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On the 7th , the division 's 2nd Brigade inserted its three battalions unopposed . After ten days ( and only one significant firefight ) the American troops returned to South Vietnam , leaving the area to the ARVN . Historian Shelby Stanton has noted that " there was a noted lack of aggressiveness " in the combat assault and that the division seemed to be " suffering from almost total combat paralysis . " During Operation Binh Tay II , the ARVN 22nd Division moved against Base Area 702 from 14 – 26 May . The second phase of the operation was carried out by ARVN forces against Base Area 701 between 20 May and 27 June when elements of the ARVN 22nd Division conducted operations against Base Area 740 .
On 10 May , Bravo Company , 3rd Battalion , 506th Regiment , 101st Airborne Division , was ambushed by a much larger North Vietnamese force in the Se San Valley . Eight U.S. soldiers were killed and 28 wounded . Among the killed was Spc . Leslie Sabo , Jr . ( posthumously promoted to sergeant ) , who was recommended for the Medal of Honor , but the paperwork went missing until 1999 . Sabo was awarded the Medal of Honor on 16 May 2012 by President Barack Obama .
In the III Corps Tactical Zone , Operation Toan Thang 44 ( Operation Bold Lancer ) , was conducted by the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division between 6 May and 30 June . The targets of the operation were Base Areas 353 , 354 , and 707 located north and northeast of Tay Ninh , South Vietnam . Once again , a hunt for COSVN units was conducted , this time around the Cambodian town of Memot and , once again , the search was futile . During its operations , the 25th Infantry killed 1 @,@ 017 PAVN and NLF troops while losing 119 of its own men killed .
Simultaneous with the launching of Toan Thang 44 , the two battalions of the 3rd Brigade , U.S. 9th Infantry Division , crossed the border 48 kilometers southwest of the Fishhook into an area known as the Dog 's Face from 7 through 12 May . The only significant contact with PAVN forces took place near the hamlet of Chantrea , where 51 North Vietnamese were killed and another 21 were captured . During the operation , the brigade lost eight men killed and 22 wounded . It was already too late for thousands of ethnic Vietnamese murdered by Cambodian persecution , but there were tens of thousands of Vietnamese still within the country who could now be evacuated to safety . South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu arranged with Lon Nol to repatriate as many as were willing to leave . The new relationship did not , however , prevent the Cambodian government from stripping the Vietnamese of their homes and other personal property before they left .
Thieu then authorized Operation Cuu Long , in which ARVN ground forces , including mechanized and armoured units , drove west and northwest up the eastern side of the Mekong River from 9 May – 1 July . A combined force of 110 Vietnamese Navy and 30 U.S. vessels proceeded up the Mekong to Prey Veng , permitting IV Corps ground forces to move westward to Phnom Penh and to aid ethnic Vietnamese seeking flight to South Vietnam . Those who did not wish to be repatriated were then forcibly expelled . Surprisingly , North Vietnamese forces did not oppose the evacuation , though they could easily have done so .
Other operations conducted from IV Corps included Operation Cuu Long II ( 16 – 24 May ) , which continued actions along the western side of the Mekong . Lon Nol had requested that the ARVN help in the retaking of Kompong Speu , a town along Route 4 southwest of Phnom Penh and 90 miles ( 140 km ) inside Cambodia . A 4 @,@ 000 @-@ man ARVN armoured task force linked up with Cambodian ground troops and then retook the town . Operation Cuu Long III ( 24 May – 30 June ) was an evolution of the previous operations after U.S. forces had left Cambodia .
After rescuing the Vietnamese from the Cambodians , ARVN was tasked with saving the Cambodians from the North Vietnamese . The goal was to relieve the city of Kompong Cham , 70 kilometers northwest of the capital and the site of the headquarters of Cambodia 's Military Region I. On 23 May , General Tri led a column of 10 @,@ 000 ARVN troops along Route 7 to the 180 @-@ acre ( 0 @.@ 73 km2 ) Chup rubber plantation , where PAVN resistance was expected to be heavy . Surprisingly , no battle ensued and the siege of Kompong Cham was lifted at a cost of 98 PAVN troops killed .
= = = Air support and logistics = = =
Aerial operations for the incursion got off to a slow start . Reconnaissance flights over the operational area were restricted since MACV believed that they might serve as a signal of intention . The role of the Air Force in the planning for the incursion itself was minimal at best , in part to preserve the secrecy of Menu which was then considered an overture to the thrust across the border .
On 17 April , General Abrams requested that the president approve Operation Patio , covert tactical airstrikes in support of Studies and Observations Group recon elements " across the fence " in Cambodia . This authorization was given , allowing U.S. aircraft to penetrate 13 miles ( 21 km ) into northeastern Cambodia . This boundary was extended to 29 miles ( 47 km ) along the entire frontier on 25 April . Patio was terminated on 18 May after 156 sorties had been flown . The last Menu mission was flown on 26 May .
During the incursion itself , U.S. and ARVN ground units were supported by 9 @,@ 878 aerial sorties ( 6 @,@ 012 U.S. / 2 @,@ 966 Vietnamese Air Force ) , an average of 210 per day . During operations in the Fishhook , for example , the USAF flew 3 @,@ 047 sorties and the South Vietnamese Air Force 332 . These tactical airstrikes were supplemented by 653 B @-@ 52 missions in the border regions ( 71 supporting Binh Tay operations , 559 for Toan Thang operations , and 23 for Cuu Long ) . 30 May saw the inauguration of Operation Freedom Deal ( named as of 6 June ) , a continuous U.S. aerial interdiction campaign conducted in Cambodia . These missions were limited to a depth of 48 @-@ kilometers between the South Vietnamese border and the Mekong River .
Within two months , however , the limit of the operational area was extended past the Mekong , and U.S. tactical aircraft were soon directly supporting Cambodian forces in the field . These missions were officially denied by the U.S. and false coordinates were given in official reports to hide their existence . Defense Department records indicated that out of more than 8 @,@ 000 combat sorties flown in Cambodia between July 1970 and February 1971 , approximately 40 percent were flown outside the authorized Freedom Deal boundary .
The real struggle for the U.S. and ARVN forces in Cambodia was the effort at keeping their units supplied . Once again , the need for security before the operations and the rapidity with which units were transferred to the border regions precluded detailed planning and preparation . This situation was exacerbated by the poor road network in the border regions and the possibility of ambush for nighttime road convoys demanded that deliveries only take place during daylight . Aerial resupply , therefore , became the chief method of logistical replenishment for the forward units . Military engineers and aviators were kept in constant motion throughout the incursion zone .
Due to the rapid pace of operations , deployment , and redeployment , coordination of artillery units and their fires became a worrisome quandary during the operations . This was made even more problematic by the confusion generated by the lack of adequate communications systems between the rapidly advancing units . The joint nature of the operation added another level of complexity to the already overstretched communications network . Regardless , due to the ability of U.S. logisticians to innovate and improvise , supplies of food , water , ammunition , and spare parts arrived at their destinations without any shortages hampering combat operations and the communications system , although complicated , functioned well enough during the short duration of U.S. operations .
= = Aftermath = =
The North Vietnamese response to the incursion was to avoid contact with allied forces and , if possible , to fall back westward and regroup . PAVN forces were well aware of the planned attack and many COSVN / B @-@ 3 Front military units were already far to the north and west conducting operations against the Cambodians when the offensive began . During 1969 PAVN logistical units had already begun the largest expansion of the Ho Chi Minh trail conducted during the entire conflict . As a response to the loss of their Cambodian supply route , North Vietnamese forces seized the Laotian towns of Attopeu and Saravane during the year , pushing what had been a 60 @-@ mile ( 97 km ) corridor to a width of 90 miles ( 140 km ) and opening the entire length of the Kong River system into Cambodia . A new logistical command , the 470th Transportation Group , was created to handle logistics in Cambodia and the new " Liberation Route " ran through Siem Prang and reached the Mekong at Stung Treng .
As foreseen by Secretary Laird , fallout from the incursion was quick in coming on the campuses of America 's universities , as protests erupted against what was perceived as an expansion of the conflict into yet another country . On 4 May the unrest escalated to violence when Ohio National Guardsmen shot and killed four unarmed students ( two of whom were not protesters ) during the Kent State shootings . Two days later , at the University at Buffalo , police wounded four more demonstrators . On 8 May 100 @,@ 000 protesters gathered in Washington and another 150 @,@ 000 in San Francisco on only ten days notice . Nationwide , 30 ROTC buildings went up in flames or were bombed while 26 schools witnessed violent clashes between students and police . National Guard units were mobilized on 21 campuses in 16 states . The student strike spread nationwide , involving more than four million students and 450 universities , colleges and high schools in mostly peaceful protests and walkouts .
Simultaneously , public opinion polls during the second week of May showed that 50 percent of the American public approved of President Nixon 's actions . Fifty @-@ eight percent blamed the students for what had occurred at Kent State . On both sides , emotions ran high . In one instance , in New York City on 8 May , pro @-@ administration construction workers rioted and attacked demonstrating students . Such violence , however , was an aberration . Most demonstrations , both pro- and anti @-@ war , were peaceful . On 20 May 100 @,@ 000 construction workers , tradesmen , and office workers marched peacefully through New York City in support of the president 's policies .
Reaction in the U.S. Congress to the incursion was also swift . Senators Frank F. Church ( Democratic Party , Idaho ) and John S. Cooper ( Republican Party , Kentucky ) , proposed an amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act that would have cut off funding not only for U.S. ground operations and advisors in Cambodia , but would also have ended U.S. air support for Cambodian forces . On 30 June the United States Senate passed the act with the amendment included . The bill was defeated in the House of Representatives after U.S. forces were withdrawn from Cambodia as scheduled . The newly amended act did , however , rescind the Southeast Asia Resolution ( better known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution ) under which Presidents Johnson and Nixon had conducted military operations for seven years without a declaration of war .
The Cooper – Church Amendment was resurrected during the winter and incorporated into the Supplementary Foreign Assistance Act of 1970 . This time the measure made it through both houses of Congress and became law on 22 December . As a result , all U.S. ground troops and advisors were barred from participating in military actions in Laos or Cambodia , while the air war being conducted in both countries by the U.S. Air Force was ignored .
= = Conclusion = =
President Nixon proclaimed the incursion to be " the most successful military operation of the entire war . " General Abrams was of like mind , believing that time had been bought for the pacification of the South Vietnamese countryside and that U.S. and ARVN forces had been made safe from any attack out of Cambodia during 1971 and 1972 . A " decent interval " had been obtained for the final American withdrawal . ARVN General Tran Dinh Tho was more skeptical : " despite its spectacular results ... it must be recognized that the Cambodian incursion proved , in the long run , to pose little more than a temporary disruption of North Vietnam 's march toward domination of all of Laos , Cambodia , and South Vietnam . "
John Shaw and other historians , military and civilian , have based the conclusions of their work on the incursion on the premise that the North Vietnamese logistical system in Cambodia had been so badly damaged that it was rendered ineffective . The next large @-@ scale North Vietnamese offensive , the Nguyen Hue Offensive of 1972 ( called the Easter Offensive in the West ) would be launched out of southern North Vietnam and western Laos , not from Cambodia , was cited as proof positive that the Cambodian operations had succeeded . The fact that PAVN forces were otherwise occupied in Cambodia and had no such offensive plan ( so far as is known ) was seemingly irrelevant . The fact that logistically , a northern offensive ( especially a conventional one backed by armour and heavy artillery ) would be launched closer to its source of manpower and supply also seemed to be of little consequence .
The logistical haul discovered , removed , or destroyed in eastern Cambodia during the operations was indeed prodigious : 20 @,@ 000 individual and 2 @,@ 500 crew @-@ served weapons ; 7 @,@ 000 to 8 @,@ 000 tons of rice ; 1 @,@ 800 tons of ammunition ( including 143 @,@ 000 mortar shells , rockets , and recoilless rifle rounds ) ; 29 tons of communications equipment ; 431 vehicles ; and 55 tons of medical supplies . MACV intelligence estimated that PAVN / NLF forces in southern Vietnam required 1 @,@ 222 tons of all supplies each month to keep up a normal pace of operations . Due to the loss of its Cambodian supply system and continued aerial interdiction in Laos , MACV estimated that for every 2 @.@ 5 tons of materiel sent south down the Ho Chi Minh trail , only one ton reached its destination . However , the true loss rate was probably only around ten percent . General Abrams claimed 11 @,@ 000 enemy soldiers killed and 2 @,@ 500 captured , but his figures were disputed by CIA , who insisted that civilians death were figured into Abrams 's total
South Vietnamese forces had performed well during the incursion but their leadership was uneven . General Tri proved a resourceful and inspiring commander , earning the sobriquet the " Patton of the Parrot 's Beak " from the American media . General Abrams also praised the skill of General Nguyen Viet Thanh , commander of IV Corps and planner of the Parrot 's Beak operation . Unfortunately for the anti @-@ communists , both officers were killed in helicopter crashes — Thanh on 2 May in Cambodia and Tri in February 1971 . Other ARVN commanders , however , had not performed well . Even at this late date in the conflict , the appointment of ARVN general officers was prompted by political loyalty rather than professional competence . As a test of Vietnamization , the incursion was praised by American generals and politicians alike , but the Vietnamese had not really performed alone . The participation of U.S. ground and air forces had precluded any such claim . When called on to conduct solo offensive operations during the incursion into Laos ( Operation Lam Son 719 ) in 1971 , the ARVN 's continued weaknesses would become all too apparent .
The Cambodian government was not informed of the incursion until it was already under way . It has been argued by some scholars that the incursion heated up the civil war and helped the insurgent Khmer Rouge gather recruits to their cause .
= = = = Unpublished government documents = = = =
Military Assistance Command , Vietnam , Command History 1967 , Annex F. Saigon , 1968 .
= = = = Published government documents = = = =
Gilster , Herman L. The Air War in Southeast Asia : Case Studies of Selected Campaigns . Maxwell Air Force Base AL : Air University Press , 1993 .
Nalty , Bernard C. Air War Over South Vietnam : 1968 – 1975 . Washington DC : Air Force History and Museums Program , 2000 .
Nalty , Bernard C. War Against Trucks : Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos , 1968 – 1972 . Washington DC : Air Force History and Museums Program , 2005 .
A War Too Long : The USAF in Southeast Asia , 1961 @-@ 1975
Foreign Relations Series
VIETNAM , JULY 1970 – JANUARY 1972
VIETNAM , JANUARY 1969 – JULY 1970
= = = = Secondary accounts = = = =
Chandler , David P. The Tragedy of Cambodian History . New Haven CT : Yale University Press , 1991 .
Deac , Wilfred , Road to the Killing Fields : The Cambodian Civil War of 1970 – 1975 . College Station TX : Texas A & M University , 1997 .
Fulghum , David , Terrence Maitland , et al . South Vietnam on Trial : Mid @-@ 1970 – 1972 . Boston ; Boston Publishing Company , 1984 .
Gitlin , Todd , The Sixties : Years of Hope , Days of Rage . New York : Bantam Books , 1987 .
Karnow , Stanley , Vietnam : A History . New York : Viking Books , 1983 .
Kennedy , Denis , Tracks in the Jungle in The Army at War . Boston : Boston Publishing Company , 1987 .
Lipsman , Samuel , Edward Doyle , et al . Fighting for Time : 1969 – 1970 . Boston : Boston Publishing Company , 1983 .
Morocco , John , Operation Menu in War in the Shadows . Boston : Boston Publishing Company , 1988 .
Morocco , John , Rain of Fire : Air War , 1969 – 1973 Boston : Boston Publishing Company , 1985 .
Nolan , Keith W. Into Cambodia : Spring Campaign , Summer Offensive , 1970 . Novato CA : Presidio Press , 1990 .
Palmer , Dave Richard ( 1978 ) . Summons of the Trumpet : The History of the Vietnam War from a Military Man 's Viewpoint . New York : Ballantine .
Prados , John , The Blood Road : The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War . New York : John Wiley and Sons , 1998 .
Shaw , John M. The Cambodian Campaign : The 1970 Offensive and America 's Vietnam War . Lawrence KS : University of Kansas Press , 2005 .
Shawcross , William , Sideshow : Kissinger , Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia . New York : Washington Square Books , 1979 .
Sorley , Lewis ( 1999 ) . A Better War : The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America 's Last Years in Vietnam . New York : Harvest Books . ISBN 0 @-@ 15 @-@ 601309 @-@ 6 .
Stanton , Shelby L. ( 1985 ) . The Rise and Fall of an American Army : U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam , 1965 – 1973 . New York : Dell . ISBN 0 @-@ 89141 @-@ 232 @-@ 8 .
Tảng , Truong Như ; David Chanoff , Van Toai Doan ( 1985 ) . A Vietcong memoir ( 1985 ed . ) . Harcourt Brace Jovanovich . ISBN 978 @-@ 0 @-@ 15 @-@ 193636 @-@ 6 . - Total pages : 350
= = = = TIME coverage = = = =
" Upsetting the Balance " . Time . 23 March 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Danger and Opportunity in Indochina " . Time . 30 March 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" The Royal Jugglers of Southeast Asia " . Time . 30 March 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Mounting Uneasiness in Southeast Asia " . Time . 6 April 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" The Nixon Doctrine 's Test in Indochina " . Time . 13 April 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" The Three @-@ Theater War " . Time . 13 April 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Indochina 's Crumbling Frontiers " . Time . 20 April 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" A New Horror in Indochina " . Time . 27 April 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Cambodia : Communists on the Rampage " . Time . 4 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Between the Lines " . Time . 4 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" The New Burdens of War " . Time . 11 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" At War with War " . Time . 18 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" In Search of an Elusive Foe " . Time . 18 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Ten Days — or Ten Years " . Time . 18 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Congress v. the President " . Time . 25 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Cambodia : Now It 's ' Operation Buy Time ' " . Time . 25 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Exodus on the Mekong " . Time . 25 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Nixon 's Campaign for Confidence " . Time . 25 May 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Cambodia : Toward War by Proxy " . Time . 1 June 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" The Senate : Unloving Acts " . Time . 1 June 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" The Widening Cracks in Nixon 's Cabinet " . Time . 1 June 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Cambodia : A Cocky New ARVN " . Time . 8 June 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Indochina : More and More Fighters " . Time . 15 June 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" No Confidence on Cambodia " . Time . 22 June 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Indochina : The Rising Tide of War " . Time . 22 June 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" New Dangers in Cambodia " . Time . 29 June 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" The Cambodian Venture : An Assessment " . Time . 6 July 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Cambodia : Struggle for Survival " . Time . 13 July 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Winding Up the Cambodian Hard Sell " . Time . 13 July 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" Gloom in the Land of Smiles " . Time . 27 July 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .
" The Discreet US Presence " . Time . 3 August 1970 . Retrieved 10 April 2007 .