you have an exception to claim, the determination can be done entirely on a factual basis by looking at the circumstances. Indeed, the mens rea requirement is so minimal (because the law is written in a way that there is none needed!), that posting photos of a swastika tattoo can get you convicted for jailtime Exceptions However, I mentioned exceptions. Those are in § 86a StGB(3), pointing to $ 86(3)&(4) [eng]: (3) Die Absätze 1 und 2 gelten nicht, wenn die Handlung der staatsbürgerlichen Aufklärung, der Abwehr verfassungswidriger Bestrebungen, der Kunst oder der Wissenschaft, der Forschung oder der Lehre, der Berichterstattung über Vorgänge des Zeitgeschehens oder der Geschichte oder ähnlichen Zwecken dient. (4) Ist die Schuld gering, so kann das Gericht von einer Bestrafung nach dieser Vorschrift absehen. (3) Subsection (1) [and (2)] does not apply if the propaganda material or the act serves civic information, to prevent unconstitutional activities, to promote the arts or science, research or teaching, reporting about current or historical events, or similar purposes. (4) If the degree of guilt is minor, the court may dispense with imposing a penalty under this provision. That is why we have swastikas in German school books, as those tell about the horrors of nazi germany. That is why the logos can be found in research material and history books analyzing the use of the symbols in different countries. That's why the news outlet filming the demo where people yell Heil Hitler show that footage without precautions (unlike those that fly the banned symbol!) That is why you can have the film Inglorious Bastards with all its Swastikas and people yelling Heil Hitler, but its advertisement material was specifically altered to not show those. However, until August 2018, computer games were not accepted as arts. This is why the German versions of Wolfenstein that did get a german release before had been altered to remove Swastikas and voice lines. But the "Sozialadäquanzklausel" had been applied to computer games in August 2018, and the games got (after some other hoops) re-released in their international version on 22nd November 2019. How come some ideologies are banned?! Germany's equivalent of a constitution is the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). Its first 20 articles (not paragraphs or sections!) prescribe the rights of any person. The very first and most important one is, and the very first sentence of it makes clear what the very guiding principle of all other laws has to be (emphasis mine) before any of the other basic rights are enumerated. Art. 1: Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt. Art. 1: (1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. This is the most absolute right anyone can have. There is no provision in any way that would allow (or make it possible!) to strip or reduce the human dignity and every human being, living and dead, has it. Violations of human dignity have been used quite often to repeal laws, such as several incarceration methods or when cuts to the social security system would prevent someone to live a life that would be without dignity. Human Dignity is the measure that can be used to cut all other rights. In fact, it is explicitly the foundational principle of all german laws, that rights are not granted beyond where other rights start and that nobody has any rights when it comes to harming the constitutional order derived from the Grundgesetz (emphasis mine): Art. 2: (1) Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstößt. (1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. Now, where comes freedom of speech? Only in Article 5, and it is absolutely not absolute but has defined limits (emphasis mine): Art 5:(1) Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bild frei zu äußern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein zugänglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewährleistet. Eine Zensur findet nicht start. (2) Diese Rechte finden ihre Schranken in den Vorschriften der allgemeinen Gesetze, den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen zum Schutze der Jugend und in dem Recht der persönlichen Ehre. (3) Kunst und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre sind frei. Die Freiheit der Lehre entbindet nicht von der Treue zur Verfassung. Art 5: (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour. (3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution. Parties and organisations that can't abide by the other rules of law because of their ideology will get banned based on that. In the case of the nazi ideology, it's quite simple: The core idea of Rassenlehre and its believe in Untermenschen is so deeply dehumanizing that there can't ever be a way to get that in line with the very first (as well as 2nd and 3rd) Article of the Grundgesetz. Or to quote the words of Amon: Nazi ideology denies dignity to some humans, goes against the liberal-democratic order, and therefore cannot enjoy the usual protections. Rule of law is still maintained because restrictions to the freedom of expression are codified in law, and violators will get a fair trial. You see, you simply don't even have an absolute right to disseminate your ramblings, because the Basic law itself points to the general laws that ban the dissemination of certain materials. This is how § 86 StGB can ban any propaganda material for organizations and § 86a StGB subsequently bans their symbols, including gestures and slogans.
College admissions scandal During the U.S. attorneys' office press conference, Andrew Lelling said, "We're not talking about donating a building so that a school is more likely to take your son or daughter. We're talking about deception and fraud." However, are schools really allowed to give some students preferential treatment if their family made significant donations to the university?	A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.	The first sub-question here is whether (public) schools can compel (parents of) students to acquire internet service, a computer, and a webcam. The MA Dept. of Education maintains that public schools must purchase at public expense textbooks and other instructional materials and supplies intended for use and re-use over a period of years, and computers fall in the category of materials intended for schools to purchase and use and re-use. There is no legislative authority to compel parents to purchase equipment or sign up for internet services. If there is a choice between in-person and online instruction, the legal requirement to attend school can be satisfied by in-person instruction. The second sub-question is whether, if a child does have the technical ability to be connected to class via the internet, can they legally require the camera to be turned on? Every district has rules, so if there is a rule requiring parental consent in this situation, then parental consent is required. If it is legal at that level, there is still a legal risk to the school. Schools can generally do those things that are reasonably necessary for educating students as long as it doesn't infringe on fundamental constitutional rights, and the camera-on requirement is educationally reasonable. The risk to the school is violating the federal law FERPA, specifically a potential violation of the privacy requirements. Schools must protect personal information, which includes anything streaming from the camera (pictures, for example, are personally identifiable information). If you assume that they have an absolutely secure connection, then there is no risk of privacy violation. However, if you believe, even reasonably so, that a school practice creates a risk of breach of privacy, that still does not create a special right to avoid school.	What you linked to is a list of definitions of terms used in the laws of Arkansas. The actual Arkansas law on gifts to elected officials reads as such: Persons elected or appointed to select offices, including members of the general assembly, shall not solicit or accept a gift from a lobbyist or a person acting on behalf of one. A lobbyist shall not offer or pay for food or drink at more than 1 planned activity in a 7 day period. Does not prohibit the acceptance of: (1) Food, drink, informational materials, or other items included in a conference registration fee; and (2) Food and drink at events coordinated through the regional or national conference and provided to persons registered to attend. Ark. Const. art. XIX,§ 30. http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx The official is just not supposed to accept gifts, besides the provision for lobbyists to pay for food or drink. It's not that they can take a gift and pay $100 dollars.	TL;DR: No. In the United States, schools tend to be funded by property taxes locally, occasionally with an added income tax. Those funds go to the schools' local taxing authority. That taxing authority may cover multiple schools. At minimum, it will almost certainly cover an elementary school and a high school, but it often covers multiple elementary schools and may cover multiple high schools. For example, in many cities, all public (government-run) schools are funded by the same taxing authority. If you had children, you might, in some places, be able to choose the school they attended and thereby direct some money to that school or schools. But that wouldn't be related to the amount that you paid in any way. That amount may be more or less than the amount that you pay. It would have some relation to the amount that the child pays. There is no way to redirect the funds that you pay. They always go to the local taxing authority. If you want to pay a different local taxing authority, then you need to buy your property in an area covered by that taxing authority. For example, you might prefer to live in the city rather than a suburb. You can donate additional money above and beyond your taxes to an individual school. Contact the individual school for details. But this won't change the taxes that you owe. Schools also get funding from the state and federal governments, mostly state. Given that you are subject to taxation by a particular state, you can't transfer those taxes either. Same thing with the US as a whole. It won't allow you to choose to pay your income taxes to a different country without changing your residence (and might not then).	This is one of the things Martha Stewart was convicted of. 18 USC 1001 is the US federal law requiring truthfulness. That statute forbids you to falsify, conceal, or cover up a material fact. One limitation on how broad this law is, is that it has to be a matter "within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States". If your neighbor is an FBI agent and he asks if you're the one who broke his window, and you lie, that's not a federal matter. Another limitation is that the lying has to be material. The essential part of the law is subsection (a). Subsection (b) then states an exception: (b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. Then you also owe a lesser duty of truthfulness to the legislature. Taking note of US. v. Yermian, it is not required that the person you lie to be a federal officer. Yermian lied to his employer, who was a defense contractor, and the fact that the relevant form was submitted to the government for scrutiny is what made it a matter in federal jurisdiction. Comparing the wording of 1001 to the perjury statute, the operative expression for perjury involves statements "which he does not believe to be true", we can see that the perjury statute requires telling the literal truth (see Bronston v. US), which allows so-called lies of omission (of a particular subtype: much more could be said about that). In contrast the lying statute forbids both literally false statements and concealing of the truth. I don't have cases at my fingertips that indicate how broad your truthful answers have to be, for example if you think the FBI is trying to put away a friend and ask you about what he did on June 14, and you know that he did a bad thing on June 13, would it be lying in the relevant sense to conceal that fact which they didn't ask about. [ADDENDUM] A session of perusing cases has led to a tiny bit of further information. A literal reading of the statute says that you are in violation of the law if you falsify a fact (sloppy epistemology, unless it refers just to altering records and evidence), or conceal a fact, and the courts recognise this as a fundamental division. As for falsifying, the way that has been applied is to refer to cases where the accused makes a statement which asserts something that he knows to be untrue. Thus, saying "No" to a question when the truth is "Yes" is a violation. A propos concealment, in US v. Diogo 320 F.2d 898 the court states that False representations, like common law perjury, require proof of actual falsity; concealment requires proof of wilful nondisclosure by means of a 'trick, scheme or device.' This case is pre-Bronston so there is mixing of concepts from perjury law and lying law, which would not happen now, but we can steering clear of their perjury citations. The crucial fact is that accused(s) were technically married in New York, for immigration purposes, and they were accused of a 1001 violation for having indicated that they were married. Part of the government's case was that such a marriage is not valid, and the court rejected that conclusion. The government's second prong was to maintain that the court "should affirm appellant's convictions on a theory of concealment", and this too the court rejected, saying "proof of their ulterior motives in marriage would not be tantamount to proof of willful and knowing concealment of these material facts". What they said on the forms was literally true, and they did not have a duty to volunteer information that they probably knew the government was interested in. Contrarily in a later case, US v. Zalman 870 F.2d 1047 we are told that the underlying purpose of a marriage is a material fact which bears upon the validity of the marriage, and that any false or fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the actual purpose of a marriage in order to gain status as a resident of the United States can be punished under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 so you have to be more truthful than the literal truth standard. There are also circumstances where there is an independent duty to give information, such as reporting income to the IRS. In US v. Hernando Ospina 798 F.2d 1570 the court maintained It is clear that in order to support a section 1001 concealment conviction there must be a legal duty to disclose the facts the defendant was convicted of concealing citing US v. Tobon-Builes 706 F.2d 1092, where again there was a legal duty to report "existence, origin, and transfer of approximately $185,200 in cash". In other words, it is not clear what information you are allowed to not volunteer when asked a question in a federal matter.	The judgment in Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. President and Fellow of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ___ (2023) was in relation to relief sought by the plaintiffs against Harvard and University of North Carolina. This is more apparent by reading the judgments below. See e.g. 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019). SFFA seeks "declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs" against the defendant "President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard Corporation)." SFFA sought the same remedies against University of North Carolina: 567 F. Supp. 3d 580 (M.D.N.C. 2021). Thus, there is no order against the federal executive. The federal executive can continue providing funding. It is Harvard and U.N.C. that are enjoined.	Yes. HIPPA does not apply to exchanges of information between professors and students, it only governs disclosures of medical information by medical providers and insurance companies. Educational privacy laws might prohibit the professor from sharing that information with someone outside the educational institution, but that is a different question entirely, than whether this information can be requested from a student. If you have a disagreement with the professor's decision, your remedy would be to ask the department chair, or the dean with jurisdiction over that professor, or provost (a.k.a. the chief academic officer) at the institution to reconsider this decision (ordinarily, in that order).	You're under 18, so you're viewed as a minor under the law, and as such, you can't agree to and sign legally binding contracts. The TOS for the applications are agreed to by your parents by default, because your parents are responsible for you and have no choice in parental guardian-type duties, such as education. Agreeing to the software TOSs may also be done for all student users by the school with their software site license(s) and under an agreement with your parents; ask for and read any written policies the school has. And, you don't have a say in data handling at your school; that will be another school policy for data and network security, and hopefully a policy exists. If a policy exists, it will set by the school board and it will respect a variety of local, state and federal laws. That said, you can approach the school board and outline your concerns and ask to take tests and assignments with pencil and paper. But they are not obligated to change policies for you or make accommodations, other than established accommodations required by law, such as under the ADA act. Once you're 18, you can fight the power. Until then, you're a minor.
Snitching on Speeders Assume I was driving on the Florida Turnpike and saw someone tailgating me. I was driving in the left lane, 80 mph in a 70 mph speed limit. Once the right lane became available I switched lanes and then the driver sped past me, his accomplice yelling out profanities - all caught on tape. No one expects to be recorded when they yell at a driver. I recorded my speedometer at 82, but he was clearly going faster. Can I snitch on him? By the way, this is a hypothetical situation. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, or actual events is purely coincidental.	Law enforcement sometimes use "pacing" as a speed enforcement tool. The basic idea is that they consistently drive a certain speed - which is at or above the speed limit and notice that the "alleged speeder" is either keeping pace or exceeding the pace. The details are complicated and a police officer would know them much better than me. But basically They have to calibrate their speedometer - because if their speedometer is broken pacing is obviously worthless. They need to bring the calibration results to court. Not having those calibration records for your speedometer means that many police departments will be reluctant to issue a speeding ticket to the other motorists. They rely on the fact that most state laws allow law enforcement leeway to exceed the posted limit. Not being a lawyer or a police officer, I do not know the exact circumstances, but if they were not allowed to slightly exceed the limit for pacing then logically every pacing enforcement should result in 2 tickets - one being for the officer. If you can swear that your speedometer is good then they can use that evidence to write you a speeding ticket, because whatever allowances the law allows law enforcement for pacing are not granted to you. I am sure they can overcome the calibration issue with regard to a ticket issued to you by your certification that the speedometer is correct. If they issued a ticket to me based on your certification that your speedometer was correct, I would call bullshit. Talking to the police can only hurt you.	RCW 46.61.419 gives government police the right to enforce speeding violations as defined in RCW 46.61.400 in certain communities (condominiums and gated communities), per RCM 64.34, 64.32, or 64.38, if: (1) A majority of the homeowner's association's, association of apartment owners', or condominium association's board of directors votes to authorize the issuance of speeding infractions on its private roads, and declares a speed limit not lower than twenty miles per hour; (2) A written agreement regarding the speeding enforcement is signed by the homeowner's association, association of apartment owners, or condominium association president and the chief law enforcement official of the city or county within whose jurisdiction the private road is located; (3) The homeowner's association, association of apartment owners, or condominium association has provided written notice to all of the homeowners, apartment owners, or unit owners describing the new authority to issue speeding infractions; and (4) Signs have been posted declaring the speed limit at all vehicle entrances to the community. Thus there can be a speeding ticket. However, if you speed on my uncle's farm, that's just trespassing because that isn't one of the specified community types. The law only allows speeding enforcement by government law enforcement officers (not private security), and limits how low the maximum speed can be set. This raises an interesting question regarding speed enforcement on the Boeing bridge off S 104th in Seattle, which is private property and not part of a "community", yet quite urban and frequently used.	If the judge is kind, yes However, this is at the discretion of the judge. Even if the judge believes every word you say, you still broke the law. The speed limit in Michigan is “a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper” and that is not “greater than that which will permit a stop within the assured, clear distance ahead.” (MCL 257.627(1)). The posted speed limit is an upper bound on what is “careful and prudent”. Given you description of trucks obstructing your view, it’s arguable that the speed you were travelling at was not “careful and prudent”. The speed limit in school zones may be set at “not more than 20 miles per hour less than the speed limit normally posted but shall be not less than 25 miles per hour.” (MCL 257.627a(2)). And the speed limit on a local street in an area zoned for residential use is 25 mph “unless another speed is fixed and posted.” If you were in a residential street, the school zone speed is no different from the normal speed - the lights just serve to warn drivers that children are about. Finally, you are responsible for knowing the law. You are on that road at that time, it’s your duty to know what the posted limit is as well as determining what speed is “careful and prudent”. It doesn’t matter if it’s hard to know, the law presumes you know it. All that said, if you catch the judge in a good mood, they might give you a break. You don’t have a legal right to one so ask, don’t demand.	The Ct. driver's manual p. 44 says that "Solid yellow lines may be crossed to make a left turn to or from an alley, private road, driveway, or street", and also "A double solid white line prohibits lane changing" (turning left is not the same as lane changing). In Washington, there is a fine of $136 for crossing a double white line, but this is related to the hyper-limited access pay lanes on the freeway. I have not found anything in the Connecticut code that indicates an analogous absolute prohibition against crossing a double white. In lieu of a statutory prohibition, you may succeed in arguing that it was a legal turn, as long as the turn was in compliance with the rest of the law, e.g. you signalled, you yielded right of way (which essentially means he was driving so fast that he appeared after you started to turn). His speed may be contributing negligence that prevents you from being liable, so it just depends.	If you were moving "with the flow of traffic" but over the limit, you were still breaking the law, and the cop can choose which car or cars to stop on any basis or none (except ones forbidden, such as racial in the US). This is almost surely not a valid defense, not in any jurisdiction that I know of at least. If you can show that to slow to the speed limit would have actually been unsafe, you might have a defense, but that is going to be hard to get a court to accept.	Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.	This is a no win situation. People who try to stop in a safe public place fearing that the cop may be an imposter risk prosecution for resisting arrest. But, no one will offer you any remedy if the cop was an imposter who was victimizing you. One recommended course of action if you doubt a cop is real is to call 911 as you pull over to confirm that the cop trying to pull you over is real.	The state argued, and the jury was convinced, that Mr. Holle turned over his keys specifically intending to facilitate the robbery. They necessarily found that Mr. Holle was not telling the truth when he said he thought it was all a joke. I don't know what evidence they had to demonstrate that, but I could imagine that there was testimony indicating Mr. Holle knew that these people had engaged in similar acts before, that the group spoke of the plan with a level of specificity that made him aware they were not joking, or that he saw them taking other steps to prepare that let him know they were planning a crime. It doesn't matter if he wasn't renting the vehicle or didn't have an agreement to divide the spoils. The question of "why" he facilitated the crime is technically irrelevant to the legal question of whether he facilitated the crime. Nonetheless, I could imagine several reasons why he would have lent his car: he wanted to ingratiate himself with this group, he was bullied into doing it, he believed he would get some of the pot they stole, he didn't like the target, and so on. The fact that he was risking prison time is a uniquely poor argument that he didn't know what he was doing. The risk of punishment is always present for committing a crime, and yet we know that people commit crimes all day, every day. Why do they do it? Probably a good question for psychology.SE.
Assignment of Inventions in Employment Contract for Software Development I have a contract that basically says this in the Assignment section: To the fullest extent under applicable law, the Company shall own all right, title and interest in and to all Inventions (including all Intellectual Property Rights therein or related thereto) that are made, conceived or reduced to practice, in whole or in part, by me during the term of my employment with the Company and which arise out of any use of Company’s facilities or assets or any research or other activity conducted by, for or under the direction of the Company (whether or not (i) conducted at the Company’s facilities, (ii) during working hours or (iii) using Company assets), or which are useful with or relate directly or indirectly to any “ Company Interest” (meaning any product, service, other Invention or Intellectual Property Right that is sold, leased, used, proposed, under consideration or under development by the Company). I will promptly disclose and provide all of the foregoing Inventions (the “ Assigned Inventions”) to the Company. I hereby make and agree to make all assignments to the Company necessary to effectuate and accomplish the foregoing ownership. Assigned Inventions shall not include any Invention that is both (a) developed entirely on my own time, without use of any Company facilities, assets, ideas or direction and (b) not useful with or related to any Company Interest. ...If I wish to clarify that something created by me prior to my employment, which relates or may relate to the Company’s actual or proposed business, is not within the scope of the assignment of Inventions under this Agreement, then I have listed it on Appendix A . If (i) I use or disclose any Restricted Materials (including anything listed in Appendix A) when acting within the scope of my employment (or otherwise on behalf of the Company), or (ii) any Assigned Invention cannot be fully made, used, reproduced, sold, distributed, or otherwise exploited without using, misappropriating or violating any Restricted Materials, I hereby grant and agree to grant to the Company a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, transferable, sublicensable right and license to use, disclose, exploit and exercise all rights in such Restricted Materials, including any Intellectual Property Rights therein. And Assurances: ...I hereby irrevocably designate and appoint the Company and its officers as my agents and attorneys-in-fact, coupled with an interest, to act for and on my behalf to execute and file any document and to perform all other lawfully permitted acts to further the purposes of the foregoing with the same legal force and effect as if executed by me. I have a couple questions. I have inventions which I'd rather not disclose, which I have documented by creating different versions and timestamping them. However, I plan on continuing to develop them on my own time as I work at a company. They are software related. First, the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. The first says whether or not during working hours, the second says it's fine if it's on my own time. Wondering if this is a problem for the contract. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are. Second, they like most other companies want me to list my prior inventions. But I've asked this before to a lawyer and they said I can't simply list a title of a project such as "Photoshop-like image editor", I have to actually go into detail and describe it. And not just a few sentences, but paragraphs of detail. Not so much detail as to be like a patent in its thoroughness, but more detail than a few paragraphs PER INVENTION. But this is a security leak as I don't want to disclose my inventions even if they are simple, it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation. And last thing is, let's say this company, a software company, is in the field of Sales and Marketing. This means they have a robust application or suite of applications, practices, and tools like CRMs, machine learning stuff, APIs, etc. They also use lots of open source programming tools. Meanwhile, let's say my inventions are in the field of Programming Tools and Application tools. It's not directly related to Sales and Marketing, but it's related pretty closely to CRMs and machine learning tools, and APIs. It's not related to their specific APIs, but it's related to APIs let's say. The question is how the line is drawn on what is considered competitive inventions. If I were to invent a new machine learning algorithm while working as a marketer or sales person at a software company, if that is considered competitive and prohibited by the contract. Oh, and "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days.	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you.	Patents become enforceable when granted, not before. However there is something called provisional rights (absolutely nothing to do with provisional applications). In the US, under 35 USC 154(d), if a claim in a published application is “substantially identical” to a claim that eventually issues, a patent owner can get damages of at least a reasonable royalty on units produced between the publication and notice and the issue date. Enforcement on this must await the granting of the patent. The infringer must have actual notice of the published application. It is rarely invoked see this article.	Is there any legal doctrine whereby E's agreement with A continued to apply to E in his work for company N? No, because the parties to the non-compete agreement were Employee E and company A, not the human who owned and sold A. What about B? Do they have any standing to block E's going to work for a B's customer? No. My rationale is that the decisions you describe result in a waiver of the non-compete clause. An employment relation between B and E never existed. Thus, the only vestige of B's non-compete rights binding E that could have been preserved stem from E's former employment at A. However, that vestige disappeared at the instant B --apropos of the hospital project-- waived its non-compete clause with N. Given B's waiver with regard to N, N's failure to establish a non-compete clause with E enables the latter to conduct business with (or accept employment at) the hospital. If anything, B would have standing to sue N for negligence or related torts. But neither B nor N has any viable non-compete claims against E.	Does this amount to the employer potentially paying the employee to lie to them, to no ultimate legal effect? Or will the employee have a problem if they end up with an obligation to sign a statement that is not in agreement with reality? Neither. Contract law contemplates a party's subsequent inability to comply with the terms that were established at the formation of the contract. In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, this is referred to as supervening impracticability. See, for instance, the Restatement at § 261. In the hypothetical scenario you outline, the loss of a company laptop renders the employee's promise (namely, "to return any company-issued computers or devices") impracticable. Instead, the circumstances may entitle the employer to restitution (by the employee) for what the employee now is literally unable to return. That would be cognizable as compliance in substance.	With respect to the first question, discussing an idea in a non-encrypted email is not a publication that forfeits the right to patent an idea, even though it is not 100% secure. In the same way, talking about an idea for a patent with your patent lawyer in a secluded booth of a coffee shop in person does not constitute publication of the idea for this purpose, even if someone is secretly spying on you at the time. Since I am at the moment employed by a company, even though the idea originates from myself, it seems that I should quit my job first not to have my current company have any claim over my idea. It is possible that the contract makes even ideas that you come up with yourself while employed by the company the property of the company. If so, you are legally in the wrong and the idea belongs to the company. But, proving the reality that you are stealing the idea from the company is harder if there is nothing in writing. An email discussing an idea while you are employed would have to be disclosed in litigation with your employer over whether the patent applied for belongs to you or to your employer under an employment agreement. If you didn't put it in an email, it wouldn't exist to turn over in litigation.	No. Only the company owns the copyright, not its shareholders. A company is a separate legal entity with its own capacity to own property. Copyright is property, not infection that can be spread onto whoever is close enough. Pretty much like shareholders can't just share the use of the company's tangible assets, they can't wet their beaks in the copyright. As a shareholder, what you could do is to appoint a director/CEO that will give you license to copy (or even transfer the copyright) — if you have enough shares to fire the current CEO and put yours. The CEO will get into legal trouble with other shareholders/creditors, but you'll still enjoy your right to copy.	From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.
Can someone legally use the word Java in a business name? Assume someone wanted to open a real estate office and wanted to use the name Java Realty, would that violate the Java (programming framework) trademark?	A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap.	Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.	Attribution is not a legal requirement If company A owns IP (copyright and trademarks in this case), they can licence it to company N on whatever terms are mutually acceptable. They may require company N to attribute their IP or they may not.	Companies with the same name can be registered in different jurisdictions Company law is jurisdiction specific, so "ABC" can be a company in say, Australia, Malaysia and the UK. Most jurisdictions have required suffixes that identify that the name is a company and the type of company it is: if ABC were a private company in each of the jurisdictions it would be ABC Pty Ltd, ABC Pte Ltd and ABC Ltd respectively. Each jurisdiction will have rules on what names can be used for a company. Nigeria's are here. The only issue you may face is if the company you have identified's name is a trade mark in Nigeria, either by being a registered trade mark or that they have a sufficient Nigerian presence that your name would cause confusion between their goods and services and yours.	Here are the jury instructions. These describe how to evaluate witness testimony, burdens of proof, and the four-factor fair use test, among other things. The jury had to answer yes or no to the following question: Has Google shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its use in Android of the declaring lines of code and their structure, sequence, and organization from Java 2 Standard Edition 1.4 and Java 2 Standard Edition Version 5.0 constitutes a "fair use" under the Copyright Act? They answered yes. Juries do not explain their reasoning (different jurors might even have different reasonings), but the assumption is that they followed the jury instructions to arrive at this conclusion. To be clear, the issue wasn't reimplementation of 37 Java APIs, but a more limited taking, including "the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization".	It isn't uncommon to interlineate contract language, or to cross out contract language, with the initials of the parties to the contract. This is normally only done with smaller businesses, however, where there is someone who has the authority to do so. Some contracts, such as insurance contracts, for example, have to have their language approved by state regulators before they can be used and can't be modified in that fashion.	We can't really know until the ruling is made. The Supreme Court might issue a ruling that encompasses all software APIs, or may predicate its ruling on this more specific situation, e.g. that because Oracle's library is so extensive its structure can be copyrighted even if that does not necessarily mean that any individual function signature can be copyrighted. They could also decide based on something unrelated to the heart of the copyright question - skimming through the petition for a writ of certiorari, they could make a decision based on the original implied license from Sun, for example. Hopefully their decision will answer the copyright question of function declarations completely, but it isn't required to.	My opinion is that the copying of a single API endpoint, "run" that takes a function as an argument is not infringement. I can think of several lines of argument that get to this same conclusion: Originality: It doesn't exhibit the modicum of creativity required by the originality test. (Feist) Short phrases doctrine: It is a short word or phrase, which both the copyright office (Copyright Office Circular, 37 CFR 202.1) and courts (e.g. Hutchins v. Zoll) have declared ineligible for copyright. Merger: The merger doctrine allows reuse of an expression if it is one of only a very few number of ways of expressing an idea. I can't think of many other ways to express a function intended to run a function other than with the verb "run". Scènes à faire: It is not infringement to use an expression if it has become standard, stock, or common in a particular setting. Naming a function "run" is common in the programming community. Any one of these alone would be enough to rule out copyright infringement by taking this individual component of Excel's API. Note: Whether merger and scènes à faire are part of the originality/copyrightability analysis or part of the infringement analysis is not uniform across circuits. For example, the 6th circuit considers both merger and scènes à faire part of the copyrightability analysis. But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat them as part of the infringement analysis and in the 9th circuit, they are affirmative defenses.
Can guns be controlled asymmetrically? The Second Amendment is oft quoted as the reason that guns cannot be completely removed from American society, at least not without some sort of further amendment to the US Constitution. But what about attacking the problem in another way? There is no right reserved to the people in the US Constitution that prevents gunpowder, bullets, or other projectiles from being totally regulated. In other words, people can buy all of the guns they want, but possession of any form of ammunition for the guns could be made totally illegal or regulated as a state sees fit (barring federal legislation). Would this hold up in court? Has any state attempted to do this beyond limiting the amounts that can be purchased in a given period?	The problem with the proposal is that the Second Amendment doesn't specifically protect the right to bear guns – the word it uses is "arms". Restricting sale of bullets or gunpowder is just as much a restriction on the right to bear arms as restricting sale of guns. Likewise, freedom of the press doesn't refer to just the freedom to use a wine press for printing purposes, it also encompasses the purchase of ink, paper, type and drying racks.	Yes. As long as a local or state ordinance is not in conflict with any section of federal statutes or federal authority as ordained my the US Constitution and current legal precedent in accordance with it, nor is unconstitutional, there is no reason a town cannot pass laws preventing this.	If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question.	That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.	No, there is no obligation to repeal It is common for statutes held to be unconstitutional to be left on the books decades later, and for others which quite likely would be so held if anyone tried to enforce them to be similarly left for even longer periods. It is somewhat less common for state constitutional provisions, but it does happen, and as those commonly take more than a simple legislative act, there is even less motivation to go through the troublesome process in such cases. There are even a few provisions in the US constitution which have become obsolete, but not actually amended away. For example, the so-called 'three-fifths compromise', which counted slaves as worth 3/5ths of a person for computing representation, was effectively repealed by the Civil War and the 13th amendment, but was not formally removed. That section was actually formally replaced by the 14th.	How is banning such events constitutional with the freedom of assembly? The rights created by the First Amendment are not absolute. They are subject to reasonable restrictions as to time, place and manner, especially if those restrictions are content neutral. Restrictions narrowly tailored to protect against genuine threats public health and safety fall within the exception of the First Amendment even if they are not strictly content neutral, that is commonly described by the rubric that you don't have a right to falsely cry "fire" in a crowded theater (causing a riot that could harm people). For example, suppose that a rope bridge over a deep gorge can only support the weight of ten people, and three dozen people want to hold a protest there. A regulation that prohibited more than ten people from engaging in the protest would be constitutional. Even then, however, a lack of content neutrality (e.g., restricting punishment to false statements likely to incite a riot) can't also be a lack of ideological neutrality (e.g. restricting punishment to anti-Catholic but not anti-Jewish statements likely to incite a riot). If it were a political protest/gathering would this change? Generally speaking political protest/gatherings are still subject to content neutral regulations of time, place or manner, and those narrowly tailored to protect genuine threats public health and safety. So, for example, if there is a genuine COVID-19 risk that public health officials are trying to address, and the regulation of gatherings is not viewpoint or content based, it would be upheld as constitutional in the face of a First Amendment freedom of assembly limitation. But, if the regulation applied, for example, only to Republican and not Democratic party protests or gatherings, which is a viewpoint or content based restriction, it would not survive a First Amendment freedom of assembly challenge.	How come this is viable? Because it’s legal. What if people use their service to commit crimes? What if people use a Ford in a bank holdup? Or a Glock in a murder? Or the US Postal Service in a Nigerian letter scam? If the goods or services are legal and not provided for an obviously illegal purpose, nothing happens.	Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule.
Is it a violation of GDPR law to email personnel gathered from hunter.io? I'm a web developer working on a project for a client. The project is a directory of sustainable companies (enviromental-friendly companies). The project is only launching now. The companies listed on the website are companies the client knows they exist and has gathered from websites such as HubSpot. The client then gathered emails for the personnel that are working in those companies. The companies are added to our database and the company personnel have the option to claim the company and change in its profile. The client wants to send emails to the contacts that he has (which he got no consent from) that our website is hosting a profile of their company and they should feel free to claim it. Would this be in violation of GDPR law?	Contacting a business email about a business matter is usually fine, but in this case we have an unsolicited marketing communication (spam), not really a business matter. The client's jurisdiction likely has more specific rules about spam. Also, it is unusual (read: presumably illegitimate) to contact individual employees rather than the company's official address with the offering. From the GDPR perspective, every processing of personal data (such as email addresses that might identify natural persons) needs a legal basis (Art 6). Let's go through them: consent? No. necessary for performance of a contract involving the data subject? No. legal obligation? No. vital interests? No. public interest? No. legitimate interest? Perhaps. The client has a legitimate interest to conduct their business. However, this legitimate interest must not be overridden by the data subject's interests, rights, and freedoms. Such as the interest in not being disturbed by spam mails. It is the Data Controller's (your client's) responsibility to balance the legitimate interest themselves to determine whether they have a legal basis, but I really don't think that they do. In conclusion, your client's idea is a bad idea: They likely do not have a legal basis for this under the GDPR. They are likely violating more specific anti-spam laws in their jurisdiction. They are working hard to get their domain put on spam filter lists. Note that already the step of collecting employee email addresses is personal data processing and needs a legal basis. Of course, the GDPR does not apply when the client is not established in the EU and only processes the addresses of persons that are not in the EU.	Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46".	Keeping logs of chats would not necessarily be against the GDPR as you have suggested. For the IRC service provider/operator: these chats/logs would be within scope if EU-based users are involved and this means the data controller/processors would have legal obligations to comply with GDPR. The IRC service provider/operator would be the data controller and would be held ultimately responsible for the data stored/processed through the IRC service, including backups and logs kept etc, and this would mean any sub-processors they select (such as hosting provider) would also have to be GDPR compliant. Due to the nature of IRC chats being entirely public in the same way forum board posts and comments are public, the contract terms between the IRC service provider and the IRC users would need to be very clear that this is the case, and the IRC users would need to give consent for this processing (this is more complicated for children, see Article 8 regarding consent from the holder of parental responsibility). For IRC users (personal use): If you wish to keep the chat records for personal use only (i.e. not in connection with a business or your employment at a business), then an exemption applies: This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; ... (GDPR, Article 2: Material Scope, Paragraph 2(c), p.32) For IRC users (commercial/business use): In this case I don't think you would have any legal basis to store/process these chats/logs if they contain personal data without a legal agreement with the data controller which would require you to put in place the same protections they have to under GDPR but then allow your business to access the data for specific purposes. While the information may be published or considered to be in the 'public domain', for you to take a copy of it without permission and use it for a purpose they haven't consented to would not be allowed under GDPR. Additionally, to go through the process of removing personal data from the chats/logs would in itself be considered 'processing' under GDPR and therefore would be unauthorised without a legal agreement with the data controller. Practically therefore, your best options under this circumstance would be if: The IRC service provider implemented a 'favourites' feature to save within their own system the chat conversations you wish to retain and refer back to in future. Since they hold the data and you already have a user agreement with them there is no further complications (this is probably the best option); The IRC service provider implemented a feature to download an anonymized copy of a chat conversation (not ideal as there are no guaruntees a user will not include personal data in their messages, though the user agreement could state that message content will be considered to exclude personal data, in a similar way to how StackExchange do for this website, see the paragraph titled "Information You Choose to Display Publicly on the Network" on the StackExchange Privacy Policy). Your business considered an alternative communications solution, such as hosting its own real-time chat system or forum boards system, in which case your business would be the data controller, and while subject to GDPR you could then define the purposes for which the data will be used in your own user agreement.	The GDPR gives controllers a lot of latitude. They must decide on the correct course of action taking into account the possible risks to data subjects. Specifically, no notification of the authority is necessary if “the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.” In your scenario 1, you suggest that there is no breach because there is no evidence that the data was improperly accessed. This analysis is faulty: the controller is aware that the data was not properly secured, and cannot rule out that the data was improperly accessed. I would argue this fits the description of a “breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful … unauthorised disclosure of … personal data” (compare the definition of a data breach in Art 4(12)). Thus, a data breach has happened. The question whether the supervisory authority has to be notified of that breach is more debatable. The controller must assess the likelihood of risks to the data subjects. Here, they can perhaps argue that the risk of disclosure is low. However, the nature of the breached data would also be relevant. If in doubt, the controller should make the notification. The goal of the GDPR is not to punish unlucky companies that suffer a breach, but to protect personal data. Thus, fixing mistakes and cooperating with the supervisory authorities is likely the best approach for most companies. In your second scenario, the data is sensitive – its disclosure has a high risk for data subjects. However, the risk of someone intercepting this data is debatable. Does the risk of interception balance out the sensitivity of the data? That's the data controller's call, but I don't think so. A notification would seem appropriate here. As a technical remark, simply offering HTTPS is not sufficient to prevent MitM attacks – users must be forced to use encrypted connections. If a controller sees MitM as a risk, they are required by Art 24 to take appropriate technical measures. Here HSTS and HSTS preload would prevent the connections from being downgraded to HTTP. Instead of offering insecure connections, the site would become inaccessible. A complementary strategy is to not serve content over HTTP, but have the HTTP server only issue a permanent redirect to the HTTPS URL.	Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails.	Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself.	The GDPR only require explicit (hard) consent if you use the cookie to store personal data. Given the conditions you cite, the data you store is not personal data, so this cookie does not require consent. In theory, someone having access to both session cookie and "analytics cookie" could relate the two, but that is highly non-trivial. You may have to do DPIA to demonstrate that this is non-trivial, or that you have mitigation in place to mitigate staff abusing such access. But provided things are as you say, the "analytics" cookie does not require consent.	a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days.
Was anyone held liable/accountable in the 2018 Hawaii False Missile Alert? On January 13, 2018, with belligerent threats and nuclear tensions between the US and North Korea on a knife edge, civil authorities in the US state of Hawaii sent out an alert to all cell phones, television, and radios in the state, saying: BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL. This caused emotional trauma and interruptions of various kinds across the state. The stress caused at least one heart attack and lots of other disruptions. Has any civil (or criminal) liability attached to any person or organization as a result of that false alarm? Are there strong legal theories or case law setting precedent for or against such liability?	I do not know what actually happened to anyone in the aftermath of this incident, but it is unlikely that there is a basis for civil or criminal liability in this case. Criminal liability does not generally attach to negligent conduct except in cases of homicide or criminally negligent motor vehicle operation. But, this case appears to have involved mere negligence. It appears that somebody made an honest mistake rather than acting recklessly or intentionally to cause harm. Governmental entities and officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacity have immunity from liability for negligence except in some vary narrowly defined areas (e.g. failure to maintain government buildings, medical mistakes in government hospitals, and car accidents) which seem unlikely to be implicated here. But, it seems likely that the responsible parties were all governmental entities or officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacities. So, it is unlikely that there would be civil liability either. Needless to say, however, this does not look good on the job performance record of any civil servant below the Governor (who doesn't get evaluated in that way) when being considered for promotion, demotion, unfavorable transfers or even termination of employment. Obviously, if new facts were uncovered and this was actually more nefarious than it seems, and this hidden truth was discovered, there could be a basis for civil or criminal liability. But, if this was the case, it would have made headlines.	Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola.	massachusetts This is a matter of state law, so let's look at a particular state: Massachusetts. My answer below is largely based on the Massachusetts model jury instructions for self-defense cases. Short answer: the most problematic part of using force in the situation you describe is that you have a "duty to retreat" in the state of Massachusetts. In other words, you would not be justified in using force in your own defense or your wife's defense unless there was no reasonable way to get away from the assailant. (The opposite of a "duty to retreat" state is a "stand your ground" state; the Wikipedia article on the subject lists which US states are which.) Long answer: You would be acting in defense of another (p. 17 of the instructions): [A] person may use reasonable force when that is necessary to help another person, if it reasonably appears that the person being aided is in a situation where the law would allow him to act in self-defense himself. In other words, your use of force to defend your wife is acceptable if it reasonably appears to you that your wife is in a situation where she would be justified in using self-defense. So would she be justified in using non-deadly force in self-defence? To prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense, the Commonwealth must prove one of the following things beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant did not reasonably believe he (she) was being attacked or immediately about to be attacked, and that his (her) safety was in immediate danger; or Second, that the defendant did not do everything reasonable in the circumstances to avoid physical combat before resorting to force; or Third, that the defendant used more force to defend himself (herself) than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances. The second point would be the tricky one for your hypothetical case. In a public space, you have the "duty to retreat"; this duty does not apply in your home (the "castle doctrine"), but it does apply everywhere else. Here are the model jury instructions for this point of law: A person cannot lawfully act in self-defense unless he or she has exhausted all other reasonable alternatives before resorting to force. A person may use physical force in self-defense only if he (she) could not get out of the situation in some other way that was available and reasonable at the time. The Commonwealth may prove the defendant did not act in self-defense by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resorted to force without using avenues of escape that were reasonably available and which would not have exposed the defendant to further danger. You may consider any evidence about where the incident took place, whether or not the defendant might have been able to escape by walking away or otherwise getting to safety or by summoning help if that could be done in time, or by holding the attacker at bay if the means were available, or by some other method. You may consider whether the use of force reasonably seemed to be the only means of protection in the circumstances. You may take into account that a person who is attacked may have to decide what to do quickly and while under emotional strain.	If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.	California law has a general defense of necessity. It appears that it's not in statute, but rather comes from common law. It's described in what appears to be the official jury instructions at CALCRIM 3403. The defendant is not guilty of (insert crime[s]) if (he/she) acted because of legal necessity. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that: (He/She) acted in an emergency to prevent a signiﬁcant bodily harm or evil to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else); (He/She) had no adequate legal alternative; The defendant’s acts did not create a greater danger than the one avoided; When the defendant acted, (he/she) actually believed that the act was necessary to prevent the threatened harm or evil; A reasonable person would also have believed that the act was necessary under the circumstances; AND The defendant did not substantially contribute to the emergency. The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each of the six listed items is true. It seems like all six requirements would apply in your hypothetical case, so if you could prove them, you'd be off the hook for a violation of Cal. Penal 148(a)(1) as cited by user6726.	Partial answer (other parts of an answer would be jurisdiction specific): Would this constitute a slander lawsuit against the group of employees and outside agency? The employee falsely alleged to be mentally ill would be the plaintiff who would be the only person who would have standing to bring suit. The person allegedly making a false statement to someone other than the employee alleged to be mentally ill (an action which is called "publication" of a false statement) would be the defendant(s). Listening to an allegedly false statement about someone is not slander, nor is believing it to be true. In the U.S., in most cases, knowledge of the truth or reckless disregard for the truth (or at least negligence in getting the facts wrong in private persons cases not involving a public interest) is necessary to establish liability. Someone who doesn't know that a statement is false and has some basis to believe it is true, can't be guilty of slander. In many non-U.S. jurisdictions, slander liability is possible without knowledge that the statement made is false (and without reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement). Also, it matter who the "outside agency" is in this case. Governmental agencies are typically immune from liability for slander for statements made in the course of their official duties. Without a fuller understanding of who is saying something and why, it is hard to evaluate the claim appropriately.	Yes and No. The Federal U.S. Government as well as each individual state and territory claim Soverign Immunity to a limited degree. In the case of Federal Government, they claim Soverign Immunity to a near limitless degree (more on this in a moment), while States and Territories claim "State Soverign Immunity" which grants them immunity with respect to all soverign powers granted under the U.S. Constitution. To clarify, each U.S. State is seperately soverign in all matters not explicitly allocated to the Federal Government by the U.S. Constitution and all constitutionally written laws. Where the Constitution does not in writing claim a power for the federal government nor reserver a power for the state government, the power is assumed to be state government. So a State can claim immunity for a police situation but not a law it makes regarding immigration or foriegn policy, since that is the exclusive wheelhouse of the Feds. Per the 11th amendment, states can only be sued in state court by citizens of the state, while non-state citizens wishing to sue a state must sue in the Federal Court (Which for the purposes of the trial may adopt the defendant State's laws and regulations for the purposes of questions of fact and law brought up in the suit). All U.S. States and the Federal Goverment additionally wave Soverign Immunity under specific conditions outlined in laws. In the case of the Federal Government, the laws governing when this immunity is waived are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (1946) and the Tucker Act (1887). The FTCA covers intentional torts by the Federal Government, while the Tucker Act typically covers matters related to contractual obligations or monitary interactions with the federal government. Things that may be sued for include but are not limited too: Intentional Torts committed by Government Agents in their Official Capacity (i.e. When the FBI violates your rights or maliciously investigates you). Contractual disputes where the Government is a party to the Contract, either in written or implied terms. Constitutional Claims (i.e. The Government may have violated the Constitution. These tend to be for non-monitary relief such as mandemuses, though the 5th Amendment's Taking Clause can be invoked of the government took property and does not justly compensate.). Individual Agencies of the Government when the monitary claim is not drawn from the U.S. Treasury (the agencies own allocated budget is used to pay). Refund for taxes paid In all cases, a Judge will determin if the Government, under the laws, can be sued. If in the example of a government employee being sued, the Justice Department will first make a determination if the employee was acting as an agent of the government when they committed the tortious act, and then will declare themselves Respondent Superior through the agency of employement. From there, the case becomes a suit against the Federal Government and FTCA immunity waiver is determined by a Judge. For example, lets say you (Mr. Rapt) sue Special Agent Jimmy Jones of an intentional tort that he committed in the course of his duty as an FBI agent. The DOJ will first declare that they are Respondent Superior in the case of Rapt v. Jones, thus turning the case to Rapt v. United States Government, Department of Justice, Federal Beura of Investigations, and Jones (Rapt v. United States, et. al.). From here, the Judge who gets the case then determins if the U.S. Government under FTCA can be sued by Rapt, based on Rapt's citizenship status (usually permanent legal residents are covered as citizens for this point, but I can say for certain in this particular law), ripeness (the suit must be filed within 2 years of the incident or first knowledge), and immunity waiver under FTCA. In the case of the State Government, they should have similar laws, but I'm not going to identify all 50 individual laws here. Additionally, the 11th Amendment permits U.S. Congress to waive a State's immunity to suit in certain cases (mostly comes up with the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment.). As a fun point, in all cases where a government appears as a defendant in a suit, it is automatically a Bench Trial, as the government usually include a waiver of their right as defendant to a jury trial. The thinking here is that, as a country that was founded by rebelling against the government, a jury of 12 of the government's citizens aren't going to give them any slack at trial, where as a judge (who they pay) is much more likely. TL;DR: Both questions are yes. The immunity is waived under federal law for certain cases, but it is a judge who will make the ruling if the specific case meets the aformentioned waived immunity.	In Guam, Any person who is an expert in the art of karate or judo, or any similar physical are in which the hands and feet are used as deadly weapons, is required to register with the Department of Revenue and Taxation but This Chapter shall not apply to duly authorized and appointed peace and law enforcement officers, nor to members of the Armed Forces of the United States However, in general, a person is not at a legal disadvantage for a self-defense defense by dint of the fact of knowing or using martial arts. You are allowed to use necessary and proportionate force to defend yourself or another from harm. The specifics vary by state, so you may be required to retreat and use force only if there is no alternative other than death. Jurors would be given some kind of instructions such as this one and this, the crucial part of which is that one may employ such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar conditions as they appeared to the person, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time of [and prior to] the incident It is possible that jurors would think that lesser force is required in the case of a martial-arts based self-defense. There would probably be expert testimony addressing the question of whether a less energetic response would be obviously effective, given the defendant's expertise.
What is it called when a pre-defined penalty is specified in a contract? In contract law, what is a pre-defined penalty for non-performance called? For example, if the contract says something like: "so-and-so will do xyz by May 5, 2021, and if so-and-so should fail to do so by that date then so-and-so will be liable for $100,000 due to the party of the first part." What is the $100,000 penalty called?	It has to be 'liquidated damages', since a penalty clause is unenforceable. It has to have a reasonable relation to the party's legitimate interest. The point is that it has to represent a good faith estimate of the actual damage.	This would appear to be a simple application of contract law - the exchange of money for a promise (to sell at a fixed price in the future). Option contracts are only regulated if they relate to options over securities (like company shares) - not if they are over personal property (like baseball cards).	Neither The contract is completed when each party has totally fulfilled its obligations under the contract. In this case, it is when the purchaser has consumed or otherwise dealt with the banana to their satisfaction. The vendor has ongoing obligations under the contract until this happens. For example, obligations that the banana is of merchantable quality and fit for purpose. If the purchaser peels the banana and discovers that it is "off" or eats the banana and develops food poisoning then the vendor still has obligations and can be sued under the contract. Yes, I realize that no one is going to sue anyone over a rotten banana but let's assume that "banana" is code for 54km of motorway construction and £1 is actually £1 billion. When is the contract formed? This is not a trivial determination and there are literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of lawsuits that have turned on this exact question. Once the contract is formed its binding on both parties; until then, either can walk away (subject to estoppel) The traditional analysis involves offer and acceptance. In your banana scenario, the shop displaying "Banana's: 50p/each" (it's a fruit shop - they always have unnecessary apostrophes) is not an offer - it is an invitation to treat. An offer is made by Ben placing the banana on the counter and proffering the £1, it is accepted by Sam taking the £1. At this point, the sale is binding on both parties. Ben has fulfilled all his obligations under the contract, Sam still has some. In addition to those discussed above, he owes Ben 50p. Strictly speaking, this is not an obligation under the contract but a debt due and payable. Consumer protection law The proceeding is a strict contract law interpretation - many jurisdictions have consumer protection legislation (and food safety laws for bananas) that impose additional protections and may change the contract law position.	Yes Quite a large chunk of the legal system deals with those general concepts. 27 - pretty much all contract law deals with when and how you must discharge your obligations 28 - ditto, although if it’s not owed until tomorrow … 29 - there are laws against criminal conspiracy 30 - making false accusations can be a crime and can give rise to defamation	Assuming there is a contract (and it is not clear that there is), this is a purported liquidated damages clause. Alice is trying to dictate what Bob will owe her if he breaches his promise to not share the file. However, there are limits on what can be stipulated in a liquidated damages clause. Super Save Disposal Inc. v. Blazin Auto Ltd., 2011 BCSC 1784: The enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in an agreement engages two competing objectives: freedom of contract versus the right of the courts to intervene in a given case to relieve against an oppressive or unconscionable result flowing from enforcement of the liquidated damages term. It is well settled that the enforceability of such a term turns on whether it is a genuine pre-estimate of the expected loss that a party will sustain in the event of a breach of contract or a penalty clause so oppressive or unreasonable that equitable intervention is justified to prevent an injustice. Judicial interference with a liquidated damages provision will be justified if enforcement of the term results in payment of a sum which is extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach Oppressive liquidated damages clauses work against a person's freedom to breach and the possibility of efficient breach. Perhaps if the file were a trade secret like the Coke recipe, the $1,000,000 might be a genuine pre-breach estimate, but without much more information about the nature of the file, I predict a court would find the $1,000,000 to be extravagant and unconscionable in comparison to the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach. What follows is less researched. If it is not a contract then I think it is at best a licence, which would make Bob's agreement to pay $1,000,000 a free-standing unenforceable promise. I also agree with Matthew's position on the possibility (and limitations of) a claim in promissory estoppel, especially in jurisdictions following Waltons Stores or similar reasoning.	At what point passed the original ETA is the contract still valid? There is no hard limit or deadline other than the one (if any) the contract itself provides. The contract remains valid regardless of a party's breach or non-performance. The remedies that would be available to you are in the form of rescinding the contract --without having to pay the cancellation fee--, or forcing the store to deliver the furniture soon. The longer the delay, the clearer your entitlement to either remedy. The manager's allegation about other customers is unavailing: Your description does not reflect that the contract or estimates are in terms of the delay that non-parties tolerated. Their contracts are totally unrelated to yours. The contracts might not even be comparable. The purpose of estimates is to give the counterparty some rough information that is known to likely influence his decision-making. Accordingly, a huge departure from the estimate supports the finding that the store deprived you of information that was material to your decision. The store's failure to timely inform you strikes the contract law tenet that you entered the contract knowingly. Furthermore, the store's deliberate act of specifying even the day of the month [mis-]led you to rule out that the delivery might actually take years. Typically furniture is purchased with the expectation of being able to start using it relatively soon, not years later. In addition to breach of contract, the store might also be in violation of statutes against unfair and misleading practices.	Contracts are a relationship between two or more people Just as it is meaningless to speak of marrying yourself, it is equally meaningless to speak of a contract with yourself. Even if you were to draft such a thing, you would not have standing to sue because you can’t sue yourself. Your example probably isn’t a “one person contract” It’s a contract between the car owner (person 1) and the car yard (person 2) - probably a corporation. The fact that person 1 is representing both parties to the contract doesn’t make it a “one person contract”. There are potential conflicts of interest with this but they are not necessarily ones that can’t be overcome. However, if the car owner runs a business as a car dealer as a sole trader, then, no, they cannot make this kind of contract.	Does this still count as consideration, even though there was never any possibility of B getting anything out of it? Yes. The sole fact that the promisee and the beneficiary are different and unrelated entities does not invalidate a contract. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 302(1)(b), what matters is that "the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance".
AG's and indictments I'm curious, let's say that a prosecutor has taken a case before a grand jury. That grand jury has chosen to indict. Can the AG withdrawal those indictments? I've been trying to find out here, but I've had no luck. Edit: This would regard Federal crimes and the United States.	Yes. The U.S. AG can decline to prosecute an indictment at any time until jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn in to consider the charges at trial. The AG can also abandon a prosecution mid-trial but then cannot retry those charges later. The AG might abandon charges, for example, because the evidence does not appear to support the charges when presented at trial, or because, for example, a prosecution might damage a diplomatic relationship of the U.S. with another country, or because a new administration has different priorities than an old one and recently had its AG appointed to office while the trial was pending. This said, there are some situations (e.g. when there is a special prosecutor, or after a lower level prosecutor has entered into a binding plea agreement) when the AG does not have the authority to overrule the decisions to prosecute or not prosecute an indictment that is made by a lower level prosecutor. The AG has line authority to give orders to lower level prosecutors in the AG's office 99% of the time, but not always.	The burden for proving claims in civil actions is "preponderance of evidence," i.e., merely that "more than 50% of the evidence favors a conclusion." However, the standard for conviction of any crime is "beyond a reasonable doubt." I.e., if the defense can raise reasonable doubt about one's guilt then the defendant should be acquitted. There is quite a bit of space between the two standards, which is compounded by prosecutorial discretion to even bring criminal charges.	Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions.	Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about.	The standard of proof for a criminal conviction is the same. So they would similarly need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the foreign national of a crime. But deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and has a different standard of proof. (In deportation you also don't have criminal defendant rights like right to an attorney if you can't afford one.) I believe the standard is "clear and convincing evidence".	An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to.	Acquittals in criminal jury trials cannot be appealed (at least in a way that affects the outcome, Colorado and a few other states allow criminal appeals by the prosecution solely for the purposes of clarifying the law prospectively). Interlocutory appeals (i.e. appeals before the case is over) by the prosecution are allowed for pre-trial rulings (e.g. suppression of evidence rulings in a pre-trial hearing), in criminal cases, but not for evidentiary rulings made in the midst of a jury trial (which is when jeopardy attaches for the purposes of the double jeopardy rule, which is what prevents acquittals from being retried). An error in a ruling on an admission or rejection of evidence at trial may be appealed by a convicted defendant if the alleged misapplication of the evidence rule was an abuse of discretion by the judge, and was not "harmless error" (i.e. if as part of all errors made in the case there is a reasonable probability that it changed the outcome that the jury reached).	It happens all of the time, even though it is mildly improper. Usually, the lawyer can get away with it until the judge sternly warns the lawyer not to try it again, in which case the lawyer risks being held in contempt of court. This is riskier for a prosecutor (who risks this conduct causing a conviction to be overturned on appeal resulting in a new trial), than for a criminal defense attorney. This is because an acquittal, if obtained by these methods, is still not subject to appeal. Indeed, for a criminal defense attorney, even if it results in a mistrial followed by a new trial (which can be allowed if the mistrial is caused by the conduct of the defense), the mistrial will often count as a win if the trial was going badly on the merits.
How can I sue an empolyer for immigration status discrimination? My situation is as follows: I interviewed with a prestigious financial service company in downtown NYC. A few days after my onsite, the head recruiter gave me a call saying "Congrats!" they would extend me an offer. Then they asked my visa status and whether I need H1B sponsorship. I replied "I will need H1B sponsorship in the future." After a few days the company pulled back the verbal offer because they do not want to sponsor H1B for this role. Is it a discrimination?	It is discrimination. However, it is legal, and generally not grounds for a lawsuit. Discrimination is legal, except when it is based upon certain specific categories, such as race, sex, and religion. For example, it is perfectly legal to discriminate for a position based on the possession of education degrees, skill certification or availability to work specific hours or days of the week. Immigration status (and specifically, needing a H1B sponsor in the future) is not a protected category, and as such it is legal to discriminate against this as a factor. Additionally, there are several downsides for hiring a H1B candidate, and foremost of which is sponsoring someone for an H1B visa is not a sure thing, since the H1B system is run as a lottery; as such, you may not receive a visa or extension, and thus be ineligible to legally work.	Why is a business allowed to refuse a customer? Because also freedom of contract is a right. Except for discrimination on the basis of protected categories, a person or entity is entitled to discretion on whether or with whom to do business and enter contracts. The last sentence in your post reflects a misconception of "completely different set of values and laws" between the USA and members of the EU. Clearly there are many differences, but a comparison of the Wikipedia link you posted and, for instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reflects an overlap of protected categories in the laws of the Netherlands and of the US, such as religion, sex, race, or national origin/nationality. One would need persuasive evidence to support a finding of unlawful discrimination in the two examples you have experienced. Assuming the bank responded to your GDPR inquiry truthfully, the bank's refusal to open an account might have stemmed from profiling or decision-making that (1) does not precisely require specific data about you, and/or (2) uses information the bank does not need to log for purposes of compliance with the GDPR. Note that the GDPR does not outlaw algorithmic decision-making. Since legislation in the EU (as in the US) portrays an approach of market economy, both bank and landlord are entitled to made decisions on the basis of their inner policies for risk management. The policies might be unclear to you, but that does not necessarily mean they contravene principles of equal opportunity.	At the federal level, employment discrimination as prohibited here is at its core a tort rather than a crime. Probably the most pertinent first part of the law is Subpart B, which encompasses procedures. The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) may receive allegations of a violation, and there is a procedure for deciding on the merits of the case. After charges are filed, there is an investigation by the EEOC, which may include a public hearing. Based on the investigation, the commission may dismiss the charge (technical flaws in the complaint); they may issue a letter of determination to that effect if they find that there was no reasonable cause for the complaint. They can also encourage a negotiated settlement. In making this determination, the commission follows its own guidelines, as encoded in the regulations. So if the commission determines by its rules that there was a violation, the courts will generally defer to that finding unless the finding is contrary to what Congress said. If there is no dismissal or settlement, then they issue a determination that there is reasonable cause (§1601.21). Then there is a procedure to rectify unlawful practices, which includes the possibility of a conciliation agreement. Finally, starting at §1601.27, we get to the point that somebody might get their day in court. If the accused still refuses to relent on whatever point was at stake, the matter can go to trial: The Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent named in a charge not a government, governmental agency or political subdivision, after thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of a charge with the Commission unless a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission has been secured But also, the aggrieved can take the accused to court at any time. The allegation then must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.	[C]ould that person, in the future, provide another I-134 for a different person who's trying to immigrate to the US? According to the Instructions for Form I-134 (PDF, 371.05 KB) If you are sponsoring more than one foreign national, you must submit a separate Form I-134 for each foreign national. There is no mention, that I can see, prohibiting future applications.	Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic.	It doesn't seem as if the bank is discriminating in the way you suggest. They offer two types of account: (A) accrues or charges interest and (B) does not accrue or charge interest. The bank says you can choose A or B whatever your religion. You the customer choose A or B, possibly depending on your religion. So I do not see what cause of action you have or what damages you have suffered. Therefore I don't think you could sue them.	Unfortunately, you are probably not entitled to the redundancy / severance money since you weren't technically ever made redundant / laid off - there was no point in time where you were willing and able to work where they refused you, and I presume you were paid for all time worked. If you're concerned that they only changed their tune because they knew you had a better job already lined up - well, you can call their bluff or just use it as a learning experience. In what jurisdiction do you work? If the US, you could call their bluff, say you'd rather stay and see what they do. You would then keep the option of simply walking away with your stuff in a box any time you felt like it (assuming at-will employment and no contracts that state otherwise).	Yes. But it isn't illegal discrimination in many places. Laws against discrimination prevent the discrimination based on forbidden categories. Take the national Olympic team: They are allowed to discriminate based on athletic performance, obviously. They are allowed to discriminate based on gender. There are men's teams and women's teams, and men cannot simply apply for a slot on the women's team. They are not allowed to discriminate based on sexual orientation. Discrimination based on a minimum age might be legal, discrimination based on a maximum age probably not. For an employer, it is legal in many places to discriminate based on (formal) qualifications, but not to discriminate based on sexual orientation or race. (It may be legal to discriminate based on nationality, however ...)
Is 'reading down' clause optional? Specifically with regard to a UK/England employment contract. I am used to seeing clauses in contracts which state crudely that if one clause is found unreasonable, that clause alone will be struck out and the remainder of the contract left to stand. From this question, I gather this is termed a 'reading down' clause. From comments, it can also be a Salvatorian Clause or Severability Clause. Is this form strictly necessary (i.e. one unreasonable clause in a contract has significant risk to invalidate the whole), or is it simply additional security in capturing something which would typically occur regardless?	I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious.	Contracts are routinely held to be valid even when there is negligible or literally zero financial “gain” (compensation, which they take into consideration in order to enter into the contract). A document purporting to be a contract might be held invalid if it is a bare promise like “I promise to give you $100 on Friday”, but you can make it an enforceable contract by including “if you give me a french fry today”. Reasoning that party “could have” done something else does not invalidate a contract, for example the party might have had $3 at the time and could have purchased a whole bag of fries. The only imaginable relevance of “I could have” thinking would be if the terms of the contract are so unclear that the party would not reasonably have understood the contract to have obligated them to pay $100, or that they would have reasonably believed that they were to receive a suitcase full of french fries. There is a (huge) difference between subjective errors in interpreting a contract and objective uncertainty. Objective uncertainty is fundamentally about the linguistic structure of the agreement, i.e. words like “it” which have no intrinsic referent, or “required books and clothing” (which could mean “required books and all clothing”, or “required books and required clothing”). There may be special rules of legal interpretation addressing how such ambiguities are resolved (this one is not well established, but is known in some spheres as the “across-the-board rule”). Personal interpretation does not enter into decisions as to the validity of a contract: if you misinterpret the words of a contract, regardless of how strong your proof is that at the time you did not understand the contract, that doesn’t matter, unless you can show that at the time you were actually not competent (did not know Armenian and could not have understood what the contract required). The courts look at the words of the contract, assume that the parties have availed themselves of wise legal counsel, and understand how the courts would interpret the contract, then they filter the words of the contract through a sieve composed of rules constituting "the law", and declare what parties A and B must do.	This aspect (and many others) of contract law is applicable in the US and various countries of the EU. can they renege after the candidate has begun their journey, thus saddling the candidate with the travel cost? No. The company would incur breach of contract. There is no need for a formal contract. The candidate only needs to prove that the company agreed (in writing, orally or clearly through its conduct) to cover or reimburse those expenses and that this elicited a meeting of the minds. The agreement would be void if the candidate incurred the expenses despite knowing (via timely notice) that the company changed its mind. Likewise, if the candidate lied on his CV, the contract (here, the company's agreement to cover the expenses) would be voidable by the company, since the candidate's intentional misrepresentations preclude the aforementioned condition of meeting of the minds. --Edited on 1/18/2019 to add ...-- Per suggestion by @KRyan, the aspect of void or voidable contract is expanded. But first, two disclaimers are pertinent: We need to be mindful that many of the follow-up concerns are either premised on or inspired by the situation described in the underlying Workplace SE post. These are somewhat beyond the scope of this Law SE question but addressed nonetheless, given their relevance as well as the OP's & audience's interest. The follow-up hypotheticals [in this Law SE question] and clarifications thereto neither speculate nor pass judgment on the stranded candidate who asked on Workplace SE. The Workplace SE post reflects a company's breach of contract. The subsequent comments here about fraud hypotheticals are mostly derivative inquiries beyond what is described in Workplace SE. In particular, we do not assume whatsoever that the stranded candidate committed fraud. The_Sympathizer commented: can the contract be voided on the spot like that without first proving in court? As it seems like it grants a rather "vigilante" justice power that is open to abuse, since effectively the "punishment" (cancellation of the flight and thus inducing a rather serious physical situation) is administered before any due process has been afforded the one accused. Yes, it can be voided on the spot (aka sua sponte). "Vigilante" justice denotes a self-attribution of punitive powers that exclusively belong to the state/government/court, whereas a party's voiding of a contract is the act of foreclosing his losses/exposures with respect to a contract that de facto never existed (such as when that contract was induced by fraud). I agree that unfortunately that is open to abuse: As a pretext to actually incur breach of contract, a company might allege that the contract was void. That is why (if taken to court) it will be the company's burden to prove that (1) it reasonably relied upon a candidate's representations (2) which were significant and blatantly false (3) given the candidate's knowledge that his lies contravened the job's core requirements. That can be quite burdensome. For instance, is the company handing out airfares without first conducting some competent corroborations about the candidate's credentials/skills? If so, one can hardly concede the company's allegation of reasonable reliance. The resulting finding would be that the contract was not voidable by the company, and thus that it is liable for breach of contract. Also, belatedly "informing" the stranded candidate that the company "is going in a different direction" falls short of evidencing that the contract was voidable. That applies even if the candidate performed very poorly in the interview or screening process. Given the hardship imposed on a stranded candidate, a company has to be morally and legally very judicious about its method and timing for "going in a different direction". But absent any representations or [company's] bylaws to the contrary, a company generally does not have the obligation to afford due process to a candidate. The court is the entity with an obligation to enforce due process as provided by law (although many of us in the U.S. have repeatedly experienced the courts' disavowal of due process). --End of edit on 1/19/2019-- a binding agreement requires both sides to give something Here, the candidate's consideration is his time and effort to accommodate the company's interest in assessing the candidate's profile at a location that is convenient to the company.	That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.	It doesn't matter. When a contract is left ambiguous the interpretation that is used is the one that is the most favorable to the party that did not draft the contract, under the logic that if the party that did draft the contract chose all the wording and thus, they could have stated their interpretation in the contract just avoided this whole mess in the first place. A similar rule exists in criminal law, where if the law is ambiguous, the interpretation used is the one most favorable to the defendant, since the state could have drafted it in a way that made their interpretation clear.	Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario.	You cannot In a conflict between written and oral terms of a contract, the written terms prevail. In any event, by you utterance you have not accepted the contract; you have made a counter-offer which the other party has not accepted and have then gone on to accept their original offer. You would need the written agreement of the other party that they accept your terms and that they understand that clicking the “I accept” is not an acceptance of their terms but merely a means of completing the technical procedure.	If a line in your will bequeaths something that you don't have the power to give (e.g. you bequeath something that you don't own at the time of your death), that line has no legal effect. If I died and left you the house at 10 Downing Street in London, for example, you wouldn't actually be getting it. If your will contains enough of those lines and/or they seem excessively unreasonable, it may cause the validity of the will to be challenged on the basis that you weren't competent to prepare and sign it. If the people reading it think it's reasonable, it may have a social effect based on what it conveys to them, which could lead to voluntary compliance with your wish (especially if the main obstacle to that being realized is a mistaken understanding of and desire to respect your wishes). That could help make peace, for example, if a surviving parent's remarriage would otherwise be opposed by children (or the surviving partner) or others based solely on a mistaken understanding of the wishes of the deceased. It could also make for a really awkward moment, depending on the views of and relationships between survivors. Addressing user662852's comment on the question: You can also use a will to name a guardian for anyone you have guardianship over, which is usually more important for children (e.g. see "Why Every Parent Needs a Will.").
Can infringement of a trademark be pursued for using a company's name in a sentence? If I have a sentence on my business website stating something similar to "Mr. Smith participated in the process that ended with Pepsi acquiring Silly Sally's Sodas" Is this a basis for infringement on Pepsi or SSS? No logos or other graphics used, just a plain statement of fact. Can Pepsi or SSS sue for trademark infringement?	The example in the question is a pretty clear case of nominative use. The mark is being used to refer to, or name, the product (or service). It is not being used to sell a similar product, or anything else. No reasonable person could take it to indicate that the trademark owner has endorsed the person making the statement, nor that there is any sort of affiliation. This page from the International Trademark Association describes the concept. This concept is sometimes called "fair use" by analogy with the concept in US copyright law, but that term is not strictly accurate. It is better to simply say "nominative use" or "descriptive use". Digital Media Law's page on "Using the trademarks of others" says: As a general matter, if you are reporting on, commenting on, or criticizing a trademark owner, most ordinary consumers will not be confused about whether the company or organization is the source or sponsor of your work. You can reduce the likelihood of confusion further by avoiding a website design that looks like the trademark owner's site or resembles its product packaging, and you should never festoon your website with a company's logo (but isolated use when relevant to a discussion is OK) ... If someone threatens you with a lawsuit or sues you for trademark dilution, then a lack of consumer confusion will not help you. Here, one obvious line of defense is to argue that there is no likelihood of dilution. Federal and state dilution law protects a trademark owner against the whittling away of the distinctiveness of its famous trademark by association with other goods or services; it does not give a trademark owner the right to shut down all unflattering speech about it. If you do not associate a famous trademark with your own goods or services, then there can be no dilution (or at least that's how your argument goes). ... The nominative fair use defense protects your ability to use a trademark to refer to a trademark owner or its goods or services for purposes of reporting, commentary, criticism, and parody, as well as for comparative advertising. Courts impose three requirements on defendants who want to take advantage of the nominative fair use defense: (1) the trademark owner, product, or service in question must not be readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) the defendant must use only as much of the mark as is necessary to identify the trademark owner, product, or service; and (3) the defendant must do nothing that would suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. This defense works against trademark infringement lawsuits. The federal dilution statute, found at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A), also makes nominative fair use a complete defense to trademark dilution claims.	Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.	The standard for fair use of trademarks is as follows: (1) the product or service in question is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark (2) only so much of the mark as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service is used (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. I think you might run into a problem with (1). In other words the trademark owner would argue that you could have used fake trademarks to satisfy your product description needs, so you are using their trademark unnecessarily.	This is fine. You can use initials, shortened names, common nicknames (Bob/Robert), omit middle names, and so forth without causing yourself any problems. Things can get more complicated if you sign by a name that is different from names that you normally use elsewhere - such as if you are called Christopher Smith and you sign as Donald Jones, having not used that name before - but there's no fundamental difference of principle. One example case is Scott v Soans [1802] 102 ER 539, where the defendant John Soans objected to the suit being made against "Jonathan otherwise John Soans". The Lord Chief Justice ruled that "Jonathan otherwise John" could be his name, and that if he'd signed a contract using that name then "what objection could be made to it?" There are several other similar cases from past centuries, some of which may no longer be reliable law since they turn on points of procedure that aren't relevant today, but the general thrust is that if you sign a contract under a certain name, then you can be sued under that name. (And you can sue other people using whatever name you like.) Mistakes in names can be corrected as part of the general process of contractual interpretation, called "rectification". This more often arises when dealing with company names, say when there are a half dozen closely linked companies with related names, and the issue is which one of them is actually meant to be named; there are some recent cases of this kind, such as Liberty Mercian Ltd v Cuddy Civil Engineering Ltd [2013] EWHC 2688 (TCC). Generally speaking, as Lord Denning said in Nittan v Solent Steel [1980] EWCA Civ J1023-4, We do not allow people to take advantage of a misnomer when everyone knows what was intended. Further, the doctrine of "estoppel by convention" means that if you sign a contract under whatever name, then act as if you were bound by the contract, you can't then wriggle out of it on the grounds that the name is not really your own. In Scots law, which includes certain doctrines imported from Roman civil law, there is a distinction between error in persona and error in nomine. The former means that you were mistaken about who your counterparty really was (such that you wouldn't have made the contract had you known the truth) and the latter means that you had the intended person but made a mistake about their name. The law of error in Scotland is not quite the same as in England and Wales, but in this case it gets to the same basic result: if you agreed on who was to be bound, that's what matters, regardless of the names used.	No, it does not fall under fair use: It is commercial use in nature It is a copyrighted work It is hard to say what portion of the copyrighted work you'd be using based on your description, so test three is inconclusive It could be argued in your favor that the infringement would not have an impact on their potential market, but it could potentially impact the value If discovered the owner of the copyright could pursue action against the company you work for.	Yes. Money damages can be awarded in this circumstance and would likely be awarded if the infringement was found to have occurred and not to have been fair use. Even in the absence of proof that any profits are made, there are statutory damages that can be awarded on a per offense basis for copyright violations, and trademark cases in addition to having statutory violations can measure damages by harm to the trademark owner and not just unjust enrichment to the infringer.	"Swiss Army Knife" is indeed a trademark. Indeed, it is a very special trademark, because after the last of the Geneva Conventions was adopted, the use of the Swiss insignia used in the Swiss Army Knife's trademarked logo was prohibited except for grandfathered trademarks such as the one you identify. But use of a trademark is infringing only when it is used in connection with the sale of a good or service to imply that the good or service sold is endorsed by or affiliated with the owner of the trademark. In the context you describe, the trademark is not being used in that fashion, and so it is not infringing.	Non-commercial copying of a copyrighted work is still copyright infringement. Realistically, a copyright or trademark infringement lawsuit is unlikely, uneconomical, and bad press, but ultimately, the owner of a copyrighted work has a right to control how it is used.
What is the difference between a law and an act? In context of Indian legislature, I know that when a bill is put to vote in the Union parliament and gets the votes of majority of the members in all the houses, it is sent to the President of India for his assent and on receiving the President of India's assent, it becomes an Act. I really do not understand the difference between an Act and a law. Do they refer to the same thing or are they different things?	The words "an Act" and "a law" are often used loosely to be synonymous in an every day conversation, but "a law" is a broader term. For example, the criminal code is "a law". But, while the original version of the criminal code may have been a single "act", the criminal code has almost certainly been amended by many other acts over the years after its original enactment as a single act. An "act" is a single enacted bill proposed in a single legislative session approved in a single Presidential assent. A law, in contrast, can be the result of multiple acts approved in multiple Presidential assents at different times and then codified into a single statute. Also, the term "a law" can be used correctly to refer to a particular holding of case law that is judicially created and not enacted by the legislature. For example, someone might correctly say, "there is a law that makes it illegal to breach a contract without legal justification", even though that is a case law principle, rather than a legislatively enacted rule. Confusingly, it isn't uncommon for the short title of a statute (i.e. a law) that is the product of multiple acts amending the original one, to be the short title of the original act that has been amended over the years. For example, in the United States, the "1933 Securities Act" which was the short title of the original act giving rise to that statute, is still described by that short title, despite the fact that it has been amended scores of times since then well into the 21st century. (A careful writer would say "the 1933 Securities Act, as amended"). I suspect that this practice is also followed in India, because the American practice of naming statutes in this fashion dates back to English practice that was in place before the American revolution and has continued to be followed since then. This isn't a hard and fast rule, however. Hence, another statute has the short title, "Statute of Frauds", even though it could have been described by the short title of the original act from the reign of Queen Anne. But, in the abstract, "an act" has its more narrow technical meaning. Incidentally, to prevent confusion, "the law" is a term much broader than either "an act" or "a law". The phrase "the law" encompasses not just a particular statute, but all statutes, all regulations that have the force of law, all treaties, the constitution, and all judicially created case law, not just statutes which come into being through the passage of bills as acts by the legislature.	The point of directives is that they concern areas of law where the EU does not legislate directly. They create a requirement that member states must achieve through their own legislation. In the EU's own words A "directive" is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve. Were a directive to be repealed, it would remove a constraint on national law. That would not automatically lead to a repeal of national law. Of course, national law itself could have a provision effecting the automatic repeal, but that might be problematic because most repeals seem actually to be modifications or recodifications, where national legislatures might be better off amending their transposing legislation rather than replacing it.	They have subtle differences. Starting with the Oxford Dictionary definitions (using the one most appropriate for a legal context): clause. 2.a particular and separate article, stipulation, or proviso in a treaty, bill, or contract. A clause is a self-contained concept within the written contract; it may have a number of subclauses. It may reference other clauses but ideally it can be read and acted on on its own. Typical contracts will contain clauses on payment, time, termination, scope etc. It is a feature of the drafting of the contract document. provision 3.a condition or requirement in a legal document: "the first private prosecution under the provisions of the 1989 Water Act" A provision is any condition (q.v.) or stipulation of things to be done or not be done within the contract. A provision may correspond with a clause, may span several clauses or be contained wholly within a subclause. It is a feature of the contract itself: verbal contracts will have provisions but they will not have clauses. condition 3.a state of affairs that must exist or be brought about before something else is possible or permitted: "for a member to borrow money, three conditions have to be met" A condition is a set of circumstances that must arise before another action can occur. There can be a "condition precedent" which means the condition must be satisfied before there is a contract. There can (will) also be conditions within the contract, for example, there will be conditions that must be satisfied before payment is made (like issuing an invoice). Conditions are a creature of the contract not the drafting. term 4.(terms) conditions under which an action may be undertaken or agreement reached; stipulated or agreed requirements: "their solicitors had agreed terms" (I don't like this definition much but it is the best they had.) A term is a provision (q.v.) in the contract for which one of the possible remedies for breach is termination of the contract by the innocent party . A provision where termination is not an available remedy is a warranty.	There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says "Congress having occupied the field" it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.	The Law Commission already does this, including: repealing legislation that no longer serves any practical purpose creating consolidation bills, which merge multiple acts (or parts of act) into a single one. Because Law Commission bills do not create or change the law, they typically have an expedited passage through Parliament.	Because the 1860 law that criminalised “unnatural” sex is unconstitutional In essence, Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India decided that criminalising sex between consenting adults violated the Constitutional right to equality. You have a Law in the Constitution that says people have to be treated equally. You have another law that says people in same-sex relationships are to be treated differently. The law in the Constitution wins. According to the BBC: Thursday's decision was delivered by a five-judge bench headed by India's outgoing chief justice Dipak Misra and was unanimous. Reading out the judgement, he said: "Criminalising carnal intercourse is irrational, arbitrary and manifestly unconstitutional." Another judge, Indu Malhotra, said she believed "history owes an apology" to LGBT people for ostracising them. Justice DY Chandrachud said the state had no right to control the private lives of LGBT community members and that the denial of the right to sexual orientation was the same as denying the right to privacy. The courts in India, like they are in most common law/civil law jurisdictions are interested it questions of law. Questions of sin and morality they are happy to leave to religion.	The veto aspect of the scenario is a red herring. All bills not passed into law by the end of a Congress die (subject to a small 10-day window for approval by a President). This is a frequently asked question at the Library of Congress: If a bill from any Congress does not become law during the Congress in which it is introduced, it is considered “dead.” For a “dead” bill to be enacted in a new Congress, it would have to be reintroduced with a new number and begin anew its journey through the legislative process. This is because when Americans elect a Congress, "[t]hey are electing a particular Congress, which lasts two years. So through 2013 and 2014, the 113th U.S. Congress has been making laws. For 2015 and 2016, the 114th U.S. Congress will be in office. ... When one Congress expires, all the pending legislation goes with it" (The Congressional Institute). "The spirit of the Constitution evidently requires the performance of every act necessary to the enactment and approval of laws to be perfect before the adjournment of Congress" (H. R. Report No. 108, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., June 11, 1864, as quoted in Edwards, below). There is only one exception, discussed in Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932). It was held that even if a Congress has adjourned at the end of that Congress's term, the President still has the full ten days to approve a bill presented from that former Congress.	Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.
Break Contract after company sells to new owners and changes names Company A signs a contract with company B, a scrap metal vendor, to buy all of company A’s scrap metal produced. Company A sells out to new owners and changes names. Company B continues to purchase scrap metal from the new company A under the contract terms. New company A wants to change scrap vendorswhen the contact expired, but there is a 1 year auto renewal clause if Company A does not give 30 days written notice from the expiration of the contract. Since Company B did not sign any type of Novation to the new Company A’s name is the contract null and void?	The parties to the contract have not changed; they are still the purchaser company and the scrap vendor. The obligations have not changed; they are presumably based on amounts of stock and monetary value. The only changes are in the name of one party and its ownership, so unless the contract permits termination for those reasons (not unheard of, if a contract has been intended to provide/avert support from/by a particular party or symbolism) the contract still stands with all its terms. A novation is not needed.	Would breaking a rule in the handbook constitute breach of contract? Generally speaking, yes. Of course, most employment contracts are "at will" so a breach of contract often isn't necessary to terminate employment. Does my employer's updating the handbook constitute a unilateral change of contract? It depends upon what is changed in the update to the handbook. Typically an employment contract would have a term that says something to the effect of "employee shall devote his full time effort to perform the duties he is directed to perform by employer in a satisfactory manner." If the employee handbook says, "part of every employee's duties includes cleaning up his work area at the close of business each day, locking his file cabinets and shutting down his computer", this would typically simply be a definition of the duties of the employee which the employer reserved the right to change in the original employment contract, and not a unilateral change of contract. On the other hand, if the employee handbook says, "vacation days may not be taken during December" when the employee's contract simply said that "you have ten vacation days per year", that might constitute a unilateral change of contract which might not be enforceable for an employee with a fixed term of employment who was not an employee at will, without additional consideration. Locale is UK but (I assume) contract law is pretty universal so answers specific to any region are welcome. I have answered based upon general contract and employment law, but the UK frequently sets mandatory standards for different kinds of contracts and modifies common law rules related to contracts (much more so than the U.S.), so it wouldn't be very surprising if this were modified by a statute of which I am not aware. We have UK lawyers who contribute to Law.SE and they can chime in if there are particular statutes in the UK that apply to this question.	A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company.	Why is this reply not considered an agreement to sell the company? Because a sender's opportunism regarding the bizarre contents of the autoreply preclude a finding that there is a meeting of the minds. Could someone get out of a contract by proving that their email agreeing to it (e.g., "Yes, I agree to the contract") was an autoreply? It mostly depends on the element of authorization to set up the autoreply that way. If the person who wrote the autoreply was authorized by the user of the email account to set it up that way, the contract binds the user. This form of blind and reckless formation of contracts is an extreme scenario of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). The contract might be null and void as unreasonable, contrary to public policy, and/or on other grounds. But a wide range of scenarios would fall short of warranting a nullification of the contract. (Disclaimer: I am affiliated with the linked site.)	If you have no contract to provide the service then you have no obligation under contract law to do so. However, if you are aware that withdrawing the service could or would cause damage to their business then doing so may leave you open to a suit on the basis of negligence; particularly if you do so precipitously and without warning. You should write to them in the following terms: Despite our agreement that the contract would not be renewed you have not made any arrangements to stop using my service. Consequently I consider that by your actions, you have continued to treat the contract as ongoing. I am happy for this arrangement to continue on a month-by-month basis and will be invoicing accordingly. If this is acceptable, please respond by 4pm on x/y/z; if you do not do so I will switch the service off at 4pm on x/y+2/z	Can he/lawyer try to use the payment to me as leverage, for example, offer to give me that payment only if I agree to sign a non-compete or other document? The employer ultimately ought to comply with the written agreements between you two. The employer is not allowed to belatedly impose conditions that alter (to your detriment) the contract(s), let alone when you are no longer his employee. The clause "You will be paid on X and Y when/if they close" does not reflect whatsoever that payment is contingent on your acceptance of a non-compete agreement. Your description does not reflect any legal merits that would justify your employer to further withhold the compensation to which you are entitled pursuant to the deal/sale that got closed. The employer and his lawyer are just being vexatious.	The fact that you have been laid off is both your company’s information, and your personal information. You are allowed to tell your own personal information. The move to a new partner however is not your information. As long as you are still employed your employment contract will probably say that you mustn’t do anything to damage the company. You’d need to read what the consequences would be. Maybe the contract says you can be fired... which doesn’t matter unless you would lose a redundancy payment. After leaving it would depend on whether you had a non-disclosure agreement. And last, does your company care? This merger can’t be kept a secret anyway.	Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.
Contesting At-Fault Car Accident Scenario: You're travelling on the highway with stop and go traffic. As a driver (Car A) you are distracted (starting at the sky, changing the radio, on your cellphone, whatever). Suddenly traffic in-front of you comes to a stop and you gently rear end the car in-front of you (Car B). The car behind you (Car C) does not stop in time either and rear ends you. All drivers emerge from their cars and communicate. Car B makes it clear that Car A was at fault for hitting him. Due to a language barrier communication with Car C is not very clear. There is no damage to any of the cars and no insurance claims are filed. Aftermath: 2 months later you go to change insurance companies and they bring up that you were at fault in this accident. You were reported at fault by Car C who in fact rear ended you (no claim was made, only at fault accident reported). Question: Are you at fault for the fact that Car C read ended you? Can this accident which is now appearing on your insurance be disputed as Car B did not report anything? Essentially I'm just wondering what the odds are that this can removed from Car A's record.	Are you at fault for the fact that Car C read ended you? Close call. A jury could go either way. Can this accident which is now appearing on your insurance be disputed as Car A did not report anything? Essentially I'm just wondering what the odds are that this can removed from Car A's record. I think that it is unlikely that the situation you suggest would happen, even though anything is possible. Usually there needs to be a claim of actual damage for an insurance company to treat it as an accident. The usual rule is "no harm, no foul" (unless someone is cited for a traffic violation). Insurance company accident records are not regulated to the same extent as say, credit reports. You could threaten to sue the company for negligent misrepresentation, or the driver of Car C for defamation, in order to try to get this statement removed, but those would be hard cases to win since you are at least arguably at fault and fault is to some extent a matter of opinion. It would be much easier to win a suit like that if the accident didn't happen at all. Here, it would be undisputed that an accident happened at a particular time and place involving certain cars and drivers, and the dispute is only over who was at fault.	If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules.	I'm not sure there would be any need - or any ability to bring - any civil action. Forgery would appear to count as a Category D felony under Section 205.090 and, "In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.", so person "a"'s damages should have been met under the process of the criminal prosecution of person "b" for forgery, with nothing further to claim. Person "c" will have stolen a car. Whether that car was legitimately owned by person "a" may only be relevant if person "c" is using their belief that it belonged to person "b" as mitigation (for example recovery of a debt - though it won't help much as this should have been done through proper channels), which again would be a criminal proceeding.	Fault, in English law, is "blameworthiness". While it covers both the act and the mental state of the defendant, it cannot equate to the subjective criminal intent of the defendant known as mens rea. In other words, you can be at fault for negligence without having the requisite intent to commit a criminal act. This is perhaps best pointed out by the next sentence after the one in bold: It would be perfectly possible for a criminal code to provide separate crimes of negligence, with lower maximum sentences, at appropriate points in the hierarchy of offences. There are also examples of such offences in English law already. For example, careless, and inconsiderate, driving ("driving without due care and attention") contrary to Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is an offence that requires fault without mens rea. The defendant merely has to be careless and inconsiderate — they do not have to be in the state of mind where they know or believe that what they are doing is criminal in some way. In contrast, dangerous driving contrary to Section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 has the implied requirement of mens rea because of the word "dangerously". This implies the defendant must have a subjective belief that what they are doing is dangerous (or otherwise be reckless about it), and therefore criminal.	It is legal to be wrong, it is legal to say false things in public (leaving out defamation), and it is legal to buy and manufacture signs that say false things. Moreover, the sign does not make a false statement, in that legal liability is distinct from moral responsibility. In fact, the sign helps to decrease their legal liability. Via this sign, you have been put on notice that the truck may spray a bit of gravel, so by following too closely, you are negligently contributing to the damage. This is what also underlies those disclaimer signs with "not responsible for theft from your auto". There is nothing "official in appearance" about this sign (a legal citation of a statute might have such an appearance).	Rules about self-defense in the US vary from state to state, but generally a person can raise a defense that they legally used deadly self-defense if they had a reasonable fear of death or grievous bodily harm, with some exceptions (exactly how these are worded changes from state to state): A person often cannot claim self defense if they are already committing a forcible felony (but it depends on the circumstances) A person cannot claim self defense if they are the aggressor in a fight or took aggressive actions toward another person who then attacked them. So, with that in mind, let's assume that Person A has a valid deadly self-defense claim against Person B. When considering self defense, the question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have feared death or grievous bodily harm. So, the exact sequence of events matters. Consider the following four scenarios: C watches B attack A and then A shoots B, C pulls out his gun and points it at A before A turns to him and points his gun in response C watches B attack A and then A shoots B, A then points his gun at C and C pulls out his gun in response C doesn't see B attack A and only sees A shoot B, C pulls out his gun and they stand off C doesn't see B attack A and only sees A shoot B, A then points his gun at C and C pulls his in response In some of these situations, A may be considered the aggressor against C even though he had a valid self-defense claim against B. In others, a jury may find that a reasonable person in C's position would not expect A to shoot them just because they shot an attacker, and therefore C is the aggressor by drawing on A. This all assumes a hypothetical where these people exist in a void, things like their relationship, the situation around the three subjects, and any other relevant facts could be introduced and considered in the analysis. In theory, a situation could exist where both sides have a valid self-defense claim against each other, the third example possibly being that situation.	First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat.	You are responsible It is unlikely that the arrangement you had with the sitter amounts to a contract. Even though there was consideration on both sides, at first blush it seems unlikely that both of you intended to create legal relations. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Notwithstanding, if there is a contract it is silent on who is responsible to for injury to the pet so it would fall back on the law of negligence anyway. For the sitter to be responsible, she must have been negligent. She wasn't. See Is there liability for pure accidents? Looking at the elements: a duty to the plaintiff, such a aduty probably exists. breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), she didn't (see below). the plaintiff must have suffered actual harm, no question that you have. the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of that harm, and that harm was foreseeable, probably it wasn't (see below). Here are the facts: She took the dog on public transport - not unreasonable, many people do. The fact that you wouldn't is irrelevant since you did not communicate this prohibition to the sitter. She took it to an off-leash park - not unreasonable, that's what they are for. She rode an escalator - it is unclear if she carried the dog or expected the dog to ride the escalator itself. The first is clearly reasonable, the second may or may not be depending on the size of the dog etc. She noted the injury and had it treated - eminentely reasonable. So, in general, she has acted as a reasonable person would. It is also far from clear to me how any of the decisions made would result in foreseeable harm to the dog. Remembering that the standard is would a reasonable person foresee that there was a risk of harm barring extraordinary circumstances. By the way, the legal reasoning is exactly the same if you had entrusted her with your child or your car.
Does a company or an employee have to pay income tax? Here is a hypothetical situation: A person worked in company A for first 9 months in a year. They paid income tax for him. The remaining 3 months he worked in company B. This company assumed that the person didn't have any income before he joined them, and didn't pay any income tax for him (because his income in company B didn't reach the threshold of taxable income). Now company B claims that the person has to pay this tax himself because it's his responsibility. As I know in many countries companies are obliged to withhold and pay income tax on employees' behalf. So it's company's responsibility to pay the tax. Who has to pay the tax in this situation? In case no one pays the tax will Revenue Department inquire this tax from the person or from the company? Assume the USA Law.	So these are the basic rules of the tax game: The taxpayer (employee, in this case) is liable for tax on income earned by him. On occasion, the payor of the income to be received by the taxpayer is required to withhold tax on the payment, remit the withheld tax to the IRS/state/local tax authority and pay the balance over to the taxpayer. If that happens, the taxpayer is entitled to a credit against his taxes for the amount withheld by the payor. Failure by the payor to withhold the required amount of tax does NOT excuse the taxpayer from paying tax on the income he earned. So company B is right.	Any tax overpayments will be refunded after you file your tax return next year. Accidental overpayment is just one way this can happen. Another common situation is when a person works for only a few months at what looks like a high annual salary. They'd be taxed as if they were making $120,000 / year, for example, but they only work for three months, so their income ends up only being $40,000. They get money back at tax-return time.	The Company is performing wage theft I have never heard of a wage method that pays a salary according to hours but doens't pay for hours over 40. Monthly Salary, by definition, is paid regardless of hours. Your contract doesn't give hours, it just gives a monthly total. That's a contract, and you should be paid according to the contract. In terms of fairness, it certainly isn't right to dock pay for weeks you worked less than 40 but not give you credit for weeks you wored more than 40. Now, it's not clear if you moved to direct employment for the second month. If you did, the first month would be a contract violation, and the second would be a violation of wage & labor law. A company can't pay you salary as an exempt (exempt from hourly wage laws, like management) employee and also dock you pay according to hours worked. So what can you do? If you are still a contractor and actually want the job, not much more than arguing with payroll. Since you (why?) decided to be a contractor instead of a direct hire, you have exactly zero protections to getting let go. If you are a direct employee, you have protections from bringing action about being paid fairly, though your long-term prospects there would be problematic if you have to take the company to task using the government. Any HR rep should know all of the above. But never just go to HR without talking to your manager first. Remember that HR works for management, and working against your manager is generally a bad career move.	The English version of the taxman's web page does not indicate any specific exemption or reduction of taxation due to being under 18, however provision 102.3 says that The monthly taxable income of disabled people of I and II groups (except for veterans of war), persons under age of 18 with limited levels of health from any type employment shall be reduced by the amount of 200 manats. Provision 106.2, about exempt income says that Income tax rate for production enterprises owned by public organizations of disabled people, or children with limited levels of health shall be reduced by 50 percent if not less than 50 percent of employees at such enterprises are disabled people, or persons under age of 18 with limited levels of health. These provisions imply that it is legal for people under 18 to work. The Azerbaijan Labor Code section 42(3) says A person who has reached the age of fifteen may be a party to an employment contract. and 58(6) says that Employees under age of 18 may be allowed to hold multiple jobs if their total daily working hours do not exceed the reduced work hours provided for them in Section 91 hereof. which again implies that those under 18 may work for money. There are a number of other provisions that address employees under age 18. A freelancer is not an employee, so the labor code is technically not applicable to you, but it suggests that it is legal to freelance if you are under 18. Usually, restrictions are placed on people working for others and it is assumed that people can be self-employed relatively freely. One would have to hire a lawyer to be sure, though.	Being outside of IR35 means one is considered a (self-employed) contractor, not an employee, and as such will not have income tax and national insurance contributions deducted under PAYE. HMRC require the NINO and Ltd Co details to cross-reference the payments declared in the public sector's accounts with the Ltd Co's accounts to ensure (a) they match, (b) the correct tax and NIC is paid by the relevant entities, and (c) to confirm the identity and/or status in the Ltd Co of the recipient of the payments.	The relevant legislation is the Employment Act 1996, but in plainer language ACAS describe that they can make deductions for the following reasons: the employee's contract specifically allows the deduction it was agreed in writing beforehand they overpaid the employee by mistake it’s required by law, for example Income Tax or a court order the employee missed work because you were on strike or taking industrial action The first two provide pretty wide latitude into what they can make deductions for so long as it's in the contract/a written agreement The employer can't make deductions that would result in your wage dropping below minimum wage except in the following circumstances: tax or National Insurance something the employee has done which their contract says they’re liable for, such as damage to a vehicle through reckless driving repayment of a loan or advance wages an overpayment made to the employee made by mistake buying shares, other securities or share options in the business accommodation provided to the employee – find out more about accommodation deductions on GOV.UK something the employee uses – for example union subscriptions or pension contributions I'm not sure if it matters whether the employer is a private individual or a company Nope - for these purposes an employer is an employer To look at your specific examples: but assume that the employee is not doing a very good job No.. incompetence can get you sacked or fired - but it can't get your wages docked. At least not unless there was some performance-related-pay element to your wages already in the contract. But that would be difficult, it would have to be quantifiable. There's a reason why such structures typically have a base salary with performance-related elements paid as bonuses, because it's easier to simply not pay extra if thresholds aren't met than it is to deduct from a base wage. snoozing on the job Again not unless that was specified in advance - and that would be an oddly specific thing to include. Most likely they'd just get fired, in the majority of employment scenarios taking unauthorized sleeps on the job is going into Gross Negligence territory if there's a pattern. taking personal phone calls Taking personal calls is something that's more likely to be covered by a contract or company policy - but again it's more likely to lead to disciplinary action or sacking than wages being docked. You'd have to get into measuring how much time was lost in order to dock the appropriate amount etc. late into work You'd think this would be a slam dunk - you're late and therefore not meeting your contractual obligations. But in reality the same requirements as above apply - there needs to be explicit agreement in advance of the deduction in either your contract or other written consent for an employer to dock wages. It's probably more common than the other examples for such a provision to exist, but it still needs to be there.	The Commonwealth of Virginia defines a worker as an employee if his or her employer: Furnishes, tools, materials and equipment needed to do the work; Sets the hours of work; Withholds payroll federal and state income taxes and Social Security taxes Receives direction and training from the employer about how to do the work; and Is paid by the hour, week, or month instead of being paid at the completion of a job Virginia also lists the 20 IRS factors and Virginia exemptions for Employee Classification on their web site. One of the factors in determining if a worker is an employee states, "If the employer furnishes significant tools, materials and other equipment by an employer, the worker is generally an employee." Other factors include whether or not the employer can discharge a worker or if the worker can quit work at any time without incurring liability. There are many factors that will be unique to your particular situation that will determine if you were an employee or a contractor. If you were an employee and not a contractor then, in Virginia, the employer would have had to pay you at least minimum wage for your efforts. Generally speaking, an employers recourse for dealing with a non-negligent employee who performs their work incorrectly is to terminate the employment relationship. It is generally not acceptable to dun the worker for damages that occur during the normal course of business. If, on the other hand, you were an actual contractor then your contract with your client will be the guide in how you were paid and would also define the damages for which you are responsible for work not performed to contractual specifications. It is still possible to pay an employee for piece work. This is often done in construction and could make sense for the type of work you were performing. However, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires that the employer maintain records regarding hours worked so that there is an assurance that minimum wage and overtime rules are followed. There is a good article related to the construction industry that provides a good explanation of the details. Most state employment commissions, including Virginia's, provide assistance to workers to help them determine if they were properly classified. Virginia's website does this as well allowing you to call or send an email.	In the U.S. severance payments are not provided for statutorily, and are rarely made when an employee quits or is fired for cause. However, even when not provided for within contracts it is common to see voluntary severances paid during lay-offs. Furthermore, in the U.S. it is more likely that they would be "laid off" in order to qualify for unemployment insurance. In Pennsylvania one can make claims on the state-run unemployment insurance system only if one is able to work and does not refuse suitable work when offered. If one quits one is not eligible for these payments. Ultimately unemployment claims are born by the employer (since their legally-mandated unemployment insurance premiums are adjusted based on realized claims). So managers with the authority to layoff employees can impose real costs on their companies, both in terms of direct severance payments (which may be optional), and in terms of the inflated unemployment premiums that will hit the company down the road. However, I have never heard of a company attempting to recoup such costs from managers, since such decisions are specifically delegated to managers with hiring/firing authority. It seems much more likely that a manager deemed to have abused the company's purse would be demoted or fired rather than being sued, unless there were some gross fraud involved (e.g., kickbacks).
Kid left in hot car: What main legal factors affect if charges are brought? If a kid gets left in a hot car (e.g. because the caretaker forgets), the kid can die. Serious criminal charges are sometimes brought against the caretaker (or caretakers, plural)... even if the car isn't locked and the child does not die even if the kid gets into the car himself even if the caretaker tries to save the baby with efforts to cool it down, after realizing the error I went looking for examples of cases where no charges were filed and attempted to find distinguishing factors, which you can look into and confirm/disconfirm in an answer; what follows is just what I found. I found race (according to the linked article and attorney cited there), being an officer (according to the primary salient fact in the linked article) or otherwise working in the local criminal justice system, and being the first case in a county (according to what distinguishing fact can be found in the article) as potential determiners of whether or not charges are brought against a caretaker. That is not a very satisfying set of factors. So, I ask: What are the factors used to determine whether or not the caretaker is charged in such a situation? For this question, assume: the period was hours, the kid died, the caretaker admitted to what s/he did, and the caretaker claimed it's because s/he forgot. If the whole United States is too broad, answer for whichever state(s) you can give the best answer for, or New York if you need a more specific pointer.	When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.	The answer is going to depend on what jurisdiction you're talking about. But I can give you some general principles that apply, in most cases, in the U.S. at least. "Homicide" is a general term for the killing of one person by another. If someone died, and another person caused it, it's homicide. "Murder" and "manslaughter" are specific crimes, usually now defined by state criminal statutes. The specifics are going to differ from state to state, but in general, murder is the more serious crime and carries a more serious punishment. So if a person dies at another person's hand, it is a homicide, and it may also be murder or manslaughter. The way the law distinguishes between murder and manslaughter usually has to do with the killer's mental state. For example, a state with three homicide offenses might break them down like this: Murder: "I killed him because I wanted to steal his wallet." Voluntary manslaughter: "I killed him because I just found out he was sleeping with my wife." Involuntary manslaughter/negligent homicide: "I didn't mean to kill him, but I was drunk and didn't see the stop sign." These homicide offenses will then be further subdivided into degrees based on aggravating or mitigating factors. For instance, in some states there is a very limited definition for first degree murder, which may be the only offense that allows the death penalty (example: murder of a police officer, murder while serving a life sentence).	I would describe those scenarios as hard cases on causation. I don't think there is any single word for an act which gives rise to such a case. Each case relates to an act which was a necessary condition of the injury which occurred. "But for" causation is established. However, the factual scenario is an unusual one where the legal or proximate cause is not obvious. Cases in which the chain of causation is too complex for the defendant to be held liable may be described as failing on the grounds of remoteness or foreseeability. An intervening act which breaks the chain of causation is called a novus actus interveniens.	Maybe, maybe not. The answer is implicit in the restraining order, which I assume you have a copy of. If the wording is unclear, you can ask your attorney. The order will state the consequences for violating the order, so you have some idea what the risk factor is. A person may also petition for a new restraining order to include bill-paying, which may or may not be granted.	Yes Now, murder needs a definition because they are all subtly different. Let’s use the one in the new-south-wales Crimes Act 1900: Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years. The only real difficulty is in the phrase “causing the death charged”. So a sensible prosecutor would charge both defendants with both deaths. A jury would find them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one of the “death[s] charged”. The case is similar to Rogerson and McNamara who took a live Jamie Gao into a storeroom and came out with a body. Each accused the other of the murder - the jury didn’t believe either of them.	Yes Under Texas law (and pretty much everywhere else) the driver of the vehicle is responsible for ensuring that it is roadworthy. This does not mean that someone else cannot also be liable - the mechanic who fixed the wheel and their employer would also be liable. The claim for damages from a motor vehicle accident lies in the tort of negligence and the standards that the driver has to attain to avoid liability is that of a reasonable person. A reasonable person is not an average person who (probably) just gets in a car and drives but a prudent person who considers the risks to themselves and others and takes reasonable steps to mitigate them. Like looking at the wheels of an unfamiliar car. If the defect were obvious to a layperson from a visual inspection, they would be liable if they had not conducted such an inspection. Similarly, continuing to drive when a car is making a "Knocking" noise even if you didn't know what it was is not something a reasonable person would do. If you knew what the noise was and kept driving we are now moving from negligence into recklessness and the realms of criminal liability like manslaughter.	It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example).	england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.
Ex-housemate cancelling NHS appointments (United Kingdom) For a year or so, my wife and I lived in a shared household with largely random people in the UK. We did not get on well with one individual, and after a year we chose to move out into our own place. Whilst we were living in shared accommodation, my wife required a medical procedure on the NHS, but because the waiting time was so long, we did not hear back from them before moving out. After moving out and not hearing anything from the NHS after ~6 months, my wife contacted the hospital that was supposed to schedule the appointment to find out when the procedure would be scheduled. The person at the hospital told her that an appointment had been scheduled for several months ago, and a letter was sent to our old property. She then went on to explain that someone had rung up to cancel the appointment. My wife informed them that she hadn't, and the person from the hospital provided the telephone number of the person who called. Needless to say the number was for our old housemate with which we had a number of disagreements. As one final note, the ex-housemate, whose number matches that which called up to cancel my wife's appointment, is a full-time nurse employed in the NHS. Has any crime been committed, and if so, is there any point in pursuing this with the police? If so, how do I go about it? Even if a crime has not been committed, I would think that at the very least, opening someone's mail and then impersonating them and cancelling the surgery would at least be viewed as unprofessional, especially for someone employed in the NHS. Is there a procedure for making a complaint against an NHS worker?	I'm not a lawyer, but I am an NHS employee, and can more concretely answer your questions. Has any crime been committed, and if so, is there any point in pursuing this with the police? If so, how do I go about it? Yes, in-fact, several crimes have been committed. Firstly, NHS employees are prohibited from viewing patient's personal information that they are not specifically treating. In opening your letter from the NHS, the nurse in question violated this practice. It's a breach of both privacy and trust. This is taught at the NHS and the nurse would be aware of this. Secondly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse has committed workplace fraud. They have impersonated a patient, and in doing so, cost the NHS money and time it won't get back by cancelling your appointment. Again, this is also taught within the NHS, and the nurse would be aware of this too. Thirdly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse may have put a life in danger in doing so, which is effectively gross negligence at a minimum. Although this can be reported to the police, it'll be more effective to report it to the appropriate NHS bodies. Even if a crime has not been committed, I would think that at the very least, opening someone's mail and then impersonating them and cancelling the surgery would at least be viewed as unprofessional, especially for someone employed in the NHS. Is there a procedure for making a complaint against an NHS worker? There are several different approaches, given the various breaches of trust. As BlueDogRanch mentioned, you can file a compliant to NHS England, which includes via email. Be sure to get appropriate information like the nurse's name, address, and if possible any details (like appointment reference numbers) to aid the investigation. Secondly, because of the cost incurred via the malicious cancellation of an appointment, costing time and money (and running the risk of opening the NHS to litigation), you can also report the fraudulent aspects to the NHS Counter Fraud Authority.	This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider.	The main US law that governs patient access to medical records is called HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Here is a brief summary of the patient record provisions from the federal Department of Health and Human Services. There are further details, intended for providers, here. In general, you are entitled to receive a copy of your records, or to have them sent to another doctor. But they can charge a reasonable fee to cover the costs of copying and mailing the records. I am not sure how this applies to a physical model: whether the doctor would be required to send the original or to make a copy (which could be expensive), or whether it would be considered a "record" at all for the purposes of this law.	This is a live political issue. Currently, the various datasets are incomplete and have known accuracy issues. Considering a particular parcel of land: It might not be in the Land Registry at all. About 85% of land in England and Wales is registered, and less in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scottish registered land might only appear on the paper "Register of Sasines", as opposed to the more recent electronic database, or potentially in even older county-specific sasine registers. The owner might be a company, partnership, trust, etc., rather than a natural person. The ownership and control of that company (etc.) can be hard to trace. Companies House data is not verified; companies can be incorporated overseas; the trusts register is not publicly searchable; things can be muddled. Raw data might not show that a dozen properties, each owned by a single company that owns nothing else, are in fact ultimately controlled by a particular person of interest. Different people may own the freehold, or a leasehold, or have various other forms of ownership or control. Even a long-term tenancy may be of interest for database purposes. Because of continuing interest in anti-money laundering, tax evasion, and general accumulation of wealth, there have been plans to have a new "register of beneficial ownership". Such a register would record, for each plot of land, the name of the human beings who actually own and control it in the end. In the anticipated structure, each of those people would have an identifying number, and so we would get your proposed reverse index where you could look up a person and see what they owned. The register introduced by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 is the "Register of Overseas Entities" (ROE). However, as the name suggests, it only covers companies/partnerships/etc. from outside the UK. It's operated by Companies House. Overseas entities who have dealt in UK land since 1999/2014/2022 (depending on which part of the UK the land was in) have to list their beneficial owners. Because this is new, it is also not very complete yet: it only went live on 1 August 2022 and no penalties apply until the deadline of 31 January 2023. In Scotland, the "Register of Persons Holding a Controlled Interest in Land" (RCI) is meant to do the same but not just for overseas entities. It is live since 1 April 2022 and the initial registration period ends on 1 April 2023, so again it may not be very complete just yet. There will likely be more political tussle over potential creation of a more extensive UK-wide register. Until that exists, this is a known problem with the extent of current data. You can get a partial view but even that will be frustrating when it comes to the most interesting chunks of property.	This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.	Questions about being barred from entry into the UK 10 years down the road need to be asked some number of years in the future. Current practice is that the Home Secretary does not bar entry because of an unpaid debt, instead you have to do something egregiously bad or antisocial. Given Brexit, future matters of immigration are not set in stone. One consequence of walking away from a lease is that you are likely to be sued (in UK courts) for breach of contract, and the court may find that you owe the rest of the lease money. If that happens, you need to be concerned with whether the judgment can be enforced against you, even when you are in the US. The general answer is, yes, the landlord can petition the US courts to enforce a UK judgment against you. The specific details depend on the law of your state, but most states have a version of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act. In addition, the landlord could sue you in US courts (maybe not as convenient for him). There is no requirement that you have to be a US citizen to sue a US person, and a landlord can (would almost certainly) sue you via a US attorney who would represent him. An alternative to fleeing your obligation and saying "Go ahead and sue me!" is to negotiate a termination of the lease. The landlord would have a duty to mitigate his losses, so if the remainder of the lease has a value of $2,000 a month for 8 months, the landlord can't just do nothing -- he has to try to rent the unit out, so perhaps his actual losses would be only $4,000. Suing a person is expensive especially when you you are dealing in trans-national disputes, so he may be willing to accept some figure in exchange for terminating the lease. Your (UK) lawyer will give you good advice on how to proceed, if you opt to not get sued.	Article 8 is pretty clear. The fact that it is recommended to extend the draft to women indicates that there is a conflict needing resolution. A relevant case before the European Court of Human Rights ruled on this and found the law to violate articles 14 and 8 of the ECHR. They identify an exoneration from the tax under the Military-Service Exemption Tax Act sect. 4. Reading the judgment could be helpful (maybe you know the case). What I get from it is that there are a bunch of situation-specific details that could be applied (e.g. you have to first complain formally in-country before going to ECHR), and issues of disability level and the distinction between disability and illness. This gives a model for anyone to attempt to resist the tax, but only a change in the law will get rid of it.	Conditions pertaining to cancellation of a contract are contained in the contract, that is there is no general "right to cancel a contract", apart from certain 3-day window rights in some jurisdictions. For example, Washington state has some specific cancellation laws, summarized here. If the contract does not allow for cancellation, then you can't cancel the contract. I assume that your contract does have a cancellation clause: then you could have to see what that clause actually states. As it turns out, Florida has a law (Fla Stat. 501.017) which regulates health studio (gym) contracts, requiring certain clauses above the signature box. One required clause per (1)(b)2 is that notice of intent to cancel by the buyer shall be given in writing to the health studio. However, If the health studio wishes to enforce the contract after receipt of the notice, it may request the department to determine the sufficiency of the notice. This means that if they want to enforce the contract after a cancellation, they may request "the department" (Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services) to rule whether the notice was according to the contract (as mandated by law). It will also contain under (1)(d) A provision for the cancellation of the contract if the buyer dies or becomes physically unable to avail himself or herself of a substantial portion of those services which he or she used from the commencement of the contract until the time of disability, with refund of funds paid or accepted in payment of the contract in an amount computed by dividing the contract price by the number of weeks in the contract term and multiplying the result by the number of weeks remaining in the contract term. The contract may require a buyer or the buyer’s estate seeking relief under this paragraph to provide proof of disability or death. A physical disability sufficient to warrant cancellation of the contract by the buyer is established if the buyer furnishes to the health studio a certification of such disability by a physician licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, or chapter 461 to the extent the diagnosis or treatment of the disability is within the physician’s scope of practice. A refund shall be issued within 30 days after receipt of the notice of cancellation made pursuant to this paragraph. It appears, then, that you simply need to give notice in the correct form (written, with a doctor's notice). In case the club does not have the required provisions in the contract, the contract violates state law and is unenforceable.
What are the types of personal data? In the GDPR, the concept of data categories is used and examples of such categories are given. The concept of data types is also used, but I do not know what they are. Example of data categories, Article 9(1), "Processing of special categories of personal data": Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. So what are the types? Article 28(3): Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor:	The "type" is the specific nature of the data to be processed For example: name, date of birth, ID photograph, address, email, description, etc.	GDPR killing genealogy websites? I could see GDPR totally killing genealogy websites if they follow the rules strictly, but would they really want to do that. Seems to me genealogy has an important historical role. Treat living persons with anonymization I assume you don't have data to identify a person or contact the living person. How would you contact to get consent to show personal information if you only have a name, impossible right? GDPR tries to stop abuse of personal data, yes, and your family tree certainly is personal data. However those who come to your website would mostly want to search and edit the non-living, search back in the history, thus the current generation follows the family tree and are not the point of entry. You can provide certain anonymization to those alive by not displaying the first names in full, maybe just the first letter. You may want to hide address, spouse, children for current generation. You could make those available for view/edit first by going through a secondary login, "not a robot". Further you may remove living people from search results and hide from search engines so they do not have ability to index the current generation. That would make it harder to abuse if you're going after an individual, but at the same time doesn't lock out the people providing information.	Storing medical data in cloud services can be legal, but isn't necessarily so (as with any other kinds of data). The GDPR considers health-related data as “special categories” of data per Art 9. Processing such data is forbidden, unless an exception applies. Per Art 9(2)(h) such processing is allowed when it is […] necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of Union or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3 Paragraph 3 requires that processing under 9(2)(h) only occurs under the responsibility of someone who is subject to an obligation of secrecy per Union or member state law, e.g. a doctor. Paragraph 4 allows individual member states to add further conditions, including limitations, to such processing. Assuming that electronic storage or processing of health data is in fact necessary, the GDPR does not make a strong distinction between in-house processing, and processing via Data Processors. Of course, the usual conditions for using data processors and performing international transfers apply. However, a data controller processing medical data will almost certainly have to first perform an Art 35 Data Protection Impact Assessment. This DPIA must consider various risks. Transferring data into third countries is risky. Using data processors is risky. But processing data in-house can also be risky, so using an external service could improve things. There is a lot to be balanced here. Where the planned processing has high risks, the responsible supervisory authority has to be consulted first (Art 36). The authority can provide “advice”, or even ban the processing per Art 58.	This is clearly personal information (PI) , and indeed personally identifiable information (PII). and so is Personal Data under the GDPR. Under Article 6 of the GDPR any processing must have a lawful basis. There are 6 possible bases. The most likely ones here would be (a) consent, or (f) legitimate interst, but the private association may claim some other basis as well. They should tell you what basis or bases justify their processing of this information, which includes storing it and publishing it. Under Article 13, Paragraph 1(c) the association should have informed you of the purposes for which information was collected when it was first collected. Under Article 15 paragraph 1 you are entitled to request and obtain from the association (or any other Data Controller) a statement of what PI about you they hold. along with this they must supply various other information including; (a) the purposes of the processing; (b)the categories of personal data concerned; (c) the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed, in particular recipients in third countries or international organisations; (d) where possible, the envisaged period for which the personal data will be stored, or, if not possible, the criteria used to determine that period; (e) the existence of the right to request from the controller rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing of personal data concerning the data subject or to object to such processing; (f) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority; and other specified information. Article 17 paragraph 1 provides that: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay ... if one the the specified conditions applies, particularly: 1(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; 1(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2) Article 21 paragraph 1 provides that: The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), including profiling based on those provisions. The controller shall no longer process the personal data unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Thus I would suggest that you send a written communication to the association, stating that you: Request access to all PI which they have about you, as permitted by GDPR article 15 paragraph 1; Request that they delete any such information from the public website and any other publications, as permitted by GDPR article 17 paragraph 1; State that you object to further processing of this information under GDPR article 21 paragraph 1; Request information on the name and contact info of the relevant supervisory authority under GDPR article 15 paragraph 1; State that you expect these requests to be complied with promptly, in no event later than 30 days. Mention your prior request for the public info to be deleted, and that several months have already elapsed. Give the exact date of the prior request. I would suggest sending these requests, together in a single email, specifically mentioning the relevant GDPR provisions. I would suggest sending a copy of this by registered mail, and retaining a copy, along with the identifying number of the registered letter. In the letter, mention the email. If the association does not promptly respond in a way you consider satisfactory, you may wish to file a complaint with the relevant data protection supervisory authority. You may also wish to consult a lawyer with experience in this area to determine if you have any legal recourse if the association does not comply.	According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses.	Consent for processing someone's personal data is only one of the possible requirements to process that person's personal data. The options listed in Art. 6.1 are (text in Spanish, with links to other languages): a. the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; b. processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; c. processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; d. processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; e. processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; f. processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Obviously, your case meets the criteria for c.1 So, you do not need consent from your hosts, and your hosts do not have to sign any consent and they cannot refuse to provide their data if they want to reside at your dwelling. The moment you ask your hosts any data to which you do not have a legitimate interest, you need the consent. And you cannot refuse hospitality to your hosts if they do not want to provide that piece of data. Anyway, maybe it would be a good idea to print a leaflet explaining why you require their data in case they have any doubts. 1 For the Guardia Civil, it would be c. and maybe a few more cases.	Articles 13 and 14 discuss what information must be provided to the data subjects, for example via a privacy policy. Art 13(1) requires: (a) the identity and the contact details of the controller, and where applicable, of the controller's representative; (b) the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable; The quote you have shown contains both the identity and contact details (postal address) of the representative, and the contact details (postal address) of the DPO. This seems to comply with the letter of the law.	Yes When personal data is processed in the context of an EU/EEA/UK establishment (for example, by a company with offices in the UK), then all these processing activities must fully comply with the GDPR, regardless of where the data subjects are located. For the UK GDPR: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the United Kingdom, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the United Kingdom or not. For the EU GDPR: The GDPR applies to: a company or entity which processes personal data as part of the activities of one of its branches established in the EU, regardless of where the data is processed; or …
Why does the District of Columbia have its own Court of Appeals? Geographically, it looks like DC should be part of the Fourth Circuit. With such a small population, only about 3% of what the other Circuits have jurisdiction over, why does it get its own?	Because cases challenging actions of almost any Federal agency or department are typically filed at the head office of that agency or department, which is usually in DC. Similarly, national organizations of all kinds who are affected by some government action often file a case from their own national headquarters, which is often in DC. Thus the DC circuit has a much larger volume of cases and appeals than its population would suggest. According to the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018 Tables the numbers of Appeals Court cases by circuit were: ` Commenced Terminated Pending ` . 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 Circuit DC 1,184 872 1,190 1,029 1,446 1,289 1st 1,538 1,213 1,488 1,322 1,408 1,299 2nd 4,450 4,316 4,382 3,937 3,252 3,631 3rd 3,477 2,926 3,745 2,969 2,297 2,254 4th 6,136 4,166 6,185 4,506 2,497 2,157 5th 8,270 7,217 8,235 7,359 5,021 4,879 6th 5,164 4,401 5,195 4,900 3,197 2,698 7th 3,332 2,754 3,452 2,652 1,669 1,771 8th 3,571 2,850 3,154 3,040 2,102 1,912 9th 11,504 10,804 12,032 12,030 12,789 11,563 10th 2,275 1,862 2,296 1,848 1,216 1,230 11th 8,050 5,982 7,686 6,240 3,905 3,647 Total 58,951 49,363 59,040 51,832 40,799 38,330` Similar data is available for other years, and for district court cases. These seem to show that caseloads for the DC or "Federal" circuit are comparable to those of the smaller circuits. This does not take into account any question of complexity levels. Also, it looks to me as if the percentage of District Court cases which are appealed to the Circuit Court level is higher in the DC circuit than in most of the other circuits.	Historically, this was true in the Icelandic Commonwealth in the Middle Ages, and in some democratic Greek city-states in the classical era. Similarly, in non-democratic feudal regimes, the lord or monarch was both the law giver and sitting in court was also the arbiter of all disputes arising under the lord's own laws. In places like Saudi Arabia where the monarchy's power is more than symbolic, the system still works this way to a significant extent. The practical reality in most one party Communist states is similar. In the United Kingdom, historically, the Appellate committee of the House of Lords (staffed by a subset of aristocrats usually appointed for life by the Prime Minister to the post) was the highest court of appeal of other courts in the British Commonwealth (with the Judicial committee of the Privy Council handling final appeals from outside Britain), and it was also a court of original jurisdiction for certain criminal cases against other aristocrats to satisfy the Magna Carta's notion that one is entitled to a jury of one's peers. Top level general purpose legislatures rarely serve as courts at the highest level, except in very isolated political matters. A good example of narrow quasi-judicial legislative power is the power of the Congress in the U.S., to be the ultimate judge for Congressional election disputes and of some Presidential election disputes. Congress also has quasi-judicial jurisdiction over impeachments of government employees whether or not they are elected, and over expulsions for cause of its own members and over other ethical sanctions of its own members. Many other legislatures have some sort of quansi-judicial impeachment and/or explusion power exercised as a whole by by some committee within it. It is common in the United States for administrative agencies, within their narrow area of competence to exercise both quasi-legislative power to enact regulations with a broad mandate in a subject area, and also to have quasi-judicial power in that same subject area. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Merit System Protection Board, for example, all operate in this fashion to some extent. Likewise, it is very common at the local government level for a city council and its planning board to carry out both legislative roles and quasi-judicial role when disputes come up regarding its land use regulations. Similarly, school boards routinely both establish employment regulations and other school rules, and serve in a quasi-judicial role with respect employee discipline or termination, and with respect to student discipline. This dual role is also common for the boards of other public institutions like hospitals and state colleges, and for private non-profit organizations. A recent example in that kind of situation is Colorado's State School Board which both exercises legislative power over when charter schools (i.e. public schools not under the direct supervision of any elected local school board) may be formed, and has the ultimate and final judicial review role over decisions by local school boards to grant or deny school charters.	Assuming you have a right of interlocutory appeal at all -- you usually don't -- you would file the appeal in the Courts of Appeal for whichever district. There are some types of cases that can be appealled directly to the California Supreme Court, or where you could petition the federal courts for an order to vacate the trial court's ruling, but these would be uncommon.	Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.	No There is some room for change of venue from, say, one county to another, or one municipality to another, within the same state. In certain circumstances this may even be constitutionally required. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (U.S. 1966) ("where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity"). But, there's no mechanism to move a state criminal trial to another state. A cousin of the scenario you're talking about is where D has committed crimes in multiple states. In such a situation the prosecutors from different states (and also the federal system) may meet and co-ordinate their strategies, and part of that will be deciding who charges what and who goes first. An example of this is the DC sniper case, which I remember pretty vividly because I grew up in the area. The Maryland and Virginia prosecutors reached an agreement to try them in Virginia first, and second in Maryland.	I think you're being confused by two separate definitions of "police power." The police power under the 10th Amendment has nothing to do with "the police," i.e. people with guns and badges and uniforms who make arrests. It refers to the authority of a government to make rules for the general welfare. Police power is almost always exercised by the legislature, and when the executive exercises it (e.g. by issuing regulations) it's typically operating under conditions set by the legislature. The United States has police power in a few situations: DC, federal property and territories, US-flagged ships on the high seas, etc. Outside of those situations, the United States instead has enumerated powers. Congress has a power to tax and spend to promote the general welfare, but otherwise it can only legislate to achieve one of the enumerated powers in the Constitution. Now, courts have read Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce very broadly, but there does need to be some relation to enumerated powers. You're asking about the Capitol Police, but they don't have "police power" in the 10th Amendment sense. They have the power to carry guns and to arrest people for crimes committed against the United States. This power is limited based on geography and/or the nature of their task; for instance, they have nationwide arrest powers "[i]n the performance of their protective duties," but not when they're traveling outside DC on other official duties (e.g. to attend training). While there's no litigation I can dig up that's directly on point, courts have repeatedly ruled that Congress has the power to do some not-entirely-legislative tasks in order to protect its own functions. For instance, in Anderson v. Dunn (1821), the Supreme Court upheld an inherent power of the House to hold private citizens in contempt of Congress for disobeying its subpoenas and for the Sergeant at Arms to arrest them and bring them before the House. It seems likely Congress would also have the authority to protect its own members from physical violence. The GAO did an analysis when it was analyzing whether there was a constitutional problem with making Capitol Police IG personnel into special deputy US marshals, and it concluded that there was no issue with congressional employees exercising arrest powers in order to physically protect the legislative branch.	Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.	So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.
As a customer, am i liable for messaging another customer found on a Facebook business page? I am a customer for a Wedding dress shop, and I messaged another customer with a warning about the shops impending closure because of issues with lack of contact from the company. I have received a warning from the Company who have stated a serious complaint has been made, using GDPR within their warning message. Have I broken any laws/rules in contacting another customer through Facebook? The message contained no disparaging remarks towards the business.	GDPR compliance is a matter between every customer and the business, not between different customers. How did you get the other customer's contact details? If they were provided or leaked by the business, that might be a failure of the business's obligation as a data controller to protect the personal data they are processing, possibly even a data breach in the sense of the GDPR. When you contacted the other person this was presumably a purely private or household activity, just like contacting any other personal acquaintance. In that case, the GDPR simply does not apply to any “processing” you may have done (compare Art 2(2)(c)). Things would be very different if you were promoting your own business, but that doesn't seem to have been the case. If the matter really is as plain as you described, then you can effectively ignore their references to the GDPR until you are contacted by your data protection authority, by their lawyer, or are served with court papers. None of these should happen: even if you were a “data controller” and your processing were subject to the GDPR – only the other customer and not the business would be the data subject, and only a data subject has a right for remedies like making complaints to the data protection agency and only the data subject would have standing to sue you in court for GDPR violations.	Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.	Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG.	There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.	Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well.	The critical part is the nature of the relationship between you, the website provider, and the provider of the material you embed. If the embed-provider acts as your data processor, then things are generally fine. The GDPR does not really distinguish between personal data processing activities that you perform yourself versus activities that you've outsourced to third parties. However, you would remain responsible for compliance. This also means that per Art 28 GDPR, you will need a contract with that embed-provider (sometimes called a “Data Processing Agreement”, DPA). This contract stipulates that the processor will only use the personal data as instructed by you, but not for their own purposes. With the Google Fonts case, it must be highlighted that Google does not act as a processor for this service. Google does not offer a DPA that covers the Fonts CDN. While Google promises that it doesn't use the personal data collected in this context in any nefarious way, there are zero contractual guarantees for website providers. So we have to consider the scenario when the embed-provider is an independent data controller. We as the website provider have no control over what the embed-provider does with the collected data, our control only extends to whether or not we cause the website to disclose data to that third party. But this is still processing as personal data (see also the CJEU Fashion ID case), and we need a legal basis for this data sharing. In the Google Fonts case, the court in Munich found that there was no legal basis for using Google's CDN. There was no consent, no contractual necessity, and no necessity for a legitimate interest. After all, these fonts could all be self-hosted. (Technical remark: and given how modern browsers enforce cache isolation and provide HTTP/2, serving fonts from your main domain is probably faster anyway). Consent management services will typically act as your data processor. You don't need a legal basis for “sharing” data with them, because the processing remains under your control. As far as the GDPR is concerned, loading a script from your processor's servers is equivalent to loading a script from your own servers (which you're probably hosting via a another data processor anyway). Sometimes, the necessary data processing agreement is already part of the standard terms of service, sometimes it's a separate document that has to be signed. Figuring this out is your responsibility as the data controller, before deploying the service. Art 6 GDPR doesn't say that you always need consent. It says that you need a legal basis, for which paragraph 1 enumerates six choices. For a lot of use cases, a “legitimate interest” will be appropriate, though it requires a balancing test. Sometimes, other laws mandate that you use a particular legal basis. For example, the ePrivacy Directive says that you must get GDPR-consent when accessing or storing information on the user's device (such as cookies), unless that access/storage is strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user.	No. From here: Organisations must not send marketing texts to individuals without their specific, valid and prior explicit consent. This consent must be recorded and kept as proof of consent. There is a limited exception for previous customers, which is known as the soft opt-in. A soft-opt in only applies if the organisation have obtained the contact details in the course of a sale (or negotiations for a sales) of a product or service to the customer; they are only marketing their own similar products or services; and they gave the customer an opportunity to opt-out of the marketing, both when first collecting the details and in every message thereafter.	The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.
Photographing my mail and giving to my ex My ex sent me a check for part of health insurance for children. After it did not come, over 2 weeks, I reached out and told him I had not received the check. He went to the post office, the mail clerks let him go through my mail and take a picture of the envelop that came from him. It was conveniently on top of the pile, so he obviously went through it. Sent it to me and told me it was at the post office. Number 1, why was that not put in my box Number 2 - why is anyone going through my mail Number 3 - letting him take a photo? That's not right.	These all seem to be issues with how the local post office is handling your mail (and no doubt that of others). I would start by asking to see the person in charge of that office, and asking that person the same questions that you asked here. I am not sure that, under US law, the "envelope information" of your mail is protected in the way that the contents are.	Is It Legally Binding? While their customer service sucks, your oral authorization of the charge is legally binding (I take payments that way almost every day in my own business, it isn't an unusual business practice in small professional businesses). You authorize oral authorization of payments over the phone in the credit card agreement that your credit card company sends you every year that you don't read and throw away. The provider has to collect more information for a credit card payment over the phone than they do for an in person swipe in a credit card machine (e.g. your credit card billing address) and they are fully responsible for wrongful charges if they deal with an imposter. By regularly checking your credit card statements, you can confirm that no incorrect charges are present. Tax Issues If you want to take a tax deduction for non-reimbursed medical expenses, you simply need to tote up the amounts your are entitled to from your own records, and put it in the appropriate box on your tax forms. You don't have to attach documentation to your return. If the IRS disputes your payment, you can offer up your credit card statements and your photograph of the receipts, and if necessary, medical records to show that you received the services, to show that the payment really happened and are deductible. Your credit card company's records, reflected in your monthly credit card statements, are considered very reliable for tax purposes. You have the burden of proving that the expense was incurred and is of a type that qualifies for a deduction by a preponderance of the evidence in the event that there is a dispute that is litigated, which means that you must show that it is more likely than not that you incurred a deductible expense of that kind in that amount in that tax year. Privacy Issues While there are financial information privacy issues associated with this transaction, HIPAA, which covers medical records, normally wouldn't apply to a credit card payment that indicates the person paid, the person paying, the account, the amount and the date, but not a description of the medical services provided or to whom they were provided, which is what is normally on a credit card receipt. The financial privacy issues are also partially addressed by the provider's merchant agreement with the credit card company which contains terms requiring them to maintain certain kinds of security with respect to your financial information (which is not to say that the provider actually follows all of the requirements of their merchant agreement scrupulously, which is why data breaches happen all the time in businesses both large and small).	You haven't suffered a legally cognizable harm because you got your money back, before you even had a chance to complain, so you have no basis for a lawsuit. For what it is worth, pretty much every adult in the United States was affected by the Equifax breach. Also, usually Equifax wouldn't have had access to full bank account numbers in the first place, so that is an unlikely source of the problem. You could open a new account and close the old one (as suggested by @mkennedy in the comments) because then if anyone had access to your bank account number and was abusing it, they could no longer do so. The fact that it only happened once rather than involving many transactions, which is what you commonly see when there is a true identity theft, however, suggests a more benign possibility. There is a pretty good chance that this errant transaction which was reversed was simply a clerical error involving an inaccurate typing in of an account number that got your number instead of the intended one and was reversed when the money didn't leave the intended account (in contrast, identity theft incidents are almost never reversed without a complaint from the account holder). In other words, this may have simply been the banking equivalent of dialing the wrong number by mistake. If this happens again, you should definitely shut down the account, but so far, it seems more likely that this was a one off clerical error. Humans are just not built to input scores of fifteen digit numbers on a daily basis in a 100% accurate fashion. As long as this job is in the hands of humans rather than computers or robots, the humans are going to make mistakes.	Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck	Much of your ability to sue the email company for damages depends on local and Estonian laws, but the most important aspect is the TOS and user agreement you agreed to when you originally signed up for the service. Read it (though if the portal is now off-line, it may not be accessible). You may have agreed to hold the company not liable for any damages from loss or stolen data, and you may have also agreed to arbitration and to not pursue them in court. It all depends on what is (was) in that agreement, so find a copy of it; though it's possible that some local or Estonian laws may supersede any contractual agreement with the company. And FYI, the email you received concerning the video and demanding payment in Bitcoin is a common scam right now, and the threat may indeed be meaningless.	What he means is you ought to give him the money. If it's not in the policy, the kids have no claim to the life insurance. You probably have to keep looking after them by law (as a decent person would anyway), and that's where the life insurance money will help you. Any money you give to the kids, the father may have rights to that, so you don't do that. You pay their food, their clothing, their holidays, their school, their university, anything where he can't get his hands on the money. PS. Life insurances handle large amounts of money every day. They have a copy of the policy. If your children had any rights to money, the life insurance company wouldn't have paid to you.	If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime.	Focusing on the legal question, the obstruction of correspondence statute would not be applicable to UPS package deliveries. To repeat 18 USC 1702, Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Private package delivery services deliver to the porch (pr similar), not to an authorized depository (such as a mailbox). They are not "mail", and they have not been in the custody of the postal service (unless they have, where USPS actually makes the delivery). Such deliveries constitute unsolicited goods / unordered merchandise, since they were not things that you requested. There are state and federal rules to the effect that you may accept such goods as gifts, and you have no obligation to return the goods. Here is the Washington state law for example, and here is what the FTC says about it at the federal level. The intended recipient cannot impose an obligation on you to store and guard his possessions, nor can a delivery service impose an obligation to safeguard property that they are responsible for.
To whom does the Vice President of India submit his resignation? In India, the Vice-President shall submit his resignation to the President. But my question is: In the absence of the President, the Vice-President shall submit his resignation to____?	In the US, the resignation of the office of President or Vice-President must be in writing to the Secretary of State. In India, the constitution provides (Art. 65) that In the event of the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of the President by reason of his death, resignation or removal, or otherwise, the Vice-President shall act as President until the date on which a new President elected in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter to fill such vacancy enters upon his office and (Art 67) a Vice-President may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office; It does not require that the president be named, nor does it require that the resignation actually be delivered to the president. The VP a.k.a. acting President can notify himself of his resignation, since he functions completely as the president. The houses of parliament might elect a new vice president between resignations.	The presidential line of succession is governed by the U.S. Constitution, specifically Article II section 1: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th amendment reinforces this and says "Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress." So, after the vice president, the constitution lets Congress pass laws governing the rest of the succession. This is governed by the Presidential Succession Act. 3 U.S. Code Chapter 1, Section 19 lays out the rest of the line of succession: Next come the Speaker of the House of Representatives (subsection a) and the President pro tempore of the Senate (subsection b) and "then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security" (subsection d). So you have the Attorney General at number 7. However, the next subsection says the following (emphasis mine). (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon them. I think the bolded text answers your question. The Acting Attorney General has not been confirmed by the Senate, so is not in the presidential line of succession. Now there is potentially room to argue that, if the Acting Attorney General has been confirmed by the Senate for some other office (most likely Deputy Attorney General), then they qualify. Of course, there is no case law to clarify this, since the presidential succession has never gone beyond what is listed in the constitution. However, I don't think it's a very compelling argument, particularly for the current Acting Attorney General who was not appointed on the basis of his previous confirmation. (Interestingly, a Bill was introduced to the House in 2003 that would have explicitly removed acting officers from the line of succession. Ultimately, that Bill did not progress.)	Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone.	Any country can certainly decide who it should grant citizenship status to. There is no international rule that I know of requiring that the recipient be currently a resident of the country granting citizenship. Any country may issue passports to its citizens.	If the Senate took the extreme measure of attempting to abolish the Supreme Court, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires them to confirm any of the President's nominees. However, attempting to dismantle one of the three branches would be nothing short of a coup d'etat. The president has some options here: He [the President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses [of Congress], or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper. -- Article 2, Sec. 3 Basically, this means that, in an extraordinary circumstance (total defiance of the entire Senate would easily qualify), the President can lock the Senate in their chamber until they straighten their heads out. And when I say "lock them in", I don't mean that figuratively. The Constitution requires that a majority of each house be present to constitute a quorum to do business. The President could order up to 51 Senators to convene, and if they refused, could order the FBI or whoever to physically arrest them and drag them to the capitol building. This was actually done in Wisconsin by Gov. Scott Walker in 2011 when 14 Democrat Senators fled the state to avoid the quorum needed to vote on a controversial bill that they couldn't block. It would be messy for sure, and as far as I know, has never been done with the U.S. Senate. But there is precedent for it. Additionally, the President could use his vacancy power and just appoint a justice. Legally, he would have to wait for the Senate to be in recess, and the Senate would likely arrange things so that never happens. However, if there were no justices left, he could just appoint a Chief Justice (the Constitution provides that there be at least one justice). Even if he did this in the most "in-your-face" illegal way, with both middle fingers extended, the only judge that can tell him he did wrong is the guy he just seated. Of course, the Senate would move to impeach that judge, and probably the President too for having appointed him illegally, but you need a supermajority of both houses to remove them from office. If you had such a supermajority, then the game is over at this point; there's no way the President would step down in such a situation (who would force him?) and we're in a civil war because we don't have a functional government anymore. In reality, this isn't an "interesting twist in constitutional law that the Founding Fathers may not have considered." It's that if Congress ever went totally off the rails like that, the President, or the people would have to step up and hope they could end the standoff peacefully without resorting to violence, because this is the kind of thing that revolutions are fought over.	Quorum defines the minimum number of members present in order to conduct business. Once quorum is met, members may make motions and the assembly may conduct business. Now your question concerns the minimum required for passing a motion, and you are correct some motions require more than majority, such as 2/3 vote. The problem in your analysis is that rules of procedure assume that the majority or supermajority is met from the members present and voting, not from the total number of members. Let me show you some examples so you can fully understand. Let's say there's an assembly with 21 members, with the standard quorum requirements of majority of the members. The minimum number of people required for quorum show up, which is 11 (more than half is majority). In order to pass a motion, you only need majority of the members present and voting. That typically means 6 people. However, let's say 2 members abstain from the vote or are present at the meeting but don't record their vote. Then a vote can pass 5-4. Quorum is met and a majority of the members present and voting, voted for the the motion. Similarly 2/3 votes are counted from members present and voting. There is an exception to this. If the organizations bylaws say that it takes a majority of the members to pass a certain motion, then the motion must pass by the majority of the total number of members in the organization, which is 11 in this case. Thus all 11 people present in the room would have to vote for it.	Can someone suggest me how to deal with such coercive tactics of begging? One option is to report it to the police as begging in either a public or private place in madhya-pradesh is an arrestable offence under section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Bhiksha Vritti Nivaran Adhiniyam, 1973: 4. Power to require person found begging to appear before Court. (1) Any police officer or other person authorised in this behalf in accordance with rules made by the State Government may arrest without a warrant any person who is found begging... The Madhya Pradesh police have on-line reporting for lodging complaints. (my ability to read Hindi is very limited but that page seems relevant, if not try searching for "First Information Report".)	Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
Why register many similar marks? Many companies apply for multiple registrations for the same term and similar goods and services, is that worthwhile? For example, Starbucks owns dozens of registrations for "Starbucks" both as standard character marks and as stylized designs. It would seem that a single registration would already prevent others from using the name for related products and services. Why is it worthwhile to apply for many registrations for the same term in reference to similar goods and services?	Registering the text string Starbucks" should prevent anyone else using it in any font for related products. However, I do not think it is useful against "Startducks" that is printed in the standard logo in Starbucks green. With the stylized version, you cover things that misleadingly look like what you see on a Starbucks building.	There are several things going on with Akinator and their use of trademarked names and characters. If you look at akinator.com Legal Notices it says: 2 – Copyright – Reproduction rights All the content of this site falls under French and international legislation on copyright and intellectual property. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part of this website, in any form or by any means is strictly prohibited without prior authorisation of the publications director. All products and trademarks mentioned are property of their respective owners. (emphasis mine) The fact that they mention that all trademarks belong to their respective owners is good, but it's a formality. What it appears the site really relies on for use of trademarked characters is what's called Nominative Use, which is a type of "trademark fair use." The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_use Akinator has to use the names and trademarks to identify those names and trademarks. Akinator could possibly be sued to establish their type of fair use is not valid in their case, but it's probably not worth it for the companies to pursue. And, most companies would rather people use and see their trademarks in a marketing and money-making fair use sense rather than sue to stop their use. See In the US, when is fair use a defense to copyright infringement? for a full description of Fair Use. Now, when you get to the "answer" part of the game, you will see a "copyright" link. Part of that resulting page says Displayed pictures are accessible from the web. It is Elokence's policy to respond to notices of alleged copyright infringement that comply with applicable international intellectual property law and make the necessary changes. In respect of Elokence's Intellectual Property Policy, Elokence operates a complaints procedure accessible via the form below. So the company has given itself a further bit of protection by only using images on the web they can link to (at least in the web browser game; I don't know about the App), so that means the image is already "out there", uploaded by someone else, and Akinator can claim they didn't upload it. And, further, there is a contact form for trademark holders to send DMCA takedown notices for their work. It's a belt and suspenders approach to the use of trademarks in their game.	If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine.	united-states I am going to answer based on US law. But many of the principles would be similar in many other countries. In particular the law in the EU is similar. There are two separate issues here, trademark rights and copyright. Trademark Rights Trademark law provides protection against the use of the mark "in commerce". This means using the mark to identify or advertise goods or services. It does not provide any protection against use not in commerce. Specifically 15 USC 1114 (part of the Lanham Act, the main US Federal trademark law) provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (1) (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (1) (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. If the plane was being used commercially, using someone else's trademark would be infringement and could lead to a successful infringement suit. But if it is not being used to provide or advertise a service or goodsm there is no trademark issue. Copyright 17 USC 106 specifies the exclusive rights that a copyright owner has. One is to make copies, another is to make derivative works. Unless fair use (or fair dealing in the UK) applies, one needs permission from the copyright owner. Without such permission, copying is infringement, and can lead to an award of damages. However, according to the question, the image has been released under a CC-BY-NC license. That grants permission, under certain conditions. One condition is that the image (or text) not be used for commercial purposes. If the plane is purely private, not rente out, these conditions seem to be complied with, so there is no copyright issue either. Conclusion Based on the statements in the question, there seems to br no IP issue here. Be sure that there is no commercial purpose, and that the CC license was issued by the actual copyright owner. A brief consultatuion with a lawyer might be wise.	I think you vastly exaggerate the difficulty. Basically: when a user registers, ask for their address, including country, as well as a phone number (including country code, which you may validate via SMS for instance). This should give you the 2 pieces of information that help you determine the country In the case of the UK, HMRC says: Support for MOSS registered micro-businesses UK micro-businesses, that are below the current UK VAT registration threshold and are registered for the VAT Mini One Stop Shop (VAT MOSS), may use best judgment and base their ‘customer location’ VAT taxation and accounting decisions on a single piece of information, such as the billing address provided by the customer or information provided to them by their payment service provider. based on the country, use the standard VAT rate for that country. The difficulty here is to track when those rates change, but your accountant should be able to keep up with that. There is very little chance any special reduced rate would apply to such services, and in any case, no tax authority will complain if you apply the standard rate instead of the reduced one! then declare everything online to your local MOSS (you don't need to register with each tax authority! You can, but you don't need to). In the case of a micro-business, this should be more than enough to comply with the rules.	I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.	A "similar brand", even a "knock off", does not infringe trademark protection (which is the issue here, not copyright) as long as reasonable consumers or purchasers will not be confused or mislead into thinking that the product is the same as the original product, or is made by, affiliated with, sponsored by, or authorized by the makers of the original product, or that the knockoff in some way shares the reputation of the original product. Obviously that is a fact-based judgement, but a name that alludes to another product but is obviously different is generally not considered an infringement. (I recall reading of a case in which the well-known "North Face" clothing brand tried to sue a new brad called "South butt". I believe that North Face lost. Apparently I was wrong and the case was settled.)	A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap.
Could Congress have ended slavery without the 13th Amendment? The 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Without this or subsequent amendments, and with a 19th century understanding/interpretation of the Constitution and first 12 amendments, did the federal government have the power to end slavery? Related question on the History StackExchange: https://history.stackexchange.com/questions/51511/what-was-the-south-actually-afraid-lincoln-or-congress-would-do-that-precipitate	Since the US Federal government didn't try to pass any such law (nor would it have been politically possible in the period shortly before the US Civil War), there is no way to know with assurance how such a hypothetical law would have been addressed by the Supreme Court of the day, nor by the various states. Congress legally could have prohibited the importation of slaves after 1808, the constitution specifically grants this power. Congress legally could have prohibited interstate commerce in slaves. Congress could have repealed the Fugitive Slave Act. Congress legally could have imposed heavy taxes on the ownership of slaves. If heavy enough these could have been a de facto abolition. A series of Presidents could have appointed Justices inclined to overturn the Dred Scott decision (denying the possibility of citizen ship for most Negros, and denying that a "free" state could free slaves temporarily resident there). Congress could have passed laws requiring negro votes to be counted in federal elections. Various of the above hypothetical measures might have made slavery less economic, and thus less common, in time. Note that it is not likely that any actual Congress would have passed most of them. But I do not see how, absent a constitutional amendment, and absent a war, a simple Federal statute could have constitutionally abolished slavery de jure throughout the US. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was legally justified as a war measure, a confiscation from those in rebellion. It did not affect loyal slave states, such as Maryland. And it was never seriously tested in court anyway.	The scenario in the question says that: They [3/4ths of citizens] agree that normal processes like public testimony, initiatives, referenda, elections, and recall effort have failed to make any changes that the public wants Nobody is suggesting violence or rebellion. All processes will follow pre-abolishment laws. But if "normal processes" cannot be used to make the changes desired, then "pre-abolishment laws" are not being followed in all respects. Moreover, id the current elected officials do not agree to be replaced, then violence of some degree will be needed to remove them, or they may initiate violence in the form of attempted arrests of those leading the change process for violations of those "pre-abolishment laws". So these conditions are inconsistent, they cannot all be true. Luther v. Borden There is at least one highly relevant episode in US history, adn it was explored in the Supreme Court case of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) In connection with he opinion the Justia Syllabus says: At the period of the American Revolution, Rhode Island did not, like the other States, adopt a new constitution, but continued the form of government established by the Charter of Charles the Second, making only such alterations, by acts of the Legislature, as were necessary to adapt it to their condition and rights as an independent State. But no mode of proceeding was pointed out by which amendments might be made. In 1841, a portion of the people held meetings and formed associations which resulted in the election of a convention to form a new constitution to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection. This convention framed a constitution, directed a vote to be taken upon it, declared afterwards that it had been adopted and ratified by a majority of the people of the State, and was the paramount law and constitution of Rhode Island. Under it, elections were held for Governor, members of the Legislature, and other officers, who assembled together in May, 1842, and proceeded to organize the new government. But the charter government did not acquiesce in these proceedings. On the contrary, it passed stringent laws, and finally passed an act declaring the State under martial law. In May, 1843, a new constitution, which had been framed by a convention called together by the charter government, went into operation, and has continued ever since. The question which of the two opposing governments was the legitimate one, viz., the charter government or the government established by the voluntary convention, has not heretofore been regarded as a judicial one in any of the State courts. The political department has always determined whether a proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision. The courts of Rhode Island have decided in favor of the validity of the charter government, and the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the state. The question whether or not a majority of those persons entitled to suffrage voted to adopt a constitution cannot be settled in a judicial proceeding. The Constitution of the United States has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power of recognizing a State government in the hands of Congress. Under the existing legislation of Congress, the exercise of this power by courts would be entirely inconsistent with that legislation. The President of the United States is vested with certain power by an act of Congress, and in this case, he exercised that power by recognizing the charter government. Although no State could establish a permanent military government, yet it may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The State must determine for itself what degree of force the crisis demands. In the Court's formal opinion, Chief Justice Taney wrote: We do not understand from the argument that the constitution under which the plaintiff acted is supposed to have been in force after the constitution of May, 1843, went into operation. T he contest is confined to the year preceding. The plaintiff contends that the charter government was displaced, and ceased to have any lawful power, after the organization, in May, 1842, of the government which he supported, and although that government never was able to exercise any authority in the State nor to command obedience to its laws or to its officers, yet he insists that it was the lawful and established government upon the ground that it was ratified by a large majority of the male people of the State of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a majority of those who were entitled to vote for general officers under the then existing laws of the State. The fact that it was so ratified was not admitted, and, at the trial in the Circuit Court, he offered to prove it by the production of the original ballots and the original registers of the persons voting, verified by the oaths of the several moderators and clerks of the meetings, and by the testimony of all the persons so voting, and by the said constitution, and also offered in evidence for the same purpose that part of the census of the United States for the year 1840 which applies to Rhode Island and a certificate of the secretary of state of the charter government showing the number of votes polled by the freemen of the State for the ten years then last past. The Circuit Court rejected this evidence, and instructed the jury that the charter government and laws under which the defendants acted were, at the time the trespass is alleged to have been committed, in full force and effect as the form of government and paramount law of the State, and constituted a justification of the acts of the defendants as set forth in their pleas. It is this opinion of the Circuit Court that we are now called upon to review. ... Certainly the question which the plaintiff proposed to raise by the testimony he offered has not heretofore been recognized as a judicial one in any of the State courts. In forming the constitutions of the different States after the Declaration of Independence, and in the various changes and alterations which have since been made, the political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision. ... The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates altogether to the constitution and laws of that State, and the well settled rule in this court is that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State. ... Besides, if the Circuit Court had entered upon this inquiry, by what rule could it have determined the qualification of voters upon the adoption or rejection of the proposed constitution unless there was some previous law of the State to guide it? It is the province of a court to expound the law, not to make it. And certainly it is no part of the judicial functions of any court of the United States to prescribe the qualification of voters in a State, giving the right to those to whom it is denied by the written and established constitution and laws of the State, or taking it away from those to whom it is given; nor has it the right to determine what political privileges the citizens of a State are entitled to, unless there is an established constitution or law to govern its decision. ... he fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on the application of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. Under this article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. ... ... by the act of February 28, 1795, provided that, in case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the legislature of such State or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to sufficient to suppress such insurrection. ... By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere is given to the President. He is to act upon the application of the legislature or of the executive, and consequently he must determine what body of men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act. The fact that both parties claim the right to the government cannot alter the case, for both cannot be entitled to it. ... ... It is true that, in this case, the militia were not called out by the President. But, upon the application of the governor under the charter government, the President recognized him as the executive power of the State, and took measures to call out the militia to support his authority if it should be found necessary for the general government to interfere, and it is admitted in the argument that it was the knowledge of this decision that put an end to the armed opposition to the charter government and prevented any further efforts to establish by force the proposed constitution. The interference of the President, therefore, by announcing his determination was as effectual as if the militia had been assembled under his orders. And it should be equally authoritative. ... The court thus upheld the verdict for the defendants, and the authority o the government recognized by the President. It should be noted that this Case arose before the passage of the 14th and 15th amendments to the Federal Constitution, and particularly the Equal protection and Sue process clauses of the 14th, and the "one man, one vote" cases later decided under those clauses. If a state government in 2020 had laws similar to the Charter Government of Rhode Island in 1840, they would be struck down as against those clauses and amendments. But unless an "abolishment" as described in the question were to be recognized and the resulting government approved by the President and Congress, it would not be lawful, and federal authority and military force could be used to support the lawful government.	Under the present constitution . . . Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? No. Lots of the language in the United States Constitution is no longer in place or in common usage or is invalid due to subsequent amendments, and that language is still effective as originally intended. The U.S. Constitution has never been "amended and restated" and can't be understood properly without annotations to its raw text. Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Not really. Every state's name is embedded in myriad federal laws and regulations in addition to the statute that admitted the state to the United States, e.g. laws assigning names to post offices, laws allocating judgeships, laws purchasing property, laws appropriating funds, laws assigning states to various districts for purposes of executive branch departments and the judiciary, tax laws (e.g. the Obamacare tax credit), etc. Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? A federal constitutional amendment would not be needed. The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to admit states and to change their boundaries with the permission of the affected states. This would be within the power over states that could be inferred from those powers. A state and the federal government could each pass a statute to call itself something different for various purposes. For example, the official name of the state of Rhode Island is "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" but various state and federal statutes authorize the use of the short form of the "State of Rhode Island" for most purposes. As a practical matter a state constitutional amendment would probably be desirable on general principles to officially change the name of a state, whether or not it was strictly required, in part, because a state constitution usually sets forth an official name of a state in its body text. It would be possible for a state to change its constitution and statutes and change its name in a move that the federal government did not accept, and if that happened, the federal government and its officials would probably continue to use the old name and the state government and its officials would probably use the new name. I think it is as a practical matter, unlikely that a standoff like this would persist, but I think that this is the most likely outcome. A federal government move to change a state's name without its consent proactively, however, would probably be struck down as violating federalism concerns. Of course, all of this is speculative, because there are really no precedents for disputes over the changing of a state's name. Context would influence the outcome of any such case.	While the Supreme Courts of Germany, Honduras, India and Italy have asserted such authority, the U.S. Supreme Court's justiciable decisions about a U.S. Constitutional Amendment are generally limited to a determination of whether the amendment was lawfully adopted pursuant to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which states: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. Usually, U.S. Supreme Court litigation over a constitutional amendment would be over whether the process of Article V has been conformed to in a particular case (which has been litigated in several prior cases). The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), that even some procedural issues are political questions for Congress to resolve that are non-justiciable, in part because the mode of ratification is expressly delegated to Congress in Article V. As the summary of Coleman at the link above explains: In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Kansas legislators had standing to sue, but found that two of the plaintiffs’ claims raised political questions that could only be resolved by Congress. With respect to the whether the Kansas legislature’s previous rejection of the Child Labor Amendment precluded its subsequent ratification, the Court stated that this “should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the amendment.” But, with respect to the language in bold in the quoted language of Article V above, the U.S. Supreme Court could determine that a constitutional amendment is unconstitutional. This narrow ground, however, is the sole basis upon which it may do so.	Meaning of the Third Amendment The US Third amendment means that if the US ever wants to quarter soldiers in private houses (or other dwellings), without the consent of the owners, it can only do so in time of war, and only in accordance with some law that Congress passes, authorizing such action and providing procedures for it. To the best of my knowledge, Congress has never passed any such law, and so no such "quartering" would be permissible, even during wartime. Note that the text of the amendment says "house". This provision might be extended to other dwellings, such as apartment buildings, but probably not to any "privately-owned building" that is not a residence (that is, was not previously a dwelling). Such non-residences are not protected by the Third Amendment , although the takings clause of the Fifth might apply, as might the Due Process clause, depending on the circumstances. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) would be relevant in such a case. Engblom v. Carey The amendment was invoked and interpreted in Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982). This is said by Wikipedia to be the first decision at the circuit court level interpreting the amendment or depending on its provisions. It has never been the basis for a US Supreme Court decision In 1979 there was a state-wide strike of NY corrections officers (prison employees). NY National Guard troops were deployed by the state. Staff had been rented apartments as part of their employment agreement. Guard troops were first housed in administrative buildings and school buildings at or near the prison. But after five days striking officer were evicted by the state, and Guard troops were housed in dorms so vacated. Two of the officers sued. The second circuit court held that: the National Guard troops are in fact soldiers under the Third Amendment; the Third Amendment applies to state as well as federal authorities, i.e., is incorporated against the states; and the protection of the Third Amendment extends beyond homeowners, but covers anyone who, within their residence, has a legal expectation of privacy and a legal right to exclude others from entering into the premises. That is, tenants and other lawful residents are protected. Issues Mentioned in the Question What law is being referenced? No such law currently exists. Congress could pass one in the future. During a war can American soldiers commandeer my house? Only if Congress passes such a law, and then only if whatever procedures that are "prescribed" by the law Congress passes are followed."	The US Constitution (broadly) does three things: It defines how the government should operate It places certain powers in the hands of certain individuals (branches of government, federal government vs states, etc.) It restricts the actions and powers of government (originally the federal government, and thought the 14th amendment, the states, and through them, municipal governments). The main thing is that there is a distinction between a governmental organization (which is effectively a portion of the government) and an organization that is funded in whole or in part by the government (The difference being if the government controls the organization or appoints (some of) it's leads, such as the FBI or Federal Reserve). Generally, the latter is not bound by the Constitution; however, it may be bound by laws or grant stipulations. Elaborating on your three questions: Free Speech: Constitutionally, no one but the government is restricted from moderating someone else's speech. There may, however, be legal repercussions, but not constitutional issues. Discrimination on protected characteristics: This is not forbidden by the Constitution, at least not in the way it is is meant colloquially. The Constitution only prohibits discrimination in access to voting, and then only for race, color, sex, and prior servitude. However, such discrimination is illegal, due to laws, such as the Civil Rights Act. A non-governmental organization that receives funds from the government constitutionally is no different than one that does not. Legally, there may be differences.	This is known as the "ministerial exception". Because the Free Exercise and Estalishment clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering with religion, the government cannot override a doctrine that contradicts the teachings of a religion (so women and gays cannot sue the Catholic church for not being hirable as priests). In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, an individual taught classes and led prayer at a religous school, but was fired ultimately due to a disability (narcolepsy). The Lutheran church does not have any known doctrine condemning narcolepsy: but it was unanimously ruled that "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own". Thus the church was legally permitted to fire the individual due to her disability.	Only with the approval of Congress. An agreement between states is called an "interstate compact" (a variety of existing compacts are listed in the link). The federal government can also unilaterally create an independent agency with authority in some states, but not others such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The relevant parts of the Constitution are Article I, Section 10, which states: 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. Also relevant are Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. and Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Does Seattle tenant enjoy the right of first order when rental is for sale? In Seattle, can I enjoy the "Right of first order" (ROR) to buy, when the property I am renting, is put up for sale?	The closest you will get is the first-in-time ordinance passed by the city, but that was overturned in court. That law required accepting the first qualified applicant for a rental: it did not say anything about sales. If there is a specific provision to that effect in your lease agreement, that would be applicable, but there is no general legal mechanism that forces a seller to accept a particular offer.	The wording of the original lease and the renewal form are vital here. The Texas Property code, Title 8, chapter 92 is the relevant state law for residential tenancies. It neither forbids nor guarantees a right of renewal. That is left up to the lease agreement. However, it does require a landlord to provide a tenant with a copy of any signed lease promptly. Specifically Sec. 92.024. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE COPY OF LEASE provides that: (a) Not later than the third business day after the date the lease is signed by each party to the lease, a landlord shall provide at least one complete copy of the lease to at least one tenant who is a party to the lease. ... c) A landlord's failure to provide a complete copy of the lease as described by Subsection (a) or (b) does not invalidate the lease or, subject to Subsection (d), prevent the landlord from prosecuting or defending a legal action or proceeding to enforce the lease. (d) A landlord may not continue to prosecute and a court shall abate an action to enforce the lease, other than an action for nonpayment of rent, only until the landlord provides to a tenant a complete copy of the lease if the tenant submits to the court evidence in a plea in abatement or otherwise that the landlord failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b). (e) A landlord may comply with this section by providing to a tenant a complete copy of the lease: (1) in a paper format; (2) in an electronic format if requested by the tenant; or (3) by e-mail if the parties have communicated by e-mail regarding the lease. Sec. 92.003 provides that: (a) In a lawsuit by a tenant under either a written or oral lease for a dwelling or in a suit to enforce a legal obligation of the owner as landlord of the dwelling, the owner's agent for service of process is determined according to this section. (b) If written notice of the name and business street address of the company that manages the dwelling has been given to the tenant, the management company is the owner's sole agent for service of process. (c) If Subsection (b) does not apply, the owner's management company, on-premise manager, or rent collector serving the dwelling is the owner's authorized agent for service of process unless the owner's name and business street address have been furnished in writing to the tenant. Dallas municipal law prohibits retaliating against a tenant who complains about improper conditions or requests maintenance, but says nothing about lease renewals. Under ordinary contract law, an offer and acceptance makes a contract, unless the parties have previously agreed otherwise. Moreover, demonstrable practice can make or confirm a contract. If the tenant has paid rent for either March or April in reliance on the renewal agreement, and at the specified renewal rate, and that rent has been accepted, that may well constitute ratification (and thus execution) of the renewed lease. This is if the new lease would hav started before the April rent was due. So the tenant may well have the right to enforce the terms specified in the February renewal form. However, this will depend on what those terms are, and also what renewal provisions, if any, were in the original lease. It might be a good idea to send a letter to the landlord and manager, saying that the renewal form that you signed constitutes an acceptance of their offer, and thus a binding contract, and asking for a signed copy as per section 92.024, mentioning the section number. If it were me, I would send such a letter by both email and USPS certified mail, to both the manager and the landlord, if I had both addresses. I would keep a copy of any communications, and make them all in writing from now on (email is writing, legally). In any case the tenant would be wise to continue to pay rent on time in the amount specified on the renewal form, by some traceable means such as a check, money order, or credit card. I would be sure to use a method the original lease listed as acceptable, or that had been used in the past, except for cash. If I used a check, I would write "payment in full for rent of {address} for {month}" on the back The tenant would be wise to consult a local lawyer who specializes in tenant's cases, there seem to be quite a few. There is a local housing crisis center. It offers regular (twice a month) legal clinics with volunteer lawyers, and can be reached at 214-828-4244 or [email protected]. Such a center might be able to recommend local lawyers. Often an initial consultation with a lawyer on such a matter is free or at a low charge. It would probably be a good idea for the tenant to take some action fairly promptly. 15 U.S. Code Chapter 96 (the federal e-sign act) (section 7001) provides that: (a) In general -- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce— (1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation. Also the UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), which has been adopted by Texas, allows but does not require the use of electronic signatures. Thus the tenant;s email response ought to be a vald means of forming a contract.	You can read about your rights as a California tenant at http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/landlordbook/catenant.pdf This is rather ridiculous: 1) No judge will evict someone for paying rent by mail. (I assume you have the new landlord's address.) 2) If the landlord cashes the check you mail then he's not going to be able to claim you didn't pay the rent. If he actually refuses to cash your mailed check then that's all to the good for you. 3) You can ignore any requirements imposed by the new landlord that aren't in the lease, just as the landlord could ignore any new requirement imposed on him by you. Even some terms in a lease can be ignored, because not all terms in a contract are legal. (This is especially the case in tenant-landlord law.) If you think there will be trouble then use certified mail.	the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it.	In the lease agreement we stipulated that rent would be 50% off until the building received full services and then the full rent payment would be due. Ouch. I bet the lease agreement also says something like "no other agreements verbal or otherwise are in effect for this agreement." So what you did was release the landlord from the responsibility to make the building habitable. Pretty sure you will need a lawyer to unwind this.	The Immigration Act 2016 introduced the so-called 'right to rent' provisions under which a landlord can be prosecuted for renting accommodation to someone who is not legally in the UK. Everyone in the UK, Brits included, is subject to the Act. This gives the landlord the right to examine your work permit and to see if your visa is valid. The landlord will make a copy of the information. This makes the landlord a data controller which imposes restrictions on how the information can be used. Because this became controversial, the Information Commissioner published a brochure on the things a landlord can do with your data. All things considered and based upon what you wrote, if the landlord did not get your permission to use the data, then it's likely he is in breach. But this does not mean it's actionable or that it would be advisable to make a formal complaint to the Commissioner. If you want to pursue it, you can use the Commissioner's "Report a Concern" page as a starting point. Alternatively, you can lodge a formal complaint with your landlord and he will have to respond to it. What does the law say? The act giving the landlord the right to access your data is in the 2016 act linked above. Everything else is in the Data Protection Act 1998. The ILPA Information Sheet is at "Right to Rent". "The information sheet was updated on 01 November 2016 to take account of the second commencement order issued by the government, on 31 October 2016, bringing further provisions into force." The information sheet is recommended reading for anyone in the UK on a work permit. Disclaimer: I'm a member.	You can read about Magnuson Moss here, but it only applies to warranties on goods, not services. As you note, the warranty on the unit is still valid. As for agreeing, it is not unusual that a consumer is not aware what all they are agreeing to when they buy a house. One of those myriad signatures that you put on myriad documents was your agreement to contract terms in the pile of papers that you were handed. If you trace through the entire pile of pieces of paper, you should find something saying that you agree to "all of the attached conditions", which is where you are supposed to say "Wait, what conditions?".	You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.
Am I bound by "this letter is confidential" boilerplate? In a lawsuit in the UK small claims court I've been sent an offer by the defendant's solicitor. I want to communicate this information to others who have the same claim. However at the bottom of the letter is a standard boilerplate text, obviously appended to every letter they send, saying that "This letter contains confidential information". They don't say anything else about confidentiality. I never agreed to keep anything confidential, and in their letter they say they will tell the judge about this offer if I still insist on going to court. Am I bound to keep their offer confidential? Edit Perhaps I should have said that this was an offer made "Without prejudice, save as to costs". It sounds like that has a bearing on the confidentiality, which I did not appreciate before. Also, I am accepting their offer, so this won't get to Court.	"Without prejudice" does not, of itself, create an obligation of confidentiality What it does do is prevent the contents being used against the author in any future proceedings - by this litigant or anyone else. The purpose of civil litigation is to resolve disputes. There is another, better, cheaper and more commonly used mechanism - parties agreeing on their own resolution through negotiation. The purpose of the without prejudice rule is to allow parties to have a full and frank negotiation without the risk that what they say will bite them on the ass in court. If they do not settle, then the court cannot and will not know about any concessions or negotiating positions that either party made or took. Adding "save as to costs" means that after the case is resolved, a party may introduce any offers they made that were better than what was won in order to show that costs should be mitigated - basically that because there was a better offer on the table the litigation was needless and the costs unnecessary. You can share it with whoever you like - they won't be able to use it in court.	A NDA can only cover confidential information, that is information that is not in the public sphere, and that was transmitted to the recipient in confidence, that is it is specifically identifiable information that the recipient knew or should have known from the circumstances of the communication was confidential. For example, "marketing techniques" are not confidential information although the specific marketing strategy (pricing, promotion etc.) to be employed for a particular group may be confidential if the circumstances of the communication are such that the recipient should have known they were. Telling them "Hey, this marketing strategy is confidential" is best, however, the nature of the communication may make it implicit, for example, if it is only communicated to a subset of employees and contains information that would obviously damage the organisation if made public such as a price or client list. An NDA that states "all information given is confidential" is probably not enforceable even if exceptions are given because a) it is manifestly untrue (how can the location of the bathrooms or which day is pay day be confidential?) and b) it places an unreasonable burden on the recipient to determine what is and what is not real confidential information.	The other answers don't quite spell it out, so I will. There is no law in the UK requiring landlords or their agents to show a property to all parties interested - refusal to show a property may however in some cases fall under discrimination laws, so that might be something you can pursue if you feel the refusal is due to your gender, race or sexual orientation. While they may have to justify their data collection under the GDPR, that is entirely separate to their refusal to show the property to you.	The fixed penalty notice is a notice under s172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (7) A requirement under subsection (2) may be made by written notice served in accordance with Criminal Procedure Rules, if the alleged offence took place in England and Wales, or by post otherwise; Let's assume england-and-wales. For service by post the relevant rule is 4.11. (2) Unless something different is shown, a document served on a person by any other method is served— (b) in the case of a document sent by first class post or by the equivalent of first class post, on the second business day after the day on which it was posted or despatched; The date it was posted or dispatched will be indicated by the postmark on the envelope, "‘business day’ means any day except Saturday, Sunday, Christmas Day, Boxing Day, Good Friday, Easter Monday or a bank holiday" (2.2), and second means not the next one but the one after that. For scotland or northern-ireland you would need to determine their laws for service by post. I'll leave that as an exercise for the reader. Your cousin was provided with all the information needed to determine the date of service because they are legally required to know the law. I can't believe neither of you had this right at your fingertips 😂. Note the "unless something different is shown". If your cousin was in the Antarctic for the summer and didn't collect their mail until they returned, that would be "something different" and service would be when they collected the mail.	Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial.	In general, court hearings are held in public; and anyone is free to make a fair and balanced report of the proceedings. It is important that justice is seen to be done. However, in some circumstances that is not true—the obvious example is if a child is involved. It is not sufficient though merely that "[the claimant] wants to keep his/her identity confidential". Have a look at the Civil Procedure Rules (part 39): 39.2 General rule – hearing to be in public The general rule is that a hearing [including a trial] is to be in public. ... A hearing, or any part of it, may be in private if – (a) publicity would defeat the object of the hearing; (b) it involves matters relating to national security; (c) it involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publicity would damage that confidentiality; (d) a private hearing is necessary to protect the interests of any child or protected party; (e) it is a hearing of an application made without notice and it would be unjust to any respondent for there to be a public hearing; (f) it involves uncontentious matters arising in the administration of trusts or in the administration of a deceased person’s estate; or (g) the court considers this to be necessary, in the interests of justice. The court may order that the identity of any party or witness must not be disclosed if it considers non-disclosure necessary in order to protect the interests of that party or witness. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part39#39.2 If you can satisfy the court that one of (a) to (g) apply, the court may make an order anonymizing proceedings (for instance, you would only be referred to as "AB" in reports and judgements) or it might hold the hearing in camera (in private). However the other party may well wish to oppose your application. Indeed, even a newspaper hearing of your case but unable to report it is entitled to object: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/1.html (In re Guardian News) Conclusion In these circumstances, when carrying out the ultimate test of balancing all the factors relating to both M's article 8 rights and the article 10 rights of the press, we have come to the conclusion that there is indeed a powerful general, public interest in identifying M in any report of these important proceedings which justifies curtailment, to that extent, of his, and his family's, article 8 Convention rights to respect for their private and family life. For all these reasons, we would set aside the anonymity order in respect of M. ... Therefore, A, K, M and HAY will be named here and in the judgments on the substantive appeals, as Mr Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, Mr Mohammed Azmir Khan, Mr Michael Marteen (formerly known as Mohammed Tunveer Ahmed) and Mr Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef (or Hani al-Seba'i), respectively.	Not for normal correspondence There are laws that require a specified channel of communication for specific purposes such as a physical address for the service of legal notices, but there is no general requirement. How, or if, a company communicates with its customers about complaints will either be specified in the contract or up to the company to determine and advertise. For example, this site specifies “ will be deemed to have been duly given when received, if personally delivered or sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested; when receipt is electronically confirmed, if transmitted by facsimile or e-mail; or the day after it is sent, if sent for next day delivery by recognized overnight delivery service” - any other method of delivery (Whatsapp, Facebook, even their own chatrooms etc.) is not a valid method of service, if you use those methods, then legally, you have not communicated. So, if the company requires complaints to deal with by online chat, they can safely ignore any letter or email you might send them.	The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one.
Is currency trading legal in US? I am trying to open a business where a client can trade their currency to me. For example, if a client has money in their PayPal, they can send it to me, then I will give the the equivalent in their local currency (removing scam). I am wondering if this is legal (in the United States). A coworker said it's money laundering and not legal. Any source will also help.	Obviously, it's not simply illegal to have a business that exchanges currency - legal currency exchanges do exist, after all. But you'd have to be careful if you wanted to open a business that does this. According to 31 CFR 1010.100, you are considered a "dealer in foreign exchange", and thus a "money services business", and thus a "financial institution", if you are: A person that accepts the currency, or other monetary instruments, funds, or other instruments denominated in the currency, of one or more countries in exchange for the currency, or other monetary instruments, funds, or other instruments denominated in the currency, of one or more other countries in an amount greater than $1,000 for any other person on any day in one or more transactions, whether or not for same-day delivery. You are not considered a "money services business" if you do this "on an infrequent basis and not for gain or profit", but you say you want to "open a business" that does this, so this exemption wouldn't apply to you. If you are considered a financial institution, then you must comply with all sorts of anti-money-laundering regulations, including, for example, verifying the identity of your customers, and filing reports with the US Treasury. You would definitely want to hire a lawyer to guide you through the requirements.	You cannot do this legally General rules Under US law you are required to file a Form 1099 with the IRS for this payment if it was for a trade or business purpose. ( $1,000.00 is above the current reporting limit of $600.) This you cannot do without the recipient's name (personal or business) and address. You will also need their SSN or TIN. Failure to file the 1099 may be a violation of law. Private people, as well as businesses, get 1099s which are also filed with the IRS. I myself have received 1099s as a private individual for freelance work. (Corporations mostly do not get 1099s.) Private individuals as well as businesses report payments on 1099s. Such a person might be involved in unlawful tax evasion, and the demand for payment in bitcoin might support a reasonable suspicion of this. If so, you might be accused of being an accessory. If the person is foreign (non-US) and the work was not done in the US it may not need to be reported, but if you do not know the person's location you cannot safely assert that it is outside the US. If you intend to deduct the payment on your own taxes as a business expense, you may also need to have a receipt showing the recipient of the money. It would seem that if the payor/client is in the US and the work was done for a trade or business (which includes a non-profit, but not a hobby or personal site) and the amount is $600 or more, there is no safe and legal way to hire a person or firm without knowing the name, address, and (in most cases) TIN (taxpayer identification number) of the contractor, or at least using ones "best efforts" to obtain the TIN. See the various IRS instructions below for details. IRS Instructions According to the Form 1099-Misc/1099-NEC insatructions Report on Form 1099-MISC [or 1099-NEC] only when payments are made in the course of your trade or business. Personal payments are not reportable. You are engaged in a trade or business if you operate for gain or profit. However, nonprofit organizations are considered to be engaged in a trade or business and are subject to these reporting requirements. Generally, payments to a corporation (including a limited liability company (LLC) that is treated as a C or S corporation) [are not reportable]. If you are required to file Form 1099-MISC, you must furnish a statement to the recipient. Enter [in Box 3] other income of $600 or more required to be reported on Form 1099-MISC that is not reportable in one of the other boxes on the form. File Form 1099-NEC, Nonemployee Compensation (NEC), for each person in the course of your business to whom you have paid the following during the year: At least $600 in ... Services performed by someone who is not your employee (including parts and materials) (box 1); Generally, you must report payments to independent contractors on Form 1099-NEC in box 1. If the following four conditions are met, you must generally report a payment as NEC. You made the payment to someone who is not your employee. You made the payment for services in the course of your trade or business (including government agencies and nonprofit organizations). You made the payment to an individual, partnership, estate, or, in some cases, a corporation; You made payments to the payee of at least $600 during the year. Instructions for Form 1042-S specify that one must report for foreign payees: Compensation for independent personal services performed in the United States. General Instructions for Certain Information Returns says: Recipient names. Show the full name and address in the section provided on the information return. If payments have been made to more than one recipient or the account is in more than one name, show on the first name line the name of the recipient whose TIN is first shown on the return. ... TINs. TINs are used to associate and verify amounts you report to the IRS with corresponding amounts on tax returns. Therefore, it is important that you report correct names, social security numbers (SSNs), individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs), employer identification numbers (EINs), or adoption taxpayer identification numbers (ATINs) for recipients on the forms sent to the IRS.	In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted.	The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory.	What does the contract say? I write that so often I should get a stamp made. If the contract is silent, then it is implied that payment in US currency is acceptable, as is any other method of payment the parties agree to. As you have correctly quoted, there is no limit to the number of US coins that are valid for payments, unlike in many other jurisdictions where there is such a limit. Accept the coins, make the tenant wait while you count them one by one and then give them a receipt. Oh, and change your lease when you can to nominate sensible forms of payment like electronic transfer.	Laundering physical money Let's say a career criminal committed a couple crimes and is now in possession of a large heap of money in form of coins and paper currency. They want to use that money to buy themselves a nice house. But showing up with a huge bag of money at a bank or real estate agency would look very suspicious. It is very likely that they will get reported and then investigated by law enforcement. What do they do? They need some explanation where that money comes from. A good way to turn that dirty money into apparently clean money is by running a legitimate cash-based business. The criminal then goes to the bank each week and deposits a chunk of their ill-gotten cash claiming it's income from their business. Common choices are restaurants, casinos or the name-giver laundromats which were famously used by crime boss Al Capone to launder his illegal income. But they can use any business for this purpose which takes payment in cash and doesn't leave easy to analyze evidence how much business they really performed. Now the criminal has all that ill-gotten money on a regular bank account and can use it to buy what they want without raising any further suspicion. Laundering electronic money Another category of money laundering which got very relevant in the age of online banking is to launder illegally obtained money which can be found on bank accounts. For example by hacking online banking accounts or running scams. If the criminal would just send that money to their personal account, then the investigators would just need to subpoena their bank and their real identity would be revealed. So they need some way to move that money which is hard to trace. Common methods are: Transfering money to accounts in foreign countries in order to tie up investigators with the bureaucracy of international investigations. Transferring money in ways which are hard to trace, like cryptocurrency, gift cards, private money transfer services or private people they recruited to forward money through their personal accounts. Buying, transfering and selling virtual assets in online games. Buying physical items from online stores using false identities and selling them again under their real identity. Fortunately none of these methods of money laundering are completely untraceable. They make the work of law enforcement more difficult, but not completely impossible. The criminals usually hope to frustrate law enforcement to the point that they give up and prioritize "larger fish".	Yes, its legal Economically, there is no difference between a cash discount and a card surcharge; legally, there is. That’s because the law prohibits charging more than the advertised price for a given payment method but doesn’t prohibit charging less. Of course, it’s likely there is some illegality here but it’s not against the customer. A business doesn't give a 10% discount to avoid paying a 1-2% fee. They do it because they are not reporting (some of) their cash sales to the tax authorities and are therefore saving the 25% VAT and 18% company tax.	You can purchase any expensive item for cash, if the seller will accept it. In the US and many other jurisdictions, a seller is not required to accept cash, but many will. In the US and many other jurisdictions banks are required to report large cash deposits to government authorities, to help combat money-laundering, drug-dealing, and tax-evasion. Such a report may trigger an investigation, and during that investigation a person who bought an expensive item for cash may well be asked about the source of the cash. Whether an answer is legally required will depend on the law in the particular place. But even if it is not legally required, refusing to answer such questions may trigger additional investigation.
When does new US legislation come into force? After the US Congress passes a new bill and the president signs it into law, when does this law come into force (become effective and binding)? Does the law need to be oficially published somewhere?	By default a new US Federal law is effective as soon as it is enacted. That is, when the President signs it, when the 10 days for approval expire without the President vetoing it, or on the date when the second of the houses of Congress votes to override a veto. However, in modern usage, many, perhaps most, statutes specify as pone of their provisions an effective date some time after the date of enactment, in some cases several years later. If such a date is specified, that is the legal date. All bills and the actions enacting them are recorded in the Congressional Record, which is a public document, published on a regular basis. They are generally included in the next revision of the USC (united States Code) and the USCA (United States Code, Annotated). But these publications are generally well after the date of enactment. The Thomson Reuters Perspectives: Teaching Legal Research and Writing (winter 2000) “HOW Can I Tell the Effective Date of a Federal Statute?” by Barbara Bintliff says: The generally applicable rule is easy to state: a federal statute usually takes effect on the date of its enactment,3 which is itself determined by when the last step necessary for the statute’s enactment occurred. Most of the time the last step in the enactment process is the president’s signature, and this date, therefore, becomes the date of effectiveness for most federal statutes. However, there are exceptions to the general rule. For instance, sometimes the last step occurs when Congress overrides the president’s veto, or when the bill is allowed to become law without a presidential signature. And sometimes a later date is specified by the terms of the statute itself. The article geos on to say: The date of enactment is most easily located by consulting the parenthetical information provided after every statutory section included in the print and online versions of the United States Code (USC), the United States Code Annotated® (USCA®), and the United States Code Service (USCS).5 The parenthetical is variously called a “source note,” “statutory authority,” “statutory history,” “history,” “source credit,” or “credit.” In the print versions, the parenthetical follows the statutory section with nothing in between the statutory text and the source note. In the primary online versions, it is labeled “credit” (in USCA on Westlaw) or “history” (in USCS on LEXIS-NEXIS). The credit has been included with federal statutes since they were first codified in the Revised Statutes of 1874 and is an official part of the statute. "Enactment of a Law - Learn About the Legislative Process" from Congress.gov describes the procsss also, saying: If the president does approve it, he signs the bill, giving the date, and transmits this information by messenger to the Senate or the House, as the case might be. In the case of revenue and tariff bills, the hour of approval is usually indicated. The enrolled bill is delivered to the archivist of the U.S., who designates it as a public or private law, depending upon its purpose, and gives it a number. Public and private laws are numbered separately and serially. An official copy is sent to Government Printing Office to be used in making the so-called slip law print. ... If a bill which has been vetoed is passed upon reconsideration by the first House by the required two-thirds vote, an endorsement to this effect is made on the back of the bill, and it is then transmitted, together with the accompanying message, to the second House for its action thereon. If likewise reconsidered and passed by that body, a similar endorsement is made thereon. The bill, which has thereby been enacted into law, is not again presented to the president, but is delivered to the Administrator of the General Services Administration for deposit in the Archives, and is printed, together with the attestations of the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of the House of its passage over the president's veto.	In the United States, the answer depends on who is unlawfully in power. In the hypothetical you presented, the answer is probably that the law would remain valid, as Congress generally has the sole authority to pass judgment on whether to admit the elected person. A third party would not have the ability to challenge the law based on the qualifications of a lawmaker. But if we were dealing with an administrative official promulgating regulations, those rules would generally be void if that official were unlawfully appointed. That was the case in Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), where a cola distributor challenged a labor regulation, saying that the members of the NLRB who enacted it were improperly appointed. The Court agreed that the appointments were improper, so the regulations were nullified. A judicial decision coming out under these circumstances would also be nullified if one of the judges weren't really a judge. That happened just last year, in Yovino v. Rizo. In that case, ten judges from the Ninth Circuit heard a case, and the vote split 6-4. But the author of the majority opinion died before the decision was published, which is when it become effective. The Supreme Court held that because there were therefore only five votes for that decision, it was not a majority opinion, and therefore not binding on future Ninth Circuit panels.	As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand.	Most of the implications here are political, not legal. For that, you'd have to ask Politics.SE. The law, however, is quite clear: If the President is alive, and "a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" do not invoke the 25th amendment, the President would remain President and just not do their job in this case. Congress could presumably provide for a different set of people to validate the President's disability status, but in your hypothetical, this wouldn't happen due to a lack of consent from the Senate. The 25th amendment was created to solve this problem: it is the only solution to it. If it is not used, then there is no other means to remove a disabled-but-alive President. Most (all?) executive agencies can run themselves perfectly well day-to-day without the President's help, so nothing would be likely to fall apart immediately. There wouldn't be anyone to appoint new judges or other presidentially appointed officers, which would probably eventually become a problem.	All ex post facto laws are unconstitutional in the United States. But, not all retroactive laws are unconstitutional in the United States. An ex post facto law is basically a law that retroactively makes conduct illegal or punishes it more severely than it was punished at the time if it was already illegal. By way of example, tax legislation is often constitutionally retroactive, and laws that retroactively make the punishments for acts that are crimes at the time more lenient (or retroactively grant amnesty for previously illegal conduct) are legal. I strongly suspect, but do not know for certain, that India's constitutional law makes the same distinction that U.S. constitutional law does in this regard.	Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have.	A law that conflicts with the Constitution is void The enactment of a treaty is still a law. Even though the US has a Constitutional mechanism for ratifying treaties, once ratified, they are the “law of the land”.	The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it.
Can a store accuse me of something and ban me without proof? A chain store that I frequent has banned me from their store, citing that I was seen stealing merchandise. I've NEVER stolen anything from their store (or any other store of this chain) before, and the store manager claims that their store has video surveillance. He can't admit that they have video evidence of ME personally stealing anything (which, if they have surveillance, they should have proof of, no?), but apparently, one of their employees has (mistakenly) identified me as a thief, resulting in my being permanently banned from their store. On top of that, the store manager claims that one of his employees (who he's named personally) is the one of who says that he saw me stealing merchandise. Yet, I've talked to this same employee before, and HE claims that another Asst. Manager of the store is the one who claims they saw me stealing something. So right there, they already have an inconsistency in their story. There are other stores of this chain around me that I could can and do go to, but I don't like the idea of being labeled & treated unfairly for something that I didn't do, and on top of that, I feel like--and I know this sounds...fantastical--they're intentionally lying just to have a reason to ban me from their store. Is this right? And is there anything legally that I can do about this? Thank any and all who answer in advance, and I look forward to hearing you all's thoughts on the situation.	In theory, a store can ban you or anyone else for any reason except those protected by law against discrimination. As a practical matter, you potentially have various forms of recourse. The first thing to do is to write the the CEO of the chain, with a long detailed letter describing the incidents, and naming names. Most CEO's don't want to deal with this kind of bad publicity, and will at least order an investigation, and make amends, if the internal investigation is in your favor. This would apply even to the late Sam Walton, if the chain is WalMart, or whoever the current CEO is. If you are a member of a protected minority, or even have dark skin, you can sue the chain on those grounds. There will be a presumption that they barred you on grounds of race or color. Then the burden of proof will be on them to show that they didn't bar you for those causes. As a form of "entrapment," you should take a witness, basically the most influential person you can get hold of that's not a family member, to the store with you to ask them why you were barred. The mayor of your town would be ideal, more llkely it would be a boss, teacher, or clergyman, but in any event, someone who knows you well. If you can get them to accuse you of stealing in front of this third party, you have the makings of a defamation case. And even if you aren't a minority, you can sue them anyway. You can demand "discovery" of all internal documents, videos, etc. relating to your case. Your lawyer will also the right to "depose" (cross examine) all offending managers.There's a good chance that something embarrassing will turn up in the process. (Many defendants settle in connection with discovery.) You might want to hire a second (libel) lawyer to teach you how to publicize the case without running into libel laws. If all this fails, the store can probably bar you, but you want to make it prohibitively expensive for them to do so, meaning that most rational people wouldn't bar you after the above. If they do, they're not rational and you're better off not using the store.	They are separate warranties. The store doesn’t have to do anything about the manufacturer’s warranty and vice versa. It is of course good service if the store takes care of things for you, but that isn’t legally required. I expect that you don’t need a receipt but proof of purchase. A bank statement or credit card statement should do. My bank (in the U.K.) can provide statements 10 years back online.	Unfortunately, the "but everyone does that" (BEDT) argument doesn't hold water as evidenced by prosecutions of looters. Would uploading this video be a copyright infringement? It would be hard to answer this part of the question without knowing where and from whom the clips had come from. If the clips came from a company like ESPN or a YouTuber that doesn't give you permission to be able to use their clips then yes this might be a copyright infringement. If you use video/clips that are labeled as creative commons then nt it wouldn't be an infringement. YouTube has a feature for this. Would my actions be fair use? First, we'll need to understand what fair-use is. Fair use is the ability to use copyright material under certain circumstances without permission. To best determine if using copyright-protected material in your work you should weigh it against the four factors of fair use. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; The nature of the copyrighted work; The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. More information about fair-use here Youtube outlines their fair use guidelines here	at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Probably depends on what you mean with just leaving. If just leaving translates I haven't paid and I won't pay (because of the hassle with the card) then that's probably Making Off Without Payment, section 3 Theft Act 1978 (Thanks @bdsl). Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? I don't think a restaurant can physically detain you. Not even the 45 min you have been waiting. But if you leave without paying and without an agreement with them how & when to pay they can of course call the police because again that looks very much like making off without payment. According to your post, they did provide a payment system (cash) which was working all the time and that moreover has the special status of being legal tender. if you don't physically have the cash on you, you can be sued? You can be sued if you don't pay your bill (assuming the bill itself is correct) when it's due. In order to avoid endless hassle of the "I tried to pay via x, but they wouldn't accept this." type, legal tender defines ways of payment of a debt that the creditor/seller must accept. In many legislations, cash in the local currency provides such a fallback if other payment methods fail. Note that cash payment is very robust against internet failure, broken devices and power The UK (+ US) meaning of legal tender is that the restaurant must accept this means of settling the debt (at this time, the food is already eaten but not payed) - but they don't have to accept any other means of payment. (Note that e.g. for the EUR-countries there is at least a recommendation to make acceptance of legal tender mandatory also in retail, which includes simultaneous exchange food vs. payment). The 2nd important implication of this is that any argumentation along the lines that no reasonable means of payment were available would be very weak. You are not required to have sufficient cash with you to pay your bill if you can reasonably assume that some other way of payment will be acceptable to the restaurant. I see that like a spare wheel for a car: if you have a flat tire (card doesn't work) having a spare wheel (cash) allows you to deal with the issue with less hassle than if you don't: change your wheel vs. having to get your car brought to a workshop and wait until they put on a new tire (pay cash instead of waiting for the card to work again or a tedious hunt for another payment method). I'd like to point out that card doesn't work and not sufficient cash at hand (or forgotten purse) is something that happens quite often in general (rarely for any given transaction, but we have lots of transactions). I'd expect a restaurant or a gas station to be experienced in dealing with that. In any case, there are several possibilities to resolve the issue short of "just leaving": The key to all this is communication: talk to the restaurant to find a way to resolve the issue. Reassure them that you're not trying to use the opportunity to defraud them - that's what they are afraid of in this situation. "Where can I find an ATM?" Possibly offering a deposit: "And would you mind looking after my bag [phone] until I'm back?" Possibly showing them your ID card (or similar, if you have any) so they have your address: remember that so far you are an anonymous customer for them: which means that suing you for the money would be somewhere between too expensive and impossible. If you are a group, it should be sufficient if only one of you leaves in search of cash. Credit cards can be charged in a total offline way (MOTO = mail order/telephone order) where the credit card data is entered manually by the seller: the restaurant may be able to charge your credit card if fill in a paper credit card payment form. They may accept settlement via other payment systems: paypal & Co. wire the money via your online banking account (even if that doesn't give an instantaneous transfer, ask them if that's OK with them if you show/forward them the "transfer accepted message" for now) allow them to withdraw the money from your account via direct debit or something similar I'd not expect a restaurant to accept this possibility as they're probably not familiar with it and it means a lot of hassle for them with their bank to get listed to receive money that way. if you are in a region where cheques are still in regular use, that may be a solution as well. Restaurants like any other business can write invoices. They usually don't like this because their risk of having costly trouble to get the money is high. While your printout bill is technically an invoice already, it can be turned into an invoice (+ copy for them) giving your name + address and specifying how and when you'll pay. Which would keep track of how you (pl. = you + restaurant) decided to settle the bill under the peculiar circumstances. This works even in case of e.g. a power outage that prevents you from getting cash from an ATM in the neighborhood.	The 4th amendment protection against unreasonable searches is irrelevant, since it only relates to governmental searches. There may be "shopkeeper privilege" laws in your state that enable a detention. Ordinarily, you cannot be arrested by a person – that would be assault and false arrest. However, a state can enact an exception, such as Washington's RCW 4.24.220, which says In any civil action brought by reason of any person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of any merchandise, it shall be a defense of such action that the person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit such investigation or questioning by a peace officer or by the owner of the mercantile establishment, his or her authorized employee or agent, and that such peace officer, owner, employee, or agent had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was committing or attempting to commit larceny or shoplifting on such premises of such merchandise. As used in this section, "reasonable grounds" shall include, but not be limited to, knowledge that a person has concealed possession of unpurchased merchandise of a mercantile establishment, and a "reasonable time" shall mean the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to examine employees and records of the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership of the merchandise. Speaking of Walmart, here is a petition regarding a lawsuit against Walmart over such an event, where a shopper failed to stop to respond to exit security, resulting in her being physically stopped. A lawsuit (assault, unlawful imprisonment, outrage) ensued. The bottom line was that the shopkeeper's privilege is a valid defense against a lawsuit to the effect that a shopper does not want to comply with a request to prove that they are not stealing goods.	If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft.	It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.	It isn’t theft Theft requires depriving the legal owner of possession permanently. In concept it’s closer to fraud than theft, however, copyright violation is its own crime - neither theft nor fraud. In casual usage, you can call it theft if you like - or pomegranate, or Howard. Whatever gets your point across.
Why weren't these affidavits in Miller-Jenkins v Jenkins accepted? The case involed two ex lovers (one supposedly ex-lesbin) arguing about who gets custody of their adopted daughter. The ex-lesbian had several affidavits written up from suppoters saying her ex abused their daughter, seen here: https://donotlink.it/rJQa However according to the case files only one (Tammara Canfield) was seen in the hearings. (see here: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.glad.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/03-26-10-mj-glad-response-brief.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwik6OjhtfXgAhXhYt8KHXvbACoQFjAAegQIBhAB&usg=AOvVaw3w8Od3hJhYHvIKuL39rbqz&cshid=1552146905450) Why were the other affidavits not used?	On page 18 of the appellate decision linked above, it says: Finding of Fact No. 60: “Ms. Miller has no justification for denying parent-child contact between Ms. Jenkins and IMJ.” . Lisa’s lawyers assert that this finding is erroneous because: (1) the court disregarded testimony that IMJ engaged in “frightening behavior” after her visits with Janet; (2) Janet disagrees with Lisa’s and IMJ’s religious beliefs; and (3) the court failed to receive evidence that Janet exposed IMJ to “the homosexual lifestyle, which is documented to be emotionally, psychologically, and physically unhealthy.” (Plaintiff- Appellant’s Brief, pp. 21-22). The simple fact is that Lisa’s extra-legal justifications for her contemptuous conduct do not change the fact that Lisa has no legal justification for non-compliance. This indicates that Lisa's law errs allege, after the fact, that certain evidence was not received by the family court, but the appellate court simply holds that such evidence was not relevant to the issue of finding of fact #60 On page 21 of the appellate decision it says: Finding of Fact No. 79: “There is no evidence of abuse of IMJ by either Ms. Miller or Ms. Jenkins.” . This statement is a truism. There was absolutely no evidence introduced at the August 21, 2009 hearing as to any abuse or allegations of abuse by either of the parties; and Lisa’s lawyers do not suggest otherwise. (Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief, pp. 20-21). Rather, they point to a 2007 affidavit of Tammara Canfield that they have placed in the Printed Case but which was not before the court at the 2009 hearing. (Id., p. 21; PC 136- 137). Furthermore, this Court would have to look further back into the history of this case well before the August, 2009 hearing to even find allegations of abuse much less evidence of it. The only live testimony presented at the August, 2009 hearing was by Janet, Janet’s mother Ruth Jenkins, expert witness Jan Tyler, and Kimberly Izzo, a client of Janet’s. None of the witnesses testified that any family members had abused IMJ and Lisa points to no record evidence from the hearing in support of her argument. To the extent Lisa’s affidavit contained any allegations of “abuse,” the judge acted well within his discretion to assess the validity of the allegations and reject them as unsupported It would seem that the Canfield affidavit was not introduced at the Family Court hering but only afterwards, and that other statements did not contain anything that the Family Court or the appellate court considered to be evidence of abuse. There is no way on the information in the question to know why this affidavit (and possibly others) was not submitted at the time of the relevant hearing.	The first step is for the parents of the child to seek a court order for child support. This would be based on your friend being the actual father, and the non-mother not having adopted the child (extinguishing the obligations of the father). Many states, but not Michigan, have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act which covers assisted reproduction, but even in those states, this does not constitute assisted reproduction. The "agreement" is legally invalid (surrogate parentage contracts are unenforceable), and that, folks, is why you should hire an attorney rather than devising a legal theory on your own. This article summarizes the various paternity laws of Michigan. Under the Paternity Act, this may be a child born out of wedlock, if the child is a child begotten and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the date of birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage where the meaning of the last expression would have to be determined by the court. Probably the court would say "this child is not the 'issue' of the marriage", given legislative intent. Under the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, unmarried parent can by signing a statement "define" the parentage of a child, but the statute is specifically limited to a man acknowledging paternity, and cannot apply to a lesbian couple. The clearest statement of the law of parentage for lesbian couples in Michigan is Lefever v. Matthews where (just one year ago) the court held that both of two women were parents – but in that case, the eggs came from one of the women and they were implanted into the other woman. An important distinguishing feature is that in this case, the woman at a statutory disadvantage sought parental rights, whereas your question is about a legal parent seeking to avoid a legal obligation to the child. Courts generally do everything possible to protect a child's right to support by the parents. The prospects that an actual father could avoid that obligation are slim.	The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (it was revised between 1868-1869, but enacted in 1870) applied specifically to civil cases (i.e. disputes between private parties); it's organized by topic area, and is there to keep people from having to comb through every law ever passed that has to do with civil cases. The Revised Statutes of 1870 gathered all the laws of "general character" into one place, for the same reason. The difference between the two was almost certainly an error. In general, there is one official version of the law; other versions are a convenience. The official version normally defaults to the individual laws passed by the legislature (which are organized by date, not by anything useful for finding relevant laws), but that can be changed by statute. In this case, the Revised Statutes contains section 3990, which says in so far as there may be any conflict between the provisions of this act and any provision of the said Revised Civil Code and Code of Practice, that said Code shall be held and taken as the law governing So, the Civil Code took precedence. Your revisions of 1876 and 1882 were not successor laws; rather, they were compilations of the Revised Statutes and Civil Code of 1870 with the amendments to those that had since been passed. The Revised Statutes from 1876 were really the Revised Statutes of 1870, modified by later laws (that didn't touch the divorce provisions). Likewise, the Civil Code from 1882 was really the Revised Civil Code of 1870, modified by later laws. The Civil Code of 1870 still took precedence over the Revised Statutes of 1870, so the divorce provisions of the Civil Code were authoritative.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	Laws criminalizing perjury are not about being mistaken or less believable in your testimony. The crime is, very narrowly, stating something which you do not believe to be true, while under oath. If you make a statement that happens to be untrue but you believe it is true (you are mistaken), that is not perjury. In the US, moreover, you have to assert something literally untrue, not simply say something that could be interpreted as being untrue. Rental arbitration hearings are nothing special, except that witnesses may or may not be sworn under the particular state's laws. If a witness is sworn and unambiguously asserts "Jones gave Smith $1,000 at that time", and another sworn witness asserts "Jones did not give Smith any money at that time", that might suggest that one witness testified as to something that they did not believe to be true. It might also show that they were standing in different places. Even if the circumstances show that the two witnesses observed the same facts, you would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one party knew at the time that their statement was false. It is also possible that one witness made mis-remembered or misinterpreted what they saw. They might say or write something else (under oath, or elsewhere) that establishes that they knew better. An example is US v. DeZarn, which clearly established that the defendant could not have believed the statement that he testified to. With no official record of what a party testified to, it may not possible to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a party committed perjury, since it can be reasonable to doubt claims of what he actually testified to. The defendant's attorney may, however, have to create such a doubt. Some answers could be perjurous if the question and answer are short enough, for example "Did you cash the check?" "No", if witnesses to the hearing testify convincingly that this exchange took place.	I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.	The explanation in the decision (fn 1) is that That announcement does not moot this case. We have said that such voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not moot a case unless “subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” [citations] The Department has not carried the “heavy burden” of making “absolutely clear” that it could not revert to its policy of excluding religious organizations... “there is no clearly effective barrier that would prevent the [Department] from reinstating [its] policy in the future”	Your question (when read with your follow-up comments) is somewhat complex, so I am going to make a few assumptions and break it down into several sub parts. Assumptions The conviction occurred in a state where the expungement statute allows you to tell employers that you were never arrested and convicted. When you say “public records websites” you’re asking about sites like atlaspublicrecords.com. That atlaspublicrecords.com is a US based company. They don’t list an address and the website used a private registration services, so can’t easily determine that they are US-based. Your questions and follow-up Considerations After I get it expunged, will it be removed from public records websites . . . . No. Websites like atlaspublicrecords.com do not link to actual public records. I searched a couple of common names and feel safe in assuming that it only collects and publishes the information—it does not actually link to court records. Nevertheless, it would not be available from the actual government agencies that keep those records. By getting your records expunged the convictions and arrest would no longer be available as public records that someone could request from the courthouse, police department, or whatever state agency does criminal history in your jurisdiction. do I have to show them proof of the expungement . . . . Yes, if you believe what the website claims. I can’t find a physical address for the website and don’t know if they are real or a scam, so understand that when you give them information about your expungement—or pay their silly fee, they might collect the money and do nothing. My opinion is that the company is shady and seems to operate in a gray area of the law that I will explain below. Options if they don’t remove the post: You could try to sue them for some type of secondary dignitary tort like defamation or false light. But these would have some significant legal hurdles. See G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that commenting on an expunged criminal records was not defamation or invasion of privacy because it was the truth. You could try to argue that they are a consumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). If they're governed by the FCRA, you have some additional legal remedies (like civil penalties/fines) if they don't remove/clarify an expunged record. The Fair Credit Reporting Act applies to credit reporting agencies, like Experian & Equifax but also covers companies that compile and sell information for background checks. This includes criminal records. See the Federal Trade Commission’s Advisory Opinion to LeBlanc (06-09-98). But . . . this website is operating in a gray area that appears to comply with the law. The FCRA only applies to consumer reporting agencies, which are defined as: Any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) Because they’re not charging money or a fee to access the reports and they’re not a nonprofit cooperative, they probably do not meet the definition of a CRA. Bottom-line is that you're best option is to give them the expungement documents once you obtain them.
Is this an infringement of their patent? This company has a patent for a bath flower. However, on Amazon I noticed that there are other sellers selling something similar, but with 5 or 7 petals, not 4 petals. Are they infringing on the patent? Or is it perfectly legal to sell a product with a modified design?	The patent number is D817,662. The D at the beginning of the number indicates it is a design patent, which only covers the appearance of the patent. Others are free to make products with the same function as long as the appearance is different enough. If the patent number was all digits, it would indicate a utility patent. Utility patents prevent others from making products with the features described in the claims section of the patent. The claims may concern the function of the product, or the method of manufacture of the product.	THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not.	The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.	In the Netherlands, this qualifies as a deceptive trade practice (misleidende handelspraktijk) and is therefore directly illegal. It's likely also an unfair trade practice, (oneerlijke handelspraktijk) as the claim appears intended for end consumers. This means that the seller cannot count on the consumer knowing anythong about stuffase. It is a dutch implementation of EU directive 2005/29/EG, so similar laws apply in other EU countries. But the illegal per se part might vary.	There is something called the exhaustion doctrine that says that once the holder of a patent sells a patented device, they have relinquished control over that particular instance of the patent implementation. Anyone who legally purchases this hardware has the right to run whatever software they want on it, as long the software is otherwise legal (software designed to defeat DRM would be an example of software that is is not legal).	In the abstract, two businesses that cooperate in violating a third party's copyright could both face liability. Applying that information to the facts you gave would amount to legal counsel. If you don't want to tell the client 'no,' you should speak to a lawyer about your potential liability. Beyond the legalities, do you really want your portfolio to advertise that you design sites by ripping other sites off?	There seems, to my ear, to be a degree of similarity between the first two works. The third does not sound, to me, very similar to either of the first two. That is not a legal question, and I am no expert. However, all of these seem to be simple themes of only a few notes, repeated, in one case with some variations. The history of music is replete with examples of short themes or figures duplicated without intentional copying. Generally, to win a copyright suit over a claimed infringement of a musical copyright one must show either proven direct copying, or identity of melody over a long enough passage that independent invention is not plausible. Normally access of the alleged infringer to the claimed source is also shown. How much identity is needed is a judgement call for the court involved, often based on expert testimony, but I rather doubt if the short themes linked in the question would be found to infringe one another. In any case, even if identity is proved, it is possible that both are copying some earlier source, perhaps one in the public domain, or one properly licensed. It is also possible that one of thee has obtained a license from another and so is perfectly legal. There is no way to know without the records of those involved.	I would refer you to I Received a Letter/Email. . . from the USPTO website. Generally though you should be careful about using another company's trademark as part of your product's name. A less risky option would be to name your product Shareaholic and then in the subtitle or description write for use with Pinterest. The point of trademarks is to prevent consumers from confusing the source or sponsorship of a product or service. If you were in court, the central question would become "would a consumer reasonably be confused whether Shareaholic for Pinterest was made by or approved by Pinterest?" And you have to remember, most consumers don't read small print such as "not affiliated with Pinterest". Lots of visitors to Pinterest and by extension users of your software may be children or elderly and computer-illiterate. You may also want to read "How do I know whether I'm infringing" at the USPTO website.

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