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3A1831641151.jsonld | ['Chapter 31 Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute'] | ["At least since 1750 when Baron de Montesquieu declared “peace is the natural effect of trade,” a number of economists and political scientists espoused the notion that trade among nations leads to peace. Employing resources more efficiently to produce some commodities rather than others is the foundation for comparative advantage. Specialization based on comparative advantage leads to gains from trade. If political conflict leads to a diminution of trade, then at least a portion of the costs of conflict can be measured by a nation's lost gains from trade. The greater two nations' gains from trade the more costly is bilateral (dyadic) conflict. This notion forms the basis of Baron de Montesquieu's assertion regarding dyadic dispute. This chapter develops an analytical framework showing that higher gains from trade between two trading partners (dyads) lowers the level of conflict between them. It describes data necessary to test this hypothesis, and it outlines current developments and extensions taking place in the resulting trade–conflict literature. Cross-sectional evidence using various data on political interactions confirms that trading nations cooperate more and fight less. A doubling of trade leads to a 20% diminution of belligerence. This result is robust under various specifications, and it is upheld when adjusting for causality using cross-section and time-series techniques. Further, the impact of trade is strengthened when bilateral import demand elasticities are incorporated to better measure gains from trade. Because democratic dyads trade more than non-democratic dyads, democracies cooperate with each other relatively more, thereby explaining the “democratic peace” that democracies rarely fight each other. The chapter then goes on to examine further extensions of the trade–conflict model regarding specific commodity trade, foreign direct investment, tariffs, foreign aid, country contiguity, and multilateral interactions."] | ['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641151'] | ['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 31 Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute']
### Abstract:
["At least since 1750 when Baron de Montesquieu declared “peace is the natural effect of trade,” a number of economists and political scientists espoused the notion that trade among nations leads to peace. Employing resources more efficiently to produce some commodities rather than others is the foundation for comparative advantage. Specialization based on comparative advantage leads to gains from trade. If political conflict leads to a diminution of trade, then at least a portion of the costs of conflict can be measured by a nation's lost gains from trade. The greater two nations' gains from trade the more costly is bilateral (dyadic) conflict. This notion forms the basis of Baron de Montesquieu's assertion regarding dyadic dispute. This chapter develops an analytical framework showing that higher gains from trade between two trading partners (dyads) lowers the level of conflict between them. It describes data necessary to test this hypothesis, and it outlines current developments and extensions taking place in the resulting trade–conflict literature. Cross-sectional evidence using various data on political interactions confirms that trading nations cooperate more and fight less. A doubling of trade leads to a 20% diminution of belligerence. This result is robust under various specifications, and it is upheld when adjusting for causality using cross-section and time-series techniques. Further, the impact of trade is strengthened when bilateral import demand elasticities are incorporated to better measure gains from trade. Because democratic dyads trade more than non-democratic dyads, democracies cooperate with each other relatively more, thereby explaining the “democratic peace” that democracies rarely fight each other. The chapter then goes on to examine further extensions of the trade–conflict model regarding specific commodity trade, foreign direct investment, tariffs, foreign aid, country contiguity, and multilateral interactions."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641151']
### GND class:
['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641178.jsonld | ['Chapter 29 Arms Trade and Arms Races: A Strategic Analysis'] | ["In this chapter we present the main characteristics and problems involved in the study of the arms trade: product definition and data, strategic aspects of the arms trade and regulation. We illustrate these aspects using the latest theoretical and empirical literature on arms trade. The papers reviewed illustrate the complexity involved in studying the arms trade. The nature of the exporters interaction in setting export controls and export policies raises the benefits of coordination in both export control and industrial policies. A failure to coordinate in one of these two policies tends to increase the incentives to deviate from an agreement to coordinate in the other policy, therefore, highlighting the importance of a unified approach to arms trade regulation. Issues such as differences in the security perceptions of exporters, the home bias and the characteristics of the competition between exporter firms may all make the implementation of export controls ever more challenging. Interestingly, although uncertainty will generally make matters worse, it may not if it decreases the effort that exporter firms put into producing higher quality weapons. We argue that supply side regulation will not be enough to prevent arms proliferation among initially non-producer countries, even if supply side controls may have a positive impact on the importers' welfare. In addition, we present a model of the arms trade which encompasses many of the strategic aspects of the problem. The model is mainly based on works by [Levine, P., Smith, R.P. (1995). “The arms trade and arms control”. The Economic Journal 105, 471–484; Levine, P., Smith, R.P. (1997a). “The arms trade”. Economic Policy, 337–370. October] and [Dunne, P., García-Alonso, M.D.C., Levine, P., Smith, R.P. (2005). “Military procurement, industry structure and regional conflict”. Discussion Paper 0502, University of Kent]. It describes the process by which optimization by buyers and sellers within a particular supply regime will result in the determination of prices and quantities. Then the collective action problems suppliers face in establishing an arms export control regime are discussed. Finally, we generalize the model to allow for an endogenous number of firms producing distinct military technologies. We use this model to examine the determinants of market structure in the military sector and how this is affected by globalization in the form of an increasing willingness of governments in arms producing countries to import arms."] | ['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641178'] | ['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 29 Arms Trade and Arms Races: A Strategic Analysis']
### Abstract:
["In this chapter we present the main characteristics and problems involved in the study of the arms trade: product definition and data, strategic aspects of the arms trade and regulation. We illustrate these aspects using the latest theoretical and empirical literature on arms trade. The papers reviewed illustrate the complexity involved in studying the arms trade. The nature of the exporters interaction in setting export controls and export policies raises the benefits of coordination in both export control and industrial policies. A failure to coordinate in one of these two policies tends to increase the incentives to deviate from an agreement to coordinate in the other policy, therefore, highlighting the importance of a unified approach to arms trade regulation. Issues such as differences in the security perceptions of exporters, the home bias and the characteristics of the competition between exporter firms may all make the implementation of export controls ever more challenging. Interestingly, although uncertainty will generally make matters worse, it may not if it decreases the effort that exporter firms put into producing higher quality weapons. We argue that supply side regulation will not be enough to prevent arms proliferation among initially non-producer countries, even if supply side controls may have a positive impact on the importers' welfare. In addition, we present a model of the arms trade which encompasses many of the strategic aspects of the problem. The model is mainly based on works by [Levine, P., Smith, R.P. (1995). “The arms trade and arms control”. The Economic Journal 105, 471–484; Levine, P., Smith, R.P. (1997a). “The arms trade”. Economic Policy, 337–370. October] and [Dunne, P., García-Alonso, M.D.C., Levine, P., Smith, R.P. (2005). “Military procurement, industry structure and regional conflict”. Discussion Paper 0502, University of Kent]. It describes the process by which optimization by buyers and sellers within a particular supply regime will result in the determination of prices and quantities. Then the collective action problems suppliers face in establishing an arms export control regime are discussed. Finally, we generalize the model to allow for an endogenous number of firms producing distinct military technologies. We use this model to examine the determinants of market structure in the military sector and how this is affected by globalization in the form of an increasing willingness of governments in arms producing countries to import arms."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641178']
### GND class:
['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641208.jsonld | ['Chapter 26 Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis'] | ["The chapter surveys the empirical literature concerning the measurement of terrorism, effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, the economic consequences of terrorism, and the economic causes of terrorism. In Section 2, terrorist incidents are grouped according to incident type, victim, and location. It is shown that terrorism began a steady decline in all regions (except for Eurasia) during the early to mid-1990s. However, the severity of the typical incident has been increasing over time. Also, several different data sets are compared in order to judge the reliability of alternative methods of obtaining and coding the data. Section 3 discusses a number of empirical studies that measure the effects of counterterrorism policies on the overall level of terrorism and on the various subcomponents of the overall series. In accord with the rational-actor model, an increase in the “relative price” of one type of terrorist activity induces a substitution out of that activity and into the now relatively less-expensive activity. Logistically similar activities display the greatest substitution possibilities. Moreover, periods of high-terrorism seem to be less persistent than periods with less terrorism. This is consistent with the notion that terrorists face a resource constraint. Section 4 pays special attention to the changes in terrorism due to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the resulting changes in counterterrorism policy. It is shown that the post-9/11 counterterrorism policies hampered al-Qaida's ability to direct logistically complex operations such as assassinations and hostage takings. The main influence of 9/11 has been on the composition, and not the overall level of terrorism. There has been a ratcheting-up of serious terrorist attacks against the US targets so that Americans are safer at home, but not abroad, following 9/11 and the enhanced homeland security. Section 5 surveys a number of empirical papers that attempt to estimate the macroeconomic and microeconomic costs of terrorism. Papers surveyed in the first part of the section indicate that the overall macroeconomic costs of terrorism are low. However, it is argued that the methodological complexities of estimating the macroeconomic costs of terrorism on a cross-section of widely disparate nations are nearly insurmountable. The macroeconomic costs of terrorism are best measured on a country-by-country basis. The second part of the section summarizes empirical studies of the microeconomic costs of terrorism on tourism, net foreign direct investment, international trade flows, and financial markets in selected countries. Section 6 considers the economic determinants of terrorism. Particular attention is paid to the common presumption that terrorism is caused by a lack of economic opportunities. Conclusions and directions for future research are contained in Section 7."] | ['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641208'] | ['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 26 Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis']
### Abstract:
["The chapter surveys the empirical literature concerning the measurement of terrorism, effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, the economic consequences of terrorism, and the economic causes of terrorism. In Section 2, terrorist incidents are grouped according to incident type, victim, and location. It is shown that terrorism began a steady decline in all regions (except for Eurasia) during the early to mid-1990s. However, the severity of the typical incident has been increasing over time. Also, several different data sets are compared in order to judge the reliability of alternative methods of obtaining and coding the data. Section 3 discusses a number of empirical studies that measure the effects of counterterrorism policies on the overall level of terrorism and on the various subcomponents of the overall series. In accord with the rational-actor model, an increase in the “relative price” of one type of terrorist activity induces a substitution out of that activity and into the now relatively less-expensive activity. Logistically similar activities display the greatest substitution possibilities. Moreover, periods of high-terrorism seem to be less persistent than periods with less terrorism. This is consistent with the notion that terrorists face a resource constraint. Section 4 pays special attention to the changes in terrorism due to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the resulting changes in counterterrorism policy. It is shown that the post-9/11 counterterrorism policies hampered al-Qaida's ability to direct logistically complex operations such as assassinations and hostage takings. The main influence of 9/11 has been on the composition, and not the overall level of terrorism. There has been a ratcheting-up of serious terrorist attacks against the US targets so that Americans are safer at home, but not abroad, following 9/11 and the enhanced homeland security. Section 5 surveys a number of empirical papers that attempt to estimate the macroeconomic and microeconomic costs of terrorism. Papers surveyed in the first part of the section indicate that the overall macroeconomic costs of terrorism are low. However, it is argued that the methodological complexities of estimating the macroeconomic costs of terrorism on a cross-section of widely disparate nations are nearly insurmountable. The macroeconomic costs of terrorism are best measured on a country-by-country basis. The second part of the section summarizes empirical studies of the microeconomic costs of terrorism on tourism, net foreign direct investment, international trade flows, and financial markets in selected countries. Section 6 considers the economic determinants of terrorism. Particular attention is paid to the common presumption that terrorism is caused by a lack of economic opportunities. Conclusions and directions for future research are contained in Section 7."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641208']
### GND class:
['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641240.jsonld | ['Chapter 22 Economics of Conflict: An Overview'] | ["In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conflict and appropriation. Allowing for the possibility of conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced, represents a significant departure from the traditional paradigm of economics. The research we emphasize, however, takes an economic perspective. Specifically, it applies conventional optimization techniques and game-theoretic tools to study the allocation of resources among competing activities – productive and otherwise appropriative, such as grabbing the product and wealth of others as well as defending one's own product and wealth. In contrast to other economic activities in which inputs are combined cooperatively through production functions, the inputs to appropriation are combined adversarially through technologies of conflict. A central objective of this research is to identify the effects of conflict on economic outcomes: the determinants of the distribution of output (or power) and how an individual party's share can be inversely related to its marginal productivity; when settlement in the shadow of conflict and when open conflict can be expected to occur, with longer time horizons capable of inducing conflict instead of settlement; how conflict and appropriation can reduce the appeal of trade; the determinants of alliance formation and the importance of intra-alliance commitments; how dynamic incentives for capital accumulation and innovation are distorted in the presence of conflict; and the role of governance in conflict management."] | ['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641240'] | ['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 22 Economics of Conflict: An Overview']
### Abstract:
["In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conflict and appropriation. Allowing for the possibility of conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced, represents a significant departure from the traditional paradigm of economics. The research we emphasize, however, takes an economic perspective. Specifically, it applies conventional optimization techniques and game-theoretic tools to study the allocation of resources among competing activities – productive and otherwise appropriative, such as grabbing the product and wealth of others as well as defending one's own product and wealth. In contrast to other economic activities in which inputs are combined cooperatively through production functions, the inputs to appropriation are combined adversarially through technologies of conflict. A central objective of this research is to identify the effects of conflict on economic outcomes: the determinants of the distribution of output (or power) and how an individual party's share can be inversely related to its marginal productivity; when settlement in the shadow of conflict and when open conflict can be expected to occur, with longer time horizons capable of inducing conflict instead of settlement; how conflict and appropriation can reduce the appeal of trade; the determinants of alliance formation and the importance of intra-alliance commitments; how dynamic incentives for capital accumulation and innovation are distorted in the presence of conflict; and the role of governance in conflict management."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641240']
### GND class:
['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641259.jsonld | ['Chapter 21 Economics of Defense in a Globalized World'] | ["In a world continuously beset by conflict and violence, the positive study of international security and defense has developed rapidly over the past decade as a cohesive discipline within economics. Part of the cause for this trend is the revolutionary effects of globalization and its new challenges to world security and stability. The challenges to security now come from new sources; they threaten new dangers, and require new instruments and concepts from us. The field of play for defense economics has thus greatly increased, but the opportunity to exploit new insights from throughout economics grown accordingly. This essay aspires to show how the recent developments in models of international political economy relate to study of this phenomenal evolution of the world's strategic situation and challenges to its safety. Here I give one perspective on the contributions expected of defense economics in a globalized world where old patterns of thinking risk obsolescence. Emphasis is focused on (a) how the field is changing, and the relation between new security challenges and required new analytic approaches, (b) how developing ideas about conflict, predation and governance have entered into and greatly influenced defense economics, and (c) how this raises questions over what should be retained from study of earlier eras and what discarded."] | ['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641259'] | ['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 21 Economics of Defense in a Globalized World']
### Abstract:
["In a world continuously beset by conflict and violence, the positive study of international security and defense has developed rapidly over the past decade as a cohesive discipline within economics. Part of the cause for this trend is the revolutionary effects of globalization and its new challenges to world security and stability. The challenges to security now come from new sources; they threaten new dangers, and require new instruments and concepts from us. The field of play for defense economics has thus greatly increased, but the opportunity to exploit new insights from throughout economics grown accordingly. This essay aspires to show how the recent developments in models of international political economy relate to study of this phenomenal evolution of the world's strategic situation and challenges to its safety. Here I give one perspective on the contributions expected of defense economics in a globalized world where old patterns of thinking risk obsolescence. Emphasis is focused on (a) how the field is changing, and the relation between new security challenges and required new analytic approaches, (b) how developing ideas about conflict, predation and governance have entered into and greatly influenced defense economics, and (c) how this raises questions over what should be retained from study of earlier eras and what discarded."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641259']
### GND class:
['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641267.jsonld | ['Chapter 20 Defense in a Globalized World: An Introduction'] | ['Since the end of the Cold War, the world remains a dangerous place with new threats: regional conflicts, transnational terrorist networks, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear). The second volume of the Handbook of Defense Economics addresses defense needs, practices, threats, agents, and policies in the modern era of globalization. This new era involves novel technologies, new business practices, and enhanced cross-border flows. Such ever-growing flows mean that military armaments and armies are less equipped to keep out unwanted intruders. This introductory chapter sets the stage for this volume in three ways. First, the chapter identifies how threats have changed since the Cold War. For example, the end of the superpower arms race has brought forth new issues, such as the quelling of local conflicts, the role of economic sanctions, and the challenge of asymmetric warfare. There are also new concerns about military manpower and the role of reservists and civilian contractors during a time when most countries have downsized their forces. Second, the chapter indicates the choice of topics and how these topics differ from those in Volume 1. In particular, we selected chapters on topics not covered in Volume 1 (e.g., civil wars, peacekeeping, trade and peace, and economic sanctions); chapters on past topics where there has been significant advances in knowledge (e.g., conflict, terrorism, arms races, and military manpower); and chapters on topics that reflects the influence of globalization and new threats (e.g., terrorism, trade and peace, and arms industries). Third, the chapter provides a brief overview of each chapter in the volume.'] | ['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641267'] | ['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 20 Defense in a Globalized World: An Introduction']
### Abstract:
['Since the end of the Cold War, the world remains a dangerous place with new threats: regional conflicts, transnational terrorist networks, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear). The second volume of the Handbook of Defense Economics addresses defense needs, practices, threats, agents, and policies in the modern era of globalization. This new era involves novel technologies, new business practices, and enhanced cross-border flows. Such ever-growing flows mean that military armaments and armies are less equipped to keep out unwanted intruders. This introductory chapter sets the stage for this volume in three ways. First, the chapter identifies how threats have changed since the Cold War. For example, the end of the superpower arms race has brought forth new issues, such as the quelling of local conflicts, the role of economic sanctions, and the challenge of asymmetric warfare. There are also new concerns about military manpower and the role of reservists and civilian contractors during a time when most countries have downsized their forces. Second, the chapter indicates the choice of topics and how these topics differ from those in Volume 1. In particular, we selected chapters on topics not covered in Volume 1 (e.g., civil wars, peacekeeping, trade and peace, and economic sanctions); chapters on past topics where there has been significant advances in knowledge (e.g., conflict, terrorism, arms races, and military manpower); and chapters on topics that reflects the influence of globalization and new threats (e.g., terrorism, trade and peace, and arms industries). Third, the chapter provides a brief overview of each chapter in the volume.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4063255-6', 'gnd:4065004-2', 'gnd:4115806-4', 'gnd:4132793-7', 'gnd:4134037-1', 'gnd:4134192-2', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641267']
### GND class:
['Militärausgaben', 'Militärpolitik', 'Rüstungsindustrie', 'Militärökonomie', 'Kriegswirtschaft', 'Rüstungswirtschaft']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641275.jsonld | ['Subject index'] | ['This chapter highlights the terms and methods that are not generally known but have been used and explained in this publication. The chapter also highlights the page numbers where these have been used.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641275'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Subject index']
### Abstract:
['This chapter highlights the terms and methods that are not generally known but have been used and explained in this publication. The chapter also highlights the page numbers where these have been used.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641275']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641291.jsonld | ['Chapter 19 The economics of disarmament'] | ['The economics of disarmament is a new discipline. It involves analyses on the economic causes of the arms race, the definitions of disarmament and the economic determinants and military expenditure. Simultaneously, disarmament is considered as an obstacle to economic development, a peace dividend or an investment. The construction of economic models of disarmament produces some controversial results. Questions arise concerning the economic effects of a reduction in military expenditure on growth, employment, inflation, budget deficits, the costs of conversion or the dual use of military products, capital capacity and R&D. Long term disarmament needs a development process and an adequate public policy.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641291'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 19 The economics of disarmament']
### Abstract:
['The economics of disarmament is a new discipline. It involves analyses on the economic causes of the arms race, the definitions of disarmament and the economic determinants and military expenditure. Simultaneously, disarmament is considered as an obstacle to economic development, a peace dividend or an investment. The construction of economic models of disarmament produces some controversial results. Questions arise concerning the economic effects of a reduction in military expenditure on growth, employment, inflation, budget deficits, the costs of conversion or the dual use of military products, capital capacity and R&D. Long term disarmament needs a development process and an adequate public policy.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641291']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641305.jsonld | ['Chapter 18 Economics of arms trade'] | ['The end of the Cold War has increased the relative importance of economic causes and consequences of arms transfers. Unfortunately, there is surprisingly little theoretical and empirical development of the economics of arms trade, making it a sub-field of defense economics ripe for foundational contributions. We offer some preliminary steps in this direction by applying simple international trade models to the arms trade. Fields other than economics have made major contributions to our understanding of arms transfers. We review the sub-literature on arms transfers and foreign policy leverage as well as the sub-literature on the relationship between arms trade and war. The central problem of the arms trade literature, for both economists and geopolitical scientists, is how to go beyond the proliferation of (albeit useful) policy position articles, to a more solid base of theoretical and empirical models. A new theoretical synthesis of economics and geopolitics would represent a major breakthrough, but the development of the economics of arms trade must move beyond its incipient stages for this synthesis to occur. Ultimately, it would be desirable to see theoretical and empirical work on the arms trade, narrow the range of outcomes which are regarded as plausible.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641305'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 18 Economics of arms trade']
### Abstract:
['The end of the Cold War has increased the relative importance of economic causes and consequences of arms transfers. Unfortunately, there is surprisingly little theoretical and empirical development of the economics of arms trade, making it a sub-field of defense economics ripe for foundational contributions. We offer some preliminary steps in this direction by applying simple international trade models to the arms trade. Fields other than economics have made major contributions to our understanding of arms transfers. We review the sub-literature on arms transfers and foreign policy leverage as well as the sub-literature on the relationship between arms trade and war. The central problem of the arms trade literature, for both economists and geopolitical scientists, is how to go beyond the proliferation of (albeit useful) policy position articles, to a more solid base of theoretical and empirical models. A new theoretical synthesis of economics and geopolitics would represent a major breakthrough, but the development of the economics of arms trade must move beyond its incipient stages for this synthesis to occur. Ultimately, it would be desirable to see theoretical and empirical work on the arms trade, narrow the range of outcomes which are regarded as plausible.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641305']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641313.jsonld | ['Chapter 17 The regional impact of defense expenditure'] | ['This chapter examines the current state of knowledge regarding the economic impact of defense expenditure at the level of the regional economy from a global perspective. Appropriate theoretical and analytical approaches are identified and selected case studies reviewed. The regional concentration of defense expenditure is explored using a variety of indicators and perceived differences in the economic impact of defense industry decline and military base contraction and closure are evaluated. The chapter considers relevant labor market issues and examines the different impacts to be expected in developing countries. Policy implications are explored in the context of the post-Cold War environment confronting the defense sector.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641313'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 17 The regional impact of defense expenditure']
### Abstract:
['This chapter examines the current state of knowledge regarding the economic impact of defense expenditure at the level of the regional economy from a global perspective. Appropriate theoretical and analytical approaches are identified and selected case studies reviewed. The regional concentration of defense expenditure is explored using a variety of indicators and perceived differences in the economic impact of defense industry decline and military base contraction and closure are evaluated. The chapter considers relevant labor market issues and examines the different impacts to be expected in developing countries. Policy implications are explored in the context of the post-Cold War environment confronting the defense sector.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641313']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641364.jsonld | ['Chapter 13 The economics of military manpower'] | ['The USA and other countries spend a significant portion of their defense budgets on personnel. Effective management of military forces requires an understanding of the economics of military manpower. Over the past three decades economists have produced a substantial body of research about the subject. This chapter distills this literature for a general audience. Topics surveyed include the supply of personnel, personnel productivity and the demand for personnel, procurement by conscription versus voluntary means, the structure of pay, the use of women and reservists, and the civilian return to military training and experience. It also points to directions for future research.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641364'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 13 The economics of military manpower']
### Abstract:
['The USA and other countries spend a significant portion of their defense budgets on personnel. Effective management of military forces requires an understanding of the economics of military manpower. Over the past three decades economists have produced a substantial body of research about the subject. This chapter distills this literature for a general audience. Topics surveyed include the supply of personnel, personnel productivity and the demand for personnel, procurement by conscription versus voluntary means, the structure of pay, the use of women and reservists, and the civilian return to military training and experience. It also points to directions for future research.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641364']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641399.jsonld | ['Chapter 10 Defense expenditure and economic growth'] | ["This chapter reviews the empirical research on the relation between defense spending and economic growth. A broad flavor of the approaches adopted by different scholars is provided through a list of selected studies on the topic since 1973 and an outline of the variations over Benoit's original work that have been explored in the literature. A discussion of three major methodological issues is then undertaken. The following section summarizes the main substantive results reported in various studies, and another section contains some thoughts on the future research on the subject. The chapter ends with a few concluding and summarizing observations."] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641399'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 10 Defense expenditure and economic growth']
### Abstract:
["This chapter reviews the empirical research on the relation between defense spending and economic growth. A broad flavor of the approaches adopted by different scholars is provided through a list of selected studies on the topic since 1973 and an outline of the variations over Benoit's original work that have been explored in the literature. A discussion of three major methodological issues is then undertaken. The following section summarizes the main substantive results reported in various studies, and another section contains some thoughts on the future research on the subject. The chapter ends with a few concluding and summarizing observations."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641399']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641402.jsonld | ['Chapter 9 Terrorism: Theory and applications'] | ['This chapter reviews game-theoretic and choice-theoretic depictions of terrorist behavior. A simple game-theoretic framework is presented to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. In another game model, we analyze whether two governments (nations) that are targeted by the same terrorist group would overdeter or underdeter terrorist attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate that piecemeal policy, which allows the governments to share intelligence but not deterrence decisions, can be worse than no coordination. Choice-theoretic models identify substitution and complementarity possibilities among diverse modes of terrorist attacks as terrorists respond optimally to government actions. A host of time-series techniques are used to study the effectiveness of alternative antiterrorism policies. Vector-autoregression intervention procedures are particularly suited. Time-series analyses are also used to identify cycles, trends, and irregular components for forecasting purposes.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641402'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 9 Terrorism: Theory and applications']
### Abstract:
['This chapter reviews game-theoretic and choice-theoretic depictions of terrorist behavior. A simple game-theoretic framework is presented to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. In another game model, we analyze whether two governments (nations) that are targeted by the same terrorist group would overdeter or underdeter terrorist attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate that piecemeal policy, which allows the governments to share intelligence but not deterrence decisions, can be worse than no coordination. Choice-theoretic models identify substitution and complementarity possibilities among diverse modes of terrorist attacks as terrorists respond optimally to government actions. A host of time-series techniques are used to study the effectiveness of alternative antiterrorism policies. Vector-autoregression intervention procedures are particularly suited. Time-series analyses are also used to identify cycles, trends, and irregular components for forecasting purposes.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641402']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641410.jsonld | ['Chapter 8 Insurrections'] | ['This essay develops an economic theory of insurrections. The decision-making agents in this theory are an incumbent ruler, a potential leader of an insurrection, and a large number of peasant or worker families. The essay distinguishes insurrections that attempt only to appropriate current income from revolutions, which are insurrections that attempt to effect permanent change in the distribution of income through the appropriation of sovereign power. The analysis shows how the technology of insurrection, together with a discount factor, determines whether there is an insurrection, the allocation of resources among productive activities, soldiering, and insurgency, and the probable outcome of an insurrection.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641410'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 8 Insurrections']
### Abstract:
['This essay develops an economic theory of insurrections. The decision-making agents in this theory are an incumbent ruler, a potential leader of an insurrection, and a large number of peasant or worker families. The essay distinguishes insurrections that attempt only to appropriate current income from revolutions, which are insurrections that attempt to effect permanent change in the distribution of income through the appropriation of sovereign power. The analysis shows how the technology of insurrection, together with a discount factor, determines whether there is an insurrection, the allocation of resources among productive activities, soldiering, and insurgency, and the probable outcome of an insurrection.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641410']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641429.jsonld | ['Chapter 7 Theorizing about conflict'] | ['The category of conflict encompasses not only war but also crime, litigation, strikes and lockouts, and redistributive politics. Exchange theory and conflict theory constitute two coequal branches of economic analysis, the first based upon contract and mutual gain, the second upon contest for asymmetric advantage. A number of the analytic options for modelling conflict are reviewed. Preferences, opportunities, and perceptions are shown to determine the choice between conflict and settlement. The technology of conflict as an economic activity is surveyed. Two illustrative models are presented, the first involving actual fighting and the other armed peace.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641429'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 7 Theorizing about conflict']
### Abstract:
['The category of conflict encompasses not only war but also crime, litigation, strikes and lockouts, and redistributive politics. Exchange theory and conflict theory constitute two coequal branches of economic analysis, the first based upon contract and mutual gain, the second upon contest for asymmetric advantage. A number of the analytic options for modelling conflict are reviewed. Preferences, opportunities, and perceptions are shown to determine the choice between conflict and settlement. The technology of conflict as an economic activity is surveyed. Two illustrative models are presented, the first involving actual fighting and the other armed peace.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641429']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641437.jsonld | ['Chapter 6 Arms races and proliferation'] | ['Previous analyses of arms races and proliferation are integrated and extended, building from a treatment of the behavioral foundations of weapons acquisitions to a general theory of arms races, with implications for the role of negotiations, the balance of power, the timing of crises, and nuclear proliferation. Recent developments in economic theory are also applied here to the problems of the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and the outbreak of war, yielding a deeper treatment of these phenomena by directly or indirectly treating asymmetric information in bargaining, repeated games that involve threats, and principal-agent problems in decisions on technology and weapons accumulation.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641437'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 6 Arms races and proliferation']
### Abstract:
['Previous analyses of arms races and proliferation are integrated and extended, building from a treatment of the behavioral foundations of weapons acquisitions to a general theory of arms races, with implications for the role of negotiations, the balance of power, the timing of crises, and nuclear proliferation. Recent developments in economic theory are also applied here to the problems of the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and the outbreak of war, yielding a deeper treatment of these phenomena by directly or indirectly treating asymmetric information in bargaining, repeated games that involve threats, and principal-agent problems in decisions on technology and weapons accumulation.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641437']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641445.jsonld | ['Chapter 5 Military alliances: Theory and empirics'] | ['This chapter provides an overview of the main theoretical and empirical findings in the economics of military alliances. The pure public and joint product models are presented along with the empirical methods used to test them. Issues concerning burden sharing and strategic doctrine in the NATO alliance are discussed. Comparisons between the Nash and Lindahl allocation processes are made by presenting the empirical work that has attempted to distinguish between them. Attention is also given to the median-voter model and to alternative technologies of public good supply.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641445'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 5 Military alliances: Theory and empirics']
### Abstract:
['This chapter provides an overview of the main theoretical and empirical findings in the economics of military alliances. The pure public and joint product models are presented along with the empirical methods used to test them. Issues concerning burden sharing and strategic doctrine in the NATO alliance are discussed. Comparisons between the Nash and Lindahl allocation processes are made by presenting the empirical work that has attempted to distinguish between them. Attention is also given to the median-voter model and to alternative technologies of public good supply.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641445']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641461.jsonld | ['Chapter 3 World military expenditures'] | ['Military expenditure is difficult to define. Major issues are functional versus institutional approaches to defense, indirect and intangible costs and benefits and current versus comprehensive accounting. Authoritative institutions have adopted standard definitions but national governments are free to use their own definitions. Specific inflation pressures complicate the creation of real time series of military expenditures. International comparisons are influenced by the choice of exchange rates. For some countries, no credible data are available. Data series on military expenditures and arms transfers must be used with caution as the publishing institutions have only limited resources to deal with the numerous conceptual and practical problems.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641461'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 3 World military expenditures']
### Abstract:
['Military expenditure is difficult to define. Major issues are functional versus institutional approaches to defense, indirect and intangible costs and benefits and current versus comprehensive accounting. Authoritative institutions have adopted standard definitions but national governments are free to use their own definitions. Specific inflation pressures complicate the creation of real time series of military expenditures. International comparisons are influenced by the choice of exchange rates. For some countries, no credible data are available. Data series on military expenditures and arms transfers must be used with caution as the publishing institutions have only limited resources to deal with the numerous conceptual and practical problems.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641461']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A183164147X.jsonld | ['Chapter 2 Defense economics and international security'] | ["Defense economics derives from and is embedded in the multi-dimensional array of issues each country must address when providing for its national security. Applying economic concepts and methods, it attempts to evaluate this great diversity of security related questions, and to understand how each country's security interacts and fits in with the security of all nations in the international system. Included in Defense Economics are such overarching questions as: definition of what security actually is; how resource scarcity, distribution, and stage of economic development influences the security obtainable by each nation in the international system; relationships between defense sectors and national economies within and across countries; efficiency in provision of security; incentive structures which promote or resolve conflict; institutional arrangements which promote or retard peace, stability, and equity."] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164147X'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 2 Defense economics and international security']
### Abstract:
["Defense economics derives from and is embedded in the multi-dimensional array of issues each country must address when providing for its national security. Applying economic concepts and methods, it attempts to evaluate this great diversity of security related questions, and to understand how each country's security interacts and fits in with the security of all nations in the international system. Included in Defense Economics are such overarching questions as: definition of what security actually is; how resource scarcity, distribution, and stage of economic development influences the security obtainable by each nation in the international system; relationships between defense sectors and national economies within and across countries; efficiency in provision of security; incentive structures which promote or resolve conflict; institutional arrangements which promote or retard peace, stability, and equity."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164147X']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641488.jsonld | ['Chapter 1 Introduction'] | ['This chapter defines defense economics and indicates how it differs from other subfields of economics. The nature and topics of defense economics are presented. A brief history of the field is also reviewed. The current importance of defense economics in the post-cold war era is discussed. Finally, the organization of the book and its component chapters are presented.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641488'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 1 Introduction']
### Abstract:
['This chapter defines defense economics and indicates how it differs from other subfields of economics. The nature and topics of defense economics are presented. A brief history of the field is also reviewed. The current importance of defense economics in the post-cold war era is discussed. Finally, the organization of the book and its component chapters are presented.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641488']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641496.jsonld | ['Acknowledgements'] | ['This chapter is a vote of thanks to many colleagues who have directly and indirectly contributed to this Handbook titled Handbook of Defense Economics. Michael Intriligator was centrally involved in initiating the volume. Distinguished contributors responded willingly and enthusiastically to various comments and suggestions and were a pleasure to work with. Colleagues with whom authors have worked with on a variety of defense economics issues include Jon Cauley, John A.C. Conybeare, Walter Enders, John E Forbes, Nick Hooper, Harvey Lapan, Dwight Lee, Stephen Martin and James Murdoch. Typing and correcting manuscripts requires care and patience. Roberta Blackburn, Margaret Cafferky, Anne Hrbek, Eileen Mericle and Sue Streeter excelled themselves in producing the final version of the manuscript. Vote of thanks is also presented the staff at North-Holland.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641496'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Acknowledgements']
### Abstract:
['This chapter is a vote of thanks to many colleagues who have directly and indirectly contributed to this Handbook titled Handbook of Defense Economics. Michael Intriligator was centrally involved in initiating the volume. Distinguished contributors responded willingly and enthusiastically to various comments and suggestions and were a pleasure to work with. Colleagues with whom authors have worked with on a variety of defense economics issues include Jon Cauley, John A.C. Conybeare, Walter Enders, John E Forbes, Nick Hooper, Harvey Lapan, Dwight Lee, Stephen Martin and James Murdoch. Typing and correcting manuscripts requires care and patience. Roberta Blackburn, Margaret Cafferky, Anne Hrbek, Eileen Mericle and Sue Streeter excelled themselves in producing the final version of the manuscript. Vote of thanks is also presented the staff at North-Holland.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641496']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A183164150X.jsonld | ['Introduction to the series'] | ['This chapter provides an introduction to Handbook of Defense Economics. This publication provides self-contained surveys of the current state of a branch of economics in the form of chapters prepared by leading specialists on various aspects of this branch of economics. These surveys summarize not only received results but also newer developments, from recent journal articles and discussion papers. Some original material is also included, but the main goal is to provide comprehensive and accessible surveys. The Handbook is intended to provide not only useful reference volumes for professional collections but also possible supplementary readings for advanced courses for graduate students in economics.'] | ['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164150X'] | ['Militärökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Introduction to the series']
### Abstract:
['This chapter provides an introduction to Handbook of Defense Economics. This publication provides self-contained surveys of the current state of a branch of economics in the form of chapters prepared by leading specialists on various aspects of this branch of economics. These surveys summarize not only received results but also newer developments, from recent journal articles and discussion papers. Some original material is also included, but the main goal is to provide comprehensive and accessible surveys. The Handbook is intended to provide not only useful reference volumes for professional collections but also possible supplementary readings for advanced courses for graduate students in economics.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4132793-7', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164150X']
### GND class:
['Militärökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641526.jsonld | ['Chapter 40 Common knowledge'] | ['This chapter presents some of the implications for economic behavior of the hypotheses that events, actions, optimization, and rationality are common knowledge. The main conclusion is that an apparently innocuous assumption of common knowledge rules out speculation, betting, and agreeing to disagree. Knowledge and interactive knowledge are central elements in economic theory. Common knowledge is the limit of a potentially infinite chain of reasoning about knowledge. Public events are the most obvious candidates for common knowledge. But events that the agents create themselves, such as the rules of a game or contract, can also plausibly be seen as common knowledge. Certain beliefs about human nature might also be taken to be common knowledge. Economists are especially interested, for example, in the consequences of the hypothesis that it is common knowledge that all agents are optimizers. It often occurs that after lengthy conversations or observations, what people are going to do is common knowledge, although the reasons for their actions may be difficult to disentangle.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641526'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 40 Common knowledge']
### Abstract:
['This chapter presents some of the implications for economic behavior of the hypotheses that events, actions, optimization, and rationality are common knowledge. The main conclusion is that an apparently innocuous assumption of common knowledge rules out speculation, betting, and agreeing to disagree. Knowledge and interactive knowledge are central elements in economic theory. Common knowledge is the limit of a potentially infinite chain of reasoning about knowledge. Public events are the most obvious candidates for common knowledge. But events that the agents create themselves, such as the rules of a game or contract, can also plausibly be seen as common knowledge. Certain beliefs about human nature might also be taken to be common knowledge. Economists are especially interested, for example, in the consequences of the hypothesis that it is common knowledge that all agents are optimizers. It often occurs that after lengthy conversations or observations, what people are going to do is common knowledge, although the reasons for their actions may be difficult to disentangle.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641526']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641534.jsonld | ['Chapter 39 Utility and subjective probability'] | ["Utility and subjective probability involve the systematic study of people's preferences and beliefs, including quantitative representations of preference and belief that facilitate analyses of problems in decision making and choice behavior. Its history spans more than 250 years and is mainly because of people in economics, mathematics, statistics, and psychology. Utility theory is primarily concerned with properties of a binary relation on a set X , where X could be a set of commodity bundles, decision alternatives, monetary gambles, n -tuples of pure strategies, and so forth, and x > y is interpreted as x is preferred to y . The formal development of utility and subjective probability is based on the notion of a binary relation. Special types of binary relations are identified by conjunctions of properties that are equivalence, linear order, weak order, and partial order."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641534'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 39 Utility and subjective probability']
### Abstract:
["Utility and subjective probability involve the systematic study of people's preferences and beliefs, including quantitative representations of preference and belief that facilitate analyses of problems in decision making and choice behavior. Its history spans more than 250 years and is mainly because of people in economics, mathematics, statistics, and psychology. Utility theory is primarily concerned with properties of a binary relation on a set X , where X could be a set of commodity bundles, decision alternatives, monetary gambles, n -tuples of pure strategies, and so forth, and x > y is interpreted as x is preferred to y . The formal development of utility and subjective probability is based on the notion of a binary relation. Special types of binary relations are identified by conjunctions of properties that are equivalence, linear order, weak order, and partial order."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641534']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641542.jsonld | ['Chapter 38 Game-theoretic aspects of computing'] | ['This chapter discusses the game-theoretic aspects of computing. Game theorists would probably favor stochastic models of failure. There is a great need for interesting theories on fault-tolerant computing where failures occur at random. A distributed system consists of a large number of loosely coupled computing devices (processors) which together perform some computation. One of the earliest general problems in the theory of distributed processing was how to establish consensus in a network of processors where faults may occur. The basic question of this type came to be known as the Byzantine Agreement problem. An overall description of the Byzantine Agreement problem that game theorists may find natural is how to establish common knowledge in the absence of a mechanism that can guarantee reliable information passing. In known examples, where a problem is solved by turning some fact into common knowledge (e.g., in the betraying wives puzzle) there is an instance where all parties involved are situated in one location and the pertinent fact is being announced, thus becoming common knowledge. Interesting and largely unexplored connections with game theory arise in complexity theory. Various measures for the computational complexity of functions are considered in this area, some of which are defined in terms of certain cooperative games.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641542'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 38 Game-theoretic aspects of computing']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses the game-theoretic aspects of computing. Game theorists would probably favor stochastic models of failure. There is a great need for interesting theories on fault-tolerant computing where failures occur at random. A distributed system consists of a large number of loosely coupled computing devices (processors) which together perform some computation. One of the earliest general problems in the theory of distributed processing was how to establish consensus in a network of processors where faults may occur. The basic question of this type came to be known as the Byzantine Agreement problem. An overall description of the Byzantine Agreement problem that game theorists may find natural is how to establish common knowledge in the absence of a mechanism that can guarantee reliable information passing. In known examples, where a problem is solved by turning some fact into common knowledge (e.g., in the betraying wives puzzle) there is an instance where all parties involved are situated in one location and the pertinent fact is being announced, thus becoming common knowledge. Interesting and largely unexplored connections with game theory arise in complexity theory. Various measures for the computational complexity of functions are considered in this area, some of which are defined in terms of certain cooperative games.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641542']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641569.jsonld | ['Chapter 36 Games in coalitional form'] | ['This chapter has had two principal purposes. One was to develop the idea of the “coalitional function” of a cooperative game as a means of abstracting from given settings (pure exchange economies, strategic-form games, political games, and the like) the possibilities available to the various coalitions through player cooperation. The other was to present several classes of games (market games, simple games, convex games, symmetric games) on which attention will be focused in subsequent chapters, and to provide several tools (covers and extensions, contractions and reductions, and the like) which will be useful in further analysis.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641569'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 36 Games in coalitional form']
### Abstract:
['This chapter has had two principal purposes. One was to develop the idea of the “coalitional function” of a cooperative game as a means of abstracting from given settings (pure exchange economies, strategic-form games, political games, and the like) the possibilities available to the various coalitions through player cooperation. The other was to present several classes of games (market games, simple games, convex games, symmetric games) on which attention will be focused in subsequent chapters, and to provide several tools (covers and extensions, contractions and reductions, and the like) which will be useful in further analysis.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641569']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641577.jsonld | ['Chapter 35 Cooperative models of bargaining'] | ["This chapter discusses cooperative models of bargaining. The axiomatic theory of bargaining originated in a fundamental paper by J.F. Nash. Nash introduced an idealized representation of the bargaining problem and developed a methodology that gave the hope that the undeterminateness of the terms of bargaining could be resolved. The canonical bargaining problem is that faced by management and labor in the division of a firm's profit. Another example concerns the specification of the terms of trade among trading partners. The chapter presents the classic characterizations of the three solutions that occupy center stage in the theory as it stands today: the Nash solution, the KalaiSmorodinsky solution, and the Egalitarian solution. Solutions to abstract bargaining problems, most notably the Nash solution, have been used to solve concrete economic problems, such as managementlabor conflicts, on numerous occasions."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641577'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 35 Cooperative models of bargaining']
### Abstract:
["This chapter discusses cooperative models of bargaining. The axiomatic theory of bargaining originated in a fundamental paper by J.F. Nash. Nash introduced an idealized representation of the bargaining problem and developed a methodology that gave the hope that the undeterminateness of the terms of bargaining could be resolved. The canonical bargaining problem is that faced by management and labor in the division of a firm's profit. Another example concerns the specification of the terms of trade among trading partners. The chapter presents the classic characterizations of the three solutions that occupy center stage in the theory as it stands today: the Nash solution, the KalaiSmorodinsky solution, and the Egalitarian solution. Solutions to abstract bargaining problems, most notably the Nash solution, have been used to solve concrete economic problems, such as managementlabor conflicts, on numerous occasions."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641577']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641607.jsonld | ['Chapter 32 Power and stability in politics'] | ['This chapter discusses power and stability in politics and describes the applications of cooperative game theory to political science. The focus of the chapter is on the idea of power. The use of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for simple games to measure the power of political actors in voting situations, with a number of illustrative applications, is presented in the chapter. A voting situation can be modeled as a cooperative game in characteristic function form in which the value 1 is assigned to any coalition which can pass a bill and 0 to any coalition that cannot. The resulting game is known as a simple game. The coalitions that can pass bills are called winning coalitions, and the game is completely determined by its set of winning coalitions. If politics is the shaping of power, political actors might act to increase their power, and the rational choice assumption that they do so might have some explanatory efficacy in political dynamics. The chapter describes three possible situations of this type.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641607'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 32 Power and stability in politics']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses power and stability in politics and describes the applications of cooperative game theory to political science. The focus of the chapter is on the idea of power. The use of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for simple games to measure the power of political actors in voting situations, with a number of illustrative applications, is presented in the chapter. A voting situation can be modeled as a cooperative game in characteristic function form in which the value 1 is assigned to any coalition which can pass a bill and 0 to any coalition that cannot. The resulting game is known as a simple game. The coalitions that can pass bills are called winning coalitions, and the game is completely determined by its set of winning coalitions. If politics is the shaping of power, political actors might act to increase their power, and the rational choice assumption that they do so might have some explanatory efficacy in political dynamics. The chapter describes three possible situations of this type.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641607']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A183164164X.jsonld | ['Chapter 28 Game theory and evolutionary biology'] | ['The subject matter of evolutionary game theory is the analysis of conflict and cooperation in animals and plants. Originally, game theory was developed as a theory of human strategic behavior based on an idealized picture of rational decision making. Evolutionary game theory does not rely on rationality assumptions but on the idea that the Darwinian process of natural selection drives organisms toward the optimization of reproductive success. Most of evolutionary game theory focuses on those cases where stable equilibrium is reached. However, the dynamics of evolutionary processes in disequilibrium is also an active area of research. In principle, evolutionary game theory deals only with fully symmetric games. Asymmetric conflicts are embedded in symmetric games where each player has the same chance to be on each side of the conflict. The mathematical definition of evolutionary stability refers to symmetric games only. Because asymmetric conflicts can be embedded in symmetric games, this is no obstacle for the treatment of asymmetric conflicts.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164164X'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 28 Game theory and evolutionary biology']
### Abstract:
['The subject matter of evolutionary game theory is the analysis of conflict and cooperation in animals and plants. Originally, game theory was developed as a theory of human strategic behavior based on an idealized picture of rational decision making. Evolutionary game theory does not rely on rationality assumptions but on the idea that the Darwinian process of natural selection drives organisms toward the optimization of reproductive success. Most of evolutionary game theory focuses on those cases where stable equilibrium is reached. However, the dynamics of evolutionary processes in disequilibrium is also an active area of research. In principle, evolutionary game theory deals only with fully symmetric games. Asymmetric conflicts are embedded in symmetric games where each player has the same chance to be on each side of the conflict. The mathematical definition of evolutionary stability refers to symmetric games only. Because asymmetric conflicts can be embedded in symmetric games, this is no obstacle for the treatment of asymmetric conflicts.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164164X']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641666.jsonld | ['Chapter 26 Moral hazard'] | ["This chapter discusses moral hazard. The principalagent relationship embodies a special form of moral hazard, which can be called one-sided, but moral hazard can also be many-sided. The paradigmatic model of many-sided moral hazard is the partnership in which there are many agents but no principal. The output of the partnership depends jointly on the actions of the partners and on the stochastic environment; each partner observes only the output (and his or her own action) but not the actions of the other partners or the environment. This engenders a free-rider problem. As in the case of principalagent relationships, a partnership, too, may last many periods. The chapter presents the principalagent model formally and describes some salient features of optimal principalagent contracts when the relationship lasts a single period. In a large class of cases, equilibrium in the one-period game is Pareto-inefficient. This is a well-known problem in providing risk-averse agent insurance while simultaneously giving the agent the incentives to take, from the principal's perspective, appropriate actions. The chapter also discusses other properties of static contracts such as monotonicity of the agent's compensation in observed profits."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641666'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 26 Moral hazard']
### Abstract:
["This chapter discusses moral hazard. The principalagent relationship embodies a special form of moral hazard, which can be called one-sided, but moral hazard can also be many-sided. The paradigmatic model of many-sided moral hazard is the partnership in which there are many agents but no principal. The output of the partnership depends jointly on the actions of the partners and on the stochastic environment; each partner observes only the output (and his or her own action) but not the actions of the other partners or the environment. This engenders a free-rider problem. As in the case of principalagent relationships, a partnership, too, may last many periods. The chapter presents the principalagent model formally and describes some salient features of optimal principalagent contracts when the relationship lasts a single period. In a large class of cases, equilibrium in the one-period game is Pareto-inefficient. This is a well-known problem in providing risk-averse agent insurance while simultaneously giving the agent the incentives to take, from the principal's perspective, appropriate actions. The chapter also discusses other properties of static contracts such as monotonicity of the agent's compensation in observed profits."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641666']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641704.jsonld | ['Chapter 22 Differential games'] | ['This chapter discusses differential games. In control theory, a certain evolutionary process (typically given by a time-dependent system of differential equations) depends on a control variable. A certain cost is associated with the control variable and with the corresponding evolutionary process. The goal is to choose the best controlthat is, the control for which the cost is minimized. A similar evolutionary process is used in differential games, but it depends on two (or more) controls. Each player is in charge of one of the controls. Each player wishes to minimize its own cost (the cost functions of the different players may be related). However, at each time t , a player must decide on its control without knowing what the other (usually opposing) players intend to do. The strategy of each player at time t depends only on whatever information the player was able to gain by observing the evolving process up to time t only.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641704'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 22 Differential games']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses differential games. In control theory, a certain evolutionary process (typically given by a time-dependent system of differential equations) depends on a control variable. A certain cost is associated with the control variable and with the corresponding evolutionary process. The goal is to choose the best controlthat is, the control for which the cost is minimized. A similar evolutionary process is used in differential games, but it depends on two (or more) controls. Each player is in charge of one of the controls. Each player wishes to minimize its own cost (the cost functions of the different players may be related). However, at each time t , a player must decide on its control without knowing what the other (usually opposing) players intend to do. The strategy of each player at time t depends only on whatever information the player was able to gain by observing the evolving process up to time t only.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641704']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641712.jsonld | ['Chapter 21 Game theory and statistics'] | ["Game theory, in particular the theory of two-person zero-sum games, has played a multiple role in statistics. Its principal role has been to provide a unifying framework for the various branches of statistical inference. Statistics, regarded from the game-theoretic point of view, became known as decision theory. While unifying statistical inference, decision theory has also proved useful as a tool for weeding out procedures and approaches that have taken hold in statistics without good reason. On a less fundamental level, game theory has contributed to statistical inference the minimax criterion. While the role of this criterion in two-person zero-sum games is central, its application in statistics is problematic. Its justification in game theory is based on the direct opposition of interests between the players, as expressed by the zero-sum assumption. Together with the minimax criterion, randomized, or mixed, strategies also appear in decision theory. The degree of importance of randomization in statistics differs according to which player is randomizing. Mixed strategies for Nature are a priori distributions. In the Bayes approach, these are assumed to represent the Statistician's states of knowledge prior to seeing the data, rather than Nature's way of playing the game. Therefore, they are often assumed to be known to the Statistician before he or she makes his or her move, unlike the situation in the typical game-theoretic set-up. Mixed strategies for the Statistician, on the other hand, are, strictly speaking, superfluous from the Bayesian point of view, while according to the minimax criterion, it may be advantageous for the Statistician to randomize, and it is certainly reasonable to grant him or her this option."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641712'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 21 Game theory and statistics']
### Abstract:
["Game theory, in particular the theory of two-person zero-sum games, has played a multiple role in statistics. Its principal role has been to provide a unifying framework for the various branches of statistical inference. Statistics, regarded from the game-theoretic point of view, became known as decision theory. While unifying statistical inference, decision theory has also proved useful as a tool for weeding out procedures and approaches that have taken hold in statistics without good reason. On a less fundamental level, game theory has contributed to statistical inference the minimax criterion. While the role of this criterion in two-person zero-sum games is central, its application in statistics is problematic. Its justification in game theory is based on the direct opposition of interests between the players, as expressed by the zero-sum assumption. Together with the minimax criterion, randomized, or mixed, strategies also appear in decision theory. The degree of importance of randomization in statistics differs according to which player is randomizing. Mixed strategies for Nature are a priori distributions. In the Bayes approach, these are assumed to represent the Statistician's states of knowledge prior to seeing the data, rather than Nature's way of playing the game. Therefore, they are often assumed to be known to the Statistician before he or she makes his or her move, unlike the situation in the typical game-theoretic set-up. Mixed strategies for the Statistician, on the other hand, are, strictly speaking, superfluous from the Bayesian point of view, while according to the minimax criterion, it may be advantageous for the Statistician to randomize, and it is certainly reasonable to grant him or her this option."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641712']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641771.jsonld | ['Chapter 19 Game and decision theoretic models in ethics'] | ["This chapter focuses on the game and decision-theoretic models in ethics. The theory of rational behavior in a social setting can be divided into game theory and ethics. Game theory deals with two or more individuals often having very different interests who try to maximize their own (selfish or unselfish) interests in a rational manner against all the other individuals who likewise try to maximize their own (selfish or unselfish) interests in a rational manner. Ethics deals with two or more individuals often having very different personal interests yet trying to promote the common interests of their society in a rational manner. The chapter discusses the axioms of Bayesian decision theory, an equi-probability model for moral value judgments, axioms for rational choice among alternative social policies, use of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities in ethics, rule utilitarianism, act utilitarianism, Rawls' and Brock's nonutilitarian theories of justice, and Brock's theory of social justice based on the Nash solution and on the Shapley value."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641771'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 19 Game and decision theoretic models in ethics']
### Abstract:
["This chapter focuses on the game and decision-theoretic models in ethics. The theory of rational behavior in a social setting can be divided into game theory and ethics. Game theory deals with two or more individuals often having very different interests who try to maximize their own (selfish or unselfish) interests in a rational manner against all the other individuals who likewise try to maximize their own (selfish or unselfish) interests in a rational manner. Ethics deals with two or more individuals often having very different personal interests yet trying to promote the common interests of their society in a rational manner. The chapter discusses the axioms of Bayesian decision theory, an equi-probability model for moral value judgments, axioms for rational choice among alternative social policies, use of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities in ethics, rule utilitarianism, act utilitarianism, Rawls' and Brock's nonutilitarian theories of justice, and Brock's theory of social justice based on the Nash solution and on the Shapley value."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641771']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641844.jsonld | ['Chapter 12 The core and balancedness'] | ['Of all solution concepts of cooperative games, the core is probably the easiest to understand. It is the set of all feasible outcomes (payoffs) that no player (participant) or group of participants (coalition) can improve upon by acting for themselves. Once an agreement in the core has been reached, no individual and no group could gain by regrouping. In a free market, outcomes should be in the core; economic activities should be advantageous to all parties involved. For many games, feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon may not exist.. In such cases one possibility is to ask that no group could gain much by recontracting. It is as if communications and coalition formations are costly. The minimum size of the set of feasible outcomes required for non-emptiness of the core is given by the so-called balancedness condition. The sets containing outcomes upon which nobody could improve by much are called -cores. The chapter discusses the theory of cores in the case of transferable utility (TU) game, the theory of cores of games with non-transferable utility (NTU), and some economic applications of the theory.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641844'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 12 The core and balancedness']
### Abstract:
['Of all solution concepts of cooperative games, the core is probably the easiest to understand. It is the set of all feasible outcomes (payoffs) that no player (participant) or group of participants (coalition) can improve upon by acting for themselves. Once an agreement in the core has been reached, no individual and no group could gain by regrouping. In a free market, outcomes should be in the core; economic activities should be advantageous to all parties involved. For many games, feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon may not exist.. In such cases one possibility is to ask that no group could gain much by recontracting. It is as if communications and coalition formations are costly. The minimum size of the set of feasible outcomes required for non-emptiness of the core is given by the so-called balancedness condition. The sets containing outcomes upon which nobody could improve by much are called -cores. The chapter discusses the theory of cores in the case of transferable utility (TU) game, the theory of cores of games with non-transferable utility (NTU), and some economic applications of the theory.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641844']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641852.jsonld | ['Chapter 11 Patent licensing'] | ["This chapter focuses on the patent licensing. Game-theoretic methods have made it possible to address questions with regard to patent licensing. The common modes of patent licensing are a royalty, possibly nonuniform, per unit of output produced with the patented technology, a fixed fee that is independent of the quantity produced with the patented technology, or a combination of a fixed fee plus a royalty. The patentee can choose which of these modes of licensing to employ and how to implement them. The interaction between a patentee and licensees is described in terms of a three-stage noncooperative game. The licensees are assumed to be members of an n -firm oligopoly, producing an identical product. Entry into the industry is assumed to be unprofitable, i.e., the cost of entry exceeds the profits an entrant could realize. The firms in the oligopoly can compete either through quantities or prices. The industry's aggregate output and product price is determined by the Cournot equilibrium in the former case and the Bertrnd equilibrium in the latter. In the simplest version of the game, the oligopoly faces a linear demand function for its product. The patented invention reduces the cost of production, i.e., it is a process innovation. Licensing of a product innovation can also be analyzed in this game-theoretic framework. The chapter discusses the licensing by means of an auction, fixed fee licensing of a cost-reducing innovation and then of a new product, licensing by means of a royalty, fixed fee plus royalty licensing, optimal licensing mechanism or the chutzpah mechanism, and patent licensing in the presence of Bertrand competition."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641852'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 11 Patent licensing']
### Abstract:
["This chapter focuses on the patent licensing. Game-theoretic methods have made it possible to address questions with regard to patent licensing. The common modes of patent licensing are a royalty, possibly nonuniform, per unit of output produced with the patented technology, a fixed fee that is independent of the quantity produced with the patented technology, or a combination of a fixed fee plus a royalty. The patentee can choose which of these modes of licensing to employ and how to implement them. The interaction between a patentee and licensees is described in terms of a three-stage noncooperative game. The licensees are assumed to be members of an n -firm oligopoly, producing an identical product. Entry into the industry is assumed to be unprofitable, i.e., the cost of entry exceeds the profits an entrant could realize. The firms in the oligopoly can compete either through quantities or prices. The industry's aggregate output and product price is determined by the Cournot equilibrium in the former case and the Bertrnd equilibrium in the latter. In the simplest version of the game, the oligopoly faces a linear demand function for its product. The patented invention reduces the cost of production, i.e., it is a process innovation. Licensing of a product innovation can also be analyzed in this game-theoretic framework. The chapter discusses the licensing by means of an auction, fixed fee licensing of a cost-reducing innovation and then of a new product, licensing by means of a royalty, fixed fee plus royalty licensing, optimal licensing mechanism or the chutzpah mechanism, and patent licensing in the presence of Bertrand competition."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641852']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641879.jsonld | ['Chapter 9 Location'] | ['This chapter focuses on the most game-theoretic elements of location theory. Spatial competition is an expanding field lying at the interface of game theory, economics, and regional science. It is still in its infancy but attracts more and more scholars\' interest because the competitive location problem emerges as a prototype of many economic situations involving interacting decision-makers. Space can be used as a "abel to deal with various problems encountered in industrial organization. The situations considered in this chapter do not exhaust the list of possible applications in that domain. Such a list would include intertemporal price discrimination and the supply of storage, competition between multiproduct firms, the incentive to innovate for imperfectly informed firms, the techniques of vertical restraints, the role of advertising, and incomplete markets due to spatial trading frictions. The location model is also well suited for analyzing nonprice competition. Firms are assumed to compete on other variables than prices; in particular, products specification appears as a basic decision variable in such a competitive environment. This model may also be useful for dealing with collective decision-making processes, like voting or competition between political parties.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641879'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 9 Location']
### Abstract:
['This chapter focuses on the most game-theoretic elements of location theory. Spatial competition is an expanding field lying at the interface of game theory, economics, and regional science. It is still in its infancy but attracts more and more scholars\' interest because the competitive location problem emerges as a prototype of many economic situations involving interacting decision-makers. Space can be used as a "abel to deal with various problems encountered in industrial organization. The situations considered in this chapter do not exhaust the list of possible applications in that domain. Such a list would include intertemporal price discrimination and the supply of storage, competition between multiproduct firms, the incentive to innovate for imperfectly informed firms, the techniques of vertical restraints, the role of advertising, and incomplete markets due to spatial trading frictions. The location model is also well suited for analyzing nonprice competition. Firms are assumed to compete on other variables than prices; in particular, products specification appears as a basic decision variable in such a competitive environment. This model may also be useful for dealing with collective decision-making processes, like voting or competition between political parties.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641879']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641887.jsonld | ['Chapter 8 Strategic analysis of auctions'] | ["This chapter describes several forms of auctions, presents the formulations used in the main models, reviews some of the general results and empirical findings, and indicates a few applications. Auctions have been used for millennia, and remain the simplest and most familiar means of price determination for multilateral trading without intermediary market makers such as brokers and specialists. Their trading procedures, which simply process bids and offers, are direct extensions of the usual forms of bilateral bargaining. Auctions also implement directly the demand submission procedures used in Walrasian models of markets. They therefore have prominent roles in the theory of exchange and in studies of the effects of economic institutions on the volume and terms of trade. Their allocative efficiency in many contexts ensures their continued prominence in economic theory. They are also favored in experimental designs investigating the predictive power of economic theories. Auctions are apt subjects for applications of game theory because they present explicit trading rules that largely fix the rules of the game. They present substantive problems of strategic behavior of practical importance. They are particularly valuable as illustrations of games of incomplete information because bidders' private information is the main factor affecting strategic behavior. The simpler forms of auctions induce normal-form games that are essentially solved by applying directly the basic equilibrium concepts of noncooperative game theory, such as the Nash equilibrium, without recourse to criteria for selecting among multiple equilibria. The common-knowledge assumption on which game theory relies is often tenable or innocuous applied to an auction."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641887'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 8 Strategic analysis of auctions']
### Abstract:
["This chapter describes several forms of auctions, presents the formulations used in the main models, reviews some of the general results and empirical findings, and indicates a few applications. Auctions have been used for millennia, and remain the simplest and most familiar means of price determination for multilateral trading without intermediary market makers such as brokers and specialists. Their trading procedures, which simply process bids and offers, are direct extensions of the usual forms of bilateral bargaining. Auctions also implement directly the demand submission procedures used in Walrasian models of markets. They therefore have prominent roles in the theory of exchange and in studies of the effects of economic institutions on the volume and terms of trade. Their allocative efficiency in many contexts ensures their continued prominence in economic theory. They are also favored in experimental designs investigating the predictive power of economic theories. Auctions are apt subjects for applications of game theory because they present explicit trading rules that largely fix the rules of the game. They present substantive problems of strategic behavior of practical importance. They are particularly valuable as illustrations of games of incomplete information because bidders' private information is the main factor affecting strategic behavior. The simpler forms of auctions induce normal-form games that are essentially solved by applying directly the basic equilibrium concepts of noncooperative game theory, such as the Nash equilibrium, without recourse to criteria for selecting among multiple equilibria. The common-knowledge assumption on which game theory relies is often tenable or innocuous applied to an auction."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641887']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641909.jsonld | ['Chapter 6 Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum'] | ["Non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with incomplete information are an appropriate model to analyze durable relationships among individuals whose information is not symmetric. The results in the zero-sum case are used explicitly in the non-zero-sum case. In the tradition of the Folk theorem, the characterization of equilibria makes use of individual rationality conditions. In the chapter, the repetition of the game has the effects of an enforcement mechanism and of a signalling mechanism at the same time. Most results available at the moment concern a particular model: there are two players, exactly one of whom is completely informed of the situation (this is called lack of information on one side), with each player observing the actions of the other after every stage (full monitoring). Nash equilibria have been studiedhe main result is a characterization of Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side; the results of the zero-sum case are used to evaluate the individually rational levels of each player. Communication equilibria has also been studied the main theme is that an infinitely repeated game contains enough communication possibilities to obtain the equivalence of different solution concepts. The game (as in Aumann's correlated equilibrium), together with the structure of the repeated game itself, is hopped to be sufficient to obtain the effect of any coordinating device, acting at every stage of the game."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641909'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 6 Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum']
### Abstract:
["Non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with incomplete information are an appropriate model to analyze durable relationships among individuals whose information is not symmetric. The results in the zero-sum case are used explicitly in the non-zero-sum case. In the tradition of the Folk theorem, the characterization of equilibria makes use of individual rationality conditions. In the chapter, the repetition of the game has the effects of an enforcement mechanism and of a signalling mechanism at the same time. Most results available at the moment concern a particular model: there are two players, exactly one of whom is completely informed of the situation (this is called lack of information on one side), with each player observing the actions of the other after every stage (full monitoring). Nash equilibria have been studiedhe main result is a characterization of Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side; the results of the zero-sum case are used to evaluate the individually rational levels of each player. Communication equilibria has also been studied the main theme is that an infinitely repeated game contains enough communication possibilities to obtain the equivalence of different solution concepts. The game (as in Aumann's correlated equilibrium), together with the structure of the repeated game itself, is hopped to be sufficient to obtain the effect of any coordinating device, acting at every stage of the game."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641909']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831641917.jsonld | ['Chapter 5 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum'] | ['This chapter focuses on the repeated games of incomplete information to analyze the strategic aspects of information: When and at what rate to reveal information, when and how to conceal information, and what resources to allocate for acquiring information. Repeated games provide the natural paradigm for dealing with these dynamic aspects of information. The repetitions of the game serve as a signaling mechanism that is the channel through which information is transmitted from one period to another. Most of the work on repeated games of incomplete information was done for two-person, zero-sum games discussed in this chapter. This is not only because it is the simplest and most natural case to start with, but also because it captures the main problems and aspects of strategic transmission of information, which can therefore be studied isolated from the phenomena of cooperation, punishments, incentives, etc. The theory of nonzero-sum repeated games of incomplete information makes extensive use of the notion of punishment which is based on the minmax value borrowed from the zero-sum case.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641917'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 5 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum']
### Abstract:
['This chapter focuses on the repeated games of incomplete information to analyze the strategic aspects of information: When and at what rate to reveal information, when and how to conceal information, and what resources to allocate for acquiring information. Repeated games provide the natural paradigm for dealing with these dynamic aspects of information. The repetitions of the game serve as a signaling mechanism that is the channel through which information is transmitted from one period to another. Most of the work on repeated games of incomplete information was done for two-person, zero-sum games discussed in this chapter. This is not only because it is the simplest and most natural case to start with, but also because it captures the main problems and aspects of strategic transmission of information, which can therefore be studied isolated from the phenomena of cooperation, punishments, incentives, etc. The theory of nonzero-sum repeated games of incomplete information makes extensive use of the notion of punishment which is based on the minmax value borrowed from the zero-sum case.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831641917']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642026.jsonld | ['Chapter 61 Implementation theory'] | ['This chapter surveys the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999) . Results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642026'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 61 Implementation theory']
### Abstract:
['This chapter surveys the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999) . Results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642026']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642034.jsonld | ['Chapter 60 Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions'] | ['We offer a selective survey of the uses of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of legal rules and institutions. In so doing, we illustrate some of the ways in which law influences behavior, analyze the mechanism design aspect of legal rules and institutions, and examine some of the difficulties in the use of game-theoretic concepts to clarify legal doctrine.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642034'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 60 Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions']
### Abstract:
['We offer a selective survey of the uses of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of legal rules and institutions. In so doing, we illustrate some of the ways in which law influences behavior, analyze the mechanism design aspect of legal rules and institutions, and examine some of the difficulties in the use of game-theoretic concepts to clarify legal doctrine.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642034']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642050.jsonld | ['Chapter 58 Some other economic applications of the value'] | ['Selected applications of the NTU Shapley value to settings other than that of general equilibrium in perfect competition. Three models are considered: Taxation and Redistribution, Public Goods, and Fixed Prices. In each case, the value leads to significant conceptual insights which, while compelling once understood, are far from obvious at the outset.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642050'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 58 Some other economic applications of the value']
### Abstract:
['Selected applications of the NTU Shapley value to settings other than that of general equilibrium in perfect competition. Three models are considered: Taxation and Redistribution, Public Goods, and Fixed Prices. In each case, the value leads to significant conceptual insights which, while compelling once understood, are far from obvious at the outset.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642050']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642069.jsonld | ['Chapter 57 Values of perfectly competitive economies'] | ['Perfectly competitive economies are economic models with many agents, each of whom is relatively insignificant. This chapter studies the relations between the basic economic concept of competitive (or Walrasian ) equilibrium , and the game-theoretic solution concept of value . It includes the classical Value Equivalence Theorem together with its many extensions and generalizations, as well as recent results.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642069'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 57 Values of perfectly competitive economies']
### Abstract:
['Perfectly competitive economies are economic models with many agents, each of whom is relatively insignificant. This chapter studies the relations between the basic economic concept of competitive (or Walrasian ) equilibrium , and the game-theoretic solution concept of value . It includes the classical Value Equivalence Theorem together with its many extensions and generalizations, as well as recent results.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642069']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642077.jsonld | ['Chapter 56 Values of games with infinitely many players'] | ['This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may exist big players who retain the power to wield single-handed influence. The interactions are modeled as cooperative games with a continuum of players. In general, the continuum consists of a non-atomic part (the “ocean”), along with (at most countably many) atoms. The continuum provides a convenient framework for mathematical analysis, and approximates the results for large finite games well. Also, it enables a unified view of games with finite, countable, or oceanic player-sets, or indeed any mixture of these.The value is defined as a map from a space of cooperative games to payoffs that satisfies the classical value axioms: additivity (linearity), efficiency, symmetry and positivity. The chapter introduces many spaces for which there exists a unique value, as well as other spaces on which there is a value.A game with infinitely many players can be considered as a limit of finite games with a large number of players. The chapter studies limiting values which are defined by means of the limits of the Shapley value of finite games that approximate the given game with infinitely many players.Various formulas for the value which express the value as an average of marginal contribution are studied. These value formulas capture the idea that the value of a player is his expected marginal contribution to a perfect sample of size t of the set of all players where the size t is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. In the case of smooth games the value formula is a diagonal formula: an integral of marginal contributions which are expressed as partial derivatives and where the integral is over all perfect samples of the set of players. The domain of the formula is further extended by changing the order of integration and derivation and the introduction of a well-crafted infinitesimal perturbation of the perfect samples of the set of players provides a value formula that is applicable to many additional games with essential nondifferentiabilities.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642077'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 56 Values of games with infinitely many players']
### Abstract:
['This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may exist big players who retain the power to wield single-handed influence. The interactions are modeled as cooperative games with a continuum of players. In general, the continuum consists of a non-atomic part (the “ocean”), along with (at most countably many) atoms. The continuum provides a convenient framework for mathematical analysis, and approximates the results for large finite games well. Also, it enables a unified view of games with finite, countable, or oceanic player-sets, or indeed any mixture of these.The value is defined as a map from a space of cooperative games to payoffs that satisfies the classical value axioms: additivity (linearity), efficiency, symmetry and positivity. The chapter introduces many spaces for which there exists a unique value, as well as other spaces on which there is a value.A game with infinitely many players can be considered as a limit of finite games with a large number of players. The chapter studies limiting values which are defined by means of the limits of the Shapley value of finite games that approximate the given game with infinitely many players.Various formulas for the value which express the value as an average of marginal contribution are studied. These value formulas capture the idea that the value of a player is his expected marginal contribution to a perfect sample of size t of the set of all players where the size t is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. In the case of smooth games the value formula is a diagonal formula: an integral of marginal contributions which are expressed as partial derivatives and where the integral is over all perfect samples of the set of players. The domain of the formula is further extended by changing the order of integration and derivation and the introduction of a well-crafted infinitesimal perturbation of the perfect samples of the set of players provides a value formula that is applicable to many additional games with essential nondifferentiabilities.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642077']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642085.jsonld | ['Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games'] | ['This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for short — that are based on varying notions of “fair division”. An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of action. The players confront the problem of choosing a payoff or solution that is feasible for the group as a whole. This is a bargaining problem and its solution may be reasonably required to satisfy various criteria, and different sets of rules or axioms will characterize different solutions or classes of solutions. For transferable utility games, the main axiomatic solution is the Shapley Value and this chapter deals with values of NTU games , i.e., solutions for NTU games that coincide with the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. We survey axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley NTU value, the Harsanyi solution, the Egalitarian solution and the non-symmetric generalizations of each. In addition, we discuss approaches to some of these solutions using the notions of potential and consistency for NTU games with finitely many as well as infinitely many players.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642085'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games']
### Abstract:
['This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for short — that are based on varying notions of “fair division”. An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of action. The players confront the problem of choosing a payoff or solution that is feasible for the group as a whole. This is a bargaining problem and its solution may be reasonably required to satisfy various criteria, and different sets of rules or axioms will characterize different solutions or classes of solutions. For transferable utility games, the main axiomatic solution is the Shapley Value and this chapter deals with values of NTU games , i.e., solutions for NTU games that coincide with the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. We survey axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley NTU value, the Harsanyi solution, the Egalitarian solution and the non-symmetric generalizations of each. In addition, we discuss approaches to some of these solutions using the notions of potential and consistency for NTU games with finitely many as well as infinitely many players.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642085']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642115.jsonld | ['Chapter 52 Economic history and game theory'] | ['This paper surveys the small, yet growing, literature that uses game theory for economic history analysis. It elaborates on the promise and challenge of applying game theory to economic history and presents the approaches taken in conducting such an application. Most of the essay, however, is devoted to studies in economic history that use game theory as their main analytical framework. Studies are presented in a way that highlights the range of potential topics in economic history that can be and have been enriched by a game-theoretical analysis.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642115'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 52 Economic history and game theory']
### Abstract:
['This paper surveys the small, yet growing, literature that uses game theory for economic history analysis. It elaborates on the promise and challenge of applying game theory to economic history and presents the approaches taken in conducting such an application. Most of the essay, however, is devoted to studies in economic history that use game theory as their main analytical framework. Studies are presented in a way that highlights the range of potential topics in economic history that can be and have been enriched by a game-theoretical analysis.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642115']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642123.jsonld | ['Chapter 51 Inspection games'] | ['Starting with the analysis of arms control and disarmament problems in the sixties, inspection games have evolved into a special area of game theory with specific theoretical aspects, and, equally important, practical applications in various fields of human activity where inspection is mandatory. In this contribution, a survey of applications is given first. These include arms control and disarmament, theoretical approaches to auditing and accounting, for example in insurance, and problems of environmental surveillance. Then, the general problem of inspection is presented in a game-theoretic framework that extends a statistical hypothesis testing problem. This defines a game since the data can be strategically manipulated by an inspectee who wants to conceal illegal actions. Using this framework, two models are solved, which are practically significant and technically interesting: material accountancy and data verification. A second important aspect of inspection games is the fact that inspection resources are limited and have to be used strategically. This is demonstrated in the context of sequential inspection games, where many mathematically challenging models have been studied. Finally, the important concept of leadership, where the inspector becomes a leader by announcing and committing himself to his strategy, is shown to apply naturally to inspection games.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642123'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 51 Inspection games']
### Abstract:
['Starting with the analysis of arms control and disarmament problems in the sixties, inspection games have evolved into a special area of game theory with specific theoretical aspects, and, equally important, practical applications in various fields of human activity where inspection is mandatory. In this contribution, a survey of applications is given first. These include arms control and disarmament, theoretical approaches to auditing and accounting, for example in insurance, and problems of environmental surveillance. Then, the general problem of inspection is presented in a game-theoretic framework that extends a statistical hypothesis testing problem. This defines a game since the data can be strategically manipulated by an inspectee who wants to conceal illegal actions. Using this framework, two models are solved, which are practically significant and technically interesting: material accountancy and data verification. A second important aspect of inspection games is the fact that inspection resources are limited and have to be used strategically. This is demonstrated in the context of sequential inspection games, where many mathematically challenging models have been studied. Finally, the important concept of leadership, where the inspector becomes a leader by announcing and committing himself to his strategy, is shown to apply naturally to inspection games.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642123']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642131.jsonld | ['Chapter 50 Bargaining with incomplete information'] | ["A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on bargaining with incomplete information.The chapter begins with an analysis of bargaining within a mechanism design framework. A modern development is provided of the classic result that, given two parties with independent private valuations, ex post efficiency is attainable if and only if it is common knowledge that gains from trade exist. The classic problems of efficient trade with one-sided incomplete information but interdependent valuations, and of efficiently dissolving a partnership with two-sided incomplete information, are also reviewed using mechanism design.The chapter then proceeds to study bargaining where the parties sequentially exchange offers. Under one-sided incomplete information, it considers sequential bargaining between a seller with a known valuation and a buyer with a private valuation. When there is a “gap” between the seller's valuation and the support of buyer valuations, the seller-offer game has essentially a unique sequential equilibrium. This equilibrium exhibits the following properties: it is stationary, trade occurs in finite time, and the price is favorable to the informed party (the Coase Conjecture). The alternating-offer game exhibits similar properties, when a refinement of sequential equilibrium is applied. However, in the case of “no gap” between the seller's valuation and the support of buyer valuations, the bargaining does not conclude with probability one after any finite number of periods, and it does not follow that sequential equilibria need be stationary. If stationarity is nevertheless assumed, then the results parallel those for the “gap” case. However, if stationarity is not assumed, then instead a folk theorem obtains, so substantial delay is possible and the uninformed party may receive substantial surplus.The chapter also briefly sketches results for sequential bargaining with two-sided incomplete information. Finally, it reviews the empirical evidence on strategic bargaining with private information by focusing on one of the most prominent examples of bargaining: union contract negotiations."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642131'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 50 Bargaining with incomplete information']
### Abstract:
["A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on bargaining with incomplete information.The chapter begins with an analysis of bargaining within a mechanism design framework. A modern development is provided of the classic result that, given two parties with independent private valuations, ex post efficiency is attainable if and only if it is common knowledge that gains from trade exist. The classic problems of efficient trade with one-sided incomplete information but interdependent valuations, and of efficiently dissolving a partnership with two-sided incomplete information, are also reviewed using mechanism design.The chapter then proceeds to study bargaining where the parties sequentially exchange offers. Under one-sided incomplete information, it considers sequential bargaining between a seller with a known valuation and a buyer with a private valuation. When there is a “gap” between the seller's valuation and the support of buyer valuations, the seller-offer game has essentially a unique sequential equilibrium. This equilibrium exhibits the following properties: it is stationary, trade occurs in finite time, and the price is favorable to the informed party (the Coase Conjecture). The alternating-offer game exhibits similar properties, when a refinement of sequential equilibrium is applied. However, in the case of “no gap” between the seller's valuation and the support of buyer valuations, the bargaining does not conclude with probability one after any finite number of periods, and it does not follow that sequential equilibria need be stationary. If stationarity is nevertheless assumed, then the results parallel those for the “gap” case. However, if stationarity is not assumed, then instead a folk theorem obtains, so substantial delay is possible and the uninformed party may receive substantial surplus.The chapter also briefly sketches results for sequential bargaining with two-sided incomplete information. Finally, it reviews the empirical evidence on strategic bargaining with private information by focusing on one of the most prominent examples of bargaining: union contract negotiations."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642131']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642166.jsonld | ['Chapter 47 Stochastic games'] | ['Stochastic games model repeated play with symmetric information. We analyze their value in the zero-sum case, and approach the study of their equilibria in the non-zero-sum case.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642166'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 47 Stochastic games']
### Abstract:
['Stochastic games model repeated play with symmetric information. We analyze their value in the zero-sum case, and approach the study of their equilibria in the non-zero-sum case.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642166']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642174.jsonld | ['Chapter 46 Non-cooperative games with many players'] | ['In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in which private information, anonymity and idiosyncratic shocks are given particular prominence.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642174'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 46 Non-cooperative games with many players']
### Abstract:
['In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in which private information, anonymity and idiosyncratic shocks are given particular prominence.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642174']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642182.jsonld | ['Chapter 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games'] | ["This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games. The games may be given in strategic form or extensive form. The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm finds one equilibrium of a bimatrix game, and provides an elementary proof that a Nash equilibrium exists. It can be given a strong geometric intuition using graphs that show the subdivision of the players' mixed strategy sets into best-response regions. The Lemke-Howson algorithm is presented with these graphs, as well as algebraically in terms of complementary pivoting. Degenerate games require a refinement of the algorithm based on lexicographic perturbations. Commonly used definitions of degenerate games are shown as equivalent. The enumeration of all equilibria is expressed as the problem of finding matching vertices in pairs of polytopes. Algorithms for computing simply stable equilibria and perfect equilibria are explained. The computation of equilibria for extensive games is difficult for larger games since the reduced strategic form may be exponentially large compared to the game tree. If the players have perfect recall, the sequence form of the extensive game is a strategic description that is more suitable for computation. In the sequence form, pure strategies of a player are replaced by sequences of choices along a play in the game. The sequence form has the same size as the game tree, and can be used for computing equilibria with the same methods as the strategic form. The paper concludes with remarks on theoretical and practical issues of concern to these computational approaches."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642182'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games']
### Abstract:
["This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games. The games may be given in strategic form or extensive form. The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm finds one equilibrium of a bimatrix game, and provides an elementary proof that a Nash equilibrium exists. It can be given a strong geometric intuition using graphs that show the subdivision of the players' mixed strategy sets into best-response regions. The Lemke-Howson algorithm is presented with these graphs, as well as algebraically in terms of complementary pivoting. Degenerate games require a refinement of the algorithm based on lexicographic perturbations. Commonly used definitions of degenerate games are shown as equivalent. The enumeration of all equilibria is expressed as the problem of finding matching vertices in pairs of polytopes. Algorithms for computing simply stable equilibria and perfect equilibria are explained. The computation of equilibria for extensive games is difficult for larger games since the reduced strategic form may be exponentially large compared to the game tree. If the players have perfect recall, the sequence form of the extensive game is a strategic description that is more suitable for computation. In the sequence form, pure strategies of a player are replaced by sequences of choices along a play in the game. The sequence form has the same size as the game tree, and can be used for computing equilibria with the same methods as the strategic form. The paper concludes with remarks on theoretical and practical issues of concern to these computational approaches."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642182']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642190.jsonld | ['Chapter 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games'] | ["This chapter is devoted to the study of Nash equilibria, and correlated equilibria in both finite and infinite games. We restrict our discussions to only those properties that are somewhat special to the case of two-person games. Many of these properties fail to extend even to three-person games. The existence of quasi-strict equilibria, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in completely mixed games, are very special to two-person games. The Lemke-Howson algorithm and Rosenmüller's algorithm which locate a Nash equilibrium in finite arithmetic steps are not extendable to general n -person games. The enumerability of extreme Nash equilibrium points and their inclusion among extreme correlated equilibrium points fail to extend beyond bimatrix games. Fictitious play, which works in zero-sum two-person matrix games, fails to extend even to the case of bimatrix games. Other algorithms that would locate certain refinements of Nash equilibria are also discussed. The chapter also deals with the structure of Nash and correlated equilibria in infinite games."] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642190'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games']
### Abstract:
["This chapter is devoted to the study of Nash equilibria, and correlated equilibria in both finite and infinite games. We restrict our discussions to only those properties that are somewhat special to the case of two-person games. Many of these properties fail to extend even to three-person games. The existence of quasi-strict equilibria, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in completely mixed games, are very special to two-person games. The Lemke-Howson algorithm and Rosenmüller's algorithm which locate a Nash equilibrium in finite arithmetic steps are not extendable to general n -person games. The enumerability of extreme Nash equilibrium points and their inclusion among extreme correlated equilibrium points fail to extend beyond bimatrix games. Fictitious play, which works in zero-sum two-person matrix games, fails to extend even to the case of bimatrix games. Other algorithms that would locate certain refinements of Nash equilibria are also discussed. The chapter also deals with the structure of Nash and correlated equilibria in infinite games."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642190']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642204.jsonld | ['Chapter 43 Incomplete information'] | ['In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take account not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as payoffs), but also of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. Two different but equivalent ways of dealing with this matter, the semantic and the syntactic, are set forth. Canonical and universal semantic systems are then defined and constructed, and the concepts of common knowledge and common priors formulated and characterized. The last two sections discuss relations with Bayesian games of incomplete information and their applications, and with interactive epistemology — the theory of multi-agent knowledge and belief as formulated in mathematical logic.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642204'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 43 Incomplete information']
### Abstract:
['In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take account not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as payoffs), but also of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. Two different but equivalent ways of dealing with this matter, the semantic and the syntactic, are set forth. Canonical and universal semantic systems are then defined and constructed, and the concepts of common knowledge and common priors formulated and characterized. The last two sections discuss relations with Bayesian games of incomplete information and their applications, and with interactive epistemology — the theory of multi-agent knowledge and belief as formulated in mathematical logic.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642204']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642212.jsonld | ['Chapter 42 Foundations of strategic equilibrium'] | ['This chapter examines the conceptual foundations of the concept of strategic equilibrium and its various variants and refinements. The emphasis is very much on the underlying ideas rather than on any technical details.After an examination of some pre-equilibrium ideas, in particular the concept of rationalizability, the concept of strategic (or Nash) equilibrium is introduced. Various interpretations of this concept are discussed and a proof of the existence of such equilibria is sketched.Next, the concept of correlated equilibrium is introduced. This concept can be thought of as retaining the self-enforcing aspect of the idea of equilibrium while relaxing the independence assumption.Most of the remainder of the chapter is concerned with the ideas underlying the refinement of equilibrium: admissibility and iterated dominance; backward induction; forward induction; and ordinality and various invariances to changes in the player set. This leads to a consideration of the concept of strategic stability, a strong refinement satisfying these various ideas.Finally there is a brief examination of the epistemic approach to equilibrium and the relation between strategic equilibrium and correlated equilibrium.'] | ['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642212'] | ['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 42 Foundations of strategic equilibrium']
### Abstract:
['This chapter examines the conceptual foundations of the concept of strategic equilibrium and its various variants and refinements. The emphasis is very much on the underlying ideas rather than on any technical details.After an examination of some pre-equilibrium ideas, in particular the concept of rationalizability, the concept of strategic (or Nash) equilibrium is introduced. Various interpretations of this concept are discussed and a proof of the existence of such equilibria is sketched.Next, the concept of correlated equilibrium is introduced. This concept can be thought of as retaining the self-enforcing aspect of the idea of equilibrium while relaxing the independence assumption.Most of the remainder of the chapter is concerned with the ideas underlying the refinement of equilibrium: admissibility and iterated dominance; backward induction; forward induction; and ordinality and various invariances to changes in the player set. This leads to a consideration of the concept of strategic stability, a strong refinement satisfying these various ideas.Finally there is a brief examination of the epistemic approach to equilibrium and the relation between strategic equilibrium and correlated equilibrium.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4056243-8', 'gnd:4066528-8', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642212']
### GND class:
['Spieltheorie', 'Wirtschaftswissenschaften']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642301.jsonld | ['Chapter 22 Targets and instruments of monetary policy'] | ["This chapter discusses the major conceptual developments in the literature of targets and instruments of money policy, with particular emphasis on the broader strategic issues defining the overall framework within which policy operates. The instrument problem of the selection of specific price or quantity that the central bank directly and immediately controls is examined in the chapter. It is a fact that what most people mean by money in discussions of monetary policy is not a plausible policy instrument at all, because it is endogenous in the kind of fractional reserve banking system common to most modern market economies. Hence, money is at best an intermediate target of monetary policy. The chapter discusses the implications of alternative monetary policy frameworks for the information available to the economy's private sector, the positive empirical question of when and whether any given central bank has actually based its operations on one kind of targeting strategy or another, and the empirical basis for making the normative selections of monetary policy targets and instruments."] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642301'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 22 Targets and instruments of monetary policy']
### Abstract:
["This chapter discusses the major conceptual developments in the literature of targets and instruments of money policy, with particular emphasis on the broader strategic issues defining the overall framework within which policy operates. The instrument problem of the selection of specific price or quantity that the central bank directly and immediately controls is examined in the chapter. It is a fact that what most people mean by money in discussions of monetary policy is not a plausible policy instrument at all, because it is endogenous in the kind of fractional reserve banking system common to most modern market economies. Hence, money is at best an intermediate target of monetary policy. The chapter discusses the implications of alternative monetary policy frameworks for the information available to the economy's private sector, the positive empirical question of when and whether any given central bank has actually based its operations on one kind of targeting strategy or another, and the empirical basis for making the normative selections of monetary policy targets and instruments."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642301']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A183164231X.jsonld | ['Chapter 21 Rules versus discretion in monetary policy'] | ['Discretionary monetary policy has long been an anomaly to liberal economists. Henry Simons addressed the issue in his classic paper Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy. This chapter discusses the gold standard as a quasi-automatic monetary policy regime and alternative monetary rules are also examined. The modern literature centered on the concept of dynamic inconsistency and its relevance to the rules versus discretion debate is discussed in the chapter. A pure gold standard is a fully automatic monetary system. The specie-flow mechanism in which the money stock adjusts through the balance of payments reveals the equilibrating tendencies inherent in the system. With all goods traded and their prices equalized worldwide, adjustment comes purely through wealth effects as the outflow of gold from a country with a current account deficit reduces the flow of spending in that country. The pre-1977 arguments of principle for rules lacked any convincing demonstration that rules might systematically be better than discretion. This demonstration came with the dynamic inconsistency literature.'] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164231X'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 21 Rules versus discretion in monetary policy']
### Abstract:
['Discretionary monetary policy has long been an anomaly to liberal economists. Henry Simons addressed the issue in his classic paper Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy. This chapter discusses the gold standard as a quasi-automatic monetary policy regime and alternative monetary rules are also examined. The modern literature centered on the concept of dynamic inconsistency and its relevance to the rules versus discretion debate is discussed in the chapter. A pure gold standard is a fully automatic monetary system. The specie-flow mechanism in which the money stock adjusts through the balance of payments reveals the equilibrating tendencies inherent in the system. With all goods traded and their prices equalized worldwide, adjustment comes purely through wealth effects as the outflow of gold from a country with a current account deficit reduces the flow of spending in that country. The pre-1977 arguments of principle for rules lacked any convincing demonstration that rules might systematically be better than discretion. This demonstration came with the dynamic inconsistency literature.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164231X']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642360.jsonld | ['Chapter 16 Credit rationing'] | ["Credit markets differ from standard markets in two important respects. First, standard markets, which are the focus of classical competitive theory, involve a number of agents who are buying and selling a homogeneous commodity. Second, in standard markets, the delivery of a commodity by a seller and payment for the commodity by a buyer occur simultaneously. The analysis of credit allocation can go astray in trying to apply the standard supply and demand model that is not very appropriate for the market for promises. In the United States, a complicated, decentralized, and interrelated set of financial markets, institutions, and instruments have evolved to provide credit. Credit rationing focuses on one set of these instrumentsloan contractswhere the promised repayments are fixed amounts. At the other extreme, equity securities are promises to repay a given fraction of a firm's profits. A spectrum of securities, including convertible bonds and preferred shares, exists between loans and equity."] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642360'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 16 Credit rationing']
### Abstract:
["Credit markets differ from standard markets in two important respects. First, standard markets, which are the focus of classical competitive theory, involve a number of agents who are buying and selling a homogeneous commodity. Second, in standard markets, the delivery of a commodity by a seller and payment for the commodity by a buyer occur simultaneously. The analysis of credit allocation can go astray in trying to apply the standard supply and demand model that is not very appropriate for the market for promises. In the United States, a complicated, decentralized, and interrelated set of financial markets, institutions, and instruments have evolved to provide credit. Credit rationing focuses on one set of these instrumentsloan contractswhere the promised repayments are fixed amounts. At the other extreme, equity securities are promises to repay a given fraction of a firm's profits. A spectrum of securities, including convertible bonds and preferred shares, exists between loans and equity."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642360']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642379.jsonld | ['Chapter 15 Why does money affect output? A survey'] | ['Considerable studies have been done in the past years on to answer the question that why money affects output. Some of it has come from clarifying old and fuzzy ideas coordination problems and the respective roles of expectations of nominal and real rigidities. A lot of it has come from running into dead ends such as the failure to explain the joint price and output responses to money in as if competitive models or the failure of individual nominal rigidities to generate aggregate price inertia under simple Ss rules. Research on real rigidities is the most urgent. A general feature of goods markets is that the fluctuations in demand lead mostly to movements in output rather than in markups; and a general feature of labor markets is that the fluctuations in the demand for labor lead mostly to movements in employment rather than in real wages. Given these features, a very small amount of nominal rigidity will lead to long-lasting effects of nominal money on output.'] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642379'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 15 Why does money affect output? A survey']
### Abstract:
['Considerable studies have been done in the past years on to answer the question that why money affects output. Some of it has come from clarifying old and fuzzy ideas coordination problems and the respective roles of expectations of nominal and real rigidities. A lot of it has come from running into dead ends such as the failure to explain the joint price and output responses to money in as if competitive models or the failure of individual nominal rigidities to generate aggregate price inertia under simple Ss rules. Research on real rigidities is the most urgent. A general feature of goods markets is that the fluctuations in demand lead mostly to movements in output rather than in markups; and a general feature of labor markets is that the fluctuations in the demand for labor lead mostly to movements in employment rather than in real wages. Given these features, a very small amount of nominal rigidity will lead to long-lasting effects of nominal money on output.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642379']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642441.jsonld | ['Chapter 12 Specification and estimation of intertemporal asset pricing models'] | ['This chapter discusses recent econometric work on dynamic, equilibrium asset-pricing models, reviews the specifications of econometric models of asset price determination, and explores the properties of several extensions of these models. It focuses on the tradeoffs involved in achieving econometric identification, both in terms of the economic and statistical assumptions, which must be made, and the limitations of the requisite data, which are used in implementing alternative models. The increased interest in the econometric implications of intertemporal asset pricing relations is traced to several important developments in economic theory and econometric method. The chapter discusses the relation between consumption and asset returns implied by the representative agent models. It describes the representation of asset prices in terms of a linear functional on a space of random payoffs. When agents can trade a complete set of contingent claims to goods in the future, the benchmark payoff that defines this function can be identified with the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of a numeraire good.'] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642441'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 12 Specification and estimation of intertemporal asset pricing models']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses recent econometric work on dynamic, equilibrium asset-pricing models, reviews the specifications of econometric models of asset price determination, and explores the properties of several extensions of these models. It focuses on the tradeoffs involved in achieving econometric identification, both in terms of the economic and statistical assumptions, which must be made, and the limitations of the requisite data, which are used in implementing alternative models. The increased interest in the econometric implications of intertemporal asset pricing relations is traced to several important developments in economic theory and econometric method. The chapter discusses the relation between consumption and asset returns implied by the representative agent models. It describes the representation of asset prices in terms of a linear functional on a space of random payoffs. When agents can trade a complete set of contingent claims to goods in the future, the benchmark payoff that defines this function can be identified with the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of a numeraire good.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642441']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A183164245X.jsonld | ['Chapter 11 Capital market theory and the pricing of financial securities'] | ['The core of financial economic theory is the study of individual behavior of households in the intertemporal allocation of their resources in an environment of uncertainty and of the role of economic organizations in facilitating these allocations. The intersection between this specialized branch of microeconomics and macroeconomic monetary theory is most apparent in the theory of capital markets. The complexity of the interaction of time and uncertainty provides intrinsic excitement to study the subject. The mathematics of capital market theory contains some of the most interesting applications of probability and optimization theory. This chapter discusses necessary conditions for static financial equilibrium that are used to determine restrictions on equilibrium security prices. The combined consumptionportfolio selection problem is formulated in a more realistic and more complex dynamic setting. The chapter examines intertemporal equilibrium pricing of securities and discusses the conditions under which allocations in the continuous trading model are Pareto efficient.'] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164245X'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 11 Capital market theory and the pricing of financial securities']
### Abstract:
['The core of financial economic theory is the study of individual behavior of households in the intertemporal allocation of their resources in an environment of uncertainty and of the role of economic organizations in facilitating these allocations. The intersection between this specialized branch of microeconomics and macroeconomic monetary theory is most apparent in the theory of capital markets. The complexity of the interaction of time and uncertainty provides intrinsic excitement to study the subject. The mathematics of capital market theory contains some of the most interesting applications of probability and optimization theory. This chapter discusses necessary conditions for static financial equilibrium that are used to determine restrictions on equilibrium security prices. The combined consumptionportfolio selection problem is formulated in a more realistic and more complex dynamic setting. The chapter examines intertemporal equilibrium pricing of securities and discusses the conditions under which allocations in the continuous trading model are Pareto efficient.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164245X']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642506.jsonld | ['Chapter 6 Money, inflation and growth'] | ['Different long-run rates of growth of money supply are eventually reflected in different rates of inflation. Tobin studied this in a simple descriptive model with aggregate saving depending only on current income. It was found that money growth was associated with higher capital stock and output per person in the steady state. Faster inflation led savers to shift their portfolios in favor of real capital. The chapter examines Sidrauski model illustrating the central neutrality result and presents some of its variations in which neutrality with respect to output fails even though the real interest rate is not affected by inflation. It examines the Fisher relation and focuses on deviations from the one infinitely lived family models. The exact function of money and the sensitivity of the long-run inflationgrowth relation to different assumptions about the reasons why money is held are also examined.'] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642506'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 6 Money, inflation and growth']
### Abstract:
['Different long-run rates of growth of money supply are eventually reflected in different rates of inflation. Tobin studied this in a simple descriptive model with aggregate saving depending only on current income. It was found that money growth was associated with higher capital stock and output per person in the steady state. Faster inflation led savers to shift their portfolios in favor of real capital. The chapter examines Sidrauski model illustrating the central neutrality result and presents some of its variations in which neutrality with respect to output fails even though the real interest rate is not affected by inflation. It examines the Fisher relation and focuses on deviations from the one infinitely lived family models. The exact function of money and the sensitivity of the long-run inflationgrowth relation to different assumptions about the reasons why money is held are also examined.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642506']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642514.jsonld | ['Chapter 5 A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institutions'] | ['This chapter discusses a game theoretic and gaming approach to the development of an appropriate microeconomic theory of money and financial institutions. The monetary and financial systems of an economy are part of the socio-politico-economic control mechanism used by every state to connect the economy with the polity and society. This neural network provides the administrative means to collect taxes, direct investment, provide public goods, finance wars, and facilitate international and intertemporal trade. Money measures provide a crude but serviceable basis for the accounting system, which, in turn, along with the codification of commercial law and financial regulation, are the basis for economic evaluation and the measurement of trust and fiduciary responsibility among economic agents. A basic purpose of the approach is adopted to show the minimal conditions that require that financial institutions and instruments emerge as the necessary carriers of process. The thrust is for the development of a mathematical institutional economics. A theory of money and financial institutions at the level of abstraction of general equilibrium theory is a theory of mechanisms and how they might work given the combination of economic forces and more or less exogenous socio-political forces.'] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642514'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 5 A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institutions']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses a game theoretic and gaming approach to the development of an appropriate microeconomic theory of money and financial institutions. The monetary and financial systems of an economy are part of the socio-politico-economic control mechanism used by every state to connect the economy with the polity and society. This neural network provides the administrative means to collect taxes, direct investment, provide public goods, finance wars, and facilitate international and intertemporal trade. Money measures provide a crude but serviceable basis for the accounting system, which, in turn, along with the codification of commercial law and financial regulation, are the basis for economic evaluation and the measurement of trust and fiduciary responsibility among economic agents. A basic purpose of the approach is adopted to show the minimal conditions that require that financial institutions and instruments emerge as the necessary carriers of process. The thrust is for the development of a mathematical institutional economics. A theory of money and financial institutions at the level of abstraction of general equilibrium theory is a theory of mechanisms and how they might work given the combination of economic forces and more or less exogenous socio-political forces.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642514']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642522.jsonld | ['Chapter 4 Non-Walrasian equilibria, money, and macroeconomics'] | ['Non-Walrasian equilibria, also called equilibria with rationing, are a wide class of equilibrium concepts that generalize the traditional notion of Walrasian equilibrium by allowing markets not to clear and emphasizing quantity rationing. In Walrasian equilibrium, total demand equals total supply for each good. This consistency of the actions of all agents is achieved by price movements in the manner in which all private agents receive a price signal and assume that they will be able to exchange whatever they want at that price system. A Walrasian equilibrium price system is a set of prices for which total demand and total supply are equal in all markets. Transactions are equal to the demands and supplies at this price system. Money can be interpreted as commodity money. But the recent evolution of money tends to privilege the interpretation of money as fiat money that is a costlessly produced legal medium of exchange. This chapter discusses simple macroeconomic applications of the microeconomic concepts and presents a micromacro model of imperfect competition and unemployment.'] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642522'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 4 Non-Walrasian equilibria, money, and macroeconomics']
### Abstract:
['Non-Walrasian equilibria, also called equilibria with rationing, are a wide class of equilibrium concepts that generalize the traditional notion of Walrasian equilibrium by allowing markets not to clear and emphasizing quantity rationing. In Walrasian equilibrium, total demand equals total supply for each good. This consistency of the actions of all agents is achieved by price movements in the manner in which all private agents receive a price signal and assume that they will be able to exchange whatever they want at that price system. A Walrasian equilibrium price system is a set of prices for which total demand and total supply are equal in all markets. Transactions are equal to the demands and supplies at this price system. Money can be interpreted as commodity money. But the recent evolution of money tends to privilege the interpretation of money as fiat money that is a costlessly produced legal medium of exchange. This chapter discusses simple macroeconomic applications of the microeconomic concepts and presents a micromacro model of imperfect competition and unemployment.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642522']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642530.jsonld | ['Chapter 3 Money in general equilibrium theory'] | ["This chapter describes conditions for the existence of general monetary equilibrium in a simple setting and discusses the role of money in general equilibrium theory. The principal contribution of general equilibrium theory has been its axiomatic validation of the benchmark model of price taking, individual rationality, and market clearing. The basic role of money as a medium of exchange is lost unless it also fills its role as a numeraire. If the value of money in relation to goods is zero, it cannot serve its purpose at all. Because terminal money lays no apparent claim to goods or services, the terminal value of money is zero. This implies, by the same reasoning, that the value of money is zero in the penultimate period. In Bewley's infinite horizon model, uncertainty generates a precautionary demand for money. Because there are no other stores of value, agents hold money as insurance against shortfalls in endowment value. If monetary markets are operated by an authority set up for the common good, it is natural to suppose that the authority would be willing to collect money left at the market after terminal trading to dispose it."] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642530'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 3 Money in general equilibrium theory']
### Abstract:
["This chapter describes conditions for the existence of general monetary equilibrium in a simple setting and discusses the role of money in general equilibrium theory. The principal contribution of general equilibrium theory has been its axiomatic validation of the benchmark model of price taking, individual rationality, and market clearing. The basic role of money as a medium of exchange is lost unless it also fills its role as a numeraire. If the value of money in relation to goods is zero, it cannot serve its purpose at all. Because terminal money lays no apparent claim to goods or services, the terminal value of money is zero. This implies, by the same reasoning, that the value of money is zero in the penultimate period. In Bewley's infinite horizon model, uncertainty generates a precautionary demand for money. Because there are no other stores of value, agents hold money as insurance against shortfalls in endowment value. If monetary markets are operated by an authority set up for the common good, it is natural to suppose that the authority would be willing to collect money left at the market after terminal trading to dispose it."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642530']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642549.jsonld | ['Chapter 2 Liquidity'] | ['Liquidity and the closely related notion of flexibility are intuitively understood by economists and others. There is the ease of conversion of an asset at a particular date into something else by means of a market transaction. It is connected with the idea that liquidity increases the set of choices at some date so that the liquidity of, for instance, a portfolio depends on the date specified for conversion. This chapter explores the way purely search-theoretic approach that leads to a liquidity ordering of assets by considering differences in the expected time to sell an asset under an optimum search policy is integrated into present equilibrium theories of an economy. Liquidity considerations are used to account for missing markets, which are now known to have more serious consequences for received theory than once thought. Search theory suggests imperfect markets and so has considerable implications for competitive theory. Ideally, it is combined with the theory of bargaining, which, in turn, leads to the modification of search theory itself.'] | ['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642549'] | ['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 2 Liquidity']
### Abstract:
['Liquidity and the closely related notion of flexibility are intuitively understood by economists and others. There is the ease of conversion of an asset at a particular date into something else by means of a market transaction. It is connected with the idea that liquidity increases the set of choices at some date so that the liquidity of, for instance, a portfolio depends on the date specified for conversion. This chapter explores the way purely search-theoretic approach that leads to a liquidity ordering of assets by considering differences in the expected time to sell an asset under an optimum search policy is integrated into present equilibrium theories of an economy. Liquidity considerations are used to account for missing markets, which are now known to have more serious consequences for received theory than once thought. Search theory suggests imperfect markets and so has considerable implications for competitive theory. Ideally, it is combined with the theory of bargaining, which, in turn, leads to the modification of search theory itself.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4019902-2', 'gnd:4121333-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642549']
### GND class:
['Geldpolitik', 'Geldtheorie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642611.jsonld | ['Chapter 25 The effects of economic regulation'] | ['This chapter discusses alternative approaches to measure the effects of economic regulation and reviews the empirical literature employing these approaches. Economic regulation refers to both the direct legislation and administrative regulation of prices and entry into specific industries or markets. It follows conventional treatment in distinguishing economic regulation from a host of other forms of government intervention in markets, including the social regulation of environmental, health and safety practices, antitrust policy, and tax and tariff policies. The measurement issues that discusses arise in the empirical analysis of all types of government regulation; therefore, it have structured the methodological discussion so that it has broad applicability. While the present study is by no means an exhaustive survey of the literature, it includes numerous examples of the use of different types of data and measurement techniques. These are selected to cover a range of industries and time periods sufficient to give the reader a good feeling for what is known, not known, or in dispute. The chapter examines the way alternative theoretical frameworks and empirical methodologies have been applied to study the effects of price and entry regulation on each of: prices, costs, technological change, product quality, and the distribution of income and rents.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642611'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 25 The effects of economic regulation']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses alternative approaches to measure the effects of economic regulation and reviews the empirical literature employing these approaches. Economic regulation refers to both the direct legislation and administrative regulation of prices and entry into specific industries or markets. It follows conventional treatment in distinguishing economic regulation from a host of other forms of government intervention in markets, including the social regulation of environmental, health and safety practices, antitrust policy, and tax and tariff policies. The measurement issues that discusses arise in the empirical analysis of all types of government regulation; therefore, it have structured the methodological discussion so that it has broad applicability. While the present study is by no means an exhaustive survey of the literature, it includes numerous examples of the use of different types of data and measurement techniques. These are selected to cover a range of industries and time periods sufficient to give the reader a good feeling for what is known, not known, or in dispute. The chapter examines the way alternative theoretical frameworks and empirical methodologies have been applied to study the effects of price and entry regulation on each of: prices, costs, technological change, product quality, and the distribution of income and rents.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642611']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642638.jsonld | ['Chapter 23 Optimal policies for natural monopolies'] | ['This chapter examines some of the optimal policies that are used to control a natural monopoly. Although the traditional view suggests that government intervention and natural monopoly go hand in hand, economic analysis since the late 1960s has suggested rather forcefully that there are ways to introduce competition for a market, even if a natural monopoly structure exists within a market. The chapter provides an overview of possible competitive approaches to the natural monopoly problem. It discusses some of the major concepts in optimal pricing in regulated industries. These include peak load pricing, Ramsey pricing, and nonlinear outlay schedules. The chapter reviews a set of issues related to the fairness of regulated prices is discussed in the context of cross-subsidy or interservice subsidy.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642638'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 23 Optimal policies for natural monopolies']
### Abstract:
['This chapter examines some of the optimal policies that are used to control a natural monopoly. Although the traditional view suggests that government intervention and natural monopoly go hand in hand, economic analysis since the late 1960s has suggested rather forcefully that there are ways to introduce competition for a market, even if a natural monopoly structure exists within a market. The chapter provides an overview of possible competitive approaches to the natural monopoly problem. It discusses some of the major concepts in optimal pricing in regulated industries. These include peak load pricing, Ramsey pricing, and nonlinear outlay schedules. The chapter reviews a set of issues related to the fairness of regulated prices is discussed in the context of cross-subsidy or interservice subsidy.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642638']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642670.jsonld | ['Chapter 19 An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods'] | ['Real markets are easy to create. The difficult part is creating a market that demonstrates a point that remains valid upon replication in other subject pools and by other experimenters. Because market behavior is sensitive to both individual preferences and to the details of the structure of the institutional arrangements, the experimenter must avoid contaminating these variables with poorly developed experimental procedures. If the experimental procedures do not control these variables adequately, attempts to replicate the results may fail, because the experimenter has unknowingly failed to conduct the same experiment. The laboratory experiments in economics have been motivated by the theories of industrial organization. The chapter reviews the question regarding the relevance of laboratory methods. Several common criticisms of experimental methods are outlined in the chapter. The recent explosion of professional interest in experimental methods reflects, in part, recognition that experimental methods provide a source of shared experience for scholars who are developing and evaluating theories about complicated, naturally occurring processes. While laboratory processes are simple in comparison to naturally occurring processes, they are real processes in the sense that real people participate for real and substantial profits and follow real rules in doing so.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642670'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 19 An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods']
### Abstract:
['Real markets are easy to create. The difficult part is creating a market that demonstrates a point that remains valid upon replication in other subject pools and by other experimenters. Because market behavior is sensitive to both individual preferences and to the details of the structure of the institutional arrangements, the experimenter must avoid contaminating these variables with poorly developed experimental procedures. If the experimental procedures do not control these variables adequately, attempts to replicate the results may fail, because the experimenter has unknowingly failed to conduct the same experiment. The laboratory experiments in economics have been motivated by the theories of industrial organization. The chapter reviews the question regarding the relevance of laboratory methods. Several common criticisms of experimental methods are outlined in the chapter. The recent explosion of professional interest in experimental methods reflects, in part, recognition that experimental methods provide a source of shared experience for scholars who are developing and evaluating theories about complicated, naturally occurring processes. While laboratory processes are simple in comparison to naturally occurring processes, they are real processes in the sense that real people participate for real and substantial profits and follow real rules in doing so.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642670']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642689.jsonld | ['Chapter 18 Empirical studies of innovation and market structure'] | ['This chapter discusses the perceptible movement of empirical scholars from a narrow concern with the role of firm size and market concentration toward a broader consideration of the fundamental determinants of technical change in industry. Although tastes, technological opportunity, and appropriability conditions themselves are subject to change over time, particularly in response to radical innovations that alter the technological regime, these conditions are reasonably assumed to determine inter-industry differences in innovative activity over relatively long periods. Although a substantial body of descriptive evidence has begun to accumulate on the way the nature and effects of demand, opportunity, and appropriability differ across industries, the absence of suitable data constrains progress in many areas. It has been observed that much of the empirical understanding of innovation derives not from the estimation of econometric models but from the use of other empirical methods. Many of the most credible empirical regularities have been established not by estimating and testing elaborate optimization models with published data but by the painstaking collection of original data, usually in the form of responses to relatively simple questions.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642689'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 18 Empirical studies of innovation and market structure']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses the perceptible movement of empirical scholars from a narrow concern with the role of firm size and market concentration toward a broader consideration of the fundamental determinants of technical change in industry. Although tastes, technological opportunity, and appropriability conditions themselves are subject to change over time, particularly in response to radical innovations that alter the technological regime, these conditions are reasonably assumed to determine inter-industry differences in innovative activity over relatively long periods. Although a substantial body of descriptive evidence has begun to accumulate on the way the nature and effects of demand, opportunity, and appropriability differ across industries, the absence of suitable data constrains progress in many areas. It has been observed that much of the empirical understanding of innovation derives not from the estimation of econometric models but from the use of other empirical methods. Many of the most credible empirical regularities have been established not by estimating and testing elaborate optimization models with published data but by the painstaking collection of original data, usually in the form of responses to relatively simple questions.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642689']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642697.jsonld | ['Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power'] | ['This chapter describes the econometric studies of market power in single markets and in groups of related markets. The recent increase in the number of such studies and substantial advances in the methods for carrying them out constitute a dramatic shift in the focus of empirical work in the industrial organization (IO) field. The chapter discusses time series data from single industries or on data from closely related markets. The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) is clearly somewhat different than the previously dominant empirical method in the field, the structureconductperformance paradigm (SCPP). The chapter presents the formation and enforcement of tacitly collusive arrangements, the nature of noncooperative oligopoly interaction in the world, the degree of single-firm market power under product differentiation, and the size and determinants of the industry price-cost margin. It reviews the various empirical models of monopoly power and of oligopoly interaction and describes the theoretical and empirical arguments for why it is monopoly power that is being measured.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642697'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power']
### Abstract:
['This chapter describes the econometric studies of market power in single markets and in groups of related markets. The recent increase in the number of such studies and substantial advances in the methods for carrying them out constitute a dramatic shift in the focus of empirical work in the industrial organization (IO) field. The chapter discusses time series data from single industries or on data from closely related markets. The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) is clearly somewhat different than the previously dominant empirical method in the field, the structureconductperformance paradigm (SCPP). The chapter presents the formation and enforcement of tacitly collusive arrangements, the nature of noncooperative oligopoly interaction in the world, the degree of single-firm market power under product differentiation, and the size and determinants of the industry price-cost margin. It reviews the various empirical models of monopoly power and of oligopoly interaction and describes the theoretical and empirical arguments for why it is monopoly power that is being measured.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642697']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642700.jsonld | ['Chapter 16 Inter-industry studies of structure and performance'] | ['This chapter discusses inter-industry studies of the relations among various measures of market structure, conduct, and performance. It discusses that tradition has indeed uncovered many stable, robust, and empirical regularities. Inter-industry research has taught much about the way markets look, especially within the manufacturing sector in developed economies, even if it has not shown exactly the way markets work. Work in some areas has produced no clear picture of the important patterns in the data, and non-manufacturing industries have not received attention commensurate with their importance. But cross-section studies are limited by serious problems of interpretation and measurement. Future inter-industry research should adopt a modest, descriptive orientation and aim to complement case studies by uncovering robust empirical regularities that can be used to evaluate and develop theoretical tools. Much of the most persuasive recent work relies on nonstandard data sources, particularly panel data that can be used to deal with disequilibrium problems and industry-specific data, which mitigate the problem of unobservable industry-specific variables.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642700'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 16 Inter-industry studies of structure and performance']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses inter-industry studies of the relations among various measures of market structure, conduct, and performance. It discusses that tradition has indeed uncovered many stable, robust, and empirical regularities. Inter-industry research has taught much about the way markets look, especially within the manufacturing sector in developed economies, even if it has not shown exactly the way markets work. Work in some areas has produced no clear picture of the important patterns in the data, and non-manufacturing industries have not received attention commensurate with their importance. But cross-section studies are limited by serious problems of interpretation and measurement. Future inter-industry research should adopt a modest, descriptive orientation and aim to complement case studies by uncovering robust empirical regularities that can be used to evaluate and develop theoretical tools. Much of the most persuasive recent work relies on nonstandard data sources, particularly panel data that can be used to deal with disequilibrium problems and industry-specific data, which mitigate the problem of unobservable industry-specific variables.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642700']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642751.jsonld | ['Chapter 15 The theory and the facts of how markets clear: Is industrial organization valuable for understanding macroeconomics?'] | ["This chapter has presented a survey of what industrial economists know about how markets clear. The evidence on price behavior is sufficiently inconsistent with the simple theories of market clearing that industrial economists should be led to explore other paradigms. The most useful extensions of the theory will be those that recognize that marketing is a costly activity, that an impersonal price mechanism is not the only device used to allocate goods, and that price methods in conjunction with non-price methods are typically used to allocate goods. Exactly what macroeconomists can learn from all this is less clear to me. Since both macroeconomists and industrial economists are interested in the same question of how markets clear, I have no doubt that there is the potential for the two groups to influence each other's research. Whether that potential is realized depends in part on how some of the new areas of research in industrial organization develop."] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642751'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 15 The theory and the facts of how markets clear: Is industrial organization valuable for understanding macroeconomics?']
### Abstract:
["This chapter has presented a survey of what industrial economists know about how markets clear. The evidence on price behavior is sufficiently inconsistent with the simple theories of market clearing that industrial economists should be led to explore other paradigms. The most useful extensions of the theory will be those that recognize that marketing is a costly activity, that an impersonal price mechanism is not the only device used to allocate goods, and that price methods in conjunction with non-price methods are typically used to allocate goods. Exactly what macroeconomists can learn from all this is less clear to me. Since both macroeconomists and industrial economists are interested in the same question of how markets clear, I have no doubt that there is the potential for the two groups to influence each other's research. Whether that potential is realized depends in part on how some of the new areas of research in industrial organization develop."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642751']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A183164276X.jsonld | ['Chapter 14 The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion'] | ['The analysis of the timing of innovation posits a particular innovation and examines the way the expected benefits, the cost of research and development, and interactions among competing firms combine to determine the pattern of expenditure across firms and over time, the date of introduction, and the identity of the innovating firm. In the case of a sequence of innovations, the expected lifetime of a given innovation and the pattern of technological leadership are also determined endogenously. Given that an innovation has been perfected, the extent and timing of its dissemination into use may be examined. This may depend upon a number of factors, including the existence of rival firms and institutions, which may facilitate or retard the dissemination of innovations. The chapter discusses the issues of innovation production in the context of symmetric noncooperative models. The chapter investigates the extent of dissemination of the innovation, where this dissemination is achieved through licensing.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164276X'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 14 The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion']
### Abstract:
['The analysis of the timing of innovation posits a particular innovation and examines the way the expected benefits, the cost of research and development, and interactions among competing firms combine to determine the pattern of expenditure across firms and over time, the date of introduction, and the identity of the innovating firm. In the case of a sequence of innovations, the expected lifetime of a given innovation and the pattern of technological leadership are also determined endogenously. Given that an innovation has been perfected, the extent and timing of its dissemination into use may be examined. This may depend upon a number of factors, including the existence of rival firms and institutions, which may facilitate or retard the dissemination of innovations. The chapter discusses the issues of innovation production in the context of symmetric noncooperative models. The chapter investigates the extent of dissemination of the innovation, where this dissemination is achieved through licensing.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164276X']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642816.jsonld | ['Chapter 9 Predation, monopolization, and antitrust'] | ["This chapter discusses a wide range of strategies that can be employed by incumbent firms either to protect or to extend their market shares against competitive attacks by actual and potential entrants. The hallmark of these strategies is that, invariably, they reduce the expected level of profits that incumbent's rivalspresent and futurecan hope to earn. As such, they differ from those types of conduct whose aim is to implement and enforce collusive arrangements among market participants. Unlike many collusive strategies, these hostile and exclusionary strategies that include low prices, output expansions, introductions of new products, redesigns of the existing products, and promotions are difficult to distinguish from area part and parcel of market rivalry that economists find salutary for economic welfare, that policy-makers wish to promote, and that business leaders often deplore."] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642816'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 9 Predation, monopolization, and antitrust']
### Abstract:
["This chapter discusses a wide range of strategies that can be employed by incumbent firms either to protect or to extend their market shares against competitive attacks by actual and potential entrants. The hallmark of these strategies is that, invariably, they reduce the expected level of profits that incumbent's rivalspresent and futurecan hope to earn. As such, they differ from those types of conduct whose aim is to implement and enforce collusive arrangements among market participants. Unlike many collusive strategies, these hostile and exclusionary strategies that include low prices, output expansions, introductions of new products, redesigns of the existing products, and promotions are difficult to distinguish from area part and parcel of market rivalry that economists find salutary for economic welfare, that policy-makers wish to promote, and that business leaders often deplore."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642816']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642824.jsonld | ['Chapter 8 Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency'] | ["This chapter discusses the difference between determinants of barriers to the mobility of capital and the welfare implications of entry and exit. The first task is confined for identifying situations in which a firm that is established in an industry benefits because of its incumbency. An incumbency advantage does not necessarily imply that welfare would be improved by encouraging entry. Consumers may be disadvantaged if forced to switch to another supplier. Industry costs would increase if entry eroded the benefits of economies of scale or learning. Entry prevention may result in both lower prices and lower costs than would occur if entry were allowed. The chapter describes Bain's determinants of barriers to entry and shows the way they may be interpreted in the light of recent contributions to the theory of strategic entry deterrence. The role of behavior in the determination of the conditions of entry is discussed in the chapter. Strategic entry deterrence is designed to influence the behavior of potential rivals. It is effective only to the extent that potential competitors look to current behavior as indicative of future market conditions."] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642824'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 8 Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency']
### Abstract:
["This chapter discusses the difference between determinants of barriers to the mobility of capital and the welfare implications of entry and exit. The first task is confined for identifying situations in which a firm that is established in an industry benefits because of its incumbency. An incumbency advantage does not necessarily imply that welfare would be improved by encouraging entry. Consumers may be disadvantaged if forced to switch to another supplier. Industry costs would increase if entry eroded the benefits of economies of scale or learning. Entry prevention may result in both lower prices and lower costs than would occur if entry were allowed. The chapter describes Bain's determinants of barriers to entry and shows the way they may be interpreted in the light of recent contributions to the theory of strategic entry deterrence. The role of behavior in the determination of the conditions of entry is discussed in the chapter. Strategic entry deterrence is designed to influence the behavior of potential rivals. It is effective only to the extent that potential competitors look to current behavior as indicative of future market conditions."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642824']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642832.jsonld | ['Chapter 7 Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger'] | ['This chapter discusses the principal theoretical and practical problems of the economics of cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger. Because the new theoretical approaches are not easily modified to encompass welfare considerations, except in a very partial-equilibrium setting, the positive side of the analysis has received more weight than the normative. The principal factors that facilitate or hinder collusion are considered. The chapter discusses the types and extent of horizontal collusion. The principal forms of explicit agreement are cartels, joint ventures, and horizontal mergers. Empirical tests of factors that facilitate or hinder collusion are of two sorts: econometric and experimental. In a series of experiments described in the chapter, the pricing performance of an industry with and without certain types of contractual clauses, advance notice of price changes, and public price posting are compared. The combination of these practices is sufficient to raise price significantly above the level observed when the practices are removed.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642832'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 7 Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses the principal theoretical and practical problems of the economics of cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger. Because the new theoretical approaches are not easily modified to encompass welfare considerations, except in a very partial-equilibrium setting, the positive side of the analysis has received more weight than the normative. The principal factors that facilitate or hinder collusion are considered. The chapter discusses the types and extent of horizontal collusion. The principal forms of explicit agreement are cartels, joint ventures, and horizontal mergers. Empirical tests of factors that facilitate or hinder collusion are of two sorts: econometric and experimental. In a series of experiments described in the chapter, the pricing performance of an industry with and without certain types of contractual clauses, advance notice of price changes, and public price posting are compared. The combination of these practices is sufficient to raise price significantly above the level observed when the practices are removed.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642832']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642867.jsonld | ['Chapter 4 Vertical integration: Determinants and effects'] | ['The theory of vertical integration is situated at the intersection of the theory of the firm, the theory of contracts, and the theory of markets. A firm can be described as vertically integrated if it encompasses two single-output production processes in which either (1) the entire output of the upstream process is employed as part or all of the quantity of one intermediate input into the downstream process or (2) the entire quantity of one intermediate input into the downstream process is obtained from part or all of the output of the upstream process. This includes the more restrictive criterion that the entire output of the upstream subsidiary be employed as all of the quantity of one intermediate input into the downstream process. There are three broad determinants of vertical integration: technological economies, transactional economies, and market imperfections. Vertical integration may arise from technological economies of integration. In particular, less of the other intermediate inputs may be required to obtain the same output in the downstream process when the firm has integrated one of the upstream processes.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642867'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 4 Vertical integration: Determinants and effects']
### Abstract:
['The theory of vertical integration is situated at the intersection of the theory of the firm, the theory of contracts, and the theory of markets. A firm can be described as vertically integrated if it encompasses two single-output production processes in which either (1) the entire output of the upstream process is employed as part or all of the quantity of one intermediate input into the downstream process or (2) the entire quantity of one intermediate input into the downstream process is obtained from part or all of the output of the upstream process. This includes the more restrictive criterion that the entire output of the upstream subsidiary be employed as all of the quantity of one intermediate input into the downstream process. There are three broad determinants of vertical integration: technological economies, transactional economies, and market imperfections. Vertical integration may arise from technological economies of integration. In particular, less of the other intermediate inputs may be required to obtain the same output in the downstream process when the firm has integrated one of the upstream processes.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642867']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642883.jsonld | ['Chapter 2 The theory of the firm'] | ["The theory of the firm has long posed a problem for economists. This chapter discusses the analytical models of the firm that go beyond the black-box conception of a production function. The firm is seen as a contract among a multitude of parties. The main hypothesis is that contractual designs, both implicit and explicit, are created to minimize transaction costs between specialized factors of production. This follows Coase's original hypothesis that institutions serve the purpose of facilitating exchange and can best be understood as optimal accommodations to contractual constraints rather than production constraints. There are three problems that need attention. A first step is to develop and apply techniques that deal with nonstandard problems, such as incomplete contracts, bounded rationality, and multi-lateral contracting. The second step ought to integrate observations from neighboring fields, such as sociology and psychology, in a consistent way into the theoretical apparatus. The third step will be to increase the evidence/theory ratio, which is currently very low in this field."] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642883'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 2 The theory of the firm']
### Abstract:
["The theory of the firm has long posed a problem for economists. This chapter discusses the analytical models of the firm that go beyond the black-box conception of a production function. The firm is seen as a contract among a multitude of parties. The main hypothesis is that contractual designs, both implicit and explicit, are created to minimize transaction costs between specialized factors of production. This follows Coase's original hypothesis that institutions serve the purpose of facilitating exchange and can best be understood as optimal accommodations to contractual constraints rather than production constraints. There are three problems that need attention. A first step is to develop and apply techniques that deal with nonstandard problems, such as incomplete contracts, bounded rationality, and multi-lateral contracting. The second step ought to integrate observations from neighboring fields, such as sociology and psychology, in a consistent way into the theoretical apparatus. The third step will be to increase the evidence/theory ratio, which is currently very low in this field."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642883']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642891.jsonld | ['Chapter 1 Technological determinants of firm and industry structure'] | ['This chapter discusses the cost concepts required for analyzing the role of technology in the determination of firm and industry structure. It focuses on the general multiproduct case, although important single product aspects of the problem are also discussed. An analysis of the role these cost concepts play in determining efficient industry structure is presented in the chapter. The most basic concept with which to characterize the productive technology available to the firm is the technology set, a list of the combinations of inputs and outputs that are available to the firm. In a private enterprise economy, any industry structure that persists in the long run must yield the firms in the industry at least zero economic profits. This places certain restrictions on the relative locations of the cost and demand curves. In an empirical application that attempts to estimate the cost function of an individual firm, the data available may be better suited for estimating a short-run cost function: a specification that assumes that only some of the inputs available to the firm are set at their cost-minimizing levels.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642891'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 1 Technological determinants of firm and industry structure']
### Abstract:
['This chapter discusses the cost concepts required for analyzing the role of technology in the determination of firm and industry structure. It focuses on the general multiproduct case, although important single product aspects of the problem are also discussed. An analysis of the role these cost concepts play in determining efficient industry structure is presented in the chapter. The most basic concept with which to characterize the productive technology available to the firm is the technology set, a list of the combinations of inputs and outputs that are available to the firm. In a private enterprise economy, any industry structure that persists in the long run must yield the firms in the industry at least zero economic profits. This places certain restrictions on the relative locations of the cost and demand curves. In an empirical application that attempts to estimate the cost function of an individual firm, the data available may be better suited for estimating a short-run cost function: a specification that assumes that only some of the inputs available to the firm are set at their cost-minimizing levels.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642891']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831642999.jsonld | ['Chapter 36 Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers'] | ['Recently there has been a notable increase in interest in antitrust law in much of the world. This chapter discusses antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers, the area of antitrust that has seen some of the most dramatic improvements in both economic tools and the application of economics in enforcement practice. The chapter discusses theoretical considerations, merger laws and enforcement practices, econometric methods for analyzing prospective horizontal mergers, and evidence concerning the ex post effects of actual horizontal mergers.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642999'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 36 Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers']
### Abstract:
['Recently there has been a notable increase in interest in antitrust law in much of the world. This chapter discusses antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers, the area of antitrust that has seen some of the most dramatic improvements in both economic tools and the application of economics in enforcement practice. The chapter discusses theoretical considerations, merger laws and enforcement practices, econometric methods for analyzing prospective horizontal mergers, and evidence concerning the ex post effects of actual horizontal mergers.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831642999']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643014.jsonld | ['Chapter 34 Price Discrimination and Competition'] | ['This chapter surveys the developments in price discrimination theory as it applies to imperfectly competitive markets. Broad themes and conclusions are discussed in the areas of first-, second- and third-degree price discrimination, pricing under demand uncertainty, bundling and behavior-based discrimination.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643014'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 34 Price Discrimination and Competition']
### Abstract:
['This chapter surveys the developments in price discrimination theory as it applies to imperfectly competitive markets. Broad themes and conclusions are discussed in the areas of first-, second- and third-degree price discrimination, pricing under demand uncertainty, bundling and behavior-based discrimination.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643014']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643022.jsonld | ['Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure'] | ["This chapter analyzes the private rationale and the social costs and benefits of market foreclosure, here defined as a firm's restriction of output in one market through the use of market power in another market. The chapter first focuses on vertical foreclosure (in which full access to a bottleneck input is denied to competitors) and provides an overview of the theory of access to an essential facility in an unregulated environment. It considers a wide array of contexts: possibility of bypass of the bottleneck facility, upstream vs downstream location of this facility, and various exclusionary activities such as vertical integration and exclusive dealing. It identifies a number of robust conclusions as to the social and private costs and benefits of foreclosure. The chapter then turns to horizontal foreclosure , where the monopoly good is sold directly to the end-users, and analyzes recent theories of anti-competitive bundling aimed at reducing competition in the adjacent markets or at protecting the monopoly market. Finally, the chapter tackles exclusive customer contracts and discusses potential efficiency defenses for exclusionary behavior."] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643022'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure']
### Abstract:
["This chapter analyzes the private rationale and the social costs and benefits of market foreclosure, here defined as a firm's restriction of output in one market through the use of market power in another market. The chapter first focuses on vertical foreclosure (in which full access to a bottleneck input is denied to competitors) and provides an overview of the theory of access to an essential facility in an unregulated environment. It considers a wide array of contexts: possibility of bypass of the bottleneck facility, upstream vs downstream location of this facility, and various exclusionary activities such as vertical integration and exclusive dealing. It identifies a number of robust conclusions as to the social and private costs and benefits of foreclosure. The chapter then turns to horizontal foreclosure , where the monopoly good is sold directly to the end-users, and analyzes recent theories of anti-competitive bundling aimed at reducing competition in the adjacent markets or at protecting the monopoly market. Finally, the chapter tackles exclusive customer contracts and discusses potential efficiency defenses for exclusionary behavior."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643022']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643049.jsonld | ['Chapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects'] | ["Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex post market power – over the same buyer in the case of switching costs (or brand loyalty), or over others with network effects. Firms compete ex ante for this ex post power, using penetration pricing, introductory offers, and price wars. Such “competition for the market” or “life-cycle competition” can adequately replace ordinary compatible competition, and can even be fiercer than compatible competition by weakening differentiation. More often, however, incompatible competition not only involves direct efficiency losses but also softens competition and magnifies incumbency advantages. With network effects, established firms have little incentive to offer better deals when buyers' and complementors' expectations hinge on non-efficiency factors (especially history such as past market shares), and although competition between incompatible networks is initially unstable and sensitive to competitive offers and random events, it later “tips” to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching costs can encourage small-scale entry, they discourage sellers from raiding one another's existing customers, and so also discourage more aggressive entry. Because of these competitive effects, even inefficient incompatible competition is often more profitable than compatible competition, especially for dominant firms with installed-base or expectational advantages. Thus firms probably seek incompatibility too often. We therefore favor thoughtfully pro-compatibility public policy."] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643049'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects']
### Abstract:
["Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex post market power – over the same buyer in the case of switching costs (or brand loyalty), or over others with network effects. Firms compete ex ante for this ex post power, using penetration pricing, introductory offers, and price wars. Such “competition for the market” or “life-cycle competition” can adequately replace ordinary compatible competition, and can even be fiercer than compatible competition by weakening differentiation. More often, however, incompatible competition not only involves direct efficiency losses but also softens competition and magnifies incumbency advantages. With network effects, established firms have little incentive to offer better deals when buyers' and complementors' expectations hinge on non-efficiency factors (especially history such as past market shares), and although competition between incompatible networks is initially unstable and sensitive to competitive offers and random events, it later “tips” to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching costs can encourage small-scale entry, they discourage sellers from raiding one another's existing customers, and so also discourage more aggressive entry. Because of these competitive effects, even inefficient incompatible competition is often more profitable than compatible competition, especially for dominant firms with installed-base or expectational advantages. Thus firms probably seek incompatibility too often. We therefore favor thoughtfully pro-compatibility public policy."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643049']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643057.jsonld | ['Chapter 30 A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO'] | ["This paper reviews a framework for numerically analyzing dynamic interactions in imperfectly competitive industries. The framework dates back to Ericson and Pakes [1995. Review of Economic Studies 62, 53–82], but it is based on equilibrium notions that had been available for some time before, and it has been extended in many ways by different authors since. The framework requires as input a set of primitives which describe the institutional structure in the industry to be analyzed. The framework outputs profits and policies for every incumbent and potential entrant at each possible state of the industry. These policies can be used to simulate the distribution of sample paths for all firms from any initial industry structure. The sample paths generated by the model can be quite different depending on the primitives, and most of the extensions were designed to enable the framework to accommodate empirically relevant cases that required modification of the initial structure. The sample paths possess similar properties to those observed in (the recently available) panel data sets on industries. These sample paths can be used either for an analysis of the likely response to a policy or an environmental change, or as the model's implication in an estimation algorithm. We begin with a review of an elementary version of the framework and a report on what is known about its analytic properties. Much of the rest of the paper deals with computational issues. We start with an introduction to iterative techniques for computing equilibrium that are analogous to the techniques used to compute the solution to single agent dynamic programming problems. This includes discussions of the determinants of the computational burden of these techniques, and the mechanism implicitly used to select an equilibrium when multiple equilibria are possible. We then outline a number of techniques that might be used to reduce the computational burden of the iterative algorithm. This section includes discussions of both the implications of differences in modeling assumptions used in the alternative techniques, and a discussion of the likely relevance of the different techniques for different institutional structures. A separate section reports on a technique for computing multiple equilibria from the same set of primitives. The paper concludes with a review of applications of the framework and a brief discussion of areas where further development of the framework would seem warranted."] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643057'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 30 A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO']
### Abstract:
["This paper reviews a framework for numerically analyzing dynamic interactions in imperfectly competitive industries. The framework dates back to Ericson and Pakes [1995. Review of Economic Studies 62, 53–82], but it is based on equilibrium notions that had been available for some time before, and it has been extended in many ways by different authors since. The framework requires as input a set of primitives which describe the institutional structure in the industry to be analyzed. The framework outputs profits and policies for every incumbent and potential entrant at each possible state of the industry. These policies can be used to simulate the distribution of sample paths for all firms from any initial industry structure. The sample paths generated by the model can be quite different depending on the primitives, and most of the extensions were designed to enable the framework to accommodate empirically relevant cases that required modification of the initial structure. The sample paths possess similar properties to those observed in (the recently available) panel data sets on industries. These sample paths can be used either for an analysis of the likely response to a policy or an environmental change, or as the model's implication in an estimation algorithm. We begin with a review of an elementary version of the framework and a report on what is known about its analytic properties. Much of the rest of the paper deals with computational issues. We start with an introduction to iterative techniques for computing equilibrium that are analogous to the techniques used to compute the solution to single agent dynamic programming problems. This includes discussions of the determinants of the computational burden of these techniques, and the mechanism implicitly used to select an equilibrium when multiple equilibria are possible. We then outline a number of techniques that might be used to reduce the computational burden of the iterative algorithm. This section includes discussions of both the implications of differences in modeling assumptions used in the alternative techniques, and a discussion of the likely relevance of the different techniques for different institutional structures. A separate section reports on a technique for computing multiple equilibria from the same set of primitives. The paper concludes with a review of applications of the framework and a brief discussion of areas where further development of the framework would seem warranted."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643057']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643065.jsonld | ['Chapter 29 Empirical Models of Entry and Market Structure'] | ['This chapter surveys empirical models of market structure. We pay particular attention to equilibrium models that interpret cross-sectional variation in the number of firms or firm turnover rates. We begin by discussing what economists can in principle learn from models with homogeneous potential entrants. We then turn to models with heterogeneous firms. In the process, we review applications that analyze market structure in airline, retail, professional, auction, lodging, and broadcasting markets. We conclude with a summary of more recent models that incorporate incomplete information, “set identified” parameters, and dynamics.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643065'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 29 Empirical Models of Entry and Market Structure']
### Abstract:
['This chapter surveys empirical models of market structure. We pay particular attention to equilibrium models that interpret cross-sectional variation in the number of firms or firm turnover rates. We begin by discussing what economists can in principle learn from models with homogeneous potential entrants. We then turn to models with heterogeneous firms. In the process, we review applications that analyze market structure in airline, retail, professional, auction, lodging, and broadcasting markets. We conclude with a summary of more recent models that incorporate incomplete information, “set identified” parameters, and dynamics.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643065']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643073.jsonld | ['Chapter 28 The Economic Analysis of Advertising'] | ['This chapter offers a comprehensive survey of the economic analysis of advertising. A first objective is to organize the literature in a manner that clarifies what is known. A second objective is to clarify how this knowledge has been obtained. The chapter begins with a discussion of the key initial writings that are associated with the persuasive, informative and complementary views of advertising. Next, work that characterizes empirical regularities between advertising and other variables is considered. Much of this work is conducted at the inter-industry level but important industry studies are also discussed. The chapter then offers several sections that summarize formal economic theories of advertising. In particular, respective sections are devoted to positive and normative theories of monopoly advertising, theories of price and non-price advertising, theories of advertising and product quality, and theories that explore the potential role for advertising in deterring entry. At this point, the chapter considers the empirical support for the formal economic theories of advertising. A summary is provided of empirical work that evaluates the predictions of recent theories of advertising, including work that specifies and estimates explicitly structural models of firm and consumer conduct. This work is characterized by the use of industry (or brand) and even household-level data. The chapter then considers work on endogenous and exogenous sunk cost industries. At a methodological level, this work is integrative in nature: it develops new theory that delivers a few robust predictions, and it then explores the empirical relevance of these predictions at both inter-industry and industry levels. Finally, the chapter considers new directions and other topics. Here, recent work on advertising and media markets is discussed, and research on behavioral economics and neuroeconomics is also featured. A final section offers some concluding thoughts.'] | ['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643073'] | ['Industrieökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 28 The Economic Analysis of Advertising']
### Abstract:
['This chapter offers a comprehensive survey of the economic analysis of advertising. A first objective is to organize the literature in a manner that clarifies what is known. A second objective is to clarify how this knowledge has been obtained. The chapter begins with a discussion of the key initial writings that are associated with the persuasive, informative and complementary views of advertising. Next, work that characterizes empirical regularities between advertising and other variables is considered. Much of this work is conducted at the inter-industry level but important industry studies are also discussed. The chapter then offers several sections that summarize formal economic theories of advertising. In particular, respective sections are devoted to positive and normative theories of monopoly advertising, theories of price and non-price advertising, theories of advertising and product quality, and theories that explore the potential role for advertising in deterring entry. At this point, the chapter considers the empirical support for the formal economic theories of advertising. A summary is provided of empirical work that evaluates the predictions of recent theories of advertising, including work that specifies and estimates explicitly structural models of firm and consumer conduct. This work is characterized by the use of industry (or brand) and even household-level data. The chapter then considers work on endogenous and exogenous sunk cost industries. At a methodological level, this work is integrative in nature: it develops new theory that delivers a few robust predictions, and it then explores the empirical relevance of these predictions at both inter-industry and industry levels. Finally, the chapter considers new directions and other topics. Here, recent work on advertising and media markets is discussed, and research on behavioral economics and neuroeconomics is also featured. A final section offers some concluding thoughts.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4133311-1', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643073']
### GND class:
['Industrieökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A183164312X.jsonld | ['Chapter 45 Trade and industrial policy reform'] | ['This chapter reviews the consequences of policy reforms. It covers both theory and evidence, as it is only the interplay of the two that allows comprehending and interpreting the world around. Research on policy reform has not been short on either theory or evidence, even though, there is still a need for systematic empirical studies on the consequences of the recent round of reforms. The chapter focuses on trade and industrial policies and discusses macroeconomic stabilization issues as they impinge on microeconomic reforms. The chapter reviews the literature on the strategy of reform and covers recent contributions including those in the theories of piecemeal reform, timing and sequencing of reform, credibility, and political economy. It also reviews the available evidence on the consequences of the reforms of the 1980s, paying particular attention to the supply response and to static and dynamic efficiency.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164312X'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 45 Trade and industrial policy reform']
### Abstract:
['This chapter reviews the consequences of policy reforms. It covers both theory and evidence, as it is only the interplay of the two that allows comprehending and interpreting the world around. Research on policy reform has not been short on either theory or evidence, even though, there is still a need for systematic empirical studies on the consequences of the recent round of reforms. The chapter focuses on trade and industrial policies and discusses macroeconomic stabilization issues as they impinge on microeconomic reforms. The chapter reviews the literature on the strategy of reform and covers recent contributions including those in the theories of piecemeal reform, timing and sequencing of reform, credibility, and political economy. It also reviews the available evidence on the consequences of the reforms of the 1980s, paying particular attention to the supply response and to static and dynamic efficiency.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164312X']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643154.jsonld | ['Chapter 42 Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations'] | ['This chapter inquires into the efficiency and equity consequences of rental and sales markets for agricultural land in the developing world. Most of the work on the relationship between farm size and productivity strongly suggests that farms that rely mostly on family labor have higher productivity levels than large farms operated primarily with hired labor. An examination of the historical evolution of land rights shows the reason for the deviations: rights over land and the concentration of ownership observed in most developing countries at the end of World War II are outgrowths of power relationships. The chapter describes the variety of land relations and their consequences for the efficiency of agricultural production. The chapter also we examines how these power relations emerged and what legal means enabled relatively few landowners to accumulate and hold on to large landholdings. The methodological epilogue examines how various strands of economic theory have contributed, or failed to contribute, to the explanation of variations in policies, distortions and land relations over space and time.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643154'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 42 Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations']
### Abstract:
['This chapter inquires into the efficiency and equity consequences of rental and sales markets for agricultural land in the developing world. Most of the work on the relationship between farm size and productivity strongly suggests that farms that rely mostly on family labor have higher productivity levels than large farms operated primarily with hired labor. An examination of the historical evolution of land rights shows the reason for the deviations: rights over land and the concentration of ownership observed in most developing countries at the end of World War II are outgrowths of power relationships. The chapter describes the variety of land relations and their consequences for the efficiency of agricultural production. The chapter also we examines how these power relations emerged and what legal means enabled relatively few landowners to accumulate and hold on to large landholdings. The methodological epilogue examines how various strands of economic theory have contributed, or failed to contribute, to the explanation of variations in policies, distortions and land relations over space and time.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643154']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643162.jsonld | ['Chapter 41 Poverty and policy'] | ['The structure, efficiency, and growth of production affect (and are affected by) the distribution of consumption. Poverty analysis has three tasks: (1) to define and describe poverty, (2) to understand its causes, and (3) to inform policy. This chapter outlines history of economic thought on poverty since the mercantilists, concentrating on relevance to current economic analysis and policy. It examines how poverty is defined and measured. Evidence from modern household surveys has allowed in the examination of the interactions between demographic, nutritional, and labor-force characteristics of poverty groups. In this process, modern economics is developing some of the central insights of the classical economists, though with measurement and modeling methods not available to them. The chapter discusses the classic development issue of the effect of growth on poverty and inequality, and (the recent classic) macroeconomic adjustment and the poor. It explores several issues that arise in governmental attempts to reduce poverty through direct interventions.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643162'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 41 Poverty and policy']
### Abstract:
['The structure, efficiency, and growth of production affect (and are affected by) the distribution of consumption. Poverty analysis has three tasks: (1) to define and describe poverty, (2) to understand its causes, and (3) to inform policy. This chapter outlines history of economic thought on poverty since the mercantilists, concentrating on relevance to current economic analysis and policy. It examines how poverty is defined and measured. Evidence from modern household surveys has allowed in the examination of the interactions between demographic, nutritional, and labor-force characteristics of poverty groups. In this process, modern economics is developing some of the central insights of the classical economists, though with measurement and modeling methods not available to them. The chapter discusses the classic development issue of the effect of growth on poverty and inequality, and (the recent classic) macroeconomic adjustment and the poor. It explores several issues that arise in governmental attempts to reduce poverty through direct interventions.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643162']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643170.jsonld | ['Chapter 40 Policy lessons from development experience since the Second World War'] | ['This chapter presents the evolution of thought regarding development policy and the evidence that challenged development thinking. The chapter focuses on the interaction between experience with development policy and development thought, as a prelude to the more detailed studies of individual aspects of economic policy and experience that follow. The chapter starts with the ideas and thinking that underlay the initial formulation of development policy. The overriding influence of the experience with early development policies is a major factor affecting policies and thinking about development and as such is important in its own right. The experience of developing countries, both the success stories (primarily in East Asia) and the stories of those countries whose growth stalled in the 1980s, is reviewed in the chapter with respect to the influence of success or failure on policy formulation. The theory and evidence regarding alternative strategies to undertake policy reform are reviewed in the chapter. The coherence of policy and the political economy of economic policy formulation and execution are also addressed in the chapter.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643170'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 40 Policy lessons from development experience since the Second World War']
### Abstract:
['This chapter presents the evolution of thought regarding development policy and the evidence that challenged development thinking. The chapter focuses on the interaction between experience with development policy and development thought, as a prelude to the more detailed studies of individual aspects of economic policy and experience that follow. The chapter starts with the ideas and thinking that underlay the initial formulation of development policy. The overriding influence of the experience with early development policies is a major factor affecting policies and thinking about development and as such is important in its own right. The experience of developing countries, both the success stories (primarily in East Asia) and the stories of those countries whose growth stalled in the 1980s, is reviewed in the chapter with respect to the influence of success or failure on policy formulation. The theory and evidence regarding alternative strategies to undertake policy reform are reviewed in the chapter. The coherence of policy and the political economy of economic policy formulation and execution are also addressed in the chapter.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643170']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643499.jsonld | ['Introduction to part 1'] | ["This chapter presents an introduction to the handbook on development economics, Part 1. Development, as contrasted with mere growth of the economy, is, according to Schumpeter, a distinct phenomenon, entirely foreign to what may be observed in the circular flow or in the tendency toward equilibrium. In the dominant neoclassical paradigm of the postwar era, Adam Smith's parable of the invisible hand was rigorously restated in terms of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. First, under a set of mild restrictions on production technology and individual preferences, the equilibrium of a laissez-faire market economy is a Pareto optimum. Second, given a set of rather restrictive assumptions, including the absence of technological externalities and increasing returns to scale in production of goods, and convexity of consumer preferences, any Pareto optimum is also a competitive equilibrium provided income (or initial endowments) of individuals can be redistributed through lump-sum transfers or other non-distortionary means. In contrast to the neoclassical approach to development, that is a historic and based on virtual time, there is the historical, real-time Marxian approach that is closer to the spirit of Schumpeter's analysis. In this approach, the forces of production, represented by available technology at any point in historical time, and the existing relations of production, represented by the institutions governing ownership and access to the means of production determine equilibrium."] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643499'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Introduction to part 1']
### Abstract:
["This chapter presents an introduction to the handbook on development economics, Part 1. Development, as contrasted with mere growth of the economy, is, according to Schumpeter, a distinct phenomenon, entirely foreign to what may be observed in the circular flow or in the tendency toward equilibrium. In the dominant neoclassical paradigm of the postwar era, Adam Smith's parable of the invisible hand was rigorously restated in terms of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. First, under a set of mild restrictions on production technology and individual preferences, the equilibrium of a laissez-faire market economy is a Pareto optimum. Second, given a set of rather restrictive assumptions, including the absence of technological externalities and increasing returns to scale in production of goods, and convexity of consumer preferences, any Pareto optimum is also a competitive equilibrium provided income (or initial endowments) of individuals can be redistributed through lump-sum transfers or other non-distortionary means. In contrast to the neoclassical approach to development, that is a historic and based on virtual time, there is the historical, real-time Marxian approach that is closer to the spirit of Schumpeter's analysis. In this approach, the forces of production, represented by available technology at any point in historical time, and the existing relations of production, represented by the institutions governing ownership and access to the means of production determine equilibrium."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643499']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643510.jsonld | ['Chapter 16 Credit markets and interlinked transactions'] | ['This chapter presents a discussion on credit markets and interlinked transactions. The chapter discusses a general specification of a credit contract, which is then specialized to yield the three main models to have appeared in the literature. In so doing, most of the important themes and ideas are introduced. The chapter discusses some of the relevant evidence that establishes the empirical importance of interlinking. Following a discussion of the reasons for interlinking, the principal-agent and bargaining theoretic approaches are compared and contrasted in the context of resource allocation, innovation, and welfare. The exposition refers to rural life and its principal actors: farmers, laborers, landlords, tenants, moneylenders, and traders. Much of the analysis, however, can be applied readily to urban life, though the balance of emphasis between the problems of hidden information and hidden actions must then be shifted in favor of the former. Two themes identified above recur throughout this chapter and exert considerable influence over its analytical approach and emphasis. First, where information is concerned, there is the distinction between not knowing what sort of person one is dealing with, which may result in adverse selection, and not knowing what actions that person will take if a contract is sealed, which may result in moral hazard. Second, the problems of contractual enforcement and willful, or strategic, default by borrowers are given a prominent place in the analysis. A third theme stems from these departures from the framework of complete and competitive marketsnamely, how the scope for strategic behavior is resolved in equilibrium. The principal-agent formulation appears in a number of guises throughout the chapter. Strategic default has had a prominent place in the analysis of this chapter.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643510'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 16 Credit markets and interlinked transactions']
### Abstract:
['This chapter presents a discussion on credit markets and interlinked transactions. The chapter discusses a general specification of a credit contract, which is then specialized to yield the three main models to have appeared in the literature. In so doing, most of the important themes and ideas are introduced. The chapter discusses some of the relevant evidence that establishes the empirical importance of interlinking. Following a discussion of the reasons for interlinking, the principal-agent and bargaining theoretic approaches are compared and contrasted in the context of resource allocation, innovation, and welfare. The exposition refers to rural life and its principal actors: farmers, laborers, landlords, tenants, moneylenders, and traders. Much of the analysis, however, can be applied readily to urban life, though the balance of emphasis between the problems of hidden information and hidden actions must then be shifted in favor of the former. Two themes identified above recur throughout this chapter and exert considerable influence over its analytical approach and emphasis. First, where information is concerned, there is the distinction between not knowing what sort of person one is dealing with, which may result in adverse selection, and not knowing what actions that person will take if a contract is sealed, which may result in moral hazard. Second, the problems of contractual enforcement and willful, or strategic, default by borrowers are given a prominent place in the analysis. A third theme stems from these departures from the framework of complete and competitive marketsnamely, how the scope for strategic behavior is resolved in equilibrium. The principal-agent formulation appears in a number of guises throughout the chapter. Strategic default has had a prominent place in the analysis of this chapter.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643510']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643529.jsonld | ['Chapter 15 Labor markets in low-income countries'] | ['Labor being by far the most abundant resource in low-income countries, the determination of the returns to labor plays a central role in models of development. The chapter discusses the operation of low-income labor markets with reference to the models that have been and continue to be influential in shaping the study of such markets. These models are evaluated in terms of their ability to shed light on the realities of the allocation, pricing, and employment of labor in low-income countries. The chapter discusses models directly concerned with and evidence on the employment and pricing of labor in the rural (agricultural) sector. The chapter also discusses the process of determining rural wages are and their rigidity, the social and private costs of reallocating labor from agriculture to other activities, labor supply behavior, labor market dualism, and unemployment determination. The chapter describes risk-mitigating and effort-eliciting contractual arrangements involving rural labor and the organization of the agricultural enterprise in an environment characterized by incomplete markets. The chapter discusses the issue of whether labor is efficiently allocated across sectors and across geographical areas and problems of barriers to mobility. Models of migration incorporating human capital investments, information and capital constraints, uncertainty with respect to employment, riskiness in annual incomes, temporary migration, remittances, and heterogeneity in preferences and abilities among workers are discussed. The chapter also discusses urban labor markets, and addresses issues concerning the duality of urban labor markets and unemployment determination. The chapter highlights issues of importance to the study of developing economiesin particular, life cycle and intergenerational labor market mobility.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643529'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 15 Labor markets in low-income countries']
### Abstract:
['Labor being by far the most abundant resource in low-income countries, the determination of the returns to labor plays a central role in models of development. The chapter discusses the operation of low-income labor markets with reference to the models that have been and continue to be influential in shaping the study of such markets. These models are evaluated in terms of their ability to shed light on the realities of the allocation, pricing, and employment of labor in low-income countries. The chapter discusses models directly concerned with and evidence on the employment and pricing of labor in the rural (agricultural) sector. The chapter also discusses the process of determining rural wages are and their rigidity, the social and private costs of reallocating labor from agriculture to other activities, labor supply behavior, labor market dualism, and unemployment determination. The chapter describes risk-mitigating and effort-eliciting contractual arrangements involving rural labor and the organization of the agricultural enterprise in an environment characterized by incomplete markets. The chapter discusses the issue of whether labor is efficiently allocated across sectors and across geographical areas and problems of barriers to mobility. Models of migration incorporating human capital investments, information and capital constraints, uncertainty with respect to employment, riskiness in annual incomes, temporary migration, remittances, and heterogeneity in preferences and abilities among workers are discussed. The chapter also discusses urban labor markets, and addresses issues concerning the duality of urban labor markets and unemployment determination. The chapter highlights issues of importance to the study of developing economiesin particular, life cycle and intergenerational labor market mobility.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643529']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643553.jsonld | ['Chapter 12 Economic approaches to population growth'] | ['This chapter presents a discussion on economic approaches to population growth. This chapter reviews the principal analytical approaches of the past several decades to the study of the relationship between population growth and economic development. Migration and urbanization are treated only insofar as necessary for a coherent treatment of population growth itself. The chapter describes demographic change in developing countries over the past three decades. It also reviews the macroeconomic literature on the consequences of high population growth rates in developing countries, covering both partial and general equilibrium approaches. Economists have proferred two rationales for a public policy to influence private fertility behavior .The first is externalitiesthat the social costs of children may exceed their private costs. The second rationale is the proposition that the market for contraceptive information, and possibly for certain contraceptive services, is poor, especially in developing countries. This second rationale is important in justifying family planning programs, irrespective of any consensus on the economic consequences of population growth.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643553'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 12 Economic approaches to population growth']
### Abstract:
['This chapter presents a discussion on economic approaches to population growth. This chapter reviews the principal analytical approaches of the past several decades to the study of the relationship between population growth and economic development. Migration and urbanization are treated only insofar as necessary for a coherent treatment of population growth itself. The chapter describes demographic change in developing countries over the past three decades. It also reviews the macroeconomic literature on the consequences of high population growth rates in developing countries, covering both partial and general equilibrium approaches. Economists have proferred two rationales for a public policy to influence private fertility behavior .The first is externalitiesthat the social costs of children may exceed their private costs. The second rationale is the proposition that the market for contraceptive information, and possibly for certain contraceptive services, is poor, especially in developing countries. This second rationale is important in justifying family planning programs, irrespective of any consensus on the economic consequences of population growth.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643553']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643596.jsonld | ['Chapter 8 The agricultural transformation'] | ['From both historical and contemporary cross-section perspectives, the agricultural transformation seems to evolve through at least four phases that are roughly definable. The process starts when agricultural productivity per worker rises. This increased productivity creates a surplus, which in the second phase can be tapped directly, through taxation and factor flows, or indirectly, through government intervention into the rural-urban terms of trade. This surplus can be utilized to develop the nonagricultural sector, and this phase has been the focus of most dual economy models of development. For resources to flow out of agriculture, rural factor, and product markets must become better integrated with those in the rest of the economy. The progressive integration of the agricultural sector into the macro economy, via improved infrastructure and market-equilibrium linkages, represents a third phase in agricultural development. When this phase is successful, the fourth phase is barely noticeable; the role of agriculture in industrialized economies is little different from the rote of the steel, housing, or insurance sectors. But when the integration is not successfully accomplishedand most countries have found it extremely difficult for political reasonsgovernments encounter serious problems of resource allocation and even problems beyond their borders because of pervasive attempts by high-income countries to protect their farmers from foreign competition.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643596'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 8 The agricultural transformation']
### Abstract:
['From both historical and contemporary cross-section perspectives, the agricultural transformation seems to evolve through at least four phases that are roughly definable. The process starts when agricultural productivity per worker rises. This increased productivity creates a surplus, which in the second phase can be tapped directly, through taxation and factor flows, or indirectly, through government intervention into the rural-urban terms of trade. This surplus can be utilized to develop the nonagricultural sector, and this phase has been the focus of most dual economy models of development. For resources to flow out of agriculture, rural factor, and product markets must become better integrated with those in the rest of the economy. The progressive integration of the agricultural sector into the macro economy, via improved infrastructure and market-equilibrium linkages, represents a third phase in agricultural development. When this phase is successful, the fourth phase is barely noticeable; the role of agriculture in industrialized economies is little different from the rote of the steel, housing, or insurance sectors. But when the integration is not successfully accomplishedand most countries have found it extremely difficult for political reasonsgovernments encounter serious problems of resource allocation and even problems beyond their borders because of pervasive attempts by high-income countries to protect their farmers from foreign competition.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643596']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A183164360X.jsonld | ['Chapter 7 Patterns of structural change'] | ['This chapter presents a discussion on the patterns of structural transformation during the transition from a low income, agrarian rural economy to an industrial urban economy with substantially higher per capita income. The chapter presents a review on the basic concepts of the empirical research program into the economic structure of developing countries during the transition process, which originated with the monumental work of Simon Kuznets. The chapter discusses methodological issues of empirical research on structural transformation. A summary of the main stylized facts of development, with emphasis on growth, accumulation, and sector proportions is presented. Attempts to model and explain the transformation are also presented. The chapter also discusses relative prices and the role of the state in facilitating, fostering, or at times hampering, an efficient transformation. Development economics can be characterized as dealing with issues of structure and growth in less developed countries. Analysis of structure appears in two variants. The first, and more recent, is concerned with the functioning of economies, their markets, institutions, mechanisms for allocating resources, income generation and its distribution, and so on. In the second variant, economic development is seen as an interrelated set of long-run processes of structural transformation that accompany growth. The central features of this approach are economy-wide phenomena such as industrialization, urbanization, and agricultural transformation, regarded as elements of what Kuznets identified as modern economic growth.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164360X'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 7 Patterns of structural change']
### Abstract:
['This chapter presents a discussion on the patterns of structural transformation during the transition from a low income, agrarian rural economy to an industrial urban economy with substantially higher per capita income. The chapter presents a review on the basic concepts of the empirical research program into the economic structure of developing countries during the transition process, which originated with the monumental work of Simon Kuznets. The chapter discusses methodological issues of empirical research on structural transformation. A summary of the main stylized facts of development, with emphasis on growth, accumulation, and sector proportions is presented. Attempts to model and explain the transformation are also presented. The chapter also discusses relative prices and the role of the state in facilitating, fostering, or at times hampering, an efficient transformation. Development economics can be characterized as dealing with issues of structure and growth in less developed countries. Analysis of structure appears in two variants. The first, and more recent, is concerned with the functioning of economies, their markets, institutions, mechanisms for allocating resources, income generation and its distribution, and so on. In the second variant, economic development is seen as an interrelated set of long-run processes of structural transformation that accompany growth. The central features of this approach are economy-wide phenomena such as industrialization, urbanization, and agricultural transformation, regarded as elements of what Kuznets identified as modern economic growth.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A183164360X']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643618.jsonld | ['Chapter 6 Long-run income distribution and growth'] | ["This chapter presents a discussion on the long-run income distribution and growth. Development economics began macro. If the whole economy changes structure during the course of development, then to understand the process one has to look at the economy as a whole. Increasing poverty and declining productive potential resulting from stabilization programs aimed at offsetting external shocks have been the rule for most developing countries in the 1980s. The long-run approach is presumably of interest because it tells something about how economies change in historical timein particular, over the century or two of what Kuznets (1966) calls modern economic growth. Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development is infrequently read nowadays, but it is the true origin of the field. Schumpeter's theory of development is interesting in itself, because it emphasizes technical and institutional change. Schumpeter begins with the kind of theory now considered long run, and in a leap discards it for more interesting processes that have been dropped from the orthodox canon. One key analytical question is how the entrepreneur obtains resources to innovate. The chapter also discusses demand-driven models; shades of Marx, the neoclassical resurgencetrade, structuralists versus monetarists, and so on. One function of neoclassical theory is to defuse radical economics by embellishment with optimizing agents and suppression of social content."] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643618'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 6 Long-run income distribution and growth']
### Abstract:
["This chapter presents a discussion on the long-run income distribution and growth. Development economics began macro. If the whole economy changes structure during the course of development, then to understand the process one has to look at the economy as a whole. Increasing poverty and declining productive potential resulting from stabilization programs aimed at offsetting external shocks have been the rule for most developing countries in the 1980s. The long-run approach is presumably of interest because it tells something about how economies change in historical timein particular, over the century or two of what Kuznets (1966) calls modern economic growth. Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development is infrequently read nowadays, but it is the true origin of the field. Schumpeter's theory of development is interesting in itself, because it emphasizes technical and institutional change. Schumpeter begins with the kind of theory now considered long run, and in a leap discards it for more interesting processes that have been dropped from the orthodox canon. One key analytical question is how the entrepreneur obtains resources to innovate. The chapter also discusses demand-driven models; shades of Marx, the neoclassical resurgencetrade, structuralists versus monetarists, and so on. One function of neoclassical theory is to defuse radical economics by embellishment with optimizing agents and suppression of social content."]
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643618']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643634.jsonld | ['Chapter 4 Analytics of development: Dualism'] | ['The concept of dualism discussed in this chapter is both more narrowly economic and dynamic. It focuses on the coexistence of two sectors that are asymmetricaland thus dualisticin terms of both product and organizational characteristics. The production asymmetry relevant here is that while traditional agriculture disposes over something approaching fixed inputs of land, very little capital, with large pre-existing inputs of labor, the modernizing manufacturing sector requires virtually no land, while capital can be accumulated and labor absorbed as needed. The concept of dualism discussed is intrinsically dynamic, because the interactions between the two sectors over time in the closed economy context and, ultimately, with each other and the rest of the world, in the open economy context is discussed. The chapter reviews in brief the place of dualism in economic history and in the history of economic thought. The chapter presents an examination of modern day dualism in the closed economy, focusing on the main elements of linkage between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors as well as on the normative problem of defining developmental success and non-success with the help of the concept of dualism in its dynamic version. The chapter also discusses open dualism, focusing on the triangular relationships between domestic agriculture, domestic non-agriculture, and the rest of the world, distinguishing between dualism in a colonial context from dualism in a developmental context.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643634'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 4 Analytics of development: Dualism']
### Abstract:
['The concept of dualism discussed in this chapter is both more narrowly economic and dynamic. It focuses on the coexistence of two sectors that are asymmetricaland thus dualisticin terms of both product and organizational characteristics. The production asymmetry relevant here is that while traditional agriculture disposes over something approaching fixed inputs of land, very little capital, with large pre-existing inputs of labor, the modernizing manufacturing sector requires virtually no land, while capital can be accumulated and labor absorbed as needed. The concept of dualism discussed is intrinsically dynamic, because the interactions between the two sectors over time in the closed economy context and, ultimately, with each other and the rest of the world, in the open economy context is discussed. The chapter reviews in brief the place of dualism in economic history and in the history of economic thought. The chapter presents an examination of modern day dualism in the closed economy, focusing on the main elements of linkage between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors as well as on the normative problem of defining developmental success and non-success with the help of the concept of dualism in its dynamic version. The chapter also discusses open dualism, focusing on the triangular relationships between domestic agriculture, domestic non-agriculture, and the rest of the world, distinguishing between dualism in a colonial context from dualism in a developmental context.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643634']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643642.jsonld | ['Chapter 3 Alternative approaches to development economics'] | ['This chapter presents a discussion on alternative approaches to development economics and focuses on the three major approaches that can be classified as neoclassical, Marxist, and structuralist-institutionalist. The chapter focuses on a few, highly selective, areas of enquiry with a brief, impressionistic, comparative assessment of some major contributions in each area. The chapter discusses five such distinct, but not entirely unrelated areas: (1) theory of the household; (2) institutions and resource allocation; (3) income distribution and growth; (4) trade and development; and (5) economic policy and the state. While these five involve some of the core issues of development economics and may represent a fair cross-section of some of the active disputes. Some of the neo-neoclassical models now fully recognize the crucial dependence of efficiency of resource allocation on asset ownership structures and property relations. Similarly, some of these non-Walrasian models have given up on market-clearing factor prices and explored the microeconomics of equilibria with involuntary unemployment and rationing. Similar bridge building between the alternative approaches has been attempted by rational-choice Marxists in tracing the micro foundations of class analysis in postulates of individual behavior and in general in using the techniques of game theory in understanding social interaction and historical change in situations of interest conflicts.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643642'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Chapter 3 Alternative approaches to development economics']
### Abstract:
['This chapter presents a discussion on alternative approaches to development economics and focuses on the three major approaches that can be classified as neoclassical, Marxist, and structuralist-institutionalist. The chapter focuses on a few, highly selective, areas of enquiry with a brief, impressionistic, comparative assessment of some major contributions in each area. The chapter discusses five such distinct, but not entirely unrelated areas: (1) theory of the household; (2) institutions and resource allocation; (3) income distribution and growth; (4) trade and development; and (5) economic policy and the state. While these five involve some of the core issues of development economics and may represent a fair cross-section of some of the active disputes. Some of the neo-neoclassical models now fully recognize the crucial dependence of efficiency of resource allocation on asset ownership structures and property relations. Similarly, some of these non-Walrasian models have given up on market-clearing factor prices and explored the microeconomics of equilibria with involuntary unemployment and rationing. Similar bridge building between the alternative approaches has been attempted by rational-choice Marxists in tracing the micro foundations of class analysis in postulates of individual behavior and in general in using the techniques of game theory in understanding social interaction and historical change in situations of interest conflicts.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643642']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
3A1831643693.jsonld | ['Introduction to the series'] | ['This chapter presents an introduction to the series Handbooks in Economic., The chapter discusses branches of economics, each of which is a definitive source, reference, and teaching supplement for use by professional researchers and advanced graduate students. Each Handbook provides self-contained surveys of the current state of a branch of economics in the form of chapters prepared by leading specialists on various aspects of this branch of economics. These surveys summarize the obtained results and newer developments from recent journal articles and discussion papers.'] | ['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643693'] | ['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie'] | Document
### Title: ['Introduction to the series']
### Abstract:
['This chapter presents an introduction to the series Handbooks in Economic., The chapter discusses branches of economics, each of which is a definitive source, reference, and teaching supplement for use by professional researchers and advanced graduate students. Each Handbook provides self-contained surveys of the current state of a branch of economics in the form of chapters prepared by leading specialists on various aspects of this branch of economics. These surveys summarize the obtained results and newer developments from recent journal articles and discussion papers.']
### GND ID:
['gnd:4066438-7', 'gnd:4213090-6', 'https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT%3A1831643693']
### GND class:
['Wirtschaftsentwicklung', 'Entwicklungsökonomie']
<|eot_id|> |
Subsets and Splits