Datasets:
carlosejimenez
/
wikitext__wikitext-2-raw-v1

Dataset card Data Studio Files Community
text
stringlengths
0
3.86k
= = = Overall = = =
When the World Rugby Rankings were introduced in October 2003 , Wales were ranked 8th . They rose to 7th in June 2004 , before falling back to 8th in November that year . Following a Grand Slam win in the 2005 Six Nations , they rose to a ranking position of 5th . They fell to 9th by June 2006 , and , after rising back to 8th by September , fell to 10th after the 2007 World Cup . A second Six Nations ' Grand Slam in 2008 propelled them to 6th in the rankings , but following losses to South Africa in the mid @-@ year and end @-@ of @-@ year internationals Wales slipped to 7th . Wales climbed to 4th after a win over Scotland in their first match of the 2009 Six Nations . They slumped to 9th in 2010 but rose back to 4th after their fourth place in the 2011 World Cup . Since then – notwithstanding a nine @-@ game slump in 2012 – 13 where they fell to 9th – Wales have ranked consistently in the top six teams . They reached their highest ranking of 2nd during the 2015 Rugby World Cup .
Wales have won 355 of their 690 Test matches for a 51 @.@ 45 % winning record . Their biggest Test defeat was 96 – 13 loss to South Africa in 1998 , and their largest victory a 98 – 0 defeat of Japan in 2004 . Their record for most tries in a match is 16 , scored against Portugal in 1994 – they also scored 102 points in this match , more than in any other Test . Wales ' record for consecutive Test wins is eleven , and for consecutive losses is ten .
Below is table summary of Wales Test matches up until 25 June 2016 .
= = Players = =
= = = Current squad = = =
On 10 May , Warren Gatland named a 35 @-@ man squad for their June 3 @-@ test series against New Zealand , pre @-@ tour test against England and the mid week match against the Chiefs .
On 29 May , after injury to Dan Lydiate in the England warm @-@ up match , Ellis Jenkins was called up to the squad to replace Lydiate .
On 7 June , Aaron Jarvis was called up to the squad as injury cover for Paul James . Jarvis later became a permanent replacement after James failed to recover form his injury .
On 11 June , Aled Davies joined the squad as an injury replacement for Lloyd Williams .
Following the first test , Keelan Giles and Rhys Patchell were called up to the squad as injury cover .
‡ – Denotes dual contracted players .
Caps and clubs updated 25 June 2016
= Anekantavada =
Anekāntavāda ( Sanskrit : अनेकान ् तवाद , " many @-@ sidedness " ) refers to the principles of pluralism and multiplicity of viewpoints , or vantage points , the notion that reality is perceived differently from diverse points of view , and that no single point of view is the complete truth , yet taken together they comprise the complete truth . It is one of the most important and fundamental doctrines of Jainism .
Jains contrast all attempts to proclaim the sole monopoly on truth with andhagajanyāyah , which can be illustrated through the parable of the " blind men and an elephant " . In this story , each blind man felt a different part of an elephant ( trunk , leg , ear , etc . ) . All the men claimed to understand and explain the true appearance of the elephant , but could only partly succeed , due to their limited perspectives . This principle is more formally stated by observing that objects are infinite in their qualities and modes of existence , so they cannot be completely grasped in all aspects and manifestations by finite human perception . ( This is the Absolute Truth . ) According to the Jains , only the Kevalis — omniscient beings — can comprehend objects in all aspects and manifestations ; others are only capable of partial knowledge . Consequently , no single , specific , human view can claim to represent absolute truth .
The origins of anekāntavāda can be traced back to the teachings of Mahāvīra ( 599 – 527 BCE ) , the 24th Jain Tīrthankara . The dialectical concepts of syādvāda " conditioned viewpoints " and nayavāda " partial viewpoints " arose from anekāntavāda , providing it with more detailed logical structure and expression . The Sanskrit compound an @-@ eka @-@ anta @-@ vāda literally means " doctrine of uncertainty " ( an- " not " , ekānta " certainty " or " single @-@ natured " , vāda ( " school of thought " or " thesis " ) ; it is roughly translated into English as " non @-@ absolutism " . An @-@ ekānta " uncertainty , non @-@ exclusivity " is the opposite of ekānta ( eka + anta ) " exclusiveness , absoluteness , necessity " ( or also " monotheistic doctrine " ) .
Anekāntavāda encourages its adherents to consider the views and beliefs of their rivals and opposing parties . Proponents of anekāntavāda apply this principle to religion and philosophy , reminding themselves that any religion or philosophy — even Jainism — which clings too dogmatically to its own tenets , is committing an error based on its limited point of view . The principle of anekāntavāda also influenced Mahatma Gandhi to adopt principles of religious tolerance , ahiṃsā and satyagraha .
= = Philosophical overview = =
The etymological root of anekāntavāda lies in the compound of two Sanskrit words : anekānta ( " manifoldness " ) and vāda ( " school of thought " ) . The word anekānta is a compound of the Sanskrit negative prefix an , eka ( " one " ) , and anta ( " attribute " ) . Hence , anekānta means " not of solitary attribute " .
The Jain doctrine lays a strong emphasis on samyaktva , that is , rationality and logic . According to Jains , the ultimate principle should always be logical and no principle can be devoid of logic or reason . Thus , the Jain texts contain deliberative exhortations on every subject , whether they are constructive or obstructive , inferential or analytical , enlightening or destructive .
= = = Jain doctrines of relativity = = =
Anekāntavāda is one of the three Jain doctrines of relativity used for logic and reasoning . The other two are :
syādvāda — the theory of conditioned predication and ;
nayavāda — the theory of partial standpoints .
These Jain philosophical concepts made important contributions to ancient Indian philosophy , especially in the areas of skepticism and relativity .
= = = = Syādvāda = = = =
Syādvāda ( Sanskrit : स ् याद ् वाद ) is the theory of conditioned predication , which provides an expression to anekānta by recommending that every phrase or statement be expressed in the optative mood ( the equivalent of the subjunctive mood in Latin and other Indo @-@ European languages ) , i.e. generally by prefacing each sentence with the verb syāt , the third person singular optative of the Sanskrit verb as , " to be " . ( In Sanskrit , syāt becomes syān when followed by an " n " , and syād when followed by a non @-@ nasal voiced consonant or vowel . ) According to Jain texts , a thing or object of knowledge has infinite characters ( i.e. , it is anekāntātmaka ) ; each character can be analysed and grasped individually . Each individual character is called a naya . Jains asserts that a naya reveals only a part of the totality , and should not be mistaken for the whole . A synthesis of different viewpoints is said to be achieved by the doctrine of conditional predications ( syādvāda ) wherein every viewpoint is able to retain its relative importance . Highlighting the indispensability of syādvāda , Acharya Samantabhadra asserts :
Affirmation , when not in conflict with negation , yields the desired result of describing truly an object of knowledge . Only when affirmation and negation are juxtaposed in mutually non @-@ conflicting situation , one is able to decide whether to accept or reject the assertion . This is how the doctrine of conditional predications ( syādvāda ) establishes the truth . ”
Syādvāda is not only an extension of anekānta ontology , but a separate system of logic capable of standing on its own . As reality is complex , no single proposition can express the nature of reality fully . Thus " syāt " should be prefixed before each proposition giving it a conditional point of view and thus removing any dogmatism in the statement . Since it ensures that each statement is expressed from seven different conditional and relative viewpoints or propositions , syādvāda is known as saptibhaṅgīnāya or " the theory of seven conditioned predications " . These saptibhaṅgī are :
syād @-@ asti — in some ways , it is ,
syān @-@ nāsti — in some ways , it is not ,
syād @-@ asti @-@ nāsti — in some ways , it is , and it is not ,
syād @-@ asti @-@ avaktavyaḥ — in some ways , it is , and it is indescribable ,
syān @-@ nāsti @-@ avaktavyaḥ — in some ways , it is not , and it is indescribable ,
syād @-@ asti @-@ nāsti @-@ avaktavyaḥ — in some ways , it is , it is not , and it is indescribable ,
syād @-@ avaktavyaḥ — in some ways , it is indescribable .
Each of these seven propositions examines the complex and multifaceted nature of reality from a relative point of view of time , space , substance and mode . To ignore the complexity of reality is to commit the fallacy of dogmatism .
The phrase ‘ in a way ’ ( syāt ) declares the standpoint of expression – affirmation with regard to own substance ( dravya ) , place ( kṣetra ) , time ( kāla ) , and being ( bhāva ) , and negation with regard to other substance ( dravya ) , place ( kṣetra ) , time ( kāla ) , and being ( bhāva ) . Thus , for a ‘ jar ’ , in regard to substance ( dravya ) – earthen , it simply is ; wooden , it simply is not . In regard to place ( kṣetra ) – room , it simply is ; terrace , it simply is not . In regard to time ( kāla ) – summer , it simply is ; winter , it simply is not . In regard to being ( bhāva ) – brown , it simply is ; white , it simply is not . And the word ‘ simply ’ has been inserted for the purpose of excluding a sense not approved by the ‘ nuance ’ ; for avoidance of a meaning not intended . The phrase ‘ in a way ’ is used to declare that the ‘ jar ’ exists in regard to its own substance etc. and not also in regard to other substance etc .
According to the Jains , Syādvāda and kevalajñāna ( omniscience ) are the foundational facts of knowledge . In this regard , Āchārya Samantabhadra writes :
Syādvāda , the doctrine of conditional predications , and kevalajñāna ( omniscience ) , are both illuminators of the substances of reality . The difference between the two is that while kevalajñāna illumines directly , syādvāda illumines indirectly . Anything which is not illuminated or expressed by the two is not a substance of reality and hence a non @-@ substance ( avastu ) .
= = = = Nayavāda = = = =
Nayavāda is the theory of partial standpoints or viewpoints . Nayavāda is a compound of two Sanskrit words — naya ( " reason " or " method " ) and vāda ( " school of thought or thesis " ) . It is used to arrive at a certain inference from a point of view . An object has infinite aspects to it , but when we describe an object in practice , we speak of only relevant aspects and ignore irrelevant ones . This does not deny the other attributes , qualities , modes and other aspects ; they are just irrelevant from a particular perspective . Authors like Natubhai Shah explain nayavāda with the example of a car ; for instance , when we talk of a " blue BMW " we are simply considering the color and make of the car . However , our statement does not imply that the car is devoid of other attributes like engine type , cylinders , speed , price and the like . This particular viewpoint is called a naya or a partial viewpoint . As a type of critical philosophy , nayavāda holds that all philosophical disputes arise out of confusion of standpoints , and the standpoints we adopt are , although we may not realise it , " the outcome of purposes that we may pursue " . While operating within the limits of language and seeing the complex nature of reality , Mahāvīra used the language of nayas . Naya , being a partial expression of truth , enables us to comprehend reality part by part .
= = = Syncretisation of changing and unchanging reality = = =
The age of Mahāvīra and Buddha was one of intense intellectual debates , especially on the nature of reality and self . Upanishadic thought postulated the absolute unchanging reality of Brahman and Ātman and claimed that change was mere illusion . The theory advanced by Buddhists denied the reality of permanence of conditioned phenomena , asserting only interdependence and impermanence . According to the vedāntin ( Upanishadic ) conceptual scheme , the Buddhists were wrong in denying permanence and absolutism , and within the Buddhist conceptual scheme , the vedāntins were wrong in denying the reality of impermanence . The two positions were contradictory and mutually exclusive from each other 's point of view . The Jains managed a synthesis of the two uncompromising positions with anekāntavāda . From the perspective of a higher , inclusive level made possible by the ontology and epistemology of anekāntavāda and syādvāda , Jains do not see such claims as contradictory or mutually exclusive ; instead , they are seen as ekantika or only partially true . The Jain breadth of vision embraces the perspectives of both Vedānta which , according to Jainism , " recognises substances but not process " , and Buddhism , which " recognises process but not substance " . Jainism , on the other hand , pays equal attention to both substance ( dravya ) and process ( paryaya ) .
This philosophical syncretisation of paradox of change through anekānta has been acknowledged by modern scholars such as Arvind Sharma , who wrote :
Our experience of the world presents a profound paradox which we can ignore existentially , but not philosophically . This paradox is the paradox of change . Something – A changes and therefore it cannot be permanent . On the other hand , if A is not permanent , then what changes ? In this debate between the " permanence " and " change " , Hinduism seems more inclined to grasp the first horn of the dilemma and Buddhism the second . It is Jainism that has the philosophical courage to grasp both horns fearlessly and simultaneously , and the philosophical skill not to be gored by either .
However , anekāntavāda is not simply about syncretisation or compromise between competing ideas , as it is cooperatively about finding the hidden elements of shared truth between such ideas ( such as naturalism — relative to pantheism and sanctuary — although its basis in simplicity may be described with the scientific principle of Occam 's razor — whereas science is likewise paradoxical in nature — relative to nonviolence ) . Anekāntavāda is not about denying the truth ; rather truth is acknowledged as an ultimate spiritual goal . For ordinary humans , it is an elusive goal , but they are still obliged to work towards its attainment . Anekāntavāda also does not mean compromising or diluting ones own values and principles . On the contrary , it allows us to understand and be tolerant of conflicting and opposing views , while respectfully maintaining the validity of ones own view @-@ point . Hence , John Koller calls anekāntavāda as – " epistemological respect for view of others " . Anekāntavāda , thus , did not prevent the Jain thinkers from defending the truth and validity of their own doctrine while simultaneously respecting and understanding the rival doctrines . Anne Vallely notes that the epistemological respect for other viewpoints was put to practice when she was invited by Ācārya Tulsi , the head of the Terāpanthī order , to teach sadhvis the tenets of Christianity . Commenting on their adherence to ahiṃsā and anekāntavāda , she says :
The Jain samaṇīs of Ladnun uncompromisingly maintain ahiṃsā to be an eternal and unchangeable moral law . Other views and beliefs that contradict this belief would certainly be challenged , and ultimately rejected . But what is significant , is that both the rejection and retention of views is tempered by the belief that our perception conveys only a partial reality , that reality itself is manifold , and that to assume one particular viewpoint is final , is to hold a limited picture of reality .
Anekāntavāda is also different from moral relativism . It does not mean conceding that all arguments and all views are equal , but rather logic and evidence determine which views are true , in what respect and to what extent ( as truth in relativism , itself ) . While employing anekāntavāda , the 17th century philosopher monk , Yaśovijaya Gaṇi also cautions against anābhigrahika ( indiscriminate attachment to all views as being true ) , which is effectively a kind of misconceived relativism . Jains thus consider anekāntavāda as a positive concept corresponding to religious pluralism that transcends monism and dualism , implying a sophisticated conception of a complex reality . It does not merely involve rejection of partisanship , but reflects a positive spirit of reconciliation of opposite views . However , it is argued that pluralism often degenerates to some form of moral relativism or religious exclusivism . According to Anne Vallely , anekānta is a way out of this epistemological quagmire , as it makes a genuinely pluralistic view possible without lapsing into extreme moral relativism or exclusivity .
= = = Parable of the blind men and elephant = = =
The ancient Jain texts often explain the concepts of anekāntvāda and syādvāda with the parable of the blind men and an elephant ( Andhgajanyāyah ) , which addresses the manifold nature of truth .
A group of blind men heard that a strange animal , called an elephant , had been brought to the town , but none of them were aware of its shape and form . Out of curiosity , they said : " We must inspect and know it by touch , of which we are capable " . So , they sought it out , and when they found it they groped about it . In the case of the first person , whose hand landed on the trunk , said " This being is like a drain pipe " . For another one whose hand reached its ear , it seemed like a kind of fan . As for another person , whose hand was upon its leg , said , " I perceive the shape of the elephant to be like a pillar " . And in the case of the one who placed his hand upon its back said , " Indeed , this elephant is like a throne " . Now , each of these presented a true aspect when he related what he had gained from experiencing the elephant . None of them had strayed from the true description of the elephant . Yet they fell short of fathoming the true appearance of the elephant .
Two of the many references to this parable are found in Tattvarthaslokavatika of Vidyanandi ( 9th century ) and Syādvādamanjari of Ācārya Mallisena ( 13th century ) . Mallisena uses the parable to argue that immature people deny various aspects of truth ; deluded by the aspects they do understand , they deny the aspects they don 't understand . " Due to extreme delusion produced on account of a partial viewpoint , the immature deny one aspect and try to establish another . This is the maxim of the blind ( men ) and the elephant . " Mallisena also cites the parable when noting the importance of considering all viewpoints in obtaining a full picture of reality . " It is impossible to properly understand an entity consisting of infinite properties without the method of modal description consisting of all viewpoints , since it will otherwise lead to a situation of seizing mere sprouts ( i.e. , a superficial , inadequate cognition ) , on the maxim of the blind ( men ) and the elephant . "
= = History and development = =
The principle of anekāntavāda is the foundation of many Jain philosophical concepts . The development of anekāntavāda also encouraged the development of the dialectics of syādvāda ( conditioned viewpoints ) , saptibhaṅgī ( the seven conditioned predication ) , and nayavāda ( partial viewpoints ) .
= = = Origins = = =
The origins of anekāntavāda lie in the teachings of Mahāvīra , who used it effectively to show the relativity of truth and reality . Taking a relativistic viewpoint , Mahāvīra is said to have explained the nature of the soul as both permanent , from the point of view of underlying substance , and temporary , from the point of view of its modes and modification . The importance and antiquity of anekāntavāda are also demonstrated by the fact that it formed the subject matter of Astinasti Pravāda , the fourth part of the lost Purva that contained teachings of the Tīrthaṇkaras prior to Mahāvīra . German Indologist Hermann Jacobi believes Mahāvīra effectively employed the dialectics of anekāntavāda to refute the agnosticism of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta . Sutrakritanga , the second oldest canon of Jainism , contains the first references to syādvāda and saptibhaṅgī . According to Sūtrakritanga , Mahāvīra advised his disciples to use syādvāda to preach his teachings :
A monk living single should not ridicule heretical doctrines , and should avoid hard words though they be true ; he should not be vain , nor brag , but he should without embarrassment and passion preach the Law . A monk should be modest , though he be of a fearless mind ; he should expound the syādvāda , he should use the two permitted kinds of speech , living among virtuous men , impartial and wise .
= = = Early history = = =
The early Jain canons and teachings contained multitudes of references to anekāntavāda and syādvāda in rudimentary form without giving it proper structure or establishing it as a separate doctrine . Śvētāmbara text , Sutrakritanga contains references to Vibhagyavāda , which , according to Hermann Jacobi , is the same as syādvāda and saptibhaṅgī . Bhagvatisūtra mentions only three primary predications of the saptibhaṅgīnaya . After Mahāvīra , Kundakunda ( 1st century CE ) was the first author – saint to expound on the doctrine of syādvāda and saptibhaṅgī and give it a proper structure in his famous works Pravacanasāra and Pancastikayasāra . Kundakunda also used nayas to discuss the essence of the self in Samayasāra . Proper classification of the nayas was provided by the philosopher monk , Umāsvāti ( 2nd century CE ) in Tattvārthasūtra . Samantabhadra ( 2nd century CE ) and Siddhasena Divākara ( 3rd century CE ) further fine @-@ tuned Jain epistemology and logic by expounding on the concepts of anekāntavāda in proper form and structure .
Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara expounded on the nature of truth in the court of King Vikramāditya :
Vikramāditya : What is ' truth ' ? That which is said repeatedly , that which is said loudly , that which is said with authority or that which is agreed by the majority ?
Divākara : None of the above . Every one has his own definition of ' truth ' and that it is conditional .
Vikramāditya : How about traditions ? They have been established by our ancestors and have passed the test of time ?
Divākara : Would the system established by ancestors hold true on examination ? In case it does not , I am not here to justify it for the sake of saving the traditional grace of the dead , irrespective of the wrath I may have to face .
In Sanmatitarka , Divākara further adds : " All doctrines are right in their own respective spheres — but if they encroach upon the province of other doctrines and try to refute their view , they are wrong . A man who holds the view of the cumulative character of truth never says that a particular view is right or that a particular view is wrong . "
= = = Age of logic = = =
The period beginning with the start of common era , up to the modern period is often referred to as the age of logic in the history of Jain philosophy . By the time of Akalanka ( 5th century CE ) , whose works are a landmark in Jain logic , anekāntavāda was firmly entrenched in Jain texts , as is evident from the various teachings of the Jain scriptures .
Ācārya Haribhadra ( 8th century CE ) was one of the leading proponents of anekāntavāda . He was the first classical author to write a doxography , a compendium of a variety of intellectual views . This attempted to contextualise Jain thoughts within the broad framework , rather than espouse narrow partisan views . It interacted with the many possible intellectual orientations available to Indian thinkers around the 8th century .
Ācārya Amrtacandra starts his famous 10th century CE work Purusathasiddhiupaya with strong praise for anekāntavāda : " I bow down to the principle of anekānta , the source and foundation of the highest scriptures , the dispeller of wrong one @-@ sided notions , that which takes into account all aspects of truth , reconciling diverse and even contradictory traits of all objects or entity . "
Ācārya Vidyānandi ( 11th century CE ) provides the analogy of the ocean to explain the nature of truth in Tattvarthaslokavārtikka , 116 : " Water from the ocean contained in a pot can neither be called an ocean nor a non @-@ ocean , but simply a part of ocean . Similarly , a doctrine , though arising from absolute truth can neither be called a whole truth nor a non @-@ truth . "